{ "id": 1155898, "name": "CARL L. PERKINS, Employee v. ARKANSAS TRUCKING SERVICES, INC., Employer; SELF-INSURED (GUARDIAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY)", "name_abbreviation": "Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Services, Inc.", "decision_date": "2000-05-05", "docket_number": "No. 422PA99", "first_page": "634", "last_page": "639", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "351 N.C. 634" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11145629 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137", "parenthetical": "\"The primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209", "parenthetical": "\"The primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 S.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "7 N.C. 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Sess. Laws 528", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 522", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2543042, 2543749, 2538439, 2540975, 2539765 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0576-02", "/nc/328/0576-04", "/nc/328/0576-03", "/nc/328/0576-05", "/nc/328/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 N.C. App. 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527300 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/101/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11145629 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0490-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 564, "char_count": 11961, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.0164784111889643e-07, "percentile": 0.9064617280775829 }, "sha256": "319d9d92822d7d02213193e173731fa1b6a37e31ab69a99ced25b2261d953590", "simhash": "1:4d9df9cf5f22c757", "word_count": 1851 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:38:07.529951+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CARL L. PERKINS, Employee v. ARKANSAS TRUCKING SERVICES, INC., Employer; SELF-INSURED (GUARDIAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Justice.\nOn 8 March 1994 plaintiff Carl L. Perkins was injured in the course and scope of his employment with Arkansas Trucking Services, Inc. (Arkansas Trucking). The accident occurred while plaintiff was operating a tractor-trailer in Florence, South Carolina. Thereafter, Arkansas Trucking commenced payment of workers\u2019 compensation benefits under Arkansas law. See generally Ark. Code Ann. ch. 9 (1996 & Supp. 1999). On 4 October 1994 plaintiff filed a Form 18 notice of accident with his employer and the North Carolina Industrial Commission (Commission or full Commission). Plaintiff also filed a Form 33 request for hearing to determine whether the Commission had jurisdiction over his workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nOn 8 May 1996, after a hearing limited to the jurisdictional question, the deputy commissioner entered an interlocutory opinion and order concluding that plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment was within North Carolina and, therefore, that the Commission had jurisdiction over his claim under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36.\nOn 30 October 1996 the deputy commissioner held a second hearing to determine the amount of plaintiff\u2019s award. On 30 April 1997 the deputy commissioner filed an opinion and award in which he concluded that plaintiff was totally disabled and was, therefore, entitled to compensation at a rate of $417.75 per week from the date of the accident. Defendants Arkansas Trucking and Guardian National Insurance Company appealed.\nOn 9 June 1998 the full Commission affirmed and adopted, with minor modifications, the deputy commissioner\u2019s 8 May 1996 interlocutory opinion and order and 30 April 1997 opinion and award. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the opinion and award of the full Commission. Perkins v. Arkansas Trucking Servs., Inc., 134 N.C. App. 490, 518 S.E.2d 36 (1999). On 4 November 1999 we allowed defendants\u2019 petition for discretionary review.\nPrior to 1991 the Commission exercised jurisdiction over work-related accidents occurring outside of North Carolina only if the contract of employment was made in this State or if the employer\u2019s principal place of business was in this State. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36 (1985) (amended 1991); Thomas v. Overland Express, Inc., 101 N.C. App. 90, 96, 398 S.E.2d 921, 925 (1990), disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 576, 403 S.E.2d 522 (1991). In 1991, however, the General Assembly ratified \u201cAn Act to Assure that the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act Extends to Injuries Outside the State for Employees Whose Principal Place of Employment is in North Carolina.\u201d Ch. 284, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 528.