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      "cite": "526 U.S. 1135",
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          "page": "751-52"
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    {
      "cite": "296 N.C. 607",
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        8569806
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      "cite": "326 S.E.2d 24",
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        {
          "page": "27"
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        {
          "page": "27"
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        {
          "page": "27"
        }
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    {
      "cite": "313 N.C. 122",
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        4725335
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          "page": "127"
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          "page": "127"
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          "page": "127"
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    {
      "cite": "515 S.E.2d 885",
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      "weight": 10,
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      "pin_cites": [
        {
          "page": "893",
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        },
        {
          "page": "893"
        },
        {
          "page": "893"
        },
        {
          "page": "893"
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        {
          "page": "893"
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        {
          "page": "893"
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        {
          "page": "898"
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        {
          "page": "898"
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        {
          "page": "893"
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        {
          "page": "893"
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    {
      "cite": "350 N.C. 483",
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        131924
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          "page": "495",
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        },
        {
          "page": "495"
        },
        {
          "page": "495"
        },
        {
          "page": "495"
        },
        {
          "page": "495"
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        {
          "page": "504"
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        {
          "page": "504"
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        {
          "page": "495"
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      "cite": "50 L. Ed. 2d 69",
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    {
      "cite": "429 U.S. 809",
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        6085,
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        6739,
        5782,
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    {
      "cite": "222 S.E.2d 222",
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    {
      "cite": "289 N.C. 372",
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        8569669
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    {
      "cite": "296 S.E.2d 258",
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      "pin_cites": [
        {
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    {
      "cite": "307 N.C. 87",
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        8560679
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      "cite": "279 S.E.2d 788",
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        {
          "page": "801",
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        },
        {
          "page": "808"
        },
        {
          "page": "809"
        },
        {
          "page": "808"
        }
      ],
      "opinion_index": 0
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    {
      "cite": "303 N.C. 321",
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        8573792
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          "page": "354"
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        {
          "page": "354"
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    {
      "cite": "76 F.3d 967",
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      "case_ids": [
        7635620
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          "page": "971",
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      "cite": "163 S.E.2d 492",
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    {
      "cite": "274 N.C. 277",
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        8559994
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      "cite": "414 S.E.2d 548",
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      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 1992,
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        {
          "page": "554",
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    {
      "cite": "331 N.C. 12",
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        2501426
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      "cite": "275 N.C. 69",
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    {
      "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 235",
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    },
    {
      "cite": "488 U.S. 900",
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        1494036
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      "cite": "321 N.C. 594",
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      "cite": "2 N.E.2d 839",
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    {
      "cite": "363 Ill. 551",
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        2589117
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    {
      "cite": "318 N.C. 54",
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        4732922
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    {
      "cite": "485 S.E.2d 271",
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          "page": "556"
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    {
      "cite": "335 N.C. 717",
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        2530210
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      "cite": "446 U.S. 929",
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      "cite": "298 N.C. 573",
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      "cite": "72 L. Ed. 2d 450",
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      "cite": "456 U.S. 932",
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    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN SALVADOR GOLPHIN STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TILMON CHARLES GOLPHIN, JR."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "WAINWRIGHT, Justice.\nOn 1 December 1997, indictments were handed down charging defendants Kevin Salvador Golphin (Kevin) and Tilmon Charles Golphin, Jr. (Tilmon), each with two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon, one count of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, one count of discharging a firearm into occupied property, and one count of possession of a stolen vehicle. Defendants, who are brothers, were tried jointly in a capital proceeding at the 23 February 1998 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Cumberland County. Defendants were tried before a jury drawn from a special venire selected in Johnston County. The jury found defendants guilty on all charges. After a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death in each murder for both defendants. On 13 May 1998, the trial court entered judgments against defendants in accordance with the jury\u2019s recommendations. In addition, the trial court sentenced each defendant to the following consecutive terms of imprisonment: (1) for possession of a stolen vehicle, a minimum of six months and a maximum of eight months; (2) for assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, a minimum of thirty-one months and a maximum of forty-seven months; (3) for discharging a firearm into occupied property, a minimum of thirty-one months and a maximum of forty-seven months; and (4) for each count of robbery with a dangerous weapon, a minimum of eighty months and a maximum of one hundred five months. Defendants appeal to this Court as of right from the judgments imposing sentences of death. On 19 July 1999, this Court allowed defendants\u2019 motions to bypass the Court of Appeals on the other convictions.\nThe State presented evidence which tended to show that on 23 September 1997, Kevin, who was seventeen, and Tilmon, who was nineteen, were living with their grandparents in Greeleyville, South Carolina. That morning, defendants\u2019 cousin, Demetric Mack, drove them to Kingstree, South Carolina, leaving them in a parking lot in the downtown area. During the ride into town, Mack noticed that Kevin was carrying a rifle that he had covered with a white towel and that TLlmon was carrying a book bag.\nAt about 10:00 a.m., defendants entered Financial Lenders, a finance company in downtown Kingstree. Two employees, Ava Rogers and Sandra Gaymon, were working that morning, and a customer, Earletha Mouzon, was also in the building. Gaymon and Mouzon were discussing business in a small office near the front of the building and saw defendants enter and walk toward the office where Rogers was working. Mouzon saw that one defendant was carrying a rifle. She immediately left the building and called the police. The taller defendant, later identified as Kevin, pointed the rifle at Rogers and demanded the keys to her car. She gave the keys to him. Defendants then ordered Rogers and Gaymon to go to the back of the building. Defendants then told the two women to go into the bathroom. The taller defendant told the women to stand with their backs toward defendants. While their backs were turned, both women heard clicking sounds made by the rifle. Defendants then left the bathroom, and the two women heard them moving things around and placing objects in front of the door. The women stayed in the bathroom for approximately five minutes. While they were in the bathroom, they heard a vehicle start and leave the parking lot behind the building. The women then left the bathroom and called 911. Rogers found that her purse had been opened and that her wallet had been stolen. She also found that her car, a dark green 1996 Toyota Camry with South Carolina license plate number CEL-269, had been stolen.\nLieutenant Michael Kirby of the Kingstree Police Department investigated the robbery at Financial Lenders. He arrived at the business shortly after the robbery and obtained a description of the suspects and the stolen vehicle. He then issued a \u201cBOLO\u201d advisory (\u201cBe On the Look Out\u201d for certain suspects or vehicles) to all law enforcement agencies in the area which contained the description of the suspects and the stolen vehicle. Lt. Kirby also entered the description of the stolen vehicle into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computer network. Later that morning, Lt. Kirby learned that the suspects were Kevin and Tilmon Golphin. He then went to their grandparents\u2019 home but was unable to locate the suspects.\nOn that same day, Bobby Owens was on duty as a shift supervisor at the State Highway Patrol Communications Center in Elizabethtown, North Carolina. The Elizabethtown center provided communications support to state troopers in a region comprised of Cumberland, Harnett, Robeson, Onslow, Duplin, Pender, New Hanover, Brunswick, Bladen, and Columbus Counties. At approximately 12:25 p.m., Owens was communicating with troopers in Cumberland County. Trooper Lloyd E. Lowry of the North Carolina State Highway Patrol was on duty in Cumberland County. He was patrolling the northbound lanes on Interstate 95 (1-95). At 12:25 p.m., Owens received a radio call from Trooper Lowry asking for a check on South Carolina registration CEL-269. Owens performed the check on the NCIC computer, and the check indicated that the vehicle with that registration had been stolen in South Carolina. At 12:26 p.m., Owens asked Trooper Lowry whether he had the vehicle stopped, and Trooper Lowry responded that he did. Owens then advised Trooper Lowry, using code \u201csignal three,\u201d to turn off the speaker inside his vehicle so that anyone in the vehicle could not hear the communications and told Trooper Lowry that the vehicle was stolen. Trooper Lowry asked Owens to send him a backup unit. Owens requested Trooper Lowry\u2019s location, and Trooper Lowry answered that he was near the intersection of 1-95 and N.C. Highway 24. At 12:27 p.m., Owens informed Trooper Lowry that there were no highway patrol units available to respond and that he would contact the Cumberland County Sheriff\u2019s Department to request assistance. Owens called the sheriff\u2019s department, and the dispatcher acknowledged the request and told Owens that a car would be dispatched to the scene. At 12:29:12 p.m., Owens called Trooper Lowry and informed him that a sheriff\u2019s department unit was en route to assist. Trooper Lowry informed Owens that a subject was in his vehicle and that he was awaiting the backup unit. After this transmission, Owens called the highway patrol office in Fayetteville and informed Sergeant Bill Martin of Trooper Lowry\u2019s situation. Sgt. Martin advised Owens that he would be en route to assist Trooper Lowry and asked Owens to attempt to contact Trooper Lowry again. At 12:32 p.m., Owens called Trooper Lowry to inform him that Sgt. Martin was en route to his location and to ask him to verify the description of the vehicle given by the NCIC computer as a dark green Toyota. At 12:32:22 p.m., Trooper Lowry confirmed the description of the vehicle. Owens did not receive any further communication from Trooper Lowry.\nOn that same day, Susan Gillis was working as a dispatcher with the Cumberland County Sheriffs Department. At 12:28 p.m., she received a telephone call from Owens requesting assistance for Trooper Lowry. Gillis passed the request for assistance to Linda Zema, another dispatcher, who asked for available sheriffs department units in the area of 1-95 and N.C. Highway 24. Deputy David Hathcock responded to the call, and the dispatchers determined that he was the closest unit to the area where Trooper Lowry had requested assistance. Deputy Hathcock was sent to the scene at 12:30 p.m. At 12:33 p.m., Deputy Hathcock reported that he would be reaching the scene in approximately one minute. No further transmissions were received from Deputy Hathcock despite repeated attempts by the dispatchers to contact him.\nAt 12:38 p.m., Deputy Kelly Curtis of the Cumberland County Sheriffs Department advised the dispatchers that he had arrived at the scene. Seconds later, Deputy Curtis informed dispatchers, \u201cOfficers down. Officers down.\u201d He requested immediate assistance. At 12:39 p.m., Deputy Curtis called and advised the dispatchers that two black male suspects were last seen headed northbound on 1-95 driving a dark green Toyota. Shortly thereafter, Deputy Curtis informed the dispatchers that both officers appeared to be dead.\nThe State presented a number of witnesses who testified regarding the events that occurred along the side of 1-95 near its intersection with N.C. Highway 24 at mile marker 52 in Cumberland County. James Patrick Rogers was driving along the exit ramp which led from westbound Highway 24 onto the service road which led to the northbound lanes of 1-95. As Rogers came down the ramp, he saw that a highway patrol vehicle and a sheriffs department vehicle were stopped in the grassy area between the service road and the northbound lanes of 1-95. The two police vehicles were parked parallel to one another on opposite sides of the grassy area facing northbound. A dark \u2014 colored car was pulled over in front of the highway patrol vehicle. Rogers testified that a black male was standing at the rear of the highway patrol vehicle with his hands on the trunk. A state trooper was standing behind him. A second black male was sitting in the front passenger seat of the dark-colored car. A sheriffs deputy was standing near the open door of that vehicle and appeared to be talking to the male seated in the car.\nWalter Pearce was traveling on 1-95 north and saw the flashing blue lights of the highway patrol vehicle. As he got close to the vehic\u00edes, he saw a state trooper and a black male with braided hair scuffling on the ground at the back of the patrol car. Pearce saw a sheriff\u2019s deputy standing between the police vehicles and a second black male sitting in the front seat of a Toyota Camry that was pulled over in front of the highway patrol vehicle. Pearce continued northbound, and a few minutes later, he saw the same two black males pass him in the Camry. A highway patrol vehicle passed him shortly afterwards, and Pearce saw both the Camry and the highway patrol vehicle leave 1-95 at exit 71.\nMarla McDowell was traveling on 1-95 north and saw the police vehicles on the side of the road with a Toyota Camry pulled over in front of them. She saw an officer and a black male struggling on the ground behind the highway patrol vehicle, and another officer and a second black male struggling in the area between the police vehicles and the Camry. She also saw the second black male pull away from the officer and run back toward the Camry.\nJanice Hocutt and her niece were traveling south on 1-95 as they approached the scene where two police vehicles and a bluish-green car were pulled over. Hocutt saw a black male, who was wearing an \u201corange-brownish\u201d hooded sweatshirt, facing south between the green car and the police vehicles. An officer was standing in front of him facing north. Hocutt saw the black male moving toward the officer, and then she saw something brown being sprayed by the officer. The officer began backing away from the black male and then fell. She then saw the black male kick and punch the officer on the ground. She never saw the officer get up. Hocutt identified Tilmon as the black male she saw kicking and punching the officer on the ground.\nWilbur Brannan was traveling northbound on 1-95 and passed the scene. He saw the highway patrol vehicle with its blue lights flashing, and as he passed it, he saw a state trooper lying facedown on the ground near the back of his vehicle. A black male was bending over the trooper. Brannan saw the black male get up and turn around toward a dark green Toyota Camry parked in front of the highway patrol vehicle. Brannan continued driving northbound and saw the same Toyota Camry with two black occupants pass him a few miles further on 1-95.\nDana Blecke, a pharmacist and former emergency medical technician, was traveling south on 1-95 and saw the blue lights flashing from the highway patrol vehicle. As she passed by, she saw someone lying in the grass on the side of the road in front of the highway patrol vehicle. She also saw a black person running toward the driver\u2019s side of a car that was parked in front of the highway patrol vehicle. Blecke slowed down and turned around through the median of the interstate and drove back toward the police vehicles. The car parked in front of the police vehicles was now gone. She parked her vehicle and went to the police officer lying in the grass. She could feel no pulse or respirations. She then walked to the state trooper who was lying facedown near the back of his vehicle. By this time, another state trooper who had arrived at the scene helped her roll the trooper\u2019s body. They found no pulse or other signs of life.\nRonald Waters was driving north on 1-95 as he came over a hill and saw the flashing blue lights of the highway patrol vehicle. As he approached the scene, he saw two black males, one taller than the other, moving around in the area between the two police vehicles and the car parked in front of the highway patrol vehicle. He saw an officer wearing a gray shirt and dark pants lying facedown in the grass near the back of the highway patrol vehicle. As he drove almost parallel with the highway patrol vehicle in the right lane of 1-95, he saw that one of the black males had what appeared to be an \u201cautomatic\u201d handgun in his hand. At that time, Waters, who had slowed down, accelerated quickly past the scene. He pulled off approximately two hundred yards further up the road, got out of his vehicle, and called 911 on his cellular phone. He looked back toward the scene and saw the taller black male shoot one of the officers four or five times. The two black males then got into the Toyota Camry and drove north on 1-95. Waters saw that other motorists had stopped, and he decided to follow the Camry. Waters remained on his cellular phone talking to the 911 operator while following the Camry. He followed the Camry until it left 1-95 at exit 55, Murphy Road. Waters saw the vehicle turn off onto a dirt road near the exit. Waters stopped his car and watched the subjects. A few minutes later, the subjects got back in the Camry and drove over the bridge to the other side of the interstate. Waters noted that the license plate had been removed from the Camry. Waters waited along the side of the ramp that led back to 1-95 north. He soon noticed the Camry come back over the top of the bridge and turn onto the ramp beside him. As the Camry pulled alongside Waters\u2019 vehicle, Waters saw the barrel of a rifle being pointed out the window toward him. He leaned over in his seat and accelerated quickly. He heard three shots hit his vehicle, and subsequently, discovered the vehicle was disabled. Waters heard the other vehicle\u2019s engine revving higher and thought it had left, so he raised his head to look out the window. He saw the Canary drawing almost parallel with his window just four to six feet away. Waters testified that the black male holding the rifle smiled at him and then pulled the trigger. The rifle clicked as if it were jammed or out of ammunition. The black male pulled the rifle back into the Camry, which sped north on 1-95. Waters identified the individual who pointed the rifle at him as Tilmon, and he identified the rifle pointed at him as the same Russian-made SKS 7.62-mil-limeter rifle seen by Demetric Mack, defendants\u2019 cousin, in his car that morning.\nTrooper Kenneth Morgan heard a radio transmission that a trooper was down and proceeded south on 1-95 from exit 72 in Harnett County. As he drove south, he obtained a description of the Toyota Camry and its occupants. At exit 65, just inside the Cumberland County line, Trooper Morgan waited on an exit ramp facing south. Just after 12:52 p.m., Trooper Morgan observed a green Toyota Camry driving north on 1-95. Trooper Morgan drove down the northbound exit ramp to attempt to overtake the Camry. He noted that there was no license plate on the vehicle and that it swerved quickly from the left lane over to the emergency lane on the far right and began accelerating rapidly. Trooper Morgan pursued the vehicle at speeds up to 120 miles per hour as the Camry veered from lane to lane heading north. At exit 71, the Camry drove up the ramp but failed to make the turn. It rolled at least once down an embankment and came to rest on its wheels. Trooper Morgan saw the two suspects run from the vehicle toward a group of tractor-trailers that were parked near a tire repair shop.\nPolice officers from the Harnett County Sheriff\u2019s Department, the Cumberland County Sheriff\u2019s Department, the Dunn Police Department, and the State Highway Patrol searched the area and apprehended Tilmon and Kevin. A Glock 9-millimeter handgun, later identified as Deputy Hathcock\u2019s weapon, was found beside Tilmon as he was arrested, and a Beretta .40-caliber handgun, identified as Trooper Lowry\u2019s weapon, was found under the steps of a home near where Kevin was captured. Deputy Hathcock\u2019s Glock handgun was fully loaded and did not exhibit any signs of being fired. Trooper Lowry\u2019s Beretta handgun was found in a cocked position, ready to fire. Only five cartridges remained in the weapon, indicating that if the weapon had been fully loaded when taken, six cartridges were missing. The SKS rifle was recovered from the wrecked Camry. The top cartridge in the magazine had misfed, causing the rifle to jam. Tilmon and Kevin were transported by the State Highway Patrol to the Cumberland County Sheriffs Department where they were questioned.\nAt the sheriffs department, Kevin waived his juvenile rights and gave a statement to Special Agent Jay Tilley of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI). Agent Tilley and Detective Ray Wood of the Cumberland County Sheriffs Department interviewed Kevin. Kevin admitted that he and Tilmon stole the Camry in Kingstree that morning and headed north on 1-95, intending to drive to Richmond, Virginia. A state trooper pulled them over in North Carolina. The trooper asked Kevin for his license, and Kevin gave him Tilmon\u2019s South Carolina license. The trooper told Kevin he was stopped for not wearing a seat belt and asked him to get out of the Camry and sit in the patrol vehicle. Kevin saw the trooper typing on his computer and talking into his telephone. Kevin heard the trooper ask for another car to come and assist him.\nKevin stated that he saw a different kind of police car drive up beside the trooper\u2019s car and that a police officer wearing a different uniform got out and came over to the trooper\u2019s car. The trooper got out of the car and told Kevin to \u201csit tight.\u201d The trooper then came around to the passenger side where Kevin was sitting, pulled out his pistol, opened the door, and ordered Kevin out of the car. Kevin said that he got out and put his hands on the hood of the car. The trooper told the other police officer to \u201cget the guy\u201d in the Camry. Kevin asked why he was being arrested and was told to \u201cshut up.\u201d The trooper pushed Kevin\u2019s head down and put him in an arm lock. Kevin stated that he resisted and tried to get free. The trooper pushed Kevin to the ground. The other officer brought Tilmon back toward the trooper\u2019s car. The trooper told the other officer to spray Kevin with pepper spray. The other officer sprayed Kevin, and Kevin began screaming and kicking at the other officer. At that point, Kevin heard gunshots. His eyes began to clear, and he saw the two police officers on the ground. The trooper tried to grab Kevin, but he shook the trooper away. Kevin then took the trooper\u2019s pistol.\nAt first, Kevin did not admit shooting the trooper\u2019s pistol and claimed not to have shot any gun that day. After being told that .40-caliber shell casings had been found at the scene and that gunshot residue tests had been performed on his hands, Kevin admitted firing the trooper\u2019s handgun. He said he did not know how many times he shot the gun, but it was pointed at the trooper when he did so.\nAfter he fired the gun, Kevin got into the passenger seat of the Camry, and he and Tilmon drove north on 1-95. He and Tilmon left the interstate at the next exit and stopped on top of a bridge where they switched places. Kevin continued driving north on 1-95, and they were chased by several police cars. Kevin said that he tried to get away, but wrecked the car when he attempted to exit the interstate. He and Tilmon ran from the car, but both were caught.\nLater in the interview, Kevin admitted that Tilmon had shot at a Jeep that was following them on 1-95 and that had stopped at the same exit where they switched drivers. Kevin said that Tilmon told him he was trying to shoot at the tires of the vehicle. Kevin also admitted that Tilmon never shot the trooper\u2019s handgun and that Tilmon never had the trooper\u2019s handgun in his possession.\nTilmon was interviewed at the sheriff\u2019s department by Special Agent Neil Godfrey of the SBI and Detective Mike Casey of the Cumberland County Sheriff\u2019s Department. Agent Godfrey advised Tilmon of his rights, and Tilmon asked to speak with an attorney. Tilmon was informed that investigators could no longer talk with him because he had requested an attorney, but they asked him several biographical questions. After he answered the questions, Tilmon stated he wanted to tell the investigators what had happened.\nTilmon\u2019s description of the events was very similar to Kevin\u2019s. When the Camry was pulled over by the state trooper, the trooper told them he had pulled them over because Kevin was not wearing his seat belt. Kevin and the trooper went back to the trooper\u2019s car while Tilmon waited in the Camry. Eventually, he saw another police car pull up beside them. He saw the other officer get out and walk toward the trooper\u2019s car. He then saw Kevin and the trooper at the back of the trooper\u2019s vehicle, and Kevin was pushed up against the vehicle. Tilmon got out of the Camry and walked back toward them. The other officer came toward him, pushed him up against the Camry, and patted him down. The officer then walked with him back toward the trooper\u2019s car where Kevin and the trooper were on the ground struggling. Tilmon said he heard Kevin say that he could not breathe. The trooper then told the other officer to spray Kevin with pepper spray. The officer sprayed Kevin and then turned to spray Tilmon. Tilmon knocked the canister from the officer\u2019s hand and ran back toward the Camry. He got the rifle from the backseat of the car. Tilmon said he pointed the rifle directly at the other officer who was about nine to twelve feet away; looked him right in the eyes; and shot him. Tilmon said the other officer appeared to be dead. He then walked over to where the trooper was on top of Kevin, aimed at the trooper\u2019s side, and shot him. Tilmon said he aimed at the trooper\u2019s side because he did not want to kill him. Tilmon then ran over to the other officer, took the handgun from his holster, and went to the driver\u2019s side of the Camry. He and Kevin drove north on 1-95 for a few miles, then exited and switched places. Tilmon stated he shot at the tires of a vehicle that had been following them. He and Kevin then continued driving north on 1-95 and were captured a short while later after they were chased by other police cars.\nTilmon originally stated that he had not fired a gun that day but later admitted that he \u201cprobably had\u201d shot a gun but could not remember doing so. Subsequently, Tilmon was able to recount how the rifle \u201cjumped\u201d as he shot the trooper. Tilmon also made no mention of the use of pepper spray by either officer but later remembered that the trooper told the other officer to spray Kevin. Additionally, Tilmon said nothing about his encounter with Waters during the first portion of his interview, but later described shooting at the tires of the Jeep in detail.\nAutopsies were performed on the bodies of Trooper Lowry and Deputy Hathcock. Three .40-caliber bullets that were fired from Trooper Lowry\u2019s handgun were recovered from his body along with a 7.62-millimeter bullet fired from the SKS rifle. An additional 7.62-millimeter bullet was found inside the body bag used to transport Trooper Lowry\u2019s body. Trooper Lowry was shot at least seven and possibly eight times, with several gunshots coming from close range. Trooper Lowry suffered potentially fatal wounds from both weapons. One .40-caliber bullet fired from Trooper Lowry\u2019s handgun and two 7.62-millimeter bullets fired from the SKS rifle were recovered from Deputy Hathcock\u2019s body. Deputy Hathcock suffered four gunshot wounds to his chest and abdomen and one gunshot wound to his wrist. Any of the four wounds to his chest and abdomen would have been fatal. Those wounds were made by both .40-caliber and 7.62-millimeter bullets.\nPRETRIAL ISSUES\nBy assignments of error, both Kevin and Tilmon argue the trial court violated their federal and state constitutional rights to be present at every stage of their capital trial when it ruled the jury would be drawn from a special venire from Johnston County Specifically, defendants claim they should have been present during out-of-court meetings relating to change of venue or a special venire. Defendants argue the right to be present includes the right to be present during the meetings concerning venue because the discussions were substantially related to the fullness of their rights to defend against the charges. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 84 L. Ed. 2d 486, 490 (1985). Defendants further argue that because the meetings involved venue for jury selection and trial, they were particularly critical to defendants, and not merely administrative as in State v. Chapman, 342 N.C. 330, 338-39, 464 S.E.2d 661, 665-66 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1023, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1077 (1996). We disagree.\nInitially, we note the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees all defendants the right to be present at every stage of their trial. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 25 L. Ed. 2d 353, 356 (1970). Through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this right also applies to the states. See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 926 (1965); State v. Buchanan, 330 N.C. 202, 209, 410 S.E.2d 832, 836 (1991).\nSimilarly, in North Carolina, pursuant to the Confrontation Clause in Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution, a defendant has a right to be present at every stage of his trial. See State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 397, 508 S.E.2d 496, 506 (1998); Chapman, 342 N.C. at 337, 464 S.E.2d at 665; State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 256, 446 S.E.2d 298, 307 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995); State v. Payne, 320 N.C. 138, 139, 357 S.E.2d 612, 612 (1987). If the defendant is being tried capitally, this right cannot be waived. See State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 227, 464 S.E.2d 414, 430 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 828, 136 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1996). Generally, however, \u201cthis right does not arise prior to the commencement of trial.\u201d Call, 349 N.C. at 397, 508 S.E.2d at 506; see also Chapman, 342 N.C. at 338, 464 S.E.2d at 665; State v. Rannels, 333 N.C. 644, 653, 430 S.E.2d 254, 259 (1993).\nIn November 1997, defense counsel for both defendants informed the prosecution that they intended to file change of venue motions from Cumberland County. In meetings between the defense attorneys and the prosecutors to discuss change of venue, defendants were not present, and the meetings were not recorded. The prosecutors and defense attorneys then met with the presiding judge to discuss possible change of venue sites or special venire locations; defendants were not present at this meeting, and the meeting was not recorded.\nSubsequently, on 5 January 1998, in the presence of Kevin, Tilmon, and their attorneys, the parties stipulated to a change of venue for purposes of jury selection. Thereafter, the trial court stated:\nAs to each Defendant, it would be my understanding that each Defendant is agreeing to a special venire for [sic] Johnston County for that Defendant\u2019s trial if the cases are joined or if that Defendant is chosen for the first trial, but that neither Defendant is waiving their right to make a Motion for a Change of Venue if there are separate trials and that particular Defendant\u2019s trial is not the first trial.\nWhen the trial court asked both defendants if this was correct, they responded, through their attorneys, in the affirmative. Pretrial motions were later heard on 16 and 23 February 1998, and jury selection commenced in Johnston County on 26 February 1998.\nThe meetings at issue in this case took place prior to commencement of defendants\u2019 trial. Moreover, defendants were present at the hearing on change of venue at which defendants stipulated to a special venire from a county other than Cumberland; the trial court proposed a special venire from Johnston County; and both defendants agreed, through counsel, to the special venire from Johnston County. Thus, no error, constitutional or otherwise, was committed. See Buckner, 342 N.C. at 228, 464 S.E.2d at 431 (holding there was no constitutional violation because the pretrial conference took place prior to commencement of the defendant\u2019s trial); Rannels, 333 N.C. at 652, 430 S.E.2d at 258 (holding it was not error to conduct private, unrecorded sidebar conferences with prospective jurors where conferences took place prior to calling the calendar for the session and the administration of the oath to the jurors). These assignments of error are overruled.\nIn another assignment of error, Kevin argues there was no filed court order changing venue for purposes of jury selection, and this violated his federal and state constitutional rights. However, the question presented in Kevin\u2019s brief relating to this assignment of error concerns whether the trial court erred by not following the statutory mandates in ordering the special venire from Johnston County. In his argument, Kevin does not address the trial court\u2019s failure to file a court order changing venue for that limited purpose. Rule 28(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure provides: \u201cQuestions raised by assignments of error in appeals from trial tribunals but not then presented and discussed in a party\u2019s brief, are deemed abandoned.\u201d N.C. R. App. P. 28(a). Thus, Kevin abandoned this assignment of error. Nevertheless, in our discretion pursuant to Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will address the merits of the question presented in Kevin\u2019s brief. See N.C. R. App. P. 2.\nKevin argues the trial court did not follow the statutory mandates in ordering the special venire from Johnston County, thereby entitling him to a new trial. Specifically, Kevin argues there are only two statutory mechanisms for changing venue \u2014 by order of the court pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-957 and -958, or by an agreement of the parties pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-133. The trial court followed neither. We disagree.\nGenerally, venue for \u201ctrial proceedings in cases within the original jurisdiction of the superior court lies in the county where the charged offense occurred.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-131(c) (1999). Parties may waive venue or defendants may move for a change of venue pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-957. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-133 (1999). A waiver of venue must be in writing, must be signed by both parties, and must specify the stages of the proceedings affected by the waiver. See id. A defendant may move for a change of venue if the prejudice is so great that he/she cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial; the trial court can then move the proceeding or order a special venire. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-957 (1999). In addition, the trial court may, upon motion by the defendant or the State, or upon its own motion, \u201cissue an order for a special venire of jurors from another county if in its discretion it determines the action to be necessary to insure a fair trial.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-958 (1999).\n\u201cThese statutory limitations on the power of a court to order a change of venue are preempted by the inherent authority of the superior court to order a change of venue in the interest of justice.\u201d State v. Chandler, 324 N.C. 172, 183, 376 S.E.2d 728, 735 (1989) (holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State\u2019s motion for change of venue, despite the statute\u2019s granting only the defendant a right to move for a change of venue, because the findings supported the trial court\u2019s conclusion and resulting order); see also State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 320, 259 S.E.2d 510, 524-25 (1979) (holding the superior court had the inherent power to move the proceedings to a county other than an adjoining county in the judicial district or a county in an adjoining judicial district as provided by the statute), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980). Moreover, the trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to change venue will not be disturbed absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Chandler, 324 N.C. at 183, 376 S.E.2d at 735.