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ROBERT FRANKLIN BREWINGTON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LAKE, Justice.\nOn 30 June 1997, defendant was indicted for two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary, one count of conspiracy to commit first-degree arson, and one count of first-degree arson. Defendant was tried capitally at the 4 August 1998 Special Criminal Session of Superior Court, Harnett County. During the course of the trial, the charges of conspiracy to commit first-degree burglary and conspiracy to commit first-degree arson were dismissed. The jury subsequently found defendant guilty of first-degree arson, both counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and both counts of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended sentences of death as to each murder conviction. On 28 August 1998, the trial court sentenced defendant to two separate sentences of death, one for each of the two convictions for first-degree murder. The trial court also sentenced defendant to a sentence of 157 to 198 months\u2019 imprisonment for the two conspiracy to commit murder convictions and to a sentence of 64 to 86 months\u2019 imprisonment for the arson conviction.\nAt trial, the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that defendant and Vera Sue Lee were engaged to be married. Defendant lived in Dunn, North Carolina, with his grandmother, Frances Brewington, who had adopted him as a child, and also with his eight-year-old nephew, Brian Brewington. On 21 April 1997, defendant took out two life insurance policies from Home Beneficial Life Insurance Company. One policy was on defendant\u2019s brother, Patrick Brewington, for $75,000. The other policy was on Patrick\u2019s son, Brian, for $58,552. Defendant forged Patrick\u2019s signature on both policies and named himself as the beneficiary on both. On 29 May 1997, Lee and defendant made a deposit on a lot and mobile home, but the mortgage company refused to approve their loan.\nAfter defendant took out the life insurance policies on Brian and Patrick, Lee met with her friend, Chris Wilson, and discussed the idea of killing Patrick Brewington to get money for a house. Lee offered to share $10,000 from the insurance proceeds with Wilson if they killed Patrick. A week later, Lee, Wilson, and defendant met to discuss killing Patrick, but Wilson refused to help. Lee, however, continued to talk about killing either Patrick or Brian Brewington during the weeks that followed. During this time, Lee also recruited Henry Michael McKeithan to help with the killing, promising him \u201c$200 or $300 Wednesday and about a $1,000 in three to four months.\u201d\nOn 1 June 1997, Lee and defendant discussed defendant\u2019s plan for her to kill Frances and Brian Brewington. Defendant told Lee to make the crime look like a robbery, remove a few items such as the TV, stab Frances and Brian, and set the house on fire. On 11 June 1997, defendant and Lee went to an open-air market and bought a knife to use for the killings. During a telephone conversation that evening, defendant told Lee that he was ready for the plan to be carried out.\nAround 4:49 a.m. on 12 June 1997, Lee and McKeithan, who had just driven by the Brewington residence and honked the horn to wake defendant, purchased two one-gallon jugs of distilled water at WinnDixie. They emptied the water from the jugs and refilled them with gasoline from the T-Mart on Cumberland Street. During this time, defendant dressed for work; collected the insurance policies and his best clothes for Frances\u2019 and Brian\u2019s funerals; and left the Brewington home, leaving the back door unlocked. Defendant drove to Hardee World where he met Lee, and defendant put his clothes in the trunk of Lee\u2019s car. Defendant then drove to work while Lee and McKeithan drove to the Brewington residence.\nWhen Lee and McKeithan arrived at the Brewington house, they parked the car in the driveway, put on rubber gloves, and entered the house through the back door, carrying the jugs of gasoline. Lee gave McKeithan the knife from the open-air market and told him to kill Brian while she killed Frances. Unable to stab Brian, McKeithan instead poured gasoline around the bedroom where the victims were sleeping. As McKeithan and Lee stood over them with knives, Frances and Brian Brewington woke up and started screaming. McKeithan stabbed Frances Brewington repeatedly and then ran to the car to get his lighter. While McKeithan was outside, Lee, who had stabbed Brian, lit a dishrag at the heater and ignited the gasoline in the bedroom. Although severely wounded, the Brewingtons continued to scream while Lee and McKeithan ran to the car and drove away. Lee and McKeithan buried the knife and burned their clothing and gloves at McKeithan\u2019s house.\nAt approximately 6:15 a.m. that morning, Harnett County Sheriff\u2019s Deputy Jerry Edwards saw smoke rising from the Brewington house. He called the fire department, then went to the house and tried to look into the windows, but the smoke was too thick for him to see inside. After the firefighters extinguished the fire, they notified Deputy Edwards that they had found two bodies in the bedroom. Deputy Edwards secured the scene after viewing the bodies and a jug of gasoline and lighter in the living room. Defendant had been summoned from work before the fire was extinguished. When he arrived at the house, defendant spoke with Deputy Edwards. Defendant told Deputy Edwards that he had left for work around 5:30 a.m., and that when he left, the only appliance running was the air conditioner. Defendant was also interviewed twice that day by Deputy Fire Marshal Jimmy Riddle. During the first interview around 8:05 a.m., defendant told Riddle that the microwave would sometimes \u201ckick out\u201d the circuit breakers and that there were several extension cords in the bedroom. Riddle terminated the interview because defendant seemed \u201cvery upset.\u201d Around 12:20 that afternoon, Riddle again interviewed defendant, who stated that he had left the house by 5:30 a.m. and that he had run several errands before arriving at work. Defendant also stated that his grandmother had been having problems with the air conditioner lately and that he had not seen the jug of gasoline that had been found in the living room.\nThe preliminary investigation of the crime scene showed that the fire had been deliberately set with an accelerant which was poured on the floor of the bedroom. This conclusion was based on factors such as the \u201cpour pattern\u201d of the gasoline, the color of the smoke and flames, and the elimination of the electrical system and all appliances as possible sources of the fire. The investigation also revealed the knife wounds to Frances Brewington\u2019s body. A knife handle and partial knife blade were also found under her body.\nFollowing the investigation, defendant, McKeithan and Lee were arrested and charged. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926, the State elected to try defendant and McKeithan in a joint trial, and Lee was tried separately.\nIn his first assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress statements made to State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) Special Agent Gail Beasley at the Harnett County Sheriffs Department on 12 and 13 June 1997. An evidentiary hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress began on 24 July 1998, but was not completed that day. The trial court resumed the evidentiary hearing on this issue on 12 August 1998, after the completion of jury selection. On 13 August 1998, in open court, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. On appeal, defendant argues the statements should have been excluded from evidence because they were made at a time when defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation and was not advised of his Miranda rights.\nFollowing the evidentiary hearing, the trial court made extensive and detailed findings of fact with regard to defendant\u2019s interviews with members of the Harnett County Fire and Sheriff\u2019s Departments, which we summarize: At approximately 8:00 a.m. on 12 June 1997, the morning of the fire and before the cause of the fire was known, Deputy Fire Marshal Jimmy Riddle interviewed defendant. Defendant stated that when he left home around 5:30 a.m., the bedroom window air conditioner had been on and that there had been problems with the microwave \u201ckicking] out\u201d the house\u2019s circuit breakers. At approximately 12:20 p.m. that afternoon, Riddle again interviewed defendant, this time at the Dunn Fire Department and in the presence of Sheriffs Detective Greg Taylor. Defendant stated that he had left the house for work after waking at 5:00 a.m. that morning, and repeated that the air conditioner had been on when he left and that the microwave oven would often trip the circuit breakers. Defendant also stated that there had been no gasoline in the house when he left.\nThe trial court\u2019s extensive findings of fact further included the following: At approximately 5:30 p.m. that same day, defendant drove himself to the Harnett County Sheriff\u2019s Department at Detective Billy Wade\u2019s request. Detective Wade asked defendant to take a polygraph test, and defendant agreed. Agent Beasley conducted the polygraph test. Defendant denied any involvement in the deaths, but Agent Beasley told him that she did not think he was telling the entire truth. Defendant then told her that Brian had started the fire, and that defendant had left the house after Brian told him to leave. Agent Beasley left the examination room to tell Detective Wade and SBI Special Agent John Hawthorne what defendant had said. As Agent Beasley returned to the room, defendant spontaneously told her that his fianc\u00e9e, Vera Lee, had started the fire. Agent Beasley reported this statement to Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne, who subsequently entered the room and advised defendant of his Miranda rights. This occurred at approximately 8:20 p.m. that evening. After defendant received his Miranda warnings, defendant stated that he thought he needed to speak with a lawyer. The officers stopped questioning defendant. However, defendant then asked, \u201cWhat if I know who did it?\u201d Detective Wade told defendant that the officers could not talk to him unless he initiated the conversation. Defendant then stated that he did want to talk to them. Detective Wade again advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant signed a written waiver of his Miranda rights at 8:33 p.m. that evening.\nAdditionally, the trial court found that defendant told Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne that defendant planned the murders with Lee and McKeithan, that the murders were defendant\u2019s idea, and that they planned to kill Brian for the proceeds of a $58,000 life insurance policy that defendant had taken out on Brian. Defendant detailed his role in the murders, giving an account of his movements on the morning of 12 June 1997. The trial court found that defendant was rational, coherent, and logical when he waived his Miranda rights, and defendant did not appear to be under the influence of alcohol or any drugs other than a prescription medication for his \u201cnerves,\u201d which he had taken earlier in the day. Defendant did not at any time request a lawyer or request that the interview stop. After the interview, defendant freely and voluntarily consented to the search of his automobile, in which several items of evidence were seized, including the life insurance policies that defendant had taken out on Brian Brewington and on Brian\u2019s father, Patrick.\nBased on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that defendant\u2019s statements to Deputy Fire Marshal Riddle and Agent Beasley were noncustodial and were made freely and voluntarily; that defendant himself reinitiated conversation with law enforcement officers following his being advised of his Miranda rights; and that defendant\u2019s subsequent statement to Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne was made freely, voluntarily, and with full comprehension of his Miranda rights. The trial court also concluded that none of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were violated during his interrogation and arrest; that defendant was not induced to make a statement or consent to the search of his vehicle by any promises, inducements, or offers of reward, or by any threat or show of force; and that defendant freely, knowingly, and voluntarily consented to the search of his car. The trial court therefore denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nAt the outset, we note that the standard of review in evaluating a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress is as follows:\nThe trial court makes the initial determination as to whether an accused has waived his right to counsel. Its findings of fact \u201care conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.\u201d State v. Eason, 336 N.C. 730, 745, 445 S.E.2d 917, 926 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096, 130 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1995). \u201cConclusions of law that are correct in light of the findings are also binding on appeal.