{ "id": 135574, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RASHAD LUCAS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Lucas", "decision_date": "2001-07-20", "docket_number": "No. 278PA00", "first_page": "568", "last_page": "599", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "353 N.C. 568" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 602", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "138 N.C. App. 226", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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11221196, 11221453, 11221007, 11221073, 11221235, 11221367, 11221048, 11221274 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/1124-10", "/us/525/1124-02", "/us/525/1124-14", "/us/525/1124-12", "/us/525/1124-05", "/us/525/1124-06", "/us/525/1124-07", "/us/525/1124-13", "/us/525/1124-01", "/us/525/1124-04", "/us/525/1124-08", "/us/525/1124-11", "/us/525/1124-03", "/us/525/1124-09" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11525121, 11525092, 11524710, 11524582, 11524807, 11525031, 11524847, 11524689, 11524884, 11524761, 11524635, 11524924, 11524734, 11524959 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0900-14", "/us/522/0900-13", "/us/522/0900-04", "/us/522/0900-01", "/us/522/0900-07", "/us/522/0900-12", "/us/522/0900-08", "/us/522/0900-03", "/us/522/0900-09", "/us/522/0900-06", "/us/522/0900-02", "/us/522/0900-10", "/us/522/0900-05", "/us/522/0900-11" ] }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11511617, 11511362, 11511587, 11511493, 11511686, 11511560, 11511754, 11511659, 11511469, 11511728, 11511536, 11511441, 11511413, 11511389, 11511806 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1024-10", "/us/523/1024-01", "/us/523/1024-09", "/us/523/1024-06", "/us/523/1024-12", "/us/523/1024-08", "/us/523/1024-14", "/us/523/1024-11", "/us/523/1024-05", "/us/523/1024-13", "/us/523/1024-07", "/us/523/1024-04", "/us/523/1024-03", "/us/523/1024-02", "/us/523/1024-15" ] }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 876", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11511102, 11511204, 11511428, 11511460, 11511173, 11511400, 11511145, 11511335, 11511085, 11511376, 11511122, 11511256, 11511068, 11511356 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0876-03", "/us/522/0876-07", "/us/522/0876-13", "/us/522/0876-14", "/us/522/0876-06", "/us/522/0876-12", "/us/522/0876-05", "/us/522/0876-09", "/us/522/0876-02", "/us/522/0876-11", "/us/522/0876-04", "/us/522/0876-08", "/us/522/0876-01", "/us/522/0876-10" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 314", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6215700 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155670 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2119", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" }, { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 227", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133049 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" }, { "page": "248" }, { "page": "329" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court's instructions emphasizing that an aider and abettor has to knowingly advise, encourage, instigate or aid another in committing a crime were sufficient to illustrate that defendant's presence alone was not sufficient to convict" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570394 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court's instructions emphasizing that an aider and abettor has to knowingly advise, encourage, instigate or aid another in committing a crime were sufficient to illustrate that defendant's presence alone was not sufficient to convict" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court did not err in giving pattern instruction that did not include a provision on mere presence where defendant followed codefendant into group with a steel pipe and made it known to codefendant that he was willing to lend any assistance necessary as codefendant shot the victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530709 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 L. Ed. 2d 965", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant was not entitled to an instruction on mere presence where there was undisputed evidence that he actively participated in the kidnapping and robbery of the victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155790 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "defendant was not entitled to an instruction on mere presence where there was undisputed evidence that he actively participated in the kidnapping and robbery of the victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 S.E.2d 346", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 94", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8599788 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0094-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786-87", "parenthetical": "\"It remains the law that one may not be found to be an aider and abettor, and thus guilty as a principal, solely because he is present when a crime is committed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 466", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571210 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476", "parenthetical": "\"It remains the law that one may not be found to be an aider and abettor, and thus guilty as a principal, solely because he is present when a crime is committed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "492 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798773 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 680", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685067, 684993, 685011, 685108 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0680-04", "/nc/352/0680-03", "/nc/352/0680-01", "/nc/352/0680-02" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 61", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. App. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11091796 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/137/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 32", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11145290 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11653537 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 891", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 N.C. App. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527366 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/92/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696125 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 417", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "540" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778082 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 856", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4753111 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0237-01" ] }, { "cite": "237 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563804 ], "year": 1977, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "413-14" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564503 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170" }, { "page": "171" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 611", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4682851 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571627, 571696, 571730, 571642, 571487 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0531-05", "/nc/349/0531-02", "/nc/349/0531-01", "/nc/349/0531-04", "/nc/349/0531-03" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 42", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 N.C. App. 692", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11470090 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "699" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0692-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 U.S. 145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1639 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "212" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/431/0145-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 375", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 52 L. Ed. 2d 203, 212 (1977)" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565416 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661", "parenthetical": "quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 52 L. Ed. 2d 203, 212 (1977)" }, { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "431 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529763 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0054-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2571664 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 L. Ed. 2d 768", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "501 S.E.2d 309", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 335", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659853 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0335-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 S.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8625125 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "512 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131954 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "260" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "313 S.E.2d 560", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Ham, 238 N.C. 94, 97, 76 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1953)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2400117 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "579", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Ham, 238 N.C. 94, 97, 76 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1953)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867705 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574086 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 S.E.2d 193", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796005 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 349", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2515495 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0349-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552791 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 L. Ed. 2d 1080", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "518 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1730080, 1729633, 1730183, 1729928, 1730015, 1729611, 1730027, 1730125, 1729681, 1729939, 1730227, 1729596, 1730110, 1729791 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/518/1024-08", "/us/518/1024-11", "/us/518/1024-13", "/us/518/1024-02", "/us/518/1024-04", "/us/518/1024-03", "/us/518/1024-12", "/us/518/1024-01", "/us/518/1024-06", "/us/518/1024-09", "/us/518/1024-14", "/us/518/1024-05", "/us/518/1024-07", "/us/518/1024-10" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795939 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "522 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155797 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793199 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867565 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "328 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "one of the essential elements of first-degree burglary \"is that the breaking and entering must have been accompanied by the intent to commit a felony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4723196 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "one of the essential elements of first-degree burglary \"is that the breaking and entering must have been accompanied by the intent to commit a felony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 401", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "404", "parenthetical": "\"kidnapping is a