{ "id": 685070, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL EARL SEXTON", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sexton", "decision_date": "2000-07-13", "docket_number": "No. 499A91-4", "first_page": "336", "last_page": "342", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "352 N.C. 336" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "163 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 N.C. App. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8554818 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/2/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659938 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155576 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132056 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0824-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132182 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 L. Ed. 2d 840", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "514 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132119 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "406" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1006", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1330529, 1332356, 1330884, 1335114, 1332012, 1330701, 1332079, 1330544, 1333073, 1335603, 1332603, 1334483, 1332790, 1332535, 1332666, 1335835 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1006-07", "/us/513/1006-08", "/us/513/1006-05", "/us/513/1006-06", "/us/513/1006-01", "/us/513/1006-15", "/us/513/1006-02", "/us/513/1006-10", "/us/513/1006-11", "/us/513/1006-13", "/us/513/1006-16", "/us/513/1006-14", "/us/513/1006-12", "/us/513/1006-09", "/us/513/1006-03", "/us/513/1006-04" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537586 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0321-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 559, "char_count": 14772, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.201689542414931e-08, "percentile": 0.3258722805846982 }, "sha256": "cc65dc35ecf04ad5dc0ad1ccf2ccef2f5881acfa964b0fbd0dc9c045bb832140", "simhash": "1:ae47b166574ab0f7", "word_count": 2356 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:59:29.406982+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL EARL SEXTON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Justice.\nThe facts and procedural history relevant to this action are as follows. Defendant, Michael Earl Sexton, was tried capitally at the 9 September 1991 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Wake County, on charges of first-degree murder, first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, first-degree kidnapping, and common law robbery. The jury found defendant guilty of all charges. After a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death for the first-degree murder conviction. The trial court subsequently entered consecutive sentences of life imprisonment for the rape conviction, life imprisonment for the sexual offense conviction, forty years\u2019 imprisonment for the kidnapping conviction, and ten years\u2019 imprisonment for the robbery conviction. On appeal, this Court found no error, and the United States Supreme Court subsequently denied defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari. State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 444 S.E.2d 879, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1006, 130 L. Ed. 2d 429 (1994).\nIn an order filed on 1 April 1996, the trial court stated the procedural history as follows:\n6. On 15 September 1995, defendant filed a Motion for Appropriate Relief and Evidentiary Hearing, a Motion to Submit Physical Evidence for DNA Testing and a Motion to Appoint Psychological Expert.\n8. On 2 October 1995, the State filed a Motion to Declare Attorney/CIient Privilege Waived and to Provide Access to Defendant\u2019s Case Files, and a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.\n9. On 21 December 1995, [the trial court heard] defendant\u2019s Motion to Submit Physical Evidence for DNA Testing, and his Motion to Appoint Psychological Expert, and . . . the State\u2019s Motion to Declare Attorney/CIient Privilege Waived and its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. That same day in open court, [the trial court] denied defendant\u2019s Motions and allowed the State\u2019s Motions.\n10. On 9 January 1996, defendant filed an Amended Motion for Appropriate Relief and Evidentiary Hearing.\n11. On 22 February 1996, [the trial court] entered a written Order denying defendant\u2019s Motion to Submit Physical Evidence for DNA Testing and his Motion to Appoint Psychological Expert, and allowed the State\u2019s Motion to Declare Attorney/CIient Privilege Waived and its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.\n13. On 6 March 1996, the State filed its Answer to Defendant\u2019s Motion for Appropriate Relief and Evidentiary Hearing.\n14. On 11 April 1996, the State filed a Motion for Partial Denial of Defendant\u2019s MAR on the Pleadings ....\nThe trial court, after making findings of fact, made the following conclusions of law:\n1. Claims IIB, IIC, HE and V (5) of defendant\u2019s Amended Motion for Appropriate Relief and Evidentiary Hearing are DENIED.\n2. The State\u2019s Motion for Partial Denial of defendant\u2019s MAR on the Pleadings is ALLOWED.\n3. Claims HA, IID, HID and IV (4) only of defendant\u2019s Amended Motion for Appropriate Relief and Evidentiary Hearing remain for resolution at an evidentiary hearing.\n4. Defendant is barred from raising any issue in any subsequent Motion for Appropriate Relief that he was in a position to raise in the present Amended Motion for Appropriate Relief but failed to do so.\nDefendant petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari on 16 May 1996 seeking review of the denied claims. This Court denied that petition on 12 June 1996. On 15 October 1996, the trial court resolved the remaining claims against defendant.