\nIn the instant case, on 5 January 1998, there was a hearing at which both defendants, through counsel, stipulated to a transfer of venue to allow jury selection in a county other than Cumberland County with the trial to be held in Cumberland County. The trial court proposed changing venue for the limited purpose of jury selection from a special venire of Johnston County residents. The trial court asked both defendants if they agreed to the proposal, and both defendants, through counsel, answered in the affirmative. Thereafter, on 13 January 1998, the trial court entered an \u201cORDER FOR SPECIAL VENIRE\u201d which provided that \u201cvenue . . . has been ordered changed to Johnston County as of February 26th, 1998 for the selection of a jury.\u201d Additionally, the trial court stated \u201cthat. . . due to the number of defendants and the fact that the charges involve the first degree murders of two law enforcement officers, the jury selection process in these matters will require that a Special Venire of jurors be summoned.\u201d\nAs Kevin never moved for a change of venue, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-957 does not apply in the instant case. In addition, there is no violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-133 as Kevin argues because there was a ruling by the trial court on the issue of venue for jury selection. Given the nature and circumstances of the alleged crimes against two law enforcement officers and defendants\u2019 acquiescence to the stipulation and proposal at the hearing, the trial court had the inherent authority to order the change of venue for the limited purpose of jury selection from a special venire of Johnston County residents. Moreover, Kevin has not shown the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the limited change of venue. Kevin\u2019s assignment of error has no merit.\nBy assignments of error, both defendants argue the trial court violated their federal and state constitutional rights to have a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community in which the crime occurred. We disagree.\nInitially, we address the State\u2019s argument that defendants did not preserve this issue for appellate review. Generally, \u201c[t]his Court will not consider arguments based upon matters not presented to or adjudicated by the trial tribunal.\u201d State v. Eason, 328 N.C. 409, 420, 402 S.E.2d 809, 814 (1991); see also N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). In this case, there is no indication from the record that defendants objected to the special venire from Johnston County. In fact, defendants, through counsel, agreed with the trial court\u2019s proposal of a special venire from Johnston County. Thus, defendants waived appellate review of this assignment of error. Nevertheless, we elect, in our discretion pursuant to Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, to review these assignments of error. See N.C. R. App. P. 2.\nThe state and federal constitutional guarantees of a trial by a jury of the accused\u2019s peers \u201cassures that members of a defendant\u2019s \u2018own race have not been systematically and arbitrarily excluded from the jury pool which is to decide [his] guilt or innocence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Bowman, 349 N.C. 459, 467, 509 S.E.2d 428, 434 (1998) (quoting State v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 718, 392 S.E.2d 78, 81 (1990)) (alteration in original), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 144 L. Ed. 2d 802 (1999). In Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 58 L. Ed. 2d 579, 587 (1979), the United States Supreme Court established a three-prong test to determine whether the right to a fair cross-section in the jury venire had been violated. To establish a prima facie case of disproportionate representation in the jury venire, a defendant must show:\n(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a \u201cdistinctive\u201d group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.\nId., quoted in Bowman, 349 N.C. at 468, 509 S.E.2d at 434.\nIn the instant case, defendants claim, according to the 1990 Census data, 60% of the residents of Cumberland County are Caucasian, and 31.8% are African-American; and 80% of the residents of Johnston County are Caucasian, and 17.5% are African-American. Thus, defendants contend, African-Americans were underrepresented in the jury pool by 45%.\nThere is no question in the instant case that defendants satisfied the first prong of the Duren test because African-Americans are unquestionably a \u201cdistinct\u201d group for purposes of the Duren analysis. See Peters v. Kiff 407 U.S. 493, 498-99, 33 L. Ed. 2d 83, 91 (1972).\nIn determining whether there is disproportionate representation under the second prong of Duren, this Court considers absolute disparity figures on a case-by-case basis. See State v. Hough, 299 N.C. 245, 252, 262 S.E.2d 268, 273 (1980). \u201cAbsolute disparity\u201d in the instant case is the percentage of African-Americans in Cumberland County minus the percentage of African-Americans in Johnston County. See id. at 251, 262 S.E.2d at 272. Defendants, however, calculated the comparative disparity, or the percentage of absolute disparity between the counties divided by the percentage of African-Americans in Cumberland County. See id. at 251-52, 262 S.E.2d at 272. To calculate the absolute disparity, we subtract 17.5% (the percentage of African-Americans in Johnston County) from 31.8% (the percentage of African-Americans in Cumberland County); thus, the absolute disparity is 14.3%, much lower than the 45% comparative disparity reported by defendants.\nThis Court has held various percentages of absolute disparity, standing alone, are not unfair and unreasonable. See Bowman, 349 N.C. at 468, 509 S.E.2d at 434 (absolute disparity of 16.17%); State v. Price, 301 N.C. 437, 447, 272 S.E.2d 103, 110 (1980) (absolute disparity of 14%). The reasoning is that a defendant is \u201c \u2018not entitled to a jury of any particular composition,... [or to] a jury which mirrors the presence of various and distinctive groups within the community.\u2019 \u201d Bowman, 349 N.C. at 468, 509 S.E.2d at 434 (quoting Price, 301 N.C. at 448, 272 S.E.2d at 110-11); see also Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 32 L. Ed. 2d 184 (1972). In addition, the trial by jury right \u201c \u2018carries with it the right to be tried before a body which is selected in such a manner that competing and divergent interests and perspectives in the community are reflected rather than reproduced absolutely.\u2019 \u201d Bowman, 349 N.C. at 468-69, 509 S.E.2d at 434 (quoting Price, 301 N.C. at 448, 272 S.E.2d at 111); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 42 L. Ed. 2d 690 (1975).\nAs we stated in Bowman and Price, defendants are not entitled to a special venire from the population of a county which exactly mirrors the population of Cumberland County as long as the venire was selected in a manner in which various interests were represented. While the population of Johnston County is not the mirror image of the population of Cumberland County, African-Americans were represented in Johnston County, and there is only a 14.3% absolute disparity. Therefore, we cannot say the absolute disparity between Cumberland County and Johnston County, standing alone, is unfair or unreasonable.\nAs to the third prong of Duren, this Court has held \u201c[t]he fact that a particular jury or series of juries does not statistically reflect the racial composition of the community does not in itself make out an invidious discrimination forbidden by the [Equal Protection] Clause.\u201d Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239, 48 L. Ed. 2d 597, 607 (1976), quoted in State v. Avery, 299 N.C. 126, 130, 261 S.E.2d 803, 806 (1980); see also Bowman, 349 N.C. at 469, 509 S.E.2d at 434-35 (holding the defendant \u201cfailed to present any evidence showing that the jury-selection process was tainted by the systematic exclusion of African-Americans from the jury pool\u201d). Moreover, \u201c[statistics concerning one jury pool, standing alone, are insufficient to meet the third prong of Duren.\u201d Bowman, 349 N.C. at 469, 509 S.E.2d at 435.\nLikewise, in the instant case, the fact that the racial composition of Johnston County differs from that of Cumberland County is not sufficient to show \u201csystematic exclusion.\u201d The statistics concerning this one jury pool cannot satisfy the \u201csystematic exclusion\u201d requirement of the third prong of Duren. See id. Therefore, defendants have failed to establish aprima facie case of disproportionate representation, and these assignments of error are overruled.\nBy assignments of error, both defendants challenge the sufficiency of the short-form murder indictments. Kevin argues the trial court committed constitutional error by entering judgment on his first-degree murder convictions where the indictments were insufficient to charge this offense. Tilmon argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the murder indictments. Both defendants contend the short-form indictments do not allege the specific elements of first-degree murder that defendants acted with premeditation and deliberation in violation of their federal constitutional rights.\nWe recently addressed this issue in State v. Wallace, 351 N.C. 481, 528 S.E.2d 326 (2000), and State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, - S.E.2d - (2000), and we decline to revisit the issue in the instant case. Defendants\u2019 arguments that the short-form murder indictments were insufficient are overruled.\nBy assignments of error, both defendants argue the trial court erred by failing to require the State to disclose the aggravating circumstances on which it intended to rely at sentencing. Defendants contend the indictment should have contained the aggravating circumstances, and the trial court erred in denying their pretrial motions for disclosure of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Specifically, defendants rely on Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999), and argue that because aggravating circumstances may increase the penalty for first-degree murder from life imprisonment to death, defendants are entitled to pretrial notice, within the indictment or other binding instrument, of the aggravating circumstances the State intends to use at sentencing. We disagree.\nThe United States Supreme Court has previously held an indictment \u201cneed not set forth facts relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime.\u201d Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228, 140 L. Ed. 2d 350, 358 (1998). In Jones, the Supreme Court recognized the difference between elements of an offense and sentencing factors when it stated, \u201cMuch turns on the determination that a fact is an element of an offense rather than a sentencing consideration, given that elements must be charged in the indictment.\u201d Jones, 526 U.S. at 232, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 319 (emphasis added).\nOn the same issue, this Court has held \u201cthe State need not set forth in an indictment the aggravating circumstances upon which it will rely in seeking a sentence of death.\u201d State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 675, 325 S.E.2d 181, 185 (1985). In State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 422, 284 S.E.2d 437, 454 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932, 72 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1982), we held N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e), which sets forth the aggravating circumstances the jury may consider, made the defendant fully aware of what the State had to prove before a death sentence could be imposed.\nAs to defendants\u2019 motions to disclose the aggravating circumstances, this Court has held a trial court may not require the State to disclose which aggravating circumstances it intends to rely on at the sentencing phase. See State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 44, 372 S.E.2d 12, 36 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990); State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 153, 362 S.E.2d 513, 531 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988). In addition, we have stated that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e) sets forth the only aggravating circumstances upon which the State may rely in seeking the death penalty, and the \u201cnotice provided by this statute is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process.\u201d Holden, 321 N.C. at 154, 362 S.E.2d at 531.\nThe United States Supreme Court\u2019s recent opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey, - U.S. -, - L. Ed. 2d -, 68 U.S.L.W. 4576 (2000), does not affect our prior holdings regarding the inclusion of aggravating circumstances in an indictment. The Supreme Court cites its previous holding in Almendarez-Torres that differentiates aggravating circumstances from elements of a crime and notes that it \u201chas previously considered and rejected the argument that the principles guiding our decision today render invalid state capital sentencing schemes.\u201d Apprendi, \u2014 U.S. at \u2014, \u2014 L. Ed. 2d at \u2014, 68 U.S.L.W. at 4584-85; see also Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 228, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 358.\nConsidering the Supreme Court\u2019s continued recognition of the \u2022difference between elements of a crime and the aggravating circumstances in a capital sentencing procedure, see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 111 L. Ed. 2d 511 (1990), our prior holdings are consistent with the decisions in Jones and Apprendi. Therefore, as we stated previously, an indictment need not contain the aggravating circumstances the State will use to seek the death penalty, see Young, 312 N.C. at 675, 325 S.E.2d at 185, and the trial court may not order the State to disclose the aggravating circumstances upon which it intends to rely, see Holden, 321 N.C. at 153, 362 S.E.2d at 531. Thus, in the instant case, the lack of aggravating circumstances on the indictment did not create error, and the trial court did not err in denying defendants\u2019 motions to order disclosure of the aggravating circumstances. Accordingly, these assignments of error are overruled.\nBy assignment of error, Tilmon argues the trial court committed error and denied him due process of law when it denied his pretrial motion to sever the cases and overruled his objections to improper joinder. We disagree.\nThe facts show that on 10 February 1998, Tilmon moved for severance of his case from that of Kevin to allow the pursuit of antagonistic defenses, to promote a fair determination of guilt or innocence, and to prevent a prejudicial outcome. Citing Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), Tilmon contended each defendant made out-of-court statements regarding the other defendant; and citing State v. Marlow, 310 N.C. 507, 313 S.E.2d 532 (1984), Tilmon argued he and Kevin had irreconcilable differences. Subsequently, on 16 February 1998, the State made a motion to join the cases on the grounds the several offenses charged were part of a common scheme or plan; were part of the same act or transaction; and were so closely connected in time, place, and occasion that it would be difficult to separate one charge from proof of the others.\nAt a pretrial hearing, Tilmon requested an ex parte, in camera hearing regarding severance on the ground he needed to divulge his defense to the trial court in order to fully and effectively argue this motion. Tilmon also argued there were antagonistic defenses with Kevin. Over the State\u2019s objection, the trial court allowed his request. Thereafter, all persons left the courtroom except Tilmon, his counsel, security personnel, the clerk, the judge, and the court reporter.\nAfter the excluded parties were returned to the courtroom, Tilmon argued the cases should be separated because the conflict between his and Kevin\u2019s respective positions was such that he would be denied a fair trial. Additionally, Tilmon argued, pursuant to State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573, 260 S.E.2d 629 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929, 64 L. Ed. 2d 282 (1980), that evidence concerning Kevin\u2019s seized luggage should be held to conflict with Tilmon\u2019s defense and/or alleged motive. The trial court denied Tilmon\u2019s motion for severance and allowed the State\u2019s motion for joinder.\nThe North Carolina General Statutes provide for joinder of defendants subject to the following provisions:\n(b) Separate Pleadings for Each Defendant and Joinder of Defendants for Trial.\n(1) Each defendant must be charged in a separate pleading.\n(2) Upon written motion of the prosecutor, charges against two or more defendants may be joined for trial:\na. When each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense; or\nb. When, even if all of the defendants are not charged with accountability for each offense, the several offenses charged:\n1. Were part of a common scheme or plan; or\n2. Were part of the same act or transaction; or\n3. Were so closely connected in time, place, and occasion that it would be difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of the others.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(b) (1999). \u201cThe propriety of joinder depends upon the circumstances of each case and is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.\u201d State v. Pickens, 335 N.C. 717, 724, 440 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1994). The trial court\u2019s discretionary ruling will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing that joinder deprived the defendant of a fair trial. See id.; State v. Evans, 346 N.C. 221, 232, 485 S.E.2d 271, 277 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1057, 139 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1998); Nelson, 298 N.C. at 586, 260 S.E.2d at 640.\nMotions for severance and objections to joinder are governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-927(c), which provides:\n(c) Objection to Joinder of Charges against Multiple Defendants for Trial; Severance.\n(1) When a defendant objects to joinder of charges against two or more defendants for trial because an out-of-court statement of a codefendant makes reference to him but is not admissible against him, the court must require the prosecutor to select one of the following courses:\na. A joint trial at which the statement is not admitted into evidence; or\nb. A joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only after all references to the moving defendant have been effectively deleted so that the statement will not prejudice him; or\nc. A separate trial of the objecting defendant.\n(2) The court, on motion of the prosecutor, or on motion of the defendant other than under subdivision (1) above must deny a joinder for trial or grant a severance of defendants whenever:\na. If before trial, it is found necessary to protect a defendant\u2019s right to a speedy trial, or it is found necessary to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants; or\nb. If during trial, upon motion of the defendant whose trial is to be severed, or motion of the prosecutor with the consent of the defendant whose trial is to be severed, it is found necessary to achieve a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of that defendant.\n(3) The court may order the prosecutor to disclose, out of the presence of the jurors, any statements made by the defendants which he intends to introduce in evidence at the trial when that information would assist the court in ruling on an objection to joinder of defendants for trial or a motion for severance of defendants.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-927(c) (1999). Thus, \u201cthe trial court must deny joinder for trial or grant a severance of defendants whenever it is necessary to promote a fair determination of the guilt or innocence of one or more defendants.\u201d Pickens, 335 N.C. at 724, 440 S.E.2d at 556.\nWe have said the presence of antagonistic defenses does not, standing alone, warrant severance. Id. at 725, 440 S.E.2d at 556. Additionally, \u201c \u2018[t]he test is whether the conflict in defendants\u2019 respective positions at trial is of such a nature that, considering all of the other evidence in the case, defendants were denied a fair trial.\u2019 \u201d State v. Lowery, 318 N.C. 54, 59, 347 S.E.2d 729, 734 (1986) (quoting Nelson, 298 N.C. at 587, 260 S.E.2d at 640); see also Pickens, 335 N.C. at 725, 440 S.E.2d at 556. To determine whether the positions of the defendants are so antagonistic, or conflicting, as to be prejudicial, this Court has stated the trial court should grant severance when necessary to avoid an evidentiary battle between the defendants \u201cwhere the state simply stands by and witnesses \u2018a combat in which the defendants [attempt] to destroy each other.\u2019 \u201d Nelson, 298 N.C. at 587, 260 S.E.2d at 640 (quoting People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 557, 2 N.E.2d 839, 842 (1936)) (alteration in original).\nThe State in the instant case did not stand by and rely on Kevin\u2019s statement to prove its case. See State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 601, 365 S.E.2d 587, 591-92 (holding the State did not rely on the codefendant\u2019s testimony, but was able to show independent evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 102 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1988). In his statement, Kevin claimed he was debilitated by pepper spray, and while in this condition, he heard gunshots. To rebut Kevin\u2019s claim, the State offered contrary evidence on the effects of pepper spray. Contrary to Tilmon\u2019s argument and to his benefit, the State\u2019s rebuttal evidence actually disproves Kevin\u2019s statement. Moreover, there was overwhelming evidence, including the testimony of several eyewitnesses, of Tilmon\u2019s involvement in the crimes. See Evans, 346 N.C. at 232, 485 S.E.2d at 277 (holding there was plenary evidence, irrespective of the codefendant\u2019s statement, that defendant was involved). This rebuttal evidence, along with the direct evidence of Tilmon\u2019s involvement in the crimes, shows the State was not a mere witness to an evidentiary battle between Kevin and Tilmon.\nTilmon also argues the trial court should have severed defendants\u2019 trials because Kevin\u2019s out-of-court statement to police could not be adequately \u201csanitized\u201d so as to avoid violating Bruton.\nIn Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held admission of a statement by a nontestifying codefendant, which incriminates the other defendant, at a joint trial, violated that defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. See Evans, 346 N.C. at 231, 485 S.E.2d at 277. Bruton applies to the states by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 403, 13 L. Ed. 2d at 926; State v. Parrish, 275 N.C. 69, 73-74, 165 S.E.2d 230, 234 (1969).\n\u201cThe result is that in joint trials of defendants it is necessary to exclude extrajudicial confessions unless all portions which implicate defendants other than the declarant can be deleted without prejudice either to the State or the declarant. If such deletion is not possible, the State must choose between relinquishing the confession or trying the defendants separately. The foregoing pronouncement presupposes (1) that the confession is inadmissible as to the codefendant. . ., and (2) that the declarant will not take the stand. If the declarant can be cross-examined, a codefendant has been accorded his right to confrontation.\u201d\nState v. Tucker, 331 N.C. 12, 23-24, 414 S.E.2d 548, 554 (1992) (quoting State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 291, 163 S.E.2d 492, 502 (1968)) (alteration in original).\nTilmon, however, waived any Bruton objection by signing the \u201cNotice of Waiver of Right\u201d in which he explicitly \u201cwaive[d] any constitutional or statutory objection that [he] may have under [Bruton] and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-927 regarding the redaction and/or admission of the statement of a nontestifying co-defendant.\u201d Additionally, Tilmon\u2019s attorney stated in open court there was \u201cno objection to the introduction of the statement of Kevin Golphin [taken by the agents on the date of his arrest] as it relates to Tilmon Golphin.\u201d See United States v. Flaherty, 76 F.3d 967, 971 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding the defendant waived a Bruton challenge when he did not mention Bruton when the codefendant\u2019s statements were admitted and the trial court gave the cautionary instruction requested by defendant); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 341-42, 279 S.E.2d 788, 801 (1981) (holding constitutional guarantees are not absolute as defendants \u201cmay waive the benefit of constitutional guarantees by express consent, failure to assert it in apt time, or by conduct inconsistent with a purpose to insist upon it\u201d). Therefore, we conclude Tilmon waived appellate review of severance based on a Bruton violation.\nTilmon further contends, pursuant to State v. Boykin, 307 N.C. 87, 296 S.E.2d 258 (1982), and State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222, death sentence vacated sub nom. Carter v. North Carolina, 429 U.S. 809, 50 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1976), that severance was appropriate because he was precluded from offering exculpatory evidence that would have been available if the cases had not been joined. However, contrary to Tilmon\u2019s argument, this case is distinguishable from Boykin and Alford. In Boykin, this Court held the defendant \u201cwas prejudiced by the court\u2019s consolidation of cases because he was prevented from testifying as to his motive in making his \u2018false confessions.\u2019 \u201d Boykin, 307 N.C. at 91, 296 S.E.2d at 260. The trial court allowed the State to introduce the admission, but because of the joint trial, the trial court did not permit the defendant to explain that the \u201cconfessions\u201d were intended to protect the codefendant, who had previously been convicted of murder. Id. This Court also held the defendant was prevented from eliciting testimony that the codefendant had also confessed to the crime. Id. The instant case is distinguishable in that Tilmon was not prevented from providing a motive for his own statements as was the case in Boykin. Tilmon contends other witnesses did not wish to testify because of the negative effect on Kevin. Tilmon\u2019s inability to elicit information about a possible motive Kevin may have had is also dissimilar from the situation in Boykin where the defendant was prevented from actually testifying about his own motive for giving false confessions.\nIn Alford, this Court held the defendant was entitled to a separate trial where the codefendant\u2019s statement could have corroborated the defendant\u2019s alibi, but neither the State nor the defendant offered the statement into evidence, and the defendant could not force the codefendant to testify because of the codefendant\u2019s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Alford, 289 N.C. at 387-88, 222 S.E.2d at 232. In the instant case, unlike in Alford, Tilmon was not prevented from offering evidence which would support an alibi. Tilmon merely contends some witnesses would not testify because of the negative statements they would have to make about Kevin; however, contrary to Alford where the defendant could not force the codefendant to testify, see id., Tilmon could have subpoenaed the witnesses to testify for him. Tilmon also states he was prevented from asking questions about Kevin\u2019s motive to kill both victims. Such questioning would not exculpate Tilmon, or clear him from guilt, as would the alibi evidence in Alford. See id. Therefore, the instant case is distinguishable from both Boykin and Alford.\nAdditionally, the evidence in the instant case clearly supports consolidation of defendants\u2019 trials and the trial court\u2019s grant of the State\u2019s motion for joinder. Kevin and Tilmon were both charged with two counts of first-degree murder; two counts of robbery with a dangerous weapon; and one count each of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill, discharging a firearm into occupied property, and possession of a stolen vehicle. The evidence tended to show the offenses arose out of a common scheme and were part of the same transaction. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(b)(2). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Tilmon\u2019s motion for severance and granting the State\u2019s motion for joinder.\nIn another assignment of error, Tilmon argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion for discovery of Trooper Lowry\u2019s and Deputy Hathcock\u2019s personnel files. Tilmon relies on his federal constitutional right to material evidence which is in the hands of the prosecution. Additionally, Tilmon relies on the rules of evidence pertaining to the admissibility of relevant evidence in arguing he was entitled to the personnel files. Tilmon further argues the files may have shown prior acts of lethal force which might have impacted the jury on the issue of whether Tilmon had a reasonable belief that Kevin was the victim of excessive force by the law enforcement officers on the day in question. We disagree.\nInitially, we note Tilmon claims the denial of this requested discovery violated his state and federal constitutional rights. However, Tilmon\u2019s motion for discovery of the personnel files did not allege any constitutional violations. As such, the trial court did not rule upon any possible constitutional violations. \u201c \u2018This Court is not required to pass upon a constitutional issue unless it affirmatively appears that the issue was raised and determined in the trial court.\u2019 \u201d State v. Nobles, 350 N.C. 483, 495, 515 S.E.2d 885, 893 (1999) (quoting State v. Creason, 313 N.C. 122, 127, 326 S.E.2d 24, 27 (1985)). Therefore, we need not address Tilmon\u2019s allegation that the denial of his motion was a violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. See also N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).\nFurthermore, discovery in the superior court is governed by chapter 15A, article 48 of the North Carolina General Statutes. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903 specifically governs disclosure of evidence by the State and provides in pertinent part:\n(d) Documents and Tangible Objects. \u2014 Upon motion of the defendant, the court must order the prosecutor to permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, motion pictures, mechanical or electronic recordings, buildings and places, or any other crime scene, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof which are within the possession, custody, or control of the State and which are material to the preparation of his defense, are intended for use by the State as evidence at the trial, or were obtained from or belong to the defendant.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(d) (1999) (emphasis added). We have previously held \u201c \u2018[w]ithin the possession, custody, or control of the State\u2019 as used in th[is] provision[] means within the possession, custody or control of the prosecutor or those working in conjunction with him and his office.\u201d State v. Crews, 296 N.C. 607, 616, 252 S.E.2d 745, 751-52 (1979); see also State v. Pigott, 320 N.C. 96, 102, 357 S.E.2d 631, 635 (1987).\nIn the instant case, on 10 February 1998, Tilmon filed a motion for discovery of personnel files in which he requested that the trial court conduct an in camera review and then provide defendant any evidence deemed exculpatory as part of discovery. In the motion, Tilmon referred to newspaper articles published after the crimes which concerned an incident involving disciplinary action against Trooper Lowry two years prior to the crimes. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion stating there was no justification for an in camera examination at that time, but the trial court reserved the right to order the files\u2019 production at a later time.\nThere was no violation of this discovery statute in the instant case. The list of discoverable items in the statute does not include victims\u2019 personnel files, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(d), and the personnel files were not in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor in this case, see id. See also State v. Cunningham, 344 N.C. 341, 352-53, 474 S.E.2d 772, 776 (1996) (holding regardless of whether the defendant had a right to an in camera inspection of the personnel file, he was not prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s refusal to allow it because the victim\u2019s conduct as a police officer would have no relevance to the question at issue in that case). Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Tilmon\u2019s motion to discovery of the victims\u2019 personnel files.\nBy assignments of error, both Kevin and Tilmon argue the trial court erred in denying Tilmon\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress the incriminating statement Tilmon made to law enforcement officers after his arrest. Tilmon argues the police continued the custodial interrogation of him after he had invoked his right to counsel. Based upon this alleged violation, Tilmon contends the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress and the trial court\u2019s error in admitting the statement entitles him to a new trial. Kevin concedes he has no standing to assert Tilmon\u2019s constitutional rights but claims he was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of Tilmon\u2019s statement. Kevin argues Tilmon\u2019s confession directly incriminated Kevin because of the acting in concert theory submitted to the jury, and the jury could have drawn inferences regarding Kevin\u2019s participation in Deputy Hathcock\u2019s murder from omissions in Tilmon\u2019s statement. We disagree.\nAs to Tilmon\u2019s argument on this issue, we have previously stated that a motion in limine was not sufficient to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence if the defendant does not object to that evidence at the time it is offered at trial. See State v. Hayes, 350 N.C. 79, 80, 511 S.E.2d 302, 303 (1999) (per curiam). As a pretrial motion to suppress is a type of motion in limine, Tilmon\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress is not sufficient to preserve for appeal the question of the admissibility of his statement because he did not object at the time the statement was offered into evidence. See id. In addition, while Tilmon\u2019s assignment of error includes plain error as an alternative, his brief contains no specific argument that there is plain error in the instant case. Accordingly, Tilmon\u2019s argument is not properly before this Court. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); State v. McNeil, 350 N.C. 657, 681, 518 S.E.2d 486, 501 (1999), cert. denied, - U.S. \u2014, 146 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2000); State v. Frye, 341 N.C. 470, 496, 461 S.E.2d 664, 677 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123, 134 L. Ed. 2d 526 (1996). However, given the constitutional nature of Tilmon\u2019s argument, pursuant to Rule 2 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, we will address the merits of Tilmon\u2019s argument.\nBoth the United States Supreme Court and this Court have held that during a custodial interrogation, if the accused invokes his right to counsel, the interrogation must cease and cannot be resumed without an attorney being present \u201cunless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.\u201d Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, 386 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966); State v. Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 97, 499 S.E.2d 431, 440, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 915, 142 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1998); State v. Jackson, 348 N.C. 52, 55, 497 S.E.2d 409, 411, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943, 142 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1998); State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 521, 308 S.E.2d 317, 321 (1983).\nThe term \u201cinterrogation\u201d is not limited to express questioning by law enforcement officers, but also includes \u201cany words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.\u201d Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980); see also State v. Coffey, 345 N.C. 389, 400, 480 S.E.2d 664, 670 (1997); State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 684, 467 S.E.2d 653, 661, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 896, 136 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1996). The focus of the definition is on the suspect\u2019s perceptions, rather than on the intent of the law enforcement officer, because Miranda protects suspects from police coercion regardless of the intent of police officers. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308. However, because \u201cthe police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words' or actions on the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.\u201d Id. at 301-02, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308.\nBased on the Supreme Court\u2019s definition of interrogation in Innis, there is a limited exception to Miranda for routine questions asked during the booking process. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 L. Ed. 2d 528, 552 (1990) (plurality opinion) (where the accused made an incriminating statement prior to being read his Miranda rights, the Supreme Court held questions regarding a suspect\u2019s name, address, physical characteristics, date of birth, and current age constituted custodial interrogation, but were \u201cnonetheless admissible because the questions [fell] within a \u2018routine booking question\u2019 exception which exempts from Miranda\u2019s coverage questions to secure the \u2018biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services\u2019 \u201d) (quoting United States v. Horton, 873 F.2d 180, 181 n.2 (8th Cir. 1989)); Clayton v. Gibson, 199 F.3d 1162 (10th Cir. 1999) (where the suspect had been given his Miranda rights and had invoked his right to counsel, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 552, in holding there was no constitutional violation because the questions asked fell within the booking exception); State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 286, 302 S.E.2d 164, 173 (1983) (where the suspect had been given his Miranda rights and had invoked his right to counsel, this Court relied on the language of Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308, to find an exception to \u201cinterrogation\u201d for questions related to the booking process). This exception is consistent with Innis because the Supreme Court stated that interrogation includes express questioning as well as \u201c \u2018any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.\u2019 \u201d Ladd, 308 N.C. at 286, 302 S.E.2d at 173 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308) (alteration in original). In an effort not to infringe upon an accused\u2019s constitutional rights, however, the exception is limited \u201cto routine informational questions necessary to complete the booking process that are not \u2018reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response\u2019 from the accused.\u201d Id. at 287, 302 S.E.2d at 173.\nIn addition, responses to generalized questions by law enforcement officers, which are not reasonably likely to elicit incriminating responses, are admissible. See State v. Gray, 347 N.C. 143, 171, 491 S.E.2d 538, 549 (1997) (asking whether the defendant needed anything was not designed to elicit an incriminating response), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1031, 140 L. Ed. 2d 486 (1998); State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 581, 461 S.E.2d 655, 662 (1995) (police captain\u2019s statements during the fingerprinting process that he would talk with the defendant later and answer any of the defendant\u2019s questions at that time were not intended or expected to elicit an incriminating response). Moreover, law enforcement officers can respond to questions posed by a defendant without violating Innis or Edwards. See State v. McQueen, 324 N.C. 118, 132, 377 S.E.2d 38, 46-47 (1989) (holding the law enforcement officer\u2019s willingness to respond to the defendant\u2019s questions and the actual answers given were not \u201cwords or actions . . . [the law enforcement officer] should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response\u201d pursuant to Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, and the defendant\u2019s statements and questions were voluntary pursuant to Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378).