{ "id": 2985361, "name": "WHITACRE PARTNERSHIP, an Illinois limited partnership v. BIOSIGNIA, INC., corporate successor to Biomar International, Inc. and Future Health Technologies Company; T. NELSON CAMPBELL; and T. COLIN CAMPBELL", "name_abbreviation": "Whitacre Partnership v. Biosignia, Inc.", "decision_date": "2004-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 617PA02", "first_page": "1", "last_page": "39", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 N.C. 1" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250964 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9302102 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 U.S. 815", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6280288, 6278117, 6280007, 6281211, 6280938, 6279340, 6278415, 6277459, 6281469, 6279674, 6277115, 6277789, 6279070 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/498/0815-10", "/us/498/0815-04", "/us/498/0815-09", "/us/498/0815-12", "/us/498/0815-11", "/us/498/0815-07", "/us/498/0815-05", "/us/498/0815-02", "/us/498/0815-13", "/us/498/0815-08", "/us/498/0815-01", "/us/498/0815-03", "/us/498/0815-06" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1117", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9715558, 9715496, 9715306, 9715372, 9715436, 9716078, 9716015, 9716238, 9715729, 9715667, 9715607, 9715867, 9715932, 9716157, 9715807 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1117-05", "/us/531/1117-04", "/us/531/1117-01", "/us/531/1117-02", "/us/531/1117-03", "/us/531/1117-13", "/us/531/1117-12", "/us/531/1117-15", "/us/531/1117-08", "/us/531/1117-07", "/us/531/1117-06", "/us/531/1117-10", "/us/531/1117-11", "/us/531/1117-14", "/us/531/1117-09" ] }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 831", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11935396, 11935014, 11935240, 11935340, 11935055, 11934832, 11934864, 11935185, 11935289, 11934902, 11934935, 11935097, 11934973 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/0831-13", "/us/506/0831-06", "/us/506/0831-10", "/us/506/0831-12", "/us/506/0831-07", "/us/506/0831-01", "/us/506/0831-02", "/us/506/0831-09", "/us/506/0831-11", "/us/506/0831-03", "/us/506/0831-04", "/us/506/0831-08", "/us/506/0831-05" ] }, { "cite": "511 U.S. 1042", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1147616, 1146372, 1147301, 1146794, 1147278, 1147662, 1146802, 1147933, 1147442, 1147606, 1146719, 1147386, 1146653, 1147454, 1147807 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/1042-06", "/us/511/1042-14", "/us/511/1042-11", "/us/511/1042-12", "/us/511/1042-03", "/us/511/1042-01", "/us/511/1042-07", "/us/511/1042-04", "/us/511/1042-15", "/us/511/1042-05", "/us/511/1042-13", "/us/511/1042-02", "/us/511/1042-10", "/us/511/1042-08", "/us/511/1042-09" ] }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 1067", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12075812, 12075880, 12075945, 12076299, 12076076, 12075504, 12075571, 12075669, 12076374, 12076022, 12076150, 12075739 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/1067-05", "/us/489/1067-06", "/us/489/1067-07", "/us/489/1067-11", "/us/489/1067-09", "/us/489/1067-01", "/us/489/1067-02", "/us/489/1067-03", "/us/489/1067-12", "/us/489/1067-08", "/us/489/1067-10", "/us/489/1067-04" ] }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 967", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1495041, 1494439, 1494654, 1495566, 1494354, 1494003, 1493717, 1495222, 1494488, 1495065, 1493373, 1494878 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0967-05", "/us/488/0967-02", "/us/488/0967-01", "/us/488/0967-12", "/us/488/0967-08", "/us/488/0967-04", "/us/488/0967-10", "/us/488/0967-03", "/us/488/0967-06", "/us/488/0967-11", "/us/488/0967-09", "/us/488/0967-07" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E.2d 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "discussing the common law origins of equitable estoppel and summarizing the \"multitude of cases\" where the doctrine has been applied in this state" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624432 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "discussing the common law origins of equitable estoppel and summarizing the \"multitude of cases\" where the doctrine has been applied in this state" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 1113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11776770, 11776643, 11776222, 11776517, 11776710, 11776395, 11776171, 11776592, 11776466, 11776339, 11776276, 11776022, 11776829, 11776126 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/1113-13", "/us/519/1113-11", "/us/519/1113-04", "/us/519/1113-09", "/us/519/1113-12", "/us/519/1113-07", "/us/519/1113-03", "/us/519/1113-10", "/us/519/1113-08", "/us/519/1113-06", "/us/519/1113-05", "/us/519/1113-01", "/us/519/1113-14", "/us/519/1113-02" ] }, { "cite": "54 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3361974 ], "weight": 11, "year": 1852, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "169-70" }, { "page": "336" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "170" }, { "page": "337" }, { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "\"It does not carry the estoppel beyond what is strictly equitable, to hold that the representation which defeated one action on a point of form should sustain another on a like point.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/54/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 211", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413530 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0211-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 U.S. 680", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1488100 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1895, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "584" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "689-92" }, { "page": "584-85" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "584", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/156/0680-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 S.E. 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "747", "parenthetical": "\"A party is not permitted to take a position in a subsequent judicial proceeding which conflicts with a position taken by him in a former judicial proceeding, where the latter position disadvantages his adversary. . . . [H]e cannot safely 'run with the hare and hunt with the hound.' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "199 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8604821 ], "year": 1930, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/199/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E. 925", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "928", "parenthetical": "where defendant's pleadings claimed title to property solely on the basis of a deed from plaintiff and that deed was later declared void, defendant could not change his position and assert a paramount title" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. 663", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661226 ], "year": 1914, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670-71", "parenthetical": "where defendant's pleadings claimed title to property solely on the basis of a deed from plaintiff and that deed was later declared void, defendant could not change his position and assert a paramount title" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/165/0663-01" ] }, { "cite": "101 S.E. 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 N.C. 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11273453 ], "year": 1919, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "612" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/178/0607-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 S.E.2d 797", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798", "parenthetical": "defendants were not entitled to dismiss action based on an agreement the existence of which they denied in their pleadings and testimony" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 56", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628114 ], "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58", "parenthetical": "defendants were not entitled to dismiss action based on an agreement the existence of which they denied in their pleadings and testimony" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 S.E.2d 779", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs who had denied existence of road in prior action could not ask court in later action to locate boundaries of that road; \"plaintiffs cannot ask for the location of something which they deny exists\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621375 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206-07", "parenthetical": "plaintiffs who had denied existence of road in prior action could not ask court in later action to locate boundaries of that road; \"plaintiffs cannot ask for the location of something which they deny exists\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/248/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 S.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "co-defendant who consistently denied the authority of an attorney to act as her attorney \"for any purpose\" could not rely on answer filed by that attorney \"purportedly in behalf of all defendants\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "252 N.C. 461", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8623032 ], "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462", "parenthetical": "co-defendant who consistently denied the authority of an attorney to act as her attorney \"for any purpose\" could not rely on answer filed by that attorney \"purportedly in behalf of all defendants\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/252/0461-01" ] }, { "cite": "152 S.E.2d 92", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "\"A person appointed administrator and acting in that capacity in defending a wrongful death action is estopped from asserting therein the invalidity of his own asserted status as such administrator.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "269 N.C. 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562168 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153", "parenthetical": "\"A person appointed administrator and acting in that capacity in defending a wrongful death action is estopped from asserting therein the invalidity of his own asserted status as such administrator.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/269/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 S.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "239 N.C. 360", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626959 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/239/0360-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 So. 2d 1331", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7598294 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/505/1331-01" ] }, { "cite": "10 F. Supp. 409", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 4145900 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/10/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 260", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 931", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11539776, 11539686, 11539590, 11539660, 11539824, 11539729, 11539634, 11539604, 11539866, 11539643, 11539580 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0931-09", "/us/522/0931-07", "/us/522/0931-02", "/us/522/0931-06", "/us/522/0931-10", "/us/522/0931-08", "/us/522/0931-04", "/us/522/0931-03", "/us/522/0931-11", "/us/522/0931-05", "/us/522/0931-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 F.3d 569", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 377658, 854764 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/208/0569-01", "/f3d/112/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 L. Ed. 2d 812", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "850 F.2d 247", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1792460 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/850/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 F.3d 327", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1318641 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "330", "parenthetical": "referring to judicial estoppel and election of remedies as \"companion doctrines\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/140/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 1038", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1039" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662097 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/168/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 S.E. 846", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850" }, { "page": "850", "parenthetical": "quoting Bigelow on Estoppel, 6 ed., p. 744" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630054 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/197/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S.E. 955", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "956-57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271886 ], "year": 1913, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/161/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 S.E. 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657404 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 S.E. 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "180 N.C. 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8653139 ], "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/180/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "16 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11274939 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1829, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "286-87" }, { "page": "286-87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/16/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 S.E. 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 N.C. 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629404 ], "year": 1926, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395-96" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/191/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 S.E.2d 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "261 N.C. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574457 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/261/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 167", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "170", "parenthetical": "quoting 31 C.J.S. Estoppel \u00a7 107 (1964)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 357", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568700 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361", "parenthetical": "quoting 31 C.J.S. Estoppel \u00a7 107 (1964)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" }, { "page": "225", "parenthetical": "privity concept extended to quasi-estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9366774 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" }, { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "privity concept extended to quasi-estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219969, 220200, 219983, 219888, 220082 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0283-03", "/nc/355/0283-02", "/nc/355/0283-05", "/nc/355/0283-04", "/nc/355/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 176", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9363747 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "804 P.2d 62", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10365816 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discussing the doctrine of \"judicial quasi-estoppel\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/804/0062-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566582 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 780", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11146921 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "31 S.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "224 N.C. 612", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610889 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/224/0612-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 S.E. 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "805" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627668 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/213/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "91 S.E.2d 903", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626600 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646-47" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "404 S.E.2d 854", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "859" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553005 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0166-01" ] }, { "cite": "626 F.2d 933", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 651489, 3505682 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "937" }, { "page": "937" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/626/0933-01", "/us-app-dc/200/0069-01" ] }, { "cite": "834 F.2d 208", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10544392 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/834/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 532", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "848 F.2d 414", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1783268, 6123166 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/848/0414-01", "/br/86/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "955 F.2d 875", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11290503 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899", "parenthetical": "noting that judicial estoppel \"is frequently expressed in language sounding of estoppel in pais\" but \"operates independently of equitable estoppel\" (quoting IB Moore, Federal Practice, \u00a7 0.405[8], at 765-68 (2d ed. 1971))" }, { "page": "898-900" }, { "page": "899" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/955/0875-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 F.2d 80", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 692506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84", "parenthetical": "describing judicial estoppel as a \"phase of equitable estoppel\"" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/252/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 907", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "913" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551066 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "70 S.E. 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8652401 ], "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/154/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 S.E.2d 248", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "quoting Boddie v. Bond, 154 N.C. 359, 365, 70 S.E. 824, 826 (1911)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563411 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240", "parenthetical": "quoting Boddie v. Bond, 154 N.C. 359, 365, 70 S.E. 824, 826 (1911)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 S.W. 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.", "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317", "parenthetical": "judicial estoppel has no mutuality requirement because the doctrine \"has nothing to do with other parties to the suit\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 Tenn. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 8535195 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650", "parenthetical": "judicial estoppel has no mutuality requirement because the doctrine \"has nothing to do with other parties to the suit\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/150/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 841", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "92 F.3d 219", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7625189 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/92/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1244", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Nw. U. L. Rev.