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LYLE CLINTON MAY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Justice.\nDefendant was indicted 3 November 1997 for the first-degree murders of Valeri Sue Riddle and Kelley Mark Laird, Jr. On 12 March 1999, a jury found defendant guilty of both charges. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury recommended a sentence of death for each murder, and the trial court entered judgments accordingly.\nAfter consideration of the assignments of error brought forward on appeal by defendant and a thorough review of the transcript of the proceedings, the record on appeal, the briefs, and oral arguments, we find no error meriting reversal of defendant\u2019s convictions or sentences.\nOn 8 July 1997, Diane Boussois was at her home in Asheville. Her son, Darrell Godfrey, was entertaining guests. These guests included defendant in this case, Lyle Clinton May, and the victims in this case, Valeri Sue Riddle and her four-year-old son, Kelley Mark Laird. The next morning, 9 July 1997, Ms. Boussois left home and saw Valeri Riddle, Mark Laird, and Darrell Godfrey up and awake. When Ms. Boussois returned home around 11:30 p.m., the house was empty, but she found a red liquid on the floor which she later learned was blood.\nIn the early morning hours of 10 July 1997, the Asheville Police found the dead bodies of Valeri Riddle and Mark Laird on a pull-off area on the Blue Ridge Parkway. The police found at the Parkway scene a variety of personal items, including a Swiss army knife with a broken blade. They also found a larger knife 2.3 miles from the Parkway scene.\nNear the time that the police discovered the bodies of the victims, they also located defendant outside a restaurant in Asheville. Asheville Police Officer Darren Moore saw defendant in the parking lot and noticed that he had blood on his shirt, socks, and shoes, and cuts on his arms. The police later found that some of this blood came from the victims. After confronting defendant, Officer Moore arrested him without incident and took him to the police station. There, during a police interview, defendant confessed. In addition to an oral confession, defendant gave a confession in his own handwriting. In that written statement, he confessed that he had stabbed Valeri Riddle to death because she \u201cgot on [his and Godfrey\u2019s] nerves.\u201d He also wrote that he had killed Mark Laird because he \u201cdid not want to see the kid crying or having the memory of his mom getting killed.\u201d He then described how he had disposed of the bodies and how Godfrey had \u201cwatched both killings and went along willingly for the ride.\u201d\nThe police also found significant physical evidence indicating defendant\u2019s guilt. That evidence included DNA from both victims on defendant\u2019s socks and shorts and defendant\u2019s DNA on the pillowcase from Ms. Boussois\u2019 home, where the murders had occurred. A box of matches found on defendant at the time of his arrest was of the same kind as matches found near the victims\u2019 bodies. The police also found defendant\u2019s bloody fingerprint on the trunk of Valeri Riddle\u2019s car.\nThe autopsy report showed that Valeri Riddle had been stabbed multiple times. She had suffered blunt-force injuries that fractured her skull, and her neck had been broken. Mark Laird had been stabbed and beaten. His blunt-force injuries were likely made by a heavy, cylindrical object like a pipe or baseball bat.\nDefendant first contends that the trial court erred because it excluded, as irrelevant, evidence allegedly indicating that Darrell Godfrey had killed the victim. Defendant specifically complains about three pieces of evidence. First, defendant sought to elicit testimony from Godfrey\u2019s mother, Ms. Boussois, that Godfrey had been hospitalized at Broughton Hospital because he was hearing voices telling him to kill people. Second, defendant sought to introduce evidence that Godfrey and the victim had a heated argument days before the homicide. Third, defendant tried to submit testimony from Dr. Raheja, a staff psychiatrist at Broughton Hospital, concerning Godfrey\u2019s intake assessment and discharge summary. This testimony would have revealed that Godfrey had told doctors he had hallucinations telling him to kill himself and other people and that Godfrey had a history of violent conduct, including beating a man with a baseball bat.\nThe trial court properly excluded this evidence on several grounds. This Court has stated:\n[W]here the evidence is proffered to show that someone other than the defendant committed the crime charged, admission of the evidence must do more than create mere conjecture of another\u2019s guilt in order to be relevant. Such evidence must (1) point directly to the guilt of some specific person, and (2) be inconsistent with the defendant\u2019s guilt.\nState v. McNeill, 326 N.C. 712, 721, 392 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1990). Furthermore, \u201c[t]his Court has consistently required that such evidence satisfy both prongs.\u201d State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 222 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818 (1995). For example, in State v. Sneed, 327 N.C. 266, 393 S.E.2d 531 (1990), this Court held that the trial court improperly excluded evidence that another could have committed the crime because it found the following:\nThe excluded evidence tended to show that Joe Reid, a specific person other than the defendant, robbed Tripp\u2019s Service Station and killed [the victim]. Since all of the evidence tended to show that only one person committed the robbery and murder, [the] testimony implicating Joe Reid was also inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant. Therefore, the excluded testimony was relevant and admissible as substantive evidence.