\nIn the instant case, the transcript of the pretrial hearing concerning Tilmon\u2019s motion to suppress reveals that Agent Godfrey and Detective Casey questioned Tilmon on 23 September 1997. Agent Godfrey advised Tilmon of his constitutional rights. Tilmon stated he wanted to talk with a lawyer. Thereafter, Agent Godfrey informed Tilmon they could not ask Tilmon about his involvement in the shootings of Trooper Lowry and Deputy Hathcock because he had requested to speak with an attorney, but Agent Godfrey told Tilmon they did need to obtain biographical information and background data for the arrest report. Subsequently, Agent Godfrey asked Tilmon for his full name, address, height, weight, next of kin, place of employment, and grade of education he had completed. Then Tilmon asked Agent Godfrey where he would be kept until his trial. Agent Godfrey responded that he would be kept in the Cumberland County jail. Tilmon then informed Agent Godfrey that he was a vegetarian and that his religion allowed him to eat only fish and prohibited anyone from cutting his hair or taking anything from his body. Agent Godfrey asked the name of Tilmon\u2019s religion so he could inform jail management in order to justify Tilmon\u2019s request. In response, Tilmon stated he was a member of the Rastafarian religion. Next, based on the belief that a video camera in Trooper Lowry\u2019s car had recorded the incident, Tilmon asked Agent Godfrey and Detective Casey why they wanted to talk about what had happened because it should have been videotaped. Agent Godfrey responded that he still needed to know why it happened. Agent Godfrey testified that at the time he made this statement, he knew there was no videotape and that neither he nor Detective Casey ever indicated to Tilmon there was a videotape. Tilmon then stated he would tell Agent Godfrey and Detective Casey why it happened. Tilmon proceeded, over a lengthy interview process which included several breaks, to make a statement concerning the shooting incident.\nAfter reviewing the motion, hearing the evidence offered by the State, and giving Tilmon an opportunity to present evidence, the trial court made findings of fact consistent with the above recitation of facts. Thereafter, the trial court concluded as a matter of law:\nTilmon Golphin made a statement to law enforcement officers freely voluntarily and understandingly, after being fully advised by law enforcement officers of all appropriate constitutional and state statutory rights and federal statutory rights related to the right to counsel and related to rights concerning self-incrimination.\nTwo, Tilmon Golphin\u2019s motion to suppress his statement of the \u2014 on the twenty-third day of September, 1997, should be denied.\nBased on the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court denied Tilmon\u2019s motion to suppress.\nA trial court is to make an initial determination as to whether a defendant waived his/her right to counsel. Those findings of fact \u201c \u2018are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u2019 \u201d State v. Peterson, 347 N.C. 253, 255, 491 S.E.2d 223, 224 (1997) (quoting State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 745, 445 S.E.2d 917, 926 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096, 130 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1995)). Conclusions of law which are supported by findings of fact are binding on appeal. Id. \u201cFurther, the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law must be legally correct, reflecting a correct application of applicable legal principles to the facts found.\u201d State v. Fernandez, 346 N.C. 1, 11, 484 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1997).\nWe conclude the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and are, therefore, binding on appeal. See Coffey, 345 N.C. 389, 480 S.E.2d 664 (holding the Court was bound by the trial court\u2019s findings because, assuming arguendo there was an interrogation, there was competent evidence in the record to support the trial court\u2019s finding that the defendant initiated the conversation with police after invoking his right to counsel). In addition, the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.\nThis Court must also determine if the trial court\u2019s conclusions are legally correct. We conclude they are. Although Tilmon asserted his right to counsel and the police continued to ask Tilmon questions, see Innis, 446 U.S. at 302, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308, the questions were included in the exception for questions used to elicit biographical information, see Ladd, 308 N.C. at 286, 302 S.E.2d at 172-73. In addition, it is unreasonable to say Agent Godfrey should have known his questions concerning Tilmon\u2019s biographical information were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and there was no reason Agent Godfrey should have known his response to Tilmon\u2019s questions about where he would be housed until the time of trial would elicit an incriminating response. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308; McQueen, 324 N.C. at 132, 377 S.E.2d at 46. Moreover, Tilmon initiated the further discussion when he asked why Agent Godfrey and Detective Casey wanted to talk about the incident when it had been videotaped. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 386. Agent Godfrey merely responded to Tilmon\u2019s question that they needed to know why it happened. Nothing should have led Agent Godfrey to believe his response to the question would elicit an incriminating response. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301-02, 64 L. Ed. 2d at 308.\nAs we have concluded that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, that the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and that the conclusions of law are legally correct, we hold Tilmon\u2019s constitutional rights were not violated by the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress his statement to police. Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nConcerning Kevin\u2019s assignment of error, it is well settled that \u201ca defendant\u2019s right to counsel is personal\u201d to the defendant. State v. Peterson, 344 N.C. 172, 179, 472 S.E.2d 730, 733 (1996). Kevin concedes he has no standing to assert Tilmon\u2019s constitutional right to counsel. Nevertheless, Kevin argues he was prejudiced by the erroneous admission of the allegedly unconstitutional confession.\nRule 10(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure requires a party to present a timely request, objection, or motion to the trial court to preserve a question for appellate review. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). However, Kevin did not make a motion in limine to suppress Tilmon\u2019s statement on the basis that both the state and federal constitutions require its exclusion. Nor did Kevin object at the time the statement was offered into evidence at trial. Thus, this issue was not properly preserved. Although Kevin\u2019s assignment of error includes plain error as an alternative, he does not argue specifically and distinctly, pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4), that there was plain error. Therefore, this assignment of error is not properly before this Court.\nJURY SELECTION ISSUES\nBy assignments of error, both defendants argue, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(a), the trial court violated its statutory duty to ensure jury selection was conducted in a random manner. Specifically, defendants contend both the trial court\u2019s use of panels for jury selection and the trial court\u2019s placement of certain prospective jurors into particular jury panels violated the randomness requirement of jury selection, the purpose of which is to protect a defendant\u2019s state and federal constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury.\nConstitutional questions not raised and passed on by the trial court will not ordinarily be considered on appeal. See Wallace, 351 N.C. at 503, 528 S.E.2d at 340-41; Nobles, 350 N.C. at 495, 515 S.E.2d at 893. However, statutory violations, regardless of objections at the trial court, are reviewable. \u201cWhen a trial court acts contrary to a statutory mandate, the right to appeal the court\u2019s action is preserved, notwithstanding the failure of the appealing party to object at trial.\u201d State v. Jones, 336 N.C. 490, 497, 445 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1994).\nIn the instant case, defendants cite Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 660, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622, 634 (1987) (holding the improper removal of prospective jurors for cause was a type of constitutional error which was not susceptible to harmless error analysis), and contend their constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury were violated. However, defendants never objected, on constitutional grounds or otherwise, to the use of panels for jury selection or the manner in which the trial court placed prospective jurors into panels. Thus, defendants have waived review of the constitutionality of the trial court\u2019s actions. See Nobles, 350 N.C. at 495, 515 S.E.2d at 893.\nAlthough defendants failed to object at trial, we review the alleged statutory violation. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(a) provides: \u201cThe clerk, under the supervision of the presiding judge, must call jurors from the panel by a system of random selection which precludes advance knowledge of the identity of the next juror to be called.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(a) (1999). A challenge to a jury panel: (1) \u201cMay be made only on the ground that the jurors were not selected or drawn according to law\u201d; (2) \u201cMust be in writing\u201d; (3) \u201cMust specify the facts constituting the ground of challenge\u201d; and (4) \u201cMust be made and decided before any juror is examined.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1211(c) (1999); see also State v. Workman, 344 N.C. 482, 498-99, 476 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1996) (where this Court found no merit in the defendant\u2019s assignment of error \u201c[i]n light of the fact that defendant failed to follow the procedures clearly set out for jury panel challenges and further failed, in any manner, to alert the trial court to the alleged improprieties\u201d). Defendants in the instant case failed to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1211(c) to challenge the panels; therefore, as this Court found in Workman, defendants have waived review of their assignments of error.\nHowever, assuming, without deciding, that the trial court violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(a), defendants cannot show prejudicial error. The facts surrounding this issue tended to show that the trial court informed both Kevin and Tilmon of its intention to place the prospective jurors into panels for jury selection. The trial court stated:\nI will hear from the state and the defendants as to each of the [hardship] requests, will rule on those. Then from those left, the court \u2014 the clerk will draw names and put them into panels. There will be thirty panels. The panels probably will not be of equal number. But the jurors will be randomly drawn and put into the thirty panels.\nDuring jury selection, there were three prospective jurors whose hardship excuses were denied or who did not appear when called and who were placed into specific panels by the trial court. Defendants assigned error to such placement.\nFirst, prospective juror Lance Peedin requested a hardship excuse because he did not have transportation to the courthouse. The trial court suggested placing Peedin in panel number thirty \u201cbecause if worse came to absolute worse, we could provide him transportation.\u201d The trial court asked if anyone had a problem with placing Peedin in panel number thirty; counsel for both defendants responded, \u201cNo, sir.\u201d Peedin was never called to be questioned for inclusion on the jury.\nSecond, prospective juror Ronald Harris requested a hardship excuse because he was starting a new job as a deputy sheriff and would have to take unpaid days off to serve. The trial court denied the request and placed Harris into panel number thirty. After some courtroom discussion, Kevin\u2019s counsel stated, \u201cWe could be out of peremptories by group thirty.\u201d Harris was never called to be questioned for inclusion on the jury.\nLastly, prospective juror Jeffrey Beasley, who was selected to be in panel number two, did not appear in court when called. Beasley later informed the court that his work obligations prevented him from coming. The court listed the alternatives of how to respond to Beasley\u2019s absence: \u201cmove him to a later panel\u201d or \u201cgo get him.\u201d Tilmon\u2019s counsel stated, \u201cI guess on behalf of Tilmon Golphin, we\u2019re satisfied if you move him to a much later group, and if we don\u2019t get to him at all, it will be a moot issue.\u201d Kevin\u2019s counsel stated, \u201cWhatever the Court decides is fine.\u201d The court then asked if they would agree to move Beasley to panel number twenty-five. Counsel for both Tilmon and Kevin agreed. Beasley was later called and did appear. Based on his responses to questioning, Tilmon\u2019s counsel challenged Beasley for cause, and counsel for Kevin joined the challenge. The trial court excused Beasley for cause.\nThere were also prospective jurors who had made written requests to be excused, some of which were denied. Those whose requests were denied were placed into a separate panel, number thirty-one. Reflecting the intent of the court, the judge stated:\nThen it is then the intent of the court to draft a letter to be sent to the address of these jurors with the jury reporting instructions informing them that they are on panel thirty-one; that it \u2014 that they are to call in each day after five; that if their panel is called in, they are to come at the appointed time at which time they will receive \u2014 that they will go through the orientation procedure and then be considered for service in this case. That letter will go out over my signature to these jurors. We will simply mail them the letter since we\u2019re not going to need them any time soon. Does anyone object to that procedure?\nBoth defendants stated there was \u201c[n]o objection.\u201d Defendants now assign error to the placement of these prospective jurors into panel number thirty-one.\nDefendants were not prejudiced by the use of panels in the jury selection process. Neither Tilmon nor Kevin objected when the trial court indicated its intention to use panels for jury selection or when the trial court stated how the prospective jurors were to be placed into panels. See State v. Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 13, 530 S.E.2d 807, 815 (2000) (holding there was a statutory violation, but the defendant could not show he was prejudiced); State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 49, 530 S.E.2d 281, 290 (2000) (holding the defendant requested and consented to any deviation in the statutory jury selection process).\nIn addition, defendants cannot show they were prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s placement of Beasley, Peedin, and Harris into specific panels. When the trial court was discussing Beasley with all parties, Tilmon\u2019s counsel suggested moving Beasley to a later panel, and Kevin\u2019s counsel stated he would agree with the court\u2019s decision. Regarding Peedin, both defendants replied \u201cno\u201d when the trial court asked if there was a problem moving Peedin into panel number thirty. Neither defendant objected when the trial court indicated its intention to move Harris into panel number thirty. See Lawrence, 352 N.C. at 13, 530 S.E.2d at 815; Hyde, 352 N.C. at 49, 530 S.E.2d at 290. Additionally, with regard to Beasley, Peedin, and Harris, defendants argue the trial court\u2019s only options were to excuse or defer them. However, Beasley was subsequently excused for cause on a challenge by defendants, and because Peedin and Harris were never called for questioning, it is inconsequential that the trial court did not excuse or defer Peedin and Harris. Thus, defendants were not prejudiced.\nMoreover, defendants cannot show they were prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s placement of the prospective jurors whose written excuses were denied into panel number thirty-one. Although defendants argue the makeup of the jury might have differed if those prospective jurors had been randomly placed into panels, \u201cdefendant[s] [are] not entitled to any particular juror. [The] right to challenge is not a right to select but to reject a juror.\u201d State v. Harris, 338 N.C. 211, 227, 449 S.E.2d 462, 470 (1994). In Harris, this Court noted that the defendant conceded that neither he nor the State exhausted their peremptory challenges, \u201cevidencing] satisfaction with the jury which was empaneled.\u201d Id. In the instant case, neither defendant exhausted the statutory number of peremptory challenges. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217(a) (1999). Thus, neither defendant can show he was prejudiced because neither was forced to accept a juror he felt was undesirable. See Lawrence, 352 N.C. at 13, 530 S.E.2d at 815 (noting that the defendant did not exhaust his peremptory challenges and was not forced to accept an undesirable juror); see also Harris, 338 N.C. at 227, 449 S.E.2d at 470.\nTherefore, we conclude defendants failed to preserve any arguments as to a constitutional violation or a statutory violation. Nevertheless, assuming arguendo there was error, defendants have failed to show they were prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s use of panels injury selection or the trial court\u2019s placement of particular jurors into specific panels.\nBy assignments of error, both TLlmon and Kevin argue the trial court violated their state and federal constitutional rights to be present at every stage of their capital trial. Defendants contend the trial court\u2019s direction to the clerk of court to meet privately with jurors about transportation and other logistical matters violated their constitutional rights because transportation was a substantive issue which was not \u201cmerely administrative\u201d in nature. We disagree.\nAs we noted above, defendants are guaranteed the right to be present at every stage of their trial by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 338, 25 L. Ed. 2d at 356. Similarly, the Confrontation Clause in Article I, Section 23 of the North Carolina Constitution provides defendants the right to be present at every stage of the trial. See Call, 349 N.C. at 397, 508 S.E.2d at 506; Chapman, 342 N.C. at 337, 464 S.E.2d at 665; Payne, 320 N.C. at 139, 357 S.E.2d at 612. This right cannot be waived when a defendant is being tried capitally, see Buckner, 342 N.C. at 227, 464 S.E.2d at 430, and extends to jury selection, see State v. McCarver, 329 N.C. 259, 261, 404 S.E.2d 821, 822 (1991); State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794, 392 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1990).\nWhile this Court has held a \u201ctrial court\u2019s ex parte admonitions to the jury amounted to error requiring a new trial,\u201d Payne, 320 N.C. at 140, 357 S.E.2d at 613, this Court has also held a defendant\u2019s right to presence is not violated when a clerk communicates with a jury about administrative matters, see State v. Bacon, 337 N.C. 66, 86, 446 S.E.2d 542, 551 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1159, 130 L. Ed. 2d 1083 (1995). In Bacon, the defendant argued his right to presence was violated by the trial court\u2019s instructions to the bailiff to \u201c \u2018put the jurors in the jury room on break\u2019 \u201d and \u201c \u2018have them to return back to the jury room\u2019 at some specific time,\u201d as well as the administrative duties of the clerk of calling jury roll and informing jurors what time they needed to arrive at court. Id. This Court concluded \u201cthat these challenged communications were of an administrative nature and did not relate to the consideration of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\u201d Id. This Court held the defendant\u2019s presence would not have had a reasonably substantial relation to his opportunity to defend. Id.\nSimilarly, in State v. Lemons, 348 N.C. 335, 346, 501 S.E.2d 309, 316 (1998), sentence vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1018, 144 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1999), the defendant argued the clerk\u2019s ex parte contact with jurors violated his right to presence because there was no record of the clerk\u2019s contact with the jurors, and there was no showing the clerk\u2019s contact was limited to the jury questionnaire inquiry. This Court held there was no violation of the defendant\u2019s constitutional rights because \u201c[i]n distributing and gathering the questionnaires, the clerk merely sought to carry out the administrative duties which the trial court had requested,\u201d and the defendant failed to show \u201c \u2018how his presence would have been useful to his defense.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 348, 501 S.E.2d at 317 (quoting Bacon, 337 N.C. at 86, 446 S.E.2d at 551-52); see also State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467, 482-83, 434 S.E.2d 840, 848 (1993) (holding the trial court\u2019s order to the bailiff to remind jurors to follow the court\u2019s instructions is not an instruction as to the law, and such communications do not relate to the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence because the defendant\u2019s right to presence would not have been useful to his defense as demonstrated by the fact that defendant\u2019s attorney had no objection; thus, while the trial court\u2019s order to the bailiff \u201cmay run the risk of violating defendant\u2019s right to be present,\u201d there was no reversible error in the case).\nIn another case, the defendant argued his right to be present was violated when the bailiff, pursuant to the trial court\u2019s instructions, told the jurors to take a fifteen minute break. See State v. May, 334 N.C. 609, 614, 434 S.E.2d 180, 183 (1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1198, 127 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1994). The defendant contended that because there was no record of the bailiff\u2019s conversation with the jury, this Court could not know the nature of the conversation, and it would be impossible to reconstruct. See id. at 614-15, 434 S.E.2d at 183. This Court held:\nWithout anything in the record to show something else happened, we will assume the bailiff followed the court\u2019s instructions. ... It would impose a heavy burden on our courts if a court reporter were required to accompany a bailiff every time he is with a jury in order to make a record of what was said.\nId. at 615, 434 S.E.2d at 183.\nIn the instant case, after the first three jurors were selected, the trial court instructed the jurors on several matters, including:\nNow, in all candor, I anticipate that that is going to take between another three and four weeks to complete it. And I think from your standpoint, having participated in the jury selection process this week, in projecting it out over the selection of basically an additional thirteen jurors, you can believe that that\u2019s probably a fair estimate. Now, I\u2019m not going to ask you to wait, as I promised you in the beginning, in the jury deliberation room while we do this. You will be placed on telephone standby.\nWhen court is recessed, please go to the jury room. The courtroom clerk and the trial court administrator from Cumberland County who are coordinating aspects relating to the jury will come into the jury deliberation room to talk with you and to get some information from you. The information that they will want will include telephone numbers where you can be reached during the day or in the evening. We need them. And they may ask questions about the best times to reach you and the best numbers to do that. So they will want some fairly complete information about places that we can reach you.\nAnd it may be that if you know between now and then there will be, you know, a couple days where you may be out of town and be at a different number, that will be fine if we can know where to reach you. So they will be trying \u2014 they will be getting more information about how to get up with you than we have been getting from the jury generally because you have been selected as jurors in this case.\nThey will also be giving you some information about the transportation procedure and about the lunch procedure during the trial, including the menu that you will be able to choose from during the trial and the menu selection sheets. So I would ask that you cooperate with them in furnishing the information that they have requested, and if you have questions about the logistics of reporting, you may ask them and they will probably have the answers.\nOne thing we do not know at this point is exactly the precise location here at the courthouse where you will report. We will have a place and there will be parking provided at that place, but we cannot tell you right now the precise location. When you are called and told to come in, you will be told specifically when to report. The reporting time will be 8:15. That is on the sheet. That will be basically the reporting time each day unless there is something unusual for that day about the court schedule. So the reporting time here at the courthouse in Johnston County or some location near this will be 8:15 in the morning.\nThe court schedule again 10:00 to 4:00 with an hour for lunch probably from 12:30 to 1:30. There will be a short break in the middle of the morning, short break in the middle of the afternoon. And then at 4:00 go back to the bus, take you back to the same place \u2014 well, the place where your car is here in Johnston County. If somebody is driving you here, that is fine. You should be back at the same place. The bus will leave from the same place and come back to the same place which is near where the cars will be parked. So if somebody is going to pick you up, they could do so at that location.\nThe trial court gave similar instructions after each of the remaining nine jurors and four alternate jurors were selected.\nDefendants argue the clerk\u2019s communication with selected jurors was not merely administrative in nature in that there is a possibility the jurors asked the clerk substantive questions. In support of this argument, defendants point out that, in its instructions to jurors Kirsti Lovette Kearney, Sharon Seals Waugh, and Alice Rayne Stephenson, the trial court added:\nIf you have questions about the logistics of when you report, where you report \u2014 no one can answer or would answer any questions about any other aspect of the trial \u2014 but if you have questions about those kind of logistical matters that [the clerk] may be able to answer those questions for you.\nDefendants argue this additional instruction indicates there was a problem limiting jurors\u2019 questions to those concerning logistical matters. Defendants also state the trial court did not give this additional instruction to any other group of selected jurors.\nThe clerk of court\u2019s contact with the selected jurors in the instant case is similar to that in Bacon, Lemons, and May. The clerk was performing an administrative duty in providing logistical information to newly selected jurors. The clerk obtained telephone numbers of the selected jurors, who were placed on telephone standby and were provided information about where to park and the lunch menu during trial. While the trial court did instruct three jurors with the additional statements as defendants indicated, the trial court also made a similar statement when instructing juror Timothy Hugh Renfrew, but to no other jurors. Later, however, when the trial court instructed alternate juror Audrey Pittman, it stated:\nif you will go to the jury deliberation room and wait there for the courtroom clerk, she will come there with the instruction material, with the menu, with the order sheets for the first couple of days, to get your telephone numbers and then answer any other questions that you have.\nContrary to defendants\u2019 contentions, the trial court\u2019s failure to make a statement to the jurors that followed, similar to the one made to jurors Kearney, Waugh, Stephenson, and Renfrew, and the one given to alternate juror Pittman, shows there was no such concern that the jurors were asking the clerk inappropriate questions. Moreover, as there is nothing in the record to suggest that anything other than logistics was discussed, and the fact that defendants failed to object, we assume the clerk engaged only in the administrative duties assigned. See May, 334 N.C. at 615, 434 S.E.2d at 183.\nDefendants also argue the trial court indicated the clerk would be discussing transportation procedures, which defendants contend was a substantive issue. Defendants made pretrial motions concerning the route jurors would take to Cumberland County and requested that jurors not be driven by the scene of the crime. These motions were allowed. Defendants contend any discussion of transportation with the clerk could have generated questions about the route and time required to travel from one county to the other.\nDefendants speculate that discussion may have arisen about the bus route to Cumberland County. Regarding the subject of transportation, the record indicates the clerk was to inform the jurors where to park their cars in the morning and where the bus would drop them off in the evening. Defendants can focus only on what jurors may have asked the clerk about the transportation route and the time necessary to travel from Johnston County to Cumberland County. Based on defendants\u2019 failure to object and because the record contains nothing to suggest the clerk spoke with jurors about the bus route or any other substantive issue, we assume the clerk limited any conversation to the logistics of jury service and any other administrative matters. See id. at 614-15, 434 S.E.2d at 183. Therefore, we conclude defendants\u2019 assignments of error are without merit and are overruled.\nBy assignments of error, both defendants contend the trial court erred by excusing for cause prospective jurors Timothy Ray, Sandra Parker, Jarrell Etheridge, Pamela Sessions, Lester Brown, Michael Hood, Richard Coppedge, Brenda Pone, Paquita Raynor, Edward Blackmon, Robert Batts, and Clifton Cooley because they were qualified to serve and could be fair and impartial. In their briefs, however, defendants argue only that the trial court erred in excusing prospective juror Sandra Parker. As to the remaining prospective jurors defendants included in their assignments of error, any claims are deemed abandoned pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(5).\nIn his brief, Tilmon argues the trial court erred in excusing prospective juror Parker for cause without allowing an opportunity to ask further questions. Tilmon contends this error stripped him of his constitutional rights by precluding him from making a full and fair inquiry during the jury selection process. Kevin incorporates Tilmon\u2019s argument and contends the trial court erred in excusing Parker for cause in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, Kevin argues the trial court\u2019s inquiry into Parker\u2019s state of mind was cursory, overly general, and not adequate to demonstrate Parker lacked the ability to be fair and impartial.\nA defendant\u2019s due process rights guarantee the right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. See State v. Boykin, 291 N.C. 264, 269, 229 S.E.2d 914, 917 (1976). Either party may challenge an individual juror for cause if the juror is \u201cunable to render a fair and impartial verdict.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212(9) (1999). \u201cIt has long been held that the \u2018granting of a challenge for cause rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.\u2019 \u201d State v. Hartman, 344 N.C. 445, 458, 476 S.E.2d 328, 335 (1996) (quoting State v. Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 753, 429 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1993)), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1201, 137 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1997); see also State v. Burrus, 344 N.C. 79, 88, 472 S.E.2d 867, 874 (1996); State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 270, 464 S.E.2d 448, 461 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1996). Therefore, absent a showing of abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court\u2019s ruling on a challenge for cause. See Hartman, 344 N.C. at 458, 476 S.E.2d at 335.\nTo determine whether a prospective juror is able to render a fair and impartial verdict, the trial court must be able to \u201c \u2018reasonably conclude from the voir dire ... that a prospective juror can disregard prior knowledge and impressions, follow the trial court\u2019s instructions on the law, and render an impartial, independent decision based on the evidence.\u2019 \u201d State v. Sokolowski, 351 N.C. 137, 148, 522 S.E.2d 65, 72 (1999) (quoting Jaynes, 342 N.C. at 270, 464 S.E.2d at 461). In the context of excusing jurors for cause because their views on the death penalty would substantially impair the performance of their duties as a juror, this Court has held:\nWhen challenges for cause are supported by prospective jurors\u2019 answers to questions propounded by the prosecutor and by the court, the court does not abuse its discretion, at least in the absence of a showing that further questioning by defendant would likely have produced different answers, by refusing to allow the defendant to question the juror challenged.\nState v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 40, 274 S.E.2d 183, 191 (1981).\nIn the instant case, Parker indicated to the prosecutor she could find defendants guilty, the relatively young ages of defendants would not cause her any problem, she could fairly evaluate the evidence despite having family members in law enforcement, she could consider both possible punishments, she could impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for someone convicted of first-degree murder, she could recommend the death penalty if she felt it was the appropriate punishment, and she could be fair. The prosecutor accepted Parker.\nTilmon\u2019s counsel then questioned Parker. Parker indicated she could render a fair judgment from the facts presented; she could maintain impartiality despite seeing the photographs and other evidence; she could maintain impartiality regardless of defendants\u2019 or the victims\u2019 race or defendants\u2019 religion; and she could weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, follow the trial court\u2019s instructions, and fairly consider both life imprisonment without parole and the death penalty. Tilmon\u2019s counsel accepted Parker.\nWhen Kevin\u2019s counsel questioned Parker, however, she became emotional and began to doubt her impartiality.\n[Counsel For Kevin]: ... Do you think your \u2014 let\u2019s go to that, do you think your nerves might cause you some problems in this trial? Do you think \u2014 I mean do you think there might be something about this trial that will cause you to be so emotional or so distraught that you just won\u2019t be able to give it your full attention and be a fair and impartial juror?\n[Prospective Juror Parker]: At the beginning of the week, I probably would have said no, but it seems like the closer it gets, the longer it goes, the more it weighs on my mind, what is actually happening here.\n[Counsel For Kevin]: You understand this is a serious charge obviously and this is serious business that we\u2019re here about. Do you mind expanding on that a little? I mean do you think there is something about the trial that may be so emotionally trying for you or so devastating that you wouldn\u2019t be able to give it your full attention or that you wouldn\u2019t be able to render a fair and impartial verdict or consider the evidence fairly and consider the defendants guilty \u2014 innocent until proven guilty, weigh the death penalty and life imprisonment without parole? Do you think some of that might be a problem because of emotions? Tell us now. Now is the time.\n[Prospective Juror Parker]: Like I said, I have a daughter. She\u2019s eight years old. And it weighs on my mind that one day she\u2019s going to be a teenager and that she may \u2014 something may happen where she gets in trouble and I may be sitting behind her in the courtroom and I don\u2019t think I can pass a judgment on another person\u2019s child. I can\u2019t do that. (Juror crying.)\nThe trial court then intervened and asked questions of Parker.\nThe Court: Ma\u2019am, let me ask you this. Do you feel that the concern that you just raised would interfere substantially with your ability to be fair and impartial to all the parties in this case?\n[Prospective Juror Parker]: (Nodding head.)\nThe Court: Now, let me ask you this. Understanding that it would be hard for you, understanding that you would give it your best efforts, right now, those are not really the questions, whether it would be hard because it may very well be hard to do, you know. And I recognize that you would absolutely give it your best effort. Given that, do you have a question about your ability to be fair to everyone involved in this case?\n[Prospective Juror Parker]: I have doubts.\nThe Court: Well, there\u2019s a way that I have asked this to some other jurors that have gone on, so I\u2019m going to ask you, are you confident \u2014 are you confident of your ability to be fair and impartial to everyone involved in this case or do you have a serious doubt, a substantial doubt concerning your ability to be fair and impartial?\n[Prospective Juror Parker]: I have a substantial doubt.\nThe trial court then excused Parker to return to the jury deliberation room. Parker left the courtroom, and the attorneys for all parties discussed her responses.\nThe Court: Anybody got anything?\n[Counsel For Kevin]: Nothing from us.\n[Prosecutor]: Yes, sir, Judge. The state would challenge her for cause based on her remarks, if I understand her correctly\u2014\nThe Court: Okay.\n[Prosecutor]: \u2014as to what she said.\nThe Court: I will hear from the defendant Kevin Golphin.\n[Counsel For Kevin]: Well, Your Honor, I guess I would like to ask her a few more questions if I could. I\u2019m not sure she has exactly said she couldn\u2019t render a fair and impartial verdict in weighing the evidence and after hearing the evidence.\nThe Court: Mr. Parish?\n[Counsel For Tilmon]: I have nothing to add.\nThe trial court then issued its ruling on the State\u2019s motion to excuse Parker for cause and Kevin\u2019s request to ask additional questions, saying:\nThe question of the ability to be fair and having substantial doubt, concerning the ability to be fair has sort of been my litany in this case throughout and it has been my inclination to allow that to be the standard, and it would be my intent when we come down with the question of any juror to keep that as the standard. Therefore, in the Court\u2019s discretion, I\u2019m going to decline the permitting of additional questions and excuse the juror for cause.\nBased on our review of the transcript in the instant case, we note that Tilmon did not request from the trial court an opportunity to ask Parker more questions. Although Tilmon states that both he and Kevin requested such an opportunity, the transcript reveals that Kevin\u2019s counsel indicated a desire to ask more questions, but Tilmon\u2019s counsel stated, \u201cI have nothing to add.\u201d The statement by Tilmon\u2019s counsel does not express an intent to join the request made by Kevin\u2019s counsel. Therefore, Tilmon has not preserved appellate review of this argument pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Moreover, as Tilmon claims the trial court\u2019s excusal of Parker violates his constitutional rights, we note that this Court is not required to rule on a constitutional issue unless it was raised and determined by the trial court. See Nobles, 350 N.C. at 495, 515 S.E.2d at 893. Tilmon\u2019s counsel did not raise a constitutional issue with the trial court concerning the trial court\u2019s decision to excuse Parker, and the trial court did not have an opportunity to rule on any constitutional issue. Therefore, we need not address Tilmon\u2019s argument as to the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude Parker for cause. As Kevin did request an opportunity to ask Parker further questions, we address his argument.