{ "id": 2987590, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID ERIC MITCHELL", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Mitchell", "decision_date": "2004-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 655PA02", "first_page": "63", "last_page": "78", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 N.C. 63" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249334 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "305" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 655", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569982 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0655-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "holding that a police officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a defendant where defendant, without provocation, fled upon seeing police officers" }, { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "holding that a police officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a defendant where defendant, without provocation, fled upon seeing police officers" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "498 S.E.2d 599", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659880 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "923" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155623 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 14, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 U.S. 891", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9454 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "894-95" }, { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/422/0891-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12123840 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "453" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 32", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9505377 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" }, { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0032-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 640", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "643" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 N.C. App. 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249334 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/154/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "acknowledging that key factors in determining the legality of a checkpoint include proof of advance decisions by superior officers as to the time and location of the roadblock, adequate training of officers, and on-site supervision of the officers conducting the roadblock" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "238 Va. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Va.", "case_ids": [ 2104555 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "acknowledging that key factors in determining the legality of a checkpoint include proof of advance decisions by superior officers as to the time and location of the roadblock, adequate training of officers, and on-site supervision of the officers conducting the roadblock" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/va/238/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "628 So. 2d 1057", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7560321 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding that roadblock unconstitutional where the operating officers had complete discretion to move it and did so" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/628/1057-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 So. 2d 1168", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 7448678 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/679/1168-01" ] }, { "cite": "941 S.W.2d 479", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 11915443 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "recognizing the importance of a systematic plan and supervisory control over establishment and operation of a checkpoint" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/941/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 947", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11133345, 11133321, 11133450, 11133468, 11133260, 11133489, 11133300, 11133239, 11133432, 11133402, 11133244, 11133373, 11133278 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0947-07", "/us/525/0947-06", "/us/525/0947-11", "/us/525/0947-12", "/us/525/0947-03", "/us/525/0947-13", "/us/525/0947-05", "/us/525/0947-01", "/us/525/0947-10", "/us/525/0947-09", "/us/525/0947-02", "/us/525/0947-08", "/us/525/0947-04" ] }, { "cite": "269 Ga. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga.", "case_ids": [ 1698972 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ga/269/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 11172076 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "concluding that conservation officers' stop of every car in a certain area to check for game, weapons, and hunting license was unconstitutional where the officers' only directive was to work the area" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/207/0686-01" ] }, { "cite": "55 S.W.3d 515", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 9473190 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/55/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ga. App. 695", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 1042726 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701-02", "parenthetical": "overruling Heimlich and similar cases based upon the court's obligation to \"follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Fourth Amendment requirements\"" }, { "page": "899", "parenthetical": "overruling Heimlich and similar cases based upon the court's obligation to \"follow the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of Fourth Amendment requirements\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/252/0695-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 Ga. App. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ga. App.", "case_ids": [ 362976 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "663", "parenthetical": "concluding checkpoint constitutional where a field officer had a \"standing order\" to establish checkpoints" }, { "page": "389", "parenthetical": "concluding checkpoint constitutional where a field officer had a \"standing order\" to establish checkpoints" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ga-app/231/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004 LEXIS 656", "category": "reporters:specialty_lexis", "reporter": "LEXIS", "weight": 9, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 02-1060" }, { "page": "*6, *9" }, { "page": "*9" }, { "page": "*15" }, { "page": "*6" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 543", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6178901 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" }, { "page": "1129" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "559" }, { "page": "1129" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 838", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9117696, 9117539, 9117635, 9117510, 9117672, 9117610, 9117586, 9117779, 9117492, 9117653, 9117750, 9117559, 9117528, 9117716 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0838-11", "/us/534/0838-04", "/us/534/0838-08", "/us/534/0838-02", "/us/534/0838-10", "/us/534/0838-07", "/us/534/0838-06", "/us/534/0838-14", "/us/534/0838-01", "/us/534/0838-09", "/us/534/0838-13", "/us/534/0838-05", "/us/534/0838-03", "/us/534/0838-12" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "728", "parenthetical": "noting the similarity between the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution and the General Warrants Clause of the state constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135728 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73", "parenthetical": "noting the similarity between the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution and the General Warrants Clause of the state constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "477 S.E.2d 172", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176", "parenthetical": "\"If supported by competent evidence, the trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867658 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709", "parenthetical": "\"If supported by competent evidence, the trial court's findings of fact are conclusive on appeal.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 20, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653-54" }, { "page": "667" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "674", "parenthetical": "\"[Pjersons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers.\"" }, { "page": "650" }, { "page": "665" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "674" }, { "page": "661-62" }, { "page": "672" }, { "page": "674" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "674" }, { "page": "659, n.18" }, { "page": "671, n.18" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 U.S. 444", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12123840 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "450" }, { "page": "420" }, { "page": "447" }, { "page": "418", "parenthetical": "upholding the constitutionality of a roadblock for detecting impaired drivers" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/496/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 32", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9505377 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44" }, { "page": "345" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0032-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1382, "char_count": 39299, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.603620154731515e-07, "percentile": 0.8878569754452866 }, "sha256": "1a2c3db376f41fe4af6a5ff939915c09e02b20d2d0fc2d09b94c2a2d294941cb", "simhash": "1:9e8933550b2f9687", "word_count": 6109 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:52.416221+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justices WAINWRIGHT and EDMUNDS join in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID ERIC MITCHELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Justice.\nOn 6 February 2000, defendant David Eric Mitchell was arrested and charged with driving while impaired in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.1. Defendant was found guilty of the offense in District Court, Gaston County. He appealed to Superior Court and, on 17 September 2001, filed a pre-trial motion to suppress on the ground that his stop and arrest following his failure to stop at a driver\u2019s license checkpoint violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Superior Court granted defendant\u2019s motion to suppress defendant\u2019s stop and arrest, finding that defendant \u201cwas stopped as a direct result of a roadblock or checking station;\u201d that \u201cthe stopping of the Defendant\u2019s vehicle at the February 6, 2000, check point was a seizure;\u201d and that the checkpoint \u201cviolates the United States and North Carolina Constitutions\u201d because of the \u201cunbridled and unrestrained discretion\u201d granted to the officers in the field. The State appealed the trial court\u2019s grant of defendant\u2019s motion to the Court of Appeals.\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court needed only to address the suppression motion in the context of the legality of defendant\u2019s stop and arrest. In support of its decision, the Court of Appeals stated that the checkpoint \u201cwas not an unreasonable detention and therefore was valid under the Fourth Amendment.\u201d State v. Mitchell, 154 N.C. App. 186, 189-90, 571 S.E.2d 640, 643 (2002). We agree with the Court of Appeals regarding the legality of the checkpoint; however, we conclude that defendant\u2019s stop and arrest was proper without resting our decision on the constitutionality of the checkpoint. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals as modified herein.\nThe State\u2019s evidence showed the following: On 6 February 2000, Boyce Falls, a police officer with the Belmont Police Department, decided to set up a random driver\u2019s license check on U.S. Highway 29/74 to check westbound traffic for valid licenses and registrations. Falls testified that he had \u201cstanding permission\u201d from Belmont Police Captain William Jonas to conduct driver\u2019s license checkpoints. Falls spoke with his shift sergeant before conducting the checkpoint to ensure that the sergeant had enough manpower for the checkpoint. Pursuant to the Belmont Police Department\u2019s requirements, three police officers were present at the checkpoint. Also, pursuant to these requirements, the officers conducted the checkpoint in a safe area, wore their traffic vests, held flashlights, which they used to direct automobiles to stop, and stopped every vehicle in the westbound lanes of U.S. 29/74. While these requirements were not stated in written form, Captain Jonas testified about them at the suppression hearing.