\nId. at 271, 393 S.E.2d at 533-34. The evidence in Sneed demonstrated not only that a third party committed the crime, but also that the defendant did not commit the crime. More recently, in State v. Israel, 353 N.C. 211, 539 S.E.2d 633 (2000), this Court again ruled that the trial court should have admitted evidence of the possible guilt of a third party. There, the evidence pointed to a specific third party who had motive and opportunity to kill the victim. Id. at 219, 539 S.E.2d at 638. The evidence also indicated that the defendant and the third party did not visit the victim at her apartment, where the murders were committed, at the same time. The defendant was seen on the apartment complex\u2019s surveillance videotape on one day, id. at 213, 539 S.E.2d at 635, and the third party on two different, days, id. at 215, 539 S.E.2d at 636. The evidence was inconclusive as to when the victim was killed.\nOn the other hand, in State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 451 S.E.2d 211, this Court found no error when the trial court excluded evidence that a third party might have committed the crime. The Court stated, \u201cthe evidence here . . . simply indicated that one person felt that [a third party] might have been \u2018involved.\u2019 This evidence was not inconsistent with defendant\u2019s guilt.\u201d Id. at 191, 451 S.E.2d at 222.\nThe case at bar is similar to Rose. Defendant in this case attempted to submit three pieces of evidence. Even if this evidence indicated that Godfrey could have been suspected of committing the crime for which defendant was accused, defendant failed to produce any evidence that was inconsistent with his own guilt. On the contrary, the State\u2019s evidence shows that Godfrey and defendant were both on the scene when the homicide occurred. Godfrey\u2019s involvement in the crime is entirely consistent with defendant\u2019s guilt. Thus, the speculative evidence that Godfrey could have killed the victims is not relevant to whether defendant in fact did kill the victims.\nFurthermore, we will not disturb the trial court\u2019s decision to exclude Ms. Boussois\u2019 testimony because defendant failed to make an offer of proof for that evidence. This Court has stated:\nIn order for a defendant to preserve for appellate review the exclusion of evidence, \u201ca defendant must make an offer of proof as to what the evidence would have shown or the relevance and content of the answer must be obvious from the context of the questioning.\u201d State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. 73, 95-96, 478 S.E.2d 146, 157 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 825, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1997). \u201c \u2018It is well established that an exception to the exclusion of evidence cannot be sustained where the record fails to show what the witness\u2019 testimony would have been had he been permitted to testify.\u2019 \u201d State v. Johnson, 340 N.C. 32, 49, 455 S.E.2d 644, 653 (1995) (quoting State v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 370, 334 S.E.2d 53, 60 (1985)).\nState v. Hipps, 348 N.C. 377, 407, 501 S.E.2d 625, 643 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1180, 143 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1999). This assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu during the State\u2019s closing arguments at the sentencing proceeding. Defendant argues that the trial court erred by not intervening to strike improper arguments made by the prosecutor. Because defendant failed to object to these allegedly improper statements during the closing arguments, he \u201cmust demonstrate that the prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments amounted to gross impropriety.\u201d State v. Rouse, 339 N.C. 59, 91, 451 S.E.2d 543, 560 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 832, 133 L. Ed. 2d 60 (1995). \u201c \u2018[T]he impropriety of the argument must be gross indeed in order for this Court to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero mo tu an argument which defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it.\u2019 \u201d State v. Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 126, 499 S.E.2d 431, 457 (quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 915, 142 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1998). \u201cWe further emphasize that \u2018statements contained in closing arguments to the jury are not to be placed in isolation or taken out of context on appeal. Instead, on appeal we must give consideration to the context in which the remarks were made and the overall factual circumstances to which they referred.\u2019 \u201d State v. Guevara, 349 N.C. 243, 257, 506 S.E.2d 711, 721 (1998) (quoting State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 188, 443 S.E.2d 14, 41, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994)), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1133, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (1999).\nDefendant claims that the trial court erred by failing to intervene on three specific occasions. First, he claims that the trial court should have intervened when the prosecutor commented as follows on the life defendant would have in prison:\nI know that it\u2019s hard when you sit here and you look at [the defendant] like that in his shirt and sometimes his tie, it\u2019s hard to picture him in a prison yard playing cards with the guys, in a prison gym punching a punching bag, in a prison cell having a snack, watching TV or listening to the radio. But if your verdict is life, one day soon that\u2019s what he\u2019ll be doing, and life will not be worse for him.