{ "id": 2986601, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN WAYNE JONES", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "2004-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 591PA03", "first_page": "473", "last_page": "487", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 N.C. 473" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955236 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957529 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155747, 1155782, 1155850, 1155723, 1155954 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0362-02", "/nc/351/0362-04", "/nc/351/0362-05", "/nc/351/0362-01", "/nc/351/0362-03" ] }, { "cite": "518 S.E.2d 241", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248", "parenthetical": "concluding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) \"clearly states that the possession of any amount of cocaine is a felony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "134 N.C. App. 546", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11145958 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "concluding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) \"clearly states that the possession of any amount of cocaine is a felony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/134/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 376", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "referring to a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-56.1 as a \"felony-grade breaking into a coin-operated machine\" where the defendant had a prior conviction for such a violation" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 N.C. App. 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522481 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443", "parenthetical": "referring to a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-56.1 as a \"felony-grade breaking into a coin-operated machine\" where the defendant had a prior conviction for such a violation" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/111/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 24", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26", "parenthetical": "noting, in passing, that under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(4), the State must prove that the defendant possessed more than one and one-half ounces of marijuana to convict the defendant of \"the felony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 22", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538166 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27", "parenthetical": "noting, in passing, that under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(4), the State must prove that the defendant possessed more than one and one-half ounces of marijuana to convict the defendant of \"the felony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0022-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4701428 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" }, { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "39 S.E. 814", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1901, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "815", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the General Assembly had previously acquiesced in the Court's century-old practice of granting petitions to rehear criminal cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "129 N.C. 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8661621 ], "year": 1901, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the General Assembly had previously acquiesced in the Court's century-old practice of granting petitions to rehear criminal cases" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/129/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 701", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" }, { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4717320 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" }, { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 S.E.2d 877", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" }, { "page": "881" }, { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138417 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2370", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 S.E. 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 N.C. 779", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8656138 ], "year": 1896, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/119/0779-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "noting that \" 'when the meaning of an act is at all doubtful, all the authorities now concur that the title should be considered' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547754 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "noting that \" 'when the meaning of an act is at all doubtful, all the authorities now concur that the title should be considered' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 1761", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 102", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "60 N.C. L. Rev. 631", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "N.C. L. Rev.", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "discussing in detail the Fair Sentencing Act and its effect on sentencing procedures in North Carolina" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 S.