specific intent crime\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720408 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "\"kidnapping is a specific intent crime\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132055 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659919 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 S.E.2d 150", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" }, { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 828", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11611424, 11611236, 11611653, 11611718, 11611367, 11611530, 11611789, 11611758, 11611599, 11611282, 11611123, 11611479, 11611324, 11611167 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0828-07", "/us/519/0828-03", "/us/519/0828-11", "/us/519/0828-12", "/us/519/0828-06", "/us/519/0828-09", "/us/519/0828-14", "/us/519/0828-13", "/us/519/0828-10", "/us/519/0828-04", "/us/519/0828-01", "/us/519/0828-08", "/us/519/0828-05", "/us/519/0828-02" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796105 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53983 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 727", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "736" }, { "page": "736" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 S.E.2d 625", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 463", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571096 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0463-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 589", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530679 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 747", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2509076 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0747-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2559246 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552812 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139483 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 L. Ed. 2d 513", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "676 F.2d 995", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 562145 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/676/0995-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1953, "char_count": 77266, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2334856339695198e-06, "percentile": 0.9883056888644859 }, "sha256": "2ae563688bcb8e902eecfcf65f00296b27bcf555d0f1c8e80b78163a77d88d0b", "simhash": "1:83cdc16e760b8c16", "word_count": 12484 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T19:31:00.841375+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RASHAD LUCAS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EDMUNDS, Justice.\nDefendant William Rashad Lucas was indicted for first-degree murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree kidnapping, possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction, conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to commit kidnapping. He was tried before a jury at the 16 February 1998 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Harnett County. On 24 February 1998, the jury returned verdicts convicting defendant of first-degree burglary as an aider and abettor, second-degree kidnapping as an aider and abettor, and possession of a weapon of mass destruction, while acquitting him of first-degree murder and the conspiracy charges. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment of 124 to 146 months for first-degree burglary, 85 to 99 months for second-degree kidnapping, and 16 to 20 months for possession of a weapon of mass death and destruction.\nDefendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, which ordered a new trial based on the trial court\u2019s failure to convey adequately the concept of specific intent necessary to support convictions of first-degree burglary and second-degree kidnapping under the theory of aiding and abetting. On 12 July 2000, we allowed both the State\u2019s petition for discretionary review and defendant\u2019s conditional petition for discretionary review as to additional issues, and on 5 October 2000, we agreed to consider defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the Court of Appeals as to the issue raised by the State. As to the additional issues raised by defendant in his conditional petition for discretionary review, we find no error. Finally, we grant defendant a new sentencing hearing on the firearm enhancement issue raised in defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief.\nAt defendant\u2019s trial, the State\u2019s evidence showed that on 18 January 1997, Dale Jerome McLean; his girlfriend, Gwendolyn Annette Morrison; and his two children, Chastity Latrice McLean and Dale Jerome McLean, Jr., were at McLean\u2019s home in Harnett County, North Carolina. Upon hearing a knock on the back door at approximately 8:00 p.m., McLean, who was in the back bedroom with Morrison, looked out the window and saw Jimmy Wayne Lawrence, Morrison\u2019s former boyfriend. Morrison told McLean that she would \u201chandle it.\u201d Wearing only a coat covering a nightgown and slippers, Morrison stepped outside to speak with Lawrence. Lawrence asked Morrison to leave with him, and when she refused, he pointed a nine-millimeter pistol at her. Morrison turned around and saw defendant standing nearby, holding a sawed-off shotgun across his body. Morrison told Lawrence that she \u201cdidn\u2019t want no trouble\u201d and that she would get dressed and go with him.\nMorrison went back into McLean\u2019s home. As she was closing the door, Lawrence \u201cbusted his way through\u201d the doorway and pushed Morrison out of the way. When McLean emerged from the bedroom, Lawrence aimed his pistol at him. Morrison struggled with Lawrence, and Lawrence began shooting. The pistol at first misfired, but Lawrence\u2019s second shot struck McLean in the head. McLean fell, and Lawrence fired eight more shots at him from close range. Morrison saw defendant standing inside the doorway of the home, holding the shotgun.\nLawrence then stated to Morrison, \u201cCome on. Let\u2019s go.\u201d When Morrison refused, Lawrence threatened to kill her if she did not leave with him, then grabbed her and took her to his vehicle. She was still wearing only an overcoat over a nightgown and slippers. Lawrence forced Morrison to sit in the back of the vehicle while he sat in the front passenger seat and defendant drove. As they were driving, Lawrence stated to defendant, \u201cSlow down. We don\u2019t want to make it look like we\u2019re doing something wrong.\u201d Defendant later commented to Lawrence, \u201cJimmy, you should have killed her too because she\u2019s going to tell it.\u201d They stopped at the home of Lawrence\u2019s father where Lawrence went inside. Morrison remained in the car as defendant stood behind the vehicle. Lawrence emerged from his father\u2019s house, spoke to defendant briefly, then made Morrison move from Lawrence\u2019s car to the back seat of defendant\u2019s vehicle. When they left Lawrence\u2019s father\u2019s house, Lawrence again sat in the front passenger seat while defendant drove.\nThey arrived at a Comfort Inn, where Lawrence checked in while defendant and Morrison remained in the vehicle. The three then entered the rented room, and defendant\u2019s shotgun was placed on the bed. After Lawrence and defendant talked briefly, defendant left for about thirty-five to forty minutes. At some point that evening, Lawrence raped Morrison at the Comfort Inn. Although the sequence of events is not clear from the record, it appears that the rape occurred during defendant\u2019s absence. When defendant returned, he brought clothes for Morrison. After talking to Lawrence, defendant departed again. Thereafter, Lawrence telephoned his father to pick him up. Once Lawrence left the room, Morrison called the police.\n- Chastity, the victim\u2019s daughter, corroborated Morrison\u2019s version of events. She testified that defendant was dressed entirely in black, held a long gun, and was \u201chalf inside and half outside\u201d McLean\u2019s house during the shooting. She identified defendant in the courtroom as the man present at the scene of the murder, and she testified that Lawrence \u201csnatched\u201d Morrison when he was leaving and that Morrison was \u201cfussing\u201d as she was forced to leave. Chastity telephoned her grandmother, Eloise McLean Swann, after Lawrence, defendant and Morrison left McLean\u2019s residence and reported that her father had been shot. Swann arrived at McLean\u2019s home shortly thereafter, and when Swann asked Chastity who was responsible, Chastity told her that \u201cit was two men.\u201d Swann\u2019s testimony at trial corroborated Chastity.\nNorth Carolina State Bureau of Investigation Agent Sam Pennica photographed the scene of the shooting and collected cartridge cases and projectiles from the area around and under McLean\u2019s body. After processing the crime scene, Agent Pennica went to .the Comfort Inn and determined that Lawrence had registered there. By that time, Lawrence was in custody at the Lee County Sheriffs Department where he signed a waiver of rights form and consented to a search of the hotel room. Agent Pennica conducted the search and found a loaded sawed-off twenty-gauge shotgun under the box springs of one of the beds.\nAgent Pennica then assisted other investigators in interviewing Lawrence, who had been moved to the Harnett County Sheriffs Department. As a result of the questioning, Lawrence identified defendant as the second man at the crime scene. In addition, North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Wayne Truax obtained the telephone records from the room registered to Lawrence at the Comfort Inn and determined that a call had been made from that room to defendant. Defendant subsequently was arrested at the residence of his girlfriend and transported to the Sanford Police Department where he waived his Miranda rights and consented to a search of his vehicle. Defendant gave a statement to Agent Pennica in which he admitted traveling with Lawrence to the victim\u2019s home, but he denied knowing why Lawrence was going there or what Lawrence planned to do. Defendant also denied having a weapon while at the home and claimed that he did not know what happened inside. During this interrogation, defendant revealed that the nine-millimeter handgun used by Lawrence to kill McLean was at his (defendant\u2019s) girlfriend\u2019s house. Agent Truax searched defendant\u2019s vehicle and recovered a pager along with several nine-millimeter rounds and twenty-gauge shotgun shells.\nTomeka Goins, defendant\u2019s girlfriend, stated that on the evening in question, defendant came to her house in an agitated state and said that \u201cJimmy was in trouble.\u201d While there, defendant received a page from Lawrence, then left with some of Goins\u2019 clothes. When he returned, defendant hid a nine-millimeter pistol at the foot of Goins\u2019 bed. She subsequently turned the weapon over to the investigators.\nNorth Carolina State Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Thomas Trochum testified that ten shell casings retrieved from the crime scene had been fired in the nine-millimeter pistol recovered from Goins\u2019 home. Pathologist Keith Lehman found seven gunshot wounds to McLean\u2019s head and two gunshot wounds to his right arm. He concluded that the cause of death was gunshot wounds to the head and added that gunpowder markings on McLean\u2019s face indicated that bullets were fired from a distance between one-half inch to three and one-half feet.