\nThe statute, as amended, provides in pertinent part:\nWhere an accident happens while the employee is employed elsewhere than in this State and the accident is one which would entitle him or his dependents or next of kin to compensation if it had happened in this State, then the employee or his dependents or next of kin shall be entitled to compensation (i) if the contract of employment was made in this State, (ii) if the employer\u2019s principal place of business is in this State, or (Hi) if the employee\u2019s principal place of employment is within this State ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36 (1999) (emphasis added).\nThe Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission\u2019s determination that plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment was within North Carolina and, therefore, upheld the Commission\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over plaintiff\u2019s claim under section 97-36(iii). Perkins, 134 N.C. App. at 493, 518 S.E.2d at 38.\nDefendants first contend the Court of Appeals applied an erroneous standard of review to the Commission\u2019s jurisdictional determination under section 97-36(iii). We agree.\nAs a general rule, the Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-86 (1999); Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998); Gallimore v. Marilyn\u2019s Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 402, 233 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1977). It is well settled, however, that the Commission\u2019s findings of jurisdictional fact are not conclusive on appeal, even if supported by competent evidence. See Lucas v. Li\u2019l Gen. Stores, 289 N.C. 212, 218, 221 S.E.2d 257, 261 (1976); Askew v. Leonard Tire Co., 264 N.C. 168, 174, 141 S.E.2d 280, 284 (1965); Aycock v. Cooper, 202 N.C. 500, 505, 163 S.E. 569, 571 (1932). \u201cThe reviewing court has the right, and the duty, to make its own independent findings of such jurisdictional facts from its consideration of all the evidence in the record.\u201d Lucas, 289 N.C. at 218, 221 S.E.2d at 261.\nIn the present case the Court of Appeals characterized the question for review as \u201cwhether there [was] any competent evidence supporting the Commission\u2019s finding that plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment [was] within North Carolina.\u201d Perkins, 134 N.C. App. at 492, 518 S.E.2d at 37. When, as here, the appellate court reviews findings of jurisdictional fact entered by the Commission, our decision in Lucas requires the reviewing court \u201cto make its own independent findings of . . . jurisdictional fact[] from its consideration of all the evidence in the record.\u201d Lucas, 289 N.C. at 218, 221 S.E.2d at 261. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the \u201cany competent evidence\u201d standard of review to the jurisdictional question raised by the present case.\nDefendants next contend the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Commission\u2019s determination that plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment was within North Carolina. We disagree.\nAt the outset, we note that section 97-36 does not define \u201cprincipal place of employment.\u201d \u201cNothing else appearing, the Legislature is presumed to have used the words of a statute to convey their natural and ordinary meaning.\u201d In re McLean Trucking Co., 281 N.C. 242, 252, 188 S.E.2d 452, 458 (1972). In the absence of a contextual definition, courts may look to dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of words within a statute. See Black v. Littlejohn, 312 N.C. 626, 638, 325 S.E.2d 469, 478 (1985); State v. Martin, 7 N.C. App. 532, 533, 173 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1970). \u201cPrincipal\u201d has been defined as \u201cmost important, consequential, or influential.\u201d Merriam Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 926 (10th ed. 1993). Therefore, we consider all the evidence of record to determine whether North Carolina was plaintiff\u2019s \u201cprincipal\u201d place of employment as \u201cprincipal\u201d is used in its natural and ordinary meaning.\nIn the instant case, plaintiff was assigned to operate a tractor-trailer in Arkansas Trucking\u2019s southeastern territory, an area consisting of twelve to thirteen southern states, including North Carolina. Arkansas Trucking employs more than three, but less than ten, truck drivers in North Carolina. Because Arkansas Trucking does not maintain a terminal in this State, plaintiff was dispatched from his residence in Dudley, North Carolina, by a dispatcher in the employer\u2019s Doraville, Georgia, terminal. Plaintiff\u2019s first pick-ups and last deliveries, including stops in Durham, Charlotte, Kinston, Raleigh, and Roseboro, were scheduled as close to his residence in Dudley as possible to prevent plaintiff from driving with an empty truck. Approximately eighteen to twenty percent of plaintiff\u2019s stops were in North Carolina. When he was off the road, plaintiff kept his employer\u2019s vehicle at his residence in Dudley. Finally, plaintiff received his paychecks at his residence in Dudley.