\nHe isn\u2019t someone who will sit there contemplating what he\u2019s done and where he\u2019s gone wrong. You know that from the evidence. He\u2019ll sit there eating his fireballs, savoring his memory of how much he enjoyed what he did.\nDefendant claims that this argument stated facts outside the record and amounted to prosecutorial misconduct.\nThis Court, however, has often rejected almost identical arguments. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 467, 496 S.E.2d 357, 365, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 845, 142 L. Ed. 2d 91 (1998); State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 252, 461 S.E.2d 687, 717 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148, 134 L. Ed. 2d 100 (1996); State v. Reeves, 337 N.C. 700, 732, 448 S.E.2d 802, 817 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1114, 131 L. Ed. 2d 860 (1995). In State v. Smith, 347 N.C. 453, 496 S.E.2d 357, the defendant contended that the prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that if defendant were sentenced to life in prison, he would spend his time comfortably doing things such as playing basketball, lifting weights, and watching television. This Court found no error because the prosecutor\u2019s argument \u201c \u2018served to emphasize the State\u2019s position that the defendant deserved the penalty of death rather than a comfortable life in prison.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 467, 496 S.E.2d at 365 (quoting Alston, 341 N.C. at 252, 461 S.E.2d at 717). The prosecutor\u2019s statements in this case are nearly identical to the statements in Smith. While the prosecutor improperly argued facts not in the record, the trial court still did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu.\nDefendant also complains about portions of the prosecutor\u2019s argument concerning defendant\u2019s expert witness, a psychiatrist. Again, however, defendant failed to object, so he must prove that the prosecutor\u2019s statements amounted to gross impropriety. Rouse, 339 N.C. at 91, 451 S.E.2d at 560. In his closing argument, the prosecutor challenged the evaluation of defendant\u2019s expert as follows:\nWho can deny that there\u2019s a very real struggle between the forces for evil and the forces for good in the world? Who can deny that?\nIn our collective consciousness, that sometimes has been overborne by a cycle that has worked its way into our criminal justice system. Here\u2019s a psychiatrist making fifteen hundred dollars a day retirement income, and the best he can do for excuseology [sic] is come here and say \u201cHe\u2019s faking normal.\u201d He says the mental status exams are normal, the physiology exams they did on him at Broughton they\u2019re normal. He says malingering, yeah, there\u2019s some element of malingering. He\u2019s faking, but he\u2019s faking normal. He\u2019s faking normal. That\u2019s the best he can do.\nThe prosecutor then continued with the portion to which defendant objects:\nA guy who\u2019s making fifteen hundred dollars a day is absolutely going to tell you every time you show him a crime like this that it\u2019s the result of mental illness. His way of life depends on that. You think somebody\u2019s going to pay anybody fifteen hundred dollars a day to walk in here and say that is one mean guy; that guy does whatever he wants, whenever he wants, wherever he wants, and that makes him very dangerous to all living creatures? Nobody\u2019s paying someone fifteen hundred dollars a day to do that, ladies and gentlemen, to come in here and say that.\nAnd there is a world of difference between a clinical psychologist who seeks to help you when you\u2019re stressed or you\u2019re suffering and an interested professional witness, somebody who builds up a resume and has a long-term goal of making fifteen hundred bucks a day doing what he did.\nDefendant claims that this argument was grossly improper because it accused his expert witness of being \u201cunethical and venal.\u201d\nThis Court, however, has rejected virtually identical challenges in the past. See, e.g., State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 626, 536 S.E.2d 36, 55 (2000), cert. denied,- U.S. -, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001); State v. Atkins, 349 N.C. 62, 83-84, 505 S.E.2d 97, 111 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1147, 143 L. Ed. 2d 1036 (1999). In State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 536 S.E.2d 36, the defendant contended that the prosecutor\u2019s arguments implied bias on the part of the defendant\u2019s expert and were so grossly improper that they required intervention by the trial court ex mero mo tu. In that case, the prosecutor stated that the expert was hired and paid by the defendant for his favorable diagnosis. We found no error.\nIn this case, as in all cases, the prosecution is allowed wide latitude in its arguments, especially at sentencing, and is permitted to argue not only the evidence presented, but also all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence. State v. Garner, 340 N.C. 573, 598, 459 S.E.2d 718, 731 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 133 L. Ed. 2d 872 (1996). Here, as in Cummings, the prosecutor\u2019s statements identified by defendant as being objectionable, but not objected to by defendant at trial, \u201cdid not exceed the \u2018broad bounds allowed in closing arguments at the capital sentencing proceeding.\u2019 \u201d Cummings, 352 N.C. at 626, 536 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting State v. Thomas, 350 N.C. 315, 362, 514 S.E.2d 486, 514, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1006, 145 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1999)). Defendant does not explain why the prosecutor\u2019s argument was improper, except to state that the prosecutor accused defendant\u2019s expert witness of being \u201cunethical and venal.