\nThis matter arises out of defendant\u2019s motion for postconviction discovery filed in Superior Court, Wake County, on 8 December 1998, seeking prosecutorial and law enforcement investigative files. On 30 August 1999, the trial court entered an order finding, inter alia, that on the date of the enactment of N.C.G.S \u00a7 15A-1415(f), 21 June 1996, a portion of defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief was still pending. Thus, the trial court concluded that, in accordance with State v. Green, 350 N.C. 400, 514 S.E.2d 724, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 144 L. Ed. 2d 840 (1999), and State v. Basden, 350 N.C. 579, 515 S.E.2d 220 (1999), defendant was entitled to postconviction discovery. On 1 September 1999, the State filed a motion for reconsideration of defendant\u2019s entitlement to postconviction discovery in light of State v. Keel, 350 N.C. 824, \u2014 S.E.2d \u2014 (1999), to which defendant responded on 10 September 1999. The trial court denied the State\u2019s motion on 14 September 1999, concluding that its previous ruling was correct under the mandate of Green and Basden and that it had \u201cno authority to rule otherwise.\u201d Following the entry of the trial court\u2019s order allowing discovery, defendant notified the State that he also wanted to review the Attorney General\u2019s files. The State then petitioned this Court for writ of certiorari which was allowed on 28 September 1999.\nThe issue for review is whether the trial court properly granted defendant\u2019s motion for postconviction discovery under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) and, if so, what that postconviction discovery right entails. The State argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant\u2019s motion for postconviction discovery in that defendant waited too long to file his motion for appropriate relief and thus waived his right to postconviction discovery, and even if defend\u00e1nt is entitled to discovery, the Attorney General\u2019s files are not subject to postconviction discovery.\nThe State first argues that defendant, by filing his motion for discovery pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) over three years after his initial filing of a motion for appropriate relief, waived his rights to discovery. Based upon our recent decision in State v. Williams, 351 N.C. 465, 526 S.E.2d 655 (2000), we disagree.\nThe legislature adopted N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) effective 21 June 1996. This statute grants broad discovery rights to capital defendants whose cases are in postconviction review. The text of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) is as follows:\nIn the case of a defendant who has been convicted of a capital offense and sentenced to death, the defendant\u2019s prior trial or appellate counsel shall make available to the capital defendant\u2019s counsel their complete files relating to the case of the defendant. The State, to the extent allowed by law, shall make available to the capital defendant\u2019s counsel the complete files of all law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies involved in the investigation of the crimes committed or the prosecution of the defendant. If the State has a reasonable belief that allowing inspection of any portion of the files by counsel for the capital defendant would not be in the interest of justice, the State may submit for inspection by the court those portions of the files so identified. If upon examination of the files, the court finds that the files could not assist the capital defendant in investigating, preparing, or presenting a motion for appropriate relief, the court in its discretion may allow the State to withhold that portion of the files.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) (1999).\nIn State v. Williams, we held that \u201c[b]ecause the purpose of [N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f)] is to assist capital defendants in investigating, preparing, or presenting all potential claims in a single [motion for appropriate relief], it logically follows that any requests for post-conviction discovery must necessarily be made within the same time period statutorily prescribed for filing the underlying [motion for appropriate relief].\u201d Williams, 351 N.C. at 468, 526 S.E.2d at 656. The time frame set forth for the underlying motion for appropriate relief requires that such a motion be filed within 120 days of the triggering occurrence as defined under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(a). Id.\nWilliams allows for one exception to this rule, which applies to those defendants who are retroactively entitled to postconviction discovery based on the decision in Green. The Green decision entitles defendants to postconviction discovery if their motions for appropriate relief had been allowed before or were still pending on 21 June 1996, the date that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) became effective. \u201cPending,\u201d as defined by our Court in Green, \u201cmeans that on 21 June 1996 a motion for appropriate relief had been filed but had not been denied by the trial court, or the motion for appropriate relief had been denied by the trial court but the defendant had filed a petition for writ of certiorari which had been allowed by, or was still before, this Court.\u201d Green, 350 N.C. at 406, 514 S.E.2d at 728. In Williams, we held that the 120-day deadline for filing motions of discovery under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) would commence 29 June 1999, the day that our Green opinion was certified, essentially adding the Green decision as a triggering event. Williams, 351 N.C. 465, 526 S.E.2d 655.\nIn the instant case, defendant filed his motion for appropriate relief on 15 September 1995. After the trial court denied portions of that motion for appropriate relief on 21 December 1995, defendant filed an amended motion for appropriate relief. In an order dated 1 April 1996, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion as to all but four claims, which were formally denied on 15 October 1996. Therefore, on 21 June 1996, the motion for appropriate relief, or at least a portion thereof, was pending before the trial court. Because the motion for appropriate relief was still pending, as pending is defined in the Green test, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) must be applied retroactively in this instance. Therefore, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that defendant is entitled to postconviction discovery under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f).