\nParker initially indicated that she could be fair and impartial but then expressed some doubt. The trial court asked Parker more than once whether she doubted her ability to be impartial. In each instance, Parker indicated either that she felt her concerns would interfere with her ability to be fair and impartial or that she doubted her ability to be fair and impartial. Based on the voir dire of Parker, the trial court correctly concluded that she could not render a fair and impartial decision. See Sokolowski, 351 N.C. at 148, 522 S.E.2d at 72. In addition, there was no showing that further questioning by Kevin\u2019s counsel would have produced different answers. See Oliver, 302 N.C. at 40, 274 S.E.2d at 191. Kevin has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to further question Parker and in excusing Parker for cause. Kevin\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nBy assignment of error, Tilmon argues the trial court erred in excusing prospective juror Belinda Smith as not qualified. Tilmon specifically argues that because more than two years had elapsed between the end of Smith\u2019s prior jury service and the time she would have been empaneled in the instant case, she was \u201cqualified\u201d to serve as a juror, and the trial court\u2019s actions in excusing her violated his state and federal constitutional rights. We disagree.\nThe transcript reveals that at the time jury selection commenced, Smith had previously served on a federal jury within two years and was not immediately qualified to serve in the instant case. In addition, Tilmon suggested that the trial court excuse her from service. Tilmon cannot now complain that the trial court\u2019s excusal of Smith violated his constitutional rights. As we have previously stated, this Court will not ordinarily consider constitutional questions not raised and passed on by the trial court. See Wallace, 351 N.C. at 503, 528 S.E.2d at 340-41. Therefore, Tilmon has failed to preserve this question for appellate review.\nAssuming arguendo that the question was preserved for appellate review, Tllmon\u2019s argument must fail.\nAll persons are qualified to serve as jurors and to be included on the jury list who are citizens of the State and residents of the county, who have not served as jurors during the preceding two years .... Persons not qualified under this section are subject to challenge for cause.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 9-3 (1999) (emphasis added). Additionally, \u201c[t]he clerk shall, at the beginning of court, swear all jurors who have not been selected as grand jurors.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 9-14 (1999) (emphasis added). In the context of swearing in prospective jurors, we have previously defined the phrase \u201cat the beginning of court\u201d as \u201cthe beginning of the [session] of court.\u201d State v. McNeill, 349 N.C. 634, 643, 509 S.E.2d 415, 420 (1998), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 145 L. Ed. 2d 87 (1999).\nIn the instant case, Tilmon argues the trial court should have moved Smith to a later panel and then sworn her in at the time she was called, which would have been two years after her prior jury service. However, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 9-14 mandates that prospective jurors be sworn in at the beginning of court, which we have held refers to the beginning of the session of court. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 9-14; McNeill, 349 N.C. at 643, 509 S.E.2d at 420. Therefore, the trial court did not have the authority to swear Smith in at a later time. Because Smith could not be sworn in at the beginning of the session of court as the statute requires, the trial court did not err in excusing her for cause. Tilmon\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nBy assignments of error, both Kevin and Tilmon argue the trial court erred by allowing the State to exercise peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of their state and federal constitutional rights. Specifically, defendants contend the State\u2019s reasons for excusing prospective jurors Deadra Holder and John Murray were pretextual, and the trial court did not conduct an adequate inquiry. We disagree.\nThe Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 26 of the Constitution of North Carolina forbid the use of peremptory challenges for a racially discriminatory purpose. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69, 80 (1986); State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 547, 508 S.E.2d 253, 262 (1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026, 144 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1999). \u201cIn Batson the United States Supreme Court set out a three-pronged test to determine whether a prosecutor impermissibly excluded prospective jurors on the basis of their race.\u201d State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 433, 502 S.E.2d 563, 574 (1998) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d 395, 405 (1991)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124, 142 L. Ed. 2d 907 (1999).\nIn the first prong of the Batson test, a criminal defendant must establish a prima facie case that a peremptory challenge was exercised on the basis of race. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405. All relevant circumstances are considered, including the \u201cdefendant\u2019s race, the victim\u2019s race, the race of key witnesses, questions and statements of the prosecutor which tend to support or refute an inference of discrimination, a pattern of strikes against minorities, or the State\u2019s acceptance rate of prospective minority jurors.\u201d White, 349 N.C. at 548, 508 S.E.2d at 262; see also State v. Hoffman, 348 N.C. 548, 550, 500 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1998).\nIn the second prong, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for striking the particular juror. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405; Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 574. The State\u2019s explanation must be clear and reasonably specific, but does not have to rise to the level of justifying a challenge for cause. See Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 574; State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 498, 391 S.E.2d 144, 151 (1990). Moreover, \u201c \u2018[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor\u2019s explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.\u2019 \u201d Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 574-75 (quoting Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 406); see also Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768-69, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834, 839-40 (1995); State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 209-10, 481 S.E.2d 44, 57, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997), and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 140 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1998). In addition, the second prong provides the defendant an opportunity for surrebuttal to show the State\u2019s explanations for the challenge are merely pretextual. See State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 668, 483 S.E.2d 396, 408, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997); State v. Robinson, 330 N.C. 1, 16, 409 S.E.2d 288, 296 (1991).\nWhen the trial court explicitly rules that a defendant failed to make out a prima facie case, review by this Court is limited to whether the trial court\u2019s finding was error. See State v. Fletcher, 348 N.C. 292, 320, 500 S.E.2d 668, 684-85 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1180, 143 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1999). However, when the trial court does not explicitly rule on whether the defendant made a prima facie case, and where the State proceeds to the second prong of Batson by articulating its explanation for the challenge, the question of whether the defendant established aprima facie case becomes moot. See State v. Williams, 343 N.C. 345, 359, 471 S.E.2d 379, 386 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1061, 136 L. Ed. 2d 618 (1997); State v. Lyons, 343 N.C. 1, 11-12, 468 S.E.2d 204, 208, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 894, 136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996).\nIn the third prong of Batson, \u201cthe trial court must determine whether the defendant has satisfied his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.\u201d Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 575 (citing Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 359, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 405). In determining the presence or absence of intentional discrimination, this Court will consider various factors including the \u201csusceptibility of the particular case to racial discrimination, whether the State used all of its peremptory challenges, the race of witnesses in the case, questions and statements by the prosecutor during jury selection which tend to support or refute an inference of discrimination, and whether the State has accepted any African-American jurors.\u201d White, 349 N.C. at 548-49, 508 S.E.2d at 262. A trial court\u2019s rulings regarding race neutrality and purposeful discrimination are largely based on evaluations of credibility and. should be given great deference. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 89 n.21; Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 575. We will uphold the trial court\u2019s determination unless we are convinced it is clearly erroneous. See State v. Kandies, 342 N.C. 419, 434-35, 467 S.E.2d 67, 75, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 894, 136 L. Ed. 2d 167 (1996).\nIn the instant case, the State peremptorily challenged Holder. Tilmon\u2019s counsel contended the challenge was not race-neutral, stating it was impermissible pursuant to Batson because Holder appeared to be African-American, she gave no inappropriate responses, she had no prior criminal record, she was gainfully employed, and there were no criminals in her family. Kevin\u2019s counsel also noted that Holder appeared to be African-American and that Batson was controlling unless the State could provide race-neutral reasons for the challenge.\nWithout ruling, the trial court stated it would hear from the State. The following dialogue took place:\n[Prosecutor]: Judge, our first contention would be that that doesn\u2019t rise to the level of prima facie showing. However, if the state \u2014 if the Court would allow me to and thinks it\u2019s appropriate at this time, I would be glad if the Court sees fit to state my reasons for excusing that juror.\nThe Court: If you will proceed.\n[Prosecutor]: Yes, sir. One \u2014 I have several reasons for that excuse, Your Honor, and one of [] them is that as I talked to Ms. Holder, I attempted to draw her out and to engage her in more than one-word answers or simply short-phrased answers in a number of ways, not only with the questions that were in the pool of questions I was asking, but also questions that related to her and her family relationship and so on.\nShe \u2014 she did not respond to that. I frankly don\u2019t know if that\u2019s because she\u2019s shy or because she didn\u2019t want to tell us or perceived it as her personal business or whatever. But I never was able to draw her out in that manner.\n. . . And so that was one of the reasons that the state considered excusing Ms. Holder. Another is the age of Ms. Holder. She indicated that she is 22 and that she has a sister who is 18. The relative ages of those individuals and the fact that they still live together in view in particular, Your Honor, of what the state perceives the defendants] to be questioning jurors about and the state\u2019s perception of what the defendants] [are] likely to assert as a defense or as an argument in this case, the defendants] [have] consistently asked jurors about their brothers and their sisters and the age differences between them and the relationships, how close they were, how close they were growing up, those sorts of things.\nThe Court: You \u2014 you\u2019re contending here that this individual has a brother the approximate age range of these defendants?\n[Prosecutor]: She said she has a sister who is 18 and she is 22. They both still live at home with their parents. They both work in the same place.\nThe Court: That she has a sibling in the age range of the defendants?\n[Prosecutor]: Yes, sir. And in view of what the state perceives and has gathered from the line of questioning \u2014 consistent line of questioning of the defense attorneys of the prospective jurors to this point, the state felt that this juror was one that we wanted to consider and think about in terms of what we perceive the defendants\u2019] defense to be.\nAlso I noted in my notes and I remember at the time when I asked her about the death penalty, she paused and she said, well, I guess if someone found \u2014 and then she said reasonable doubt, the death penalty might be \u2014 is appropriate. Then I see nothing wrong with it. She had a pause there that also we had some concern about. And the \u2014 but mainly the concerns that we had regarding what the state perceives the defense to be proceeding on is our concern.\nThe trial court then gave Tilmon\u2019s counsel an opportunity to respond. Tilmon\u2019s counsel stated that the State had not asked other prospective jurors whether they had siblings in this age group; that Holder answered the closed-ended questions posed to her with \u201cyes, ma\u2019am,\u201d and \u201cno, ma\u2019am,\u201d answers; and that Holder did not hesitate when answering the State\u2019s questions regarding the death penalty, to which she indicated she could vote for the death penalty if someone was proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Kevin\u2019s counsel reiterated Tilmon\u2019s counsel\u2019s comments and noted that he had not heard the State ask other prospective jurors about their siblings, the State asked nothing but yes or no questions, and Holder answered the death penalty questions appropriately.\nThe trial court then ruled:\nIt is the Court\u2019s belief that the articulated reason that the juror was relatively young and close to the age range of the defendants and that the juror had a sibling at approximately the age range of the defendants constitutes an articulable race neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge, and so the motion is, therefore, denied.\nThe following day, the State peremptorily challenged Murray Kevin\u2019s counsel challenged the State\u2019s peremptory challenge of Murray based on Batson. Kevin\u2019s counsel indicated there was no articulable basis for the challenge; both Murray and Kevin were black males; and over one-quarter, and almost one-third, of the State\u2019s peremptory challenges were against African-Americans. Tilmon\u2019s counsel joined the motion and stated the State had passed only one minority juror at that point. The trial court then indicated that because it had required an articulable reason for the previous Batson challenge, it was going to require an articulable reason for each Batson challenge thereafter.\nThe State then provided the following reasons for its peremptory challenge:\n[Prosecutor]: . . . Your Honor, we would challenge Mr. Murray on the cumulative effect of three things. One, he has a prior conviction himself for driving while impaired. Two, his father has a prior conviction for robbery for which he served, if I remember correctly, six years in the Department of Corrections. And three, Mr. Murray\u2019s statement that he attributed to a male and a female white juror in the courtroom with respect to what he viewed as a challenge to the due process rights of the defendants. The cumulative effect of that we contend makes him challengeable by the state from our point of view peremptorily.\nI would also note that during the course of his answers at no time other than answering the questions and facing the person that was asking him the questions, while I certainly don\u2019t expect to be afforded any courtesy or recognition of authority because I don\u2019t have any authority, so to speak, but I noticed that when he spoke, he did not refer to the Court with any deferential statement other than saying \u201cyes\u201d or \u201cno\u201d in answering your questions when you asked them.\nIn addition, in my view with respect to his demeanor, I noted that he had a gold earring in his left ear. I also noted and perceived from my point of view a rather militant animus with respect to some of his answers. He elaborated on some things. Other things, he gave very short, what I viewed as sharp answers and also noted that when he spoke to the Court, that he did not defer, at least in his language, to the Court\u2019s authority, did not refer to the Court in answering yes, sir or no, sir. Did not address the Court as Your Honor. He just simply gave rather short, cryptic answers.\nThe trial court then allowed defendants an opportunity to respond. Kevin\u2019s counsel stated: the State\u2019s argument relying on comments of others was unfair in our system of justice; a prospective juror who was Caucasian had convictions for breaking and entering and trespassing but had not been challenged by the State; Murray stated the situation with his father would not affect him as a juror; and because there were fewer than ten percent minority members of prospective jurors to be chosen in this case, with this challenge, the State had challenged one-third of the prospective minority jurors. Tilmon\u2019s counsel noted: the State accepted another prospective Caucasian juror with a driving while impaired conviction; Murray indicated to the State and to the trial court that the conversation he overheard would not impact his ability to be fair; and the State did not ask questions which would show the impact of Murray\u2019s father\u2019s conviction, such as whether his father was treated fairly and whether the conviction affected Murray.\nThe trial court then held: \u201cThe Court determines that the state has established a non-racial basis for the peremptory challenge and the objection to that peremptory challenge based on Batson is overruled and denied.\u201d Following defendants\u2019 objections, the trial court stated:\nI would just note for the record that I did not perceive \u2014 since this has been raised, I did not perceive any conduct of the juror to be less than deferential to the Court. I think that the juror did demonstrate a consistent reticence to elaborate on questions, but all of his responses were appropriate to the specific questions asked. And probably that \u2014 there was a substantial degree of clarity and thoughtfulness in the juror\u2019s responses.\nAnd the Court will note for the record that it is primarily relying upon the defendant\u2019s prior record, specifically which it involved an interaction with a traffic law enforcement officer, and the potential empathy that might be engendered from a father who was a criminal defendant as the basis for the exercise of the peremptory challenge.\nI would note further I am not relying upon the impact of the incident in the courtroom as providing a basis for this and frankly is not \u2014 I do not consider it to be appropriate for even the exercise for a peremptory challenge.\nThe State in the instant case gave reasons for peremptorily challenging both Holder and Murray. Therefore, \u201c \u2018we need not address the question of whether defendants] met [their] initial burden of showing discrimination],] and [they] may proceed as if a prima facie case had been established.\u2019 \u201d Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 434, 502 S.E.2d at 575 (quoting State v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542, 557, 476 S.E.2d 658, 665 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1147, 137 L. Ed. 2d 483 (1997)).\nAs to the second prong of Batson, the State provided race-neutral reasons for the peremptory challenges of both Holder and Murray. With regard to Holder, we perceive no inherent discriminatory intent in the State\u2019s explanation that Holder was young, within the age range of defendants, and had a sister who was also within the age range of defendants. See Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 574-75. Defendants have failed to show the State\u2019s reasoning was pretextual. See Gaines, 345 N.C. at 668, 483 S.E.2d at 408. The State relied on previous questions by defense counsel to formulate what it believed to be the defense theory in this case and then proceeded to ask questions similar to those asked by defense counsel. There was no evidence of pretext, as the State sought to exclude Holder because she might be able to empathize with defendants because she and her sister were within the same age range as defendants. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that the State\u2019s reasoning was race-neutral.\nWith regard to Murray, we perceive no inherent discriminatory intent in the State\u2019s explanation that Murray had been convicted of driving while impaired and that his father had a prior conviction for robbery for which he had served six years in the Department of Correction. See Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 574-75. Defendants did not show the State\u2019s explanation to be pretextual. See Gaines, 345 N.C. at 668, 483 S.E.2d at 408. While defendants pointed to two other Caucasian prospective jurors who had criminal convictions and were accepted by the State, those other prospective jurors did not also have a parent who was convicted of robbery for which he or she was incarcerated. There is no evidence of pretext, as the State sought to exclude Murray because he might empathize with defendants because of his own experience with traffic law enforcement and his father\u2019s incarceration in the Department of Correction. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding the State\u2019s reasoning to be race-neutral.\nAs the State provided race-neutral reasons for its peremptory challenges of Holder and Murray, we move to the third prong of Batson. In light of the factors we consider in evaluating whether there is purposeful discrimination, we note that this case may be one susceptible to racial discrimination because defendants are African-Americans and the victims were Caucasian. See White, 349 N.C. at 548-49, 508 S.E.2d at 262. However, the State did not exhaust the statutory number of peremptory challenges allowed for the first twelve jurors, nor did it exhaust its challenges in selecting the four alternate jurors. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1217; White, 349 N.C. at 548-49, 508 S.E.2d at 262. In addition, based on the discussion which occurred at the time the State challenged Holder, the State had exercised nine peremptory challenges, only three of which were against African-Americans; the next day, when Murray was challenged, the State had exercised eleven peremptory challenges, only four of which were against African-Americans, one being Holder. The State had accepted six prospective jurors, one of whom was African-American. This constituted a higher percentage of African-Americans accepted by the State than were in the jury pool. In selecting the twelve jurors and four alternates, the State exercised twenty-seven peremptory challenges, only four of which were against African-Americans. This ratio represents a percentage of African-Americans equivalent to the percentage of African-Americans in the jury pool. Moreover, during jury selection, the State made no comments which would support an inference of discrimination in the instant case.\nFrom our review of the transcript in the instant case, it is apparent the trial court gave great consideration to the arguments by all parties with regard to these two Batson challenges before concluding the State did not purposefully discriminate against Holder or Murray. We give great deference to the trial court\u2019s rulings. See Bonnett, 348 N.C. at 433, 502 S.E.2d at 575. Given the foregoing, we are convinced the State did not discriminate on the basis of race in exercising its peremptory challenges against Holder and Murray. See Kandies, 342 N.C. at 434-35, 467 S.E.2d at 75. Defendants\u2019 assignments of error are overruled.\nGUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE\nBy assignment of error, Kevin argues the trial court erred in allowing the State, during its presentation of rebuttal evidence, to demonstrate the effects of pepper spray in an experiment under circumstances dissimilar to those that actually occurred and with the use of law enforcement officers trained in the use of pepper spray. Kevin contends the experiment prejudiced his defense. We disagree.\nThis Court has recognized a distinction between demonstrations and experiments. An experiment is \u201c \u2018a test made to demonstrate a known truth, to examine the validity of a hypothesis, or to determine the efficacy of something previously untried.\u2019 \u201d State v. Allen, 323 N.C. 208, 225, 372 S.E.2d 855, 865 (1988) (quoting State v. Hunt, 80 N.C. App. 190, 193, 341 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1986)), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1021, 108 L. Ed. 2d 601 (1990). \u201cExperimental evidence is competent and admissible if the experiment is carried out under substantially similar circumstances to those which surrounded the original occurrence.\u201d State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 147, 505 S.E.2d 277, 294 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1075, 143 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1999); see also State v. Jones, 287 N.C. 84, 97, 214 S.E.2d 24, 33 (1975); State v. Carter, 282 N.C. 297, 300, 192 S.E.2d 279, 281 (1972). However, exclusion is not required when the conditions are not exactly similar; rather, it goes to the weight of the evidence with the jury. See Locklear, 349 N.C. at 147, 505 S.E.2d at 294. Generally, the trial court is given broad discretion to determine if the conditions are sufficiently similar. See id.; State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 686, 309 S.E.2d 170, 178 (1983).\nA demonstration on the other hand is \u201c \u2018an illustration or explanation, as of a theory or product, by exemplification or practical application.\u2019 \u201d Allen, 323 N.C. at 225, 372 S.E.2d at 865 (quoting Hunt, 80 N.C. App. at 193, 341 S.E.2d at 353). The test for admissibility of evidence regarding a demonstration is whether, if relevant, the probative value of the evidence \u201cis substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading the jury.\u201d Id.; see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 401, 403 (1999). In general, we note that all evidence offered by the State will have a prejudicial effect on a defendant; however, the prejudicial effect will vary in degree. See State v. Hedgepeth, 350 N.C. 776, 785, 517 S.E.2d 605, 611 (1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 146 L. Ed. 2d 223, (2000); State v. Wilson, 345 N.C. 119, 127, 478 S.E.2d 507, 512-13 (1996); State v. Weathers, 339 N.C. 441, 449, 451 S.E.2d 266, 270 (1994). The determination of whether relevant evidence should be excluded pursuant to Rule 403 \u201cis a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court can be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d Wallace, 351 N.C. at 523, 528 S.E.2d at 352-53; see also State v. Pierce, 346 N.C. 471, 490, 488 S.E.2d 576, 587 (1997).\nThis issue originated when the prosecutor asked First Sergeant George Williamson, a training officer with the North Carolina State Highway Patrol, to spray the prosecutor\u2019s arms with pepper spray. Kevin objected to the prosecutor being the subject of the demonstration because he would become a witness. Thereafter, during a lengthy discussion on the issue and after the trial court had indicated a willingness to allow the pepper spray demonstration with witnesses other than the prosecutor, Kevin again voiced an objection based on the use of law enforcement officers who have experience being sprayed with pepper spray because \u201c[t]hat would skew the results, unless the demonstration \u2014 or the sample is sufficiently large that you would find some of these variable reactions in there.\u201d The trial court overruled that objection. Kevin modified his objection and moved \u201cthat whoever the state uses to spray be a person who does not have prior experience with being sprayed.\u201d The trial court overruled the objection and stated it would not limit either side as to who is sprayed because the opposing side could point out the prior experience to the jury during cross-examination. The trial court further limited the testimony to the subject\u2019s reaction to being sprayed.\nWhen the State presented six possible witnesses to be sprayed, Kevin objected to all six as they were all trained law enforcement officers and objected to the \u201cdemonstration in total as being inappropriate, improper and not a valid sampling of the general population as to the effects of pepper spray.\u201d The trial court sustained the objection as to two Cumberland County sheriff\u2019s deputies who had provided security to the jury, but overruled the objection as to four members of the State Highway Patrol.\nThereafter, Sgt. Williamson sprayed Troopers Raymond Battle and Curtis Toler with foam pepper spray. The State asked Sgt. Williamson to spray Trooper Battle in a manner so that some of the spray got on his face and in his ear but not in his eye. The State then asked Sgt. Williamson to spray Trooper Toler in a manner so that some spray got on his face, in his ear, and in his eye. Trooper Battle then testified that he felt no burning sensation on his face or in his ear. He further testified that in 1993, he was sprayed with stream pepper spray, rather than foam pepper spray, directly in his eyes. Trooper Battle indicated the prior spraying had been incapacitating and that it had taken approximately twenty-five minutes before he could see well enough to function.\nTrooper Toler then testified to his reaction. He indicated that he felt an intense burning sensation when the spray hit his left eye, and he closed his eye. He stated he could still use his right eye and felt no burning sensation in the right eye. In 1993, Trooper Toler was sprayed in both eyes, and it had taken approximately twenty to twenty-five minutes for him to recover. Trooper Toler then stated that if he had been sprayed in both eyes, as he was in 1993, he would not have been able to walk to his chair unassisted as he was able to do following the instant demonstration. Trooper Toler also indicated that in 1993, a lot of pepper spray had gotten into his nose causing \u201cmaterial\u201d to come out of his nose; however, during the instant demonstration, only a little spray got into his nose which caused him to have only a minor \u201csniffle.\u201d Following the State\u2019s demonstration, both defendants were given an opportunity to present additional witnesses to be sprayed with pepper spray and then to testify about their reaction. Neither defendant chose to present evidence in response to the State\u2019s demonstration.\nWe hold the evidence at issue here was a demonstration. In arguing for the pepper spray demonstration, the State contended that \u201cat this point all we\u2019re trying to do is, first of all, explain to this jury what this stuff is. It\u2019s not some fancy compound. It\u2019s just, uh, cayenne peppers,\u201d and that the jury \u201cneeds to have some reality to this issue.\u201d The presentation by the State was to illustrate or explain to the jury the effects of pepper spray by practical application. See Allen, 323 N.C. at 225, 372 S.E.2d at 865.\nThe evidence of the pepper spray demonstration was relevant as Kevin had made the effects of pepper spray an issue in the instant case. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401. During the State\u2019s presentation of evidence, Kevin repeatedly asked witnesses on cross-examination questions pertaining to pepper spray. On cross-examination of Sergeant Jimmie Turbeville of the State Highway Patrol, Kevin asked what the effects of being sprayed in the face with pepper spray would be, and Sgt. Turbeville responded that it was very painful and irritating to the eyes. On cross-examination of Sergeant Danny Williams of the Harnett County Sheriff\u2019s Department, Kevin asked about the use of pepper spray and the varying reactions people with different sensitivities can have to being sprayed. Sgt. Williams also indicated that if someone was not sprayed in the eyes, the person might experience mild burning depending on the sensitivity of the individual\u2019s skin. On cross-examination of Trooper Vincent Terry of the State Highway Patrol, Kevin asked whether Trooper Terry himself had been sprayed and whether he had ever used pepper spray on anyone else. Trooper Terry stated that when he was sprayed, he experienced a burning sensation in his eyes; and when he sprayed someone during a traffic stop, the person began crying and screaming, and he assumed she was feeling pain from being sprayed.\nIn addition, Kevin\u2019s entire presentation of evidence related to the use of pepper spray. The sole focus of Kevin\u2019s opening statement was pepper spray. Kevin\u2019s counsel read the warning label from the container of pepper spray as well as instructions for use of the product. Thereafter, Kevin offered a pepper spray demonstration by a private investigator and then called Sergeant William Ellis of the Cumberland County Sheriff\u2019s Department to testify about pepper spray. Kevin asked Sgt. Ellis several questions about the proper use of pepper spray and then asked him to read portions of the instructions for the use of pepper spray, which included: \u201cNumber six, extreme caution should be exercised when using an aerosol irritant projector against persons who have reduced sensitivity to pain. If such persons are not disabled with an aerosol irritant projector, they may react with violence.\u201d\nAs Kevin continually asked questions on cross-examination of State witnesses about the effects of pepper spray, and on direct examination offered only evidence concerning the use of pepper spray, the effects of pepper spray, and the warnings for pepper spray, the State\u2019s rebuttal demonstration showing the effects of pepper spray was relevant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401.\nHaving determined the evidence of the demonstration was relevant, we must now determine whether the evidence should have been excluded because the probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-I, Rule 403. Although Kevin argues the circumstances surrounding the demonstration were dissimilar to those surrounding the incident, that is not the focus of our review in the instant case. Kevin has not shown that the prejudicial effect of the demonstration substantially outweighed its probative value. Based on our review of the transcript, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the demonstration of the effects of pepper spray. Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing the demonstration.\nWith regard to Kevin\u2019s argument about the use of law enforcement officers for the demonstration, he cannot show prejudice. When the trial court decided to allow the State to present the demonstration, it informed Kevin he would also be given an opportunity to present witnesses to be sprayed and then to testify. Kevin even indicated to the court that he would call his own witnesses to be sprayed and to testify. However, at the conclusion of the State\u2019s presentation, Kevin decided not to introduce alternative participants. In addition, the trial court stated, \u201cBoth sides may cross [-] examine each person as to their bias, and that they are, therefore, uh, not completely credible as to their description of their subjective experience.\u201d With Kevin\u2019s opportunity to offer alternative people to participate in the demonstration and his ability to cross-examine the law enforcement officers regarding their potential bias, he cannot show he was prejudiced by the use of law enforcement officers during this demonstration. This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy assignments of error, Kevin argues the trial court erred by admitting evidence offered, first, by the State and, second, by Tilmon regarding seizure of his luggage by the Fayetteville police a week prior to the murders. Kevin contends the evidence offered by the State concerning the alleged misconduct was hearsay, did not corroborate the witness\u2019 testimony, was irrelevant as it showed only bad character, and violated his Confrontation Clause rights. He further contends the evidence offered by Tilmon concerning the alleged misconduct was irrelevant as it had no bearing on Tilmon\u2019s guilt. Both Tilmon and the State relied on this evidence to show Kevin\u2019s motive for stealing the Toyota Camry and to show why the brothers were unable to take the bus back to Richmond. We disagree with Kevin\u2019s contentions.\nIn a pretrial motion in limine, Kevin requested a hearing on the admissibility of any information regarding seizure of drugs from Kevin on 17 September 1997. In the motion, Kevin indicated that on 17 September 1997, the Fayetteville Police Department stopped him at the Fayetteville Greyhound bus station and requested to search his luggage. Kevin refused. The Fayetteville police retained Kevin\u2019s luggage, and Kevin proceeded to South Carolina without being arrested or charged. Thereafter, the police obtained a search warrant and searched Kevin\u2019s luggage. The police allegedly discovered eighty grams of marijuana in Kevin\u2019s bag. In the motion, Kevin asked the trial court to prevent the State from mentioning the seizure of marijuana because there never was a conviction, the seizure was not connected to the instant case, and the introduction of the evidence would be unfairly prejudicial. The trial court deferred ruling on the motion until it became an issue in the case.\nWe begin our discussion with Kevin\u2019s argument that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce evidence concerning the seizure of Kevin\u2019s luggage. When the State was questioning Lt. Kirby about the investigation of the 23 September 1997 armed robbery in Kingstree, South Carolina, the prosecutor sought to introduce the armed robbery report. Kevin asked to view the report and stated that if it referenced only the armed robbery, then he had no objection. After viewing the exhibit, Kevin objected to it \u201cin part.\u201d The trial court overruled the objection and received the report into evidence.\nGenerally, the report includes information similar to Lt. Kirby\u2019s testimony. In his testimony, Lt. Kirby stated that he investigated the armed robbery by canvassing the businesses near Financial Lenders, including the bus station. In the bus station, an employee gave him information on the robbery suspects. Based on this information, Lt. Kirby drove to Greeleyville, South Carolina, to the home of Kevin and Tilmon\u2019s grandparents.\nThe robbery report, however, further provides what people told Lt. Kirby, which Kevin argues to this Court is inadmissible hearsay and violates the Rules of Evidence, as well as his rights under the Confrontation Clause. The report indicates, in pertinent part:\nDuring the course of investigating the above case number, this r/o went to Marcus Department Store, after hearing that Mr. Marcus did talk with the two b/m\u2019s before the robbery took place. While in the store Mr. Marcus was not there, so this r/o asked Mr. Jimmy if he knew anything about the two b/m\u2019s. Mr. Jimmy stated that the suspects came up to file a report that their luggage got lost on the Bus. Mr. Jimmy stated that he asked the two b/m\u2019s what happened to their luggage. Mr. Jimmy stated that the two males stated that the police in Fayetteville, N.C. took their luggage. Mr. Jimmy stated that he asked them did they have any drugs in their luggage. Mr. Jimmy stated they said nothing. Mr. Jimmy stated he told them if they had drugs in the bags that they would not get their luggage back. Mr. Jimmy gave me a copy of a paper with a name of a Thomas Jr. and an address of Rte. 2 Box 66-B Greeleyville, S.C. 29056.\nRegarding the alleged violation of Kevin\u2019s Confrontation Clause rights, we initially note that in the motion in limine requesting a hearing on the admissibility of evidence, Kevin did not raise any constitutional issues. In addition, the objection Kevin made to the introduction of the police report was a general objection \u2014 he did not raise any constitutional issues and did not provide the trial court with an opportunity to rule on any constitutional issues. As \u201c \u2018[t]his Court is not required to pass upon a constitutional issue unless it affirmatively appears that the issue was raised and determined in the trial court,\u2019 \u201d Nobles, 350 N.C. at 495, 515 S.E.2d at 893 (quoting Creason, 313 N.C. at 127, 326 S.E.2d at 27), we need not address Kevin\u2019s argument that admission of the robbery report violated his Confrontation Clause rights.