\nOn the night in question, at 4:15 a.m., defendant approached the checkpoint, which was evidenced by the continuous activation of the blue lights on the patrol cars. Falls testified that as defendant approached the checkpoint, he shined his flashlight on his left hand, directing defendant to stop. Defendant did not stop. Officer Falls stated that:\nThe closer [defendant] got \u2014 and he got very, very close to me\u2014 within twenty-five yards of me \u2014 I shined the flashlight in his eyes and said stop, whoa; and then I put my flashlight back down on my hand; and when I realized that he was only speeding up, I jumped out of the road and went and got in my vehicle so I could pursue after him because I knew he wasn\u2019t going to stop at that time.\nNext, Falls pursued defendant with the blue lights and siren of his patrol car activated. Defendant finally stopped one and one-half miles beyond the checkpoint. We have no evidence in the record of what transpired after defendant stopped; the only evidence before us comes from the suppression hearing, and relates to events that occurred prior to the stop.\nThe only issue raised by defendant and addressed by the trial court at the suppression hearing was whether the stop and arrest should be suppressed. The constitutionality of the checkpoint was the rationale for defendant\u2019s argument that the stop and arrest should be suppressed because the checkpoint was unconstitutionally authorized. While concluding that the checkpoint was constitutional, we also conclude that the trial court erred by analyzing defendant\u2019s stop and arrest in terms of the legality of the checkpoint. Defendant failed to stop at the checkpoint and in fact, according to Officer Falls\u2019 testimony, increased his speed and forced Falls to quickly move out of the path of the oncoming vehicle. Therefore, whether defendant\u2019s stop and arrest should be suppressed turns on whether Officer Falls had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant after defendant drove through the checkpoint and nearly struck Falls with the vehicle. We conclude that Officer Falls did have reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant. Therefore, the trial court erred by suppressing defendant\u2019s stop and arrest.\nPolice officers effectuate a seizure when they stop a vehicle at a checkpoint. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333, 342 (2000). But, \u201c[t]he Fourth Amendment does not treat a motorist\u2019s car as his castle.\u201d Illinois v. Lidster, - U.S. -,-,- L. Ed. 2d \u2014,- (Jan. 13, 2004) (No. 02-1060). And checkpoint stops conform to the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable. Michigan Dep\u2019t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 420 (1990). \u201c[W]e must judge [the] reasonableness [of a checkpoint stop], hence, its constitutionality, on the basis of individual circumstances.\u201d Lidster at -, - L. Ed. 2d at \u2014. In the case at bar, we conclude that the checkpoint is reasonable, and thus conforms to the Fourth Amendment.\nBecause checkpoint stops are minimally intrusive, and are not subjective stops, like those arising from roving patrols, checkpoints are viewed with less scrutiny than are roving patrols. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95, 45 L. Ed. 2d 623, 628 (1975):\n[T]he circumstances surrounding a checkpoint stop and search are far less intrusive than those attending a roving-patrol stop. Roving patrols often operate at night on seldom-traveled roads, and their approach may frighten motorists. At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers\u2019 authority, and he is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion.\nIn the instant case, the checkpoint stop was only a minimal intrusion.\nRelying on Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, where the United States Supreme Court upheld a sobriety checkpoint conducted pursuant to written guidelines, defendant argues and the dissent agrees that the Fourth Amendment prohibits officers from conducting checkpoints without written guidelines. We disagree. Although the Michigan State Police in Sitz conducted the sobriety checkpoint pursuant to written guidelines, the United States Supreme Court did not uphold the checkpoint solely because of those written guidelines. Id. at 453, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 422. The Court also found the checkpoint constitutional because it was a checkpoint, not a roving patrol, and because the police stopped every approaching vehicle. Similarly, in the instant case, the Belmont Police stopped every oncoming vehicle.\nDefendant also claims Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979), prohibits police officers from conducting driver\u2019s license checkpoints without written guidelines. In Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits police from randomly stopping motorists to check their driver\u2019s licenses and registrations. Id. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 673. The Court condemned the \u201cunbridled discretion\u201d exercised by law enforcement officers conducting these spot checks. Id. at 661, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 672. However, as defendant concedes, the Court in Prouse sanctioned checkpoints like the one at issue, stating: \u201cQuestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative [to random stops].\u201d Id. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 674. As previously noted, the officers stopped all oncoming traffic at the checkpoint.\nNeither Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, nor the Fourth Amendment requires police departments to have written guidelines before conducting driver\u2019s license checkpoints, nor do we find any such requirement under our state constitution. Therefore, we decline to conclude that checkpoints conducted without written guidelines are per se unconstitutional. Here adequate internal guidelines were testified to and implemented.