\nThe second question that the State argues relates to whether the Attorney General\u2019s files fall within the purview of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). The State contends that the Attorney General is not a \u201claw enforcement\u201d or \u201cprosecutorial\u201d agency, as specified in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f), but rather that its role in criminal cases is limited by law to defending the conviction during the appellate and capital post-conviction stages of the case except in limited exceptions that are not present here. We agree.\nOur Constitution dictates that the Attorney General\u2019s duties are those \u201cprescribed by law.\u201d N.C. Const, art. Ill, \u00a7 7(2). In cases such as the case sub judice, the Attorney General is subsequently limited by law to defending the conviction during the appellate and, when applicable, the capital postconviction portions of the case. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 114-2(1) (1999). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) limits the files available to defendants in a postconviction discovery phase to those that relate specifically to the investigation of the crimes committed or to the prosecution of the defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). It is the district attorney who is \u201cresponsible for the prosecution of criminal cases \u2018on behalf of the State.\u2019 \u201d State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 38, 497 S.E.2d 276, 281 (1998) (quoting N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 18). Accordingly, it is the district attorney who shall \u201cbe responsible for the prosecution on behalf of the State of all criminal actions in the Superior Courts of his district, perform such duties related to appeals therefrom as the Attorney General may require, and perform such other duties as the General Assembly may prescribe.\u201d N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 18 (emphasis added).\n\u201cThe Attorney General has no voice in the preparation of the record on appeal but must take it as he finds it.\u201d State v. Hickman, 2 N.C. App. 627, 630, 163 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1968). Because the Attorney General does not generally \u201cprosecute\u201d but instead only defends the State\u2019s conviction when on appeal, we conclude that the Attorney General\u2019s files do not fall within the purview of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). Therefore, defendant is not generally entitled to access to such files in postconviction discovery by way of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). The possible exception to this rule would exist when the Special Prosecutions Division of the Attorney General\u2019s office did, in fact, prosecute or participate in the actual prosecution. This occurs only when attorneys assigned to that division are \u201crequested to [assist in the prosecution] by a district attorney and the Attorney General approves.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 114-11.6 (1999). This, however, is not the circumstance in the present case.\nFor the reasons stated herein, the order of the superior court to grant defendant postconviction discovery rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) is affirmed, but files belonging to the Attorney General\u2019s office are excluded from those discoverable files.\nAFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Valerie B. Spalding, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Irving Joyner and Tracy Barley for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL EARL SEXTON\nNo. 499A91-4\n(Filed 13 July 2000)\n1. Discovery\u2014 capital cases \u2014 postconviction motion for appropriate relief \u2014 retroactivity of discovery statute\nAlthough defendant filed his motion for postconviction discovery of prosecutorial and law enforcement investigative files pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) over three years after his initial filing of a motion for appropriate relief, the trial court did not err in holding that defendant was retroactively entitled to discovery because on 21 June 1996, defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief, or at least a portion thereof, was pending before the trial court.\n2. Discovery\u2014 capital cases \u2014 discovery of State\u2019s files\u2014 Attorney General\u2019s files not included\nAlthough defendant is entitled to postconviction discovery of prosecutorial and law enforcement investigative files pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f), the Attorney General\u2019s files are excluded from those discoverable files because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) limits the files available to defendants in a postconviction discovery phase to those that relate specifically to the investigation of the crimes committed or to the prosecution of defendant; (2) the district attorney is responsible for the prosecution of criminal cases on behalf of the State; (3) the Attorney General is not a \u201claw enforcement\u201d or \u201cprosecutorial\u201d agency, as specified in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f) since its role in criminal cases is limited by law to defending the conviction during the appellate and capital post-conviction stages of the case; and (4) the only possible exception, which is not present in this case, is when the Special Prosecutions Division of the Attorney General\u2019s office did, in fact, prosecute or participate in the actual prosecution, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 114-11.6.\nOn writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-32(b) to review an order entered 30 August 1999 by Stephens (Donald W), J., in Superior Court, Wake County, granting defendant\u2019s motion for discovery under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(f). Heard in the Supreme Court 13 December 1999.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by Valerie B. Spalding, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nIrving Joyner and Tracy Barley for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0336-01", "first_page_order": 376, "last_page_order": 382 }