{ "id": 1155928, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALLEN TERRELL ANTHONY", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Anthony", "decision_date": "2000-05-05", "docket_number": "No. 342PA99", "first_page": "611", "last_page": "619", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 N.C. 611" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "516 S.E.2d 195", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "133 N.C. App. 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11220679 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/133/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617151 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 565", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 S.E. 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656138 ], "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/119/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Woolard, 119 N.C. 779, 780, 25 S.E. 719, 719 (1896)" }, { "page": "763" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547754 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Woolard, 119 N.C. 779, 780, 25 S.E. 719, 719 (1896)" }, { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561054 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529763 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573306 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "637" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 S.E.2d 206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" }, { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561811 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4758398 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8690159 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1877, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/76/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 S.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798953 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "294" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659938 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "209 S.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563921 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572408 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "230 S.E.2d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558442 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0442-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 830, "char_count": 20083, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.964666276895393e-07, "percentile": 0.90441160855324 }, "sha256": "63b735c582a8c2d3a5a280396cf3ed037758c0a63e1207f5955f0aeb6584ce33", "simhash": "1:2afdd516b47a41fc", "word_count": 3401 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:38:07.529951+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Orr joins in the dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALLEN TERRELL ANTHONY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "FRYE, Chief Justice.\nThe sole issue in this case is the construction of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b), which provides:\nA defendant is guilty of a Class C felony if the defendant engages in vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with another person who is 13, 14, or 15 years old and the defendant is more than four but less than six years older than the person, except when the defendant is lawfully married to the person.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b) (1999). The question raised by defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review is whether the statute permits a defense of consent. We conclude that it does not.\nThe relevant facts are not in dispute and need not be elaborated in great detail. Defendant, aged twenty, spent the evening of 6 January 1997 with the victim, aged fourteen, and two other teenagers. At approximately 11:00 p.m., defendant began driving his three companions home. Defendant first dropped off the other teenagers. At some time between 11:15 and 11:45 p.m., while defendant and the victim were alone in the car, defendant drove the car off the main road and engaged in sexual intercourse with the victim in the front seat. Defendant then drove the victim home.\nThe victim\u2019s mother took her to the Davie County Hospital emergency room, where she was examined in the early morning hours of 7 January 1997. The victim told hospital personnel that she had been raped. The examining physician noted that the victim\u2019s condition was consistent with sexual intercourse. When law enforcement officers arrived at the hospital, the victim told them that defendant had forced himself on her.\nLater that morning, defendant was arrested on a warrant charging him with second-degree rape. Defendant gave a statement to law enforcement officers in which he admitted having sex with the victim but contended that it was consensual.\nOn 27 May 1997, defendant was indicted on a charge of violating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b), specifically that he\nunlawfully, willfully and feloniously did engage in vaginal intercourse with [the victim], a person of 14 years of age. At the time of the offense, the defendant was more than four but less than six years older than the victim, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State.\nDefendant was tried before a jury at the 2 March 1998 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Davie County. At the close of all the evidence, the prosecutor requested that the trial court give an additional instruction that \u201cconsent is not a defense to the charge of statutory rape.\u201d The trial court agreed and, after instructing the jury as to the elements of the charged offense, instructed the jury as follows:\nI also instruct you that the forbidden conduct under this statutory rape charge is the act of intercourse itself. Any force used in the act or apparent lack of consent of the child or not are not essential elements. This is so because this statutory rape law was designed to protect children.\nThe jury returned a verdict of guilty \u201cof statutory rape of a victim who was 14 years old at the time of the offense and the defendant was more than four but less than six years older.