\nThree witnesses testified during defendant\u2019s case in chief. Linda Dowdy, Lawrence\u2019s aunt, testified that defendant was at a cookout on 18 January 1997 and left with Lawrence in Lawrence\u2019s vehicle. She also testified that she had purchased the nine-millimeter pistol used in the shootings from a pawn shop and had given it to Lawrence.\nDefendant testified in his own behalf. He stated that he spent 18 January 1997 with Lawrence at a cookout at Lawrence\u2019s father\u2019s house. While there, Lawrence received three pages from a female. The female apparently was Morrison, who testified that she paged defendant several times earlier in the day. Lawrence called the female in response to the pages, then asked defendant to drive him home. After arriving at Lawrence\u2019s home, Lawrence asked defendant to ride with him to the house of a female with whom he was \u201csupposed to get a room.\u201d Defendant noticed that Lawrence \u201cwasn\u2019t acting right\u201d and had a gun. When defendant asked Lawrence why he had a weapon with him, Lawrence responded, \u201c[Y]ou never know. Anything can happen.\u201d Defendant then obtained his shotgun and placed it on the floor of Lawrence\u2019s vehicle.\nLawrence drove to a house near the woods and told defendant to get out. Defendant stood off to the side by himself with his shotgun while Lawrence knocked on the door. Morrison came out and spoke with Lawrence for approximately five minutes. Defendant \u201cplayed with the dirt\u201d during this time. The conversation became heated, and defendant heard Morrison tell Lawrence that she would leave with him. Morrison reentered the house, and Lawrence followed her. Defendant did not see anything until he heard the first shot. He then ran to the house, looked through the closed screen door, and saw Lawrence and Morrison \u201ctangling with each other.\u201d Defendant heard more shots as he ran back to Lawrence\u2019s vehicle where he \u201cfroze.\u201d Lawrence and Morrison emerged from the house, and Lawrence told defendant to drive because he wanted to talk with Morrison. Lawrence gave defendant directions to Lawrence\u2019s father\u2019s home. When they arrived, defendant was ready to leave, but Lawrence \u201cbegg[ed]\u201d defendant to wait and give him a ride to the hotel. After Lawrence spent approximately five minutes in his father\u2019s house, he, defendant and Morrison changed cars and left in defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nLawrence told defendant to take him to the Comfort Inn in Sanford, North Carolina, where Lawrence checked in and asked defendant to return his pistol to his father\u2019s house. Defendant hid the pistol in the back of his car, then left. Ten minutes later, in response to a page, defendant called Lawrence from his girlfriend\u2019s house. When Lawrence \u201cbeggfed]\u201d him to bring some clothes to the hotel room, defendant took some of his girlfriend\u2019s clothes to the Comfort Inn, then returned to his girlfriend\u2019s home. Defendant claimed that he was unaware of what happened to his shotgun after he initially arrived at the hotel and that he never entered the room registered to Lawrence. On cross-examination, defendant admitted that the last time he saw the nine-millimeter pistol was at his girlfriend\u2019s house.\nFinally, forensic psychologist James H. Hilkey testified on defendant\u2019s behalf. Dr. Hilkey diagnosed defendant as suffering from generalized anxiety disorder. He also discerned in defendant a pattern consistent with depressive personality disorder and traits characteristic of dependent personality disorder. He testified that defendant functions psychologically as a twelve-, thirteen- or fourteen-year old, especially in stressful situations, and is particularly susceptible to peer pressure. He believed the shots fired by Lawrence represented a pivotal point beyond which defendant found it difficult to extricate himself.\nSTATE\u2019S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW\nWe first address the single issue raised by the State. At trial, defendant requested the trial court to instruct the jury that, in order to convict him under the theory of aiding and abetting Lawrence, the jury must find defendant had the specific intent to commit the underlying offenses of kidnapping and burglary. As detailed below, the trial court instead instructed that, in order to convict defendant as an aider and abettor, the jury had to find he \u201cknowingly encouraged or aided\u201d Lawrence in the burglary and \u201cknowingly encouraged and aided\u201d Lawrence in the kidnapping. The Court of Appeals held that these instructions failed to convey the requisite intent and ordered a new trial.\nAt the close of all the evidence, defendant made a written request for the following instruction on specific intent:\nThat as to the charges of conspiracy, kidnapping and burglary and murder under all theories for any offense, that all references to ;the defendant and/or Jimmy Lawrence intending to commit the felonies be stricken and that the following be inserted:\nThat the defendant, William Rashad Lucas, intended to commit (the felony). That is he had the specific intent to (name elements of felony). It is not sufficient that the State prove that Jimmy Lawrence intentionally committed (the felony); rather the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that William Rashad Lucas, himself, had a specific intent to commit (the felony).\nThe trial court denied defendant\u2019s request and instead instructed the jury in pertinent part:\nNow, as to aiding and abetting in the charge of burglary and first- or second-degree kidnapping, a person may be guilty of a crime although he personally does not do any of the acts necessary to constitute that crime. A person who aids and abets another to commit a crime is guilty of that crime. You must clearly understand that if he does aid and abet, he is guilty of the crime just as if he had personally done all the acts necessary to constitute the crime. For you to find the Defendant guilty of another crime because of aiding and abetting the State must prove generally three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the crime was committed by some other person, in this case Jimmy Wayne Lawrence. Secondly, that the Defendant knowingly encouraged or aided the other person to commit that crime. And third, that the Defendant\u2019s actions or statements caused or contributed to the commission of the crime by Jimmy Wayne Lawrence. So as to burglary by aiding and abetting I charge that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date Jimmy Wayne Lawrence committed burglary and that the Defendant was actually present at the time the crime was committed and that the Defendant knowingly encouraged or aided Jimmy Wayne Lawrence to commit the crime and that in so doing the Defendant\u2019s actions or statements caused or contributed to the commission of the crime by Jimmy Wayne Lawrence, your duty would be to return a verdict of guilty of burglary by aiding and abetting. ... As to second-degree kidnapping by aiding and abetting, I charge that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date Jimmy Wayne Lawrence committed second-degree kidnapping and that the Defendant was actually present at the time the crime was committed and that the Defendant knowingly encouraged and aided Jimmy Wayne Lawrence to commit the crime and that in so doing the Defendant\u2019s actions or statements caused or contributed to the commission of the crime by Jimmy Wayne Lawrence, your duty would be to return a verdict of guilty of second-degree kidnapping by aiding and abetting.\n(Emphases added.)\nWhen a defendant makes a written request for an instruction that is timely, correct in law, and supported by the evidence, the trial court must give such an instruction. State v. Dodd, 330 N.C. 747, 412 S.E.2d 46 (1992). However, the trial court is not required to give a requested instruction verbatim, State v. Brown, 335 N.C. 477, 439 S.E.2d 589 (1994), so long as the instruction actually provided adequately conveys the substance of the requested instruction, State v. Green, 305 N.C. 463, 290 S.E.2d 625 (1982). Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court\u2019s instructions were correct in law and adequately conveyed the substance of defendant\u2019s request.\nWe review the instructions given here in conjunction with our holding in State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, 447 S.E.2d 727 (1994), overruled by State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 481 S.E.2d 44, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997), and cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 140 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1998), which was controlling at the time this case was tried. In Blankenship, the defendant raised a similar issue on appeal, and we held that the trial court\u2019s instructions on acting in concert were erroneous because they\npermitted] defendant to be convicted of premeditated and deliberated murder when he himself did not inflict the fatal wounds, did not share a common purpose to murder with the one who did inflict the fatal wounds and had no specific intent to kill the victims when the fatal wounds were inflicted.\nId. at 557, 447 S.E.2d at 736. Specifically, we noted that the doctrine of acting in concert requires that \u201cone may not be criminally responsible under the theory of acting in concert for a crime . . . which requires a specific intent, unless he is shown to have the requisite specific intent.\u201d Id. at 558, 447 S.E.2d at 736.\nThe principles set out in Blankenship regarding the doctrine of acting in concert subsequently were applied to the doctrine of aiding and abetting in State v. Buckner, 342 N.C. 198, 464 S.E.2d 414 (1995), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 828, 136 L. Ed. 2d 47 (1996), and State v. Allen, 339 N.C. 545, 453 S.E.2d 150 (1995), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). Although Blankenship has been overruled, as noted above, the overruling was not retroactive. State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 502 S.E.2d 563 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1124, 142 L. Ed. 2d 907 (1999). Because the instant offense occurred while Blankenship was in effect, we apply the Blankenship acting in concert rule to defendant\u2019s case. State v. Barrow, 350 N.C. 640, 517 S.E.2d 374 (1999).\nDefendant was convicted under a theory of aiding and abetting both first-degree burglary and second-degree kidnapping, each of which is a specific intent crime. State v. Moore, 315 N.C. 738, 743, 340 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1986) (\u201ckidnapping is a specific intent crime\u201d); State v. Warren, 313 N.C. 254, 262, 328 S.E.2d 256, 262 (1985) (one of the essential elements of first-degree burglary \u201cis that the breaking and entering must have been accompanied by the intent to commit a felony\u201d). Defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s instructions that he must have \u201cknowingly encouraged and aided\u201d and \u201cknowingly encouraged or aided\u201d Lawrence in the commission of the crimes were inadequate and misleading. Specifically, defendant contends that the instructions permitted the jury to find him guilty of burglary and kidnapping without specific findings that he individually possessed the requisite mens rea for those crimes. However, we have previously approved instructions similar to those given here. In Allen, decided while Blankenship was controlling, the trial court instructed the jury that to find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting, it would have to find in part that the defendant \u201cknowingly aided Thomas Mitchell\u201d in committing first-degree murder or involuntary manslaughter. State v. Allen, 339 N.C. at 555, 453 S.E.2d at 156. We found these instructions adequate and stated:\nDespite the court\u2019s erroneous use of the phrases \u201cshould have known\u201d and \u201creasonable grounds to believe,\u201d we conclude that the instructions as a whole conveyed that under the theory of aiding and abetting, Mitchell had to have the specific intent to kill the victim; defendant had to know this was Mitchell\u2019s intent when he handed him the gun; and defendant, with that knowledge, intended to aid Mitchell in committing the crime. The court conveyed this principle by its overall instructions and specifically by its use of the phrase \u201cknowingly aided.