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 584", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565300 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0584-01" ] }, { "cite": "1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 373", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375-76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2569559 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 866", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2398163 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 967", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "967-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "75 S.E.2d 242", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "243", "parenthetical": "concluding that because a person convicted under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, the predecessor to the Controlled Substances Act, was not punished \"by either death or imprisonment in the State's Prison . . . they must be punished as misdemeanants rather than as felons\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "237 N.C. 427", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8612826 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/237/0427-01" ] }, { "cite": "1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1477", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135857 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E.2d 663", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670", "parenthetical": "\"It is a well established principle of statutory construction that a section of a statute dealing with a specific situation controls, with respect to that situation, other sections which are general in their application.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558370 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "\"It is a well established principle of statutory construction that a section of a statute dealing with a specific situation controls, with respect to that situation, other sections which are general in their application.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "300 U.S. 41", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 336826 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/300/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "82 L. Ed. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "420" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 U.S. 540", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6142580 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/302/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 L. Ed. 442", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552, 82 L. Ed. 2d 413, 420 (1938)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6156993 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25-26", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552, 82 L. Ed. 2d 413, 420 (1938)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/333/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" }, { "page": "136" }, { "page": "128" }, { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511319 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136-37" }, { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 S.E.2d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 39", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132016 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0039-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 S.E. 505", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658160 ], "year": 1921, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/181/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136-37" }, { "page": "141", "parenthetical": "\"Legislative history is a factor to consider in determining legislative intent.\"" }, { "page": "141", "parenthetical": "\"Courts may use subsequent enactments or amendments as an aid in arriving at the correct meaning of a prior statute by utilizing the natural inferences arising out of the legislative history as it continues to evolve.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" }, { "page": "216" }, { "page": "216" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516033 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511376 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 5", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 N.C. App. 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8955236 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/161/0060-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1304, "char_count": 36814, "ocr_confidence": 0.74, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.438898347396299e-06, "percentile": 0.9911371280719455 }, "sha256": "7c2b6360d0e1b823a579672c81de62a1479d8f575e74aa0e8d12914181e4dc3a", "simhash": "1:aa09f9a7162ffc32", "word_count": 6020 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:52.416221+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN WAYNE JONES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRADY, Justice.\nThe sole issue presented for review is whether the North Carolina General Assembly classifies the offense of possession of cocaine as a misdemeanor or a felony under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2). For the reasons stated in this opinion, we conclude that possession of cocaine is a felony and therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals holding otherwise.\nThe underlying facts are as follows: Defendant Norman Wayne Jones was indicted on 26 November 2001 for possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and for being an habitual felon. Defendant\u2019s habitual felon indictment was supported by three underlying felonies, one of which was a 12 November 1991 conviction for possession of cocaine. On 24 May 2002, defendant pled guilty to possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine and to attaining habitual felon status. Based upon defendant\u2019s stipulation to a prior record level of IV for felony sentencing purposes, defendant received a minimum sentence of 107 months to a maximum sentence of 138 months\u2019 imprisonment. Pursuant to his plea agreement, defendant preserved a right to appeal the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress, motion for writ of habeas corpus, and motion to dismiss his habitual felon indictment.