\nNext, we turn to whether admission of the robbery report violated the Rules of Evidence. Kevin objected to the introduction of the robbery report without specifying the grounds for the objection; therefore, we rely on the rules governing general objections. We have previously stated that a general objection is \u201cineffective unless there is no proper purpose for which the evidence is admissible. The burden is on the defendant to show that there was no proper purpose for which the evidence could be admitted.\u201d State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 (1986) (citation omitted); see also State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1, 32, 449 S.E.2d 412, 431 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1091, 131 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1995).\n\u201cRelevant evidence\u201d is \u201cevidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401; see also State v. Perry, 298 N.C. 502, 510, 259 S.E.2d 496, 501 (1979) (holding, \u201c[generally, evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to prove a fact in issue in the case\u201d). Evidence which has no tendency to prove a fact in issue is, however, inadmissible. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 402 (1999); Perry, 298 N.C. at 510, 259 S.E.2d at 501. Pursuant to Rule 403, \u201cthe determination of whether relevant evidence should be excluded is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and the trial court can be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion.\u201d Wallace, 351 N.C. at 523, 528 S.E.2d at 352-53; see also Pierce, 346 N.C. at 490, 488 S.E.2d at 587.\nFurthermore, evidentiary rules define hearsay as \u201ca statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 801(c) (1999). Out-of-court statements offered for purposes other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted are not considered hearsay. State v. Thomas, 350 N.C. 315, 339, 514 S.E.2d 486, 501, cert. denied, - U.S. -, 145 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1999). We have held \u201cstatements of one person to another to explain subsequent actions taken by the person to whom the statement was made are admissible as nonhearsay evidence.\u201d Id.; see also State v. Morston, 336 N.C. 381, 399, 445 S.E.2d 1, 11 (1994); State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 282, 389 S.E.2d 48, 56 (1990).\nThe robbery report in the instant case is relevant evidence. The statements made to Lt. Kirby were vital to the identification of Kevin and Tilmon as the suspects in the armed robbery. The declarant provided the background information in order to show his knowledge of the suspects. Moreover, the report does not indicate the Fayetteville police actually discovered drags in Kevin\u2019s luggage. The declarant merely informed Kevin and Tilmon that if the police discovered drags in the luggage, then the luggage would not be returned to them. In addition, the report was admissible for nonhearsay purposes. The report was not offered to prove the truth of the statements made by the declarant to police, but to help explain the subsequent actions taken by Lt. Kirby in traveling to the home of Kevin and Tilmon\u2019s grandparents, which in turn furthered the investigation of this case. As we have found that the robbery report was admissible, Kevin has not met his burden of showing \u201cthere was no proper purpose for which the evidence could be admitted.\u201d Young, 317 N.C. at 412, 346 S.E.2d at 635. Therefore, we conclude Kevin\u2019s general objection was ineffective, and the trial court did not err in admitting the robbery report into evidence.\nWe now turn to Kevin\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in admitting Tilmon\u2019s evidence concerning the seizure of Kevin\u2019s luggage by the Fayetteville police. Tilmon sought to call Sam Willie McCray, Kevin and Tilmon\u2019s grandfather, as a witness. Tilmon initially reminded the trial court of Kevin\u2019s motion in limine concerning the admissibility of evidence that Fayetteville police seized drugs from Kevin\u2019s luggage. In indicating an intent to call McCray as a witness, Tilmon stated that in a prior interview, \u201cMcCray indicated that Kevin told him that he\u2019d been stopped in Fayetteville on the bus; that the cops had taken his luggage but didn\u2019t say why the law enforcement officers had taken his luggage.\u201d Tilmon further stated he believed \u201cMcCray would testify, if asked, that Kevin told him that he was stopped at the bus station, talked to some of the officers and that they left his luggage there \u2014 they seized his luggage after a dog alerted to it.\u201d Kevin\u2019s counsel then responded: \u201cWe haven\u2019t put anything on from Kevin that they could use that to impeach. I think under a 404 or 403 balancing test, it still fails the test to come in. And it now becomes, at least for practical purposes here, double hearsay.\u201d Kevin\u2019s counsel further argued: \u201cIt may be a prior bad act statement of the defendant. It\u2019s not something Mr. McCray independently knows about.\u201d The trial court allowed Tilmon\u2019s counsel an opportunity to rebut, and TLlmon\u2019s counsel stated: \u201cIt is our contention that it bears on the need to take the car; that it was not our client\u2019s need; that\u2014 again, that the inability to take the bus back up through Fayetteville was based on Kevin Golphin\u2019s problems when he encountered the law enforcement officers in Fayetteville.\u201d Tilmon\u2019s counsel further indicated that while McCray was not told whether there were drugs in Kevin\u2019s luggage, McCray did have a conversation with Kevin about what happened to Kevin\u2019s luggage. The trial court then denied Kevin\u2019s objection.\nTilmon then called McCray, and the following exchange took place, in pertinent part:\nQ Did you ask Kevin about how he got down [to Greeleyville, S.C.]?\nA Yeah \u2014 yes, I did.\nQ What did he tell you?\nA He tell me he came on the bus.\nQ All right. From Richmond?\nA Yes.\nQ Did he indicate any stops along the way?\nA Well, he told me \u2014 he said the bus stop in Fayetteville.\nQ Fayetteville, North Carolina?\nA Yes, sir.\nQ All right. When you saw Kevin, did he have any luggage with him at all?\nA No, sir.\nQ Kevin tell you anything about why he didn\u2019t have any luggage?\nA Well, he said the police had took his luggage in Fayetteville.\nQ Did he tell you why?\nA Uh, no. He just say they take his luggage.\nQ All right. Did they give it back to him?\nA No, sir.\nQ Did he indicate to you why they took the luggage?\n[Kevin\u2019s Counsel]: Objection, asked and answered.\nA No, he didn\u2019t \u2014 he didn\u2019t stated [sic] why they take\u2014\nThe Court: Overruled.\nA \u2014-his luggage.\nThe Court: Overruled.\nAlthough Kevin does not specifically argue the admission of this testimony violates his constitutional rights, he makes a general argument to that effect. However, as previously noted, this Court will not address any constitutional issue with regard to the admission of McCray\u2019s testimony concerning the seizure of Kevin\u2019s luggage because Kevin did not give the trial court an opportunity to pass on any such constitutional issue. See Nobles, 350 N.C. at 495, 515 S.E.2d at 893.\nWe now turn our focus to answering the questions of whether McCray\u2019s testimony was inadmissible as it pertained to unrelated misconduct and whether it was irrelevant as it had no bearing on the question of Tilmon\u2019s guilt. As to the argument that McCray\u2019s testimony was inadmissible because it related to prior misconduct,\n[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (1999) (emphasis added). Rule 404(b), as we have previously held, is\na clear general rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\nCoffey, 326 N.C. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54.\nOn the issue of the relevance of McCray\u2019s testimony, we have previously stated:\n\u201c[I]n a criminal case every circumstance calculated to throw any light upon the supposed crime is admissible and permissible. It is not required that evidence bear directly on the question in issue, and evidence is competent and relevant if it is one of the circumstances surrounding the parties, and necessary to be known, to properly understand their conduct or motives, or if it reasonably allows the jury to draw an inference as to a disputed fact.\u201d\nState v. Jones, 336 N.C. 229, 243, 443 S.E.2d 48, 54 (quoting State v. Arnold, 284 N.C. 41, 47-48, 199 S.E.2d 423, 427 (1973)) (citations omitted in original), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1994); see also State v. Brown, 350 N.C. 193, 202, 513 S.E.2d 57, 63 (1999).\nIn the instant case, McCray\u2019s testimony concerning Kevin\u2019s luggage is both admissible pursuant to Rule 404(b) and relevant. Pursuant to Rule 404(b), the testimony was admissible to prove Kevin\u2019s motive for not wanting to return to Richmond by bus. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b); Coffey, 326 N.C. at 278-79, 389 S.E.2d at 54. The testimony was also relevant as it involved a circumstance surrounding Kevin\u2019s trip from Richmond to Greeleyville which then revealed information concerning the motive for his future actions. See Jones, 336 N.C. at 243, 443 S.E.2d at 54. From this evidence, the jury could infer that Kevin did not wish to take the bus back to Richmond because it would stop in Fayetteville where his luggage had been seized by police. See id.\nAs we previously concluded that the State\u2019s evidence of the robbery report was admissible for a proper purpose and we now conclude that Tilmon\u2019s evidence of McCray\u2019s testimony was admissible and relevant, we hold the trial court did not err. These assignments of error are overruled.\nBy assignment of error, Kevin argues the trial court violated his state and federal constitutional rights by admitting into evidence a statement made by Tilmon which implicated Kevin. Specifically, Kevin argues admission of the statement violated Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, which held the defendant\u2019s Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s confession. We disagree.\nThis issue arose when the State called Howard Kinlaw as a witness and began to question him about being in an isolation cell beside Tilmon in the Cumberland County jail. Kevin\u2019s counsel objected and indicated there were potential Bruton problems because of a statement made by Tilmon to Kinlaw. On voir dire, Kinlaw stated that Tilmon said, in pertinent part:\nthat they had, uh \u2014 were on their way to Virginia to rob a Food Lion so that they could get some money to go to Jamaica. And, uh, they got pulled and, uh, his brother was, uh, being roughed up and sprayed with Mace by this cop. And a deputy sheriff came up and jumped out and went running over there and started to pull his Mace out. And when he seen that, he took a AK-47 and jumped out of the car and shot him, and then his brother got up and took a pistol and shot the cop and they left.\nIn addition to an objection based on hearsay, Kevin\u2019s counsel stated:\nWe object to the part that says they stole \u2014 not to the part about stealing the car \u2014 to rob a Food \u2014 where it starts \u201cto rob a Food Lion.\u201d \u201cHe stated that they had already planned to rob \u2014 they had already planned to rob the Food Lion in Richmond, Virginia. He stated that they were going to rob the Food Lion in order to get money to go to Jamaica.\u201d We object to that under Bruton grounds. The next part we object to is his brother \u2014 his description of \u201chis brother then got up off the ground, took the officer\u2019s pistols and shot him \u2014 pistol and shot him.\u201d That\u2019s all we object to in the statement.\nAfter discussing the issue with all the parties, the trial court issued its ruling.\n[The Court:] In dealing with the specifics of Bruton as to this witness, there are, um \u2014 there are two things in particular. The discussion of the Richmond armed robbery. Now \u2014 (pause)\u2014 now, I will suggest a redaction of that so that he stated that there was a plan to rob the Food Lion in Richmond in order to get money to go to Jamaica. He stated that they stole a car on the way to Richmond. I don\u2019t require a redaction of that.\n[Kevin\u2019s Counsel]: We\u2019re not objecting to that.\nThe Court: There\u2019s not a serious issue to \u2014 all right. Stated that they stole a car on the way to Richmond. There was a plan to rob the Food Lion in Richmond, Virginia, in order to get money to go to Jamaica.\nAnd then the other Bruton objection is\u2014\n[Kevin\u2019s Counsel]: His brother then got off\u2014\nThe Court: Yeah, that his brother got off the ground and took the officer\u2019s pistol and shot him. And I am going to sustain that objection and require that redaction.\nSubsequently, the trial court explained the ruling to Kinlaw.\nThe Court: All right. Let me \u2014 just be patient for a moment. Now, the first issue concerns the testimony related to the Food Lion in Richmond, Virginia. And as it relates to that, you can testify that they stole a car on the way to Richmond; that there was a plan to rob the Food Lion in Richmond in order to get money to go to Jamaica. Not that \u201cthey planned\u201d but that \u201cthere was a plan.\u201d\nWitness: Um-hum. I understand that.\nThe Court: Now, you understand the difference between that\u2014\nWitness: I understand.\nThe Court: Now, you are not to relate the part of your testimony in which you assert that the statement was made that the defendant said his brother then got off the ground, took the officer\u2019s pistol and shot him.\nThereafter, with the jury present, Kinlaw testified regarding Tilmon\u2019s statement to him as follows:\n[H]e had stolen a car and, uh, there was apian to go to Richmond to rob a Food Lion so that he could get money to go to Jamaica. And that, uh, he had gotten pulled over.\nBy a state trooper.\nAnd that his brother was getting Maced, and that a deputy sheriff had pulled up and got out. And as he [the deputy sheriff] was running over to where the trooper, uh, and his brother were, he was\u2014\n... He was pulling out his Mace. And when he seen that, he got out of the car with a AK-47 and shot the two officers.\n(Emphasis added.)\nOn appeal, Kevin contends the trial court\u2019s redactions were not sufficient to preserve Kevin\u2019s rights under Bruton because the reference to \u201ca plan\u201d implicated him. Pursuant to Rule 10(b)(1) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, however, \u201ca party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make\u201d in order to preserve a question for appellate review. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Kevin\u2019s only objection came prior to the voir dire of Kinlaw. Kevin did not object to the trial court\u2019s suggested redaction, nor did he object when Kinlaw actually testified as instructed by the trial court. As there was no further objection to the trial court\u2019s response to the original objection, Kevin violated Rule 10(b)(1). Because of the constitutional nature of Kevin\u2019s argument, in our discretion pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 2, we will address the merits of Kevin\u2019s argument.\nAs we have previously stated, the Supreme Court in Bruton, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, held the defendant\u2019s Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the admission of a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s confession that implicated the defendant in the crime. See Barnes, 345 N.C. at 214, 481 S.E.2d at 60. The Supreme Court noted that the confession was \u201cpowerfully incriminating\u201d and then explained that because there was a substantial risk the jury would look to the extrajudicial statements in determining the defendant\u2019s guilt, despite instructions to the contrary, admission of the codefendant\u2019s confession violated the defendant\u2019s right of cross-examination guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 214-15, 481 S.E.2d at 60.\nKevin contends the instant case is more like Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 140 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1998). In Gray, the Supreme Court held Bruton's protective rule applied to the codefendant\u2019s confession, which merely substituted blanks and the word \u201cdelete\u201d for the defendant\u2019s actual name. See id. at 188, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 298. The State, on the other hand, argues the case is more similar to Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176 (1987). In Richardson, the Supreme Court held the Confrontation Clause was not violated where a nontestifying codefendant\u2019s confession was redacted so as to eliminate the defendant\u2019s name as well as any reference to the defendant\u2019s existence. See id. at 211, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 188.\nWe find the instant case more similar to Barnes, 345 N.C. at 217, 481 S.E.2d at 62, wherein this Court found Bruton distinguishable. A codefendant in Ba.'mes stated, \u201cI shouldn\u2019t have gone with them,\u201d and the defendant argued that the statement was prejudicial in that it was \u201cparticularly significant\u201d and that it violated his due process and confrontation rights. Id. This Court recognized that while the Supreme Court in Bruton held the introduction of a codefendant\u2019s hearsay statement \u201cposed a substantial threat to [the defendant\u2019s] right to confront the witnesses against him\u201d and therefore constituted reversible error, Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 486, the Supreme Court also stated that \u201c \u2018[n]ot every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting instructions .... It is not unreasonable to conclude.that in many such cases the jury can and will follow the trial judge\u2019s instructions to disregard such information.\u2019 \u201d Barnes, 345 N.C. at 218, 481 S.E.2d at 62 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 484-85). We stated that the statement the defendant complained of was not \u201cpowerfully incriminating\u201d when viewed in the context of the evidence against him, that the reference to \u201cthem\u201d in the statement was not made in the context of any specific statements about the killings, and that the trial court cautioned the jury with respect to the statement. Id. at 217-18, 481 S.E.2d at 62. We concluded that the statement did not clearly identify the defendant or create a substantial risk that the jury would ignore the trial court\u2019s instructions in its determination of the defendant\u2019s guilt. Id. at 218, 481 S.E.2d at 62.\nSimilarly, in the instant case, considering the evidence against Kevin, Tilmon\u2019s statement to Kinlaw was not \u201cpowerfully incriminating\u201d toward Kevin. Kinlaw testified that Tilmon told him that Tilmon stole the car, that there was a plan to rob a Food Lion in Virginia so Tilmon could get money to go to Jamaica, and that Tilmon got out of the car with an \u201cAK-47\u201d and shot the two officers when he saw them attempting to spray Kevin with \u201cMace.\u201d Although the statement did not eliminate all reference to Kevin and his existence, as was the situation in Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 188, the reference to \u201cthey\u201d in the statement was not in connection with the \u201cplan\u201d to rob the Food Lion to get money to go to Jamaica, as Kevin argued, see Barnes, 345 N.C. at 217-18, 481 S.E.2d at 62. In addition, the trial court repeatedly cautioned the jury to consider the evidence against each defendant separately. As in Barnes, we conclude Tilmon\u2019s statement to Kinlaw did not clearly make reference to Kevin in relation to the plan or create a substantial risk that the jury would ignore the trial court\u2019s instructions in its determination of Kevin\u2019s guilt. See id. Therefore, Kevin\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nBy assignment of error, Kevin argues the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a portion of his statement to police in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. Specifically, Kevin contends he had invoked his right to silence with respect to a particulax topic, and the investigator continued to ask him questions regarding that topic. We disagree.\nPrior to trial, Kevin made a motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement officers on the basis that he did not waive his right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion, concluding that Kevin freely, voluntarily, and understandingly waived his rights including the right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present.\nThereafter, during trial, Agent Tilley testified concerning the interview he conducted with Kevin on 23 September 1997. Agent Tilley stated that prior to asking any case-specific questions, he informed Kevin of his juvenile rights, which include the rights to remain silent; to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; and to have an attorney. Agent Tilley then read Kevin the waiver of rights form, which Kevin subsequently signed.\nAgent Tilley testified that Kevin then told him of the events of 23 September 1997. After Kevin completed his recitation of the events, Agent Tilley informed him he was aware of an incident involving a Jeep. Agent Tilley testified that Kevin said \u201che didn\u2019t want to say anything about the jeep. He did not know who it was or he would have told us.\u201d Agent Tilley then asked about the Jeep incident, and Kevin stated that Tilmon shot at the Jeep while Kevin drove past it.\nOn appeal, Kevin argues his rights were violated because questioning resumed after he had invoked his right to silence regarding the Jeep incident. Kevin did not object to Agent Tilley\u2019s testimony on the basis of waiver or on the basis of resumption of questioning. As we stated previously, a motion in limine is not sufficient to preserve for appeal the question of admissibility of evidence if the defendant does not object to that evidence at the time it is offered at trial. See Hayes, 350 N.C. at 80, 511 S.E.2d at 303. Therefore, Kevin has not properly preserved this issue for appellate review. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1).\nNonetheless, as Kevin argues the trial court committed plain error with regard to this assignment of error, he is entitled to relief if he can demonstrate plain error. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4). \u201c \u2018Under the plain error rule, defendant must convince this Court not only that there was error, but that absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.\u2019 \u201d State v. Roseboro, 351 N.C. 536, 553, 528 S.E.2d 1, 12 (2000) (quoting State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993)).\nThe United States Supreme Court, in Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, held \u201ca suspect must be informed of his rights upon being arrested: that is, to remain silent, to an attorney and that any statement made may be used as evidence against him.\u201d State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 666, 477 S.E.2d 915, 920 (1996). Additionally, juveniles have the right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a)(3) (1999); Miller, 344 N.C. at 666, 477 S.E.2d at 920. Pursuant to Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, and Edwards, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution \u201crequire that during custodial interrogation, if the individual \u2018indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.\u2019 \u201d Fletcher, 348 N.C. at 305-06, 500 S.E.2d at 676 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 723); see also Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 384.\nRecently, however, based on the United States Supreme Court\u2019s case involving ambiguous invocations of a suspect\u2019s right to a lawyer, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue of ambiguous invocations of a defendant\u2019s right to remain silent in Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 147 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (2000). In Burket, the Fourth Circuit held it was not clear the defendant wished to remain silent and, considering the circumstances as a whole, the investigator had every reason to believe the defendant wished to talk and, thus, concluded that the police did not violate Miranda because the defendant never invoked his right to remain silent. Id. at 200. The Fourth Circuit stated:\nThe Supreme Court\u2019s most recent exposition on ambiguous invocations was in the context of whether a suspect invoked his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In Davis, the Court held that the determination of whether a suspect invoked his right to counsel is an objective one. The question is whether the suspect \u201carticulate [d] his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney.\u201d [Davis, 512 U.S. at 459, 129 L. Ed. 2d at 371.] Other circuits have held that this \u201cobjective inquiry\u201d into ambiguity is applicable to invocations of the right to remain silent.\nBurket, 208 F.3d at 200. The Fourth Circuit then noted that the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have relied on the Supreme Court\u2019s analysis in Davis to determine whether a suspect\u2019s invocation of the right to remain silent was ambiguous. Id. The Fourth Circuit then noted that it had not yet decided whether Davis applied to invocations of the right to remain silent, but held that it was not necessary to do so in Burket because that case specifically focused on federal law. Id. However, the Fourth Circuit then held, \u201c[i]n light of the language and logic of the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Davis,\u201d the Virginia Supreme Court\u2019s decision to admit the defendant\u2019s statement was not \u201ccontrary ... to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.\u201d Id. In so holding, the Fourth Circuit stated:\nDavis held that when faced with an ambiguous invocation of a right, an interrogator was not required to ask clarifying questions. In this case, however, [the defendant] said to the officers \u201cI just don\u2019t think that I should say anything\u201d and \u201cI need somebody that I can talk to.\u201d These statements do not constitute an unequivocal request to remain silent. In fact, [the defendant\u2019s] statements are quite similar to the defendant\u2019s statement in Davis (\u201cMaybe I should talk to a lawyer\u201d), which the Supreme Court found ambiguous.\nId. (citation omitted).\nSimilarly, in the instant case, Kevin\u2019s statement did not constitute an unequivocal request to remain silent. When Agent Tilley asked Kevin about an incident involving a Jeep, which Kevin had not mentioned previously during his statement, Agent Tilley stated that Kevin said \u201che didn\u2019t want to say anything about the jeep. He did not know who it was or he would have told us.\u201d This statement is not an unambiguous invocation of Kevin\u2019s right to silence, as he indicated that had he known who the incident involved, he would have made a statement concerning that incident. See id. Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Agent Tilley to believe Kevin wanted to talk and to then inquire as to what happened involving the Jeep. Kevin\u2019s rights were not violated, as the police did not act contrary to clearly established federal law.\nBecause Kevin did not unambiguously invoke his right to remain silent, the trial court did not err in admitting the portion of his statement concerning the Jeep. Thus, Kevin has failed to satisfy the first part of plain error review, that there be error. See Roseboro, 351 N.C. at 553, 528 S.E.2d at 12. Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nBy assignments of error, both Kevin and Tilmon argue the State\u2019s improper closing argument violated their state and federal constitutional rights. Specifically, they argue the State\u2019s closing argument was so grossly improper that the trial court should have intervened ex mero motu. In addition, Tilmon argues the State further violated his rights by categorizing the portions of his statement, which the State had introduced into evidence, as lies. We disagree.\nWe first address Kevin\u2019s and Tilmon\u2019s argument that the trial court should have intervened ex mero motu. During the State\u2019s closing argument, the prosecutor was recounting the testimony of the various witnesses to the crimes. One witness observed Tilmon resisting Deputy Hathcock and trying to get back toward the stolen vehicle. In explaining why Tilmon might want to get back to the vehicle, the prosecutor held up the SKS rifle Tilmon allegedly used in the killings. Then, in explaining what one might do with a rifle, the prosecutor displayed the rifle in the direction of one of the district attorneys and then in the direction of a juror, and then put the rifle down. Later, the prosecutor described that another witness observed Deputy Hathcock backing away from Tilmon. In explaining why the deputy might have been backing away, the prosecutor again displayed the rifle in the direction of the same juror.\nDefendants argue the trial court\u2019s failure to intervene when the prosecutor displayed the rifle in the direction of a juror was prejudicial and entitles them to new trials. Defendants, however, failed to object to the allegedly improper closing argument. Therefore, \u201cthe standard of review is whether the argument was so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu.\u201d Roseboro, 351 N.C. at 546, 528 S.E.2d at 8; see also State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 451, 509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1999). A \u201c \u2018trial court is not required to intervene ex mero motu unless the argument strays so far from the bounds of propriety as to impede defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial.\u2019 \u201d State v. Smith, 351 N.C. 251, 269, 524 S.E.2d 28, 41 (2000) (quoting State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 84, 505 S.E.2d 97, 111 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036 (1999)). Prosecutors, in capital cases, have wide latitude during jury arguments and must vigorously present arguments for the sentence of death using every legitimate method. See Roseboro, 351 N.C. at 546, 528 S.E.2d at 8; Warren, 348 N.C. at 124, 499 S.E.2d at 456; Daniels, 337 N.C. at 277, 446 S.E.2d at 319. Whether a prosecutor \u201c \u2018abuses this privilege is a matter ordinarily left to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and we will not review the exercise of this discretion unless there be such gross impropriety in the argument as would be likely to influence the verdict of the jury.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 351 N.C. at 270, 524 S.E.2d at 41 (quoting State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 328, 226 S.E.2d 629, 640 (1976)).\nIn State v. Oliver, 302 N.C. 28, 274 S.E.2d 183, the prosecutor waved a gun which had been offered into evidence during closing argument. Id. at 42, 274 S.E.2d at 193. Later, the prosecutor made reference to the gun while displaying it to the jury. Id. The defendants objected, but the trial court overruled their objections. Id. This Court held the record revealed no improper use of the weapon in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument because the gun was in evidence and because it \u201cwas not improper for the prosecutor to utilize it in his summation so long as he did not attempt to draw inferences from the weapon which were not supported by the evidence or to frighten or intimidate the jury with it.\u201d Id. This Court then emphasized that prosecutors may argue \u201c \u2018the facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Covington, 290 N.C. at 327-28, 226 S.E.2d at 640).\nIn the instant case, the trial court did not err by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu. We note that we are unable to determine from the transcript exactly how the prosecutor used the rifle during closing arguments. While the court reporter made references during transcription, it is mere speculation as to the exact nature of the use of the rifle. The court reporter did not provide details and did not note any reaction from the juror or any courtroom personnel. Four seasoned defense attorneys and an able trial judge were present, and no objection was made to the prosecutor\u2019s actions. That being said, the record does not reveal that the prosecutor used the rifle to attempt to draw inferences from the weapon which were not supported by the evidence. See id. In addition, the record does not reveal that the juror was frightened or intimidated by the prosecutor\u2019s actions. See id. Based on the testimony of numerous witnesses, the prosecutor was simply explaining Tllmon\u2019s actions according to what witnesses observed.\nWhile we do not condone pointing weapons at jurors, if that in fact occurred, the prosecutor\u2019s actions were not \u201cso grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero mo tu.\" Roseboro, 351 N.C. at 546, 528 S.E.2d at 8. Defendants have failed to show the trial court abused its discretion. In light of the overwhelming evidence in this case, defendants were not prejudiced, and the prosecutor\u2019s actions during closing arguments did not prevent defendants from receiving a fair trial. This assignment of error is overruled.\nWe next address Tilmon\u2019s argument that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the portion of the State\u2019s closing argument in which the prosecutor referred to parts of his statement as lies. During the State\u2019s closing argument, the prosecutor was describing Tilmon\u2019s different versions of the events of 23 September 1997. The prosecutor then referred to \u201c[l]ie number one,\u201d to which Tilmon\u2019s counsel objected, with the qualification, \u201cunless he\u2019s contending it\u2019s a lie.\u201d The prosecutor stated that he was contending it was a lie. The trial court then overruled the objection. Thereafter, the prosecutor described eighteen items from Tilmon\u2019s statement about which the State contended Tilmon had lied, including that Tilmon originally did not mention anything about pepper spray; that Tilmon originally stated he had not shot a gun that day, and then that he probably had shot a gun that day; and that Tilmon omitted shooting at Waters or at Waters\u2019 vehicle.\nTilmon acknowledges the State can \u201ccontend\u201d that a defendant lied, see State v. Davis, 291 N.C. 1, 12, 229 S.E.2d 285, 293 (1976), but argues the State offered his statement into evidence, and it should not be able to argue the statement contains lies because he did not put his own credibility at issue.\nThis Court addressed a similar issue in State v. Williams, 314 N.C. 337, 333 S.E.2d 708 (1985). In Williams, the defendant offered no evidence on his own behalf, but the State introduced his confession. See id. In holding the trial court did not err, this Court stated:\nThe introduction of an exculpatory statement by the State does not preclude it from showing facts concerning the crime to be different. The State is entitled to comment during closing argument on any contradictory evidence as the basis for the jury\u2019s disbelief of the defendant\u2019s story. The record here plainly exhibits plenary evidence introduced by the State to contradict defendant\u2019s written statement. During her closing argument, the District Attorney indeed commented on the untruthfulness of that statement. This the law allowed her to do.\nId. at 357, 333 S.E.2d at 721-22 (citations omitted).\nIn the instant case, as in Williams, the State introduced Tilmon\u2019s statement into evidence, and Tilmon did not testify. The State repeated to the jury some instances where Tilmon made exculpatory statements during questioning and later gave different versions of the events. The law permits the State to show the jury how those exculpatory statements differed from the version of events depicted by other evidence that was presented. See id.\nTilmon relies on State v. Locklear, 294 N.C. 210, 241 S.E.2d 65 (1978), where we said: \u201cIt is improper for a lawyer to assert his opinion that a witness is lying. \u2018He can argue to the jury that they should not believe a witness, but he should not call him a liar.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 217, 241 S.E.2d at 70 (quoting State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 345 (1967)). In addition, Tilmon cites State v. Bolin, 281 N.C. 415, 189 S.E.2d 235 (1972), where we said: \u201c \u2018When the State introduces in evidence exculpatory statements of the defendant which are not contradicted or shown to be false by any other facts or circumstances in evidence, the State is bound by these statements.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 424, 189 S.E.2d at 241 (quoting State v. Carter, 254 N.C. 475, 479, 119 S.E.2d 461, 464 (1961)).\nLocklear is distinguishable. Tilmon was not a witness in the case, and the prosecutor was merely showing the jury instances where Tilmon had not been truthful while giving his statement to law enforcement officers. See Locklear, 294 N.C. at 217, 241 S.E.2d at 70. As for Tilmon\u2019s reliance on Bolin, it is misplaced. Tilmon incorrectly stated that we referred to nonexculpatory statements in Bolin, when in fact we referred to instances when the State introduced exculpatory statements. See Bolin, 281 N.C. at 424, 189 S.E.2d at 241. Nevertheless, in addition to the statement Tilmon attributes to Bolin, we also stated: \u201cThe introduction in evidence by the State of a statement made by defendant which may tend to exculpate him, does not prevent the State from showing that the facts concerning the homicide were different from what the defendant said about them.\u201d Id. at 425, 189 S.E.2d at 241-42. In the instant case, the prosecutor merely pointed out exculpatory statements or omissions to show how the facts differed from Tilmon\u2019s statement.\nTilmon was not prejudiced by the prosecutor\u2019s contention that portions of Tllmon\u2019s statement were lies. Therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nBy numerous assignments of error, both Kevin and Tilmon argue the trial court erred by giving an acting in concert instruction for the first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon charges. Defendants contend the instruction permitted the jury to find them guilty of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon without finding the required intent to commit the crimes, in violation of their constitutional rights. In addition, Kevin argues the evidence was not sufficient to convict him of the first-degree murder or the robbery with a dangerous weapon of Deputy Hathcock. We disagree.\nThis Court, in Barnes, 345 N.C. at 233, 481 S.E.2d at 71, restated the doctrine of acting in concert as enumerated in State v. Erlewine, 328 N.C. 626, 403 S.E.2d 280 (1991), and State v. Westbrook, 279 N.C. 18, 181 S.E.2d 572 (1971), death sentence vacated, 408 U.S. 939, 33 L. Ed. 2d 761 (1972):\n\u201c[I]f \u2018two persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty as a principal if the other commits that particular crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose ... or as a natural or probable consequence thereof.\u2019 \u201d\nErlewine, 328 N.C. at 637, 403 S.E.2d at 286 (quoting Westbrook, 279 N.C. at 41-42, 181 S.E.2d at 586) (alteration in original); see also Gaines, 345 N.C. at 677 n.1, 483 S.E.2d at 414 n.1 (\u201cIn State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 233, 481 S.E.2d 44, 71 (1997), a majority of this Court held that a finding that the accomplice individually possessed the mens rea to commit the crime is not necessary to convict a defendant of premeditated and deliberate murder under a theory of acting in concert.\u201d).\nThus, \u201cif two or more persons act together in pursuit of a common plan or purpose, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is guilty of any crime committed by any of the others in pursuit of the common plan.\u201d State v. Laws, 325 N.C. 81, 97, 381 S.E.2d 609, 618 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990), quoted in State v. McCullers, 341 N.C. 19, 29-30, 460 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1995). . While a person may be either actually or constructively present at the scene, see State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 362, 307 S.E.2d 304, 327 (1983), \u201c[a] person is constructively present during the commission of a crime if he is close enough to provide assistance if needed and to encourage the actual execution of the crime.