No. 47A99
(Filed 3 December 1999)
Evidence— malicious prosecution — employer’s Medicaid over-billing — malice
The decision of the Court of Appeals in this case is reversed for the reason stated in the dissenting opinion that evidence of defendant employer’s over-billing practices for Medicaid was relevant in a malicious prosecution action to show malice.
Justice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 131 N.C. App. 744, 509 S.E.2d 219 (1998), affirming in part and reversing in part a judgment signed 23 May 1997 by McHugh, J., in Superior Court, Guilford County, and remanding for a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 November 1999.
Tuggle Duggins & Meschan, P.A., by Robert C. Cone and J. Reed Johnston, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.
Smith Helms Mulliss & Moore, L.L.P., by J. Donald Cowan, Jr.; James G. Exum, Jr.; and Paul K. Sun, Jr., for defendantappellees.
As to the issue regarding the admission of Robert Nowell’s testimony, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed for the reasons stated in Chief Judge Eagles’ dissent.
REVERSED.
Justice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.