\nDefendant appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. Defendant contended that his habitual felon indictment was insufficient because one of the convictions supporting the indictment, the 1991 conviction for possession of cocaine, was classified as a misdemeanor under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2). A panel of the Court of Appeals unanimously agreed based upon its conclusion that in 1991 N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) \u201cplainly\u201d classified possession of cocaine as a misdemeanor. State v. Jones, 161 N.C. App. 60, 67, 588 S.E.2d 5, 11 (2003). Accordingly, the court held that because defendant\u2019s habitual felon indictment was improperly supported by a misdemeanor conviction, the indictment was invalid and did not convey jurisdiction on the trial court. Id. As a result, the Court of Appeals vacated defendant\u2019s guilty plea to attaining habitual felon status. Id. The case is now before this Court pursuant to the State\u2019s petition for discretionary review of the portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals which held that possession of cocaine is a misdemeanor.\nUnder N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.1,\nAny person who has been convicted of or pled guilty to three felony offenses in any federal court or state court in the United States or combination thereof is declared to be an habitual felon. For the purpose of this Article, a felony offense is defined as an offense which is a felony under the laws of the State or other sovereign wherein a plea of guilty was entered or a conviction was returned regardless of the sentence actually imposed.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-7.1 (2003). To determine whether defendant\u2019s 1991 conviction for possession of cocaine properly served as an underlying felony for his habitual felon indictment, we must decide whether the offense of possession of cocaine is a felony or a misdemeanor.\nWe conclude that possession of cocaine is a felony and therefore can serve as an underlying felony to an habitual felon indictment. The language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), the statute\u2019s legislative history, and the terminology used in other criminal statutes all indicate the General Assembly\u2019s intent to classify possession of cocaine as a felony offense. Moreover, for nearly twenty-five years, our criminal justice system has treated possession of cocaine as a felony pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2). If the General Assembly had not intended such an interpretation of section 90-95(d)(2) to continue, it could have amended the statute to end this long-standing practice. Because it did not, and in light of other factors discussed below, we conclude that possession of cocaine is a felony.\nI.\nThe North Carolina Controlled Substances Act categorizes cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-90(l)d. (2003); accord N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-90(a)4. (1990) (renumbered as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-90(l)d. (1999)) (providing, at the time of defendant\u2019s 1991 conviction for possession of cocaine, that cocaine was a Schedule II controlled substance). Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(3), it is generally unlawful to possess a controlled substance. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a)(3) (2003).\n[A]ny person who violates G.S. 90-95(a)(3) with respect to:\n(2) A controlled substance classified in Schedule II, III, or TV shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. If the controlled substance exceeds four tablets, capsules, or other dosage units or equivalent quantity of hydromorphone or if the quantity of the controlled substance, or combination of the controlled substances, exceeds one hundred tablets, capsules or other dosage units, or equivalent quantity, the violation shall be punishable as a Class I felony. If the controlled substance is methamphetamine, amphetamine, phencyclidine, or cocaine and any salt, isomer, salts of isomers, compound, derivative, or preparation thereof, or coca leaves and any salt, isomer, salts of isomers, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, or any salt, isomer, salts of isomers, compound, derivative or preparation thereof which is chemically equivalent or identical with any of these substances (except decocanized coca leaves or any extraction of coca leaves which does not contain cocaine or ecgonine), the violation shall be punishable as a Class I felony.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) (2003) (emphasis added).\nDefendant contends that under the plain language of section 90-95(d)(2), the offense of possession of cocaine is a misdemeanor. Defendant explains that this result is dictated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-90(l)d., which classifies cocaine as a Schedule II controlled substance, and the first sentence of section 90-95(d)(2), which states that a person in possession of a \u201cSchedule II, III, or IV\u201d controlled substance is \u201cguilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2). According to defendant, the statute\u2019s third sentence, providing that a conviction for possession of cocaine is \u201cpunishable as a Class I felony,\u201d id., does not serve to classify possession of cocaine as a felony for determining habitual felon status. Rather, that phrase simply denotes the proper punishment or sentence for a conviction for possession of cocaine. Defendant argues that because a conviction for possession of cocaine is not classified as a felony, it cannot serve as a predicate offense for an habitual felon indictment. We disagree with defendant\u2019s interpretation of section 90-95(d)(2).\nWhen interpreting statutes, our principal goal is \u201cto effectuate the purpose of the legislature.\u201d Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 574, 573 S.E.2d 118, 121 (2002). \u201cWhen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.\u201d Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 322 N.C. 271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1988). \u201cBut where a statute is ambiguous, judicial construction must be used to ascertain the legislative will.