\u201d Gaines, 345 N.C. at 675-76, 483 S.E.2d at 413; see also State v. Willis, 332 N.C. 151, 175, 420 S.E.2d 158, 169 (1992).\nIn the instant case, in instructing the jury on the first-degree murder charges, the trial court included an acting in concert instruction consistent with the pattern instruction, and stated:\nFor a person to be guilty of a crime, it is not necessary that he himself do all the acts necessary to constitute the crime. If two or more persons join in a purpose to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is not only guilty of that crime of, in this case, possession of a stolen vehicle, if the other commits the crime, but he is also guilty of any other crime committed by the other in pursuance of the common purpose to commit the crime of possession of a stolen vehicle.\nSee N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 202.10 (1998). A similar instruction was included in the jury instruction for robbery with a dangerous weapon, pursuant to N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 202.10.\nIn its mandate on each charge of first-degree murder, the trial court instructed as follows:\nI charge that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the twenty-third day of September, 1997, the defendant [defendant\u2019s name], acting either by himself or acting together with [other defendant\u2019s name], intentionally killed the victim [victim\u2019s name] with a deadly weapon, thereby proximately causing the victim [victim\u2019s name] death, and that the defendant [defendant\u2019s name] acted with malice, with premeditation and with deliberation, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of first degree murder.\nSimilarly, in its mandates on robbery with a dangerous weapon, the trial court gave instructions substantially similar to the following:\nas to the charge of robbery with a firearm in which [defendant\u2019s name] is the defendant and in which [victim\u2019s name] is the alleged victim, I charge that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the twenty-third day of September, 1997, the defendant [defendant\u2019s name] had in his possession a firearm and took and carried away property from the person or presence of [victim\u2019s name], without [victim\u2019s name]\u2019s voluntary consent, by endangering or threatening [victim\u2019s name]\u2019s life with the use or threatened use of a firearm, the defendant [defendant\u2019s name] knowing that he was not entitled to take the property and intending to deprive [victim\u2019s name] of its use permanently, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty of robbery with a firearm in the case in which [victim\u2019s name] is the alleged victim.\nWe note the trial court\u2019s acting in concert instructions comported in all respects with our previous case law. Therefore, defendants\u2019 arguments in this regard are without merit.\nWe next address whether there was sufficient evidence to submit the charges of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon of Deputy Hathcock against Kevin. Kevin made a motion to dismiss to preserve this issue for appellate review. The trial court denied that motion. \u201cIn ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\u201d Nobles, 350 N.C. at 504, 515 S.E.2d at 898; see also Call, 349 N.C. at 417, 508 S.E.2d at 518; State v. Lee, 348 N.C. 474, 488, 501 S.E.2d 334, 343 (1998). To withstand a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, \u201cthe trial court need determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and that the defendant is the perpetrator.\u201d Call, 349 N.C. at 417, 508 S.E.2d at 518. \u201c[T]he trial court should consider all evidence actually admitted, whether competent or not, that is favorable to the State.\u201d State v. Jones, 342 N.C. 523, 540, 467 S.E.2d 12, 23 (1996).\nCircumstantial evidence may be utilized to overcome a motion to dismiss \u201c \u2018even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.\u2019 \u201d Thomas, 350 N.C. at 343, 514 S.E.2d at 503 (quoting State v. Stone, 323 N.C. 447, 452, 373 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1988)). If the trial court finds substantial evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, or a combination, \u201cto support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 358, 368 S.E.2d 377, 383 (1988). If, however, the evidence \u201cis sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss must be allowed.\u201d State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 179, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983).\nRegarding the sufficiency of the evidence of the charges of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon of Deputy Hathcock against Kevin, the trial court instructed the jury with an acting in concert instruction based on the possession of a stolen vehicle. As we previously held, this instruction was proper. Therefore, our inquiry is limited to whether there was sufficient evidence of first-degree murder by Kevin, Tilmon, or both, and robbery with a dangerous weapon by Kevin, Tilmon, or both, based on the common purpose of possessing the stolen vehicle.\nWe find there was sufficient evidence that Kevin and Tilmon acted with a common purpose in possessing the stolen vehicle. The evidence showed Kevin and Tilmon were riding together from Kingstree to Richmond when they were stopped by Trooper Lowry near Fayetteville. Although Kevin was driving the stolen vehicle, in his statement to Agent Tilley, he admitted giving Tilmon\u2019s driver\u2019s license to Trooper Lowry. After shooting both Trooper Lowry and Deputy Hathcock, Kevin and Tilmon retrieved the officers\u2019 weapons and left the scene in the stolen vehicle. There is also evidence they exited the highway to remove the license plate from the stolen vehicle to avoid detection.\nMoreover, without utilizing the acting in concert theory, there was sufficient evidence Kevin committed first-degree murder. Contrary to Kevin\u2019s argument that Tilmon shot Deputy Hathcock with Trooper Lowry\u2019s weapon prior to retrieving the rifle, Kevin, in his statement to Agent Tilley, stated he took Trooper Lowry\u2019s gun from the trooper\u2019s holster. Kevin also stated Tilmon did not fire the trooper\u2019s gun, and he did not think Tilmon ever had the trooper\u2019s gun in his possession. After initially denying that he had shot a gun on the day in question, Kevin eventually admitted shooting the trooper\u2019s gun. A gunshot residue test on Kevin\u2019s hands revealed that he had shot a weapon recently. Additionally, a .40-caliber bullet from Trooper Lowry\u2019s gun was recovered from Deputy Hathcock\u2019s body during the autopsy, and that .40-caliber wound was a fatal wound.\nIn addition, a rational trier of fact could find Kevin and Tilmon committed robbery with a dangerous weapon of Deputy Hathcock. The evidence shows Tilmon shot Deputy Hathcock with an assault rifle. Thereafter, Tilmon retrieved Deputy Hathcock\u2019s weapon. There is also evidence that Kevin inflicted a fatal wound to Deputy Hathcock. Subsequently, when Kevin and Tilmon fled the scene, Tilmon was carrying Deputy Hathcock\u2019s weapon.\nKevin points to other possible scenarios based on the evidence presented. However, we do not require the evidence to rule out every possible hypothesis of innocence. See Thomas, 350 N.C. at 343, 514 S.E.2d at 503. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, see Nobles, 350 N.C. at 504, 515 S.E.2d at 898, there is substantial evidence from which the jury could find that the first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon of Deputy Hathcock were committed pursuant to Kevin\u2019s common purpose with Tilmon of possessing a stolen vehicle.\nCAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING\nBy assignment of error, Tilmon argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever his and Kevin\u2019s sentencing proceedings. Tilmon contends the trial court\u2019s actions constituted prejudicial error. By a similar assignment of error, Kevin argues the trial court committed reversible constitutional error by joining his and Tilmon\u2019s cases for sentencing. We disagree.\nInitially, we note Kevin concedes he did not object to joinder for sentencing or renew a previous motion to sever; therefore, he did not preserve appellate review of this issue pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). Kevin argues, however, the trial court\u2019s error amounts to plain error pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4). However, plain error review is limited to errors in a trial court\u2019s jury instructions or a trial court\u2019s rulings on admissibility of evidence. See State v. Cummings, 346 N.C. 291, 313-14, 488 S.E.2d 550, 563 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1092, 139 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1998). This Court has previously declined to extend plain error review to other issues, and we decline to do so now. See State v. Fleming, 350 N.C. 109, 133, 512 S.E.2d 720, 737 (declined to extend plain error review to the situation where the trial court allowed and instructed the prosecutor to prompt his witness after the witness had taken the stand), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 145 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1999); Atkins, 349 N.C. at 81, 505 S.E.2d at 109-10 (declined to extend plain error review to situations in which the trial court failed to give an instruction during jury voir dire which was not requested). Therefore, we will not review Kevin\u2019s assignment of error.\nTilmon, on the other hand, relied on a letter from his mother, Sylvia Williams, to show why the cases should be severed for sentencing. The letter stated that Williams would not testify for Tilmon because of possible damage to Kevin\u2019s case. However, Tilmon never actually renewed his prior motion to sever, nor did he object to joinder of the cases for sentencing. Therefore, the trial court never ruled on this issue. Tilmon\u2019s purported efforts, during the sentencing phase, to revive his previous motion to sever were insufficient to satisfy N.C. R. App. P. 10 to preserve appellate review of this issue. Pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 2, however, we waive the appellate rules and review Tilmon\u2019s assignment of error. Any error found by this Court will also apply to Kevin, as his case was joined with Tilmon\u2019s. See Oliver, 309 N.C. at 361, 307 S.E.2d at 327.\nJoint defendants convicted of capital crimes at a joint trial can be joined for sentencing if each defendant receives individualized sentencing consideration. See id. at 366, 307 S.E.2d at 328-29. In Oliver, this Court stated that the United States Supreme Court impliedly approved joint sentencing proceedings as long as there is \u201cindividualized consideration given to each defendant\u2019s culpability.\u201d Id. at 366, 307 S.E.2d at 330 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982)). In considering joinder for sentencing, this Court has relied on the general rules governing joinder for trial. See Barnes, 345 N.C. at 224, 481 S.E.2d at 66 (where this Court relied on Pickens, 335 N.C. 717, 440 S.E.2d 552, which addresses joinder for trial, and held two of the three defendants were not denied a fair capital sentencing proceeding because testimony of a third defendant did not result in antagonistic defenses, as each defendant could show why he should not receive the death penalty).\n\u201c[T]he propriety of joinder depends upon the circumstances of each case and is within the sound discretion of the trial judge.\u201d Pickens, 335 N.C. at 724, 440 S.E.2d at 556. When a decision is within the trial court\u2019s discretion, the court\u2019s determination will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See id. As we previously stated, the North Carolina General Statutes provide for joinder of defendants in situations where each defendant is charged with accountability for each offense. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(b). Joinder of defendants is also appropriate if the several offenses charged were part of a common plan or scheme; were part of the same act or transaction; or were so closely connected in time, place, and occasion that it would be difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of the others. See id.\nTilmon argues severance was appropriate because Williams would not testify for him otherwise. Tilmon\u2019s argument, however, makes the unsubstantiated assumption that Williams would have testified favorably on his behalf and unfavorably on behalf of Kevin. Such an assertion can be substantiated only by an offer of proof.\n\u201cIt is well established that an exception to the exclusion of evidence cannot be sustained where the record fails to show what the witness\u2019 testimony would have been had he been permitted to testify.\u201d State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 370, 334 S.E.2d 53, 60 (1985) (citing State v. Cheek, 307 N.C. 552, 299 S.E.2d 633 (1983)). \u201c[I]n order for a party to preserve for appellate review the exclusion of evidence, the significance of the excluded evidence must be made to appear in the record and a specific offer of proof is required unless the significance of the evidence is obvious from the record.\u201d Id. at 370, 334 S.E.2d at 60 (citing Currence v. Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 387 (1978)).\nState v. Johnson, 340 N.C. 32, 49, 455 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1995). However, Tilmon made no offer of proof in the instant case as to the actual substance of Williams\u2019 testimony, and the significance of the testimony is not apparent from the record. Thus, we are unable to rely on this reasoning in support of Tilmon\u2019s argument. Furthermore, we note that Tilmon could have subpoenaed Williams to testify. See Coffey, 326 N.C. at 292, 389 S.E.2d at 62. There was no indication that she would not testify truthfully if she had been subpoenaed.\nIn addition, Tilmon contends that information Williams would have provided regarding his difficult childhood could have supported mitigating circumstances that would have led the jury to impose life imprisonment rather than death. This information, however, had already been provided by other witnesses, and Tilmon has offered no proof that Williams\u2019 testimony would have expanded on what had already been made known to the jury.\nFurther, Tilmon cannot show he was denied individualized consideration during the joint sentencing proceeding. The trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury at the conclusion of the sentencing proceeding included the following: \u201c[Y]ou must consider the evidence separately as to each defendant and as to each victim. You must evaluate and make a separate recommendation based upon a separate and distinct evaluation as to each defendant and as to each victim.\u201d (Emphasis added.) On more than one occasion, the trial court instructed the jury to consider each defendant separately. We presume juries follow the instructions of the trial court. See Trull, 349 N.C. at 455, 509 S.E.2d at 196. As such, the transcript reveals Tilmon received individualized consideration during the sentencing proceeding. It is also apparent from the \u201cIssues and Recommendation as to Punishment\u201d forms that Kevin and Tilmon were given separate consideration by the jury. The jury found as a mitigating circumstance that Kevin lacked parental involvement. In contrast, in Tilmon\u2019s case, the jury did not find any of the mitigating circumstances related to parental involvement. Therefore, Kevin and Tilmon were given individualized sentencing consideration. See Oliver, 309 N.C. at 366, 307 S.E.2d at 330. Tilmon has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion. Therefore, Tilmon\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nBy assignment of error, Tilmon contends the trial court committed reversible error by denying his motion to suppress two letters seized by prison officials allegedly in violation of his constitutional rights to freedom of speech and freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures. Tilmon\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress the content of the letters was denied by the trial court after conducting a hearing. The State did not use the letters during the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, but introduced them during the sentencing proceeding. When the State introduced the letters and read them to the jury, Tilmon failed to object. To preserve an issue for appeal, the defendant must make an objection at the point during the trial when the State attempts to introduce the evidence. See Hayes, 350 N.C. at 80, 511 S.E.2d at 303. A defendant cannot rely on his pretrial motion to suppress to preserve an issue for appeal. See id. His objection must be renewed at trial. See id. Tilmon\u2019s failure to object at trial waived his right to have this issue reviewed on appeal. This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy two assignments of error, Kevin contends the trial court erred by admitting into evidence during the sentencing proceeding a note he wrote. This note contained Rastafarian language, and Kevin argues the note was seized in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights, has no relevance to the issues presented in his case, and was unfairly prejudicial. We disagree.\nDuring the jury selection phase of the trial, Kevin drafted a note while sitting in the courtroom. Correctional Sergeant Scott Brown, who led the security detail during transport of defendants, instructed Kevin not to bring anything into or take anything out of the courtroom. Another officer informed Sgt. Brown that Kevin was leaving the courtroom with a piece of paper in his hand. Sgt. Brown took no immediate action, but waited to see if Kevin would pass the note to his attorneys on the way out of the courtroom. He did not. Thereafter, when Kevin was in the prisoner holding area, Sgt. Brown confiscated the note. Sgt. Brown testified that he confiscated the note because of concerns about possible escape plans.\nAt the outset, we note that Kevin failed to raise an objection regarding his argument that the note was seized in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights. Prior to sentencing, Kevin raised relevancy as the only basis for his objection to the introduction of the letter. \u201c \u2018This Court is not required to pass upon a constitutional issue unless it affirmatively appears that the issue was raised and determined in the trial court.\u2019 \u201d Nobles, 350 N.C. at 495, 515 S.E.2d at 893 (quoting Creason, 313 N.C. at 127, 326 S.E.2d at 27). Therefore, we need not address Kevin\u2019s allegation that the note was seized in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights.\nWe now turn to Kevin\u2019s claims that the note was irrelevant and highly prejudicial. It is well settled that \u201c [t]he North Carolina Rules of Evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings.\u201d State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 31, 478 S.E.2d 163, 179 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997). \u201cEvidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, and may include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (e) and (f).\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(a)(3) (1999); see also State v. Daughtry, 340 N.C. 488, 517, 459 S.E.2d 747, 762 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1079, 133 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1996). Because the State can present any evidence that is competent and relevant to the submitted aggravating circumstances, \u201ctrial courts are not required to perform the Rule 403 balancing test during a sentencing proceeding.\u201d State v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 273, 506 S.E.2d 702, 708 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1135, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1015 (1999).\nIn the instant case, the State offered five statutory aggravating circumstances in Kevin\u2019s sentencing proceeding for the murder of Trooper Lowry, including N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) \u2014 that the murder of Trooper Lowry was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. This Court has previously held \u201c \u2018[i]t is not merely the specific and narrow method in which a victim is killed which makes a murder heinous, atrocious, and cruel; rather, it is the entire set of circumstances surrounding the killing.\u2019 \u201d State v. Stanley, 310 N.C. 332, 338-39, 312 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1984) (quoting Magill v. State, 428 So. 2d 649, 651 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1983)); see also State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 63, 436 S.E.2d 321, 357 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994). Evidence that a murder was racially motivated can be used to show the \u201cdepravity of defendant\u2019s character.\u201d State v. Moose, 310 N.C. 482, 500, 313 S.E.2d 507, 519 (1984). The evidence of racial motivation then becomes a key factor because the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance is appropriate \u201cwhen the killing demonstrates an unusual depravity of mind on the part of the defendant.\u201d Kandies, 342 N.C. at 450, 467 S.E.2d at 84.\nKevin\u2019s note contained references to \u201cthe beast\u201d and \u201cBabylon,\u201d which were interpreted at trial to mean \u201cthe police\u201d and \u201cCaucasian-run America,\u201d respectively. The references in Kevin\u2019s note are evidence that the murders were racially motivated; therefore, the jury could properly consider the note when determining if the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn two assignments of error, Tilmon contends the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine Dr. John Warren, an expert in the field of forensic psychology, regarding Dr. Warren\u2019s potential bias. Tilmon argues certain questions asked by the prosecutor were improper and resulted in a denial of his federal and state constitutional rights to a fair sentencing hearing. Tilmon claims the questions concerning the fees charged by Dr. Warren for testimony in indigent cases, his ownership of a plane, places where he would not testify and a highly publicized case in which he was involved were improper. However, Tilmon failed to object to any questions asked or .answers given during the portion of the cross-examination when these topics were discussed.\nTo preserve an issue for appeal, a party must make a timely objection. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). As Tilmon did not object, he has failed to preserve these assignments of error for appellate review. In addition, this Court will not review Tilmon\u2019s constitutional arguments because he did not provide the trial court with an opportunity to rule on any constitutional issue related to this cross-examination. See Nobles, 350 N.C. at 495, 515 S.E.2d at 893. Moreover, although Tilmon assigns plain error in the alternative, he did not \u201cspecifically and distinctly\u201d argue plain error. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4). Therefore, these assignments of error are overruled.\nIn two assignments of error, Kevin argues the trial court erred by allowing the State to cross-examine one of Tilmon\u2019s expert witnesses with a report prepared by another expert witness and by allowing the report into evidence. Specifically, Kevin contends his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated by the introduction of this report, and the report contains incriminating hearsay statements that are highly prejudicial to his case. We disagree.\nDr. James Johnson, an expert on African-American males and the sociological impact of societal forces, testified on behalf of Tilmon and was cross-examined by the State. Kevin was given an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Johnson but chose not to do so. Later, following Dr. Johnson\u2019s testimony, the trial court ruled that a preliminary draft of a report completed by Dr. Johnson was discoverable by the State. Kevin received a copy of the report after the trial court\u2019s ruling. Subsequently, the State then cross-examined Dr. Warren about the report and introduced it into evidence following Dr. Warren\u2019s testimony.\nKevin first argues the report itself was hearsay and was improperly introduced after Dr. Warren\u2019s testimony. Therefore, it should not have been allowed into evidence. The Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing hearings. See Daughtry, 340 N.C. at 517, 459 S.E.2d at 762. \u201cAny evidence the court \u2018deems relevant to sentence\u2019 may be introduced at [the sentencing proceeding].\u201d Id. (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(a)(3)). Hearsay evidence can be admitted if the trial court concludes it is relevant to the defendant\u2019s sentencing, and it does not violate a defendant\u2019s constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. See State v. McLaughlin, 341 N.C. 426, 458-59, 462 S.E.2d 1, 19 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1133, 133 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1996).\nKevin contends he was denied his right to confront Dr. Johnson because he was not given an opportunity to cross-examine Dr. Johnson regarding the substance of the report. While it is true that Kevin did not obtain a copy of the report until after Dr. Johnson had been excused as a witness, Kevin was aware of the report\u2019s existence prior to the conclusion of Dr. Johnson\u2019s testimony. The State cross-examined Dr. Johnson regarding the existence of the report. Only one question was asked regarding its substance, but a plain and unambiguous reference was made which clearly revealed its existence. After cross-examination by the State and redirect examination by Tilmon\u2019s counsel, the court gave Kevin a second opportunity to question Dr. Johnson, following the line of questioning by the State which revealed the report\u2019s existence. Kevin responded to the court that he had no questions for Dr. Johnson. Kevin cannot now claim his decision not to cross-examine Dr. Johnson was influenced by a lack of time for adequate preparation because he could have requested a continuance. See State v. Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 104-05, 291 S.E.2d 653, 656 (1982) (holding a motion to continue which raises constitutional issues, including the right to confront witnesses, has no fixed time limits, and there is a case-by-case determination as to what constitutes a reasonable time to prepare a defense). Thus, introduction of the report did not violate Kevin\u2019s right to confront the witnesses against him. The trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Johnson\u2019s report into evidence.\nKevin also argues the report itself contained inadmissible hearsay statements which also violated his right to confront the witnesses against him. Rule 703 provides guidance on the admissibility of expert opinions based on out-of-court communications when presented during the sentencing proceeding:\nThe facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 703 (1999).\nAllowing disclosure of the bases of an expert\u2019s opinion \u201cis essential to the factfinder\u2019s assessment of the credibility and weight to be given to it.\u201d State v. Jones, 322 N.C. 406, 412, 368 S.E.2d 844, 847 (1988).\nTestimony as to matters offered to show the basis for a physician\u2019s opinion and not for the truth of the matters testified to is not hearsay. \u201cWe emphasize again that such testimony is not substantive evidence.\u201d State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 464, 251 S.E.2d 407, 412 (1979). Its admissibility does not depend on an exception to the hearsay rule, but on the limited purpose for which it is offered.\nState v. Wood, 306 N.C. 510, 516-17, 294 S.E.2d 310, 313 (1982); see also Jones, 322 N.C. at 412, 368 S.E.2d at 847; State v. Allen, 322 N.C. 176, 184, 367 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1988).\nDr. Johnson\u2019s report included comments from unidentified informants on various aspects of Tilmon\u2019s character and upbringing, including the relationship Tilmon had with his parents, Tilmon\u2019s prior experience with police, Tilmon\u2019s demeanor, and the influence Kevin had over Tilmon. Experts in Dr. Johnson\u2019s field often rely upon statements such as these to form an opinion. These statements were introduced, not for the truth of the matter asserted, but as non-hearsay evidence to support Dr. Johnson\u2019s conclusions. Therefore, the report was admissible.\nKevin further argues the State improperly cross-examined Dr. Warren about Dr. Johnson\u2019s report. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 705, an expert witness may be cross-examined with regard to \u201c \u2018the underlying facts and data used by [the] expert in reaching his expert opinion,\u2019 \u201d including other experts\u2019 reports. State v. White, 343 N.C. 378, 393, 471 S.E.2d 593, 602 (quoting State v. Simpson, 341 N.C. 316, 355, 462 S.E.2d 191, 213 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1161, 134 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1996)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 936, 136 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1996).\nAssuming arguendo that the report was improperly admitted, any error that may have resulted was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Kevin argues that certain statements in the report were \u201cincriminating.\u201d However, references to Kevin in the report as \u201cthe sly manipulator\u201d and the \u201cbad\u201d brother were not nearly as incriminating as the evidence that Kevin resisted arrest; shot Trooper Lowry several times after he had been rendered helpless; shot Deputy Hathcock after he had been rendered helpless; and according to Kevin\u2019s own statement, drove the stolen car past Waters\u2019 Jeep so Tilmon could shoot at him. Furthermore, Dr. Johnson\u2019s report supported Kevin\u2019s mitigating circumstances that he grew up in an unstable environment and that he had previous negative experiences with the police. Kevin was not prejudiced by the State\u2019s cross-examination of Dr. Warren.\nAccordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting Dr. Johnson\u2019s report into evidence, and the cross-examination of Dr. Warren about Dr. Johnson\u2019s report did not prejudice Kevin. Therefore, these assignments of error are overruled.\nIn assignments of error, Tilmon and Kevin argue the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury that unless the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, a life sentence should be imposed. Defendants claim the trial court\u2019s use of the pattern jury instructions resulted in confusion and may have led to imposition of a death sentence on less than complete jury unanimity. Defendants also argue the trial court\u2019s instructions called for imposition of the death penalty if the jury found the mitigating circumstances and aggravating circumstances to be in \u201cequipoise,\u201d which means a state of equilibrium.\nThe trial court instructed the jury, pursuant to the pattern instruction, as follows: \u201cDo you unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstance or circumstances found is, or are, insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found by you?\u201d This instruction is entirely consistent with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(c)(3), which provides that the jury may recommend a death sentence if it finds \u201c[t]hat the mitigating circumstance or circumstances are insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found.\u201d This Court has previously denied the same argument. See State v. Keel, 337 N.C. 469, 493-94, 447 S.E.2d 748, 761-62 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1198, 131 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1995); State v. Hunt, 323 N.C. 407, 433, 373 S.E.2d 400, 416-17 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1990); State v. McDougall, 308 N.C. 1, 26, 301 S.E.2d 308, 326, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 173 (1983). Defendants request that we reconsider these holdings. We decline to do so and reaffirm our prior decisions with respect to this issue. These assignments of error are overruled.\nBy assignments of error, Tilmon and Kevin contend the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State\u2019s sentencing proceeding arguments. Neither defendant objected to the State\u2019s argument. Specifically, both defendants claim the State improperly argued general deterrence. In addition, Tilmon contends the State improperly argued community sentiment, and Kevin claims Tilmon\u2019s Rastafarian beliefs were wrongly attributed to him. Defendants insist these arguments were improper and warranted the trial court\u2019s intervention ex mero motu. We disagree.\nProsecutors are given wide latitude during jury arguments and may argue \u201cthe facts in evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom.\u201d State v. Anderson, 322 N.C. 22, 37, 366 S.E.2d 459, 468, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975, 102 L. Ed. 2d 548 (1988). When a defendant does not object to an allegedly improper argument, the trial court should intervene ex mero motu if the argument rises to the level of gross impropriety. See Trull, 349 N.C. at 451, 509 S.E.2d at 193. \u201cIt is well established that \u2018[c]ontrol of closing arguments is in the discretion of the trial court.\u2019 \u201d State v. Barrett, 343 N.C. 164, 181, 469 S.E.2d 888, 898 (quoting State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 186, 443 S.E.2d 14, 40, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 953, 136 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1996). As previously stated, \u201c \u2018we will not review the exercise of this discretion unless there be such gross impropriety in the argument as would be likely to influence the verdict of the jury.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 351 N.C. at 270, 524 S.E.2d at 41 (quoting Covington, 290 N.C. at 328, 226 S.E.2d at 640).\nWe first address defendants\u2019 arguments that the State made impermissible statements regarding the general deterrent effect of the death penalty. Although Tilmon objected to one reference regarding sending a message to anyone contemplating lawlessness and the trial court sustained the objection, both defendants argue the trial court should have intervened with regard to other such references.\nIn spite of the wide latitude granted to the State, Anderson, 322 N.C. at 37, 366 S.E.2d at 468, the State is prohibited from arguing general deterrence \u201cbecause it is not relevant to defendant, his character, his record, or the circumstances of the charged offense.\u201d State v. Bishop, 343 N.C. 518, 555, 472 S.E.2d 842, 862 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1097, 136 L. Ed. 2d 723 (1997). The State, however, in its arguments, can \u201curg[e] the jury to sentence a particular defendant to death to specifically deter that defendant from engaging in future murders.\u201d McNeil, 350 N.C. at 687, 518 S.E.2d at 504.\nIn the instant case, the State\u2019s argument included such statements as the following:\nThese two defendants deserve the death penalty for what they did, for their motives, for their actions. Someone has got to tell people like these two defendants, \u201cWe absolutely will not tolerate this any longer.\u201d If you don\u2019t tell that to these two defendants, nobody else will. We can\u2019t rely on the next bad case. We can\u2019t rely on the next jury to send that message to people who have no regard for your way of life, for your state, for your law enforcement officers.\nAfter reviewing the argument in context, we conclude the State\u2019s arguments did not constitute a general deterrence argument. See State v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 258, 506 S.E.2d 711, 721 (1998) (holding the State\u2019s argument \u201cmerely focused the jury\u2019s attention on the seriousness of the crime and the importance of the jury\u2019s duty\u201d and did not constitute a general deterrence argument), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1999); Barrett, 343 N.C. at 181, 469 S.E.2d at 898 (holding the State can argue the seriousness of the crime). Nevertheless, assuming the State\u2019s arguments were improper, they were not so grossly improper as to warrant intervention by the trial court. See, e.g., McNeil, 350 N.C. at 687, 518 S.E.2d at 504 (holding the State\u2019s argument that the death penalty is proper in our society and \u201cwe\u2019re going to enforce the laws and if you kill three people, that\u2019s enough\u201d was not so \u201cgrossly improper\u201d as to warrant intervention by the trial court ex mero motu); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 475, 319 S.E.2d 163, 170 (1984) (holding the State\u2019s argument referring to the \u201cdeterrent effect\u201d of the death penalty did not warrant ex mero motu intervention by the trial court). Therefore, intervention by the trial court was not warranted.\nWe next address Tilmon\u2019s argument that the State\u2019s reference to the community\u2019s sentiment regarding the death penalty was improper. A prosecutor is prohibited from \u201cintimating] to the jury community preferences regarding capital punishment.\u201d State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 329, 384 S.E.2d 470, 499 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990). The State cannot encourage the jury to lend an ear to the community. See State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 161, 451 S.E.2d 826, 852 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995). However, \u201cit is not improper to remind the jury... that its voice is the conscience of the community,\u201d nor is it \u201cobjectionable to tell the jury that its verdict will \u2018send a message to the community\u2019 about what may befall a person convicted of murder in a court of justice.\u201d Artis, 325 N.C. at 329-30, 384 S.E.2d at 499-500.\nThe State\u2019s arguments in the instant case included the following:\nSomeone has got to stand up and tell defendants like this, \u201cWe are not gonna tolerate this. We cannot tolerate this.\u201d What does a life sentence to these two defendants send as a message to the citizens of this state? . . .\nI submit that it would send a message to them that we do not hold our law enforcement officers in very high esteem ....\n(Emphasis added.)\nA review of the prosecutor\u2019s statements reveals that he never told the jury what was expected of them by the community, but instead reiterated what the jury\u2019s message should be to the community. See State v. Quesinberry, 325 N.C. 125, 141, 381 S.E.2d 681, 691 (1989) (holding the trial court properly did not intervene ex mero motu to the State\u2019s argument that the jury should send a message to the community), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990). Thus, we conclude the State did not improperly argue community sentiment to the jury.\nWe finally address Kevin\u2019s argument that the trial court should have intervened ex mero motu because the State\u2019s attribution of hatred based on Rastafarian beliefs on him was not supported by the evidence and was grossly improper. He contends that any discussion of Rastafarianism, and its related beliefs, should have been limited to Tilmon\u2019s sentencing but was improperly submitted to the jury as a factor in considering his own sentence.\nA review of the record and transcript, however, shows there was evidence that Kevin was involved with Rastafarianism. The note written by Kevin during jury selection revealed that he, too, was immersed in the Rastafarian culture, as the note contained references to \u201cthe beast\u201d and \u201cBabylon.\u201d There was evidence which showed that these two words were used in Rastafarian jargon to mean \u201cthe police\u201d and \u201cCaucasian-run America.\u201d In addition, there was evidence from Kevin\u2019s expert witness, Dr. Thomas Harbin, who referred to Kevin\u2019s religious belief in terms of the Rastafarian religion. Dr. Harbin stated that Kevin got his beliefs from his brother. The State\u2019s argument was comprised of reasonable inferences from the facts in evidence. See Anderson, 322 N.C. at 37, 366 S.E.2d at 468. Thus, Kevin cannot show a consideration of Rastafarian beliefs by the jury regarding his sentencing was grossly improper. Therefore, the State\u2019s closing argument during sentencing did not require ex mero motu intervention by the trial court. These assignments of error are overruled.