\u201d The probable interpretation of \u201cknowingly aided\u201d by the jury was that before it could find defendant guilty, it would have to determine that defendant knowingly participated in the crime based on an intent to assist Mitchell in committing it. We also note that this phrase is used to describe the intent element in the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions on aiding and abetting.\nId. at 558-59, 453 S.E.2d at 158 (citation omitted).\nCiting Allen, we reiterated this holding in Buckner, which also was decided while Blankenship was controlling. We stated:\nHere, the trial court used the phrase \u201cknowingly advised, instigated, encouraged, procured or aided the other person or persons to commit the crime.\u201d ... We conclude these instructions clearly convey that for the jury to find defendant guilty under the theory of aiding and abetting, defendant had to have knowingly participated in the murder based on an intent to assist Bivens in committing the crimes for which defendant was charged. The instructions were not erroneous, and defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nState v. Buckner, 342 N.C. at 227, 464 S.E.2d at 430.\nIn the case at bar, the trial court instructed the jury that it could convict defendant only if it found that, in addition to the other elements, defendant \u201cknowingly encouraged or aided\u201d Lawrence in committing first-degree burglary and \u201cknowingly encouraged and aided\u201d Lawrence in committing second-degree kidnapping. These instructions adequately conveyed the requirement that to convict under a theory of aiding and abetting, defendant had to have the specific intent to aid Lawrence in those offenses. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court\u2019s instructions were improper, and we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nDEFENDANT\u2019S CONDITIONAL PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW\nDefendant\u2019s first issue on review is whether the trial court erred when it denied his motion to dismiss the charges of burglary and kidnapping made at the close of the State\u2019s evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence. Defendant contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the convictions.\nWhen such a motion is made, the only issue for the trial court is \u201cwhether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being the perpetrator of the offense.\u201d State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65, 73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. State v. Vick, 341 N.C. 569, 461 S.E.2d 655 (1995). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the trial court should be concerned only with the sufficiency of the evidence, not with its weight. State v. Sokolowski, 351 N.C. 137, 522 S.E.2d 65 (1999). The court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give the State the benefit of every reasonable inference from that evidence. State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 464 S.E.2d 448 (1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1080 (1996). The defendant\u2019s evidence is not considered unless favorable to the State. State v. Taylor, 337 N.C. 597, 447 S.E.2d 360 (1994). Determination of any witness\u2019 credibility is for the jury, State v. Locklear, 322 N.C. 349, 368 S.E.2d 377 (1988), and contradictions and discrepancies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the State, State v. Gibson, 342 N.C. 142, 463 S.E.2d 193 (1995). Review of the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss is the same whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or both. State v. Jones, 303 N.C. 500, 279 S.E.2d 835 (1981).\nWe now apply the foregoing principles to the case at bar. The elements of first-degree burglary are: (1) breaking, (2) and entering, (3) at night, (4) into the dwelling, (5) of another, (6) that is occupied, (7) with the intent to commit a felony therein. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-51 (1999); State v. Singletary, 344 N.C. 95, 472 S.E.2d 895 (1996). Here, the felony underlying the burglary was murder. Although aiding and abetting may be found in a number of circumstances, see Thomas H. Thornburg, North Carolina Grimes: A Guidebook on the Elements of Grime (Institute of Gov\u2019t 4th ed. 1995), the elements of aiding and abetting for purposes of the instant case are that defendant: (1) was present at the scene of the crime, (2) intended to aid Lawrence in the crime if necessary, and (3) communicated to Lawrence his intent to provide aid. State v. Johnson, 310 N.C. 574, 313 S.E.2d 560 (1984). \u201cThe communication or intent to aid does not have to be shown by express words of the defendant but may be inferred from his actions and from his relation to the actual perpetrators.\u201d State v. Goode, 350 N.C. 247, 260, 512 S.E.2d 414, 422 (1999). In addition, \u201cthe motives tempting [him] to assist in the crime ... and [his] conduct before and after the crime are circumstances to be considered.\u201d State v. Birchfield, 235 N.C. 410, 414, 70 S.E.2d 5, 8 (1952). Moreover, \u201cwhen the bystander is a friend of the perpetrator and knows that his presence will be regarded by the perpetrator as an encouragement and protection, presence alone may be regarded as an encouragement.\u201d State v. Goode, 350 N.C. at 260, 512 S.E.2d at 422. Therefore, \u201ca defendant may be guilty of a crime by his mere presence if the perpetrator knows the friend\u2019s presence will be regarded as encouragement and protection.\u201d State v. Lemons, 348 N.C. 335, 377, 501 S.E.2d 309, 334 (1998), sentence vacated on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1018, 144 L. Ed. 2d 768 (1999). We have referred to this doctrine as the \u201cfriend\u201d exception to the general rule that a defendant\u2019s mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to establish guilt. Id.\nDefendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the specific intent to aid Lawrence in committing the murder underlying the burglary and that there was insufficient evidence that he communicated any intent to Lawrence. However, defendant\u2019s reliance on his own testimony to support this argument is misplaced. State v. Taylor, 337 N.C. 597, 447 S.E.2d 360 (unless favorable to the prosecution, defendant\u2019s evidence is not to be considered when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence). Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence reveals that defendant was Lawrence\u2019s friend and on 18 January 1997, spent the day with him at a cookout. Defendant, clad in black, accompanied Lawrence that night to McLean\u2019s home. When defendant saw that Lawrence was taking a pistol, defendant armed himself with a loaded sawed-off shotgun. After arriving at McLean\u2019s home, defendant stood by, holding his shotgun while Lawrence argued with Morrison and pointed his pistol at her. Defendant then followed Lawrence into McLean\u2019s home and stood inside the doorway, still holding his shotgun, while Lawrence shot McLean numerous times. As defendant drove the vehicle away from the scene of the crime with Lawrence and the abducted Morrison, he remarked that Lawrence should have killed Morrison also. Defendant later hid Lawrence\u2019s murder weapon at his girlfriend\u2019s home, and a search of his vehicle yielded several nine-millimeter rounds and twenty-gauge shotgun shells.\nFrom this evidence, the jury readily could have inferred that defendant had the requisite criminal intent to aid Lawrence in committing the felony of murder while inside the victim\u2019s residence and that such intent was communicated to Lawrence. This evidence also is sufficient to support an inference that defendant both encouraged and protected Lawrence. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the burglary charge.\nWe now turn to the charge of second-degree kidnapping. The elements of kidnapping are: (1) confinement, restraint, or removal from one place to another; (2) of a person; (3) without the person\u2019s consent; (4) for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a felony. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39(a) (1999). If the victim was released in a safe place and neither sexually assaulted nor seriously injured, the kidnapping is of the second degree. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39(b). In the case at bar, the trial court instructed the jury on defendant\u2019s removal of Morrison for the purpose of facilitating the felony of sexual assault. Because defendant was convicted under a theory of aiding and abetting, we apply the same tests as we did above to determine whether there was sufficient evidence for a trier of fact to find that defendant was at the scene of the kidnapping, that defendant intended to aid Lawrence in the kidnapping, and that he communicated this intent to Lawrence.\nAlthough defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the specific intent to aid Lawrence in removing Morrison for the purpose of facilitating a sexual assault and that there was insufficient evidence that he communicated any such intent to Lawrence, he again erroneously relies on his own testimony. State v. Taylor, 337 N.C. 597, 447 S.E.2d 360. Considered in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence shows that defendant left a cookout with Lawrence to travel to McLean\u2019s home while aware that Lawrence intended to get a hotel room with a female. Once at McLean\u2019s home, defendant watched Lawrence point a pistol at Morrison and demand that she leave with him. After Morrison refused, Lawrence and defendant followed her into McLean\u2019s home where Lawrence shot McLean. Lawrence then forced the barely clad Morrison, who was screaming and crying, to leave with him. As defendant drove from the scene of the murder to Lawrence\u2019s father\u2019s home, he stated to Lawrence, \u201c[Y]ou should have killed her too because she\u2019s going to tell it.\u201d At one point, Lawrence instructed defendant to \u201c[s]low down. We don\u2019t want to make it look like we\u2019re doing something wrong.\u201d When Lawrence went inside his father\u2019s home, defendant hovered behind the vehicle in which Morrison sat until they swapped vehicles. Defendant then drove Lawrence and Morrison to the Comfort Inn where he remained in the vehicle with Morrison while Lawrence registered. Defendant\u2019s loaded shotgun subsequently was brought into the rented room. After being paged by Lawrence, defendant later returned to the room to give Lawrence clothing for Morrison. This substantial evidence supports the conclusion that defendant had the requisite criminal intent to aid Lawrence in removing Morrison for the purpose of committing the felony of sexual assault and that his intent was communicated to Lawrence.