\u201d Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136-37 (1990). Furthermore, \u201cwhere a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will... contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded.\u201d State v. Barksdale, 181 N.C. 621, 625, 107 S.E. 505, 507 (1921), quoted in Frye Reg\u2019l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Hunt, 350 N.C. 39, 45, 510 S.E.2d 159, 163 (1999).\nAs with any other statute, the legislative intent controls the interpretation of a criminal statute. State v. Hearst, 356 N.C. 132, 136-37, 567 S.E.2d 124, 128 (2002). We generally construe criminal statutes against the State. Id. at 136, 567 S.E.2d at 128. However,\n\u201c[t]he canon in favor of strict construction [of criminal statutes] is not an inexorable command to override common sense and evident statutory purpose. . . . Nor does it demand that a statute be given the \u2018narrowest meaning\u2019; it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.\u201d\nUnited States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26, 92 L. Ed. 442, 448 (1948) (quoting United States v. Raynor, 302 U.S. 540, 552, 82 L. Ed. 2d 413, 420 (1938)), quoted in Hearst, 356 N.C. at 137, 567 S.E.2d at 128; see also United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48, 81 L. Ed. 493, 497 (1936).\nDefendant\u2019s interpretation of section 90-95(d)(2) evinces, at best, an ambiguity in the General Assembly\u2019s use of the phrase \u201cpunishable as a... felony,\u201d thus making the statute susceptible to more than one interpretation. We believe an interpretation other than the one asserted by defendant controls the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2). The first sentence of section 90-95(d)(2), providing that a person found guilty of possession of a Schedule II, III, or IV controlled substance is \u201cguilty of a . . . misdemeanor,\u201d is a general provision governing convictions for possession of Schedule II, III, or IV controlled substances. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2). The next two sentences of the statute are exceptions to that general rule, by which the General Assembly chose to treat the possession of certain controlled substances differently by elevating them to felony status.\nPursuant to these exceptions, when a person is found in possession of the substances listed, a conviction for that crime is \u201cpunishable as a Class I felony.\u201d Id. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), the phrase \u201cpunishable as a Class I felony\u201d does not simply denote a sentencing classification, but rather, dictates that a conviction for possession of the substances listed therein, including cocaine, is elevated to a felony classification for all purposes. Concerning the controlled substances listed therein, the specific exceptions contained in section 90-95(d)(2) control over the general rule that possession of any Schedule II, III, or IV controlled substance is a misdemeanor. See State ex rel. Utils. Comm\u2019n v. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp., 275 N.C. 250, 260, 166 S.E.2d 663, 670 (1969) (\u201cIt is a well established principle of statutory construction that a section of a statute dealing with a specific situation controls, with respect to that situation, other sections which are general in their application.\u201d).\nII.\nOur interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) is not only supported by the statute\u2019s language and phrasing but also accords with the statute\u2019s legislative history. The legislative intent of a statute may first be ascertained through examining the language of the statute, and then by examining the statute\u2019s legislative history, the spirit of the statute, and the goal that the statute seeks to accomplish. Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 664, 548 S.E.2d 513, 517 (2001); see also Burgess, 326 N.C. at 216, 388 S.E.2d at 141 (\u201cLegislative history is a factor to consider in determining legislative intent.\u201d).\nIn 1971 the General Assembly enacted the North Carolina Controlled Substances Act \u201cto revise the laws concerning drugs, the various illegal and dangerous drugs and drug substances.\u201d Act of July 19, 1971, ch. 919, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 1477 (codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 90-86 to -113.8). Pursuant to the Controlled Substances Act, the General Assembly categorized various drugs into one of six schedules, see ch. 919, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1481-88 (codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 90-89 to -94), and classified offenses involving these drugs as either misdemeanors or felonies, see id. at 1488-90 (codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95). Prior to the enactment of the Controlled Substances Act, possession of cocaine was a misdemeanor. See State v. Miller, 237 N.C. 427, 429, 75 S.E.2d 242, 243 (1953) (concluding that because a person convicted under the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act, the predecessor to the Controlled Substances Act, was not punished \u201cby either death or imprisonment in the State\u2019s Prison . . . they must be punished as misdemeanants rather than as felons\u201d). Relevant to our discussion here, the 1971 General Assembly classified coca leaves or any derivative thereof, presumably including cocaine, as a Schedule II controlled substance, see ch. 919, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws at 1483 (originally codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-90(a)4.), and further provided that a person in possession of a Schedule II controlled substance \u201cshall be guilty of a felony and shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than five years or fined not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000) or both in the discretion of the court,\u201d id. at 1488 (originally codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(c)). Thus, it appears that under the Controlled Substances Act as originally enacted, possession of cocaine was a felony.