\u201d However, we do not view the prosecutor\u2019s argument as going so far as to accuse the expert witness of being \u201cunethical and venal.\u201d While it would be unquestionably inappropriate under these facts to argue that an expert witness had, in essence, offered perjured testimony in exchange for a fee, the argument in question falls within the recognized area of challenging an expert\u2019s opinion because of the financial consideration involved. Id. The prosecutor\u2019s argument was that defendant would not have offered his expert as a witness if the expert\u2019s testimony would have been injurious to the defendant. Thus, based on the evidence, the trial court\u2019s failure to intervene ex mero motu did not amount to gross impropriety, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.\nDefendant next complains about the prosecutor\u2019s statements during his closing argument about the insurance procedures at Broughton Hospital, where defendant received a psychiatric exam. The prosecutor argued that the defendant was not cured during his time at Broughton because he was not mentally ill. He then stated:\nSee this book, the DSM-IV? Remember back when [defendant\u2019s expert witness] was on the stand and I said it\u2019s loaded with insurance codes, isn\u2019t it? He said, yes, it is.\nThat\u2019s why they diagnose him at all. That\u2019s why they give him any diagnosis. Because they can\u2019t get paid if they don\u2019t have an insurance code attached to a diagnosis.\nAgain, defendant did not object to this portion of the prosecutor\u2019s argument and thus must show that it was grossly improper. He has failed to do so.\nHere, as with defendant\u2019s complaint regarding the prosecutor\u2019s statements about the defense expert\u2019s possible bias, the prosecutor\u2019s statements identified by defendant as being objectionable, but not objected to by defendant at trial, were supported by the direct evidence of record or by reasonable inferences that could be drawn from that evidence. They \u201cdid not exceed the \u2018broad bounds allowed in closing arguments at the capital sentencing proceeding.\u2019 \u201d Cummings, 352 N.C. at 626, 536 S.E.2d at 55 (quoting Thomas, 350 N.C. at 362, 514 S.E.2d at 514). Defendant claims that the argument was improper because the prosecutor accused the state hospital of fraud, and there was nothing to support this allegation. However, during trial, the prosecutor asked defendant\u2019s expert, \u201cAnd [the DSM-IV is] loaded with insurance codes so that psychiatrists and psychologists can get reimbursed by insurance companies for seeing people?\u201d Defendant\u2019s expert answered, \u201cI think it\u2019s fair [to say that].\u201d He was then asked: \u201cDo you remember testifying in a previous case . . . that you can\u2019t take this stuff from the DSM-IV too seriously?\u201d He responded, \u201cI\u2019m sure I\u2019ve said that in many cases.\u201d Here again, we view the prosecutor\u2019s argument as being based on inferences from the evidence that the medical diagnosis was categorized in such a way as to fall within the various insurance codes provided. Furthermore, the argument that the diagnosis was made so as to result in insurance compensation is not so grossly improper as to warrant intervention by the trial court ex mero mo tu, and thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.\nDefendant next complains that the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument was improper because he called defendant \u201cgarbage.\u201d In fact, he did not call defendant \u201cgarbage.\u201d The prosecutor\u2019s statement, in context, was:\nAnd when you are the kind of person [defendant] is, he thinks he can do whatever he wants, whenever he wants and wherever he wants; he thinks that having family rules like going to church on Sunday and not doing drugs are bothersome, you perpetrate atrocious conduct. Garbage in/garbage out. Because you have no moral rectitude. And the more those psychiatrically-based beliefs take hold on our consciousness, the more foolishness and injustice results.\nThe prosecutor did not call defendant \u201cgarbage.\u201d Rather, he intimated that, in effect, when a person\u2019s beliefs are \u201cgarbage,\u201d then a person\u2019s acts are usually \u201cgarbage.\u201d The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by failing to intervene ex mero mo tu.\nDefendant\u2019s final complaint regarding the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument is that the trial court\u2019s failure to intervene ex mero motu in each of the above instances cumulatively warrants a new sentencing hearing. However, because the trial court did not err in failing to intervene in any of these instances, there is no cumulative error. This assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nDefendant argues several other issues. All of these contentions, however, are barred because defendant failed to object to any of them. With certain exceptions not applicable to any of these contentions, a timely objection at trial is required to preserve an alleged error on appeal. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1446(a), (b) (1999); N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1); State v. Adams, 335 N.C. 401, 411, 439 S.E.2d 760, 765 (1994).