{ "id": 2986844, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PARISH LORENZO MATTHEWS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Matthews", "decision_date": "2004-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 654A01", "first_page": "102", "last_page": "112", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 N.C. 102" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "315 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716847 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 110", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 867", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9538048, 9537729, 9537923, 9537860, 9537989, 9537638, 9537799, 9538117, 9538377, 9538435, 9538319, 9538197, 9537686, 9538264 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/0867-08", "/us/531/0867-03", "/us/531/0867-06", "/us/531/0867-05", "/us/531/0867-07", "/us/531/0867-01", "/us/531/0867-04", "/us/531/0867-09", "/us/531/0867-13", "/us/531/0867-14", "/us/531/0867-12", "/us/531/0867-10", "/us/531/0867-02", "/us/531/0867-11" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155594 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 L. Ed. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 344", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491533 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 U.S. 78", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 333750 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "1321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/295/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 S.E.2d 335", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "granting defendant a new trial where the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion that a witness was lying" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "271 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566320 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" }, { "page": "660", "parenthetical": "granting defendant a new trial where the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion that a witness was lying" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/271/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 33", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534822 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 1099", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 1142", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11562464, 11562529, 11562560, 11562626, 11562501, 11562406, 11562376, 11562665, 11562347, 11562476, 11562444, 11562361, 11562394, 11562427, 11562590 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1142-08", "/us/523/1142-11", "/us/523/1142-12", "/us/523/1142-14", "/us/523/1142-10", "/us/523/1142-05", "/us/523/1142-03", "/us/523/1142-15", "/us/523/1142-01", "/us/523/1142-09", "/us/523/1142-07", "/us/523/1142-02", "/us/523/1142-04", "/us/523/1142-06", "/us/523/1142-13" ] }, { "cite": "493 S.E.2d 264", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551151 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 S.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" }, { "page": "459-60", "parenthetical": "reversing defendant's rape conviction where the prosecutor improperly described defendant as \"lower than the bone belly of a cur dog\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "279 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566096 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "165-67", "parenthetical": "reversing defendant's rape conviction where the prosecutor improperly described defendant as \"lower than the bone belly of a cur dog\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/279/0163-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 163, 166, 181 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1971)" }, { "page": "105" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "103", "parenthetical": "vacating defendant's death sentence because the prosecutor improperly compared the victim's life to those lives lost in the Columbine Shootings and the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219899 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 163, 166, 181 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1971)" }, { "page": "129" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "vacating defendant's death sentence because the prosecutor improperly compared the victim's life to those lives lost in the Columbine Shootings and the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 266", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659844 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" }, { "page": "270-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0266-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 S.E.2d 184", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4705739 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 405", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 474", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778236 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "483" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0474-01" ] }, { "cite": "391 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 489", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305969 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 L. Ed. 2d 322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "529 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9519264, 