\u201d State v. Howell, 343 N.C. 229, 239, 470 S.E.2d 38, 43 (1996).\nState v. Peterson, 347 N.C. 253, 255, 491 S.E.2d 223, 224 (1997). Furthermore, this Court has recently reaffirmed that\na trial court\u2019s resolution of a conflict in the evidence will not be disturbed on appeal, State v. Braxton, 344 N.C. 702, 709, 477 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1996), and its findings of fact are conclusive if they are supported by the evidence, State v. Robinson, 346 N.C. 586, 596, 488 S.E.2d 174, 181 (1997). Once this Court concludes that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by the evidence, then this Court\u2019s next task \u201cis to determine whether the trial court\u2019s conclusion^] of law [are] supported by the findings.\u201d State v. Hyde, 352 N.C. 37, 45, 530 S.E.2d 281, 288 (2000).\nState v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 237, - S.E.2d -, - (2000).\nIn this assignment of error, defendant first addresses the admission of the two statements made by defendant to Agent Beasley at the Harnett County Sheriff\u2019s Department after 6:00 p.m. on 12 June 1997. Defendant argues that these statements should have been excluded from evidence because they were made at a time when defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation and had not been advised of his Miranda rights. We disagree.\nIn determining whether a statement is voluntary, this Court reviews the totality of the surrounding circumstances in which the statement was made. Hyde, 352 N.C. at 45, 530 S.E.2d at 288. This Court reaffirmed that pertinent factors include\nwhether defendant was in custody, whether he was deceived, whether his Miranda rights were honored, whether he was held incommunicado, the length of the interrogation, whether there were physical threats or shows of violence, whether promises were made to obtain the confession, the familiarity of the declarant with the criminal justice system, and the mental condition of the declarant.\nState v. Hardy, 339 N.C. 207, 222, 451 S.E.2d 600, 608 (1994). Additionally, with regard to the question of whether a person is in custody, this Court has stated:\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that in determining whether a suspect was in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293 (1994) (per curiam).\nState v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396, 404-05, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997).\nOur review of the record, in its entirety, reflects that after Detective Wade requested an interview with defendant, defendant voluntarily drove himself to the Sheriff\u2019s Department in a private automobile. Defendant was not accompanied by a police officer. Once defendant arrived at the Sheriffs Department, he was not confined, handcuffed, restrained in any manner, threatened or subjected to any show of force. Defendant consented when Detective Wade asked him if he would agree to take a polygraph examination. After defendant met Agent Beasley, she told defendant that \u201cthis test was voluntary and he could leave at any time.\u201d Defendant replied that he \u201chad no problem with taking a polygraph.\u201d Defendant agreed to sign, and did sign, a polygraph examination consent form, which reaffirmed that defendant was not in custody and was taking the polygraph examination voluntarily. After Agent Beasley explained the polygraphic process to defendant, defendant returned to the waiting room for about ten to fifteen minutes while Agent Beasley prepared for the test. Once Agent Beasley prepared the polygraph, defendant voluntarily returned to the examination room with her. Defendant was not handcuffed or restrained during his interview with Agent Beasley. He was not threatened, and Agent Beasley did not make any promises to defendant. Defendant was not crying and did not appear to be agitated.\nAt the conclusion of the polygraph test, when Agent Beasley told defendant that she did not believe he was telling the entire truth, defendant stated that he had been present when the fire started, but blamed the arson on his nephew, Brian. No one else was in the room with defendant and Agent Beasley at this time. Agent Beasley left the room and reported defendant\u2019s statement to Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne, and defendant remained in the examining room alone. Defendant was not handcuffed or under any restraint at this time. Agent Beasley returned to the examining room alone. Upon her return, before she could \u201cget a chance to speak,\u201d defendant stated, \u201cI know who set the fire and she is sitting out there. . . . She\u2019s here. My fianc\u00e9e, Vera Lee.\u201d Defendant never requested a lawyer during the time he spent with Agent Beasley, and she had no further communication with him.\nBased on the foregoing, we conclude that the record contains ample evidence which supports the trial court\u2019s findings of fact. We also conclude that the trial court correctly determined that, under the \u201ctotality of the circumstances,\u201d defendant was not in custody during his entire interview with Agent Beasley. Therefore, the trial court properly admitted defendant\u2019s statements to Agent Beasley into evidence at trial.\nBy this same assignment of error, defendant next challenges the admissibility of the statement he made to Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne. Defendant concedes that he was then in custody and that he had properly been informed of his Miranda rights at this time. However, defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting his statement into evidence because after defendant invoked his right to counsel, Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne did not scrupulously honor defendant\u2019s right to end the questioning.\nOur review of the record reveals that when Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne entered the examination room at approximately 8:20 p.m. and read the Miranda warnings to defendant, defendant responded that he understood each item. Wade subsequently read the Miranda waiver to defendant, who did not sign the waiver form. Defendant stated, \u201cI believe I need to talk to a lawyer.\u201d Wade responded, \u201cI .believe you do too.\u201d Defendant concedes that this response indicates that Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne understood defendant\u2019s invocation of his rights to counsel.\nAfter defendant invoked his right to counsel, Agent Hawthorne asked defendant questions that were not \u201ccase-specific.\u201d Agent Hawthorne testified during voir dire that the purpose of these questions \u201cwas to document our activity and who we were talking to\u201d and to complete defendant\u2019s \u201cPersonal History Arrest Form.\u201d Specifically, the information Agent Hawthorne sought to obtain was defendant\u2019s date of birth, social security number, address, height and weight. The record reveals that while Agent Hawthorne was in the process of obtaining this information, defendant began questioning Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne about the crimes, and asked, \u201cWhat if I know who did it?\u201d During voir dire, Detective Wade testified that at this point he responded to defendant as follows:\nI informed him that I could not talk to him since he had not waived his rights. There was nothing that I could say to him and he should say nothing to me. And that if he wanted to talk to me, he had to initiate it. I had to re-advise him of his required Miranda rights and he would need to sign the waiver stating that he did not wish to have an attorney.\nThis testimony indicates that Detective Wade understood that defendant was trying to initiate communication about the case, and Detective Wade correctly reminded defendant that he had invoked his right to counsel. Detective Wade also reminded defendant that he could not discuss the case with defendant unless and until defendant formally waived his Miranda privileges in writing.\nAgent Hawthorne also testified that as defendant continued to ask case-specific questions,\nwe explained to him that he had invoked his right to counsel and we couldn\u2019t discuss the case with him, and also explained to him that, you know, it couldn\u2019t be a one-way conversation; that he\u2019d invoked the right to counsel and I couldn\u2019t discuss the facts of the case with him.\nDefendant then indicated to both Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne that he had changed his mind and wanted to participate in the interview, after which both Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne took steps to \u201cmake sure [defendant], in fact, was changing his mind.\u201d Agent Hawthorne testified that it was necessary\n[a]lso to make sure that [defendant] understood that he had revoked his right to counsel, that any decision on his part had to be his decision. And he had \u2014 in other words, I had to be convinced that he was changing his mind on his own and wanted to, in fact, make a statement.\nOnce defendant convinced Agent Hawthorne and Detective Wade that he wanted to speak to them, Agent Hawthorne and Detective Wade informed defendant of his Miranda rights a second time. Not until defendant formally waived his Miranda rights and signed the waiver form did Agent Hawthorne and Detective Wade question defendant about the arson and murders.\nDuring the period between the first and second Miranda warnings, Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne were the only people present in the room with defendant. Defendant was not handcuffed, and while Agent Hawthorne obtained historical and personal data from defendant, defendant appeared to speak in a rational and understanding manner. Defendant did not appear to be impaired, fatigued, or under the influence of a controlled substance.\nIn Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 68 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1981), the United States Supreme Court held that:\nan accused, . . . having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.\nId. at 484-85, 68 L. Ed. 2d at 386. Defendant asserts that this rule is premised upon the assumption that the first interrogation was immediately terminated for a substantial period of time. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 46 L. Ed. 2d 313 (1975). Defendant contends that in the case sub judice, the initial reading of the Miranda warnings constituted the \u201cfirst interrogation,\u201d and that Agent Hawthorne\u2019s questions, which were asked in order to complete defendant\u2019s \u201cPersonal History Arrest Form,\u201d constituted a reinitiation of that custodial interrogation in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights. We disagree.\nThe Supreme Court has defined the term \u201cinterrogation\u201d as follows:\n[A]ny words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.\nRhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297, 308 (1980). Additionally, this Court has held that \u201cinterrogation does not encompass routine informational questions posited to a defendant during the booking process.\u201d State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 286, 302 S.E.2d 164, 173 (1983). We therefore conclude, based on the aforementioned evidence contained in the record, that defendant was subjected to custodial interrogation only after he continued to ask Detective Wade and Agent Hawthorne questions about the case, told them that he wanted to talk without the presence of counsel, and formally waived his Miranda rights. We further conclude that this evidence supports the trial court\u2019s findings of fact in this regard, and that these findings of fact support the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. The trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress his statements and any evidence obtained as a result of those statements.\nFinally, under this assignment of error, defendant addresses the search of his automobile on 12 June 1997. After defendant waived his Miranda rights and at the conclusion of defendant\u2019s interrogation and statements regarding the murders and arson, defendant agreed to allow law enforcement officers to search his vehicle for evidence pertaining to these crimes. After defendant gave his consent, Detective Taylor and Agent Beasley searched defendant\u2019s vehicle and seized a number of items of evidence, including the life insurance policies insuring the lives of Brian and Patrick Brewington that named defendant as beneficiary. On appeal, defendant argues that this evidence should have been excluded because defendant\u2019s statement giving consent to the search was made without a voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights. This contention is without merit. We have already concluded that the trial court properly determined that none of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were violated during his arrest and interrogation and that he voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. From the totality of the evidence of record regarding defendant\u2019s arrest, waiver of Miranda rights, interrogation and statements made, we conclude defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for discovery and production of the documents relating to the polygraph examination taken on 12 June 1997. Defendant filed a motion for supplemental discovery on 5 November 1997. In that motion, defendant made a specific request that the State provide the printout of defendant\u2019s 12 June 1997 polygraph test as well as any consent form or other documents that may have been created in connection with the polygraph testing. A hearing on defendant\u2019s motion was held on 15 December 1997. On that day, the trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion, but noted, \u201c[W]e may have to go back and look at that one again later.