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1248" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "667 F.2d 1162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 464017 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1166" }, { "page": "1166-67" }, { "page": "1166-67", "parenthetical": "judicial estoppel may apply where election of remedies would not" }, { "page": "1166-67" }, { "page": "1166" }, { "page": "1166" }, { "page": "1167", "parenthetical": "stating that although judicial acceptance of a party's prior position is not an absolute prerequisite for judicial estoppel, it is \"obviously more appropriate\" in that situation" }, { "page": "1167" }, { "page": "1166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/667/1162-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 485", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219927 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0485-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 610", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9364358 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 329", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551316 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" }, { "page": "333-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0329-01" ] }, { "cite": "474 S.E.2d 127", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867636 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413" }, { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "589", "parenthetical": "referring to \"collateral estoppel by judgment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "147", "parenthetical": "referring to \"collateral estoppel by judgment\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" }, { "page": "20" }, { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155739 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" }, { "page": "623" }, { "page": "623-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 157", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2546781 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491-92" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 S.E.2d 552", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560" }, { "page": "556" }, { "page": "560" }, { "page": "556", "parenthetical": "res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to the \"same parties or those in privity with them\"" }, { "page": "559-60", "parenthetical": "following Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery and abandoning the strict mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel in North Carolina" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 421", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736107 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "434" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "433-34" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "433-34" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 589", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Conn. Ins. L.J.", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "3 F.2d 57", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1686824 ], "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "using \"judicial estoppel\" to refer to res judicata and collateral estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/3/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 F. 761", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.", "case_ids": [ 6735369 ], "year": 1920, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "766-67", "parenthetical": "using \"judicial estoppel\" to refer to an election of remedies doctrine" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f/264/0761-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 F.2d 881", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1735603 ], "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881", "parenthetical": "using \"judicial estoppel\" to refer to res judicata or claim preclusion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/27/0881-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 F.2d 817", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1731395 ], "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "819", "parenthetical": "using the phrase \"judicial estoppel\" to refer to collateral estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/28/0817-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 461", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Loy. L.A. L. Rev.", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76, 483" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 51", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6194213 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "discussing estoppel generally" }, { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "discussing estoppel generally" }, { "page": "60" }, { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0051-01" ] }, { "cite": "690 F.2d 595", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1473989 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "598" }, { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "risk of either court being misled" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/690/0595-01" ] }, { "cite": "75 Am. Bankr. L.J. 197", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Am. Bankr. L.J.", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "37 Tenn. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Tenn.", "case_ids": [ 11265339 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1857, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/tenn/37/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 N.C. 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11275274 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1852, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/44/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 S.E.2d 785", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571663 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 884", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659872, 1659906, 1659879, 1659945, 1659892 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0076-01", "/nc/348/0076-05", "/nc/348/0076-04", "/nc/348/0076-02", "/nc/348/0076-03" ] }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 811", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815", "parenthetical": "using the term \"judicial estoppel\" interchangeably with \"equitable estoppel\"" }, { "page": "815" }, { "page": "815-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "128 N.C. App. 394", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11654914 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400", "parenthetical": "using the term \"judicial estoppel\" interchangeably with \"equitable estoppel\"" }, { "page": "400" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/128/0394-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 S.E.2d 361", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "363-64", "parenthetical": "defining judicial estoppel" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "364" }, { "page": "363-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. App. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11917625 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769-71", "parenthetical": "defining judicial estoppel" }, { "page": "771" }, { "page": "771" }, { "page": "771" }, { "page": "769-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/119/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S.E. 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "\"It is well understood that, except in proper instances, a party to a suit should not be allowed to change his position with respect to a material matter, during the course of litigation, nor should he be allowed to 'blow hot and cold in the same breath.' \" (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "adding that a party should not be permitted to \"blow hot and cold in the same breath\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "182 N.C. 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655255 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/182/0077-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1711", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Pa. L. Rev.", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1756-60", "parenthetical": "appendix listing thirty-three states as having accepted judicial estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "647 N.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "419 Mass. 782", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 823668 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787-88" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/419/0782-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 S.C. 242", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "S.C.", "case_ids": [ 518737 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "251-52" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "251-52" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/327/0242-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 S.E.2d 475", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479-80", "parenthetical": "citing Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, 134 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998)" }, { "page": "480" }, { "page": "480" }, { "page": "480" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 N.C. App. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9250964 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614", "parenthetical": "citing Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, 134 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998)" }, { "page": "614" }, { "page": "615-16" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/153/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 742", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9302102 ], "weight": 45, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "749" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "750" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "751" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "749" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "979-80" }, { "page": "755" }, { "page": "981" }, { "page": "750" }, { "page": "978" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "979" }, { "page": "753" }, { "page": "979" }, { "page": "747-48" }, { "page": "975-76" }, { "page": "750" }, { "page": "977-78", "parenthetical": "\"[Jjudicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 F.3d 67", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11542050 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "a party's statements must be \"directly inconsistent\" to support application of judicial estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/184/0067-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 F.3d 79", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11191112, 11205764 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "judicial estoppel requires a \"true inconsistency\" such that the two statements \"cannot be reconciled\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/219/0079-01", "/br/251/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E. 360", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 254", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624337 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E. 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293-94" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11254050 ], "year": 1916, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/172/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 U.S.C. \u00a7 707", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 U.S.C. \u00a7 343", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "11 U.S.C. \u00a7 341", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 136", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11471033 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142-43", "parenthetical": "rejecting argument that ruling on admissibility of expert testimony should be reviewed de novo simply because it arose in the \"outcome determinative\" context of a summary judgment motion, and instead reviewing for abuse of discretion" }, { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "rejecting argument that ruling on admissibility of expert testimony should be reviewed de novo simply because it arose in the \"outcome determinative\" context of a summary judgment motion, and instead reviewing for abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0136-01" ] }, { "cite": "2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15776", "category": "reporters:specialty_lexis", "reporter": "U.S. Dist. LEXIS", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*7", "parenthetical": "application of judicial estoppel in context of summary judgment motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 774", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749092, 4745836, 4743052, 4744786, 4746645 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0671-05", "/nc/319/0671-02", "/nc/319/0671-04", "/nc/319/0671-03", "/nc/319/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "353 S.E.2d 671", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12169150 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 795", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133778 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/0795-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 845", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 1145", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11805350, 11805420, 11805581, 11805493, 11805750, 11805945, 11805658, 11805883, 11805277, 11805823 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/1145-02", "/us/519/1145-03", "/us/519/1145-05", "/us/519/1145-04", "/us/519/1145-07", "/us/519/1145-10", "/us/519/1145-06", "/us/519/1145-09", "/us/519/1145-01", "/us/519/1145-08" ] }, { "cite": "91 F.3d 610", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9043435 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/91/0610-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 F.3d 1419", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 22335 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/133/1419-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 F.3d 778", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9467780, 9466799 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/269/0778-01", "/f3d/270/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "103 L. Ed. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 1033", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058720, 12058826, 12058891, 12059090, 12059189, 12059030, 12058651, 12058972, 12059262 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/1033-02", "/us/489/1033-03", "/us/489/1033-04", "/us/489/1033-07", "/us/489/1033-08", "/us/489/1033-06", "/us/489/1033-01", "/us/489/1033-05", "/us/489/1033-09" ] }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 732", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 1165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12444, 12982, 12847 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/1165-02", "/us/476/1165-03", "/us/476/1165-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" }, { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2394579 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 582", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511484 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0582-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 U.S. 46", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8284883 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1918, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57", "parenthetical": "delay in ultimate disposition of case resulting from remand preferable to Court's exercising \"a duty which it was the province of the court below to perform\"" }, { "page": "573-74", "parenthetical": "delay in ultimate disposition of case resulting from remand preferable to Court's exercising \"a duty which it was the province of the court below to perform\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/246/0046-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 U.S. 321", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6141509 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1924, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327-28", "parenthetical": "remand to trial court appropriate where trial court did not decide questions of fact upon which ultimate decision must rest" }, { "page": "312-13", "parenthetical": "remand to trial court appropriate where trial court did not decide questions of fact upon which ultimate decision must rest" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/266/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 476", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "remand to trial court appropriate where lower courts have adjudicated parties' rights \"without considering essential facts in light of the controlling law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6157163 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "remand to trial court appropriate where lower courts have adjudicated parties' rights \"without considering essential facts in light of the controlling law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/333/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 F.2d 1127", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1127874 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1135", "parenthetical": "privity is appropriately \"resolved on a case by case basis by an examination of underlying facts and circumstances\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/517/1127-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 F.2d 590", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 811297 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/364/0590-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 F.2d 958", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1211800 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/405/0958-01" ] }, { "cite": "72 L. Ed. 2d 162", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "456 U.S. 906", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203686, 6201960, 6202794, 6202161, 6204114, 6203294, 6203897, 6202556, 6203069, 6202366, 6203519 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/456/0906-09", "/us/456/0906-01", "/us/456/0906-05", "/us/456/0906-02", "/us/456/0906-11", "/us/456/0906-07", "/us/456/0906-10", "/us/456/0906-04", "/us/456/0906-06", "/us/456/0906-03", "/us/456/0906-08" ] }, { "cite": "658 F.2d 1106", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 474295 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/658/1106-01" ] }, { "cite": "878 F.2d 1271", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10541018 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/878/1271-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 F.3d 753", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 288084 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "756" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/148/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18330", "category": "reporters:specialty_lexis", "reporter": "U.S. Dist. LEXIS", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "102 Utah 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Utah", "case_ids": [ 43755 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/utah/102/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 P.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10413162 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/687/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "289 So. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9732953 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/289/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "975 P.