9519454, 9519074, 9519332, 9519301, 9519119, 9519055, 9519154, 9519026, 9519190, 9519480, 9519385, 9519230, 9519422 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/529/1024-08", "/us/529/1024-13", "/us/529/1024-03", "/us/529/1024-10", "/us/529/1024-09", "/us/529/1024-04", "/us/529/1024-02", "/us/529/1024-05", "/us/529/1024-01", "/us/529/1024-06", "/us/529/1024-14", "/us/529/1024-11", "/us/529/1024-07", "/us/529/1024-12" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 701", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131990 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0701-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 585", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "591" }, { "page": "591" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573095 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 672", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 1123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12995, 12899, 12492, 12429, 13010, 12883, 12756, 12661, 13047, 12568, 13049, 12828, 12351 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/1123-12", "/us/476/1123-01", "/us/476/1123-10", "/us/476/1123-08", "/us/476/1123-13", "/us/476/1123-11", "/us/476/1123-03", "/us/476/1123-07", "/us/476/1123-02", "/us/476/1123-06", "/us/476/1123-05", "/us/476/1123-09", "/us/476/1123-04" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507-08" }, { "page": "507" }, { "page": "507" }, { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4716847 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0175-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1047, "char_count": 23677, "ocr_confidence": 0.717, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.0454534267598656e-07, "percentile": 0.855533276264369 }, "sha256": "7369fa014645bba31a83d079527c04e7d61ca9f274db2cd66c131adc4e03dd97", "simhash": "1:91175000b3862456", "word_count": 3793 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:52.416221+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PARISH LORENZO MATTHEWS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "ORR, Justice.\nOn 7 February 2000, an Edgecombe County grand jury indicted Parish Lorenzo Matthews for one count of first-degree murder, one count of larceny, and one count of financial transaction card theft. On 6 November 2000; defendant was further indicted for second-degree burglary and attempted second-degree rape.\nOn 21 May 2001, prior to the start of trial, defendant pled guilty to the larceny and financial transaction card theft charges. At the end of the evidence, the trial court dismissed the attempted second-degree rape charge. On 24 May 2001, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder with premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. The jury further found defendant guilty of second-degree burglary. The jury recommended that defendant be sentenced to death. The trial court imposed the death sentence, and in addition imposed a sentence of between ten and twelve months'for the larceny and financial card theft, and a sentence of sixteen to twenty months for the second-degree burglary, with all three sentences running consecutively.\nDefendant presented no evidence at trial, but the State\u2019s evidence tended to show the following: On 7 August 1999, defendant and Jessie Pettaway watched movies at Pettaway\u2019s residence. After leaving Pettaway\u2019s home, defendant returned later that night. He entered the home through a window and took several items belonging to Pettaway, including a cellular phone, debit card, stereo equipment, and a VCR. At some point, defendant tied Pettaway\u2019s feet and arms with a robe belt and an extension cord, placed tissue paper in Pettaway\u2019s mouth and covered her mouth with duct tape. The' autopsy showed Pettaway died from asphyxiation; the tissue paper obstructed her airway.\nDefendant drove away from Pettaway\u2019s home in her Nissan Pathfinder. The next day he drove the Pathfinder to meet Johnny Ball. Ball changed the automobile\u2019s license plate to an Illinois license plate and then Ball and defendant drove the automobile to Illinois.\nDuring their drive to Illinois, defendant and Ball stopped in Sunman, Indiana, where defendant used Pettaway\u2019s debit card to purchase gas. On 20 August 1999, in Illinois, Robert Myer of the Pulaski County Sheriff\u2019s Department stopped Ball for speeding. Myer discovered that the vehicle was stolen, and found the vehicle\u2019s original license plate, along with other items, including Pettaway\u2019s cellular phone, handcuffs and a knife. Myer checked the license plate inside the Pathfinder and discovered that defendant was wanted in North Carolina for Pettaway\u2019s murder. Myer then arrested defendant.\nDavid Hawkins, a police sergeant from Rocky Mount, North Carolina, interviewed defendant in Illinois. Defendant made a voluntary statement to Sergeant Hawkins in which he admitted the following: Defendant watched movies with Pettaway at her home. He then left Pettaway\u2019s home and went to see \u201cPeeknuckle.\u201d Defendant and Peeknuckle climbed through Pettaway\u2019s window and took several items from her. Defendant helped Peeknuckle tie Pettaway\u2019s arms and legs. Peeknuckle then put a sock in Pettaway\u2019s mouth and taped her mouth. Defendant stated that Pettaway was aliv\u00e9 when he left her. After defendant made his statement, he admitted to Sergeant Hawkins that Peeknuckle did not exist. Defendant waived extradition to North Carolina, and Sergeant Hawkins and another detective transported defendant back to Rocky Mount.