\nDefendant also contends the checkpoint is unconstitutional because Officer Falls, who established the checkpoint, failed to obtain supervisory permission before creating it. To support this contention, defendant relies heavily on Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, in which the United States Supreme Court held that a police officer abused his discretion by randomly stopping a driver to check the driver\u2019s license and registration. Defendant contends that to prevent police officers from abusing their discretion, this Court should require them to obtain supervisory permission before creating driver^ license checkpoints. But, in the case subjudice, Officer Falls had supervisory permission to create the checkpoint. Officer Falls testified that before conducting the checkpoint, he \u201cspoke with the shift sergeant. . . [t]o make sure [the sergeant] ha[d] the manpower\u201d for Falls to set up the checkpoint. Additionally, Falls testified that he had \u201cstanding permission\u201d from Captain Jonas to conduct driver\u2019s license checkpoints as long as he followed Jonas\u2019 guidelines. Captain Jonas\u2019 guidelines, as testified to at the hearing, included: requiring his police officers to conduct driver\u2019s license checkpoints in safe places that had proper lighting; requiring officers to activate their blue lights while conducting a checkpoint; requiring officers to stop all cars approaching a checkpoint; and requiring at least three officers to be present at a checkpoint.\nWe conclude that Falls\u2019 standing permission to set up checkpoints pursuant to Captain Jonas\u2019 oral guidelines and Officer Falls\u2019 call to his supervisor before creating the checkpoint at issue are constitutionally sufficient restraints to keep Falls from abusing his discretion. Because police officers are not constitutionally mandated to conduct driver\u2019s license checkpoints pursuant to written guidelines; because Officer Falls received sufficient supervisory authority to conduct the checkpoint; and because the officers stopped all oncoming traffic at the checkpoint, we conclude that the checkpoint was constitutional.\nFinally, we note that in the United States Supreme Court\u2019s most recent decision on the constitutionality of checkpoints, the Court neither addressed the need for officers to set up checkpoints pursuant to written guidelines nor the need for officers to obtain supervisory permission before creating a checkpoint. Lidster. - U.S.-,-L. Ed. 2d-. That neither the parties in Lidster, nor the Supreme Court itself were compelled to address these issues indicates the issues are not lynchpins for determining the constitutionality of a checkpoint.\nLidster involved a roadblock set up to seek information about a prior crime, and not a roadblock set up to check drivers\u2019 licenses and registrations. But here, defendant\u2019s argument requesting this Court to impose additional constraints on police officers who set up driver\u2019s license checkpoints would arguably apply to police officers who set up information-seeking checkpoints. Thus, we conclude that the absence in Lidster of any focus on an issue dealing with supervisory permission and written guidelines indicates that these issues do not merit a constitutionally mandated reversal in a roadblock case such as the one sub judice.\nAlternatively, because defendant did not stop at the checkpoint, we also consider whether Officer Falls had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant after defendant ignored the officer\u2019s order to stop and forced Falls to jump out of the road to avoid being struck by defendant\u2019s vehicle. A police officer may stop a person if the officer has \u201creasonable articulable suspicion\u201d that the person was engaged in criminal activity prior to the seizure. State v. Foreman, 351 N.C. 627, 631, 527 S.E.2d 921, 923 (2000). \u201cWhen an officer observes conduct which leads him reasonably to believe that criminal conduct may be afoot, he may stop the suspicious person to make reasonable inquiries.\u201d State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 275, 498 S.E.2d 599, 600 (1998).\nOfficer Falls had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant. As the United States Supreme Court recently stated: \u201cHeadlong flight \u2014 wherever it occurs \u2014 is the consummate act of evasion: It is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it is certainly suggestive of such.\u201d Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000) (holding that a police officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a defendant where defendant, without provocation, fled upon seeing police officers). In the case sub judice, defendant accelerated his vehicle when Falls ordered him to stop, and defendant\u2019s vehicle nearly struck Falls. Defendant\u2019s actions constituted evidence of flight. This flight and the surrounding circumstances gave Officer Falls reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant. We note, however, that the facts of the case do not deal with the circumstance where a driver makes a legal turn away from a checkpoint.\nFurthermore, without concluding that defendant committed any crimes, we note that Falls had reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant committed several crimes: assaulting a police officer, \u201cattempting to elude a law enforcement officer who is in the lawful performance of his duties\u201d in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-141.5(a) (2001), and driving a vehicle \u201ccarelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others,\u201d in violation of the reckless driving statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20440(a) (2001).\nFalls also had reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant committed an assault. \u201cThere is no statutory definition of assault in North Carolina, and the crime of assault is governed by common law rules.\u201d State v. Roberts, 270 N.C. 655, 658, 155 S.E.2d 303, 305 (1967). This Court defines assault as, \u201c \u2018an overt act or an attempt, or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and violence, to do some immediate physical injury to the person of another, which show of force or menace of violence must be sufficient to put a person of reasonable firmness in fear of immediate bodily harm.