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 11617510 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/975/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "518 F.2d 246", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1122029 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/518/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 U.S. 322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11330171 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"It is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/439/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 793", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746778 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797-99", "parenthetical": "describing the constitutional rationale for allowing preclusion doctrines to estop a \"privy\" to a prior action from relitigating claims and issues" }, { "page": "83-84", "parenthetical": "describing the constitutional rationale for allowing preclusion doctrines to estop a \"privy\" to a prior action from relitigating claims and issues" }, { "page": "797-99" }, { "page": "83-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "402 U.S. 313", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11733536 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328-29", "parenthetical": "discussing due process limitations to collateral estoppel" }, { "page": "799-800", "parenthetical": "discussing due process limitations to collateral estoppel" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/402/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 U.S. 274", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5646733 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1876, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" }, { "page": "915-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/93/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 686", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627407 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "688" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 S.E.2d 384", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387", "parenthetical": "equitable estoppel binds parties and their privies" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 N.C. 510", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8621679 ], "year": 1946, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514", "parenthetical": "equitable estoppel binds parties and their privies" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/226/0510-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 S.E.2d 300", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307", "parenthetical": "estoppel of record binds parties and their privies" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574322 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28", "parenthetical": "estoppel of record binds parties and their privies" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "857", "parenthetical": "under doctrine of election, heirs and devisees of one who accepts benefits under a will are estopped to contest that will" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565447 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377", "parenthetical": "under doctrine of election, heirs and devisees of one who accepts benefits under a will are estopped to contest that will" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/277/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 L. Ed. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "892 F.2d 829", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10527492 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "836" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/892/0829-01" ] }, { "cite": "11 F.3d 1420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11329763 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1427-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/11/1420-01" ] }, { "cite": "232 F.3d 383", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11153631 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "quoting Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1427-28 (7th Cir. 1993)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/232/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 F.3d 355", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 6467132, 7650398 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "\"[Judicial estoppel] is not meant to be a technical defense for litigants seeking to derail potentially meritorious claims, especially when the alleged inconsistency is insignificant at best and there is no evidence of intent to manipulate or mislead the courts.\"" }, { "page": "358", "parenthetical": "\"Judicial estoppel is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies, however slight or inadvertent; rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from 'playing \"fast and loose with the courts.\" ' \"" }, { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "court unwilling to administer \"strong medicine\" of judicial estoppel \"to treat careless or inadvertent nondisclosures\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/194/0355-01", "/f3d/81/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "18 N.C. 452", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8694920 ], "year": 1836, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/18/0452-01" ] }, { "cite": "911 F.2d 1214", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10540514 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1218", "parenthetical": "noting that judicial estoppel may \"impingfe] on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/911/1214-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 F.3d 773", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11124852 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" }, { "page": "779", "parenthetical": "\"Summary judgment is appropriate when operation of judicial estoppel renders a litigant unable to state a prima facie case.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/243/0773-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 L. Ed. 2d 193", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "511 U.S. 1032", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1147045, 1147334, 1146824, 1146412, 1146417, 1147762, 1147796, 1146900, 1146424, 1147321, 1147578, 1147134 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/511/1032-03", "/us/511/1032-06", "/us/511/1032-12", "/us/511/1032-10", "/us/511/1032-11", "/us/511/1032-08", "/us/511/1032-05", "/us/511/1032-07", "/us/511/1032-09", "/us/511/1032-01", "/us/511/1032-02", "/us/511/1032-04" ] }, { "cite": "3 F.3d 877", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 10514751 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/3/0877-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 F.3d 694", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1753206 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/199/0694-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 N.C. 509", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569066 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/286/0509-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11634688, 11634848, 11634818, 11635043, 11634787, 11634759, 11634727, 11634921, 11635018, 11634704, 11634993, 11635185, 11635091, 11634969, 11635131, 11634878 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/1135-01", "/us/522/1135-07", "/us/522/1135-06", "/us/522/1135-13", "/us/522/1135-05", "/us/522/1135-04", "/us/522/1135-03", "/us/522/1135-09", "/us/522/1135-12", "/us/522/1135-02", "/us/522/1135-11", "/us/522/1135-16", "/us/522/1135-14", "/us/522/1135-10", "/us/522/1135-15", "/us/522/1135-08" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551309 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 780", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 799", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "817" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684937 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 681", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "570 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "\"prosecutor has the duty to vigorously present the State's case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511396 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "\"prosecutor has the duty to vigorously present the State's case\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "247 F.3d 118", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11105930 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/247/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "765 N.E.2d 578", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 9449233 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/765/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "840 F.2d 118", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10542916 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/840/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "69 F.3d 1255", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7413927 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/69/1255-01" ] }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 538", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11503916 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "120 F.3d 1045", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 224521 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1070" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/120/1045-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 L. 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Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 F.3d 1175", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 9344381 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1193", "parenthetical": "McKay, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/317/1175-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 F.3d 26", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7409733 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29" }, { "page": "29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/65/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 L. Ed. 2d 1078", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 1260", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108141, 1108495, 1107792, 1108215, 1108060, 1107903 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/1260-06", "/us/501/1260-02", "/us/501/1260-01", "/us/501/1260-04", "/us/501/1260-05", "/us/501/1260-03" ] }, { "cite": "893 F.2d 1033", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11649989 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1037" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/893/1033-01" ] }, { "cite": "944 F.2d 253", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10521641, 6510091 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "inconsistent court determinations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/944/0253-01", "/br/131/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 L. Ed. 2d 510", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 1082", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9562784, 9561697, 9562402, 9562501, 9562663, 9562058, 9561964, 9562284, 9562158, 9561876, 9561590, 9561784 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/1082-12", "/us/529/1082-02", "/us/529/1082-09", "/us/529/1082-10", "/us/529/1082-11", "/us/529/1082-06", "/us/529/1082-05", "/us/529/1082-08", "/us/529/1082-07", "/us/529/1082-04", "/us/529/1082-01", "/us/529/1082-03" ] }, { "cite": "195 F.3d 299", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1738149 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/195/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 L. Ed. 2d 211", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Supp. 1104", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3832484 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1111" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/813/1104-01" ] }, { "cite": "922 F.2d 357", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10542665 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "362" }, { "page": "364", "parenthetical": "applying Illinois law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/922/0357-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1059", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "U. Chi. L. Rev.", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1064" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 U.S. 258", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3382729 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1877, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "267" }, { "page": "696", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/96/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "78 L. Ed. 1489", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 U.S. 637", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 429899, 429842, 429939, 430069, 429786 ], "year": 1934, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/292/0637-01", "/us/292/0637-02", "/us/292/0637-05", "/us/292/0637-03", "/us/292/0637-04" ] }, { "cite": "67 F.2d 807", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 284977 ], "year": 1933, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "noting that an essential aspect of Howard was the fact that the \"defense in the first suit was of a character to induce the plaintiff to change his ground of action\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/67/0807-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 3106, "char_count": 102255, "ocr_confidence": 0.735, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.610220171570656e-06, "percentile": 0.9927190735830544 }, "sha256": "1d030ec612158ca830727d166128e28517f6b8f01a03bfc14d98aaf7368bcd7b", "simhash": "1:1accf5ba2a3f2f4e", "word_count": 16464 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:52.416221+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WHITACRE PARTNERSHIP, an Illinois limited partnership v. BIOSIGNIA, INC., corporate successor to Biomar International, Inc. and Future Health Technologies Company; T. NELSON CAMPBELL; and T. COLIN CAMPBELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Justice.\nPlaintiff Whitacre Partnership, an Illinois limited partnership (plaintiff or Whitacre Partnership), seeks a declaration establishing its ownership of 1,000,000 shares of common stock in defendant Biosignia, Inc. (defendant or Biosignia). In the alternative, plaintiff seeks damages for the wrongful conversion of the stock. On 28 June 2001, defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded plaintiff from asserting a factual position contrary to earlier representations made by plaintiff\u2019s general partners before a bankruptcy tribunal. The trial court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact and granted defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals determined that judicial estoppel did not apply on the facts of the present case and remanded to the trial court. We modify and affirm.\nI.\nThe facts of the instant case may be summarized as follows. Whitacre Partnership is an Illinois limited partnership. Its general partners are Mark E. Whitacre and Ginger L. Whitacre (collectively \u201cthe Whitacres\u201d), and its limited partners are the Whitacres\u2019 three children, Alexander R. Whitacre, William A. Whitacre, and Tanya M. Whitacre (collectively \u201cthe Whitacre children\u201d). The Whitacres, as general partners, each hold a one percent interest in the family partnership. The Whitacre children collectively own a ninety-eight percent interest as limited partners. According to the deposition testimony of Mark E. Whitacre (Whitacre), \u201c[t]he Whitacre Partnership was meant to be a trust fund\u201d for the benefit of the Whitacre children. At all times since the partnership was formed, its sole asset has been whatever right or title it may have had in the stock at issue in the present case.\nBiosignia is a closely held Delaware biotech corporation registered as a foreign corporation doing business in North Carolina. Its principal place of business is Orange County, North Carolina. Biosignia\u2019s corporate predecessors include Advocacy Communications, Inc. (Advocacy), also known by its trade name, F\u00fature Health Technologies, Inc. (FHT), and Biomar International, Inc. (Biomar). Defendants T. Nelson Campbell and T. Colin Campbell (the Campbell defendants) are officers and directors of Biosignia and its predecessor companies.\nOn 1 October 1995, Whitacre was appointed director, President, and Chief Executive Officer of FHT, and Advocacy issued 250 shares of common stock to Whitacre in his name. The employment agreement reached between Whitacre and FHT on or prior to 1 October 1995 was memorialized in a letter dated 12 October 1995 and signed by both Whitacre and defendant T. Colin Campbell. The letter provided that Whitacre would receive, in addition to his salary, \u201c20% of the outstanding shares of FHT by the date of FHT\u2019s first private placement,\u201d conditioned on Whitacre\u2019s contribution of $150,000 to FHT and his \u201cnot [having] voluntarily retired from [his] position of CEO or otherwise terminated [his] continuing relationship to FHT\u201d as of the date of the first private placement. By the terms of the letter, the shares would be issued to Whitacre \u201cand/or any trust established on behalf of [his] children.\u201d On 1 January 1996, Whitacre transferred his 250 shares in Advocacy to Whitacre Partnership.\nOn 26 April 1996, Advocacy\u2019s Board of Directors and shareholders executed a \u201cUnanimous Written Consent in Lieu of a Joint Special Meeting\u201d (Unanimous Written Consent). Whitacre signed as a director and on behalf of Whitacre Partnership as a shareholder of Advocacy. The Campbell defendants signed as directors and individually as shareholders. The Unanimous Written Consent (1) ratified Advocacy\u2019s hiring of Whitacre as President and CEO of the corporation and the issuance of 250 shares of Advocacy stock to Whitacre; (2) acknowledged that the value of those shares as of 1 October 1995 was $150,000, and that they \u201crepresented] 20% of total ownership\u201d of Advocacy and were issued for reimbursable expenses incurred on behalf of the corporation and as compensation for Whitacre\u2019s services; and (3) authorized a share exchange for officers and counsel of the corporation at a rate of 8,000 \u201cNew Shares\u201d for each \u201cOld Share.\u201d\nOn 29 April 1996, Advocacy filed a certificate of amendment with the Delaware Secretary of State to change its corporate name to \u201cBiomar, International, Inc.\u201d The following day Biomar issued stock certificate number 8 to Whitacre Partnership for 2,000,000 shares. No restrictive legend or other limiting indication appears on the face of the stock certificate. In a letter enclosing the certificate dated 25 September 1996, counsel for Biomar informed Whitacre that the new certificate \u201creplace [d] the stock certificate of the original corporation, Advocacy Communications, Inc.\u201d and that the \u201coriginal of those certificates were marked cancelled and placed in the corporate book of Advocacy Communications, Inc.\u201d\nIn early 1997, a federal grand jury indicted Whitacre on forty-five counts of tax fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, conspiracy, and other charges in connection with Whitacre\u2019s embezzlement of several million dollars from his former employer, Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Whitacre pled guilty in October 1997 to thirty-seven counts of wire fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, conspiracy to defraud, money laundering, and filing false tax returns in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois. On 4 March 1998, Whitacre was ordered to serve an active sentence of 108 months in a federal correctional facility and to pay over $11,000,000 in restitution. Shortly thereafter, in a separate federal proceeding, Whitacre was sentenced to an active term of thirty months for his participation in a price-fixing scheme during his tenure at ADM. In at least the former of the two criminal proceedings, as well as a bankruptcy proceeding initiated in September 1997, Whitacre was represented by Attorneys Bill T. Walker and Richard F. Kurth.