\u201d\nOn 20 February 1998, defendant filed a further motion to compel discovery of the polygram. At the hearing on that motion, the trial court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s request to defer a hearing and ruling on that motion until the State could be represented by John Watters, counsel for the SBI. On 19 March 1998, after hearing argument from Mr. Watters and counsel for the defense, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to compel and allowed the State\u2019s motion to modify the trial court\u2019s order on discovery so as to exclude the polygram from discoverable material. The trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion to seal the polygram, which the SBI transmitted to the Harnett County Clerk of Court.\nDefendant contends that the polygram falls within the purview of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(e), which provides for the discovery of \u201cresults or reports of physical or mental examinations or of tests, measurements or experiments made in connection with the case.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(e) (1999). Defendant therefore argues that this case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to provide defendant with the polygram. For the reasons stated below, we conclude that polygrams do not fall within the scope of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903.\nIn State v. Grier, 307 N.C. 628, 300 S.E.2d 351 (1983), this Court reviewed the law in North Carolina and in other jurisdictions as to the admissibility of polygraph results. This Court ultimately determined that \u201cin North Carolina, polygraph evidence is no longer admissible in any trial. This is so even though the parties stipulate to its admissibility.\u201d Id. at 645, 300 S.E.2d at 361. Defendant contends that Grier does not apply because he did not intend to introduce into evidence the polygrams themselves. Rather, defendant asserts that he intended to submit the polygrams to his own expert to determine whether Beasley misrepresented to defendant what the polygraph test revealed. However, as this Court clearly stated in Grier, the meaning of a polygram depends entirely upon interpretation. Id. at 636, 300 S.E.2d at 355-56. Chief Justice Branch, speaking for the Court, explained:\nEven if the accuracy of the machine as a measuring device and the operative theory of the polygraph is accepted, this is not the end of the inquiry regarding the validity of the polygraphic process. All courts and commentators concede that the most important factor to be considered when evaluating the reliability and utility of the polygraph is the role of the examiner. ...\n. . . The recordings of the machine do not, in and of themselves, indicate whether the examinee has been truthful or deceptive. Rather, the ultimate conclusion is totally dependent upon the examiner\u2019s interpretation and analysis of the physiological changes measured by the polygraph. The entire process, then, is a combination of scientific measurement and human evaluation. Because human judgment in the role of the examiner is intrinsic to the method, human error is, perhaps, equally intrinsic. . ..\nRecognizing that a litigant could legitimately challenge the proffered results of a test on the basis of the motivation of the subject, the subject\u2019s physical and mental condition, the competence and attitude of the examiner, the wording of the relevant questions, and the interpretation of the test results, we are acutely aware of the possibility that the criminal proceeding may degenerate into a trial of the polygraph machine. The introduction and rebuttal of polygraph evidence, if all the possibilities for error in the polygraphic process were deeply explored, could divert the jury\u2019s attention from the question of the defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence to a judgment of the validity and limitations of the polygraph.\nId. at 636, 643, 300 S.E.2d at 355-56, 359-60 (citations omitted).\nIn State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 394 S.E.2d 158 (1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1092, 112 L. Ed. 2d 1062 (1991), this Court reiterated its position regarding the admissibility of polygrams that it adopted in Grier. The defendant in Payne sought the physiological measurements contained in a polygram \u201cas part of his challenge to the admissibility of the statements he made to law enforcement officers after the polygraph examination, as well as to challenge the credibility of those officers\u2019 testimony.\u201d Id. at 201, 394 S.E.2d at 161-62. However, the defendant in Payne waited until four days prior to trial to specially request the polygram. Id. at 201, 394 S.E.2d at 162. This Court overruled defendant Payne\u2019s assignment of error. Id.\nDefendant in the case sub judice construes this Court\u2019s decision in Payne to mean that polygram readouts are discoverable so long as defendant makes a timely motion to do so. We do not agree. Defendant\u2019s argument that polygrams are discoverable under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(e) ignores this Court\u2019s analysis in Grier relating the nature of the polygraph. As stated in the above-quoted passage, a polygraph\u2019s results are not merely scientific evaluations, but also the product of human judgment. This Court\u2019s refusal to admit the results of a polygraph into evidence is grounded in the fear that, given the subjective nature of the results of a polygraph, a \u201ccriminal proceeding may degenerate into ... a judgment of the validity and limitations of the polygraph.\u201d Grier, 307 N.C. at 643, 300 S.E.2d at 359-60. This concern is not only a threat during the actual trial, but it is present at all aspects of a criminal proceeding. Accordingly, we conclude that a polygraph does not fall within the category of \u201cphysical or mental examinations\u201d contemplated under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(e).\nFurther, the determination of whether a defendant\u2019s inculpatory statement was voluntary depends upon the totality of the circumstances. Hyde, 352 N.C. at -, 530 S.E.2d at 288. The issue of whether the person administering the polygraph correctly interpreted or commented upon the test results is merely one factor bearing upon the total circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s statement made following the agent\u2019s comment that she did not think he was telling the entire truth. The significance of this factor is greatly diminished by the unreliable nature of the polygraph due to the subjective nature of an interpretation of its results. Furthermore, and more fundamentally, the question of whether the polygraph results themselves were in fact accurate or not has no real bearing on whether defendant\u2019s statement was voluntary. For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the State\u2019s motion to exclude the polygram or polygraph results from discoverable material. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s admission of codefendant McKeithan\u2019s confession into evidence. Both defendant and McKeithan had made statements to law enforcement officers detailing their involvement in the murders. Each defendant\u2019s confession implicated himself, his codefendant in this joint trial as well as Vera Sue Lee, who was tried and convicted in a separate trial. The State redacted the confessions to the extent that each defendant\u2019s confession contained no references to the other defendant. Defendant argues that the admission of McKeithan\u2019s redacted confession into evidence without a limiting instruction violated defendant\u2019s right to confront and cross-examine a witness against him. We do not agree.\n\u201cThe Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, extended against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of a criminal defendant \u2018to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\u2019 \u201d Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 95 L. Ed. 2d 176, 185 (1987). \u201cThe central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.\u201d Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845, 111 L. Ed. 2d 666, 678 (1990). In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968), the Supreme Court held that a defendant\u2019s rights under the Confrontation Clause are violated when his nontestifying codefendant\u2019s confession is introduced at their joint trial, and the confession names the defendant as a participant in the crime. The Court\u2019s rationale was that a trial court\u2019s limiting instruction for the jury not to consider the confession as evidence against defendant was an ineffective protection of defendant\u2019s right of cross-examination. Id. at 135-36, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 484-85.\nThe Supreme Court later limited the Bruton rule by holding that there is no Confrontation Clause violation by the admission of a non-testifying codefendant\u2019s confession along with a limiting instruction where the confession has been redacted to eliminate defendant\u2019s name as well as all references to defendant\u2019s existence. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 211, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 188. In determining not to extend the Bruton rule to fully redacted confessions, the Supreme Court in Richardson distinguished the confession in Bruton as a \u201cpowerfully incriminating\u201d confession that \u201c \u2018expressly implicated]\u2019 the defendant as [the] accomplice.\u201d Id. at 208, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 186 (quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124 n.1, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 476 n.1). In contrast, the Court in Richardson described the redacted confession as one that \u201cwas not incriminating on its face, and became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial (the defendant\u2019s own testimony).\u201d Id. Accordingly, the confession in Richardson was evidence requiring \u201clinkage\u201d in order for it to become incriminating. Id.\nThe Supreme Court clarified the significance of a fully redacted confession in determining a Bruton issue in Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 140 L. Ed. 2d 294 (1998). In Gray, the Supreme Court ruled that a confession redacted so as to merely replace defendant\u2019s name with a blank and the word \u201cdelete\u201d falls within the \u201cclass of statements to which Bruton\u2019s protections apply.\u201d Id. at 197, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 304. Even though the trial court had given the jury a limiting instruction in Gray, the Supreme Court focused its analysis on the adequacy of the redaction. The Supreme Court distinguished the confession in Gray from the fully redacted confession in Richardson because the State of Maryland in Gray \u201cha[d] simply replaced the nonconfessing defendant\u2019s name with a kind of symbol, namely the word \u2018deleted\u2019 or a blank space set off by commas.\u201d Id. at 192, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 300. Therefore, the Supreme Court ruled that the Gray confession was inadequate because, unlike the confession in Richardson, it \u201creferred] directly to the \u2018existence\u2019 of the nonconfessing defendant.\u201d Id.\nThe Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that Bruton and its progeny would affect criminal trials in this state as follows:\n\u201cThe result is that in joint trials of defendants it is necessary to exclude extrajudicial confessions unless all portions which implicate defendants other than the declarant can be deleted without prejudice either to the State or the declarant. If such deletion is not possible, the State must choose between relinquishing the confession or trying the defendants separately. The foregoing pronouncement presupposes (1) that the confession is inadmissible as to the codefendant. . . , and (2) that the declarant will not take the stand. If the declarant can be cross-examined, a codefendant has been accorded his right to confrontation.