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting 1 Strong\u2019s N.C. Index, Assault and Battery, \u00a7 4, p. 182 [1957]). Because defendant accelerated his vehicle as he directly approached Officer Falls, Falls could have determined that defendant was attempting to injure him. Hence, Falls had reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant committed an assault.\nMoreover, the fact that defendant accelerated when Officer Falls requested him to stop, and that defendant nearly hit Falls, provided Falls with reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-141.5(a) (2001), which states: \u201cIt shall be unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle on a street, highway, or public vehicular area while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer who is in the lawful performance of his duties,\u201d and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-140(a) (2001), which states: \u201cAny person who drives any vehicle upon a highway or any public vehicular area carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others shall be guilty of reckless driving.\u201d Therefore, regardless of the constitutional status of the checkpoint, Officer Falls properly stopped and seized defendant. Accordingly, the trial court erred in suppressing evidence of defendant\u2019s stop and arrest.\nTo follow the dissent\u2019s argument, to its logical and practical conclusion under the facts of this case would result in the inability of a law enforcement officer to stop a motorist who disobeyed the officer\u2019s request to stop at a roadblock. The dissent attempts to avoid this conclusion by stating that: \u201cPolice officers may certainly develop a reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a car based upon their observations, unrelated to the checkpoint, that a crime has been committed.\u201d Even with this acknowledgment, under the dissent, a motorist who \u201cguesses\u201d correctly that a checkpoint is not validly set up would appear to have carte blanche to ignore the checkpoint absent circumstances unrelated to the checkpoint.\nMODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice BRADY\ndissenting.\nI acknowledge that impaired drivers seriously endanger the lives of their fellow citizens across our state and nation. I further acknowledge that North Carolina\u2019s state and local law enforcement agencies work diligently to ensure the safety of our streets and highways. However, I cannot agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that this case \u201cturns on whether Officer Falls had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant\u201d after defendant proceeded through the license checkpoint; nor can I agree that the driver\u2019s license checkpoint at issue passes constitutional muster under the United States and North Carolina Constitutions. In this case, field officers were endowed with unbridled discretion to implement and operate a random license checkpoint. I would adhere to the requirements of Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1979) and hold that the discretion granted the Belmont officers rendered the checkpoint violative of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.\nThe paramount question in this case should be the constitutionality of the driver\u2019s license checkpoint. The majority acknowledges that this was the \u201conly issue\u201d raised by defendant and considered by the trial court at the suppression hearing. At that hearing, Officer Falls confirmed that defendant\u2019s \u201cvehicle was pursued and stopped solely as a result of this random stop \u2014 this random checkpoint.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Thereafter, the trial court found that Officer Falls stopped defendant \u201cas a sole and direct result of the random check point or roadblock.\u201d Instead of constraining itself to the trial court\u2019s factual findings, see State v. Braxton, 344 N.C. 702, 709, 477 S.E.2d 172, 176 (1996) (\u201cIf supported by competent evidence, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal.\u201d), the majority speculates as to what crimes would have justified Officer Falls\u2019 seizure of defendant, see cf. 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure \u00a7 3.2(d), at 44 (3rd ed. 1996) (\u201cIt is axiomatic that hindsight may not be employed in determining whether a prior arrest or search was made upon probable cause.\u201d). However, defendant was never charged with any of the crimes the majority now suggests that he committed, nor did Officer Falls testify that he formulated probable cause to believe defendant had committed any of those offenses.\nClearly, defendant\u2019s behavior was questionable in that defendant, with no knowledge of the checkpoint\u2019s unconstitutional nature, failed to stop when so directed. Motorists do not have carte blanche to ignore checkpoints that they suspect are invalid and to avoid responsibility if they guess correctly. Police officers may certainly develop reasonable articulable suspicion to stop a car based upon their observations, unrelated to the checkpoint, that a crime has been committed. Armed with such suspicion, the officers\u2019 seizure of the vehicle is proper regardless of the constitutionality of the checkpoint. See State v. Palmquist, - S.W.3d -, -, 2003 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 891, at *5 (Oct. 13, 2003) (No. M2002-01047-CCA-R3-CD) (concluding that a vehicle seizure was constitutional where an officer, stationed at an unconstitutional roadblock, testified that he stopped the vehicle \u201conly because Defendant was illegally operating his vehicle without its headlights on, and not because Defendant had intentionally avoided the roadblock\u201d). However, in the instant case, there is no record evidence to support the crimes speculated to by the majority.\nAs the license checkpoint was the impetus for defendant\u2019s stop, the determinative issue is as follows: Did the degree of discretion afforded Belmont Police Officer Falls render the random license checkpoint unreasonable and therefore unconstitutional under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution? Upon a careful analysis of the relevant United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, I believe that it did.\nThe Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects \u201c[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.