\nIn another assignment of error, Kevin contends the trial court committed plain error by not instructing the jury consistently with Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140, and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1987), in the Hathcock murder case, when there was evidence that defendant himself did not participate in that killing. Kevin concedes that he did not request such an instruction at trial and therefore relies on the plain error rule for this assignment of error.\nBecause Kevin did not request the Enmund/Tison instruction, he is limited to plain error review. N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4). As we have stated, under plain error review, the defendant must be able to show that there was error and that the jury probably would have reached a different result absent the error. See Roseboro, 351 N.C. at 553, 528 S.E.2d at 12.\nIn State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 433 S.E.2d 144 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994), this Court explained the holdings in Enmund and Tison:\nIn Enmund, the [United States Supreme] Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who aids and abets in the commission of a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others, when the defendant does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1154. In a later case, however, the Court further construed its holding in Enmund and held that major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient grounds for the imposition of the death penalty. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 158, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127, 145 (1987).\nMcCollum, 334 N.C. at 223, 433 S.E.2d at 151-52.\nPursuant to our pattern jury instructions, if there is evidence which suggests that a defendant was not personally involved in the killing, then an instruction must be given which requires the jury to first determine the defendant\u2019s culpability before considering the death penalty. See N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 150.10 (1998); Lemons, 348 N.C. at 364-65, 501 S.E.2d at 327.\nThis issue, however, \u201conly arises when the State proceeds on a felony murder theory.\u201d State v. Robinson, 342 N.C. 74, 87, 463 S.E.2d 218, 226 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1996). In State v. Gaines, this Court held:\nThe Enmund rule does not apply to a defendant who has been found guilty of first-degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation. Because defendant was convicted of first-degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation, and not based on the felony-murder rule, Issue One-A [of the pattern jury instructions] is inapplicable.\n345 N.C. at 682, 483 S.E.2d at 417 (where the jury found the defendant guilty of premeditated and deliberate murder either under the theory of acting in concert or by aiding and abetting); see also Lemons, 348 N.C. at 365, 501 S.E.2d at 327.\nIn the instant case, the jury found Kevin guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation under the theory that Kevin committed all the elements or that he acted in concert with Tilmon. As we stated in Gaines, the Enmund/Tison instruction is not required in such a case. Gaines, 345 N.C. at 682, 483 S.E.2d at 417. Therefore, the trial court did not err by failing to give the requested instruction, and Kevin has failed to establish the existence of error for the purpose of plain error review. Moreover, even if the Enmund/Tison instruction did apply to premeditated and deliberate murder, there was more than sufficient evidence that Kevin\u2019s actions alone possessed the requisite intent to overcome the need for the Enmund/Tison instruction. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nBy assignment of error, Kevin contends the trial court committed constitutional error by failing to give a peremptory instruction for the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, which relates to \u201c[t]he age of the defendant at the time of the crime.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7) (1999). We disagree.\n\u201cUpon request, a trial court should give a peremptory instruction for any mitigating circumstance, whether statutory or nonstatutory, if it is supported by uncontroverted evidence.\u201d Wallace, 351 N.C. at 525-26, 528 S.E.2d at 354; see also White, 349 N.C. at 568, 508 S.E.2d at 274. Conversely, the trial court is not required to give a peremptory instruction when the evidence supporting a mitigating circumstance is controverted. See State v. Womble, 343 N.C. 667, 683, 473 S.E.2d 291, 300 (1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1095, 136 L. Ed. 2d 719 (1997). The existence of the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance is not wholly determined by the defendant\u2019s chronological age. See State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 47, 446 S.E.2d 252, 277 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995). Other varying circumstances and conditions must also be considered. See State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 422, 459 S.E.2d 638, 671 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108, 134 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1996).\nIn the instant case, Kevin clearly requested a peremptory instruction on the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance. The State did not object to Kevin\u2019s request. The trial court then decided to give a partial peremptory instruction that all the evidence showed that Kevin was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes. Kevin did not object. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury on the (f)(7) circumstance, stating:\nThe evidence tends to show that the defendant Kevin Golphin was seventeen years of age at the time of each of these murders. The mitigating effect of the age of the defendant is for you to determine from all the facts and circumstances which you find from the evidence. \u201cAge\u201d is a flexible and relative concept. The chronological age of the defendant is not always the determinative factor.\nFollowing the court\u2019s instructions, Kevin did not object to the instruction, nor did Kevin request any clarification for the jury. Therefore, Kevin waived appellate review of this assignment of error. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2); see also State v. Gregory, 348 N.C. 203, 211-12, 499 S.E.2d 753, 759 (holding the defendant waived appellate review where he requested a peremptory instruction, the trial court gave the peremptory instruction, and the defendant did not object to the instruction or request clarification), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 952, 142 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1998). Moreover, Kevin cannot show prejudice because one or more jurors found the (f)(7) circumstance. While Kevin assigns plain error as an alternative, he does not specifically and distinctly argue plain error. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4). This assignment of error is overruled.\nBy assignment of error, Tilmon contends the trial court erred by refusing to give a peremptory instruction on several mitigating circumstances which he contends are supported by uncontroverted, credible evidence. Specifically, Tilmon contends his request for peremptory instructions on the mitigating circumstances regarding his age, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7), and inability to appreciate the criminality of his actions, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(6), and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances regarding Tilmon\u2019s being forced to lie about parental abuse, being subjected to parental neglect, and his not receiving necessary counseling were improperly denied. We disagree.\nAs we previously stated, the trial court should give a peremptory instruction for mitigating circumstances when the evidence is uncontroverted. See Wallace, 351 N.C. at 525-26, 528 S.E.2d at 354. However, peremptory instructions are not required when the evidence supporting a mitigating circumstance is controverted. See Womble, 343 N.C. at 683, 473 S.E.2d at 300.\nWe first address the failure of the trial court to give a peremptory instruction for the statutory mitigating circumstance of Tilmon\u2019s age at the time of the crimes. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7).\nOur review of the transcript reveals that Tilmon did not request a peremptory instruction on the (f)(7) statutory mitigating circumstance. In addition, following the trial court\u2019s instructions, when the parties were given an opportunity to request corrections and clarifications, Tilmon did not object to the trial court\u2019s failure to give any peremptory instruction on Tilmon\u2019s age at the time of the crime. Therefore, pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), Tilmon cannot now assign as error this alleged omission from the instruction. Accordingly, this argument is without merit.\nTilmon also contends he should have received a peremptory instruction stating that the evidence tended to show \u201c[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A~2000(f)(6).\nWhile there was evidence which supported Tilmon\u2019s contention that he could not \u201cappreciate the criminality of his conduct,\u201d there was also evidence that Tilmon attempted to eliminate Waters as a witness and that he initially denied shooting Trooper Lowry or Deputy Hathcock. In addition, there was evidence from family members that Tilmon cared for his grandmother. See State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435, 477, 459 S.E.2d 679, 701 (1995) (holding evidence by friends and family that a defendant volunteered to help and took care of others could conflict with evidence that a defendant\u2019s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was impaired), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 134 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1996). Therefore, as there was contradictory evidence, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a peremptory instruction on the (f)(6) statutory mitigating circumstance.\nTilmon further contends the trial court should have given peremptory instructions which he requested for several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: (1) he was subjected to parental neglect, (2) his mother forced him to lie about being abused, (3) he did not receive appropriate counseling, and (4) he was abandoned by his father. Our review of the transcript reveals Tilmon was given a peremptory instruction on the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that he was abandoned by his father. Therefore, we address only Tilmon\u2019s argument as to the other three circumstances.\nTilmon\u2019s claim that he was subjected to parental neglect was supported by evidence at trial. However, the State presented contradictory evidence. Neighbors of the Golphin family testified they never witnessed neglect by Tilmon\u2019s parents. In addition, there was evidence Tilmon lived in two nice neighborhoods while growing up. Therefore, as there was contradictory evidence, the trial court did not err in refusing to give a peremptory instruction on the nonstatutory mitigator that Tilmon was neglected by his parents.\nTilmon also argues the trial court should have granted his request for a peremptory instruction about his mother previously forcing him to lie about parental abuse to protective services. The trial court originally indicated it would peremptorily instruct the jury with regard to this circumstance, but then decided the word \u201cforced\u201d in the circumstance was \u201csufficiently subjective\u201d and not appropriate for a peremptory instruction. While there may have been evidence that Tilmon lied to protective services about abuse, it is not clear from the evidence that he was \u201cforced\u201d to lie. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to give a peremptory instruction for this nonstatutory mitigating circumstance.\nFinally, Tilmon argues the trial court should have given a peremptory instruction on the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that he did not receive any counseling for his problems. Again, the trial court initially agreed to give the instruction, but then decided it was \u201cjust too universal to be subject to a peremptory instruction.\u201d While Dr. Johnson testified there was \u201cnothing in the record that says Tilmon got any counseling,\u201d this is not definitive evidence that he did not have any counseling. Therefore, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the peremptory instruction. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nIn another assignment of error, Kevin contends the trial court committed reversible constitutional error by giving disjunctive instructions on the statutory aggravating circumstance of murder committed in the course of a felony. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5). Kevin argues the instruction given by the trial court allowed the jury to find the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance to exist if the jury found him guilty of either armed robbery of Ava Rogers\u2019 car in South Carolina, or guilty of robbery of Trooper Lowry\u2019s weapon. Kevin contends this violated the jury unanimity requirement. We disagree.\nIn State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 467 S.E.2d 653, this Court approved the use of a disjunctive instruction on the (e)(3) aggravating circumstance \u2014 that defendant had been previously convicted of a crime involving the use or threat of violence to another person. Id. at 696, 467 S.E.2d at 668-69. We noted that the defendant\u2019s reliance on cases requiring a unanimous verdict to convict a defendant of a charged offense was misplaced. Id. We then stated, \u201cSo long as the crimes for which defendant had been previously convicted were felonies and involved the use or threatened use of violence against another person, the specific crime which supports this aggravating circumstance is immaterial.\u201d Id. at 696-97, 467 S.E.2d at 669.\nIn the instant case, the State requested two (e)(5) aggravating circumstances, one for each felony, to insure unanimity. Kevin objected to using two (e)(5) circumstances, and requested one (e)(5) circumstance based on one felony because the jury may perceive the number of aggravating circumstances as significant, and the legislature did not intend subdivision of the eleven aggravating circumstances. The trial court recognized Kevin\u2019s concerns and refused to allow the separate (e)(5) circumstances to be submitted based on each felony. Instead, the trial court submitted two theories of (e)(5) to the jury as subissues of one (e)(5) aggravating circumstance. On this issue, it instructed as follows:\nAs to the defendant Kevin Golphin as to the case in which the victim is Lloyd Lowry, the potential aggravating circumstance is stated as follows: \u201cWas the capital felony committed by the defendant while the defendant was engaged in a flight after committing armed robbery or while in the commission of an armed robbery?\u201d\nAs to the defendant Kevin Golphin in the case in which Lloyd Lowry is the victim, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that when Kevin Golphin killed Lloyd Lowry, the defendant was engaged in a flight after taking and carrying away a motor vehicle from the person and presence of Ava Rogers without her voluntary consent by endangering or threatening her life with a firearm, the defendant Kevin Golphin knowing that he was not entitled to take the property and intending at that time to deprive Ava Rogers of its use permanently or if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that when Kevin Golphin killed Lloyd Lowry, the defendant was in the commission of taking and carrying away a pistol from the person and presence of Lloyd Lowry, without his voluntary consent by endangering or threatening his life with a firearm, the defendant Kevin Golphin knowing he was not entitled to take the pistol and intending at that time to deprive him of its use permanently, then you would find this aggravating circumstance and would so indicate by having your foreperson write, \u201cYes,\u201d in the space provided.\nThe instant case is analogous to DeCastro. There was evidence to support both theories of the (e)(5) circumstance, and both of the theories involved felonies. Therefore, both theories satisfy the requirements of the (e)(5) circumstance. See id. at 696, 467 S.E.2d at 668-69. As such, it is immaterial which crime the jurors use to support the circumstance. See id. at 697, 467 S.E.2d at 669. Moreover, the case relied on by Kevin to support the unanimity requirement, Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813, 143 L. Ed. 2d 985 (1999), actually requires unanimity for elements of an offense, rather than for aggravating circumstances. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err by using a disjunctive instruction for the two theories under one (e)(5) aggravating circumstance. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn an assignment of error, Kevin argues the trial court committed reversible constitutional error by submitting the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) aggravating circumstance, that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in the Trooper Lowry case. The jury found this circumstance to exist, and Kevin contends resentencing is required. Kevin bases his argument on three separate grounds: (1) the (e)(9) circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, (2) submission of the (e)(9) circumstance was not supported by the evidence, and (3) it was arbitrary and capricious to submit the (e)(9) circumstance as to him and not as to his brother. We disagree.\nWe first address Kevin\u2019s argument that the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague. Although defendant requested that the trial court not submit the (e)(9) circumstance because it was not justified in the instant case, he never made any constitutional claims at trial and never objected after the trial court\u2019s instruction. He will \u201cnot be heard on any constitutional grounds now.\u201d State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 186, 513 S.E.2d 296, 317, cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. -, 145 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1999). Moreover, this Court has consistently rejected this argument. See id. at 187, 513 S.E.2d at 317; Simpson, 341 N.C. at 357, 462 S.E.2d at 214.\nKevin further contends the evidence does not support submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance. \u201cIn determining whether evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s submission of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, we must consider the evidence \u2018in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\u2019 \u201d Flippen, 349 N.C. at 270, 506 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 319, 364 S.E.2d 316, 328, sentence vacated on other grounds, 488 U.S. 807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1988)). Determination of whether submission of the (e)(9) circumstance is appropriate depends on the facts of the case. See Anderson, 350 N.C. at 185, 513 S.E.2d at 316.\nThis Court has previously held the following types of murders to warrant submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance:\nOne type includes killings physically agonizing or otherwise dehumanizing to the victim. State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 319, 364 S.E.2d 316, 328 (1988). A second type includes killings less violent but \u201cconscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous to the victim,\u201d State v. Brown, 315 N.C. 40, 65, 337 S.E.2d 808, 826-27 (1985) [, cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1164, 90 L. Ed. 2d 733 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988)], including those which leave the victim in her \u201clast moments aware of but helpless to prevent impending death,\u201d State v. Hamlet, 312 N.C. 162, 175, 321 S.E.2d 837, 846 (1984). A third type exists where the \u201ckilling demonstrates an unusual depravity of mind on the part of the defendant beyond that normally present in first-degree murder.\u201d Brown, 315 N.C. at 65, 337 S.E.2d at 827.\nGibbs, 335 N.C. at 61-62, 436 S.E.2d at 356. In addition, this Court held the submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance is warranted when there is evidence that the killing was committed in a fashion beyond what was necessary to effectuate the victim\u2019s death. See State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110, 146, 353 S.E.2d 352, 373 (1987), overruled on other grounds by Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 481 S.E.2d 44.\nIn two previous cases with fact patterns similar to the instant case, this Court found no error in the submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance. In State v. Pinch, the defendant shot the victim once, and then walked over to where the victim lay moaning and shot him again at close range. State v. Pinch, 306 N.C. 1, 35, 292 S.E.2d 203, 228, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056, 74 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1982), overruled on other grounds by State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 451 S.E.2d 543 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 832, 133 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995), by State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 443 S.E.2d 306 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995), and by State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988). In State v. Bonney, this Court held the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance was properly submitted to the jury when the victim died within two or three minutes after being shot, but was nevertheless aware of his impending death. See State v. Bonney, 329 N.C. 61, 80, 405 S.E.2d 145, 156 (1991). In the instant case, Ulmon shot Trooper Lowry, causing him to become incapacitated. Kevin was therefore able to shake himself free of Trooper Lowry\u2019s grasp and retrieve the trooper\u2019s pistol. He then shot the trooper multiple times as he lay on the ground moaning. Because Trooper Lowry had the presence of mind to attempt to grab Kevin after he had been shot, this, taken in the light most favorable to the State, was evidence he was aware of his fate and unable to prevent impending death. See Hamlet, 312 N.C. at 175, 321 S.E.2d at 846. These facts are sufficiently similar to the facts of Pinch and Bonney to warrant the same holding. Therefore, sufficient evidence did exist to support the submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance to the jury.\nIn his third argument, Kevin contends the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance should not have been submitted against him because it was arbitrary and capricious to submit the circumstance against only him, and not against Tilmon. However, he failed to object at trial and has cited no authority to support his contentions. We have previously recognized that the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance can be utilized when the evidence shows the murder \u201cwas committed in such a way as to amount to a conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.\u201d State v. Martin, 303 N.C. 246, 255, 278 S.E.2d 214, 220, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 933, 70 L. Ed. 2d 240 (1981) (emphasis added). The State has borne this burden with respect to Kevin. Kevin has not shown the (e)(9) circumstance was improperly submitted. The trial court did not err in submitting the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance against Kevin. This assignment of error is accordingly overruled.\nBy assignments of error, Tilmon and Kevin contend the trial court erred by allowing the jury to consider and find aggravating circumstances pursuant to both N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(4), that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody, and (e)(8), that the capital felony was committed against a law enforcement officer while engaged in the performance of his official duties. We disagree.\nKevin concedes this argument has been decided adversely to his position in Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 279 S.E.2d 788. Tilmon, however, argues the circumstances were based on the same evidence and inherently duplicitous. \u201cAggravating circumstances are not considered redundant absent a complete overlap in the evidence supporting them.\u201d Moseley, 338 N.C. at 54, 449 S.E.2d at 444. The same evidence cannot be used to support submission of more than one aggravating circumstance. See Hutchins, 303 N.C. at 354, 279 S.E.2d at 808.\nIn Hutchins, this Court addressed the submission of both the (e)(4) and (e)(8) aggravating circumstances:\nOf the two aggravating circumstances challenged by defendant here as purportedly being based upon the same evidence, one of the aggravating circumstances looks to the underlying factual basis of defendant\u2019s crime, the other to defendant\u2019s subjective motivation for his act. The aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed against an officer engaged in the performance of his lawful duties involved the consideration of the factual circumstances of defendant\u2019s crime. The aggravating circumstance that the murder was for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest forced the jury to weigh in the balance defendant\u2019s motivation in pursuing his course of conduct. There was no error in submitting both of these aggravating circumstances to the jury.\nId. at 355, 279 S.E.2d at 809.\nAs in Hutchins, in the instant case, the trial court submitted both the (e)(4) and (e)(8) aggravating circumstances to the jury. The (e)(4) aggravating circumstance required the jury to determine the subjective motivation for the murders. There is evidence that defendants were motivated by the desire to avoid arrest for stealing Rogers\u2019 vehicle. In support of the (e)(8) aggravating circumstance, the jury must consider the factual circumstances of the crime. There was evidence Trooper Lowry was performing an official duty when he stopped Kevin on 1-95 for not wearing a seat belt and then learned of defendants\u2019 theft. There is also evidence that Deputy Hathcock was performing an official duty when he arrived on the scene to provide assistance to a fellow officer. Therefore, although the same underlying sequence of events was the subject of the (e)(4) and (e)(8) aggravating circumstances, the two circumstances were directed at distinct aspects of the crimes charged. The trial court did not err by submitting both the (e)(4) and (e)(8) aggravating circumstances. These assignments of error are overruled.\nBy assignments of error, Kevin and Tilmon contend the trial court erred by submitting the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance, that the capital felony was committed while defendant was engaged in or in flight after committing a robbery, and the (e)(ll) aggravating circumstance, that the murder committed was part of a course of conduct involving other violent crimes, without instructing the jury not to consider the same evidence for each. We disagree.\nIt is axiomatic that a sentencing jury may not consider the same evidence in support of more than one aggravating circumstance. See Hutchins, 303 N.C. at 354, 279 S.E.2d at 808. In the instant case, both defendants concede there was sufficient evidence to provide adequate and separate bases for the two statutory aggravating circumstances in that both an armed robbery and a double murder took place. However, both argue that there was a likelihood that without a proper instruction, the jury might have utilized the same evidence in support of more than one aggravating circumstance. Neither defendant objected to the submission of the (e)(5) and (e)(ll) circumstances on this basis, nor did they request a limiting instruction to that effect. Therefore, our review is limited to a search for plain error, \u201cwhich requires [a] defendant to show that the error was so fundamental that another result would probably have obtained absent the error.\u201d Rouse, 339 N.C. at 99, 451 S.E.2d at 565. After a careful review of the record, we agree with defendants\u2019 concessions that there exists more than sufficient evidence to provide independent bases for the two aggravating circumstances. Because such a quantum of evidence exists, defendants cannot show that a different result was probable had a limiting instruction been given. See Kandies, 342 N.C. at 452, 467 S.E.2d at 85. Accordingly, we decline to find plain error, and these assignments of error are overruled.\nBy several assignments of error, Kevin and Tilmon contend the trial court\u2019s instructions involving the jury\u2019s consideration of mitigating circumstances were erroneous. Specifically, they argue the instruction that allows the jury to reject a mitigating circumstance if it finds the circumstance to be without mitigating value is unconstitutional. We disagree.\nKevin and Tilmon both concede that this Court has previously upheld the instructions they challenge and ruled contrary to their positions on this issue in State v. Hill, 331 N.C. 387, 417 S.E.2d 765 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924, 122 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1993). However, Tilmon makes an additional argument, without reference to any prior holding of this Court, relating to the jury\u2019s rejection of several non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Tilmon claims that uncontroverted evidence supported, inter alia, the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstances: that he had an unstable home environment, that he was physically abused as a child, that he was reared by an abusive father, that he was remorseful, that he cared for his ailing grandmother, that he loved his grandparents, and that he suffered from parental neglect and low intellectual functioning. Tilmon claims that because these circumstances possess inherent mitigating value, the jury was not free to reject them and was required to give them mitigating value pursuant to Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982).\nAlthough Tilmon attempts to frame this argument anew, citing \u201cinherent mitigating content,\u201d we have previously rejected these claims. See Hill, 331 N.C. at 418, 417 S.E.2d at 780; State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 58-61, 381 S.E.2d 635, 668-70 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990); State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 395-97, 373 S.E.2d 518, 533-34 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1990). Defendant has not cited, nor do we perceive, any reason to revisit our prior decisions. These assignments of error are overruled.\nBy another assignment of error, Kevin contends his sentences of death were imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner because no juror found that the (f)(2) mitigating circumstance existed even though a peremptory instruction was given and substantial and uncontradicted evidence was presented in support of it. Kevin argues the jury was required to find that the (f)(2) circumstance existed because at least one juror found the existence of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that \u201cKevin Golphin lacked parental involvement or support in treatment for psychological problems.\u201d He contends the same evidence was sufficient to support the (f)(2) statutory mitigating circumstance that \u201cthe capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(2). We disagree.\nAlthough a peremptory instruction for a mitigating circumstance may be given because the evidence in support of it is uncontroverted, a jury remains free to reject the circumstance in the event it does not find the evidence in support of the circumstance credible or convincing. See, e.g., Rouse, 339 N.C. at 107, 451 S.E.2d at 571; Gay, 334 N.C. at 492, 434 S.E.2d at 854; Huff, 325 N.C. at 59, 381 S.E.2d at 669. The evidence presented by Kevin\u2019s mental health expert was not so manifestly credible that we are able to conclude that the jury was required to find it convincing. Furthermore, the fact that a juror accepted the expert\u2019s testimony to support the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that \u201cKevin Golphin lacked parental involvement or support in treatment for psychological problems,\u201d is not determinative of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the (f)(2) statutory mitigating circumstance. The two mitigating circumstances emphasize different times and different events. The nonstatutory circumstance relates to parental support at the time Kevin sought psychological treatment, before these crimes were committed. The statutory circumstance involves Kevin\u2019s mental or emotional state at the time the crimes were committed. Thus, it cannot be said that the same evidence necessarily supports both mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nPRESERVATION TSSTTES\nDefendants have raised seven additional issues which they concede have been decided previously by this Court contrary to their respective positions: (1) the trial court\u2019s instruction regarding the burden of proof applicable to mitigating circumstances was unconstitutionally vague and imposed too high a burden of proof by utilizing the term \u201csatisfy\u201d; (2) the jury instructions for Issues Three and Four on the sentencing recommendations forms which provided that jurors \u201cmay\u201d rather than \u201cmust\u201d consider mitigating circumstances were erroneous; (3) the jury instructions for Issues Three and Four which provided that each juror could consider only mitigating circumstances that juror had found in Issue Two were erroneous; (4) the jury instructions for Issues One, Three, and Four were unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous, resulting in an arbitrary verdict and requiring the jury to unanimously reject a death sentence to impose a life sentence; (5) the jury instruction defining mitigation was unconstitutionally narrow; (6) the trial court erred by \u201cdeath qualifying\u201d the jury, which resulted in an unconstitutionally biased jury in favor of the death penalty, and by failing to require separate juries for determinations of guilt and sentence; and (7) the North Carolina death penalty statute and the death sentences imposed are unconstitutional.\nDefendants make these arguments for the purposes of permitting this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and to preserve these arguments for any possible further judicial review in these cases. We have thoroughly considered defendants\u2019 arguments on these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings. Accordingly, these assignments of error are overruled.\nPROPORTIONALITY REVIEW\nHaving concluded that defendants\u2019 trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error, it is our duty, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2), to make the following determinations with regard to each sentence of death: (1) whether the evidence supports the jury\u2019s findings of the aggravating circumstances upon which the sentence of death was based; (2) whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2).\nIn relation to Kevin\u2019s conviction for the murder of Trooper Lowry, the jury found the following five aggravating circumstances to exist: (1) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(4); (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in flight after committing robbery or while the defendant was engaged in the commission of armed robbery (Lowry\u2019s gun), N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5); (3) the capital felony was committed against a law enforcement officer while engaged in the performance of his official duties, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(8); (4) the murder for which defendant stands convicted was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(ll); and (5) the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). In relation to Kevin\u2019s conviction for the murder of Deputy Hathcock as well as Tllmon\u2019s convictions for the murders of both officers, the jury found the following four aggravating circumstances to exist in each instance: (1) the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(4); (2) the capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged in flight after committing robbery, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5); (3) the capital felony was committed against a law enforcement officer while engaged in the performance of his official duties, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(8); and (4) the murder for which defendant stands convicted was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(ll).\nThe trial court submitted four statutory mitigating circumstances as to each murder on Kevin\u2019s behalf. The jury found that one, defendant\u2019s age at the time of the crimes, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7), existed. The jury also found that one of the fifteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, that Kevin \u201clacked parental involvement or support in treatment for psychological problems,\u201d submitted by the trial court on Kevin\u2019s behalf existed. The trial court submitted five statutory mitigating circumstances as to each murder on Tilmon\u2019s behalf. Again, the jury found that one, defendant\u2019s age at the time of the crimes, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7), existed. Of the thirty-six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted on Tilmon\u2019s behalf, the jury found none to exist.\nAfter a thorough review of the record, including the transcripts, briefs, and oral arguments, we conclude the evidence fully supports all of the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. Further, we find no indication the sentences of death were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. We therefore turn to our final statutory duty of proportionality review.\nThe purpose of proportionality review is to \u201celiminate the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury.\u201d Holden, 321 N.C. at 164-65, 362 S.E.2d at 537. Proportionality review also acts \u201c[a]s a check against the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty.\u201d Barfield, 298 N.C. at 354, 259 S.E.2d at 544. In conducting proportionality review, we compare the instant cases with other cases in which this Court has concluded the death penalty was disproportionate. See McCollum, 334 N.C. at 240, 433 S.E.2d at 162. This Court has determined the death penalty to be disproportionate on seven occasions: Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517; State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, and by Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373; Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181; Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163; Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170; State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\nSeveral factors lead us to the conclusion that the instant cases are not similar to the cases in which we have found a death sentence to be disproportionate. First and foremost, the evidence in this case reveals that defendants deliberately murdered two law enforcement officers for the purpose of evading lawful arrest. This Court has noted that the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(4) and (e)(8) aggravating circumstances reflect the General Assembly\u2019s recognition that \u201cthe collective conscience requires the most severe penalty for those who flout our system of law enforcement.\u201d State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 230, 358 S.E.2d 1, 33, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987).\nThe murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his official duties differs in kind and not merely in degree from other murders. When in the performance of his duties, a law enforcement officer is the representative of the public and a symbol of the rule of law. The murder of a law enforcement officer engaged in the performance of his duties in the truest sense strikes a blow at the entire public \u2014 the body politic \u2014 and is a direct attack upon the rule of law which must prevail if our society as we know it is to survive.\nHill, 311 N.C. at 488, 319 S.E.2d at 177 (Mitchell, J. (later C.J.) concurring in part and dissenting in part), quoted with approval in McKoy, 323 N.C. at 46-47, 372 S.E.2d at 37. Second, defendants were each convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. This Court has never found a sentence of death disproportionate in a case where the jury has found a defendant guilty of murdering more than one victim. See State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 552, 461 S.E.2d 631, 654 (1995). Third, defendants\u2019 convictions for the murders were based on the theory of premeditation and deliberation. This Court has stated, \u201cThe finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more coldblooded and calculated crime.\u201d Artis, 325 N.C. at 341, 384 S.E.2d at 506. Fourth and finally, as to each murder conviction, the jury found these two aggravating circumstances: (1) \u201c[t]he capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5); and (2) \u201c[t]he murder for which the defendant stands convicted was part of a course of conduct in which the defendant engaged and which included the commission by the defendant of other crimes of violence against another person or persons,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(ll). In addition, in relation to Kevin\u2019s conviction for Trooper Lowry\u2019s murder, the jury also found that \u201c[t]he capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). There are four statutory aggravating circumstances which, standing alone, this Court has held sufficient to support a sentence of death. See Bacon, 337 N.C. at 110 n.8, 446 S.E.2d at 566 n.8. The N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5), (e)(9), and (e)(ll) statutory aggravating circumstances are among those four. See id. For these stated reasons, we conclude this case is not substantially similar to any case in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate.\nWe also compare the instant cases with the cases in which this Court has found the death penalty to be proportionate. While we review all of the cases in the pool of \u201csimilar cases\u201d when engaging in our statutorily mandated duty of proportionality review, we reemphasize that we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out that duty. See State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 81, 301 S.E.2d 335, 356, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983). Considering the brutal circumstances of these murders along with the fact that the victims were law enforcement officers engaged in the performance of their official duties, it suffices to say the instant cases are more similar to cases in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have found it disproportionate.\nAccordingly, we conclude that defendants received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error, and that the sentences of death are not disproportionate. Therefore, the judgments of the trial court must be and are left undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.\n. On 17 September 1997, Kevin was traveling from Richmond, Virginia, to South Carolina on a bus which stopped in Fayetteville, North Carolina. While the bus was stopped, Fayetteville Police Department officers seized Kevin\u2019s luggage on the suspicion the luggage contained illegal drugs. A drug-sniffing dog had alerted the officers to the possible presence of drugs in the luggage. The officers detained the luggage after Kevin refused to give them permission to search it. Kevin continued his trip to South Carolina without his luggage and without being arrested or charged.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "WAINWRIGHT, Justice."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William B. Crumpler and Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State.",