\nAlthough defendant argues that this evidence at most shows that he assisted Lawrence in escorting Morrison to the hotel for a consensual sexual encounter with Lawrence, a reasonable juror readily could have inferred that defendant knew a sexual assault was in the offing. Testimony established that Morrison, barely dressed and in obvious distress, was removed at gunpoint from her home immediately after she saw her boyfriend murdered and was then kept in the vehicle while Lawrence checked in at the Comfort Inn. Soon thereafter, Morrison noticed that a loaded shotgun had been brought into the hotel room. Defendant\u2019s behavior both encouraged and protected Lawrence and also ensured that others would not witness or hinder the commission of the rape. Defendant\u2019s claim that he was unaware a sexual assault would take place is not plausible, and the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the kidnapping charge. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next contends that he is entitled to a new trial on the kidnapping charge because the trial court instructed the jury on a theory not alleged in the indictment. Defendant did not make a contemporaneous objection; therefore, we review the instructions for plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), (c)(4). Under this standard, defendant must show that the instructions were erroneous and that absent the erroneous instructions, a jury probably would have returned a different verdict. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (1999); State v. White, 321 N.C. 52, 361 S.E.2d 724 (1987). The error in the instructions must be \u201cso fundamental that it denied the defendant a fair trial and quite probably tilted the scales against him.\u201d State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 62, 431 S.E.2d 188, 193 (1993). We have observed that \u201c \u2018[i]t is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court.\u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 661, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154, 52 L. Ed. 2d 203, 212 (1977)).\nAs a general rule, \u201can indictment couched in the language of the statute is sufficient to charge the statutory offense.\u201d State v. Blackmon, 130 N.C. App. 692, 699, 507 S.E.2d 42, 46, cert. denied, 349 N.C. 531, 526 S.E.2d 470 (1998). Although defendant was convicted of aiding and abetting second-degree kidnapping, he was indicted for first-degree kidnapping. In order properly to indict a defendant for first-degree kidnapping, the State must allege both the essential elements of kidnapping as provided in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39(a) and at least one of the elements of first-degree kidnapping listed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39(b). State v. Bell, 311 N.C. 131, 316 S.E.2d 611 (1984). Section 14-39 of the North Carolina General Statutes provides:\n(a) Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person, or any other person under the age of 16 years without the consent of a parent or legal custodian of such person, shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint or removal is for the purpose of:\n(1) Holding such other person for a ransom or as a hostage or using such other person as a shield; or\n(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony; or\n(3) Doing serious bodily harm to or terrorizing the person so confined, restrained or removed or any other person; or\n(4) Holding such other person in involuntary servitude in violation of G.S. 14-43.2.\n(b) There shall be two degrees of kidnapping as defined by subsection (a). If the person kidnapped either was not released by the defendant in a safe place or had been seriously injured or sexually assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the first degree and is punishable as a Class C felony. If the person kidnapped was released in a safe place by the defendant and had not been seriously injured or sexually assaulted, the offense is kidnapping in the second degree and is punishable as a Class E felony.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39(a), (b).\nThe indictment in defendant\u2019s case provided:\nThe jurors for the State upon their oath present that on or about the date of offense shown and in the county named above the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did kidnap Gwen Morrison, a person who had attained the age of 16 years, by unlawfully confining her without her consent, and for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a felony, to wit: murder, sexual assault and for terrorizing the victim. Ms. Morrison was released in a safe place, and was sexually assaulted.\n(Emphasis added.) However, the trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:\nAs to first-degree kidnapping \u2014 he is also accused of first-degree kidnapping on two theories: One as the principal and the other as an aider and abettor. As to first-degree kidnapping for you to find the Defendant guilty of first-degree kidnapping the State must prove five elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the Defendant unlawfully removed a person from one place to another. Second, that the person did not consent to this removal. A consent obtained by fear is not consent. Third, that the Defendant remove that person for the purpose of commission of a felony sexual assault. . . . Fourth, that this removal was a separate, complete act independent of and apart from a sexual assault. And fifth, that the person had been sexually assaulted. So I charge if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the Defendant unlawfully, that is, the Defendant himself unlawfully removed Gwen Morrison from one place to another and that she did not consent to this removal and that this removal was done for the purpose of commission of a felonious sexual assault and that this removal was a separate complete act independent of and apart from sexual assault and that Gwen Morrison had been sexually assaulted, your duty would be to return a verdict of guilty of first-degree kidnapping as principal. . . . Second-degree kidnapping differs from first-degree kidnapping only in that it is unnecessary for the State to prove that the person kidnapped had been sexually assaulted. So I charge that if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the Defendant unlawfully removed Gwen Morrison from one place to another and she did not consent to this removal and that this removal was done for the purpose of commission of a sexual assault and that this removal was a separate complete act independent and apart from the intended sexual assault, your duty would be to return a verdict of guilty of second-degree kidnapping as a principal.\n(Emphases added.)\nWe have long held that \u201cit is error, generally prejudicial, for the trial judge to permit a jury to convict upon some abstract theory not supported by the bill of indictment.\u201d State v. Taylor, 301 N.C. 164, 170, 270 S.E.2d 409, 413 (1980). For instance, in State v. Dammons, 293 N.C. 263, 237 S.E.2d 834 (1977), the defendant was indicted for kidnapping on a theory of removal for purposes of terrorizing and feloniously assaulting the victim. However, the trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty if he confined, restrained or removed the victim for the purposes of holding the victim for ransom, holding the victim hostage, sexually assaulting the victim, or facilitating flight. We noted that \u201c[t]hese theories of the crime were neither supported by the evidence nor charged in the bill of indictment\u201d and held that the instructions constituted prejudicial error. Id. at 272, 237 S.E.2d at 841. Subsequently, in State v. Taylor, the defendant was indicted on a theory of removal for the purposes of facilitating defendant\u2019s commission of the felony of rape and subsequent flight. The trial court, however, charged the jury on theories of confinement, removal or restraint for the purposes of facilitating the defendant\u2019s flight from apprehension for another crime or to obtain the use of the victim\u2019s vehicle. The Court in the Taylor opinion did not state whether the defendant lodged an objection to the trial court\u2019s instructions or what standard of review was applied. We noted that the indictment charged \u201cremoving\u201d while the instruction erroneously cited \u201cconfined\u201d and \u201crestrained\u201d and observed that while confinement and restraint might be supported by the evidence, those theories were not charged in the indictment. However, our extended analysis focused on the purpose for which the kidnapping was committed. We held:\nIt was prejudicial error, therefore, for the trial court to instruct with respect to \u201canother crime\u201d and to refer to \u201c[obtaining] the use of her vehicle,\u201d the latter not being charged in the bill of indictment. ... Its failure to instruct on the theory charged in the bill of indictment, in addition to its instructions on theories not charged, constitutes prejudicial error entitling defendant to a new trial on the charge of kidnapping.\nState v. Taylor, 301 N.C. at 171, 270 S.E.2d at 413-14. Likewise, in State v. Brown, 312 N.C. 237, 321 S.E.2d 856 (1984), the defendant was indicted on theories of confinement, removal and restraint for the purpose of facilitating the commission of the felony of attempted rape. The indictment also alleged that the defend\u00e1nt did not release the victim in a safe place. However, the trial court charged the jury on theories of confinement, removal and restraint for the purpose of terrorizing the victim. In addition, the trial court instructed that to convict defendant of first-degree kidnapping, the jury must find that the defendant sexually assaulted the victim rather than that he failed to release her in a safe place, as alleged in the indictment. Noting that we were \u201cespecially concerned by the \u2018terrorism\u2019 instruction, for the State presented absolutely no evidence directed to proof of the theory that defendant kidnapped Ms. Noles for the purpose of terrorizing her,\u201d we concluded that\nthe judge\u2019s instructions permitted the jury in this case to predicate guilt on theories of the crime which were not charged in the bill of indictment and which were, in one instance, not supported by the evidence at trial. We therefore hold that under the factual circumstances of this case, there was \u201cplain error\u201d in the jury instructions as that concept was defined in Odom and defendant must therefore receive a new trial on the first-degree kidnapping charge.\nId. at 249, 321 S.E.2d at 863. Finally, in State v. Tucker, 317 N.C. 532, 346 S.E.2d 417 (1986), the defendant was indicted on a theory of removal for purposes of facilitating the commission of the felonies of first-degree rape and first-degree sexual offense, but the trial court instructed the jury on a theory of restraint. We held that under a plain error analysis, \u201c[i]n light of the highly conflicting evidence in the instant kidnapping case on the unlawful removal and restraint issues, we think the instructional error might have ... \u2018 \u201ctilted the scales\u201d and caused the jury to reach its verdict convicting the defendant.\u201d \u2019 Id. at 540, 346 S.E.2d at 422 (quoting State v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1986)).\nBecause the indictment here charged confinement, the instructions given by the trial court based on the theory of removal were erroneous. However, we find that the error was not prejudicial. The cases cited above are distinguishable from the case at bar. In Dammons, Brown and Taylor, the trial court instructed the jury on the defendant\u2019s underlying intent or purpose in committing the kidnapping, which in each case differed from that alleged in the indictment. In the instant case, however, defendant was indicted for kidnapping for the purposes of facilitating the commission of \u201cmurder, sexual assault and for terrorizing the victim,\u201d and the trial court instructed the jury that defendant\u2019s purpose in the kidnapping was to commit sexual assault, either as a principal or as an aider and abettor. Thus, unlike Dammons, Brown and Taylor, this purpose did not differ from that listed in the indictment. In addition, while the evidence in Tucker was highly conflicting, the evidence of confinement, restraint and removal was compelling in the case at bar. After examining the instructions and the record in its entirety, we cannot say that any defect in the instructions was \u201c \u2018a \u201cfundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done.