\u201d U.S. Const, amend. IV; see also N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 20 (\u201cGeneral warrants, whereby any officer or other person may be commanded to search suspected places without evidence of the act committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, whose offense is not particularly described and supported by evidence, are dangerous to liberty and shall not be granted.\u201d); State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 73, 540 S.E.2d 713, 728 (2000) (noting the similarity between the Fourth Amendment to the federal constitution and the General Warrants Clause of the state constitution), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001). While license checks and sobriety checks are not per se unconstitutional, it is well established that stopping a person at such checkpoints is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be reasonable. Michigan Dep\u2019t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412, 420 (1990); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 667. Because checkpoint stops are not based on individualized suspicion, they must be carried out in a manner that avoids the exercise of \u201cunbridled discretion\u201d by officers in the field. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 674 (\u201c[Pjersons in automobiles on public roadways may not for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the unbridled discretion of police officers.\u201d).\nIn Prouse, the United States Supreme Court specifically addressed the constitutionality of a practice by which a patrol officer in a police cruiser stopped vehicles and detained drivers to spot check their licenses and registrations without reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the stops. Id. at 650, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 665. At those stops, \u201c[t]he patrolman was not acting pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to document spot checks, promulgated by either his department or the State Attorney General.\u201d Id.\nThe Supreme Court held in Prouse that the suspicionless seizure of motorists for spot checks was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the practice granted the patrol officer \u201cunbridled discretion.\u201d Id. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 674. The Court articulated the \u201c \u2018grave danger\u2019 \u201d inherent in the abuse of officer discretion as follows:\nWhen there is not probable cause to believe that a driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment regulations \u2014 or other articulable basis amounting to reasonable suspicion that the driver is unlicensed or his vehicle unregistered \u2014 we cannot conceive of any legitimate basis upon which a patrolman could decide that stopping a particular driver for a spot check would be more productive than stopping any other driver. This kind of standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circumscribed, at least to some extent.\n440 U.S. at 661-62, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 672 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 559, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, 1129 (1976)) (emphasis added). The Court then clarified that \u201c[t]his holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion.\u201d Id. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 674. While dicta within Prouse indicated that stopping all vehicles might be one such method to eliminate the evil inherent in spot checking, id. at 663, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 674, United States Supreme Court jurisprudence strongly suggests that the method for conducting the type of suspicionless stop at issue in the present case would be chosen, planned, disseminated, and regulated from a supervisory level, see, e.g., Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116; see also City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 148 L. Ed. 2d 333 (2000).\nThis concept was first voiced by the United States Supreme Court in Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116, in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of suspicionless seizures at fixed immigration checkpoints. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court explained,\n[t]he location of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effective allocation of limited enforcement resources. We may assume that such officials will be unlikely to locate a checkpoint where it bears arbitrarily or oppressively on motorists as a class.\nId. at 559, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1129.\nSubsequently, in Sitz, the Court placed great emphasis on the fact that a roadblock for detecting impaired drivers was conducted under written \u201cguidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint operations, site selection, and publicity\u201d that left virtually no discretion to the officer in the field. 496 U.S. at 447, 110 L. Ed. 2d at 418 (upholding the constitutionality of a roadblock for detecting impaired drivers). Further, the United States Supreme Court recently stated that a law enforcement officer cannot undertake a suspicionless seizure when the seizure\u2019s primary purpose is \u201cto advance \u2018the general interest in crime control.\u2019 \u201d Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44, 148 L. Ed. 2d. at 345 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659, n.18, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 671, n.18) (explaining that the primary purpose of a seizure is to be ascertained at the programmatic level). Although Edmond does not address the specific issue raised by the present case, it illustrates the need for and the Court\u2019s expectation that law enforcement agencies implement standard written procedures to prevent abuses of officer discretion.\nMost recently, in Illinois v. Lidster, the Supreme Court scrutinized a highway checkpoint set up to solicit information from motorists regarding a hit-and-run accident. Illinois v. Lidster, - U.S.-, \u2014-, - L. Ed. 2d -, -, 2004 LEXIS 656 (Jan. 13, 2004) (No. 02-1060). The Court, in Lidster, validated a new and wholly independent class of constitutional suspicionless searches, \u201cinformation-seeking highway stops.