      "Malcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Janine C. Fodor and Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for defendant-appellant Kevin Golphin.",
      "M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellant Tilmon Golphin."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KEVIN SALVADOR GOLPHIN STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. TILMON CHARLES GOLPHIN, JR.\nNo. 441A98\n(Filed 25 August 2000)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to be present at all stages\u2014 out-of-court discussions \u2014 special venire\nThe trial court did not violate defendants\u2019 right to be present at all stages of their capital trial when it ruled the jury would be drawn from a special venire from another county, even though defendants were not present during out-of-court meetings relating to change of venue or a special venire, because: (1) the meetings took place prior to commencement of defendants\u2019 trial; (2) defendants were present at the hearing on change of venue at which defendants stipulated to a special venire; and (3) both defendants agreed through counsel to the special venire.\n2. Jury\u2014 special venire \u2014 another county\nAlthough one defendant argues there was no filed court order changing venue for purposes of jury selection, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital trial by ordering a special venire from another county for the limited purpose of jury selection because: (1) both defendants agreed through their counsel to the proposed change; (2) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-957 does not apply since defendants never moved for a change of venue; and (3) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-133 was not violated since the trial court had the inherent authority to order the change based on the nature and circumstances of the alleged crimes against two law enforcement officers, and defendants\u2019 acquiescence to the stipulation and proposal at the hearing.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to fair cross-section \u2014 jury venire\nThe trial court did not violate defendants\u2019 right to have a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community in which the crimes occurred, based on defendants\u2019 failure to establish a prima facie case of disproportionate representation, because: (1) defendants are not entitled to a special venire from the population of a county which exactly mirrors the population of the county in which the crimes were committed as long as the venire was selected in a manner in which various interests were represented; (2) there is only a 14.3% absolute disparity in the representation of African-Americans between the county of the crimes and the special venire county, and this percentage standing alone is not unfair and unreasonable; and (3) the fact that the racial composition of the county of the crimes differs from that of the special venire county is not sufficient to show \u201csystematic exclusion.\u201d\n4. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 short-form indictment\u2014 sufficiency\n\u25a0 The trial court did not err by denying one defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the murder indictments and by holding the short-form indictments were sufficient to charge both defendants with first-degree murder.\n5. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 indictment\u2014aggravating circumstances\nThe trial court did not err in a capital trial by failing to require the State to disclose in its indictment the aggravating circumstances it intended to rely upon at sentencing, and by denying defendants\u2019 pretrial motions for disclosure of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, because: (1) an indictment does not need to set forth facts relevant only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime, since it is not an element of the offense; and (2) a trial court may not require the State to disclose which aggravating circumstances it intends to rely upon at the sentencing phase since N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e) provides sufficient notice of the aggravating circumstances.\n6. Criminal Law \u2014 joinder\u2014common scheme \u2014 same transaction\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital trial by denying one defendant\u2019s pretrial motion to sever the cases and by overruling his objections to improper joinder, because: (1) the presence of antagonistic defenses standing alone does not warrant severance; (2) there was overwhelming evidence from several eyewitnesses concerning defendant\u2019s involvement in the crimes; (3) defendant signed a waiver regarding any objections to the redaction and/or admission of the statement of his non-testifying co-defendant, and defendant\u2019s attorney stated in open court that there was no objection to the introduction of the codefendant\u2019s statement as it relates to defendant; (4) defendant was not precluded from offering exculpatory evidence since he could have subpoenaed witnesses to testify for him; and (5) the evidence supports consolidation of defendants\u2019 trials since the offenses arose out of a common scheme and were part of the same transaction. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-926(b) and 15A-927(c).\n7. Discovery\u2014 victims\u2019 personnel files \u2014 not discoverable\nThe trial court did not err in a capital trial by denying one defendant\u2019s pretrial motion for discovery of the two law enforcement victims\u2019 personnel files because: (1) defendant did not preserve his constitutional issue since it was not raised and determined by the trial court, N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); and (2) the list of discoverable items in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(d) does not include victims\u2019 personnel files, and the personnel files were not in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor in this case.\n8. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to counsel \u2014 incriminating statements \u2014 booking exception\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights in a capital trial by denying his pretrial motion to suppress the incriminating statements he made to law enforcement officers after his arrest, based on the police continuing the custodial interrogation of defendant after he invoked his right to counsel, because: (1) a motion in limine was not sufficient to preserve this issue since defendant did not object when it was offered at trial; (2) defendant did not argue plain error in his brief, N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4); (3) the questions asked by the police were included in the booking exception for eliciting biographical information; (4) it is unreasonable to conclude the S.B.I. agent should have known his questions concerning biographical information were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response; and (5) defendant initiated the further discussion when he asked the agent and detective why they wanted to talk about the incident when it had been videotaped.\n9. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to counsel \u2014 incriminating statements \u2014 no standing\nThe trial court did not violate defendant\u2019s rights in a capital trial by denying his codefendant\u2019s pretrial motion to suppress the incriminating statements the codefendant made to law enforcement officers after his arrest because: (1) defendant has no standing to assert his codefendant\u2019s constitutional right to counsel; (2) defendant did not make a motion in limine to suppress his co-defendant\u2019s statement, nor did he object at the time the statement was offered into evidence at trial, N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); and (3) defendant did not argue plain error, N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4).\n10. Jury\u2014 capital trial \u2014 selection\u2014use of panels\nThe trial court did not violate its duty to ensure jury selection was conducted in a random manner when it used panels because: (1) defendants failed to object on constitutional grounds, thus waiving review of any constitutional issues; (2) defendants failed to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1211(c) to challenge the panels; (3) even if the trial court violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(a), defendants cannot show prejudicial error in light of the fact that neither defendant objected when the trial court informed both defendants of how the prospective jurors were to be placed into panels; and (4) neither defendants nor the State exhausted their peremptory challenges, evidencing satisfaction with the jury which was empaneled.\n11. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to be present at every stage\u2014 administrative matters\nThe trial court did not violate defendants\u2019 right to be present at every stage of their capital trial by directing the clerk of court to meet privately with jurors about transportation and logistical matters because: (1) the right to be present is not violated when a clerk communicates with a jury about administrative matters, and defendants failed to show their presence would have had a reasonably substantial relation to their opportunity to defend; (2) the trial court\u2019s failure to give an additional instruction shows there was no concern that the jurors were asking the clerk inappropriate questions; (3) nothing in the record suggests that anything other than logistics were discussed; and (4) the fact that defendants failed to object allows the assumption that the clerk engaged only in the administrative duties assigned.\n12. Jury\u2014 challenge for cause \u2014 unable to render fair and impartial verdict\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital trial by excusing for cause a prospective juror based on the theory that she was unable to render a fair and impartial verdict as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212(9) because: (1) the prospective juror became emotional and stated she had substantial doubt about her impartiality after being questioned by one defendant\u2019s counsel; (2) one defendant did not request an opportunity to ask additional questions of the prospective juror as required by N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) in order to preserve this question for appeal; and (3) there was no showing that further questioning by the codefendant\u2019s counsel would have produced different answers.\n13. Jury\u2014 excusal \u2014 service on federal jury within two years\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights by excusing a prospective juror under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 9-3 on the basis that she had previously served on a federal jury within two years and was not immediately qualified to serve in the instant case, because: (1) defendant suggested that the trial court excuse her from service and cannot now complain that his constitutional rights have been violated; (2) defendant did not raise any constitutional issue below, and therefore, has failed to preserve this question for appellate review; and (3) the trial court could not have moved the prospective juror to a later panel and then have her sworn in at the time she was called, which would have been two years after her prior jury service, since N.C.G.S. \u00a7 9-14 mandates that prospective jurors be sworn in at the beginning of court.\n14. Jury\u2014 peremptory challenges \u2014 not racially discriminatory manner\nThe trial court did not err in a capital trial by allowing the State to exercise peremptory challenges for two African-American prospective jurors because: (1) the articulated reasons that one juror was relatively young and close to the age range of the defendants, and that she had a sibling approximately the age range of defendants, constitutes an articulable race neutral reason; (2) the articulated reasons that the other juror had a criminal record specifically involving an interaction with an officer and the potential empathy that might be engendered, and the fact that the juror\u2019s father was incarcerated for six years, are race neutral reasons; (3) the State did accept an African-American juror; and (4) the State made no comments which would support an inference of discrimination.\n15. Evidence\u2014 demonstration \u2014 pepper spray\nThe trial court did not unfairly prejudice one defendant\u2019s defense in a capital trial by allowing the State during its presentation of rebuttal evidence to demonstrate the effects of pepper spray because: (1) the demonstration was relevant under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 since defendant made the effects of pepper spray an issue in the case, and the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403; (2) the use of law enforcement officers during the presentation did not prejudice defendant since he was also given an opportunity to present witnesses to be sprayed and then to testify, but decided not to do so; and (3) the trial court allowed both sides to cross-examine each person as to their potential bias.\n16. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 constitutional issue \u2014 failure to raise in a motion or in trial court\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s Confrontation Clause rights in a capital trial by admitting evidence of a police report regarding seizure of that defendant\u2019s luggage by the police a week prior to the murders because: (1) defendant did not raise any constitutional issue in his motion in limine requesting a hearing on the admissibility of evidence; and (2) defendant did not preserve his argument since he did not raise this constitutional issue at the trial court.\n17. Evidence\u2014 hearsay \u2014 police report \u2014 not truth of matter asserted \u2014 subsequent actions\nThe trial court did not err in a capital trial by admitting evidence of a police robbery report regarding seizure of one defendant\u2019s luggage by the police a week prior to the murders because: (1) the report was relevant since the statements made to the officer were vital to the identification of defendants as the suspects in the armed robbery; (2) the report does not indicate the Fayetteville police actually discovered drugs in the luggage; and (3) the report was admissible for nonhearsay purposes to help explain the subsequent actions taken by the officer in traveling to the home of defendants\u2019 grandparents, which in turn furthered the investigation of the case.\n18. Evidence\u2014 prior crimes or acts \u2014 motive\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights by admitting his grandfather\u2019s testimony, offered by his codefendant, concerning the seizure of defendant\u2019s luggage by the police at a bus station a week prior to the murders because: (1) defendant did not preserve any constitutional argument since he did not raise it at the trial court; (2) the testimony was admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) to prove defendant\u2019s motive for not wanting to return by bus, and for his future actions; and (3) the jury could infer that defendant did not wish to take the bus because it would stop in the city where his luggage had been seized by police.\n19. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 redacted statement of codefendant\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s constitutional rights by admitting his nontestifying codefendant\u2019s redacted statement that there was a plan to rob a Food Lion and that the codefendant shot the two officers when he saw them attempting to spray defendant with mace, because: (1) the codefendant\u2019s statement to another inmate was not \u201cpowerfully incriminating\u201d toward defendant; (2) the trial court repeatedly cautioned the jury to consider the evidence against each defendant separately; and (3) the codefendant\u2019s statement to another inmate did not clearly make reference to defendant in relation to the plan, nor did it create a substantial risk that the jury would ignore the trial court\u2019s instructions in its determination of defendant\u2019s guilt.\n20. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 right to silence \u2014 equivocal\nThe trial court did not commit plain error in a capital trial by admitting into evidence a portion of one defendant\u2019s statement to police after defendant\u2019s alleged invocation of his right to silence because defendant\u2019s statement, that he did not want to say anything about the jeep and that he did not know who it was or he would have told the officers, did not constitute an unequivocal request to remain silent.\n21. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 displaying rifle in direction of juror\nThe trial court did not err in a capital trial by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State\u2019s closing argument when the prosecutor displayed a rifle in the direction of a juror because: (1) the prosecutor did not use the rifle to attempt to draw inferences from the weapon which were not supported by the evidence; (2) the juror was not frightened or intimidated by the prosecutor\u2019s actions; (3) the prosecutor was merely explaining one defendant\u2019s actions according to what witnesses observed; and (4) defendants were not prejudiced and were not prevented from receiving a fair trial in light of the overwhelming evidence.\n22. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 defendant\u2019s statements as lies\nThe trial court did not err in a capital trial by overruling one defendant\u2019s objection to the portion of the State\u2019s closing argument where the prosecutor referred to parts of the nontestifying defendant\u2019s statement as lies because: (1) the prosecutor was showing the jury instances where defendant had not been truthful while giving his statement to law enforcement officers; and (2) the prosecutor was pointing out exculpatory statements or omissions to show how the facts differed from defendant\u2019s statement.\n23. Criminal Law\u2014 acting in concert \u2014 propriety of instruction\nThe trial court did not err in a capital trial by giving acting in concert instructions based on the possession of a stolen vehicle for the first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon charges because the trial court\u2019s instructions were given consistent with the pattern jury instructions and comported in all respects with previous case law.\n24. Homicide; Robbery\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 armed robbery \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err in a capital case by denying one defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss charges of first-degree murder and robbery with a dangerous weapon of a deputy sheriff because: (1) defendants acted with a common purpose in possessing a stolen vehicle and removing the license plate from the stolen vehicle to avoid detection; (2) sufficient evidence revealed that defendant committed first-degree murder based on his admission that he took a State trooper\u2019s gun and was the only one to shoot it, a gunshot residue test revealed defendant had shot a weapon recently, and a bullet from the trooper\u2019s gun was recovered from the deputy\u2019s body; and (3) sufficient evidence revealed that defendants committed robbery with a dangerous weapon based on the facts that the codefendant shot the deputy with an assault rifle and thereafter took the deputy\u2019s weapon, defendant inflicted a fatal wound to the deputy, and both defendants fled the scene with the deputy\u2019s weapon.\n25. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 joinder\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital sentencing proceeding by joining defendants\u2019 cases for sentencing and by denying a motion to sever because: (1) one defendant did not preserve this issue since he did not object to joinder for sentencing or renew a previous motion to sever, and plain error review does not apply; (2) the codefendant made an unsubstantiated assumption without an offer of proof that his mother would have testified favorably on his behalf if the trials were severed, and the significance of the testimony is not apparent from the record; (3) the codefendant could have subpoenaed his mother to testify; and (4) the codefendant cannot show he was denied individualized consideration.\n26. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to object\nAlthough one defendant contends the trial court erred in a capital sentencing proceeding by denying his motion to suppress two letters seized by prison officials, defendant did not preserve this issue for appeal since he did not object when the letters were introduced, and he cannot rely on his pretrial motion to suppress.\n27. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 note confiscated from courtroom\u2014 racial motivation \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\nThe trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by admitting evidence of a note that one defendant drafted while sitting in the courtroom during the jury selection phase of the trial, which was confiscated by an officer when defendant was leaving the courtroom, because: (1) defendant did not preserve any constitutional argument since he did not raise it at the trial court; (2) the trial court is not required to perform the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 balancing test during a sentencing proceeding; and (3) the references in defendant\u2019s note are evidence that the murders were racially motivated, and therefore, could be considered by the jury when determining if the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9).\n28. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to object \u2014 failure to argue plain error\nAlthough one defendant claims the trial court erred during a capital sentencing proceeding by allowing the State to cross-examine an expert regarding his potential bias, defendant did not preserve this issue because: (1) he failed to object or to raise any constitutional argument at the trial court; and (2) defendant did not \u201cspecifically and distinctly\u201d argue plain error as required by N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4).\n29. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 hearsay\u2014Rules of Evidence inapplicable\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights during a capital sentencing proceeding by allowing one expert\u2019s report into evidence for purposes of cross-examining another expert because: (1) even if the report itself was hearsay, the Rules of Evidence do not apply in sentencing hearings; and (2) the trial court can admit any evidence it deems relevant to sentence.\n30. Constitutional Law\u2014 right of confrontation \u2014 expert report \u2014 basis of opinion\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s right of confrontation during a capital sentencing proceeding based on the theory that defendant was not given an opportunity to cross-examine an expert regarding the substance of the expert\u2019s report because: (1) defendant was aware of the report\u2019s existence prior to the conclusion of the expert\u2019s testimony; (2) the trial court gave defendant a second opportunity to question the expert after the State revealed the report\u2019s existence, and defendant stated he had no questions for the expert; (3) defendant could have requested a continuance if he felt he had a lack of time for adequate preparation; and (4) the report did not contain inadmissible hearsay since the comments in the report were introduced to help show the basis of the expert\u2019s opinion, and not for the truth of the matter asserted. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 703.\n31. Evidence\u2014 expert witnesses \u2014 cross-examination\u2014another expert\u2019s report\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights during a capital sentencing proceeding by allowing the State to cross-examine his codefendant\u2019s expert witness with a report prepared by another expert witness because: (1) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 705 provides that an expert witness may be cross-examined with regard to the underlying facts and data used by the expert in reaching his expert opinion, including other experts\u2019 reports; and (2) any error that may have resulted was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the overwhelming evidence of his guilt.\n32. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating and mitigating circumstances \u2014 requested instruction\nThe trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by failing to instruct the jury that a life sentence should be imposed unless the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances, because: (1) the trial court\u2019s instruction was consistent with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(c)(3); and (2) the Supreme Court has previously denied this same argument.\n33. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 general deterrent effect of death penalty\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State\u2019s arguments that these two defendants deserve the death penalty for what they did, that someone has got to tell people like these two defendants that we absolutely will not tolerate this any longer, and that we cannot rely on the next jury to send that message, because: (1) the State\u2019s argument viewed in context did not constitute a general deterrence argument; and (2) even if the State\u2019s arguments were improper, they were not so grossly improper as to warrant intervention by the trial court.\n34. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 community sentiment\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State\u2019s arguments, that someone has got to stand up and tell defendants like this that we are not going to tolerate this conduct and that asked what type of message a life sentence for these two defendants would send to the citizens of this state, because a review of the prosecutor\u2019s statements reveals that the prosecutor never told the jury what was expected of them by the community, but instead reiterated what the jury\u2019s message should be to the community.\n35. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 hatred based on Rastafarian beliefs\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights in a capital sentencing proceeding by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State\u2019s argument stating that both defendants had hatred based on Rastafarian beliefs because there was evidence that defendant was involved with Rastafarianism, including a note and the testimony of defendant\u2019s own expert witness.\n36. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 Enmund/Tison instruction inapplicable\nThe trial court did not commit plain error during a capital sentencing proceeding by failing to instruct the jury according to the Emnund/Tison instruction that there was evidence one defendant did not participate in the murder of the deputy, because this instruction does not apply to a defendant who has been found guilty of first-degree murder based on premeditation and deliberation.\n37. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 peremptory instructions \u2014 statutory mitigating circumstances \u2014 age\u2014controverted evidence\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights during a capital sentencing proceeding by failing to give a peremptory instruction for the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7) mitigating circumstance concerning the age of defendant at the time of the crime, because: (1) the trial court gave a partial peremptory instruction that all the evidence showed defendant was seventeen years old at the time of the crimes; (2) defendant waived review of the trial court\u2019s instruction since he failed to object, N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2); (3) defendant cannot show prejudice because one or more jurors found the (f)(7) circumstance to exist; and (4) defendant did not specifically and distinctly argue plain error, N.C. R. App. 10(c)(4).\n38. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to object\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights during a capital sentencing proceeding by refusing to give a peremptory instruction for the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7) mitigating circumstance concerning the age of defendant at the time of the crime, because defendant failed to preserve this issue since he did not request this peremptory instruction, nor did he object to the trial court\u2019s failure to give this instruction. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2).\n39. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 peremptory instructions \u2014 statutory mitigating circumstances \u2014 ability to appreciate criminality \u2014 controverted evidence\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights during a capital sentencing proceeding by refusing to give a peremptory instruction for the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(6) mitigating circumstance concerning his ability to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, because: (1) defendant attempted to eliminate a witness, and he initially denied shooting either victim; and (2) defendant\u2019s family members stated that defendant cared for his grandmother, and evidence by friends and family that a defendant volunteered to help and take care of others conflicts with evidence that a defendant\u2019s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was impaired.\n40. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 peremptory instructions \u2014 nonstatutory mitigating circumstances \u2014 controverted evidence\nThe trial court did not violate one defendant\u2019s rights during a capital sentencing proceeding by refusing to give peremptory instructions for the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that he was subjected to parental neglect, his mother forced him to lie about being abused, he did not receive appropriate counseling, and he was abandoned by his father, because: (1) the jury was given a peremptory instruction on the mitigating circumstance that defendant was abandoned by his father; (2) the State presented contradictory evidence from defendants\u2019 neighbors that they never witnessed neglect by defendants\u2019 parents; (3) the evidence is unclear as to whether defendant was forced to lie about his abuse; and (4) an expert\u2019s testimony that there was nothing in the record that says defendant got any counseling is not definitive evidence that he did not have any counseling.\n41. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 murder during course of felony \u2014 disjunctive instructions\nThe trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by giving disjunctive instructions on the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5) aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed in the course of a felony based on either an armed robbery in which a car was taken or a robbery in which a trooper\u2019s weapon was taken, because: (1) there was evidence to support both theories of the (e)(5) circumstance and both theories involved felonies, showing that it is immaterial which crime the jurors use to support the circumstance; and (2) unanimity is required for elements of an offense, rather than for aggravating circumstances.\n42. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel\nThe trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by submitting as to one defendant the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) aggravating circumstance that the murder of a State trooper was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, because: (1) although defendant now contends the (e)(9) circumstance is unconstitutionally vague, no constitutional claims were made at trial, defendant never objected, and this argument has previously been rejected; (2) the trooper-victim was aware of his fate and unable to prevent impending death; and (3) the State met its burden to show that one defendant\u2019s part in the crime was unnecessarily torturous to the victim.\n43. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 avoiding lawful arrest \u2014 committed against law enforcement officer\nThe trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by submitting both the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(4) aggravating circumstance that the capital felony was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody, and the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(8) circumstance that the capital felony was committed against a law enforcement officer while engaged in the performance of his official duties, because even though the same underlying sequence of events was the subject of both circumstances, the (e)(8) circumstance looks to the underlying factual basis of defendant\u2019s crime whereas the (e)(4) circumstance looks to defendant\u2019s subjective motivation for his act.\n44. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 flight\u2014 course of conduct \u2014 no plain error\nThe trial court did not commit plain error during a capital sentencing proceeding by submitting the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5) aggravating circumstance that the capital felony was committed while defendant was engaged in or in flight after committing a robbery, and the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (e)(ll) circumstance that the murder was committed as part of a course of conduct involving other violent crimes, because: (1) neither defendant objected to submission of these two circumstances on the basis that there was a likelihood the jury might have utilized the same evidence, nor did they request a limiting instruction to that effect; (2) there is sufficient evidence to provide independent bases for the two aggravating circumstances; and (3) defendants cannot show that a different result was probable had a limiting instruction been given.\n45. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 mitigating circumstances\nThe trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by its instruction that allows the jury to reject a non-statutory mitigating circumstance if it finds the circumstance to be without mitigating value because although one defendant attempts to frame this argument anew by stating that his non-statutory mitigating circumstances contain \u201cinherent mitigating content\u201d requiring the jury to give them mitigating value, the Supreme Court has previously rejected this claim and finds no reason to revisit their prior decisions.\n46. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 mitigating circumstances \u2014 peremptory instruction \u2014 jury free to reject\nThe sentences of death were not imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner based on the jury\u2019s rejection of the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (f)(2) mental or emotional disturbance mitigating circumstance, even though a peremptory instruction was given, because: (1) a jury remains free to reject the circumstance; (2) the evidence presented by one defendant\u2019s mental health expert was not so manifestly credible to require the jury to find it convincing; and (3) a juror\u2019s acceptance of an expert\u2019s testimony that defendant lacked parental involvement or support in treatment for psychological problems is not determinative of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the (f)(2) circumstance since the nonstatutory mitigating circumstance relates to parental support whereas the statutory circumstance involves defendant\u2019s mental or emotional state at the time of the crimes.\n47. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 death penalty not disproportionate\nThe trial court did not err by imposing two sentences of death for each defendant because: (1) defendants murdered two law enforcement officers for the purpose of evading lawful arrest; (2) defendants were each convicted of two counts of first-degree murder; (3) defendants\u2019 convictions for the murders were based on the theory of premeditation and deliberation; and (4) as to each murder conviction, the jury found the two aggravating circumstances of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(ll), either of which standing alone has been held sufficient to support a death sentence.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from judgments imposing two sentences of death for each defendant entered by Brewer, J., on 13 May 1998 in Superior Court, Cumberland County, upon jury verdicts finding each defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. The Supreme Court allowed defendants\u2019 motions to bypass the Court of Appeals as to their appeal of additional judgments on 19 July 1999. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 February 2000.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by William B. Crumpler and Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State.\nMalcolm Ray Hunter, Jr., Appellate Defender, by Janine C. Fodor and Anne M. Gomez, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for defendant-appellant Kevin Golphin.\nM. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant-appellant Tilmon Golphin."
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