\nDefendant\u2019s failure to object therefore precludes him from raising these issues on appeal. First, defendant is barred from arguing that the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the prosecutor to peremptorily challenge prospective juror Harill Heath because of his religion. The record reveals that defendant failed to object to the prosecutor\u2019s challenge. This assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nSecond, defendant is barred from arguing that the trial court erred when it reopened voir dire on prospective juror Edward Chandler and allowed the State to peremptorily challenge that juror. The record reveals that defendant failed to object to the trial judge\u2019s decision to reopen voir dire even after being explicitly asked if he had any objection. This assignment of error is therefore overruled.\nThird, defendant is barred from challenging the order issued before trial that resulted from an ex parte motion by the State for the Broughton Hospital psychiatric records of codefendant Darrell Godfrey and one of the victims, Valeri Riddle. Defendant claims that the trial court had no authority to issue this order ex parte, that the trial court failed to make the necessary findings to issue the order, and that the ex parte hearing violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The record again reveals that defendant lodged no objection, constitutional or otherwise, to the ex parte hearing, or to the order, either at trial or before. Nor did he make a motion to strike the order or to prevent the State from using the records the order produced. He further failed to appeal from that order or to petition for appellate review when he became aware of the order before trial. Defendant has therefore waived any right to appellate review of this issue.\nPRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant also makes several contentions that he admits this Court has already decided against him. His first preservation claim is that North Carolina\u2019s short-form indictment for murder violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We have previously held, however, that the short-form indictment does not violate due process because it gives the defendant notice that he was charged with first-degree murder and that the maximum penalty to which he could be subjected is death. See State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 175, 531 S.E.2d 428, 438 (2000), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 148 L. Ed. 2d 797 (2001); State v. Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 530 S.E.2d 807 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1083, 148 L. Ed. 2d 684 (2001). Because defendant has presented no compelling reason for this Court to reconsider its position on this issue, we overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury during sentencing by giving pattern jury instruction 150.10. Defendant claims that this instruction inadequately limits the facially vague N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. We have consistently upheld the instruction as given. See, e.g., State v. Stroud, 345 N.C. 106, 115-16, 478 S.E.2d 476 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 826, 139 L. Ed. 2d 43 (1997). \u201cBecause these jury instructions incorporate narrowing definitions adopted by this Court and expressly approved by the United States Supreme Court, or are of the tenor of the definitions approved, we reaffirm that these instructions provide constitutionally sufficient guidance to the jury.\u201d State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 391-92, 428 S.E.2d 118, 141, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993). Because defendant offers no compelling reason to alter or reverse our previous holdings, we overrule this assignment of error.\nDefendant next alleges that the trial court erred when it instructed the sentencing jury that it need not consider nonstatutory mitigators unless it found that those circumstances had mitigating value. Defendant claims that these instructions violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant concedes that this Court has previously decided this issue against him, State v. Huff, 325 N.C. 1, 381 S.E.2d 635 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 497 U.S. 1021, 111 L. Ed. 2d 777 (1990); State v. Fullwood, 323 N.C. 371, 373 S.E.2d 518 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1990), but contends that two later opinions by the United States Supreme Court, Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989); and McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 108 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1990), have invalidated our prior holdings. We disagree. Since Penry and McKoy were handed down by the United States Supreme Court, we have consistently upheld jury instructions similar to those given in this case and in Huff and Fullwood. See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 340 N.C. 435, 475, 459 S.E.2d 679 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1143, 134 L. Ed. 2d 558 (1996); State v. Robinson, 336 N.C. 78, 117, 443 S.E.2d 306, 325 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1089, 130 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1995). Because defendant has presented no compelling reason for this Court to reconsider its position on this issue, we overrule this assignment of error.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial court\u2019s instruction on the capital sentencing procedure unconstitutionally made the consideration of mitigating evidence discretionary with the jury during sentencing. Specifically, defendant contends that the instructions violated the Eighth Amendment because the word \u201cmay\u201d in the instructions on Issues Three and Four on the \u201cIssues and Recommendation as to Punishment\u201d form allowed each juror to ignore mitigating circumstances that the juror personally found to exist in Issue Two.