\u201d Id. at-,-L. Ed. 2d at-, 2004 LEXIS 656, at *6, *9. The Court emphasized that these checkpoints are not designed to help police apprehend the stopped drivers but are instead intended to \u201cask vehicle occupants, as members of the public, for their help in providing information about a crime in all likelihood committed by others.\u201d Id. at-,-L. Ed. 2d at-, 2004 LEXIS 656, at *9. Given the novel and limited nature of this particular Fourth Amendment distinction, Lidster has little precedential value with regard to the case currently before this Court.\nEven so, it is instructive to note that, when determining the reasonableness of the Lidster seizure, the United States Supreme Court thoroughly discussed the narrow scope of the checkpoint stop. The Court reasoned that\n[t]he police appropriately tailored their checkpoint stops to fit important criminal investigatory needs. The stops took place about one week after the hit-and-run accident, on the same highway near the location of the accident, and at about the same time of night.\nId. at-,-L. Ed. 2d at-, 2004 LEXIS 656, at *15 (emphasis added). During the checkpoint\u2019s implementation, \u201cas each vehicle drew up to the checkpoint, an officer would stop it for 10 to 15 seconds, ask the occupants whether they had seen anything happen there the previous weekend, and hand each driver a flyer.\u201d Id. at-, -L. Ed. 2d at-, 2004 LEXIS 656, at *6. Clearly, the impetus for the Lidster checkpoint, its date, the location, the time, and the questions asked were command directed by the Lombard Police Department, and not left to the discretion of a single officer in the field. The Court took care to weigh these factors in its determination that the checkpoint was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.\nI submit that the cases discussed supra mandate a significant level of supervisory authority and written standardized regulations regarding the time, place, and manner in which field officers conduct checkpoints. Standard policies and procedures are necessary for safeguarding the constitutional rights of individuals who are subjected to suspicionless seizures. Implementing written policies constitutes a manageable method for eliminating the \u201cevil\u201d of \u201cstandardless and unconstrained discretion.\u201d Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 59 L. Ed. 2d at 672. Indeed, the North Carolina State Highway Patrol already adheres to written guidelines that require supervision of every \u201cpreplanned, systematic stopping of vehicles to check motorists for compliance with motor vehicle laws including driving while impaired.\u201d Div. of State Highway Patrol, N.C. Dep\u2019t of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, Policy and Procedures Manual K.4 (2001) (mandating that \u201c[a] daytime checking station must be approved by a district supervisor\u201d and \u201c[a] nighttime checking station must be approved by the First Sergeant or higher authority\u201d). Furthermore, as the State conceded upon questioning at oral argument, all law enforcement agencies and departments accredited by the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. must follow similarly mandated procedures.\nNotwithstanding the United States Supreme Court\u2019s admonitions against unconstrained field-officer discretion and the apparent prevailing law enforcement practice in North Carolina, no supervision or written regulations guided the field officers in the case sub judice. Officer Falls testified that the checkpoint at issue was considered by the Belmont Police Department to be a \u201crandom\u201d license checkpoint. Testimony at the suppression hearing also confirmed that Officer Falls was granted \u201cstanding permission\u201d to set up such a \u201crandom\u201d license checkpoint whenever, wherever, however, and for as long as he deemed necessary.\nThe majority correctly points out that Officer Falls contacted his shift sergeant before implementing the checkpoint, but the record reveals that this contact was only to ensure that he had \u201cthe manpower . . . [to] actually set up the checkpoint.\u201d At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court recognized that Officer Falls had not obtained permission to establish the checkpoint. As the court was announcing its oral order, the State pointed out that \u201cOfficer Falls did get the permission from his shift sergeant.\u201d The trial court disagreed, noting that Officer Falls \u201csaid he told the shift sergeant he was going to do [a checkpoint].\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAs this case illustrates, a field officer\u2019s \u201cstanding permission\u201d to conduct \u201crandom\u201d license checkpoints absent standard guidelines as to when, where, and how to administer the roadblocks equates to a complete lack of supervisory authority, and in fact, represents the very form of unbridled discretion that was prohibited by the Supreme Court in Prouse. See Heimlich v. State, 231 Ga. App. 662, 663, 500 S.E.2d 388, 389 (1998) (concluding checkpoint constitutional where a field officer had a \u201cstanding order\u201d to establish checkpoints), overruled by Baker v. State, 252 Ga. App. 695, 701-02, 556 S.E.2d 892, 899 (2001) (overruling Heimlich and similar cases based upon the court\u2019s obligation to \u201cfollow the United States Supreme Court\u2019s interpretation of Fourth Amendment requirements\u201d), cert. denied, - Ga. -, - S.E.2d -, 2003 Ga. LEXIS 423 (May 13, 2003) (No. S02C0539). Furthermore, the guidelines referenced by the majority \u2014 choosing a safe location, wearing reflective vests, having three officers present, using flashlights, and turning on the patrol cars\u2019 blue lights \u2014 are not guidelines specific to checkpoints but are standard nighttime safety procedures. Neither these procedures nor the practice of stopping every car curbs a field officer\u2019s discretion to set up a roadblock when and wherever he chooses. The suppression hearing testimony of Belmont Police Captain William Jonas is indicative. Captain Jonas confirmed that under the city\u2019s present practices, Belmont field officers \u201ccould set up a road check and check one car within five minutes and then dissolve the roadblock.