\u201d The trial court sentenced defendant to a minimum of fifty-eight months\u2019 and a maximum of seventy-nine months\u2019 imprisonment. The Court of Appeals found no error in defendant\u2019s trial.\nThe single issue presented to this Court by defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review is whether consent is a defense to a charged violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b) and, thus, whether the trial court\u2019s instruction constituted plain error. Section 14-27.7A was enacted in 1995 and, prior to the instant case, had not been interpreted by our appellate courts. In this respect, therefore, this case presents an issue of first impression. However, to the extent that the legislature has historically defined statutory rape and statutory sex offenses and the Court has conducted ample review and interpretation of those statutes, the decision announced today does not depart from the established jurisprudence of the state.\nWe begin by examining the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b). \u201cIn matters of statutory construction, our primary task is to ensure that the purpose of the legislature, the legislative intent, is accomplished. Legislative purpose is first ascertained from the plain words of the statute.\u201d Electric Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991) (citation omitted). In this case, the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous as to the conduct prohibited. The statute prohibits vaginal intercourse or sexual acts with a person thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years old by a defendant who is \u201cmore than four but less than six years older.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b).\nWhile the crime is unambiguously defined, however, whether consent is or is not a defense to the crime is not expressly addressed by the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b). Defendant contends that, because the legislature could have specifically prohibited consent as a defense to a charge under this section and did not, the legislature must have intended consent to be a defense. However, the legislature did specifically identify marriage as a defense in both subsections (a) and (b) of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A. While not dispositive, under the doctrine inclusio unius est exclusio alterius (\u201cThe inclusion of one is the exclusion of another.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 763 (6th ed. 1990)), the designation of this single defense is an implicit rejection of all others.\nIn addition to the language of a statute, we also look to \u201cthe spirit of the act[] and what the act seeks to accomplish\u201d when discerning legislative intent. Taylor v. Taylor, 343 N.C. 50, 56, 468 S.E.2d 33, 37 (1996). In this case, an analysis of the development of North Carolina\u2019s law shows that the new statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A, embodies the spirit and purpose of earlier statutes dealing with the same general subject.\nAs early as 1837, North Carolina had codified the crime of rape as follows:\nAny person, who shall ravish and carnally know any female, of the age of ten years or more, by force or against her will, or who shall unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any female child under the age of ten years, shall be adjudged guilty of felony, and shall suffer death ....\n1837 Rev. Code ch. 34, \u00a7 5 (emphasis added). In describing the origin of our state\u2019s \u201cstatutory rape\u201d law, the Court in State v. Johnston, 76 N.C. 209 (1877), noted:\nRape is the carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and against her will. This definition leaves out the elements of age altogether. And it seems to be left in some obscurity how and why that element came to be considered. Probably it was in this way; there were instances where children below the age of discretion were enticed to yield, without a full knowledge of the nature of the act and of the consequences; and therefore, it became necessary to fix an age under which it should be presumed, not that the act could not be consummated, but that consent could not be given. And so it came to be provided, that the consummation of the act upon a female under ten years of age, with or without her consent, shall be the same as if consummated upon a female over ten years of age without her consent or against her will.\nId. at 210 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The legislature later raised to twelve the age under which it was presumed that consent could not be given. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-21 (Supp. 1977) (repealed 1979). The present-day successor to this line of statutes is N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l), which provides:\n(a) A person is guilty of rape in the first degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse:\n(1) With a victim who is a child under the age of 13 years and the defendant is at least 12 years old and is at least four years older than the victim[.]\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l) (1999); see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.4(a)(l) (1999) (first-degree sexual offense).\nThis Court has consistently recognized that consent of the victim is not a defense under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l) or its predecessor statutes. See, e.g., State v. Rose, 312 N.C. 441, 445, 323 S.E.2d 339, 342 (1984); State v. Temple, 269 N.C. 57, 68, 152 S.E.2d 206, 214 (1967); Johnston, 76 N.C. at 210. Where the age of the victim is an essential element of the crime of rape, as in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l) and its predecessor statute N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-21, the result is a strict liability offense. As we said in State v. Temple, \u201cConsent is no defense, and this is true by virtue of the language of the statute.\u201d 269 N.C. at 68, 152 S.E.2d at 214 (reviewing a prosecution under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-21, where the defendant was charged with feloniously and carnally knowing and abusing a female child under the age of twelve years).