\u201d \u2019 \u201d State v. Odom, 307 N.C. at 660, 300 S.E.2d at 378 (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir.) (footnote omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513 (1982)), quoted in State v. Robinson, 346 N.C. 586, 603, 488 S.E.2d 174, 185 (1997); see also State v. Clinding, 92 N.C. App. 555, 562-63, 374 S.E.2d 891, 895 (1989) (defendant argued that the trial court committed plain error in instructing the jury on restraint when the indictment alleged only removal and confinement as theories of kidnapping, and the court held that \u201c[b]ecause the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt in this case is overwhelming,\u201d including \u201cthe testimonies of five eyewitnesses, and a confession by the defendant explaining his involvement in the crimes, suffice it to say that we do not believe that a different result would likely have been reached had this instruction not been given\u201d). Accordingly, we conclude that a different result would not have been reached had the trial court instructed on confinement rather than removal and hold that the erroneous instructions do not constitute prejudicial error.\nAlthough our holding in Tucker was intended to encourage trial courts to exercise care in instructing juries in kidnapping cases, we note that issues relating to such instructions continue to arise. In State v. Raynor, 128 N.C. App. 244, 495 S.E.2d 176 (1998), the indictment alleged restraint, but the instructions allowed a conviction upon either restraint or removal. No objection was raised, and the Court of Appeals found no plain error, holding that the evidence supported conviction on either theory. In State v. Dominie, 134 N.C. App. 445, 518 S.E.2d 32 (1999), the indictment alleged removal, and the trial court instructed that the jury could convict upon a finding of removal, restraint or confinement. The State confessed error on the issue, and the Court of Appeals reversed, citing Tucker. The Court of Appeals in Dominie did not state whether an objection was raised at trial. Most recently, in State v. Lancaster, 137 N.C. App. 37, 527 S.E.2d 61, disc. rev. denied in part and allowed in part, 352 N.C. 680, \u2014 S.E.2d - (2000), the indictment charged kidnapping by confining, restraining and removing. The court instructed on kidnapping by confinement, restraint or removal. In the absence of an objection, the Court of Appeals applied plain error analysis and found no error, holding that the evidence allowed a conviction under any of the theories.\nBecause kidnapping is an ongoing offense that often begins as a restraint or confinement and segues into a removal, State v. White, 127 N.C. App. 565, 492 S.E.2d 48 (1997), a prosecutor may encounter problems in drafting an indictment that properly describes the offense and gives adequate notice to the defendant. The trial court may face similar difficulties in preparing instructions for the jury. Although we acknowledge these concerns, we reaffirm our holding in Tucker, and we again adjure the trial courts to take particular care to ensure that the jury instructions are consistent with the theory presented in the indictment and with the evidence presented at trial.\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial on the burglary and kidnapping charges because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on defendant\u2019s \u201cmere presence.\u201d As above, because defendant did not object to the instructions at trial, we review the instructions for plain error. N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(2), (c)(4).\nThe trial court gave the following instructions during its charge to the jury:\nNow, as to aiding and abetting in the charge of burglary and first- or second-degree kidnapping, a person may be guilty of a crime although he personally does not do any of the acts necessary to constitute that crime. A person who aids and abets another to commit a crime is guilty of that crime. You must clearly understand that if he does aid and abet, he is guilty of the crime just as if he had personally done all the acts necessary to constitute the crime. For you to find the Defendant guilty of another crime because of aiding and abetting the State must prove generally three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: First, that the crime was committed by some other person, in this case Jimmy Wayne Lawrence. Second, that the Defendant knowingly encouraged or aided the other person to commit that crime. And third, that the Defendant\u2019s actions or statements caused or contributed to the commission of the crime by Jimmy Wayne Lawrence.\nThese instructions reflect almost verbatim the pattern jury instructions for aiding and abetting. N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 202.20 (1998). However, defendant contends that the court also should have included parenthetical language provided in the pattern instructions as follows:\n(A person is not guilty of a crime merely because he is present at the scene, even though he may silently approve of the crime or secretly intend to assist in its commission. To be guilty he must aid or actively encourage the person committing the crime, or in some way communicate to this person his intention to assist in its commission.)\nId.\nThere is no question that a defendant\u2019s mere presence at the scene of a crime will not support a finding of guilt of the crime charged. State v. Walden, 306 N.C. 466, 476, 293 S.E.2d 780, 786-87 (1982) (\u201cIt remains the law that one may not be found to be an aider and abettor, and thus guilty as a principal, solely because he is present when a crime is committed.\u201d).\n\u201cTo render one who does not actually participate in the commission of the crime guilty of the offense committed, there must be some evidence to show that he, by word or deed, gave active encouragement to the perpetrator of the crime or by his conduct made it known to such perpetrator that he was standing by to render assistance when and if it should become necessary.\u201d\nState v. Johnson, 310 N.C. 574, 579, 313 S.E.2d 560, 564 (1984) (quoting State v. Ham, 238 N.C. 94, 97, 76 S.E.2d 346, 348 (1953)) (alteration in original). There is no obligation, however, to give an instruction on mere presence where the evidence is undisputed that the defendant participated in the crime and was not just a bystander. State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 520 S.E.2d 545 (1999) (defendant was not entitled to an instruction on mere presence where there was undisputed evidence that he actively participated in the kidnapping and robbery of the victim), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245, 147 L. Ed. 2d 965 (2000); State v. Bonnett, 348 N.C. 417, 502 S.E.2d 563 (trial court correctly did not instruct jury on mere presence where evidence overwhelmingly showed defendant was not merely present at the murder scene but that defendant agreed to the robbery and murder, supplied the murder weapon, and actively participated in stealing the money box); State v. Harvell, 334 N.C. 356, 432 S.E.2d 125 (1993) (trial court did not err in giving pattern instruction that did not include a provision on mere presence where defendant followed codefendant into group with a steel pipe and made it known to codefendant that he was willing to lend any assistance necessary as codefendant shot the victim).\nAs in the cases cited above, there is undisputed evidence that defendant was more than merely present at the scene of the offenses. That evidence, detailed previously, showed that defendant armed himself to accompany his friend Lawrence, stood by with his loaded weapon ready for use while Lawrence abducted Morrison after shooting her boyfriend numerous times, commented on Lawrence\u2019s failure to kill Morrison, drove the getaway car, guarded Morrison, brought clothes to Lawrence for Morrison to wear, and hid Lawrence\u2019s murder weapon. Defendant did not deny any of this evidence, and his contention that it amounts to \u201cmere presence\u201d is unpersuasive.\nMoreover, when read as a whole, the instructions adequately convey the principle that defendant\u2019s presence alone is not sufficient to support a conviction for burglary or kidnapping as an aider and abettor. Given these instructions, a reasonable juror could not have found that defendant\u2019s mere presence at the scene of the crimes was sufficient for a conviction. State v. Hammonds, 301 N.C. 713, 272 S.E.2d 856 (1981) (trial court\u2019s instructions emphasizing that an aider and abettor has to knowingly advise, encourage, instigate or aid another in committing a crime were sufficient to illustrate that defendant\u2019s presence alone was not sufficient to convict). This assignment of error is overruled.\nDEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF\nDefendant contends in his motion for appropriate relief that the court-imposed enhancements of his burglary and kidnapping sentences must be vacated because North Carolina\u2019s firearm enhancement statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A (1999), is unconstitutional on its face and as applied to him. Specifically, defendant argues that the statute unconstitutionally authorizes imposition of an enhanced sentence without requiring submission of the enhancing factors to a jury and without requiring proof of those factors beyond a reasonable doubt. In addition, defendant asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentencing enhancements because none of the indictments alleged any elements set out in the applicable statute.\nSection 15A-1340.16A, North Carolina\u2019s firearm enhancement statute, provides:\n(a) If a person is convicted of a Class A, Bl, B2, C, D, or E felony and the court finds that the person used, displayed, or threatened to use or display a firearm at the time of the felony, the court shall increase the minimum term of imprisonment to which the person is sentenced by 60 months. The court shall not suspend the 60-month minimum term of imprisonment imposed as an enhanced sentence under this section and shall not place any person sentenced under this section on probation for the enhanced sentence.\n(b) Subsection (a) of this section does not apply in any of the following circumstances:\n(1) The person is not sentenced to an active term of imprisonment.\n(2) The evidence of the use, display, or threatened use or display of a firearm is needed to prove an element of the underlying Class A, Bl, B2, C, D, or E felony.\n(3) The person did not actually possess a firearm about his or her person.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A.\nAt defendant\u2019s trial, the jury returned verdicts finding defendant guilty of both first-degree burglary and second-degree kidnapping. First-degree burglary is punishable as a class D felony, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-52 (1999), and second-degree kidnapping is punishable as a class E felony, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39. At sentencing, the trial court found defendant to have a prior record level of I. Pursuant to section 15A-1340.17, which provides in pertinent part the punishment limits for each class of offense and prior record level, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(c), (e) (1999), the trial court sentenced defendant to 64 to 86 months\u2019 imprisonment for first-degree burglary and 25 to 39 months\u2019 imprisonment for second-degree kidnapping. The trial court then added 60 months to each sentence pursuant to the firearm enhancement statute, which resulted in the imposition of 124 to 146 months\u2019 imprisonment for the burglary and 85 to 99 months\u2019 imprisonment for the kidnapping.