\u201d\nState v. Tucker, 331 N.C. 12, 23-24, 414 S.E.2d 548, 554 (1992) (quoting State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 291, 163 S.E.2d 492, 502 (1968)). The North Carolina General Assembly codified these principles in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-927(c)(l), which provides:\nWhen a defendant objects to joinder of charges against two or more defendants for trial because an out-of-court statement of a codefendant makes reference to him but is not admissible against him, the court must require the prosecutor to select one of the following courses:\na. A joint trial at which the statement is not admitted into evidence; or\nb. A joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only after all references to the moving defendant have been effectively deleted so that the statement will not prejudice him; or\nc. A separate trial of the objecting defendant.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-927(c)(l) (1999). This Court has held that Bruton and its progeny apply only when a confession by a nontestifying defendant is \u201c \u2018inadmissible as to the codefendant.\u2019 \u201d Tucker, 331 N.C. at 24, 414 S.E.2d at 554 (quoting Fox, 274 N.C. at 291, 163 S.E.2d at 502). \u201cA statement is inadmissible as to a codefendant only if it is made outside his presence and incriminates him.\u201d Id. at 24, 414 S.E.2d at 554-55. In the case sub judice, although McKeithan\u2019s statement was made outside of defendant\u2019s presence, after it was redacted it did not incriminate defendant. We conclude that because McKeithan\u2019s confession was fully redacted and did not incriminate defendant, its admission into evidence did not violate defendant\u2019s rights under the Confrontation Clause.\nAt trial, defendant made a general objection to the admission of McKeithan\u2019s redacted confession into evidence, and the trial court overruled this objection. Detective Wade read to the jury McKeithan\u2019s redacted confession, which stated in essence: Lee asked McKeithan to meet her at the Main Street Grill, where she offered him \u201c$200 or $300 Wednesday and about a $1000 in three to four months by killing this dude named Pat.\u201d After about three failed attempts to kill \u201cPat,\u201d Lee suggested they kill his son instead. McKeithan proposed that they kidnap Brian and hold him for ransom, but Lee said that they would get more money if they killed the boy. On the night of the crime, Lee and McKeithan bought two water jugs from Winn-Dixie, emptied them out, and filled them with gasoline. After a stop at Hardee World, they drove to the Brewington house. On the way there, Lee said that they should make the crime look like a burglary. They entered the back door of the house, carrying the jugs of gasoline and a hunting knife. Lee told McKeithan to kill Brian and leave \u201cGrandma\u201d to her. McKeithan was unable to stab Brian, but poured gasoline around the bedroom and on the end of both beds. Lee brought a knife from the kitchen, and she'and McKeithan switched knives. Lee put her knife to Brian\u2019s throat, and Brian and Frances woke up and started screaming. McKeithan stabbed Frances while Lee stabbed Brian. He then ran to the car to get his lighter, but while he was outside, Lee lit a dishrag at the heater, which she threw into the bedroom. Lee and McKeithan then ran to the car and drove away.\nPrior to trial, defendant objected to the adequacy of the proposed redaction of McKeithan\u2019s confession and requested that it be modified further. Specifically, defendant directed his complaints to the \u201cblackouts on sections of the confessions.\u201d Defendant also complained that the reference in McKeithan\u2019s confession that \u201c \u2018they\u2019 bought a knife at a flea market\u201d was a direct reference to him and Lee. Finally, defendant objected to the use of the words \u201cGrandma\u201d and \u201cgrandmother\u201d in McKeithan\u2019s confession because they referred to Frances Brewington. In response to defendant\u2019s objections, the State then deleted the entire sentence which contained the reference to anyone buying a knife. The State also retyped the confession to eliminate the \u201cblackouts\u201d and any suggestion that the confession had been altered. Further, after these additional modifications, the appearance of the words \u201cGrandma\u201d and \u201cgrandmother\u201d was reduced to five instances where they were contextually appropriate.\nAt trial, following the conclusion of Detective Wade\u2019s testimony with regard to McKeithan\u2019s confession, the trial court noted that it was five o\u2019clock and excused the jury until the following morning. After the jury left the courtroom, the trial court asked the attorneys whether there was anything that needed to be discussed. Counsel for McKeithan then objected as follows:\nYour Honor, the defendant McKeithan would object to the redacted statement being what comes into evidence. We insist and believe it\u2019s only fair that the entire statement come into evidence, and we would make that motion that the entire statement come in.\nCounsel for defendant Brewington then stated, \u201cWe have also made that same objection numerous times, Your Honor, and we would renew it at this time.\u201d The trial court denied the defense attorneys\u2019 objections and motions that the entire statement come in. At no point did counsel for defendant Brewington request a limiting instruction, and he did not further challenge the sufficiency of the modified statement or last redaction, or question the content of McKeithan\u2019s statement.\nNow, on appeal, defendant contends that the admission of McKeithan\u2019s confession into evidence without a limiting instruction violated defendant\u2019s right to confront and cross-examine a witness against him as set forth in Bruton. However, the concerns that the Supreme Court addressed in Bruton and its progeny, as well as the concerns addressed by this Court in Fox and its progeny, arise only if a defendant is incriminated by his codefendant\u2019s statement. As this Court has long held, \u201c[t]he sine qua non for application of Bruton is that the party claiming incrimination without confrontation at least be incriminated.\u201d State v. Jones, 280 N.C. 322, 340, 185 S.E.2d 858, 869 (1972). Accordingly, this Court will not determine whether the introduction of McKeithan\u2019s statements violated defendant\u2019s rights under the Confrontation Clause unless this Court first concludes that McKeithan\u2019s statement implicated defendant.\nDefendant contends that allowing the words \u201cGrandma\u201d and \u201cgrandmother\u201d to remain in the confession prejudiced him. Defendant asserts that because he was the victim\u2019s grandson, any reference to \u201cGrandma\u201d or \u201cgrandmother\u201d was a reference to his existence and thereby violated Bruton. As a result of the State\u2019s redaction, there were no references to defendant by name, and the five remaining references to \u201cGrandma\u201d or \u201cgrandmother\u201d in McKeithan\u2019s confession are as follows:\nWe went to the back screen door and Vera handed me the knife and told me to go kill Brian and leave Grandma up to her. I walked through the bathroom, down a little hallway into Grandmother and Brian\u2019s room.\nShe put the knife to his throat. Brian started screaming and crying and then his grandmother woke up and said to me, \u201cWho are you?\u201d\n. . . while I was stabbing Grandma, Vera was stabbing Brian.\nVera threw the dishrag in the bedroom and you could hear Grandma screaming, \u201cOh, help me. Help me. Oh.\u201d\n(Emphasis added.) Defendant contends that the case sub judice is analogous to Gray, and defendant compares the inclusion of the words \u201cGrandma\u201d and \u201cgrandmother\u201d in the instant confession to the artless redactions contained in the Gray confession. However, we conclude that the instant case is distinguishable from Gray. There was no attempt to disguise the redactions in the Gray confession because that confession contained blanks and the word \u201cdelete\u201d in place of defendant\u2019s name. Gray, 523 U.S. at 193, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 300. The redactions in the Gray confession obviously encouraged the jury to speculate about those omitted references and overemphasized their importance. Id. at 193, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 301. The Supreme Court also noted that in Gray, the prosecutor blatantly linked defendant to the deleted names by asking a detective whether the defendant was arrested on the basis of information contained in the codefendant\u2019s confession. Id. at 188, 140 L. Ed. 2d at 298.\nIn contrast, the confession in the case at bar was carefully redacted by taking out complete sentences and groups of sentences that mentioned, connected, or referenced the existence of defendant. Additionally, McKeithan\u2019s confession as redacted retains a natural narrative flow. It does not contain any contextual clues which indicate that the confession was altered in any manner. Unlike the explicit deletions which the Supreme Court disapproved in Gray, the alterations in McKeithan\u2019s confession are subtle and neither attract the jury\u2019s attention nor invite speculation.\nUpon careful review of the record and the evidence introduced at trial, including McKeithan\u2019s confession, we conclude that defendant in the case sub judice was not incriminated by the inclusion of the words \u201cGrandma\u201d and \u201cgrandmother\u201d in McKeithan\u2019s confession. Unlike the instant case, the cases where this Court has held that the redacted confession violates Bruton are those where, notwithstanding the redaction of defendant\u2019s name, the defendant is directly implicated by language which invites the jury to infer that the unnamed third party referred to in the confession was the defendant.\nThis Court reviewed this issue in State v. Littlejohn, 340 N.C. 750, 459 S.E.2d 629 (1995). In that case, the State introduced a redacted confession made by Littlejohn which implicated his codefendant Dayson. Id. at 755, 459 S.E.2d at 632. That statement did not include defendant Dayson\u2019s name or any specific reference to him. Id. However, it did refer to the \u201cthree remaining,\u201d who divided the money. Id. at 756, 459 S.E.2d at 632. This Court recognized that the jury could determine through the process of elimination that defendant Dayson had to be one of the \u201cthree remaining\u201d mentioned in the confession. Id. However, because there was other overwhelming evidence against the defendant, this Court ruled that the admission of the confession was \u201charmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Id.\nThe references to \u201cGrandma\u201d and \u201cgrandmother\u201d in McKeithan\u2019s redacted confession, unlike the confession in Littlejohn, do not refer to the existence of someone else who was involved in the crime. The reference to one of the victims by familial relationship does not directly or indirectly identify or implicate defendant. Frances Brewington adopted both defendant and his brother, Patrick, as her children. Therefore, she was both their mother and their grandmother. Furthermore, because Brian was Patrick\u2019s son, Frances was both Brian\u2019s grandmother and his great-grandmother. Therefore, the references in McKeithan\u2019s confession to the familial connection when referring to Frances Brewington do not point to defendant. There is one particular instance in McKeithan\u2019s confession where Frances is identified as Brian\u2019s grandmother: \u201cBrian started screaming and crying and then his grandmother woke up and said to me, \u2018Who are you?\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) This statement clearly refers to Frances as Brian\u2019s grandmother. The evidence before the jury showed that McKeithan did not know defendant, Frances, or Brian prior to 12 June 1997. Therefore, it is consistent with what the jury knew and understood about McKeithan for the jury to infer that McKeithan merely adopted Vera Lee\u2019s designation of the eighty-two-year-old lady in the bed as \u201cGrandma\u201d and assumed her to be Brian\u2019s grandmother. All of McKeithan\u2019s references to \u201cGrandma\u201d or \u201cgrandmother\u201d in his redacted confession can be appropriately understood as referring to Brian\u2019s grandmother.\nEven if this Court were to conclude that the inclusion of the five references to either \u201cGrandma\u201d or \u201cgrandmother\u201d constituted error, we conclude that such error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court has held that a \u201cBruton violation does not automatically require reversal of an otherwise valid conviction.\u201d State v. Hayes, 314 N.C. 460, 469, 334 S.E.2d 741, 747 (1985). In recognizing this rule, this Court reasoned as follows:\nOn at least three occasions, the United States Supreme Court has applied a harmless error analysis to claimed Bruton violations. Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 36 L. Ed. 2d 208 (1973); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 31 L. Ed. 2d 340 (1972); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 23 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1969)....