\nThe purpose of the statutory rape law is to protect children under a certain age from sexual acts. See State v. Weaver, 306 N.C. 629, 295 S.E.2d 375 (1982), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 61, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993). In Weaver, we said:\n[The] lack of an assault requirement under the statutory rape law, G.S. 14-27.2(a)(l), is understandable given the purpose of the statute. Unlike the provision of the first-degree rape statute that applies if the victim is an adult, the forbidden conduct under the statutory rape provision is the act of intercourse itself, any force used in the act, any injury inflicted in the course of the act, or the apparent lack of consent of the child are not essential elements. This is so because the statutory rape law, G.S. 14-27.2(a)(1), was designed to protect children under twelve from sexual acts.\nWeaver, 306 N.C. at 637, 295 S.E.2d at 380 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (explaining an earlier version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l)).\nDefendant contends that because the legislature created N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A as a separate statute, rather than amending N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l), it intended the two statutes to be construed differently and that prior case law interpreting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l) should not be used to construe N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b). We disagree. We conclude that the purpose of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A, by its plain language and when viewed in the context of the historical development of this area of the law, is to protect children aged thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen years old from sexual acts. It would undermine this purpose to allow a defendant to claim that the thirteen-, fourteen-, or fifteen-year-old victim consented to the very acts that the statute is designed to prevent. This Court will avoid a construction that works to \u201c \u2018defeat or impair the object of the statute ... if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language.\u2019 \u201d Electric Supply Co., 328 N.C. at 656, 403 S.E.2d at 294 (quoting State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 80, 213 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1975)).\nWe also note that the legislature identified the defendant\u2019s age, or more specifically the difference in age between the defendant and the victim, as an essential element of the crime at issue here. This is consistent with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l), which requires that the defendant be \u201cat least 12 years old and ... at least four years older than the victim.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l); see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.4(a)(l) (first-degree sexual offense). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A is a logical extension of the existing statutory rape and statutory sexual offense laws in this respect, particularly when the statute is read as a whole. Subsection (a) prohibits vaginal intercourse or sexual acts with a person who is thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years old by a defendant who is at least six years older than the victim and punishes this offense as a Class B1 felony. The same conduct is forbidden by subsection (b) where the defendant is more than four but less than six years older than the victim but is punishable as a Class C felony. The structure of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A is consistent with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2(a)(l) in reflecting a legitimate legislative decision that sexual intercourse or sexual acts with children deserve more severe punishment if the victim is younger or based on a greater difference in age between the victim and the older defendant. The fact that the legislature did not choose to amend an existing statute does not mean that it intended to depart from well-established precedent and allow consent as a defense to a charge of violating the new statutory rape statute.\nFinally, we may consider the title of an Act as a \u201c \u2018legislative declaration of the tenor and object of the Act.\u2019 \u201d State ex rel. Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 90, 423 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1992) (quoting State v. Woolard, 119 N.C. 779, 780, 25 S.E. 719, 719 (1896)). The statute at issue here was passed under the title \u201cAn Act to Create Offenses of Statutory Rape and Statutory Sexual Offense Against Victims Who Are Thirteen, Fourteen, or Fifteen Years Old.\u201d Act of 19 June, 1995, ch. 281, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 565, 565-66. The term \u201cstatutory rape\u201d has a particularized meaning as an offense committed against a victim legally incapable of giving consent to sexual intercourse because of age or other incapacity. See, e.g., State v. Browder, 252 N.C. 35, 38, 112 S.E.2d 728, 730 (1960). \u201c[W]e presume that the legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law and its construction by the courts.\u201d State ex rel. Cobey, 333 N.C. at 90, 423 S.E.2d at 763. Therefore, by using the term \u201cstatutory rape\u201d in the title of this Act, we presume that the legislature intended to impart that term\u2019s well-understood meaning to the offenses defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A.\nWe note that defendant makes numerous public policy arguments why thirteen-, fourteen-, and fifteen-year-old persons should be considered capable of giving meaningful consent to sexual acts. However, these arguments are more properly directed to the legislature. The sole issue before this Court is one of statutory construction, and for the foregoing reasons, we hold that consent is not a defense to a charge of violating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b). Accordingly, the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury was a correct statement of the law, and we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nAFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "FRYE, Chief Justice." }, { "text": "Justice Wainwright\ndissenting.