\nThis Court has repeatedly rejected virtually identical challenges to the use of the word \u201cmay\u201d in the instructions for the consideration of mitigating evidence in Issue Three and Issue Four. See, e.g., State v. Geddie, 345 N.C. at 104, 478 S.E.2d at 162; State v. Gregory, 340 N.C. 365, 417-19, 459 S.E.2d 638, 668-69 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1108, 134 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1996). Because defendant has presented no compelling reason for this Court to reconsider its position on this issue, we overrule this assignment of error.\nPROPORTIONALITY REVIEW\nHaving concluded that defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error, we must now determine: (1) whether the record supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury and upon which the sentences of death were based; (2) whether the death sentences were entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the death sentences are excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) (1999).\nAfter thoroughly reviewing the record, transcripts, and briefs in this case, we conclude that the record fully supports as to each murder the jury\u2019s finding of the aggravating circumstance that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). The jury also found as to each murder the aggravating circumstance that the murder was part of a course of conduct in which defendant engaged and which included defendant\u2019s commission of other crimes of violence against another person or persons. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(ll). After meticulous review and careful deliberation, we conclude that this aggravating circumstance submitted to and found by the jury is also fully supported by the record as to each murder. Further, we conclude that nothing in the record suggests that defendant\u2019s death sentences in this case were imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. We must now turn to our final statutory duty of proportionality review.\nProportionality review is designed to \u201celiminate the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury.\u201d State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 164-65, 362 S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988). In conducting proportionality review, we determine whether \u201cthe sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.\u201d State v. Williams, 308 N.C. 47, 79, 301 S.E.2d 335, 355, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 78 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1983); accord N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2). Whether the death penalty is disproportionate \u201cultimately rest[s] upon the \u2018experienced judgments\u2019 of the members of this Court.\u201d Green, 336 N.C. at 198, 443 S.E.2d at 47.\nIn our proportionality review, it is proper to compare the present case with other cases in which this Court has concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 433 S.E.2d 144 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994). It is also proper for this Court to compare this case with the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be proportionate. Id. Although we review all of these cases when engaging in this statutory duty, we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out that duty. Id.\nThis Court has determined that the sentence of death was disproportionate in seven cases. State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\nHowever, we find the present case distinguishable from each of these seven cases. In three of those cases, Benson, Stokes, and Jackson, the defendant either pled guilty or was convicted by the jury solely under the theory of felony murder. Here, defendant was convicted on the theory of premeditation and deliberation. We have said that \u201c[t]he finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-blooded and calculated crime.\u201d State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990).\nFurther, multiple aggravating circumstances were found to exist in only two of the disproportionate cases. See Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181; Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170. The present case, however, is distinguishable from both of those cases. In determining that the death penalty was disproportionate in Young, the Court noted that the jury failed to find the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9). Young, 312 N.C. at 691, 325 S.E.2d at 194. Here, however, the jury found the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance. In Bondurant, this Court found the death penalty disproportionate because the defendant immediately exhibited remorse and concern for the victim\u2019s life. The defendant went into the hospital to secure medical help for the victim, voluntarily spoke to police, and admitted shooting the victim. Bondurant, 309 N.C. at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 182-83. Here, the evidence was very different. After the murder, instead of showing concern for the victims\u2019 lives, defendant attempted to hide his crime by disposing of the bodies in the woods. After defendant was arrested, he showed little remorse. When asked how he felt about killing the victims, defendant said, \u201cIt was a rush. I had thought about it quite a while.\u201d Thus, we find no significant similarity between this case and Young or Bondurant.\nAn additional characteristic of this case supports the determination that imposition of the death sentence was not disproportionate. In the present case, one of the victims was a small child, less than five years old and under four feet tall, who weighed a mere fifty-one pounds.