\nWe have reviewed the assignments of error brought forward by defendant and we find reversible error in defense counsel\u2019s concession of defendant\u2019s guilt without his consent during closing arguments of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial.\nDefendant claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney conceded his guilt to second-degree murder, a lesser included crime, without his consent and in violation of State v. Harbison, 315 N.C. 175, 337 S.E.2d 504 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123, 90 L. Ed. 2d 672 (1986). After reviewing defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief on this issue filed with this Court, we determined that the record on appeal contained insufficient evidence to permit this Court to determine the issue. Therefore, on 3 January 2003, this Court entered an order remanding defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief to Superior Court, Edgecombe County, for an evidentiary hearing. The order directed the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to defendant\u2019s allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court, with Judge Frank R. Brown presiding, entered its order on 30 June 2003 with extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law concluding that defendant had not received ineffective assistance of counsel, and denying defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief. This order, along with a transcript of the hearing was filed in this Court on 24 July 2003 and is considered an addendum to the record on appeal in this case.\nFindings of fact made by the trial court pursuant to hearings on motions for appropriate relief are \u201cbinding upon the [defendant] if they were supported by evidence.\u201d State v. Stevens, 305 N.C. 712, 719-20, 291 S.E.2d 585, 591 (1982). \u201cOur inquiry therefore, is to determine whether the findings of fact are supported by evidence, whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law, and whether the conclusions of law support the order entered by the trial court.\u201d Stevens, 305 at 720, 291 S.E.2d at 591; see also, State v. Morganherring, 350 N.C. 701, 714, 517 S.E.2d 622, 630 (1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1024, 146 L. Ed. 2d 322 (2000).\nIn Harbison, we held that \u201cineffective assistance of counsel, per se in violation of the Sixth Amendment, has been established in every criminal case in which the defendant\u2019s counsel admits the defendant\u2019s guilt to the jury without the defendant\u2019s consent.\u201d Harbison, 315 N.C. at 180, 337 S.E.2d at 507-08. Therefore, we must determine whether the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law that \u201c [defendant has failed to make any showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel pursuant to Harbison\u201d is supported by the trial court\u2019s findings of fact.\nDuring the closing argument of the guilt-innocence phase of defendant\u2019s jury trial, one of his attorneys, Edward Simmons, stated:\nThere are three possible verdicts in that case. And Mr. Graham has shown you that. You have a possible verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. And there are two theories upon which the State relies for that. And we\u2019re going to talk about that in just a minute.\nYou have a possible verdict of guilty of second-degree murder. And then the third possibility is not guilty. I\u2019ve been practicing law twenty-four years and I\u2019ve been in this position many times. And this is probably the first time I\u2019ve come up in front of the jury and said you ought not to even consider that last possibility.\nAnd I\u2019m not up here and I\u2019m not telling you that that\u2019s a possibility. I\u2019m not saying you should find Mr. Matthews not guilty. That\u2019s very unusual. And it kind of cuts against the grain of a defense lawyer. But I\u2019m telling you in this case you ought not to find him not guilty because he is guilty of something.\n(Emphasis added.) Simmons later stated: \u201cWhen you look at the evidence . . . you\u2019re going to find that he\u2019s guilty of second-degree murder.\u201d\nIn Judge Brown\u2019s 30 June 2003 order filed in Superior Court, Edgecombe County, following the Harbison, the trial court found the following:\n9. The trial attorneys\u2019 theory of the case was to deny first-degree murder but acknowledge that defendant was accountable, which is why they argued strenuously for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter .... Judge Everett did not give an instruction on voluntary manslaughter ....\n11. After the charge conference at guilt/innocence, Simmons did not ask defendant if he would concede to Simmons\u2019 arguing second-degree murder to the jury. . . .\n12. ... [Simmons] asked the jury to find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder. When it was over, defendant appeared to be angry and upset. [Defendant] said nothing to Simmons but Godwin told Simmons that defendant did not want Simmons to say or do anything else in the case.\n16. Simmons stated that the trial strategy was to try for voluntary manslaughter if the attorneys could get an instruction on it, or for second-degree murder if they could not... .