\nThe General Assembly amended the Controlled Substances Act in 1973 to increase the penalties for certain violations. Act of May 22, 1973, ch. 654, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 967 (rewriting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95, amending N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-96, and adding N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-96.1). Specifically, the revised N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95 provided in pertinent part, that those persons in possession of either a Schedule II, III, or IV controlled substance\nshall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ; but if the quantity of the controlled substance . . . exceeds 100 tablets, capsules, or other dosage units, or equivalent quantity, the violation shall be a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both in the discretion of the court.\nId. at 967-68 (codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2)). Thus, following the 1973 amendments, possession of a Schedule II, III, or IV controlled substance was generally classified as a misdemeanor, unless the quantity of the substance exceeded a certain amount; then the classification for possession of those substances was a felony.\nThe following year, the General Assembly further amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) to specifically provide that \u201cone gram or more of cocaine\u201d was \u201cequivalent\u201d to the threshold number of pills or other dosage units that would convert a possession violation from a misdemeanor to a felony. Act of April 12, 1974, ch. 1358, sec. 10, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws (2d Sess. 1974) 722, 724. Thus, effective 12 April 1974, section 90-95(d)(2) provided, in pertinent part, that those in possession of a Schedule II controlled substance \u201cshall be guilty of a misdemeanor . . . ; but if the quantity of the controlled substance . . . exceeds 100 tablets, capsules or other dosage units, or equivalent quantity, including . . . one gram or more of cocaine, the violation shall be a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment\u201d or a fine, or both. Id. at 724-25.\nIn 1979 the General Assembly enacted the Fair Sentencing Act as part of \u201ca movement away from indeterminate sentencing and toward the imposition of presumptive terms for specified crimes.\u201d State v. Thompson, 310 N.C. 209, 219, 311 S.E.2d 866, 872 (1984), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 573-74, 364 S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (1988); see also Act of June 4,1979, ch. 760, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 850, 850 (\u201cAn Act to Establish a Fair Sentencing System in North Carolina Criminal Courts.\u201d) (codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1340.1 to -1340.7 (amended 1991) (repealed 1993)). Although the Fair Sentencing Act was to become effective on 1 July 1980, it \u201cunderwent technical amendments in 1980 and more substantial amendments in 1981\u201d and thus applied \u201conly to felonies committed on or after 1 July 1981.\u201d State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 594, 300 S.E.2d 689, 695 (1983). The new sentencing act established ten categories of felonies, Classes A through J. See ch. 760, sec. 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws at 850 (codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-1.1). The Act also amended various sections of Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes to\u2019 assign a specific class to each felony defined therein. Id., sec. 5 at 859-71. The Act set a maximum prison term for each class, id., sec. 1 at 850, as well as a presumptive prison term for Classes C through J, id., sec. 2 at 853-54 (codified as N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.4(f)). See generally Susan Kelly Nichols, Comment, Criminal Procedure \u2014 The North Carolina Fair Sentencing Act, 60 N.C. L. Rev. 631 (1982) (discussing in detail the Fair Sentencing Act and its effect on sentencing procedures in North Carolina).\nPursuant to the Fair Sentencing Act, the General Assembly amended several substantive criminal statutes, including N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), to remove references to the length of a particular felony sentence and replace those references with the appropriate felony class level. See ch. 760, sec. 5, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws at 859-71. Similar to changes made to other criminal statutes, section 90-95(d)(2) was \u201camended by deleting the phrase \u2018a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than five years or a fine of not more than five thousand dollars ($5,000), or both, in the discretion of the court\u2019 and inserting in lieu thereof \u2018punishable as a Class I felony\u2019.\u201d Id. at 870 (emphasis added). There was no indication in either the language of the statute or the legislative history that the General Assembly intended to classify possession of one gram or more of cocaine as a felony for Sentencing purposes only. Rather, the General Assembly amended section 90-95(d)(2) to bring the statute in conformity with the Fair Sentencing Act\u2019s new felony classification system.\nSubsequent to the enactment of the Fair Sentencing Act and prior to defendant\u2019s 1991 conviction for possession of cocaine, the General Assembly again amended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) to add that, in addition to possession of cocaine, possession of certain derivatives of cocaine was also punishable as a felony. Act of April 27, 1987, ch. 105, sec. 4, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 102, 103. Moreover, in 1989 the General Assembly deleted the \u201cone gram or more of\u2019 language in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), thereby making possession of cocaine punishable as a felony without regard to quantity. Act of July 15, 1989, ch. 641, sec. 1, 1989 N.C. Sess. Laws 1761, 1761. The relevant session law was entitled \u201cAn Act to Make the Possession of Any Amount of Cocaine or Phenclyclidine a Felony.