[I]t is well established that where two or more persons join together to commit a crime, each of them, if actually or constructively present, is guilty of the particular crime and any other crime committed by the other or others in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the common purpose.... The question of which of the defendants actually committed the assaults was irrelevant to the jury verdicts finding each of the defendants guilty of all of the crimes charged. The interlocking confessions combined with the fact that certain items taken from [the victims] were found in the possession of some of the defendants provided overwhelming evidence of each defendant\u2019s guilt as to each charge[,] and any Bruton error which may have occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nHayes, 314 N.C. at 469-70, 334 S.E.2d at 747.\nIn another decision, State v. Squire, 292 N.C. 494, 234 S.E.2d 563, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 998, 54 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1977), this Court reached the same result as it did in Hayes. In Squire, this Court concluded that if there was a Bruton error in admitting a codefendant\u2019s statement which incriminated defendant Squire, then that error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 510, 234 S.E.2d at 573. In reaching this conclusion, this Court determined that the evidence of the defendant\u2019s guilt, including the defendant\u2019s own confession, was so overwhelming as to render any possible Bruton violation harmless. Id. at 510, 234 S.E.2d at 572-73.\nIn the case sub judice, on the first day of trial and prior to the admission of McKeithan\u2019s confession, defendant\u2019s own confession was read to the jury. In that confession, defendant admitted his full participation in the planning, initiation, and attempted coverup of the murders of Frances and Brian. Defendant\u2019s confession was internally consistent, and our review of the record reveals that defendant\u2019s confession was corroborated by other objective evidence introduced at trial. Defendant\u2019s confession was consistent with the testimony of Greg Maitland, a neighbor of the Brewingtons, with regard to being \u201cstartled awake\u201d when Lee drove by the Brewington house and honked her vehicle\u2019s horn in order to wake defendant. Defendant\u2019s confession was also corroborated by physical evidence regarding the stab wounds to the victims, the knife blade found in Frances\u2019 hip bone, and the knife handle found under her body. During his confession, defendant gave a detailed description of that knife and also took credit for developing the plan of stabbing the victims and setting the house on fire. Deputy Fire Marshal Riddle\u2019s testimony at trial corroborated the portion of defendant\u2019s confession where he admitted to taking clothes for Frances\u2019 and Brian\u2019s funerals when he left the house the morning of the murders, before they were committed. Riddle testified that clothes were missing from defendant\u2019s closet in the bedroom. Kevin Harrington testified that he sold defendant the insurance policies on Patrick and Brian. Poshia Bell and Reverend J. Brewington corroborated the importance to defendant of those polices in their testimony regarding defendant\u2019s act of bringing the policies to church for members to anoint and pray over. Wilson\u2019s testimony corroborated defendant\u2019s admission that the original plan was to kill defendant\u2019s brother, Patrick; recover the insurance proceeds; and purchase the double-wide mobile home he and Lee wanted. Finally, the law enforcement officers found the insurance policies in Lee\u2019s vehicle, corroborating defendant\u2019s admission that he removed the policies from the house and put them in Lee\u2019s car the morning of the murders.\nBased on the foregoing, we conclude that McKeithan\u2019s redacted confession did not identify, much less incriminate, defendant. Even assuming arguendo that McKeithan\u2019s confession did incriminate defendant through inference, we conclude that due to the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, particularly in light of defendant\u2019s own confession, any Bruton error which may have occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also alternatively argues that his confession was not reliable because (1) it did not reflect what he actually said; or (2) it did accurately reflect what he said, but he merely told the officers what they wanted to hear. Defendant argues that the jurors were instructed they were required to determine whether defendant made the statements attributed to him and, if he did, whether those statements were truthful and what weight to give them. Defendant made no objection to this instruction. Further, defendant now asserts that the prosecutor was allowed to argue in closing arguments to the jury, without objection, that the details in McKeithan\u2019s statement which overlapped those in defendant\u2019s statement could have convinced the jury to find defendant\u2019s statements truthful. In light of the foregoing, and particularly in view of our consideration of defendant\u2019s first and third assignments of error, we conclude that these arguments are without merit. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred in granting the State\u2019s motion for joinder of defendants Brewington and McKeithan for trial, and in refusing to grant defendant\u2019s motions for severance.\nIn a written pretrial motion, the State moved for joinder of defendants Brewington and McKeithan for trial. As basis for this motion, the State argued that public policy strongly favored joinder in a case such as this. Defendant and McKeithan were each charged with two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and the underlying offense of first-degree arson. Although the State was proceeding on a theory of accessory before the fact against defendant, joinder is still permissible pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(b). That section provides in part:\n(2) Upon written motion of the prosecutor, charges against two or more defendants may be joined for trial:\na. When each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense; or\nb. When, even if all of the defendants are not charged with accountability for each offense, the several offenses charged:\n1. Were part of a common scheme or plan; or\n2. Were part of the same act or transaction; or\n3. Were so closely connected in time, place, and occasion that it would be difficult to separate proof of one charge from proof of the others.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-926(b)(2) (1999). Defendant and McKeithan were charged with the same offenses, but on different theories. The several offenses for which defendant and McKeithan were charged were clearly part of a common scheme or plan to murder Frances and Brian Brewington and to disguise their murders by burning the Brewington house.\nOn appeal, defendant argues that joinder was improper and that severance was necessary to ensure that he received a fair trial because the introduction of McKeithan\u2019s confession without a limiting instruction prejudiced defendant. Defendant does not present any new arguments from those addressed in the previous assignment of error regarding this issue. Accordingly, for the reasons previously stated, we conclude that the admission of McKeithan\u2019s confession did not prejudice defendant and that joinder of defendant and McKeithan for trial was proper. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that the short-form murder indictment was constitutionally insufficient to charge him with first-degree murder. This Court has recently reaffirmed that indictments for murder based on the short-form indictment statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-144 (1999), are in compliance with both the North Carolina and the United States Constitutions. State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 174, - S.E.2d -, - (2000). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends by his next assignment of error that he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because the trial court failed to submit the (f)(7) statutory mitigating circumstance, defendant\u2019s age at the time of the offense. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7) (1999). Defendant\u2019s attorneys submitted to the trial court a written list of six statutory (including the catchall) and forty-four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances for the jury to consider. The (f)(7) statutory circumstance, defendant\u2019s age at the time of the offense, was not included on that list. The trial court ruled that all of the listed circumstances, except for a few of the nonstatutory circumstances, would be submitted as to both murders. Defendant now contends that the trial court\u2019s consideration of the mitigating circumstances formally requested by defendant\u2019s attorneys was insufficient to fulfill the trial court\u2019s obligations concerning the submission of statutory mitigating circumstances to the jury. We disagree.\nThis Court has recently addressed this issue and held that \u201cthis Court will not conclude that the trial court erred in failing to submit the age mitigator where evidence of defendant\u2019s emotional immaturity is counterbalanced by other factors such as defendant\u2019s chronological age, defendant\u2019s apparently normal intellectual and physical development, and defendant\u2019s lifetime experience.\u201d State v. Steen, 352 N.C. at 257, - S.E.2d at \u2014. The evidence in Steen revealed that defendant was twenty-six at the time of the murder, but that defendant suffered a head injury at twenty-one which caused organic brain damage and resulted in a personality change. Id. The evidence also showed that defendant\u2019s injury caused him to suffer borderline mental retardation and that his memory was impaired. Id. However, there was also evidence that defendant was competent to manage simple financial transactions and had a fair ability to understand, retain and follow instructions. Id. Defendant was gainfully employed and was able to perform his job duties proficiently. Id. at 258, - S.E.2d at -. Because there was evidence which showed that defendant functioned adequately in society, this Court concluded that the evidence of defendant\u2019s immaturity was not so substantial as to require the trial court to submit the age mitigator. Id. at 258, \u2014 S.E.2d at -.\nIn the case subjudice, defendant contends that he presented substantial evidence of his limited intellectual and emotional capacity at trial, primarily through the testimony of Dr. Jerry Noble, a clinical psychologist. Dr. Noble testified that defendant\u2019s limited mental capacity, which had declined from the level of low-average when defendant was in public school ten years earlier, was the result of dementia, probably the product of his \u201cAIDS infection.\u201d Defendant\u2019s full scale IQ was 76, a level just above that of mental retardation. Defendant\u2019s evidence tended to show that his social adjustment, as well as his ability to understand situations and alternatives and choose between them in an appropriate way, was even more impaired and in the lowest percentile of the adult population. Dr. Noble testified that defendant\u2019s reduced intellectual capacity, in combination with his dependent personality disorder, made defendant very susceptible to being persuaded and dominated. Therefore, defendant now argues on appeal that even though his chronological age at the time of the murders was thirty-three years, he presented substantial evidence that his psychological maturity was that of a child.\nHowever, the record at the sentencing proceeding reflects evidence which counterbalances the foregoing evidence of defendant\u2019s mental condition. During cross-examination, Dr. Noble conceded that he is not a medical doctor; that he has had no medical training; and that the AIDS-related dementia was his own diagnosis, not that of a treating physician. Further, Dr. Delia Chiuton, the physician who actually treated defendant at Dorothea Dix, observed no symptoms of AIDS-related dementia and did not believe defendant had AIDS-related dementia. Unlike Dr. Noble, Dr. Chiuton is a medical doctor who has had \u201cextensive training and experience in the diagnosis and treatment of AIDS.\u201d Additionally, other evidence showed that defendant was never placed in special-education classes, never repeated a grade, graduated from his school, passed the high school competency test, and attended technical college. In the ninth grade, defendant\u2019s reading vocabulary was in the top half of students taking the California Achievement Test. Finally, prior to the murders, defendant had no criminal record, and there was no evidence that defendant ever abused his girlfriend and codefendant, Vera Sue Lee. Defendant was extremely active in his church and participated in gospel singing groups. Even defendant\u2019s own expert witness, Dr. Noble, conceded that defendant had a good work history and that he had the intellectual capacity to understand that murder was illegal and wrong.\nTherefore, in light of the foregoing evidence that defendant was thirty-three years of age at the time of the murders, appeared to be fairly well adjusted in society, and had sufficient intelligence to attend community college and establish a good work history, we cannot conclude that the evidence of defendant\u2019s immaturity was so substantial as to require the trial court to submit the age mitigator. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his next assignment of error, defendant contends that he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because the trial court erred in refusing to submit three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances which were supported by the evidence and which a reasonable juror could have found to have some mitigating value. In a written request, defendant asked the trial court to submit six statutory and thirty-seven nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to the jury. Defendant later revised this request and asked the trial court to submit the same six statutory mitigating circumstances and forty-four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. During the sentencing charge conference, the trial court stated its intention to submit all of the statutory mitigating circumstances defendant requested; the statutory catchall circumstance, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9); and forty of the nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that defendant requested. Defendant then objected to the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude the following four nonstatutory mitigating circumstances defendant requested:\n35. The defendant, Robbie Brewington, did not stab or bum anyone.\n36. The defendant, Robbie Brewington, was not an active participant in the murders.\n37. The defendant, Robbie Brewington, was not present when the crime took place.\n38. The codefendant, Vera Lee, received life in prison for her participation in the crime.\nDefendant concedes that the trial court properly refused to submit number 38 because the jury did not hear evidence regarding Vera Lee\u2019s life sentence. However, defendant contends that the trial court\u2019s refusal to submit numbers 35, 36, and 37 prejudiced him because the jury was erroneously precluded from considering them as a basis for a sentence less than death. We disagree.\nGenerally, the trial court must submit nonstatutory mitigating circumstances that are supported by the evidence and which the jury could deem to have mitigating value when a defendant makes a timely written request for the trial court to do so. See State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 55, 446 S.E.2d 252, 282 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995). However, \u201c[a] trial court\u2019s error in failing to submit a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance is harmless \u2018where it is clear that the jury was not prevented from considering any potential mitigating evidence.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 56, 446 S.E.2d at 283 (quoting State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 183, 443 S.E.2d 14, 38, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994)).\nIn the case sub judice, the trial court did not preclude the jury from considering as evidence in mitigation that defendant was not present when the murders occurred, that he did not physically stab or burn anyone, or that he was not an active participant in the murders or arson. Upon defendant\u2019s request, the trial court submitted in regard to each murder the (f)(4) statutory mitigating circumstance, that \u201cdefendant was an accomplice in or accessory to the capital felony committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(4). Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury on the (f)(4) mitigator as follows:\nNext, consider whether the murder was actually committed by another person, and the defendant was only an accomplice in the murder and his participation in the murder was relatively minor. The distinguishing feature of an accomplice or accessory is that he is not the person who actually committed the murder.\nYou would find this mitigating circumstance if you find that the victim was killed by another person and that the defendant was only an accessory to the killing and that the defendant\u2019s conduct constitutes relatively minor participation in the murder. If one or more of you finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the circumstance exists, you would write yes. If none of you find the circumstance exists, you would write no in the space.\nThe trial court also instructed the jury on the \u201ccatchall\u201d mitigating circumstance:\nFinally, members of the jury, you may consider any other circumstance or circumstances arising from the evidence which you deem to have mitigating value. If one or more of you so find by a preponderance of the evidence, you should so indicate by having your foreperson write yes in the space provided after this mitigating circumstance on the issues and recommendation form. If none of you find any such circumstance to exist, you would so indicate by having your foreperson write no in that space.\nThis instruction invited the jurors to consider any and all mitigating circumstances they deemed to exist from the evidence.\nA trial court\u2019s failure or refusal to submit a defendant\u2019s proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstances separately or independently is not error where requested mitigating circumstances are subsumed in submitted mitigating circumstances. Skipper, 337 N.C. at 55-56, 446 S.E.2d at 282-83. In the instant case, the trial court\u2019s instruction regarding the (f)(4) mitigator specifically refers to defendant\u2019s indirect participation three times: \u201cthe murder was actually committed by another person\u201d; \u201cthe distinguishing feature of an accomplice or accessory is that he is not the person who actually committed the murder\u201d; and \u201cthe victim was killed by another person.\u201d This instruction fully encompassed and more accurately stated the concepts that defendant wanted the jury to consider. Also, because this was a statutory mitigating circumstance, any juror who found it to exist was required to give it some mitigating value. We conclude that defendant\u2019s proposed nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were subsumed in the (f)(4) mitigating circumstance submitted to the jury by the trial court.\nDefendant also argues, however, that the submission of the (f)(4) statutory mitigating circumstance did not satisfy his request for these three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances because the jurors could reasonably have found mitigating value in his absence from the crime scene, even though finding that defendant\u2019s participation was not minor. However, this argument overlooks the purpose of the (f)(9) statutory catchall mitigating circumstance. The trial court\u2019s instruction on the (f)(9) mitigator gave the jury the authority and full opportunity to consider any and all facts, \u201cany other circumstance,\u201d in evidence which any member of the jury found to have mitigating value. The jury could have given the evidence that defendant was not present during the murders mitigating value under this catchall circumstance. See State v. McLaughlin, 341 N.C. 426, 448, 462 S.E.2d 1, 12-13 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1133, 133 L. Ed. 2d 879 (1996). No juror was precluded from considering, finding and attaching mitigating value to defendant\u2019s absence from the scene of the murders and arson. We therefore conclude the trial court committed no error in refusing to submit these three nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends in his next assignment of error that the trial court committed prejudicial error when it failed to peremptorily instruct the jury in accordance with the North Carolina pattern jury instructions on the (f)(1) mitigating circumstance, that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(l). For the reasons stated below, we conclude this assignment of error is without merit.\nAt the close of the evidence in the penalty phase, defendant gave the trial court a written list of the mitigating circumstances he wished to be submitted to the jury. Defendant requested the trial court to peremptorily instruct the jury, in accordance with the North Carolina pattern jury instructions, on the (f)(1) statutory mitigating circumstance, that defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity. During the charge conference, the prosecutor conceded that defendant was entitled to a peremptory instruction on the (f)(1) mitigator. In its charge to the jury, the trial court gave the following instruction:\n\u201cThe defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity before the date of the murder.\u201d The defendant has the burden of establishing this mitigating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence as explained to you. There is no evidence that the defendant has been convicted of any criminal activity. Accordingly, if one or more of you find the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show, then you will answer this mitigating circumstance yes.\nAt no point did defendant\u2019s attorneys object to this instruction during trial. However, defendant now argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing proceeding because the trial court\u2019s instruction was not in accordance with the pattern jury instruction, which states:\nThe defendant has the burden of establishing this mitigating circumstance by the preponderance of the evidence, as I have explained to you.\nAccordingly, as to this mitigating circumstance, I charge you that if one or more of you find the facts to be as all the evidence tends to show, you will answer \u201cYes\u201d as to Mitigating Circumstance Number (read number) on the \u201cIssues and Recommendation\u201d form.\nN.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 150.11 (1994).\nThe jury found the (f)(1) statutory mitigating circumstance to exist as to each murder. Even though the trial court\u2019s instructions were not precisely identical to the pattern jury instructions, they were substantially so, and defendant cannot show how the trial court\u2019s instruction prejudiced him. This assignment of error is overruled.\nIn his final assignment of error, defendant contends that the submission of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9), violated defendant\u2019s rights under the North Carolina and United States Constitutions because it impermissibly allowed the jury to find the existence of an aggravating circumstance based solely upon his codefendants\u2019 actions. At trial, defendant objected to the submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance. As basis for this objection, defendant argued that he was not present at the time of the homicides and that there was no evidence that he intended the killings to be carried out in a manner that was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The trial court overruled defendant\u2019s objection and submitted the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance on the issues and recommendation as to punishment forms with respect to both murders. On appeal, defendant asserts that the (e)(9) aggravator was properly submitted only as to McKeithan. Defendant concedes that the evidence shows that the murders were committed in a manner that was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, and that the evidence also shows that McKeithan was personally culpable for the specific details of the killings. However, defendant contends that because there was no evidence showing that he was personally culpable for the specific details of the killings, the trial court committed reversible error in submitting the (e)(9) aggravating factor as to him. We disagree.\nDefendant was tried and convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of conspiracy to commit murder, and one count of arson. Defendant admitted to planning the murders and enlisting his codefendants to perform the murders. Because defendant was not present when the murders were actually committed, defendant was convicted under the theory that he was an \u201caccessory before the fact.\u201d Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-5.2, North Carolina law does not recognize any guilt or sentencing distinctions between an accessory before the fact and a principal to a felony. This statutory section provides in part:\nAll distinctions between accessories before the fact and principals to the commission of a felony are abolished. Every person who heretofore would have been guilty as an accessory before the fact to any felony shall be guilty and punishable as a principal to that felony.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-5.2 (1999). This Court has held that \u201caccessories before the fact, who do not actually commit the crime, and indeed may not have been present, can be convicted of first-degree murder under a theory of aiding and abetting.\u201d State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 24, 478 S.E.2d 163, 174-75 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997). \u201cA showing of defendant\u2019s presence or lack thereof is no longer required.\u201d Id.\nThe United States Supreme Court has held that capital punishment must be tailored to the particular defendant\u2019s personal responsibility and moral guilt. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982). In construing Enmund, this Court stated:\nIn Enmund, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment forbids the imposition of the death penalty on a defendant who aids and abets in the commission of a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others, when the defendant does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. Id. at 797, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 1151. Thus, an Enmund issue only arises when the State proceeds on a felony murder theory.\nState v. Robinson, 342 N.C. 74, 87, 463 S.E.2d 218, 226 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197, 134 L. Ed. 2d 793 (1996). Accordingly, the constitutional concerns that the United States Supreme Court addressed in Enmund do not apply in a case where a defendant \u201cintend[s] that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed.\u201d Id.\nDefendant argues that the submission of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance as to him was erroneous under our recent decision in State v. McNeil, 350 N.C. 657, 518 S.E.2d 486 (1999), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 146 L. Ed. 2d 321 (2000). The defendant in McNeil argued that the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury regarding the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance erroneously allowed the jury to consider the behavior of McNeil\u2019s accomplice in committing the murder. However, this Court approved the submission of the (e)(9) aggravator because there was sufficient evidence showing that McNeil\u2019s individual acts toward the victim were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Id. at 693-95, 518 S.E.2d at 508-09. Defendant therefore argues that the clear implication of McNeil is that submission of the (e)(9) aggravator requires evidence sufficient to show that the defendant was personally involved in the infliction of the particular brutality that justifies a conclusion that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.\nThis Court has held:\n\u201cIn determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court\u2019s submission of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator, we must consider the evidence \u2018in the light most favorable to the State, and the State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom.\u2019 \u201d State v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 270, 506 S.E.2d 702, 706 (1998) (quoting [State v. Lloyd, 321 N.C. 301, 319, 364 S.E.2d 316, 328, sentence vacated on other grounds, 488 U.S. 807, 102 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1988)]), cert. denied, [526 U.S. 1135, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1015] (1999). \u201c[Contradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve; and all evidence admitted that is favorable to the State is to be considered.\u201d Robinson, 342 N.C. at 86, 463 S.E.2d at 225.\nMcNeil, 350 N.C. at 693, 518 S.E.2d at 508. This Court has also stated that \u201ccapital sentencing must focus on the individual defendant, his crimes, personal culpability, and mitigation,\u201d State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 67, 436 S.E.2d 321, 359 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1246, 129 L. Ed. 2d 881 (1994), and that the particular facts of each case dictate whether the (e)(9) statutory aggravating circumstance was properly submitted, McNeil, 350 N.C. at 693-94, 518 S.E.2d at 508. Additionally, evidence regarding the circumstances of the murders is relevant and admissible to support the submission of an aggravating circumstance. The fact that defendant was not present when the murders occurred, and that a codefendant actually committed the murders, is a matter that a jury would properly consider in determining the weight to give an aggravating circumstance and in balancing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Furthermore, this Court has stated that in determining the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance, \u201cthe evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the State and with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence.\u201d State v. Moseley, 336 N.C. 710, 722, 445 S.E.2d 906, 913 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1120, 130 L. Ed. 2d 802 (1995).\nDefendant\u2019s confession reveals that defendant and Lee initially developed the idea to murder the victims in order to collect the life insurance proceeds. Defendant told Lee and McKeithan to sneak into the unlocked house after he left for work, stab the victims, and then burn the house to disguise the murders. Defendant directed McKeithan and Lee to use gasoline so the house would burn quickly. Because defendant knew that the house would be burned on the morning of the murders, he removed the insurance policies and his Sunday clothes from the house so they would not be destroyed in the fire. Defendant also confessed that he purchased the knife for McKeithan and Lee to use in the murders.\nFrom this evidence, a reasonable juror could infer that defendant intended for McKeithan and Lee to sneak into the house while the victims were asleep and stab one victim and then the other. Defendant was aware that the victims shared a bedroom, and because he provided only one knife for the two murders, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant knew the stabbings would not be simultaneous. A reasonable juror could also infer that because the victims shared a bedroom and because defendant knew that the killers would necessarily be required to move from one victim in the room to the other, the stabbings could not occur at the same time. Under this scenario, it was likely that death would not be instantaneous for one or both victims or that one or both victims would be left without a fatal wound after the initial attack. Any consideration of these planned circumstances, which logic dictates must have occurred, would clearly call to mind that at least one and possibly both victims would be aware of these ongoing assaults upon them, of the pain they were suffering, and of their probable imminent death, and thus would be placed in terror for some moments.\nIt is clear from the evidence that defendant and his codefendants carefully considered and planned these killings in considerable detail, including how the house would be burned. Defendant told Lee to use gasoline, intending that the house burn quickly to cover the stabbings. Defendant knew Lee and McKeithan would not stay in the house once the fire began. Therefore, if the stab wounds were not immediately fatal, the fire would ultimately cause the victims\u2019 deaths. The evidence shows this is, in fact, the way both victims died. Because of the plan so carefully designed and put in motion by defendant, his eight-year-old nephew and his grandmother, who gave defendant a home, burned to death. In the context of \u201cespecially heinous, atrocious, or cruel,\u201d it is difficult to imagine a human mind that could desire such an end for any two lives, and for mere money.\nUnder the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer and conclude that defendant intended and directed McKeithan and Lee to perform the murders in exactly the manner they employed. Even though defendant was not present when McKeithan and Lee committed the murders, defendant was personally involved in planning the details of the murders. Defendant also took deliberate steps to enable the murders to proceed according to his instructions. Defendant does not dispute that the manner in which the victims were murdered is sufficient to support the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance. Because defendant directed that each victim experience the deaths which they suffered, we conclude that the trial court did not err in submitting the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance in this case. This assignment of error is overruled.\nPRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant raises seven additional issues which he concedes have been previously decided contrary to his position by this Court: (1) the North Carolina death penalty statute is unconstitutional; (2) the trial court erred by failing to prohibit the State from death-qualifying the jury; (3) the trial court erred in denying defendant\u2019s motion to examine prospective jurors regarding their opinions on parole eligibility; (4) the trial court erred in excluding evidence of codefendant\u2019s Lee\u2019s life sentence; (5) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it was the jury\u2019s \u201cduty\u201d to recommend a sentence of death if it found the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and that the aggravating circumstances, when considered with the mitigating circumstances, were sufficiently substantial to call for the death penalty; (6) the trial court erred in defining mitigating circumstances as set forth in the pattern jury instructions; and (7) the standards set by the Supreme Court of North Carolina for its proportionality review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) are vague and arbitrary.\nDefendant raises these issues for the purpose of permitting this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and also for the purpose of preserving them for possible further judicial review of this case. We have considered defendant\u2019s arguments on these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings. These assignments of error are overruled.\nPROPORTIONALITY REVIEW\nHaving concluded that defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error, we must now review the record and determine: (1) whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury and upon which the sentencing court based its sentence of death; (2) whether the sentence was entered under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the sentence is \u201cexcessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2). We have thoroughly reviewed the record, transcript and briefs in this case. We conclude that the record fully supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. Further, we find no indication that the sentence of death in this case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor. We therefore turn to our final statutory duty of proportionality review.\nIn the present case, defendant was found guilty of two counts of murder under the theories of premeditation and deliberation and felony murder. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury found three aggravating circumstances submitted as to the murder of Brian Brewington: (i) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(6); (ii) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9); and (iii) the murder was part of a course of conduct, including defendant\u2019s commission of other crimes of violence against another person or persons, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(ll). The jury also found three aggravating circumstances submitted as to the murder of Frances Brewington: (i) the murder was committed while engaged, or an aider or abettor, in the commission of arson, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5); (ii) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9); and (iii) the murder was part of a course of conduct, including defendant\u2019s commission of other crimes of violence against another person or persons, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(ll).\nThe trial court submitted and the jury found, as to each murder, two statutory mitigating circumstances: (i) defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(l); and (ii) defendant acted under domination of another person, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(5). The trial court also submitted the statutory \u201ccatchall\u201d circumstance, but the jury did not find \u201c[a]ny other circumstance arising from the evidence which the jury deems to have mitigating value.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9). Of the forty nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted as to each murder, the jury found five to exist.\nOne purpose of our proportionality review is to \u201celiminate the possibility that a sentence of death was imposed by the action of an aberrant jury.\u201d State v. Lee, 335 N.C. 244, 294, 439 S.E.2d 547, 573, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 891, 130 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1994). Another is to guard \u201cagainst the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty.\u201d State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980). In conducting proportionality review, we compare the present case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 240, 433 S.E.2d 144, 162 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994). This Court has found the death penalty disproportionate in seven cases: State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\nWe conclude that this case is not substantially similar to any case in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate. First, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. This Court has never found the death sentence disproportionate in a case where the jury has found defendant guilty of murdering more than one victim. State v. Goode, 341 N.C. 513, 552, 461 S.E.2d 631, 654 (1995). In addition, the jury convicted defendant under the theory of premeditation and deliberation. This Court has stated that \u201c[t]he finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-blooded and calculated crime.