\nAfter careful review of the evidence of record, we hold that North Carolina constituted plaintiff\u2019s principal place of employment under section 97-36(iii). Not surprisingly, as a truck driver, plaintiff did not perform the majority of his job duties in any one state. The record reflects, however, that no state, standing alone, had the same degree of significant contacts to plaintiff\u2019s employment as North Carolina. We believe our construction of section 97-36, as amended, best promotes the legislative intent behind addition of subsection (iii). See Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990) (\u201cThe primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.\u201d). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the Commission had jurisdiction over the instant workers\u2019 compensation claim.\nWe likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the \u201cPolicies, Procedures and Agreement\u201d form signed by plaintiff upon being hired is an invalid attempt to limit plaintiff\u2019s rights to those enumerated under Arkansas workers\u2019 compensation law. This agreement conflicts with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36 and specifically violates N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-6, which invalidates agreements that operate to relieve an employer of any obligation under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nAccordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed as modified.\nMODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Jonathan S. Williams, P.C., by Jonathan S. Williams, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Teague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, by Dayle A. Flammia and Tracey L. Jones, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CARL L. PERKINS, Employee v. ARKANSAS TRUCKING SERVICES, INC., Employer; SELF-INSURED (GUARDIAN NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY)\nNo. 422PA99\n(Filed 5 May 2000)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 jurisdiction \u2014 standard of review \u2014 independent findings\nThe Court of Appeals erred by applying the \u201cany competent evidence\u201d standard in its review of the Industrial Commission\u2019s jurisdictional determination under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36(iii) for a workers\u2019 compensation case because the proper standard for a reviewing court on a jurisdictional issue is to make its own independent findings from its consideration of all the evidence in the record.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 jurisdiction \u2014 principal place of employment\nThe Court of Appeals did not err in concluding the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction over this workers\u2019 compensation case because plaintiff-truck driver\u2019s principal place of employment was within North Carolina under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36(iii) since no other state, standing alone, had the same degree of significant contacts to plaintiff\u2019s employment, as evidenced by the facts that: (1) plaintiff was assigned to operate a tractor-trailer in Arkansas Trucking\u2019s southeastern territory, an area consisting of twelve to thirteen southern states including North Carolina; (2) Arkansas Trucking employs more than three but less than ten truck drivers in North Carolina; (3) plaintiff was dispatched from his residence in North Carolina by a dispatcher in the employer\u2019s Georgia terminal since Arkansas Trucking does not maintain a terminal in North Carolina; (4) plaintiffs first pick-ups and last deliveries were scheduled as close to his residence in North Carolina as possible to prevent plaintiff from driving with an empty truck; (5) approximately eighteen to twenty percent of plaintiff\u2019s stops were in North Carolina; (6) plaintiff kept his employer\u2019s vehicle at his residence in North Carolina when he was off the road; and (7) plaintiff received his paychecks at his residence in North Carolina.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 employment form \u2014 invalid attempt to limit workers\u2019 compensation rights\nThe Court of Appeals did not err in its determination that the \u201cPolicies, Procedures, and Agreement\u201d form signed by plaintiff-truck driver upon being hired by Arkansas Trucking was an invalid attempt by the employer to limit plaintiff\u2019s rights to Arkansas workers\u2019 compensation law because the agreement conflicts with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-36 and specifically violates \u00a7 97-6, which invalidates agreements that operate to relieve an employer of any obligation under the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 134 N.C. App. 490, 518 S.E.2d 36 (1999), affirming an opinion and award entered by the North Carolina Industrial Commission on 9 June 1998. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 February 2000.\nJonathan S. Williams, P.C., by Jonathan S. Williams, for plaintiff-appellee.\nTeague Campbell Dennis & Gorham, by Dayle A. Flammia and Tracey L. Jones, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0634-01", "first_page_order": 684, "last_page_order": 689 }