\nOur review of the legality of these sentences is both guided and bound by two recent opinions of the United States Supreme Court. In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 143 L. Ed. 2d 311 (1999), the defendant was indicted, in part, for carjacking or aiding and abetting that offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2119. That statute authorizes a maximum penalty of fifteen years\u2019 imprisonment upon conviction; however, higher penalties may be imposed when the offense results in serious bodily injury or death. The defendant\u2019s indictment made no reference to the numbered subsections of the statute that specify the offense level, nor did it allege any of the factors set out in those subsections that authorize the sentencing court to impose an enhanced sentence. However, because a preponderance of the evidence established that one of the victims had suffered serious bodily injury, the district court sentenced defendant under a twenty-five-year enhancement provision of the statute. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the defendant\u2019s sentence, but the United States Supreme Court reversed.\nFocusing on the role of the jury and the distinction between an \u201celement\u201d of an offense and a \u201csentencing consideration,\u201d the Supreme Court expressed concern \u201cwhether recognizing an unlimited legislative power to authorize determinations setting ultimate sentencing limits without a jury would invite erosion of the jury\u2019s function to a point against which a line must necessarily be drawn.\u201d Id. at 244, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 326. The Court determined that the \u201cdiminishment of the jury\u2019s significance by removing control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range\u201d would raise serious constitutional questions under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 248, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 329. Accordingly, the Court construed 18 U.S.C. \u00a7 2119 \u201cas establishing three separate offenses by the specification of distinct elements\u201d and held that each element \u201cmust be charged by indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to a jury for its verdict.\u201d Id. at 252, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 331.\nSubsequently, the Supreme Court extended this holding to the states in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000). In Apprendi, the defendant fired several bullets into the home of an African-American family. The defendant was indicted, in part, for second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose in violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 2C:39-4a. Under New Jersey state law, a second-degree offense is punishable by imprisonment between five and ten years. However, New Jersey has enacted a hate crime law, N.J. Stat. Ann. \u00a7 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 2000), which authorizes an extended imprisonment term between ten and twenty years for second-degree offenses committed for the purpose of intimidating individuals on the basis of their race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity. The trial court applied this enhancement in the defendant\u2019s case after finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant\u2019s actions were undertaken for the purpose of intimidation. Although the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey and the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed, the United States Supreme Court reversed.\nAs in Jones, the Court analyzed the difference between an \u201celement\u201d of an offense and a \u201csentencing factor\u201d and concluded that the key inquiry is, \u201c[D]oes the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury\u2019s guilty verdict?\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 457. The Court answered this question in .the affirmative, stating that \u201cthe effect of New Jersey\u2019s sentencing \u2018enhancement\u2019 here is unquestionably to turn a second-degree offense into a first-degree offense, under the State\u2019s own criminal code.\u201d Id.\n\u201c[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d The Fourteenth Amendment commands the same answer in this case involving a state statute.\nId. at 476, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 446 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 326 n.6). Accordingly, the Supreme Court held: \u201cOther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Id. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455.\nJones and Apprendi apply to the case at bar only if the statute in question \u201cincreases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.\u201d Id. The North Carolina sentencing scheme is structurally unlike that of either New Jersey or the United States. With only a few exceptions, such as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-17, North Carolina criminal statutes setting out the elements of offenses do not specify a punishment. Instead, the statutes define the class of felony. Reference must then be made to article 81B of section 15A of the General Statutes, which contains the sentencing charts. The range of possible minimum sentences becomes known only when the sentencing court determines the defendant\u2019s prior record level and whether the offense was mitigated or aggravated, then cross-checks the sentencing grid found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(c) to determine the available range of minimum sentences. Once the minimum sentence is selected from that range, the sentencing court refers to another chart found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(e) to determine the maximum sentence corresponding to the minimum sentence that has been imposed. See Stevens H. Clarke, Law of Sentencing, Probation and Parole in North Carolina (Institute of Gov\u2019t 2d ed. 1997).\nBecause many of the factors that are considered in determining a defendant\u2019s sentencing range are uncertain or unknown in the early stages of a criminal prosecution, most trial courts routinely have followed a cautious course and advised defendants at arraignment that the maximum sentence is that which could be imposed if the defendant were in the highest criminal history category and the offense were aggravated. Such prudence is entirely sensible, and we endorse it. Any estimate of a sentence based on preliminary and incomplete information will be wrong if, as frequently happens, additional facts surface that have an impact on sentencing detrimental to the defendant. Similarly, most trial courts follow a comparable procedure when a negotiated plea is entered. Although the parties may have agreed to the sentence that will actually, be imposed, the court must nevertheless again advise the defendant of the maximum possible sentence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(a)(6) (1999). Warning a defendant of the harshest possible outcome ensures that the defendant is fully advised of the implications of the charge against him or her and, if pleading, is aware of the possible consequences of the plea. We believe this approach, focusing on the theoretical maximum sentence any defendant could receive rather than the actual maximum sentence a particular defendant is facing, is also proper for determining the statutory maximum sentence for an offense. Accordingly, we hold that, unless the statute describing the offense explicitly sets out a maximum sentence, the statutory maximum sentence for a criminal offense in North Carolina is that which results from: (1) findings that the defendant falls into the highest criminal history category for the applicable class offense and that the offense was aggravated, followed by (2) a decision by the sentencing court to impose the highest possible corresponding minimum sentence from the ranges presented in the chart found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(c). The statutory maximum sentence is then found by reference to the chart set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(e).\nIn the present case, defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, a class D felony. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-52. Although defendant\u2019s prior record level was I and his actual sentencing range was toward the low end of the sentencing tables, we determine the statutory maximum sentence, as opposed to defendant\u2019s maximum sentence, by assuming that the offense was aggravated and that defendant had a criminal history level of VI. Accordingly, the highest possible minimum sentence for defendant is 183 months. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(c). Reference to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(e) reveals that the corresponding statutory maximum sentence is 229 months. However, application of the firearm enhancement yields an enhanced minimum sentence of 243 months (183 months plus the 60-month enhancement), and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(e) then provides an enhanced maximum sentence of 301 months, which exceeds the statutory maximum of 229 months. A similar analysis of defendant\u2019s second-degree kidnapping offense shows that, despite defendant\u2019s prior record level of I, application of the firearm enhancement results in an enhanced maximum sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum.\nUnder this analysis, it is apparent that the enhancement provision of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A \u201cincreases the penalty for [defendant\u2019s] crime[s] beyond the prescribed statutory maximum.\u201d Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455. According to our analysis of the process used to determine the statutory maximum sentence for any given offense, the addition of sixty months to the longest minimum sentence results in the addition of at least sixty months to the corresponding statutory maximum sentence, a process which results in an enhanced maximum exceeding that set out in the sentencing charts for a defendant in the highest criminal history category convicted of an aggravated offense. This result is forbidden by Jones and Apprendi unless the use of a firearm under the statute is charged in the indictment, proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and submitted to the jury. Accordingly, we hold that in every instance where the State seeks an enhanced sentence pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A, it must allege the statutory factors supporting the enhancement in an indictment, which may be the same indictment that charges the underlying offense, and submit those factors to the jury. If the jury returns a guilty verdict that includes these factors, the trial judge shall make the finding set out in the statute and impose an enhanced sentence.\nWe must acknowledge that our analysis does not encompass the most serious offenses. Regardless of the firearm enhancement, life without parole and death are the only sentences available for defendants convicted of a class A offense, and life without parole is the only sentence available for a defendant convicted of a class B1 offense whose prior record level is V or VI. Nevertheless, should a prosecutor wish to have an enhancement on the record for a judge conducting a review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1380.5 or for other purposes, the enhancement must be pleaded by indictment and proven as set out in the body of this opinion.