\u201d\nThis Court\u2019s decision sanctioning total field-officer discretion is not only contrary to United States Supreme Court precedent, it also stands alone among the decisions of many of our sister jurisdictions that have addressed this or similar issues regarding checkpoints and roadblocks. See, e.g., State v. Hicks, 55 S.W.3d 515 (Tenn. 2001) (holding that there are two factors critical to .a finding that officers\u2019 discretion was limited are whether the decision to set up the roadblock was made by the officers actually carrying it out and whether officers on the scene could decide for themselves the procedures to be used in operation of the checkpoint); State v. Legg, 536 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 2000) (concluding that conservation officers\u2019 stop of every car in a certain area to check for game, weapons, and hunting license was unconstitutional where the officers\u2019 only directive was to work the area); LaFontaine v. State, 269 Ga. 251, 497 S.E.2d 367 (concluding that the decision to implement the roadblock must be made by supervisory personnel not officers in the field), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 947, 142 L. Ed. 2d 307 (1998); Commonwealth v. Bothman, 941 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. Ct. App. 1996) (recognizing the importance of a systematic plan and supervisory control over establishment and operation of a checkpoint); Campbell v. State, 679 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam) (holding that specific and detailed written guidelines are required before police can establish a constitutional roadblock); Hagood v. Town of Town Creek, 628 So. 2d 1057 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (concluding that roadblock unconstitutional where the operating officers had complete discretion to move it and did so); Crandol v. City of Newport News, 238 Va. 697, 386 S.E.2d 113 (1989) (acknowledging that key factors in determining the legality of a checkpoint include proof of advance decisions by superior officers as to the time and location of the roadblock, adequate training of officers, and on-site supervision of the officers conducting the roadblock). There is no indication that these states have suffered the phenomenon predicted by the majority, that is, the \u201cendanger[ment] [of] the safety of the law enforcement officers and the public with impunity.\u201d Rather, by providing clear direction to local law enforcement agencies as to the requirements of a constitutional checkpoint, these courts have enabled those agencies to better police the roads and highways of their communities, while safeguarding the constitutional rights of motorists.\nFinally, under the majority\u2019s opinion, officers are given wide latitude in establishing license checkpoints but are greatly constrained by statutorily mandated standards in establishing similar impaired driver checkpoints, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-16.3A (2003). Suppression hearing testimony in the present case suggests that this disparity between the standards for license checkpoints and impaired driver checkpoints can lead to abuse of field-officer discretion. According to Officer Falls\u2019 testimony, during the past two years, he had participated in only three impaired driver checkpoints but he had participated in around forty random license checkpoints.\nOur founding fathers intended the Fourth Amendment to protect the right of ordinary individuals to be free from arbitrary invasions of their person and property by the state. Delegating all discretion to field officers for the purpose of implementing checkpoints necessarily invites unreasonable interference with that constitutional right. I believe that permitting field officers to choose the time, location, and manner of license checkpoints without supervision or written regulation implicitly validates unbridled field-officer discretion, an evil that the United States and North Carolina Constitutions strictly prohibit. Because Officer Falls was granted such unguided discretion to establish and conduct the license checkpoint at issue in the present case, defendant\u2019s seizure, resulting from that checkpoint, was unconstitutional. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nJustices WAINWRIGHT and EDMUNDS join in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice BRADY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Isaac T. Avery, III, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Patricia A. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Inc., by Seth H. Jaffe, for the defendant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID ERIC MITCHELL\nNo. 655PA02\n(Filed 6 February 2004)\nMotor Vehicles\u2014 driving while impaired \u2014 driver\u2019s license checkpoint\nThe Court of Appeals did not err in a driving while impaired case by concluding that a driver\u2019s license checkpoint was legal, because: (1) officers are not constitutionally mandated to conduct driver\u2019s license checkpoints pursuant to written guidelines, the officer received sufficient supervisory authority to conduct the checkpoint, and the officers stopped all oncoming traffic at the checkpoint; (2) the pertinent officer had reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant when defendant ignored the officer\u2019s order to stop and forced the officer to jump out of the road to avoid being struck by defendant\u2019s .vehicle; and (3) the officer had reasonable articulable suspicion that defendant committed several crimes including assaulting a police officer, attempting to elude an officer who was in the lawful performance of his duties, and driving a vehicle carelessly and heedlessly in willful or wanton disregard of the rights or safety of others.\nJustice Brady dissenting.\nJustices Wainwright and Edmunds join in the dissenting opinion.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a decision of the Court of Appeals, 154 N.C. App. 186, 571 S.E.2d 640 (2002), reversing an order entered in open court and reduced to writing on 17 October 2001 by Judge Marcus L. Johnson in Superior Court, Gaston County. Heard in the Supreme Court 16 October 2003.\nAttorney General Roy Cooper, by Isaac T. Avery, III, Special Deputy Attorney General, and Patricia A. Duffy, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nAmerican Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Inc., by Seth H. Jaffe, for the defendant." }, "file_name": "0063-01", "first_page_order": 95, "last_page_order": 110 }