\n17. Simmons had discussed the trial strategy with Godwin and he agreed with it. Simmons had discussed the same strategy with defendant several times in depth and in great detail: i.e. trying to get a verdict of something less than first-degree murder at guilt/innocence. Defendant took part in these strategy discussions.\n19. Simmons and Godwin discussed second degree murder with defendant in the sense that anything less than first degree murder would be good. This was their trial strategy. Simmons was certain that defendant concurred with it.. . .\n26. When Simmons was giving closing argument at the guilt/ innocence phase, defendant tapped Godwin on the shoulder and asked whether he heard what Simmons had just said. Prior to Simmons\u2019 return to the counsel table, defendant told Godwin to tell Simmons that he was to have nothing further to do with the case and that Godwin was to complete the case. Simmons continued to help in discussion and preparation, but Godwin did all the communicating with defendant.\n27. Godwin testified that defendant never specifically said to the attorneys, \u201cYou have my permission to tell the jury that I am guilty of second-degree murder.\u201d Godwin did not recall that either he or Simmons specifically asked defendant if they could argue that he was guilty of second-degree murder. . . .\n30. The attorneys\u2019 trial strategy was to try to convince the jury that defendant was guilty of something other than first degree murder. This included pleading to the larceny charges to show that there was some culpability. Godwin did not believe that the attorneys were ever going to try to concede to second degree murder because defendant had told the officers that he did not intend to kill Pettaway, but that depended on how things turned out during the State\u2019s case.\n32. This Court finds on the basis of the sworn testimony given by [] Simmons and Godwin that defendant\u2019s consent to the trial strategy was knowing and intelligent, arrived at after much discussion, and adhered to by Simmons in closing argument as to second degree murder rather than voluntary manslaughter because voluntary manslaughter was no longer an option.\nBased on these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that defendant \u201cfailed to make any showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel pursuant to Harbison.\u201d and denied defendant\u2019s Harbison claim.\nWe now address whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusion that defendant\u2019s trial counsel did not commit Harbison error. The trial court found that defense counsel\u2019s trial strategy was \u201cto convince the jury that defendant was guilty of something other than first degree murder.\u201d The trial court found that, because defendant consented to this overall strategy, and because \u201c[d]efendant\u2019s IQ was high,\u201d defendant implicitly allowed his trial counsel to concede his guilt. However, we conclude that Harbison requires more than implicit consent based on an overall trial strategy and defendant\u2019s intelligence.\n[T]he gravity of the consequences demands that the decision to plead guilty remain in the defendant\u2019s hands. When counsel admits his client\u2019s guilt without first obtaining the client\u2019s consent, the client\u2019s rights to a fair trial and to put the State to the burden of proof are completely swept away. The practical effect is the same as if counsel had entered a plea of guilty without the client\u2019s consent. Counsel in such situations denies the client\u2019s right to have the issue of guilt or innocence decided by a jury.\nHarbison, 315 N.C. at 180, 337 S.E.2d at 507.\nNeither the trial court\u2019s order, the trial transcripts, nor the Harbison hearing transcripts indicate that defendant\u2019s counsel advised him they were going to concede his guilt to second-degree murder. Harbison requires that the decision to concede guilt to a lesser included crime \u201cbe made exclusively by the defendant.\u201d Harbison, 315 N.C. at 180, 337 S.E.2d at 507. Furthermore, \u201c[b]ecause of the gravity of the consequences, a decision to plead guilty must be made knowingly and voluntarily by the defendant after full appraisal of the consequences.\u201d Id. at 180, 337 S.E.2d at 507. For us to conclude that a defendant permitted his counsel to concede his guilt to a lesser-included crime, the facts must show, at a minimum, that defendant knew his counsel were going to make such a concession. Because the record does not indicate defendant knew his attorney was going to concede his guilt to second-degree murder, we must conclude defendant\u2019s attorney made this concession without defendant\u2019s consent, in violation of Harbison. Thus, the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law that no Harbison error occurred is not supported by the trial court\u2019s findings of fact. Defendant\u2019s attorney committed ineffective assistance of counsel per se, and defendant is entitled to a new trial.\nAlthough defendant\u2019s death sentence is reversed and his case is remanded to the trial court for a new trial, we take this opportunity to address two additional issues to prevent them from recurring at defendant\u2019s second trial. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 326 N.C. 489, 511, 391 S.E.2d 144, 158 (1990); State v. Williams, 317 N.C. 474, 483, 346 S.E.2d 405, 411 (1986); State v. Stokes, 308 N.C. 634, 652, 304 S.E.2d 184, 195 (1983).