\nIn January or February of 1997, upon Whitacre\u2019s request, Biomar reissued 250,000 of the 2,000,000 shares held by Whitacre Partnership in the names of Whitacre\u2019s attorneys, Walker and Kurth. Certificate number 18 was issued to Bill T. Walker and his spouse Susan P. Walker as joint tenants with a right of survivorship in the amount of 100,000 shares. Certificate number 19 was issued to Richard Kurth and his spouse Diane Kurth for 150,000 shares. Both certificates were issued sometime in 1997 and backdated to 3 September 1996, and both are listed in Biomar\u2019s stock ledger as \u201ctransfer^]\u201d from Whitacre Partnership. The record also reveals that a third stock certificate \u2014 certificate number 17, issued to Whitacre Partnership in the amount of 1,750,000 shares \u2014 was also dated 3 September 1996. The record is silent as to whether this certificate was also backdated, and the stock ledger entry describes certificate number 17 as a new issue for \u201cshares retained\u201d after a transfer of 250,000 shares. Taken together, certificates 17, 18, and 19 are consistent with T. Nelson Campbell and Whitacre\u2019s contentions that Whitacre Partnership transferred 250,000 of its 2,000,000 shares in Biosignia to compensate Whitacre\u2019s attorneys. Cumulatively, they reflect a 250,000-share reduction in Whitacre Partnership\u2019s holding in Biosignia, an amount equivalent to the number of shares transferred to Whitacre\u2019s attorneys as compensation for their services. All three certificates were signed by T. Nelson Campbell as Secretary/Treasurer of Biomar and by Mark E. Whitacre as President of Biomar.\nOn 11 February 1997, following his indictment by a federal grand jury and a brief period of hospitalization for what he characterized as \u201csuicidal thoughts and erratic behavior,\u201d Whitacre resigned as President and Chief Executive Officer of Biomar. In connection with his resignation, Whitacre accepted a position as an officer of Clintech, a new subsidiary of Biomar. In his letter of resignation to T. Nelson Campbell, Whitacre referred to a \u201cprevious understanding\u201d between Campbell and Whitacre whereby Whitacre\u2019s resignation would \u201cresult in the forfeiture of 500,000 unearned shares of Biomar\u2019s common stock.\u201d The letter also expressed Whitacre\u2019s understanding \u201cthat a new certificate will be issued in the amount of 1,250,000 shares,\u201d and stated that a \u201ccopy of [Whitacre\u2019s original] stock certificate\u201d was attached. The letter requested that the new certificate be \u201cissued to [Whitacre\u2019s] children\u201d in the name of W.F.P. Management Company (WFP), which Whitacre described as \u201cthe company holding my children\u2019s estate (via a Family Limited Partnership).\u201d W.F.P. Management, it appears, is simply another name for the Whitacre Family Partnership.\nIn a letter accepting Whitacre\u2019s resignation dated 20 February 1997, T. Colin Campbell invited Whitacre\u2019s approval to an expression of the \u201cagreement between [Whitacre] and Biomar concerning [Whitacre\u2019s] resignation.\u201d The letter stated that \u201cthe total number of shares owned by [Whitacre\u2019s] family partnership (prior to any share distributions to [Whitacre\u2019s] attorneys) is 1,250,000 shares\u201d and requested Whitacre to \u201cindicate [his] approval by signing below.\u201d Whitacre did sign the letter, just below Campbell\u2019s signature, under the caption \u201cAGREED TO.\u201d The date \u201c20 February 1997\u201d also appears on the face of two separate stock certificates issued by Biomar to Whitacre Partnership. Stock certificate number 21, signed by T. Nelson Campbell as Secretary and T. Colin Campbell as President, was issued in the name of \u201cW.F.P. Management Co., Inc.\u201d in the amount of 1,000,000 shares. The ledger entry for certificate number 21 indicates that its issuance coincided with the purported surrender of 750,000 shares from certificate number 17, which was originally issued in the amount of 1,750,000 shares in the name of Whitacre Partnership. It is listed as a transfer from \u201cWhitaker [sic] Partnership.\u201d Stock certificate number 27, also signed by the Campbell defendants, was issued in the name of \u201cWhitacre Partnership, a family partnership\u201d in the amount of 1,000,000 shares. The stock ledger indicates that this was a transfer from WFP. In his 10 May 2001 deposition, Whitacre acknowledged that the date on certificate 21 was written in his own handwriting, and that the certificate \u201cresulted from the discussions that [T. Nelson Campbell] and I had at my termination of employment with Biomar in February ;97.\u201d Whitacre also acknowledged that he had signed a \u201ccontract\u201d on 20 February 1997, under the terms of which he was to \u201cforfeit 750,000 of those shares out of the 2,000,000.\u201d\nIn early 1997, Whitacre and T. Nelson Campbell executed a Restricted Stock Agreement (RSA), the scope and effect of which is crucial to a determination of the ownership of the stock at issue here. Although the agreement is dated 23 October 1995, the parties agree that the RSA was backdated to be given retroactive effect, and was not actually executed on 23 October 1995. The record is unclear, however, as to the actual date of execution.\nThe RSA purports to be a fully integrated agreement between Whitacre and T. Nelson Campbell, as an officer of FHT \u201cor any other future name\u201d of FHT, concerning the 2,000,000 shares issued to Whitacre. By its terms, the agreement is binding on the \u201cparties . . . themselves, their successors and their assigns.\u201d The RSA states that the company \u201chereby provides [Whitacre] 2,000,000 shares of its common stock . . . upon [Whitacre\u2019s] joining the company . . . and for his continued employment as an officer of the Company or one of its subsidiaries/or joint ventures subject to the options and restrictions as specified below.\u201d After expressing the parties\u2019 desire to \u201crestrict[] the sale, disposition, or other transfer\u201d of Whitacre\u2019s shares, it defines \u201cRestricted Shares\u201d to include \u201call outstanding Provided Shares\u201d and defines \u201cProvided Shares\u201d as \u201cthe 2,000,000 Shares provided to [Whitacre] upon joining the Company.. . and for his continued employment as an officer of the Company or one of its subsidiaries/or joint ventures for a period of five years in order to be fully vested.\u201d\nOn 4 March 1997, thirteen days after Biomar had accepted Whitacre\u2019s resignation from FHT, T. Nelson Campbell and Whitacre executed an addendum to the 23 October 1995 RSA. In its entirety, the addendum provides as follows:\nOn March 4, 1997 this agreement was reached among the Principals of Biomar International, Inc. that Dr. Mark E. Whitacre would become the CEO/President of a subsidiary of Biomar to establish a joint venture company that will provide biostatistical services to pharmaceutical companies and HMOs. In this position, 1.25 million shares of stock (including the shares used to pay attorneys) will be maintained in the Whitacre Limited Partnership. 50% of the 1.25 million shares will be vested in 1.5 years from the above date (3/4/97), and 100% within four years.\nDefendants claim that this addendum to the vesting schedule originally laid out in the October 1995 RSA controls the disposition of this case.\nOn 11 September 1997, the Whitacres filed a voluntary petition for discharge of their debts under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. In the course of their bankruptcy filings and statements before the bankruptcy trustee, the Whitacres made the following factual representations, which defendant maintains plaintiff is now estopped to contradict.\nFirst, on the statutorily mandated \u201cSchedule B\u201d. disclosure of their personal property, the Whitacres appeared to acknowledge that the stock in question was subject to the 23 October 1995 RSA. Under the heading \u201cStock and interest in incorporated and unincorporated businesses,\u201d the Whitacres listed \u201c1.25 million shares of Biomar Stock maintained in Whitacre Limited Partnership conditioned on October 23, 1995 restricted stock agreement.\u201d There is no corresponding entry for this stock in the \u201cvalue\u201d column. In the subsequent paragraph, titled \u201cInterest in partnerships or joint ventures,\u201d the Whitacres stated, \u201cDebtors are general partners in Whitacre Limited Partnership with right to receive 1% each for administration. Management Company known as W.P. Management Company. Currently not funded.\u201d The market value of this asset is listed as \u201cUNKNOWN.\u201d\nSecond, during the statutorily mandated \u201c341 Meeting\u201d between debtors, creditors, and the bankruptcy trustee, Whitacre made additional statements, under oath, that appeared to acknowledge that the stock was subject to the 4 March 1997 Addendum to the RSA and that, given Whitacre\u2019s resignation from the company, it could never vest in interest. The relevant portion of the transcript from that meeting reads as follows:\nMr. Yaeger [bankruptcy trustee]: You had a restricted stock agreement \u2014 and have provided me a copy of that \u2014 related to your employment as a chief executive officer where you were to receive 1.25 million shares of BioMar?\nDr. Whitacre: Right.\nMr. Yaeger: What\u2019s the status of that? Is that an asset your creditors can look to?\nDr. Whitacre: It\u2019s an asset I won\u2019t have because of a vesting schedule that is required \u2014 two and a half years to receive fifty percent of that, which would have been spring of next year, and five years to receive a hundred percent of that on a vesting schedule, so I will not receive that at this point.\nMr. Craven [counsel for Whitacre]: As a result of resigning 1, October.\nDr. Whitacre: Right. Resigning \u2014 -the October 1 resignation.\nMr. Yaeger: Does that stock have any present value?\nDr. Whitacre: It does not.\nMr. Yaeger: Are you owed anything by BioMar as a result of your employment or other contributions?\nDr. Whitacre: No, I received my last paycheck, and that\u2019s it.\nEventually, the Whitacres\u2019 bankruptcy petition was voluntarily dismissed.\nWhitacre resigned from Clintech in October 1997, permanently ending his professional relationship with Biosignia, its predecessors, and its subsidiaries. Handwritten entries in the \u201ctransfer\u201d columns of the stock ledger dated 1 October 1997 describe certificates 18, 19, and 27 \u2014 issued to Attorney Bill Walker, Attorney Richard Kurth, and Whitacre Partnership, respectively \u2014 as \u201cVOID: Reverted to Biosignia, Inc.\u201d\nOn 8 May 2000, Whitacre Partnership instituted the instant civil action against Biosignia, alleging wrongful cancellation of and, in the alternative, conversion of, 1,000,000 shares of stock, and seeking damages in excess of twenty million dollars. On 28 June 2001, after the close of discovery, Biosignia filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Whitacre Partnership was judicially estopped to deny the earlier assertions of its general partners before a bankruptcy tribunal that the stock was subject to the RSA and its Addendum and, by the terms of those agreements, could never vest in plaintiff. On 13 July 2001, the trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment. On 5 November 2002, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for adjudication on the merits. On 27 February 2003, this Court allowed discretionary review.\nII.\nThe dispositive issue before this Court is whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel bars Whitacre Partnership from asserting ownership of the stock in question based on the Whitacres\u2019 earlier representations before a bankruptcy tribunal. This case thus requires us to determine whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel is a part of the common law of North Carolina. We hold that it is, and hereby join at least thirty-five other states and the United States Supreme Court in recognizing the doctrine. See New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968, 977 (2001); Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. 242, 251-52, 489 S.E.2d 472, 477 (1997); Fay v. Fed. Nat\u2019l Mortgage Ass\u2019n, 419 Mass. 782, 787-88, 647 N.E.2d 422, 426 (1995); Douglas W. Henkin, Comment, Judicial Estoppel\u2014Beating Shields into Swords and Back Again, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1711, 1756-60 (1991) (appendix listing thirty-three states as having accepted judicial estoppel).\nBefore we describe the contours of the doctrine, we pause to consider the evolution of judicial estoppel, tracing its roots in the legal landscape of this Court and the United States Supreme Court. As this discussion will show, our recognition of judicial estoppel is not a point of departure, but a natural step in the evolution of our jurisprudence, consistent with well-established legal principles and settled precedent. Although we have not previously considered whether judicial estoppel is a viable doctrine in North Carolina, we have long applied several of its companion estoppel doctrines and have consistently recognized the importance of protecting the integrity of the judicial process from the vagaries of litigants who may seek to manipulate it. See, e.g., Kannan v. Assad, 182 N.C. 77, 78, 108 S.E. 383, 384 (1921) (\u201cIt is well understood that, except in proper instances, a party to a suit should not be allowed to change his position with respect to a material matter, during the course of litigation, nor should he be allowed to \u2018blow hot and cold in the same breath.\u2019 \u201d (citations omitted)). In addition, although the Court of Appeals has recognized the doctrine, it has struggled with its precise formulation. See, e.g., Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Servs., 119 N.C. App. 767, 769-71, 460 S.E.2d 361, 363-64 (1995) (defining judicial estoppel); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C. App. 394, 400, 496 S.E.2d 811, 815 (1998) (using the term \u201cjudicial estoppel\u201d interchangeably with \u201cequitable estoppel\u201d), disc. rev. denied, 348 N.C. 76, 505 S.E.2d 884 (1998), appeal dismissed in part, 348 N.C. 76, 505 S.E.2d 884 (1998), aff\u2019d, 349 N.C. 219, 504 S.E.2d 785 (1998). Our discussion of the historical roots of judicial estoppel seeks to avoid further confusion by carefully situating judicial estoppel in the broader analytical framework of estoppel and preclusion doctrines.\nBroadly speaking, \u201cestoppel is a bar which precludes a person from denying or asserting anything to the contrary of that which has, in contemplation of law, been established as the truth.\u201d 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver \u00a7 1 (2000). As we noted over 150 years ago, it is a principle which \u201clies at the foundation of all fair dealing between [persons], and without which, it would be impossible to administer law as a system.\u201d Armfield v. Moore, 44 N.C. 157, 161 (1852). \u201cEstoppel\u201d is not a single coherent doctrine, but a complex body of interrelated rules, including estoppel by record, estoppel by deed, collateral estoppel, equitable estoppel, promissory estoppel, and judicial estoppel. 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver \u00a7 2 (2000). Viewed in its proper theoretical context, judicial estoppel is best understood as a specific branch of a broader spectrum of estoppel and preclusion doctrines customarily used to promote the fairness and integrity of judicial proceedings.\nWhile estoppel in its broadest sense predates the American colonial experience, see Armfield, 44 N.C. at 161, legal scholars generally agree that the concept of judicial estoppel was first applied in Hamilton v. Zimmerman, 37 Tenn. 39 (1857). See William Houston Brown, Debtor\u2019s Counsel Beware: Use of the Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel in Nonbankruptcy Forums, 75 Am. Bankr. L.J. 197, 200 (2001) [hereinafter Brown]. Describing the doctrine as a device to protect the sanctity of the oath, the Tennessee Supreme Court applied judicial estoppel on an absolute basis, holding that a factual assertion in a judicial proceeding estopped any contradictory factual assertion by the same party in a later proceeding, except where the original representation was made \u201cinconsiderately or by mistake.\u201d Hamilton, 37 Tenn. at 48. Although the Tennessee courts continue to apply this narrow version of the doctrine, most modem authorities agree that the purpose of judicial estoppel is to \u201c \u2018protect the integrity of the judicial process,\u2019 \u201d New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 977 (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 598 (6th Cir. 1982)), not just the sanctity of the oath, and that \u201ca hallmark of the doctrine is its flexible application.\u201d Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 59, 81 L. Ed. 2d 42, 51 (1984) (discussing estoppel generally); see also 18 James Wm. Moore et al, Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 134.31, at 134-71 (3d ed. 1997).\nScholars have noted that the doctrine \u201chas its roots in nineteenth century American law,\u201d a period when preclusion law formed an \u201cinconsistent patchwork,\u201d and the phrase \u201cjudicial estoppel\u201d was often used to refer to the emerging doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Lawrence B. Solum, Caution! Estoppel Ahead: Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corporation, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 461, 475-76, 483 (1999) [hereinafter Solum]. By the early part of the twentieth century, the phrase was used loosely to refer to a variety of legal doctrines, including res judicata, collateral estoppel, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and election of remedies. See, e.g., Aycock v. O\u2019Brien, 28 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1928) (using the phrase \u201cjudicial estoppel\u201d to refer to collateral estoppel); Van Norden v. Charles R. McCormick Lumber Co., 27 F.2d 881, 881 (9th Cir. 1928) (using \u201cjudicial estoppel\u201d to refer to res judicata or claim preclusion); Parkerson v. Borst, 264 F. 761, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1920) (using \u201cjudicial estoppel\u201d to refer to an election of remedies doctrine); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Porter, 3 F.2d 57, 59 (D. Idaho 1924) (using \u201cjudicial estoppel\u201d to refer to res judicata and collateral estoppel). Although these doctrines are technically distinguishable from judicial estoppel, they reflect a shared and longstanding judicial reluctance to permit the assertion of inconsistent positions before a judicial or administrative tribunal. See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation with a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel, Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, \u201cMend the Hold,\u201d \u201cFraud on the Court\u201d and Judicial and Evidentiary Admissions, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. 589, 591-97 (1998) [hereinafter Anderson & Holober]. It is therefore useful to consider judicial estoppel in connection with these related doctrines.\nNorth Carolina courts have recognized many of the doctrinal precursors of judicial estoppel in an evolving jurisprudence that has consistently disfavored reversals of position on factual matters to suit the exigencies of the moment. Our recognition of judicial estoppel is a natural extension of these doctrines, one which parallels the development of a line of cases from the United States Supreme Court that culminated in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968.\nWe begin our survey of the historical roots of judicial estoppel with a discussion of res judicata and collateral estoppel. North Carolina recognizes both doctrines as traditionally formulated, although we have followed the modem trend in abandoning the strict \u201cmutuality of estoppel\u201d requirement for defensive uses of collateral estoppel. Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 434, 349 S.E.2d 552, 560 (1986). Recognizing the close relationship between the two doctrines, we have sometimes referred to both res judicata and collateral estoppel as species of a broader category of \u201cestoppel by judgment.\u201d See, e.g., Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 491-92, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 (1993). More often, however, we have used the term \u201cestoppel by judgment\u201d to refer specifically to collateral estoppel. See, e.g., State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 622, 528 S.E.2d 17, 20 (2000); State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 147, 446 S.E.2d 579, 589 (1994) (referring to \u201ccollateral estoppel by judgment\u201d).