\" Id. (emphasis added). The act\u2019s title, making no distinction between a classification for conviction purposes and for sentencing purposes, is further persuasive evidence that the General Assembly intended to classify possession of cocaine as a felony for all purposes. See also State ex rel. Cobey v. Simpson, 333 N.C. 81, 90, 423 S.E.2d 759, 764 (1992) (noting that \u201c \u2018when the meaning of an act is at all doubtful, all the authorities now concur that the title should be considered\u2019 \u201d) (quoting State v. Woolard, 119 N.C. 779, 780-81, 25 S.E. 719, 719 (1896)).\nAmendments, to section 90-95(d)(2) following defendant\u2019s 1991 conviction also support this conclusion. See cf. Burgess, 326 N.C. at 216, 388 S.E.2d at 141 (\u201cCourts may use subsequent enactments or amendments as an aid in arriving at the correct meaning of a prior statute by utilizing the natural inferences arising out of the legislative history as it continues to evolve.\u201d). When enacting the Structured Sentencing Act in 1993, the General Assembly reinserted language into N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) making possession of \u201cone gram or more of\u2019 cocaine, rather than any amount of cocaine, punishable as a felony. Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 539, sec. 1358.1, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2370, 2823. However, prior to the 1 January 1995 effective date of that amendment, the General Assembly repealed the session law inserting the \u201cone gram or more of\u2019 language. Act of March 14, 1994, ch. 11, sec. 1, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws (Extra Sess. 1994) 22, 22 (providing that \u201c[s]ection 1358.1 of Chapter 539 of the 1993 Session Laws is repealed\u201d). The repealing act was entitled, in relevant part, \u201cAn Act to Repeal the Provision in the Structured Sentencing Act That Would Have Provided That Possession of Less Than One Gram of Cocaine Was Not a Felony.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Again, with no distinction made between convictions and sentences for possession of cocaine, the title provides yet another indication that the General Assembly intended that possession of cocaine was to be classified as a felony for all purposes.\nFurthermore, the legislative history of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) evinces the General Assembly\u2019s acquiescence to the long-standing practice in our criminal justice system of classifying possession of cocaine as a felony. In Wells v. Consol. Jud\u2019l Ret. Sys., 354 N.C. 313, 553 S.E.2d 877 (2001), this Court upheld a state agency\u2019s interpretation of certain statutes governing the judicial-retirement system based in part upon the agency\u2019s long-standing adherence to that interpretation and the lack of legislative intervention. 354 N.C. at 319-20, 553 S.E.2d at 881. The agency in Wells w&s \u201cestablished to administer the retirement statutes\u201d and \u201cha[d] adhered to the same interpretation . . . since the 1970s.\u201d Id. at 319, 553 S.E.2d at 881. The Court in Wells stated that \u201c[t]he legislature is presumed to act with full knowledge of prior and existing law,\u201d and \u201c[w]hen the legislature chooses not to amend a statutory provision that has been interpreted in a specific way, we assume it is satisfied with the administrative interpretation.\u201d Id. Although it is this Court\u2019s ultimate duty to construe statutes, we \u201caccord great weight to the administrative interpretation, especially when, as [in Wells], the agency\u2019s position has been long-standing and has been met with legislative acquiescence.\u201d Id. at 319-20, 553 S.E.2d at 881.\nWe have applied this principle of legislative acquiescence in the criminal context when the General Assembly failed to intervene in light of a long-standing judicial practice. See, e.g., State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444, 462, 340 S.E.2d 701, 713 (1986) (concluding that it was not double jeopardy to convict and sentence a defendant in the same trial for both breaking and/or entering and larceny when the Court \u201cuniformly and frequently held, from as early as the turn of the century, that [the two crimes] are separate and distinct crimes,\u201d and \u201c[those] many years of uniform construction have been acquiesced in by our legislature\u201d); State v. Council, 129 N.C. 511, 513, 39 S.E. 814, 815 (1901) (recognizing that the General Assembly had previously acquiesced in the Court\u2019s century-old practice of granting petitions to rehear criminal cases).\nSince insertion of the \u201cpunishable as a . . . felony\u201d language into N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) in 1979, our judiciary, the branch of government responsible for the adjudication of criminal cases, has universally adhered to the practice of classifying possession of cocaine as a felony. Indeed, for almost twenty-five years, defendants charged with possession of cocaine, including defendant in the case sub judice, have been indicted as felons and tried and convicted as felons in the Superior Court Division of the General Courts of Justice. We presume, as we must, that the General Assembly had full knowledge of the judiciary\u2019s long-standing practice. Yet, during the course of multiple clarifying amendments to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) between 1979 and the present, at no time did the General Assembly amend section 90-95(d)(2) to convert the crime of possession of cocaine to misdemeanor status. If the General Assembly intended for possession of cocaine to be treated as a misdemeanor, \u201cit could have addressed the matter during the course of these many years.