\u201d State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990). The jury in this case also found all three of the aggravating circumstances submitted as to each murder conviction. In none of the cases where this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate has the jury found three aggravating circumstances. State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 458, 509 S.E.2d 178, 198 (1998), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1999). Finally, of the cases in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate, the jury found the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance in only two cases. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653; Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170.\nNeither Stokes nor Bondurant is similar to this case. As we have noted, defendant here was convicted of murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation as well as under the felony murder rule. The defendant in Stokes, however, was convicted solely on the basis of the felony murder rule. In Bondurant, the defendant exhibited his remorse, as he \u201creadily spoke with policemen at the hospital, confessing that he fired the shot which killed [the victim].\u201d Bondurant, 309 N.C. at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 183. Defendant in the case sub judice \u201cdid not exhibit the kind of conduct we recognized as ameliorating in Bondurant.\u201d Flippen, 349 N.C. at 278, 506 S.E.2d at 711.\nIt is also proper for this Court to \u201ccompare this case with the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be proportionate.\u201d State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164. Although this Court reviews all of the cases in the pool when engaging in our duty of proportionality review, we have repeatedly stated that \u201cwe will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out that duty.\u201d Id. It suffices to say here that we conclude that the present case is more similar to certain cases in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have found the sentence of death disproportionate or to those in which juries have consistently returned recommendations of life imprisonment.\nFinally, this Court has noted that similarity of cases is not the last word on the subject of proportionality. State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 287, 446 S.E.2d 298, 325 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995). Similarity \u201cmerely serves as an initial point of inquiry.\u201d Id. Whether the death penalty is disproportionate \u201cultimately rest[s] upon the \u2018experienced judgments\u2019 of the members of this Court.\u201d State v. Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47.\nBased on the foregoing and the entire record in this case, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the sentence of death was excessive or disproportionate. We hold that defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free of prejudicial error.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "LAKE, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G. Barnwell and Joan M. Cunningham, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State.", "Ann B. Petersen for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT FRANKLIN BREWINGTON\nNo. 252A99\n(Filed 25 August 2000)\n1. Confessions and Other Incriminating Statements\u2014 not custodial\nThe trial court did not err by admitting statements by a capital first-degree murder defendant where defendant voluntarily drove himself to the Sheriffs Department in a private automobile after a detective requested an interview; defendant was not confined, handcuffed, restrained, threatened, or subjected to any show of force; he consented to a polygraph examination, returning to a waiting room while the test was prepared and voluntarily going to the examination room; when the examiner told defendant that she did not think he was telling the entire truth, he replied that he had been present when the fire was set and blamed it on one of the victims; and when the examiner returned after speaking with the detectives, defendant stated before she could speak that his fiancee had set the fire. Under the totality of the circumstances, defendant was not in custody during his interview.\n2. Confessions and Other Incriminating Statements\u2014 statements after request for counsel\nThe trial court did not err in a prosecution for capital first-degree murder and other crimes by admitting statements made by defendant after he indicated that he wished to talk with counsel where defendant was then subjected to interrogation only after continuing to ask questions about the case, telling detectives that he wished to talk without the presence of counsel, and formally waiving his Miranda rights.\n3. Search and Seizure\u2014 consent to search \u2014 voluntary waiver of rights\nThe trial court did not err in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder by admitting evidence seized during a search of defendant\u2019s automobile. Although defendant argued that his consent to the search was given without a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights, the trial court had already properly determined that none of defendant\u2019s constitutional rights were violated during his arrest and interrogation and that defendant had voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. From the totality of evidence regarding defendant\u2019s arrest, waiver of rights, interrogation and statements made, defendant knowingly and voluntarily consented to the search of his vehicle.\n4. Discovery\u2014 polygraph \u2014 results not discoverable\nThe trial court did not err in a capital first-degree murder prosecution by denying defendant\u2019s motion to discover polygrams (produced by a polygraph test) under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-903(e) where defendant asserted that he wanted to submit the polygrams to his own expert to determine whether the examiner had misrepresented the results to defendant. Polygraphs do not fall within the category of examinations contemplated by the statute; furthermore, the issue of whether the examiner correctly interpreted or commented upon the test results is merely one factor bearing upon the total circumstances\n5. Confessions and Other Incriminating Statements\u2014 redacted confession of codefendant \u2014 other overwhelming evidence\nThere was no prejudicial error in a capital prosecution for first-degree murder, conspiracy, and arson in the admission of the redacted and retyped confession of an accomplice where the confession was carefully redacted by taking out complete sentences and groups of sentences that mentioned, connected, or referenced the existence of defendant; the confession as redacted retained a natural narrative flow and did not contain any contextual clues indicating that it had been altered; and, the alterations were subtle, neither attracted the jury\u2019s attention nor invited speculation, and did not directly implicate defendant by language which invited the jury to infer that the unnamed third party referred to in the confession was defendant. Furthermore, any Bruton error which may have occurred was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt due to the overwhelming evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt, including defendant\u2019s own confession.\n6. Criminal Law\u2014 joinder \u2014 confession of codefendant\nThe trial court did not err by joining the capital trials of two defendants for first-degree murder, arson, and conspiracy where defendant Brewington argued that joinder was improper and severance necessary due to prejudice from the introduction of his codefendant\u2019s confession, but, as stated elsewhere in the opinion, the admission of the confession did not prejudice defendant.\n7. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 short-form indictment\nA short-form murder indictment was constitutionally sufficient.\n8. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 mitigating circumstances \u2014 age of defendant\nThe trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by not submitting the statutory mitigating circumstance of defendant\u2019s age at the time of the offense, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7), where defendant argues that he presented substantial evidence that his psychological maturity was that of a child even though his chronological age at the time of the murders was 33, there was evidence that defendant appeared to be fairly well adjusted in society, and he had sufficient intelligence to attend community college and establish a good work history. The North Carolina Supreme Court will not conclude that a trial court erred by failing to submit this mitigator where evidence of emotional immaturity is counterbalanced by other factors.\n9.Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 nonstatutory mitigating circumstances \u2014 relatively minor participation \u2014 subsumed by statutory circumstances\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by not submitting defendant\u2019s requested nonstatutory mitigating circumstances concerning the fact that he was not present when the killing was done where the court submitted the statutory mitigating circumstance that defendant was an accomplice or accessory\u2019 and his participation was relatively minor. The court\u2019s instruction regarding that mitigator specifically referred to defendant\u2019s indirect participation three times and it fully encompassed and more accurately stated the concepts defendant wanted the jury to consider; moreover, any juror who found it to exist was required to give it mitigating value because it was a statutory circumstance. Finally, although defendant argues that the statutory circumstance was insufficient because jurors could have found defendant\u2019s absence from the scene to have mitigating value even if his participation was not minor, the court\u2019s instruction on the statutory catchall mitigating circumstance gave the jury the authority and opportunity to consider any and all facts in evidence which any member of the jury found to have mitigating value. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(4); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(9).\n10. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 mitigating circumstances \u2014 instructions \u2014 substantially similar to Pattern Jury Instructions\nA defendant in a capital sentencing proceeding could not show that the trial court\u2019s instruction prejudiced him where defendant requested the pattern jury instruction on the mitigating circumstance of no significant history of prior criminal activity, the court gave an instruction which was not precisely identical to the pattern jury instruction but was substantially so, and the jury found the circumstance. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(l).\n11. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel \u2014 accomplice not at scene\nThe trial court did not err during a capital sentencing proceeding by submitting the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance where defendant was not present when the murders were committed. Even though he was not present, he was personally involved in planning the details of the murders, took deliberate steps to enable the murders to proceed according to his instructions, and does not dispute that the manner in which the victims were murdered is sufficient to support the circumstance. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9).\n12. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 proportionality\nA death sentence for a first-degree murder was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other factor, the evidence supported the aggravating circumstances found by the jury, and the sentence was not disproportionate. Defendant was convicted of two counts of murder, the jury found three aggravating circumstances, and the jury found the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance.\nAppeal as of right by defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from judgments imposing sentences of death entered by Bowen, J., on 28 August 1998 in Superior Court, Harnett County, upon jury verdicts finding defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. On 26 October 1999, the Supreme Court allowed defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of additional judgments. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 May 2000.\nMichael F. Easley, Attorney General, by John G. Barnwell and Joan M. Cunningham, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State.\nAnn B. Petersen for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0489-01", "first_page_order": 529, "last_page_order": 570 }