\nUnder the doctrine of res judicata or \u201cclaim preclusion,\u201d a final judgment on the merits in one action precludes a second suit based on the same cause of action between the same parties or their privies. State ex rel. Tucker v. Frinzi, 344 N.C. 411, 413, 474 S.E.2d 127, 128 (1996); Hales v. North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass\u2019n, 337 N.C. 329, 333, 445 S.E.2d 590, 594 (1994). The doctrine prevents the relitigation of \u201call matters . . . that were or should have been adjudicated in the prior action.\u201d McInnis, 318 N.C. at 428, 349 S.E.2d at 556. Under the companion doctrine of collateral estoppel, also known as \u201cestoppel by judgment\u201d or \u201cissue preclusion,\u201d the determination of an issue in a prior judicial or administrative proceeding precludes the relitigation of that issue in a later action, provided the party against whom the estoppel is asserted enjoyed a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier proceeding. McInnis, 318 N.C. at 433-34, 349 S.E.2d at 560; Bradley v. Hidden Valley Transp., Inc., 148 N.C. App. 163, 166, 557 S.E.2d 610, 613 (2001), aff\u2019d per curiam, 355 N.C. 485, 562 S.E.2d 422 (2002). Whereas res judicata estops a party or its privy from bringing a subsequent action based on the \u201csame claim\u201d as that litigated in an earlier action, collateral estoppel precludes the subsequent adjudication of a previously determined issue, even if the subsequent action is based on an entirely different claim. Hales, 337 N.C. at 333, 445 S.E.2d at 594. The two doctrines are complementary in that each may apply in situations where the other would not and both advance the twin policy goals of \u201cprotecting litigants from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.\u201d Bockweg, 333 N.C. at 491, 428 S.E.2d at 161.\nMany authorities have noted that judicial estoppel is \u201cclosely related\u201d to collateral estoppel, although \u201cdissimilar in critical respects.\u201d Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982); see also 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 134.30, at 134-69 (3d ed. 1997) (stating that the doctrines are \u201csimilar\u201d but have \u201csubstantial differences\u201d). The doctrines are similar not just in their preclusive effect, but also in their shared requirement of an identity of issues. Just as a party may not be collaterally estopped to argue an issue unless that same issue has been litigated and determined in a prior action, Summers, 351 N.C. at 623, 528 S.E.2d at 20, a party may not be judicially estopped to assert \u201cinconsistent positions with respect to issues that are only superficially similar.\u201d 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore\u2019s Federal Practice \u00a7 134.30, at 134-69 (3d ed. 1997). The doctrines are distinguishable, on the other hand, in three principle respects. First, judicial estoppel seeks to protect the integrity of the judicial process itself, whereas collateral estoppel and res judicata seek to protect the rights and interests of the parties to an action. Rand G. Boyers, Comment, Precluding Inconsistent Statements: The Doctrine of Judicial Estoppel, 80 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1244, 1248 (1986). Second, unlike collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel has no requirement that an issue have been actually litigated in a prior proceeding. See Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 223 n.3 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1113, 136 L. Ed. 2d 841 (1997). Third, unlike collateral estoppel, judicial estoppel has no requirement of \u201cmutuality\u201d of the parties in either its offensive or defensive applications. Id. at 223 n.3; see also Sartain v. Dixie Coal & Iron Co., 150 Tenn. 633, 650, 266 S.W. 313, 317 (1924) (judicial estoppel has no mutuality requirement because the doctrine \u201chas nothing to do with other parties to the suit\u201d). Because of these distinctions, judicial estoppel may apply in situations where collateral estoppel would not. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1166-67. Thus, although the doctrines may overlap depending on the facts of any given case, they maintain independent spheres of operation.\nNorth Carolina courts have also long recognized the doctrine of equitable estoppel, otherwise known as estoppel in pais. In re Will of Covington, 252 N.C. 546, 548, 114 S.E.2d 257, 259 (1960) (discussing the common law origins of equitable estoppel and summarizing the \u201cmultitude of cases\u201d where the doctrine has been applied in this state). Generally speaking, the doctrine applies\n\u201cwhen any one, by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain- facts exist, and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts.\u201d\nState Highway Comm\u2019n. v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 240, 156 S.E.2d 248, 258 (1967) (quoting Boddie v. Bond, 154 N.C. 359, 365, 70 S.E. 824, 826 (1911)). In such a situation, the party whose words or conduct induced another\u2019s detrimental reliance may be estopped to deny the truth of his earlier representations in the interests of fairness to the other party. Id. In applying the doctrine, a court must consider the conduct of both parties to determine whether each has \u201cconformed to strict standards of equity with regard to the matter at issue.\u201d Creech v. Melnik, 347 N.C. 520, 529, 495 S.E.2d 907, 913 (1998).\nEquitable estoppel is closely related to judicial estoppel. Indeed, some authorities have described the latter as a subset or variation of the former. See, e.g., Eads Hide & Wool Co. v. Merrill, 252 F.2d 80, 84 (10th Cir. 1958) (describing judicial estoppel as a \u201cphase of equitable estoppel\u201d). In some jurisdictions, the close connection between the doctrines has led to substantial confusion. See, e.g., Guinness PLC v. Ward, 955 F.2d 875, 899 (4th Cir. 1992) (noting that judicial estoppel \u201cis frequently expressed in language sounding of estoppel in pais\u201d but \u201coperates independently of equitable estoppel\u201d (quoting IB Moore, Federal Practice, \u00a7 0.405[8], at 765-68 (2d ed. 1971))). Most authorities, however, have consistently distinguished the doctrines on the following grounds. First, equitable estoppel is designed to promote fairness between the parties, whereas judicial estoppel seeks primarily to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings. See Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598; Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 102 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1988). Second, as a natural consequence of this distinction in purpose, mutuality of the parties and detrimental reliance on the part of the party invoking estoppel \u2014 both elements of equitable estoppel \u2014 are not required for judicial estoppel. See Patriot Cinemas v. Gen. Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 214 (1st Cir. 1987); Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980).\nThis Court has also recognized that branch of equitable estoppel known as \u201cquasi-estoppel\u201d or \u201cestoppel by benefit.\u201d Brooks v. Hackney, 329 N.C. 166, 172 n.3, 173, 404 S.E.2d 854, 858 n.3, 859 (1991); see also Shuford v. Asheville Oil Co., 243 N.C. 636, 646-47, 91 S.E.2d 903, 911 (1956); Allen v. Allen, 213 N.C. 264, 271, 195 S.E. 801, 805 (1938). Under a quasi-estoppel theory, a party who accepts a transaction or instrument and then accepts benefits under it may be estopped to take a later position inconsistent with the prior acceptance of that same transaction or instrument. Brooks, 329 N.C. at 173, 404 S.E.2d at 859; see also Pure Oil Co. v. Baars, 224 N.C. 612, 615, 31 S.E.2d 854, 856 (1944); 11A Strong\u2019s North Carolina Index 4th Estoppel \u00a7 13 (2001). The key distinction between quasi-estoppel and equitable estoppel is that the former may operate without detrimental reliance on the part of the party invoking the estoppel. See Chance v. Henderson, 134 N.C. App. 657, 665, 518 S.E.2d 780, 785 (1999); 11A Strong\u2019s North Carolina Index 4th Estoppel \u00a7 13 (2001); cf. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws \u00a7 74 cmt. b (1971) (stating that under a \u201ctrue\u201d estoppel, \u201cone party induces another to rely to his damage upon certain representations\u201d). In comparison to equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel is inherently flexible and cannot be reduced to any rigid formulation. See Taylor v. Taylor, 321 N.C. 244, 249 n.1, 362 S.E.2d 542, 546 n.1 (1987).\nIn light of these distinctions, quasi-estoppel may be more closely related to judicial estoppel than any other equitable doctrine. See Anderson & Holober, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. at 666-69 (comparing judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, and quasi-estoppel). Indeed, the doctrines are so similar in function and purpose that courts in other jurisdictions have occasionally used the terms interchangeably, and some commentators have classified judicial estoppel as a subset of quasiestoppel. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. State, 804 P.2d 62, 66 n.7 (Alaska 1990) (discussing the doctrine of \u201cjudicial quasi-estoppel\u201d); 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver \u00a7 74 (2000) (\u201cJudicial estoppel is a subset of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, which has its basis in election, waiver, acquiescence, or an acceptance of benefits.\u201d).\nDespite this close connection, however, there are substantial differences between the doctrines, with quasi-estoppel appearing to occupy an intermediary position between judicial estoppel and equitable estoppel. See Anderson & Holober, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. at 666-69 (comparing judicial estoppel, equitable estoppel, and quasi-estoppel). As our Court of Appeals has noted, \u201cthe essential purpose of quasiestoppel ... is to prevent a party from benefitting by taking two clearly inconsistent positions.\u201d B & F Slosman v. Sonopress, Inc., 148 N.C. App. 81, 88, 557 S.E.2d 176, 181 (2001), disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 283, 560 S.E.2d 795 (2002). Like equitable estoppel, and unlike judicial estoppel, quasi-estoppel requires mutuality of parties; the doctrine may not be asserted by or against a \u201cstranger\u201d to the transaction that gave rise to the estoppel. See In re Estate of Anderson, 148 N.C. App. 501, 505, 559 S.E.2d 222, 225 (2002); 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver \u00a7 131 (2000). Like judicial estoppel, and unlike equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel \u201cdoes not require detrimental reliance per se by anyone.\u201d Godley v. Cty. of Pitt, 306 N.C. 357, 361, 293 S.E.2d 167, 170 (1982) (quoting 31 C.J.S. Estoppel \u00a7 107 (1964)). Instead, quasi-estoppel \u201cis directly grounded . .. upon a party\u2019s acquiescence or acceptance of payment or benefits, by virtue of which that party is thereafter prevented from maintaining a position inconsistent with those acts.\u201d Id.; see also Taylor v. Taylor, 321 N.C. at 249, 362 S.E.2d at 546.\nIn sum, quasi-estoppel is similar to judicial estoppel in the absence of a requirement of detrimental reliance on the part of the party invoking the estoppel. Quasi-estoppel is similar to equitable estoppel in that it may not be invoked by a stranger to the transaction where the prior position was asserted. Thus, as with the other doctrines discussed above, quasi-estoppel overlaps judicial estoppel, but the doctrines are not redundant.\nFinally, North Carolina courts have long recognized and applied the election of remedies doctrine. E.g., Richardson v. Richardson, 261 N.C. 521, 530, 135 S.E.2d 532, 539 (1964); Adams v. Wilson, 191 N.C. 392, 395-96, 131 S.E. 760, 762 (1926); Field v. Eaton, 16 N.C. 283, 286-87 (1829). \u201cAn election, in equity, is a choice which a party is compelled to make between the acceptance of a benefit under a written instrument, and the retention of some property already his own, which is attempted to be disposed of in favor of a third party by virtue of the same paper.\u201d Elmore v. Byrd, 180 N.C. 120, 122, 104 S.E. 162, 163 (1920). The doctrine \u201cis founded on the principle that where by law or by contract there is a choice of two remedies which proceed upon opposite and irreconcilable claims of right, the one taken must exclude and bar the prosecution of the other.\u201d Irvin v. Harris, 182 N.C. 647, 653, 109 S.E. 867, 870 (1921). The doctrine precludes the assertion of inconsistent positions by confining a party to the position \u201cwhich he first adopts.\u201d In re Lloyd\u2019s Will, 161 N.C. 557, 559-60, 77 S.E. 955, 956-57 (1913); see also Sears v. Braswell, 197 N.C. 515, 523, 149 S.E. 846, 850 (1929); Chilton v. Groome, 168 N.C. 639, 640-41, 84 S.E. 1038, 1039 (1915). Thus, a party asserting rights under a will, deed, or contract is \u201c \u2018estopped, by claiming under it, to attack any of its provisions. . . . [0]ne who accepts the terms of [an instrument] must accept the same as a whole; one cannot accept part and reject the rest.\u2019 \u201d Braswell, 197 N.C. at 523, 149 S.E. at 850 (quoting Bigelow on Estoppel, 6 ed., p. 744); see also Field v. Eaton, 16 N.C. at 286-87.\nOther authorities have recognized the close connection and essential differences between judicial estoppel and the doctrine of election. See, e.g., United States v. Carrero, 140 F.3d 327, 330 (1st Cir. 1998) (referring to judicial estoppel and election of remedies as \u201ccompanion doctrines\u201d); Butcher v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 850 F.2d 247, 248 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1067, 103 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1989). Both are equitable doctrines that derive from the ancient common law doctrine of estoppel, and both work to preclude a party from asserting a position that is \u201cinconsistent\u201d with its position in a prior proceeding. See Gens v. Resolution Trust Corp., 112 F.3d 569, 572 (1st Cir. 1997), cert. denied, Gens v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 522 U.S. 931, 139 L. Ed. 2d 260 (1997). Neither doctrine requires the party invoking the estoppel to show that he has detrimentally relied on the prior position of the party to be estopped. See, e.g., Myers v. Ross, 10 F. Supp. 409, 411 (S.D. Fla. 1935); Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So. 2d 1331, 1334 (Fla. 1987). Despite these similarities, however, the doctrines diverge in their purposes and scopes of application. Whereas the primary purpose of judicial estoppel is to \u201c \u2018protect the integrity of the judicial process,\u2019 \u201d New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 977 (quoting Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598), the doctrine of election is used to \u201cprevent double redress for a single wrong.\u201d Smith v. Gulf Oil Corp., 239 N.C. 360, 368, 79 S.E.2d 880, 885 (1954). Furthermore, because it is \u201cbased upon an inconsistency of position rather than a selection of means of enforcing a right,\u201d Eads Hide & Wool Co., 252 F.2d at 84, judicial estoppel has a much broader scope of application than the doctrine of election. Cf. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1166-67 (judicial estoppel may apply where election of remedies would not). Thus, even though the election of remedies rule substantially overlaps judicial estoppel, the doctrines are not coextensive.\nIn addition to invoking the specific estoppel doctrines described above, we have on other occasions estopped parties to assert inconsistent positions in the same or subsequent judicial proceeding without specifying the precise legal theory at work. See, e.g., King v. Snyder, 269 N.C. 148, 153, 152 S.E.2d 92, 96 (1967) (\u201cA person appointed administrator and acting in that capacity in defending a wrongful death action is estopped from asserting therein the invalidity of his own asserted status as such administrator.\u201d); Owens v. Voncannon, 252 N.C. 461, 462, 114 S.E.2d 95, 96 (1960) (co-defendant who consistently denied the authority of an attorney to act as her attorney \u201cfor any purpose\u201d could not rely on answer filed by that attorney \u201cpurportedly in behalf of all defendants\u201d); Kanupp v. Land, 248 N.C. 203, 206-07, 102 S.E.2d 779, 782 (1958) (plaintiffs who had denied existence of road in prior action could not ask court in later action to locate boundaries of that road; \u201cplaintiffs cannot ask for the location of something which they deny exists\u201d); Brown v. Vestal, 231 N.C. 56, 58, 55 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1949) (defendants were not entitled to dismiss action based on an agreement the existence of which they denied in their pleadings and testimony); Hill v. Dir.-Gen. of R.R.s, 178 N.C. 607, 612, 101 S.E. 376, 379 (1919) (where Director General of Railroads had obtained stay of proceedings against defendant railroad on grounds that such suits must be conducted against him in his official capacity, \u201che should not be allowed to change his attitude and undertake a resistance as being in charge of the [railroad]\u201d); Fisher v. Toxoway Co., 165 N.C. 663, 670-71, 81 S.E. 925, 928 (1914) (where defendant\u2019s pleadings claimed title to property solely on the basis of a deed from plaintiff and that deed was later declared void, defendant could not change his position and assert a paramount title). In many of these cases, the rationale for the estoppel has come very close to that traditionally used to support judicial estoppel. See, e.g., Rand v. Gillette, 199 N.C. 462, 463, 154 S.E. 746, 747 (1930) (\u201cA party is not permitted to take a position in a subsequent judicial proceeding which conflicts with a position taken by him in a former judicial proceeding, where the latter position disadvantages his adversary. . . . [H]e cannot safely \u2018run with the hare and hunt with the hound.\u2019 \u201d).\nWe do not propose that these cases applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel without denominating it as such. Rather, these cases evince the early stirrings of judicial estoppel in the case law of this state. The purpose and effect of the estoppels applied in these cases closely approximate the purpose and effect of judicial estoppel as it has been applied in most jurisdictions. We therefore draw upon these cases, in addition to all the others cited earlier, in recognizing that judicial estoppel is a part of the common law of this state.\nWe now turn to a close examination of the precedents cited in New Hampshire v. Maine in support of the United States Supreme Court\u2019s articulation of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Because we follow the Supreme Court\u2019s reasoning in that case in our opinion today, we explore in some detail the manner in which the United States Supreme Court derived the rule of judicial estoppel from its own precedents.\nIn New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court implicitly recognized the doctrine\u2019s deep roots in American jurisprudence, beginning its discussion of the law of judicial estoppel with the following quotation from the 1895 case, Davis v. Wakelee: \u201c \u2018Where a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume a contrary position, especially if it be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken ....\u2019\u201d New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 977 (quoting Davis v. Wakelee, 156 U.S. 680, 689, 39 L. Ed. 578, 584 (1895)). The Court stated that \u201c[t]his rule, known as judicial estoppel, \u2018generally prevents a party from prevailing in one phase of a case on an argument and then relying on a contradictory argument to prevail in another phase.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 749, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 977 (quoting Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 227 n.8, 147 L. Ed. 2d 164, 180 n.8 (2000)).\nIt is important to note that Davis v. Wakelee, cited in New Hampshire v. Maine as a statement of the law of judicial estoppel, never mentions the doctrine by name. Rather, Davis v. Wakelee states the rule as a \u201cgeneral principle\u201d and cites two distinct lines of cases expounding the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the related doctrine of \u201cmend the hold.