\nAfter reviewing the cases, we conclude that the present case is more similar to certain cases in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have found the sentence of death disproportionate or those in which juries have consistently returned recommendations of life imprisonment. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the defendant\u2019s death sentences are disproportionate.\nHaving considered and rejected all of defendant\u2019s assignments of error, and after a thorough and careful review of the record, transcripts, briefs, and oral arguments, we conclude that defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error. Therefore, the convictions and sentences of death entered against defendant must be and are left undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy A. Cooper, Attorney General, by William P. Hart, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Marshall Dayan for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. LYLE CLINTON MAY\nNo. 509A99\n(Filed 5 October 2001)\n1. Evidence\u2014 guilt of another\u2014mental history\nThe trial court did not err in a capital first-degree murder prosecution by excluding evidence allegedly indicating that someone else had killed the victim. Such evidence must point directly to the guilt of a specific person and must be inconsistent with the defendant\u2019 guilt. Here, even if the evidence of this person\u2019s mental history indicated that he could have been suspected of this crime, it was not inconsistent with defendant\u2019s guilt. Furthermore, defendant failed to make an offer of proof for some of the evidence.\n2. Sentencing\u2014 capital\u2014prosecutor\u2019s argument\u2014life in prison\nThe trial court did not err by not intervening ex mero motu during the State\u2019s closing arguments in a capital sentencing proceeding where the prosecutor commented on the life defendant would have in prison.\n3. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument\u2014capital sentencing\u2014mental health expert\u2014financial considerations\nThe trial court did not err by not intervening ex mero motu during the State\u2019s closing arguments in a capital sentencing proceeding where the argument fell within the recognized area of challenging an expert\u2019s opinion because of the financial consideration involved.\n4. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument\u2014capital sentencing\u2014mental health diagnosis\nThe trial court did not err by not intervening ex mero motu during the State\u2019s closing arguments in a capital sentencing proceeding where the prosecutor argued that defendant\u2019s mental health diagnosis was made so as to result in insurance compensation and that defendant was not mentally ill.\n5. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument\u2014capital sentencing\u2014garbage\nThe trial court did not err by not intervening ex mero motu during the State\u2019s closing arguments in a capital sentencing proceeding where the prosecutor argued that a person\u2019s acts are garbage when a person\u2019s beliefs are garbage.\n6. Sentencing\u2014 capital\u2014prosecutor\u2019s arguments\u2014cumulative effect\u2014no error\nThe cumulative effect of a prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments in a capital sentencing proceeding did not warrant a new sentencing hearing where the trial court did not err by failing to intervene in any of the arguments.\n7. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues\u2014failure to object\nA defendant in a capital first-degree murder prosecution waived appellate review of issues involving jury selection and an ex parte motion for hospital records by failing to object.\n8. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder\u2014short-form indictment\nNorth Carolina\u2019s short-form indictment for murder does not violate due process.\n9. Sentencing\u2014 capital\u2014instructions\u2014aggravating circumstance\u2014especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel murder\u2014 instructions\nThe trial court did not err by giving Pattern Jury Instruction 150.10 on the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance in a capital sentencing proceeding.\n10.Sentencing\u2014 capital\u2014mitigating circumstances\u2014non-statutory\u2014instructions\u2014mitigating value\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by instructing the jury that it need not consider nonstatutory mitigators unless it found that those circumstances had mitigating value.\n11. Sentencing\u2014 capital\u2014instructions\u2014use of \u201cmay\u201d\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by using the word \u201cmay\u201d in the instructions on Issues Three and Four on the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form.\n12. Sentencing\u2014 capital\u2014death penalty\u2014not disproportionate\nA death sentence was not disproportionate where defendant was convicted on the theory of premeditation and deliberation; multiple aggravating circumstances were found to exist; defendant did not show concern for the victims, but attempted to hide his crime; he showed very little remorse; and one of the victims was a small child, less than five years old and under four feet tall, who weighed only 51 pounds.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from judgments imposing two sentences of death entered by Downs, J., on 18 March 1999 in Superior Court, Buncombe County, upon jury verdicts finding defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 May 2001.\nRoy A. Cooper, Attorney General, by William P. Hart, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nMarshall Dayan for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0172-01", "first_page_order": 206, "last_page_order": 222 }