\nFirst, we conclude that the prosecutor violated Rule 24 of the North Carolina General Rules of Practice for Superior and District Courts by failing to hold a special pre-trial conference. Rule 24 states in pertinent part:\nThere shall be a pretrial conference in every case in which the defendant stands charged with a crime punishable by death. No later than ten days after the superior court obtains jurisdiction in such case, the district attorney shall apply to the presiding superior court judge or other superior court judge holding court in the district, who shall enter an order requiring the prosecution and defense counsel to appear before the court within forty-five days thereafter for the pretrial conference. Upon request of either party at the pretrial conference the judge may for good cause shown continue the pretrial conference for a reasonable time.\nR. Pretrial Conference in Capital Cases 24, 2001 N.C. R. Ct. (State) 74. Rule 24 also mandates that the trial court and the parties consider \u201cthe nature of the charges and the existence of evidence of aggravating circumstances; . . . [and] timely appointment of assistant counsel for an indigent defendant when the State is seeking the death penalty.\u201d Id.\nRule 24 provides a simple, bright-line rule, requiring prosecutors to petition for a special pretrial conference in all capital cases. \u201cRule 24 of the Rules of Practice is mandatory.\u201d State v. Rorie, 348 N.C. 266, 271, 500 S.E.2d 77, 81 (1998). In the case sub judice, the prosecutor violated the rule by failing to petition an Edgecombe County Superior Court judge for a pretrial conference as the rule mandates.\n\u201cRepeated violations of the rule manifesting willful disregard for the fair and expeditious prosecution of capital cases may result in citation for contempt pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 5A-11(7) or other appropriate disciplinary action against the district attorney.\u201d Rorie, 348 N.C. at 270-71, 500 S.E.2d at 81. Before the State retries defendant, the prosecutor must petition a superior court judge for a Rule 24 conference. If the prosecutor fails to petition the superior court for a pretrial conference, he risks disciplinary action.\nNext, we address defendant\u2019s complaint that the prosecutor presented an improper and unprofessional closing argument to the jury. Unfortunately as we have repeatedly noted, complaints such as defendant\u2019s come before this Court in criminal cases far too frequently. This case is remanded for other reasons, and it is not necessary for this Court to reach the issue of improper closing argument in the case at hand. However, we feel compelled to instruct the attorneys and courts of this State, once again, on how to conduct themselves in a proper and professional manner during closing argument.\n\u201cWhen the prosecutor becomes abusive, injects his personal views and opinions into the argument before the jury, he violates the rules of fair debate.\u201d State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 130, 558 S.E.2d 97, 105 (2002) (quoting State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 163, 166, 181 S.E.2d 458, 460 (1971)). The prosecutor\u2019s closing argument in the case at bar was improper because the prosecutor engaged in name-calling and used scatological language when referring to defendant\u2019s theory of the case. During closing argument the prosecutor characterized defendant as a \u201cmonster,\u201d \u201cdemon,\u201d \u201cdevil,\u201d \u201ca man without morals\u201d and as having a \u201cmonster mind.\u201d Such improper characterizations of defendant amounted to no more than name-calling and did not serve the State because the prosecutor was not arguing the evidence and the conclusions that can be inferred therefrom. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1230(a) (2003).\nDefendant also complains that the prosecutor\u2019s use of scatological language was inappropriate and thus improper. We agree. In his closing argument, the prosecutor attacked the defendant\u2019s theory of the case as follows:\nThe defendant, I believe through Mr. Simmons, is going to be portrayed as somebody who is not a monster; as somebody who made a mistake; as somebody who probably did wrong by going in that house; as somebody who only wanted the stuff in the house; as somebody who wouldn\u2019t harm a flea; as somebody who would not kill; as somebody who regretted what they did; as somebody who was sorry for what they did; as somebody who, just resist the urge to laugh, who tried to save her.\nThat\u2019s bull crap.\n(Emphasis added.)\nThis Court has repeatedly warned that closing arguments must be kept within the bounds of civility. Walters, 357 N.C. at 108, 588 S.E.2d at 368; Jones, 355 N.C. at 129, 558 S.E.2d at 105. Though \u201c[g]enerally, trial counsel is allowed wide latitude in the scope of jury arguments,\u201d State v. Hill, 347 N.C. 275, 298, 493 S.E.2d 264, 277 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1142, 140 L. Ed. 2d 1099 (1998), \u201ca trial attorney may not make uncomplimentary comments about opposing counsel, and should \u2018refrain from abusive, vituperative, and opprobrious language, or from indulging in invectives.\u2019 \u201d State v. Sanderson, 336 N.C. 1, 10, 442 S.E.2d 33, 39 (1994) (quoting State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 659, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967)).