\u201d 156 U.S. at 689-92, 39 L. Ed. at 584-85. We believe Davis v. Wakelee is properly understood as an early, prototypical formulation of judicial estoppel, one that implicitly derives a new species of estoppel from earlier strands of doctrine.\nThe first case cited in Davis v. Wakelee in support of the rule quoted above is Philadelphia, Wilmington & Baltimore Co. R.R. v. Howard, 54 U.S. 307, 14 L. Ed. 157 (1852). In Howard, the United States Supreme Court held that a corporation was estopped to deny that a written instrument was intended to be a deed of the corporation where the corporation had earlier treated the instrument as bearing the corporate seal, thereby inducing the plaintiff to bring an action upon the instrument, and had prevailed at the earlier trial by asserting that the paper was a valid deed. Id. at 336, 14 L. Ed. at 169-70. The Court stated that these facts brought the case \u201cwithin the principle of common law, that when a party asserts what he knows is false, or does not know to be true, to another\u2019s loss, and to his own gain, he is guilty of a fraud; a fraud in fact, if he knows it to be false, a fraud in law, if he does not know it to be true.\u201d Id. at 336, 14 L. Ed. at 170. The Court concluded, \u201cIt does not carry the estoppel beyond what is strictly equitable, to hold that the representation which defeated one action on a point of form should sustain another on a like point.\u201d Id. at 337, 14 L. Ed. at 170. A fair reading of Howard suggests that the Court applied a species of equitable estoppel, albeit in a form close to judicial estoppel. The Court\u2019s emphasis on the plaintiff having been \u201cinduced\u201d by defendant\u2019s representations to bring an action and on plaintiff\u2019s resulting \u201closs\u201d calls to mind the doctrine of equitable estoppel, which requires a showing of detrimental reliance on the part of the party asserting the estoppel. See Stoody Co. v. Mills Alloys, Inc., 67 F.2d 807, 811 (9th Cir. 1933) (noting that an essential aspect of Howard was the fact that the \u201cdefense in the first suit was of a character to induce the plaintiff to change his ground of action\u201d), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 637, 78 L. Ed. 1489 (1934). The Court also appeared willing, however, to extend the concept of estoppel beyond the relatively strict parameters of estoppel in pais. Howard, 54 U.S. at 337, 14 L. Ed. at 170 (\u201cIt does not carry the estoppel beyond what is strictly equitable, to hold that the representation which defeated one action on a point of form should sustain another on a like point.\u201d). Moreover, the Court\u2019s reasoning that a party should not be permitted to commit a \u201cfraud\u201d upon the court, id., evokes the central purpose of judicial estoppel: to protect the integrity of the judicial process. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 749, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 977. Thus, Howard appears to occupy a gray area between equitable and judicial estoppel, perhaps marking the emergence of the latter doctrine in the United States Supreme Court\u2019s jurisprudence. Cf. Solum, 32 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. at 461 n.2 (describing the rule stated in Howard as a \u201cprinciple [] of law akin to judicial estoppel\u201d that operates as both a rule of evidence and an equitable defense).\nThis interpretation is bolstered by the statement in Davis v. Wakelee that estoppel is appropriate \u201cespecially if [the shift in position] be to the prejudice of the party who has acquiesced in the position formerly taken by him.\u201d 156 U.S. at 689, 39 L. Ed. at 584 (emphasis added). As discussed above, equitable estoppel requires the party asserting the estoppel to have detrimentally relied on the earlier representations of the party to be estopped. E.g., Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d at 937. This is not, however, an element of judicial estoppel, which seeks to protect courts, not litigants, from manipulation. Id. By transmuting detrimental reliance from an essential element to a factor that makes an estoppel \u201cespecially\u201d appropriate, the Davis v. Wakelee Court thus took a crucial analytical step in the evolution of the doctrine of judicial estoppel in the United States Supreme Court\u2019s jurisprudence. If Howard marked the emergence of a distinct offshoot from equitable estoppel, Davis v. Wakelee signaled its analytical independence.\nThe second case cited in Davis v. Wakelee in support of the rule articulated there is Ry. Co. v. McCarthy, 96 U.S. 258, 24 L. Ed. 693 (1877). la McCarthy, the defendant railroad proved at trial that it was incapable of transporting certain cattle on a Sunday solely because of a lack of cars. Id. at 265, 24 L. Ed. at 695. On appeal, the defendant alleged that it had failed to deliver the cattle because a Sunday shipment would have violated West Virginia\u2019s \u201cSunday Law.\u201d Id. at 267, 24 L. Ed. 2d at 696. The United States Supreme Court held that defendant was estopped to make this argument, reasoning that \u201c[w]here a party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching anything involved in a controversy, he cannot, after litigation has begun, change his ground, and put his conduct upon another and a different consideration. He is not permitted thus to mend his hold.\u201d Id. at 267-68, 24 L. Ed. at 696 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).\nMcCarthy is probably the earliest articulation of the \u201cmend the hold\u201d doctrine, an equitable doctrine that precludes the assertion of inconsistent litigation positions, usually concerning the meaning of a contract, within the context of a single lawsuit. Robert Sitkoff, Comment, \u201cMend the Hold\u201d and Erie: Why an Obscure Contracts Doctrine Should Control in Federal Diversity Cases, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1059, 1064 (1998); Anderson & Holober, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. at 692-93. The metaphor that gives the doctrine its name derives from wrestling terminology and means \u201cto get a better grip (hold) on your opponent.\u201d Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont\u2019l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 362 (7th Cir. 1990). Traditionally, the \u201cmend the hold\u201d doctrine has been applied only to inconsistent positions asserted within the same legal proceeding, although at least one modern case has extended the doctrine to inconsistent positions asserted in two different proceedings. Anderson & Holober, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. at 692 n.413 (citing Rottmund v. Cont\u2019l Assurance Co., 813 F. Supp. 1104, 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1992)). It is a rule generally applied in actions on a contract, most often against insurance companies that attempt to shift positions in the course of litigation in an effort to deny policyholders\u2019 claims. Id. at 693-94. It is unsettled whether the doctrine is a procedural rule or a substantive rule of contract law. See AM Int\u2019l v. Graphic Mgmt. Assocs., 44 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir. 1995).\nIn Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont\u2019l Bank Corp., the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit closely compared the doctrines of judicial estoppel and \u201cmend the hold\u201d and concluded that the two are \u201c cousin [s].\u201d 922 F.2d at 364 (applying Illinois law). The similarities between the doctrines are clear. Both judicial estoppel and the \u201cmend the hold\u201d rule preclude the assertion of inconsistent factual positions before a tribunal, and both serve to preserve judicial resources, protect judicial integrity, and boost public confidence in the fairness of the judicial system. Anderson & Holober, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. at 698. In light of these strong similarities, it is not surprising that the United States Supreme Court would cite McCarthy, a case applying the \u201cmend the hold\u201d rule, in support of its nascent formulation of judicial estoppel in Davis v. Wakelee. The latter doctrine is in many ways a natural extension of the former.\nReturning to an analysis of our own precedents, we believe that the evolution of our estoppel jurisprudence parallels that of the United States Supreme Court. We have already explained that the doctrine of equitable estoppel has deep roots in the jurisprudence of this state. In addition, we have recognized and approved the \u201cmend the hold\u201d rule, as stated by the United States Supreme Court in McCarthy, on at least two occasions. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Harrison-Wright Co., 207 N.C. 661, 672, 178 S.E. 235, 241 (1935) (under McCarthy, insurer not permitted to \u201cmend his hold\u201d by denying that policy covered insured, where insurer\u2019s prior representations to court had implicitly acknowledged the contrary); McAden v. R.F. Craig, 222 N.C. 497, 499, 24 S.E.2d. 1, 3-4 (1943) (quoting McCarthy and precluding defendant from reversing position asserted in his answer as an apparent \u201cafterthought\u201d suggested by \u201cthe pressure and exigencies of the case\u201d). We have also applied a different formulation of the rule on at least five other occasions, stating in each case that \u201c[i]t is well understood that, except in proper instances, a party to a suit should not be allowed to change his position with respect to a material matter in the course of litigation.\u201d Roberts v. Grogan, 222 N.C. 30, 33, 21 S.E.2d 829, 830 (1942) (adding that a party \u201ccannot swap horses in midstream\u201d); Kannan, 182 N.C. at 78, 108 S.E. at 384 (adding that a party should not be permitted to \u201cblow hot and cold in the same breath\u201d); Hylton v. Mount Airy, 227 N.C. 622, 626, 44 S.E.2d 51, 54 (1947); Clark v. Harris, 187 N.C. 251, 251, 121 S.E. 453, 453 (1924); Ingram v. Yadkin River Power Co., 181 N.C. 359, 360, 107 S.E. 209, 209 (1921).\nAs the United States Supreme Court did in Wakelee, we now draw upon our equitable estoppel and \u201cmend the hold\u201d precedents in support of our recognition of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Although the doctrines are not equivalent, they substantially overlap and are motivated by a similar set of policy concerns. Anderson & Holober, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. at 637. Together with the other doctrines previously discussed, these two doctrines demonstrate that the common law of this state has long recognized the importance of protecting the integrity of judicial proceedings, and the appropriateness, under certain circumstances, of invoking some form of estoppel to promote that salutary objective.\nAs the foregoing discussion demonstrates, North Carolina courts have previously recognized several doctrines that may be used, under prescribed circumstances, to preclude the assertion of inconsistent positions before a tribunal. Judicial estoppel, however, is distinguishable from its companion doctrines in two principle respects. First, judicial estoppel seeks to protect courts, not litigants, from individuals who would play \u201cfast and loose\u201d with the judicial system. In re Cassidy, 892 F.2d 637, 641 (7th Cir. 1990), superceded in part on other grounds by statute as stated in Meyer v. Rigdon, 36 F.3d 1375 (7th Cir. 1994). This essential purpose necessarily limits the application of judicial estoppel relative to those doctrines that may be applied when litigants, not courts, are threatened by a party\u2019s shift in position. Second, because of its inherent flexibility as a discretionary equitable doctrine, judicial estoppel plays an important role as a gap-filler, providing courts with a means to protect the integrity of judicial proceedings where doctrines designed to protect litigants might not adequately serve that role. See Guinness, 955 F.2d at 898-900; Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1166-67.\nOf course, there is no need for judicial estoppel where previously established doctrines would preclude the assertion of an inconsistent position. See Estate of Burford v. Burford, 935 P.2d 943, 948 (Colo. 1997). But where the technical requirements of mutuality, reliance, or prejudice might render these rules inapplicable, judicial estoppel provides courts with a discretionary tool \u201cto protect the integrity of the courts and the judicial process.\u201d Guinness, 955 F.2d at 899. Thus, judicial estoppel dovetails with other well-established doctrines to substantially promote that ancient and overarching estoppel principle which \u201clies at the foundation of all fair dealing between [persons], and without which, it would be impossible to administer law as a system.\u201d Armfield, 44 N.C. at 161.\nIII.\nWith this understanding of the nature and evolution of judicial estoppel in mind, we now turn to an analysis of the issues raised in this appeal. Because it is central to the disposition of this case, we begin with the question of how the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be applied in North Carolina. This is a question of first impression for this Court.\nPlaintiff asks us to adopt the \u201cnarrow view\u201d of judicial estoppel set forth in Medicare Rentals, Inc. v. Advanced Servs., 119 N.C. App. 767, 460 S.E.2d 361 and applied in the instant case by the Court of Appeals. Plaintiff offers no reasons, however, why this definition of judicial estoppel is preferable to any other. We therefore structure our discussion of this issue around the Court of Appeals\u2019 analysis.\nThe Court of Appeals delineated two doctrinal variations of judicial estoppel in the instant proceeding. First, the Court of Appeals cited the Fourth Circuit case of Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group in formulating the \u201cfederal\u201d test for judicial estoppel as follows: \u201cThis three-pronged test requires that (1) the estopped party assert a position that is factually inconsistent with that taken in prior litigation; (2) the estopped party intentionally misled the court to gain an unfair advantage; and (3) the prior position be accepted by the court.\u201d Whitacre P\u2019ship v. Biosignia, Inc., 153 N.C. App. 608, 614, 574 S.E.2d 475, 479-80 (2002) (citing Sedlack v. Braswell Servs. Group, 134 F.3d 219, 224 (4th Cir. 1998)). Second, the Court of Appeals set out and applied its own \u201cnarrower view\u201d of judicial estoppel, a formulation announced in Medicare Rentals, 119 N.C. App. 767, 460 S.E.2d 361. Whitacre P\u2019ship, 153 N.C. App. at 614, 574 S.E.2d at 480. In Medicare Rentals, the Court of Appeals stated that \u201c[jJudicial estoppel is a harsh doctrine and requires at a minimum that the party against whom the doctrine is asserted intentionally have changed its position in order to gain an advantage.\u201d 119 N.C. App. at 771, 460 S.E.2d at 364.\nWhile it is true that Sedlack described the three prongs of its test as \u201cthree elements [that] must always be satisfied,\u201d Sedlack, 134 F.3d at 224, the United States Supreme Court in New Hampshire v. Maine emphasized that because the doctrine is a flexible, equitable one, \u201c \u2018the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle.\u2019 \u201d New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978 (quoting Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1166). Thus, judicial estoppel requires discretionary weighing of the relevant \u201cfactors,\u201d not rote application of \u201cinflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula.\u201d Id. at 751, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978. Similarly, under the Medicare Rentals test, judicial estoppel requires \u201cat a minimum\u201d a showing of intentional misrepresentation to gain advantage. Medicare Rentals, 119 N.C. App. at 771, 460 S.E.2d at 364. Insofar as the Medicare Rentals test suggests that judicial estoppel can be reduced to \u201cinflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula,\u201d New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751,149 L. Ed. 2d at 978, it too fails to adequately recognize the inherently flexible nature of this discretionary equitable doctrine. Thus, we decline to accept either version of the doctrine articulated by the Court of Appeals, and instead follow the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in New Hampshire v. Maine.\nIn New Hampshire v. Maine, the United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to preclude the State of New Hampshire from asserting that a portion of the New Hampshire-Maine border ran along the Maine shore when it had successfully argued in a previous action that the same portion of that border was located at the center of the Piscataqua River\u2019s main navigable channel. 532 U.S. 742, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968. The Court stated that the purpose of the doctrine was \u201c \u2018to protect the integrity of the judicial process,\u2019 \u201d id. at 749, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 977 (quoting Edwards, 690 F.2d at 598), \u201cby \u2018prohibiting parties from deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the moment,\u2019 \u201d id. at 750, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 977 (quoting United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1042, 128 L. Ed. 2d 211 (1994)). Noting that \u201c \u2018the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle,\u2019 \u201d id. at 750, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978 (quoting Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1166), the Court enumerated three factors that \u201ctypically inform the decision whether to apply the doctrine in a particular case.\u201d Id. at 750, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978. First, a party\u2019s subsequent position \u201cmust be \u2018clearly inconsistent\u2019 with its earlier position.\u201d Id. (quoting United States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 306 (7th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1082, 146 L. Ed. 2d 510 (2000)). \u201cSecond, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party\u2019s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding\u201d might pose a \u201cthreat to judicial integrity\u201d by leading to \u201c \u2018inconsistent court determinations\u2019 \u201d or \u201c \u2018the perception that either the first or the second court was misled.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 750-51, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978 (quoting United States v. C. I. T. Constr. Inc., 944 F.2d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 1991) (inconsistent court determinations) and Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599 (risk of either court being misled)). Third, courts consider \u201cwhether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.\u201d Id. at 751, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978.\nApplying these factors, the United States Supreme Court concluded that they \u201ctip[ped] the balance of equities in favor of barring New Hampshire\u2019s present complaint.\u201d Id. The Court emphasized, however, that these three factors \u201cdo not establish inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel\u201d and that \u201c [additional considerations may inform the doctrine\u2019s application in specific factual contexts.\u201d Id.; cf. Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1167 (stating that although judicial acceptance of a party\u2019s prior position is not an absolute prerequisite for judicial estoppel, it is \u201cobviously more appropriate\u201d in that situation). Finally, the Court noted that \u201cjudicial estoppel \u2018is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 750, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978 (quoting Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1260, 115 L. Ed. 2d 1078 (1991)). Thus, \u201cit may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel \u2018when a party\u2019s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 753, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 979-80 (quoting John S. Clark Co. v. Faggert & Frieden, P.C., 65 F.3d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1995)).