\nI respectfully dissent. This is a case of statutory construction. I agree with the majority that the statute at issue in the instant case is clear and unambiguous; however, because there is no clear mandate from the legislature, I do not agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that the statute does not include a consent defense. \u201c[W]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous there is no room for judicial construction and the court must give the statute its plain and definite meaning without superimposing provisions or limitations not contained within the statute.\u201d State v. Williams, 291 N.C. 442, 446, 230 S.E.2d 515, 517 (1976); accord State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 361, 259 S.E.2d 752, 757 (1979); State v. Camp, 286 N.C. 148, 152, 209 S.E.2d 754, 756 (1974).\nIn other statutes within chapter 14, article 7A, the legislature included consent language: (1) section 14-27.2, the first-degree rape statute, refers to vaginal intercourse with a child under the age of thirteen years or with another person by force and against the will of that person, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.2 (1999); (2) section 14-27.3, the second-degree rape statute, refers to vaginal intercourse with another person by force and against the will of that person or with someone who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated or physically helpless, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.3 (1999); (3) section 14-27.4, the first-degree sexual offense statute, refers to engaging in a sexual act with a child under the age of thirteen years or with another person by force and against the will of that person, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.4 (1999); (4) section 14-27.5, the second-degree sexual offense statute, refers to engaging in a sexual act with a person by force and against the will of that person or with someone who is mentally defective, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.5 (1999); and (5) section 14-27.7, titled \u201cIntercourse and sexual offenses with certain victims; consent no defense,\u201d explicitly states \u201c[c]onsent is not a defense to a charge under this section,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7 (1999).\nIn contrast, the statute at issue, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A, refers to vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with a person who is thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years old. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A (1999). In the other statutes in this article, the legislature included the phrase \u201cby force and against the will of the other person\u201d or \u201c[cjonsent is not a defense\u201d to specify its intention. Therefore, it is clear the legislature knew how to indicate consent was not a defense if that was its intention.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A is neither unclear nor ambiguous as to whether consent is a defense. It is silent. We have previously stated that this Court, \u201ceven if persuaded by the State\u2019s concerns, may not substitute its judgment for that of the General Assembly.\u201d State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 37, 497 S.E.2d 276, 280 (1998). While the majority focuses on the specific inclusion of a marriage defense and the \u201cspirit\u201d of the Act to protect children, I cannot overlook the legislature\u2019s clear distinction between the use of the phrase \u201cby force and against the will of the other person\u201d or the inclusion of the specific language that \u201c[c]onsent is not a defense\u201d in the other statutes of the same article. Without a clear mandate that consent is not a defense, the majority is substituting its judgment for the legislature\u2019s and creating a limitation which is not in the statute.\nJustice Orr joins in the dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice Wainwright" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Elizabeth L. Oxley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Bobbi Jo Markert, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ALLEN TERRELL ANTHONY\nNo. 342PA99\n(Filed 5 May 2000)\nRape\u2014 statutory \u2014 consent not a defense\nStatutory construction of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.7A(b) reveals that consent is not a defense to a charge of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act with a person who is thirteen, fourteen, or fifteen years old by a defendant who is more than four but less than six years older than the victim because: (1) the designation of marriage in this statute as the single defense is an implicit rejection of all other defenses under the doctrine of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius; (2) the purpose of the statute, when viewed in the context of the historical development of this area of law, is to protect children aged thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen years old from sexual acts; (3) the legislature identified the difference in age between the defendant and the victim as an essential element of the crime, reflecting a legitimate legislative decision that sexual intercourse or sexual acts with children deserve more severe punishment if the victim is younger or based on a greater difference in age between the victim and the older defendant; (4) the fact the legislature did not chose to amend an existing statute does not mean that it intended to depart from well-established precedent and allow consent as a defense to a charge of violating the new statutory rape statute; and (5) the use of the term \u201cstatutory rape\u201d in the title of the legislative act presumes the legislature intended to impart that term\u2019s well-understood meaning of an offense committed against a victim legally incapable of giving consent to sexual intercourse because of age or other incapacity.\nJustice Wainwright dissenting.\nJustice Orr joins in the dissenting opinion.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 133 N.C. App. 573, 516 S.E.2d 195 (1999), finding no error in a judgment entered 25 March 1998 by Martin (Lester R, Jr.), J., in Superior Court, Davie County. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 February 2000.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Elizabeth L. Oxley, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Bobbi Jo Markert, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0611-01", "first_page_order": 661, "last_page_order": 669 }