\nBecause defendant was not charged in an indictment with the statutory factors supporting an enhancement, nor were those factors submitted to the jury, the trial court improperly imposed an enhanced sentence. We remand to the trial court for imposition of an unenhanced sentence in accordance with this opinion.\nWe note that,. as in Apprendi, this holding does not declare N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A unconstitutional, but instead requires that the State meet the requirements set out in Jones and Apprendi in order to apply the enhancement provisions of the statute. We further hold that this ruling applies to cases in which the defendants have not been indicted as of the certification date of this opinion and to cases that are now pending on direct review or are not yet final. State v. Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 523 S.E.2d 663 (2000); Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1987).\nTo prevent future confusion, we also take this opportunity to address an issue raised by the State that might otherwise come before this Court in future cases. Defendant was convicted of first-degree burglary, a class D felony. The offense was neither mitigated nor aggravated, and defendant\u2019s criminal history category was at level I. The trial court properly determined a sentence of a minimum of 64 months\u2019 imprisonment and a maximum of 86 months\u2019 imprisonment. However, when the trial court enhanced the sentence, it added 60 months to both the minimum and maximum sentence, yielding 124 to 146 months\u2019 imprisonment. The trial court followed the same procedure with defendant\u2019s kidnapping sentence. However, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A provides only that the 60 months are added to the minimum sentence. Accordingly, we believe that the General Assembly intended that the trial court add 60 months to the minimum sentence, then refer to the sentencing charts to determine the corresponding maximum sentence. In the case at bar for example, an enhanced minimum sentence of 124 months for kidnapping would yield an enhanced maximum sentence of 158 months, rather than 146 months.\nBased upon the foregoing, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the issue raised by the State on appeal and hold that the trial court properly instructed as to defendant\u2019s specific intent to commit first-degree kidnapping .and second-degree burglary. As to defendant\u2019s additional issues raised in his petition for discretionary review, we find no error. As to defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief seeking review of his enhanced sentences for first-degree kidnapping and second-degree burglary, we vacate the sentences imposed and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED IN PART; NO ERROR IN PART; SENTENCES VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR NEW SENTENCING HEARING IN PART.\n. As discussed previously, the \u201cmere presence\u201d rule is subject to an exception where a friend\u2019s presence provides encouragement and protection to the perpetrator. State v. Lemons, 348 N.C. 335, 501 S.E.2d 309.\n. To illustrate, consider a defendant convicted of a class E felony. Assuming an aggravated offense and a criminal history category of VI, the defendant\u2019s longest minimum sentence is 74 months according to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(c). Cross-reference to the table in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(e) then yields a corresponding statutory maximum of 98 months. If the firearm enhancement is applied, the longest minimum sentence becomes 134 months (74 months plus 60 months), and the corresponding maximum becomes 170 months, which exceeds the 98-month statutory maximum sentence. Another example is a defendant convicted of an aggravated class B1 offense who falls into criminal history category IV, the highest category for any class offense that does not automatically receive a life sentence upon conviction. A judge following our analysis would determine that the statutory maximum sentence is the sum of 480 months, 20% of 480 months, and 9 months, or 585 months. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.17(c), (el). This sentence appears to be the highest maximum nonlife sentence contemplated by the sentencing tables. However, if the firearm enhancement is added, the enhanced maximum sentence would be the sum of 540 months (480 months plus the 60-month enhancement), 20% of 540 months, and 9 months, or 657 months, a sentence exceeding any found in the sentencing tables.", "type": "majority", "author": "EDMUNDS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy A. Cooper, Attorney General, by K.D. Sturgis and Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State-appellant and -appellee.", "Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Danielle M. Carman, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant and -appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM RASHAD LUCAS\nNo. 278PA00\n(Filed 20 July 2001)\n1. Aiding and Abetting\u2014 instructions \u2014 specific intent\nThe Court of Appeals erred by holding improper a trial court\u2019s instructions on aiding and abetting a kidnapping and burglary where the offense occurred when State v. Blankenship, 337 N.C. 543, was in effect and the court instructed the jury that it had to find that defendant \u201cknowingly encouraged or aided\u201d in the burglary and kidnapping in order to convict. These instructions are similar to those approved in State v. Allen, 339 N.C. 545, and adequately convey the requirement that defendant had to have the specific intent to aid in the underlying offenses.\n2. Burglary\u2014 aiding and abetting \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\u2014 underlying murder \u2014 intent\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of first-degree burglary by aiding and abetting where defendant contended that there was insufficient evidence that he possessed the specific intent to aid the principal (Lawrence) in committing the murder underlying the burglary, but defendant mistakenly relied upon his own testimony. Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence showed that defendant was a friend of Lawrence and spent the day with him at a cookout; defendant, clad in black, accompanied Lawrence that night to the home of the victim (McLean), arming himself with a sawed-off shotgun after seeing that Lawrence was carrying a pistol; defendant stood by with his shotgun at McLean\u2019s home while Lawrence argued with his former girlfriend, Morrison; defendant followed Lawrence into McLean\u2019s home and stood inside the doorway with his shotgun while Lawrence shot McLean numerous times; defendant drove the vehicle away from the scene with Lawrence and the abducted Morrison, remarking that Lawrence should have killed Morrison also; defendant hid the murder weapon; and a search of defendant\u2019s vehicle yielded several nine-millimeter rounds and twenty-gauge shotgun shells.\n3. Kidnapping\u2014 aiding and abetting \u2014 intent\u2014sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge of kidnapping by aiding and abetting where, although defendant argued that the evidence at most showed that he assisted in escorting the victim to a hotel for a consensual sexual encounter, a reasonable juror could have inferred that defendant knew a sexual assault was in the offing; testimony established that the victim, barely dressed and in obvious distress, was removed at gunpoint from her home immediately after she saw her boyfriend murdered and was then kept in the vehicle while the principal (Lawrence) checked in at the hotel; and the victim noticed soon after that a loaded shotgun had been brought into the hotel room. Defendant\u2019s behavior both encouraged and protected Lawrence and also ensured that others would not witness or hinder the commission of the rape.\n4. Kidnapping\u2014 instructions \u2014 theory not alleged in indictment \u2014 not prejudicial or plain error\nThe trial court erred in a kidnapping prosecution by instructing the jury on removal when the indictment alleged only confinement. However, the erroneous instructions did not constitute prejudicial or plain error where the court\u2019s instructions on purpose did not differ from that listed in the indictment, the evidence of confinement, restraint and removal was compelling, and a different result would not have been reached by the jury had the trial court instructed on confinement rather than removal.\n5. Aiding and Abetting\u2014 instructions \u2014 mere presence\nThere was no plain error in a prosecution for first-degree burglary and first-degree kidnapping as an aider and abettor where defendant contends that the court should have instructed on \u201cmere presence.\u201d There is no obligation to instruct on mere presence when the evidence is undisputed that defendant participated in the crime and was not just a bystander. Moreover, read as a whole, the instructions adequately conveyed the principle that defendant\u2019s presence alone is not sufficient to support a conviction for burglary or kidnapping as an aider and abettor.\n6. Sentencing\u2014 firearms enhancement \u2014 determination of maximum sentence\nA first-degree burglary and kidnapping defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief in the Supreme Court was granted, his sentences were vacated, and the matter was remanded where the trial court\u2019s application of the firearms enhancement provision of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A added sixty months to the longest minimum sentence, resulting in the addition of at least sixty months to the corresponding statutory maximum sentence and an enhanced maximum exceeding that set out in the sentencing charts for a defendant in the highest criminal history category convicted of an aggravated offense. In every instance where the State seeks an enhanced sentence pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16A, it must allege the statutory factors supporting the enhancement in the indictment, which may be the same indictment that charges the underlying offense, and submit those factors to the jury. Although this defendant\u2019s prior record level and actual sentencing range was toward the low end of the sen-tenting tables, the statutory maximum is determined by assuming that the offense was aggravated and that defendant had a criminal history level of VI. It was noted that the General Assembly intended that the trial court add 60 months to the minimum sentence and then refer to the sentencing charts to determine the corresponding maximum sentence.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 138 N.C. App. 226, 530 S.E.2d 602 (2000), finding error in judgments entered 24 February 1998 by Bowen, J., in Superior Court, Harnett County, and ordering a new trial. On 12 July 2000, the Supreme Court allowed defendant\u2019s conditional petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. On 5 October 2000, the Supreme Court agreed to hear defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief and ordered both parties to file supplemental briefs. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 February 2001.\nRoy A. Cooper, Attorney General, by K.D. Sturgis and Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State-appellant and -appellee.\nStaples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Danielle M. Carman, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellant and -appellee." }, "file_name": "0568-01", "first_page_order": 616, "last_page_order": 647 }