\nWe are persuaded that New Hampshire v. Maine best characterizes our common law doctrine of judicial estoppel and thus follow the United States Supreme Court\u2019s doctrinal formulation without hesitation. With a view toward providing appropriate guidance to our trial courts in their application of judicial estoppel, however, we pause to observe two important limitations on our holding.\nAs an initial matter, our recognition of judicial estoppel is limited to civil proceedings. New Hampshire v. Maine did not squarely address the applicability of the doctrine in the criminal context, and we believe public policy considerations militate against extending the doctrine to that arena. We address this issue from two standpoints: (1) whether judicial estoppel may be applied against a criminal defendant and (2) whether judicial estoppel may be applied against the government in a criminal case.\nFirst, judicial estoppel should not ordinarily be applied against a criminal defendant. Although the United States Supreme Court did cite three criminal cases in New Hampshire v. Maine, the Court took no express position on the applicability of judicial estoppel to criminal proceedings, and in none of these cases was judicial estoppel actually applied against a defendant. See Russell, 893 F.2d 1033; Hook, 195 F.3d 299; McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368. Moreover, in only one of those cases was judicial estoppel applied at all. See Russell, 893 F.2d 1033 (applying judicial estoppel against the state). It appears that \u201c[t]he Supreme Court in New Hampshire was ... simply collecting cases in which judicial estoppel was discussed, not where it was applied.\u201d Beem v. McKune, 317 F.3d 1175, 1193 (10th Cir. 2003) (McKay, J., dissenting), cert. denied,-U.S. -, 157 L. Ed. 2d 24 (2003). Hence, New Hampshire leaves unresolved the question of the applicability of judicial estoppel in the criminal context.\nThe policies undergirding judicial estoppel must sometimes yield to countervailing policy concerns. As the Ninth Circuit has noted, given the high stakes of criminal prosecutions and the special protections traditionally afforded criminal defendants, \u201c[j]ustice would not be served by holding [a criminal] defendant to [his or her] prior false statements, because to do so would assign a higher value to the \u2018sanctity of the oath\u2019 than to the guilt or innocence of the accused.\u201d Morris v. California, 966 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 831, 121 L. Ed. 2d 57 (1992). It is not surprising, then, that \u201c[n]o circuit has ever applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bar a criminal defendant from asserting a claim based on innocence.\u201d Id. In light of these concerns, we agree with the Ninth Circuit\u2019s conclusion that \u201c[t]he judicial process can more easily survive a rule that precludes the use of judicial estoppel to keep intact convictions of innocent persons than it can a rule that purports to preserve judicial sacrosanctity by leaving wrongful convictions in place as a sanction for lying.\u201d Id.\nSecond, judicial estoppel should not ordinarily be applied against the government in a criminal proceeding. See, e.g., Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1070 (9th Cir. 1997), rev\u2019d and remanded on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538, 140 L. Ed. 2d 728 (1998); Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1272 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 129-30 n.7 (1st Cir. 1988); Smith v. State, 765 N.E.2d 578, 583 (Ind. 2002); see also United States v. Simmons, 247 F.3d 118, 124 (4th Cir. 2001). In North Carolina, such a restriction on the doctrine is necessitated by the structure of our criminal justice system. A prosecutor is under a constitutional duty to enforce the criminal law by prosecuting criminal actions on behalf of the state. N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 18; State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 237, 570 S.E.2d 440, 472 (2002) (\u201cprosecutor has the duty to vigorously present the State\u2019s case\u201d), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 155 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2003); see also State v. Blakeney, 352 N.C. 287, 312, 531 S.E.2d 799, 817 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1117, 148 L. Ed. 2d 780 (2001). We have frequently emphasized that prosecutors must be given \u201cwide latitude\u201d in framing their arguments in the pursuit of this constitutional duty. E.g., State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 36-37, 489 S.E.2d 391, 411-12 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135, 140 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1998); State v. Monk, 286 N.C. 509, 515, 212 S.E.2d 125, 131 (1975). Moreover, as the United States Supreme Court stated in New Hampshire, \u201c \u2018When the Government is unable to enforce the law because the conduct of its agents has given rise to an estoppel, the interest of the citizenry as a whole in obedience to the rule of law is undermined.\u2019 \u201d 532 U.S. at 755, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 981 (quoting Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. at 60, 81 L. Ed. 2d at 52). Thus, in light of the state\u2019s unique status as a litigant and its interest in enforcing the criminal law, \u201cit is well settled that the Government may not be estopped on the same terms as any other litigant.\u201d Id. In sum, the strong public interest in maintaining prosecutorial independence normally precludes application of judicial estoppel against the government in criminal cases.\nNext, we emphasize that our recognition of judicial estoppel is limited to the context of inconsistent factual assertions and that the doctrine should not be applied to prevent the assertion of inconsistent legal theories. Although not addressed in New Hampshire v. Maine, this limitation on the reach of judicial estoppel has been adopted by the majority of courts to consider the matter. See, e.g., Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d at 90; Pittson Co. v. United States, 199 F.3d 694, 701 n.4 (4th Cir. 1999); Lowery, 92 F.3d at 224; Royal Ins. Co. v. Quinn-L Capital Corp., 3 F.3d 877, 885 n.6 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1032, 128 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1994); Hayne Fed. Credit Union v. Bailey, 327 S.C. at 251-52, 489 S.E.2d at 477. Moreover, such a limitation is necessary to avoid interference with our liberal pleading rules, which permit a litigant to assert inconsistent, even contradictory, legal positions within a lawsuit. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 8 (2003); see also Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1167; Montrose Med. Corp. Particip. Savings Plan v. Bulger, 243 F.3d 773, 782 (3d Cir. 2001). In sum, while other doctrines such as \u201cmend the hold\u201d and judicial admissions may restrict the extent to which a party may assert contradictory legal positions, the doctrine of judicial estoppel limits only inconsistent assertions of fact.\nHaving delineated the doctrine of judicial estoppel, we now turn to an issue that concerns its application here. Plaintiff argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that judicial estoppel does not apply in this case because there was \u201cno evidence that Dr. Whitacre intentionally misled the court\u201d by \u201cintentionally manipulat[ing] or hid[ing] the truth to gain an unfair advantage.\u201d Whitacre P\u2019ship, 153 N.C. App. at 615-16, 574 S.E.2d at 480. This holding comports with the definition of judicial estoppel previously adopted by the Court of Appeals. See Medicare Rentals, 119 N.C. App. at 771, 460 S.E.2d at 364. A trial court applying judicial estoppel, however, is not obliged to specifically determine that the party to be estopped intended to mislead that court by its representations in the later action. As the United States Supreme Court emphasized in New Hampshire v. Maine, judicial estoppel is a \u201cflexible equitable doctrine,\u201d and the \u201c \u2018circumstances \u25a0under which [it] may appropriately be invoked are probably not reducible to any general formulation of principle.\u2019 \u201d 532 U.S. at 750, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 978 (quoting Zurich Ins. Co., 667 F.2d at 1166). While it would weigh heavily in favor of invoking the doctrine, intent to deceive is not enumerated in New Hampshire as one of the relevant factors. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. 742, 149 L. Ed. 2d 968. Moreover, New Hampshire v. Maine specifically provides that \u201cit may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel \u2018when a party\u2019s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 753, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 979 (quoting John S. Clark Co., 65 F.3d at 29). In stating that it \u201cmay be appropriate\u201d to \u201cresist\u201d application of judicial estoppel under these circumstances, the United States Supreme Court implicitly rejected the proposition that the subsequent position must be intended to deceive in order for the doctrine to apply.\nWe are mindful that the application of judicial estoppel to preclude a party from making a true factual assertion in a later proceeding because it contradicts a false factual assertion made in an earlier one may be seen as interfering with the truth-seeking function of courts. See Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Nat\u2019l Labor Relations Bd., 911 F.2d 1214, 1218 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that judicial estoppel may \u201cimpingfe] on the truth-seeking function of the court because the doctrine precludes a contradictory position without examining the truth of either statement\u201d). As we said long ago in a related context, estoppels, while valuable to help \u201cprevent that which deals in duplicity and inconsistency,\u201d by their nature run the risk of \u201cshutting] out the real truth\u201d in favor of its \u201cartificial representative.\u201d Jones v. Sasser, 18 N.C. 452, 464 (1836). Upon careful reflection, we are not dissuaded by these concerns. First, judicial estoppel is to be applied in the sound discretion of our trial courts. If a trial court believes that justice would not be served by judicially estopping a party\u2019s factual contention, it may decline to do so. See Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir. 1996) (\u201c[Judicial estoppel] is not meant to be a technical defense for litigants seeking to derail potentially meritorious claims, especially when the alleged inconsistency is insignificant at best and there is no evidence of intent to manipulate or mislead the courts.\u201d). We are confident that our trial courts will apply the doctrine judiciously, and not in a reflexive or technical manner that would defeat its underlying purpose. See id. at 358 (\u201cJudicial estoppel is not intended to eliminate all inconsistencies, however slight or inadvertent; rather, it is designed to prevent litigants from \u2018playing \u201cfast and loose with the courts.\u201d \u2019 \u201d) (citations omitted). Second, the \u201ctruth-defeating\u201d potential of judicial estoppel is somewhat counterbalanced by its prophylactic effect. In practice, the doctrine tends not to subvert the truth because it encourages litigants to tell the truth in the first place by \u201c \u2018raising] the cost of lying.\u2019 \u201d Int'l Union, UMW v. Marrowbone Dev. Co., 232 F.3d 383, 391 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1427-28 (7th Cir. 1993)). Third, the doctrine expressly guides our trial courts to consider whether a party\u2019s prior position was innocently asserted. We follow the lead of the Unit\u00e9d States Supreme Court in stressing that \u201cit may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel \u2018when a party\u2019s prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.\u2019 \u201d New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 753, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 979 (quoting John S. Clark Co., 65 F.3d at 29); see also Ryan Operations, 81 F.3d at 364 (court unwilling to administer \u201cstrong medicine\u201d of judicial estoppel \u201cto treat careless or inadvertent nondisclosures\u201d). Thus, while we do not impose any particular scienter requirement on what must remain an inherently flexible equitable doctrine, we remind our trial courts to carefully balance the equities in applying judicial estoppel, and emphasize that a reasonable justification for a party\u2019s change in position may militate against its application in a particular case. See, e.g., Morris v. California, 966 F.2d at 453; In re Corey, 892 F.2d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. Kulalani, Ltd. v. Corey, 498 U.S. 815, 112 L. Ed. 2d 31 (1990).\nPlaintiff next argues that Whitacre was acting in his individual capacity, and not as a general partner of Whitacre Partnership, when he filed his bankruptcy petition and gave testimony at the 341 meeting with the bankruptcy trustee and his creditors. According to plaintiff, North Carolina partnership law precludes an estoppel against Whitacre Partnership based on representations made by Whitacre during the bankruptcy proceeding. Because Whitacre was not \u201capparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership of which he is a member,\u201d plaintiff argues, his representations at the bankruptcy proceeding cannot \u201cbind[] the partnership.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 59-39(a) (2003). The Court of Appeals found this argument persuasive, holding that summary judgment was precluded because a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether Whitacre\u2019s statements at the 341 hearing were \u201c \u2018for the purposes of [the partnership\u2019s] business,\u2019 and were made for \u2018carrying on in the usual way the business of the partnership\u2019, so as to bind the partnership.\u201d Whitacre P\u2019ship, 153 N.C. App. at 615, 574 S.E.2d at 480 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 59-39(a) (2001)).\nThe issue in the instant case, however, is not whether Whitacre was acting within his authority as a general partner of Whitacre Partnership when he represented to the bankruptcy court that Whitacre Partnership\u2019s shares could never vest. Rather, the issue is whether plaintiff can be judicially estopped from asserting a position in one legal proceeding contradictory to representations made by its general partners in an earlier legal proceeding. This issue, in turn, raises two additional questions: (1) whether judicial estoppel may be applied not just to the parties to a prior action but also to their \u201cprivies\u201d and (2) whether plaintiff and its general partners are in \u201cprivity\u201d with one another in this case.\nPlaintiff suggests that under New Hampshire v. Maine, judicial estoppel applies only against a \u201cparty\u201d who asserts inconsistent positions in subsequent legal proceedings. Because Whitacre Partnership was a not a party to the Whitacres\u2019 bankruptcy proceeding, plaintiff appears to argue, Whitacre Partnership cannot be judicially estopped on the basis of the Whitacres\u2019 representations in that proceeding. Plaintiff bases this argument on its observation that the United States Supreme Court in New Hampshire never mentioned \u201cprivity\u201d or \u201cprivies\u201d and referred throughout the opinion to the application of the doctrine against a \u201cparty\u201d or \u201cparties.\u201d We think plaintiff makes too much of this observation. In New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court did not discuss privity because it had no need to do so. In that case, the parties before the Court, the states of New Hampshire and Maine, had also been parties to the previous action in which the prior inconsistent statement was made. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 747-48, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 975-76. The Court was not called upon to consider whether the privity concept applied to judicial estoppel, and did not expressly limit judicial estoppel to \u201cparties\u201d as opposed to \u201cprivies.\u201d\nIn the present case, by contrast, we are faced with a corporation seeking to estop a partnership from contradicting prior representations made by the partnership\u2019s general partners in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding. Since Whitacre Partnership itself was not a party to the bankruptcy proceeding, there is no mutuality of estoppel, and we are forced to decide whether a privity relationship may sustain the application of judicial estoppel.\nThis Court has consistently applied the privity concept to a variety of estoppel doctrines. See, e.g., McInnis, 318 N.C. at 428, 349 S.E.2d at 556 (res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to the \u201csame parties or those in privity with them\u201d); Mansour v. Rabil, 277 N.C. 364, 377, 177 S.E.2d 849, 857 (1970) (under doctrine of election, heirs and devisees of one who accepts benefits under a will are estopped to contest that will); Smith v. Smith, 265 N.C. 18, 28, 143 S.E.2d 300, 307 (1965) (estoppel of record binds parties and their privies); Long v. Trantham, 226 N.C. 510, 514, 39 S.E.2d 384, 387 (1946) (equitable estoppel binds parties and their privies); see also In re Estate of Anderson, 148 N.C. App. 501, 505, 559 S.E.2d 222, 225 (2002) (privity concept extended to quasi-estoppel). See generally 11A Strong\u2019s North Carolina Index 4th Estoppel \u00a7 2 (2001) (\u201cWhere a party would be estopped, persons in privity with that party, including heirs and devisees, are estopped.\u201d). \u201cIn general, \u2018privity involves a person so identified in interest with another that he represents the same legal right.\u2019 \u201d Tucker, 344 N.C. at 417, 474 S.E.2d at 130 (quoting 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments \u00a7 663 (1995)). Although the meaning of \u201cprivity\u201d has proven to be elusive, and \u201cthere is no definition of the word . . . which can be applied in all cases,\u201d the prevailing definition in our cases, at least in the context of res judicata and collateral estoppel, is that privity \u201cdenotes a mutual or successive relationship to the same rights' of property.\u201d Id. at 416-17, 474 S.E.2d at 130 (quoting Hales, 337 N.C. at 333-34, 445 S.E.2d at 594 (citations omitted)). In determining whether such a privity relation exists, \u201c \u2018courts will look beyond the nominal party whose name appears on the record as plaintiff and consider the legal questions raised as they may affect the real party or parties in interest.\u2019 \u201d Summers, 351 N.C. at 623-24, 528 S.E.2d at 21 (quoting Davenport v. Patrick, 227 N.C. 686, 688, 44 S.E.2d 203, 205 (1947)).\nIn deciding whether judicial estoppel applies not only to parties, but also to their privies, it is instructive to consider the rationale for applying the privity concept in the collateral estoppel context. Due process requires that persons be given a fair opportunity to litigate their legal rights. U.S. Const, amends. V, XIV; Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277, 23 L. Ed. 914, 915-16 (1876). This right to be heard may prohibit the application of a preclusion doctrine to estop a party who never had a chance to present arguments and evidence in a prior action from doing so at a later proceeding. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 328-29, 28 L. Ed. 2d 788, 799-800 (1971) (discussing due process limitations to collateral estoppel). It is well settled, however, that where there is a sufficiently close relationship, called \u201cprivity,\u201d between the party to a prior action and the party to be estopped in a later action, due process is not offended by the estoppel of the latter, provided the former had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter to be precluded. See, e.g., Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. 793, 797-99, 135 L. Ed. 2d 76, 83-84 (1996) (describing the constitutional rationale for allowing preclusion doctrines to estop a \u201cprivy\u201d to a prior action from relitigating claims and issues); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7; 58 L. Ed. 2d 552, 559 n.7 (1979) (\u201cIt is a violation of due process for a judgment to be binding on a litigant who was not a party or a privy and therefore has never had an opportunity to be heard.