\nIn the case sub judice, the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument was improper because his personal opinion about defendant\u2019s theory of the case exceeded proper boundaries and he engaged in improper name-calling.\nIn sum, improper closing arguments cannot be tolerated. We again admonish the attorneys and trial courts of this State to reevaluate the need for melodrama and theatrics over civil, reasoned persuasion.\nA well-reasoned, well articulated closing argument can be a critical part of winning a case. However, such argument, no matter how effective, must: (1) be devoid of counsel\u2019s personal opinion; (2) avoid name-calling and/or references to matters beyond the record; (3) be premised on logical deductions, not on appeals to passion or prejudice; and (4) be constructed from fair inferences drawn only from evidence properly admitted at trial.\nJones, 355 N.C. at 135, 558 S.E.2d at 108. We remind the prosecutor that the State\u2019s interest \u201cin a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.\u201d Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 79 L. Ed. 1314, 1321 (1935).\nFinally, while defendant assigns numerous errors to all phases of his trial, we decline to address every potential error as these errors are unlikely to recur at a new trial. We conclude as a matter of law that defense counsel\u2019s admission that defendant was guilty of second-degree murder constituted ineffective assistance of counsel per se. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court\u2019s errors were prejudicial to defendant\u2019s right to a fair trial, and thus defendant is entitled to a new trial.\nNEW TRIAL.\n. State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68, 105, 588 S.E.2d 344, 366 (prosecutor improperly compared defendant to Hitler in his closing argument), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 157 L. Ed. 2d 320 (2003); State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 126, 558 S.E.2d 97,103 (2002) (vacating defendant\u2019s death sentence because the prosecutor improperly compared the victim\u2019s life to those lives lost in the Columbine Shootings and the Oklahoma City Federal Building bombing); State v. Gell, 351 N.C. 192, 216, 524 S.E.2d 332, 347 (prosecutors improperly made biblical arguments to the jury), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 867, 148 L. Ed. 2d 110, (2000); State v. Smith, 279 N.C. 163, 165-67, 181 S.E.2d 458, 459-60 (1971) (reversing defendant\u2019s rape conviction where the prosecutor improperly described defendant as \u201clower than the bone belly of a cur dog\u201d); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 660, 157 S.E.2d 335, 346 (1967) (granting defendant a new trial where the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion that a witness was lying).", "type": "majority", "author": "ORR, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Valerie B. Spalding, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "William F. W. Massengale and Marilyn G. Ozer, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. PARISH LORENZO MATTHEWS\nNo. 654A01\n(Filed 6 February 2004)\n1. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 concession of guilt without defendant\u2019s consent\nA defendant in a capital first-degree murder case received ineffective assistance of counsel per se based on defense counsel\u2019s concession of defendant\u2019s guilt to second-degree murder during closing arguments of the guilt-innocence phase of the trial without defendant\u2019s consent, and the case is remanded for a new trial because: (1) Harbison, 315 N.C. 175 (1985), requires more than implicit consent based on an overall trial strategy and defendant\u2019s intelligence; (2) neither the trial court\u2019s order, the trial transcripts, nor the Harbison hearing transcripts indicate that defendant\u2019s counsel advised him they were going to concede his guilt to second-degree murder; and (3) the record does not indicate defendant knew his attorney was going to concede his guilt to second-degree murder.\n2. Homicide\u2014 first-degree murder \u2014 pretrial conference required\nThe prosecutor violated Rule 24 of the North Carolina General Rules of Practice for Superior and District Courts by failing to hold a special pretrial conference in a capital first-degree murder case, and the prosecutor must petition a superior court judge for a Rule 24 conference before the State retries defendant in the instant case.\n3. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 name-calling\u2014 scatological language\nThe prosecutor in a first-degree murder case presented an improper closing argument when he engaged in name-calling and used scatological language when referring to defendant\u2019s theory of the case.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered 26 May 2001 by Judge Clifton W. Everett, Jr., in Superior Court, Edgecombe County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. On 24 June 2002, the Supreme Court allowed defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of additional judgments. Heard in the Supreme Court 19 November 2003.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Valerie B. Spalding, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nWilliam F. W. Massengale and Marilyn G. Ozer, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0102-01", "first_page_order": 134, "last_page_order": 144 }