\u201d) (emphasis added) (citations omitted); McInnis, 318 N.C. at 433-34, 349 S.E.2d at 559-60 (following Blonder-Tongue and Parklane Hosiery and abandoning the strict mutuality requirement for collateral estoppel in North Carolina).\nWe observe that other courts have applied the privity concept to the doctrine of judicial estoppel. See, e.g., In re Johnson, 518 F.2d 246, 252 (10th Cir. 1975); Farmers High Line Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 975 P.2d 189, 202 (Colo. 1999); Barnett v. Develle, 289 So. 2d 129, 138 (La. 1974); Messler v. Simmons Gun Specialties, Inc., 687 P.2d 121, 128 (Okla. 1984); Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co., 102 Utah 509, 515, 132 P.2d 388, 390 (1942); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d \u00a7 129 Estoppel and Waiver (2000); Anderson & Holober, 4 Conn. Ins. L.J. at 608-09. We agree that \u201ca rigid rule requiring the estopped party to be the identical party as in the earlier proceeding would unnecessarily diminish the protective function of the doctrine of judicial estoppel.\u201d Capsopoulos v. Chater, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18330 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996); see also Ladd v. ITT Corp., 148 F.3d 753, 756 (7th Cir. 1998). Moreover, so long as the party to be judicially estopped is a privy of the party who made the prior inconsistent statement before a tribunal, due process is not offended by the lack of mutuality of the parties between the two proceedings. See Richards v. Jefferson Cty., 517 U.S. at 797-99, 135 L. Ed. 2d at 83-84.\nWe do not address whether the Whitacres, as general partners of Whitacre Partnership, were in privity with the partnership. Whether privity exists in a given case should generally be resolved by the trial court in the first instance. See Lowell Staats Mining Co. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 878 F.2d 1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1989); Vulcan, Inc. v. Fordees Corp., 658 F.2d 1106, 1109 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 906, 72 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1982); Astron Indus. Assocs. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 405 F.2d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1968); Towle v. Boeing Airplane Co., 364 F.2d 590, 592 (8th Cir. 1966); see also Gerrard v. Larsen, 517 F.2d 1127, 1135 (8th Cir. 1975) (privity is appropriately \u201cresolved on a case by case basis by an examination of underlying facts and circumstances\u201d). We cannot discern whether the trial court made a privity determination in the present case. The parties did not brief the issue in their summary judgment memoranda, and no published appellate decisions in this state have previously discussed the applicability of the privity concept to judicial estoppel. Thus, rather than usurping the trial court\u2019s role by making a privity determination on the basis of a cold record, we deem it advisable to reserve this factual question for the trial court to address on remand. Cf. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 77, 92 L. Ed. 476, 492 (1948) (remand to trial court appropriate where lower courts have adjudicated parties\u2019 rights \u201cwithout considering essential facts in light of the controlling law\u201d); Gerdes v. Lustgarten, 266 U.S. 321, 327-28, 69 L. Ed. 309, 312-13 (1924) (remand to trial court appropriate where trial court did not decide questions of fact upon which ultimate decision must rest); Marconi Wireless Tel. Co. v. Simon, 246 U.S. 46, 57, 62 L. Ed. 568, 573-74 (1918) (delay in ultimate disposition of case resulting from remand preferable to Court\u2019s exercising \u201ca duty which it was the province of the court below to perform\u201d). This disposition reflects trial courts\u2019 \u201cinstitutional advantages\u201d over appellate courts in the \u201capplication of facts to fact-dependent legal standards.\u201d Augur v. Augur, 356 N.C. 582, 586, 573 S.E.2d 125, 129 (2002).\nMoreover, we are unable to determine from the record what precise formulation of judicial estoppel the trial court applied to the facts of the instant case. Assuming that the trial court applied the law of judicial estoppel as it had been articulated by our appellate courts up to now, see Medicare Rentals, 119 N.C. App. at 769-71, 460 S.E.2d at 363-64, State v. Taylor, 128 N.C. App. at 400, 496 S.E.2d at 815, the court necessarily applied a version of the doctrine substantially different from the one we delineate today. Because the trial judge \u201cdid not have the legal standard which we articulate today to guide him in his consideration of the case,... it is not reasonable to expect him to have applied it without the benefit of this opinion.\u201d State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1165, 90 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1986), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 103 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1989). Accordingly, we remand to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for reconsideration of defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment in light of our newly articulated standards concerning judicial estoppel and the applicability of the privity concept. See id. at 75, 310 S.E.2d at 309.\nWe note that a trial court\u2019s application of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 977-78 (\u201c[Jjudicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked by a court at its discretion.\u201d); see also Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir. 2001); Taylor v. Food World, 133 F.3d 1419, 1422 (11th Cir. 1998); McNemar v. Disney Store, 91 F.3d 610, 616-17 (3d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1145, 136 L. Ed. 2d 845 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 143 L. Ed. 2d 966 (1999); State v. Taylor, 128 N.C. App. at 400, 496 S.E.2d at 815-16. Moreover, as the Court of Appeals properly recognized, \u201c[w]hen an action pled is barred by a legal impediment, such as judicial estoppel, there are no triable issues of fact as a matter of law.\u201d Whitacre P\u2019ship, 153 N.C. App. at 614, 574 S.E.2d at 479 (citing Andrews v. Davenport, 84 N.C. App. 675, 677, 353 S.E.2d 671, 673 (1987), disc, review denied, 319 N.C. 671, 356 S.E.2d 774 (1987)). Thus, when a trial court has acted within its discretion in applying judicial estoppel, leaving no triable issues of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate. See Montrose, 243 F.3d at 779 (\u201cSummary judgment is appropriate when operation of judicial estoppel renders a litigant unable to state a prima facie case.\u201d); West Delta Oil Co. v. Hof, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15776, at *7 (E.D. La. 2002) (application of judicial estoppel in context of summary judgment motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion); cf. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43, 139 L. Ed. 2d 508, 516 (1997) (rejecting argument that ruling on admissibility of expert testimony should be reviewed de novo simply because it arose in the \u201coutcome determinative\u201d context of a summary judgment motion, and instead reviewing for abuse of discretion).\nIn conclusion, the doctrine of judicial estoppel is a part of the common law of this state. In the instant case, however, the trial court did not have the benefit of the precise formulation of the doctrine we articulate in this opinion. Moreover, judicial estoppel is a discretionary doctrine, and the privity inquiry required here is a fact-intensive one. Thus, we instruct the trial judge on remand to determine whether the Whitacres and Whitacre Partnership are in privity and, if so, to exercise discretion in determining whether the doctrine of judicial estoppel is applicable in the instant case. Accordingly, we remand to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nMODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.\n. The Court of Appeals concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether FHT was a \u201cpredecessor corporation to Advocacy\u201d and stated that \u201c[n]othing in the corporate documents in the record reflects FHT\u2019s relationship, if any, to Advocacy, Biomar, Biosignia, or Clintech.\u201d We disagree. The record is unequivocal on the question of Biosignia\u2019s corporate lineage. Plaintiff\u2019s own complaint specifically alleges that Biosignia is a \u201ccorporate successor\u201d to FHT. Biosignia, in its answer, admits this factual allegation. In an affidavit attached to its summary judgment motion, Biosignia outlined its corporate history, explaining that FHT was \u201calso known as\u201d Advocacy and that Advocacy and Biomar were corporate predecessors of Biosignia. At no point has plaintiff denied any of this history. Finally, Whitacre expressly acknowledged in his deposition testimony that \u201cFuture Health Technologies, Biomar, and Biosignia all are one.\u201d\n. We note that the issuance of 2,000,000 shares to \u201creplace]]\u201d the original 250 shares issued by Advocacy is consistent with the share exchange ratio of 8,000 to 1 referred to in the Unanimous Written Consent.\n. We note that there is a discrepancy in Whitacre\u2019s representations as to how many shares he agreed to forfeit. While his resignation letter refers to the forfeiture of 500,000 shares, Whitacre\u2019s deposition testimony corroborates Biosignia\u2019s stock ledger and reflects a forfeiture of 750,000 shares. The latter figure is more consistent with plaintiff\u2019s assertion that it owns 1,000,000, not 1,250,000, shares of Biosignia stock. Plaintiff\u2019s original 2,000,000 share holding, less 250,000 shares to pay Whitacre\u2019s attorneys and a forfeiture of 750,000 shares, leaves 1,000,000 shares remaining.\n. Under section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy trustee must convene and preside over a meeting between the debtor, his or her creditors, and any equity security holders. During this meeting, the trustee must orally examine the debtor concerning the effects of a discharge in bankruptcy, the debtor\u2019s ability to file a petition under a different chapter, and other matters. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 341 (2000). The debtor must testify under oath at this examination. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 343 (2000).\n. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a voluntary dismissal is not at the debtor\u2019s discretion. Upon motion by the debtor, the bankruptcy trustee may order dismissal only \u201cfor cause\u201d following notice to creditors and a hearing. 11 U.S.C. \u00a7 707(a) (2000); 11 U.S.C. app., R. Bankr. P. 1017(a) (2000).\n. We acknowledge that some of our older cases have articulated the doctrine of election in language sounding in estoppel in pais, where the facts would have supported application of either doctrine. See, e.g., Holloman v. S. Ry. Co., 172 N.C. 372, 376, 90 S.E. 292, 293-94 (1916). Where equitable estoppel and the election of remedies doctrine overlap, such hybrid formulations are not problematic. We note, however, that where the facts have supported only the doctrine of election, and not equitable estoppel, our formulations of the election of remedies rule have not required the party invoking the estoppel to prove detrimental reliance on the position first asserted. See, e.g., F. E. Lykes & Co. v. Grove, 201 N.C. 254, 257, 159 S.E. 360, 362 (1931) (\u201c[A]n election once made, with knowledge of the facts, between coexisting, remedial rights, which are inconsistent, is irrevocable and conclusive, irrespective of intent, and constitutes an absolute bar to any action, suit, or proceeding, based upon any remedial right inconsistent with that asserted by the election.\u201d)\n. We note that among the three \u201cfactors\u201d enumerated by the United States Supreme Court, the \u201cclearly inconsistent\u201d requirement alone appears to be an essential element which \u201cmust be\u201d present in order for judicial estoppel to be applicable. The Court\u2019s mandatory language (\u201cmust be\u201d) supports this conclusion, as do a multitude of federal opinions that have explored this aspect of the doctrine. See, e.g., Wight v. BankAmerica Corp., 219 F.3d 79, 90 (2d Cir. 2000) (judicial estoppel requires a \u201ctrue inconsistency\u201d such that the two statements \u201ccannot be reconciled\u201d); Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 82 (1st Cir. 1999) (a party\u2019s statements must be \u201cdirectly inconsistent\u201d to support application of judicial estoppel); see also 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver \u00a7 74 (2003) (judicial estoppel applies only where \u201cthe truth of one position must necessarily preclude the truth of the other position\u201d); Brown, 75 Am. Bankr. L.J. at 223 (noting that all federal circuits are in agreement on this point). Common sense also dictates this interpretation of the first New Hampshire \u201cfactor.\u201d A doctrine that precludes the assertion of inconsistent positions obviously cannot preclude the assertion of consistent positions, whatever the equities of the situation might be.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Farmer & Watlington, L.L.P., by R. Lee Farmer; and Bill T. Walker, pro hac vice, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Parker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P., by Robert W. Spearman; and Steptoe & Johnson, L.L.P., by J. William Koegel, Jr., pro hac vice, for defendant-appellants." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WHITACRE PARTNERSHIP, an Illinois limited partnership v. BIOSIGNIA, INC., corporate successor to Biomar International, Inc. and Future Health Technologies Company; T. NELSON CAMPBELL; and T. COLIN CAMPBELL\nNo. 617PA02\n(Filed 6 February 2004)\n1. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 recognized\nThe doctrine of judicial estoppel is part of the common law of North Carolina. This recognition of the doctrine is a natural step in the evolution of North Carolina jurisprudence, consistent with settled precedent, and not a point of departure.\n2. Collateral Estoppel and Res Judicata\u2014 doctrines distinguished\nRes judicata estops a party or its privy from bringing a subsequent action based on the same claim, while collateral estoppel precludes the subsequent adjudication of a previously determined issue, even if the subsequent action is based on a different claim.\nB. Estoppel \u2014 judicial\u2014distinguished from collateral estoppel\nJudicial estoppel and collateral estoppel are closely related, but differ in that judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial process rather than the parties. Judicial estoppel does not require that an issue have been litigated in the prior proceeding and does not require mutuality of the parties.\n4. Estoppel\u2014 equitable \u2014 detrimental reliance\nUnder equitable estoppel, a party whose words or conduct induce another\u2019s detrimental reliance may be estopped to deny the truth of his earlier representations.\n5. Estoppel \u2014 judicial\u2014distinguished from equitable estoppel\nJudicial estoppel and equitable estoppel may be distinguished in that judicial estoppel does not require mutuality of parties, does not require detrimental reliance, and protects the integrity of judicial proceedings rather than fairness between parties.\n6. Estoppel\u2014 quasi \u2014 defined\nQuasi-estoppel prohibits a party who has accepted a transaction and its benefits from taking a later, inconsistent position.\n7. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 distinguished from quasi-estoppel\nJudicial estoppel, unlike quasi-estoppel, does not require mutuality of parties. Neither requires detrimental reliance.\n8. Damages and Remedies\u2014 election of \u2014 defined\nElection of remedies compels that a choice must be made between remedies that proceed upon opposite and irreconcilable claims of right.\n9. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 distinguished from election of remedies\nJudicial estoppel and election of remedies overlap, but not perfectly. Judicial estoppel exists to protect the integrity of the judicial process rather than the redress of a single wrong, and it is based upon an inconsistency of position rather than a selection of means of enforcing a right.\n10. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 theory without label\nNorth Carolina courts have estopped parties from asserting inconsistent positions in the same or subsequent judicial proceedings without specifying the precise legal theory at work.\n11. Estoppel \u2014 judicial\u2014reasoning behind N.C. doctrine\nThe North Carolina Supreme Court follows the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, in recognizing the rule of judicial estoppel.\n12. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 factors\u2014flexible\nThe doctrine of judicial estoppel is applied in North Carolina with a weighing of discretionary factors rather than a rote application of inflexible prerequisites. The only essential factor is that the party\u2019s subsequent position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier position. Courts also look at whether the earlier court accepted the earlier position and whether the party asserting the inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage. It may be appropriate to resist application of judicial estoppel when the prior position was based on inadvertence or mistake.\n13. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 criminal proceedings \u2014 no application\nJudicial estoppel should not ordinarily be applied against defendants or the government in a criminal proceeding.\n14. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 inconsistent legal theories \u2014 no application\nJudicial estoppel is limited to inconsistent factual assertions and should not be applied to prevent the assertion of inconsistent legal theories.\n15. Estoppel \u2014 judicial\u2014intent to deceive \u2014 not required \u2014 permitted as a factor\nA court applying judicial estoppel is not required to specifically determine that the party to be estopped intended to mislead the court. While intent to deceive would weigh heavily in favor of invoking the doctrine, courts should carefully balance the equities and it is possible that a reasonable justification for a change in position may militate against its application.\n16. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 privity of parties \u2014 not required\nA rigid judicial estoppel rule requiring the party to be estopped to be identical with the party in the earlier proceeding would necessarily diminish the protective function of the doctrine of judicial estoppel. So long as the party to be judicially estopped is a privy of the party who made the prior inconsistent statement before a tribunal, due process is not offended.\n17. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 privity of partners and partnership\u2014 not determined\nWhether general partners were in privity with the partnership for judicial estoppel purposes was for the trial court to determine on remand where the Supreme Court could not discern whether the trial court had made the privity determination.\n18. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 version of doctrine used by trial court \u2014 undeterminable\u2014remand\nA judicial estoppel case was remanded because the Supreme Court could not determine the formulation of judicial estoppel used by the trial court, and because the Supreme Court articulated a different version of the doctrine.\n19. Estoppel\u2014 judicial \u2014 review\u2014abuse of discretion standard\nA trial court\u2019s application of judicial estoppel is reviewed for abuse of discretion.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 153 N.C. App. 608, 574 S.E.2d 475 (2002), reversing and remanding an order for summary judgment entered 13 July 2001 by Judge David Q. LaBarre in Superior Court, Orange County. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 September 2003.\nFarmer & Watlington, L.L.P., by R. Lee Farmer; and Bill T. Walker, pro hac vice, for plaintiff-appellee.\nParker, Poe, Adams & Bernstein, L.L.P., by Robert W. Spearman; and Steptoe & Johnson, L.L.P., by J. William Koegel, Jr., pro hac vice, for defendant-appellants." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 33, "last_page_order": 71 }