\u201d Gardner, 315 N.C. at 463, 340 S.E.2d at 713. Because the General Assembly has not done so, it is clear that the legislature has acquiesced in the practice of classifying the offense of possession of cocaine as a felony.\nIII.\nWe acknowledge that the General Assembly utilizes differing terminology to classify criminal offenses as felonies. Compare N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) (providing that possession of cocaine is \u201cpunishable as a Class I felony\u201d), with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(e)(9) (providing that any person in possession of a controlled substance at \u201ca penal institution or local confinement facility shall be guilty of a Class H felony\u201d), and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(h)(3) (providing that a person who sells, manufactures, delivers, transports, or possesses twenty-eight grams of cocaine or more \u201cshall be guilty of a felony\u201d). However, we reject defendant\u2019s. argument that these differences indicate the General Assembly\u2019s intent to create a special felony sentencing classification for possession of cocaine. We recognize that it is within the General Assembly\u2019s authority to create such a classification. See cf. State v. Perry, 316 N.C. 87, 101, 340 S.E.2d 450, 459 (1986). Nonetheless, given our review of the legislative history behind N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), we conclude that the General Assembly has not done so.\nFurthermore, the use of the phrase \u201cpunishable as a. .. felony\u201d is not limited to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2). The phrase is also the nomenclature used by our General Assembly to establish other serious felonies, including manslaughter, burglary, and kidnapping. To accept defendant\u2019s interpretation of the \u201cpunishable as\u201d language and to take his argument to its logical end would necessarily lead us to the absurd conclusion that the General Assembly intended these and other serious crimes to be misdemeanors. We decline to do so.\nThe General Assembly routinely uses the phrases \u201cpunished as\u201d or \u201cpunishable as\u201d a \u201cfelony\u201d or \u201cfelon\u201d to classify certain crimes as felonies. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-18 (2003) (providing that \u201c[v]oluntary manslaughter shall be punishable as a Class D felony, and involuntary manslaughter shall be punishable as a Class F felony\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-30 (2003) (stating that a person who commits the crime malicious maiming \u201cshall be punished as a Class C felon\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39(b) (2003) (noting that first-degree kidnapping \u201cis punishable as a Class C felony\u201d and that second-degree kidnapping \u201cis punishable as a Class E felony\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-52 (2003) (stating that \u201c[b]urglary in the first degree shall be punishable as a Class D felony, and burglary in the second degree shall be punishable as a Class G felony\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-58 (2003) (providing that first-degree arson \u201cis punishable as a Class D felony\u201d and that second-degree arson \u201cis punishable as a Class G felony\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-202.1(b) (2003) (stating that \u201c[t]aking indecent liberties with children is punishable as a Class F felony\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-106 (2003) (providing that a person guilty of receiving or transferring stolen vehicles \u201cshall be punished as a Class H felon\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-138.5(a), (b) (2003) (noting, pursuant to the habitual impaired driving statute, that if a person drives while impaired and has been convicted of three or more offenses involving impaired driving as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-4.01(24a) within the previous seven years, that person \u201cshall be punished as a Class F felon\u201d).\nIn addition, other statutes contain a structure similar to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), in which a crime is classified as a misdemeanor, but elevated to a felony by the language \u201cpunishable\u201d or \u201cpunished\u201d as a \u201cfelony\u201d or \u201cfelon\u201d where special circumstances exist. These circumstances include the existence of a prior conviction, the use of deadly force or a dangerous weapon, the possession of an elevated quantity of an illegal substance, or the possession of a certain particularly problematic substance. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-56.1 (2003) (providing that anyone who breaks into or forcibly opens a coin- or currency-operated machine \u201cshall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor, but if such person has previously been convicted of violating this section, such person shall be punished as a Class I felon\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-56.3 (2003) (noting the same for the crime of breaking into paper currency machines); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-136 (2003) (stating that a person who sets fire to \u201cgrass and brushlands and woodlands\u201d shall be \u201cguilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor for the first offense\u201d and \u201cguilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor\u201d for the second offense, but if the person intends to damage another\u2019s property, the person \u201cshall be punished as a Class I felon\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-288.9(c) (2003) (providing that any person who assaults emergency personnel \u201cis guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor,\u201d and any person who does so with a dangerous weapon or substance \u201cshall be punished as a Class F felon\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90~95(d)(4) (stating that any person in possession of a Schedule VI controlled substance \u201cshall be guilty of a Class 3 misdemeanor,\u201d but if that substance exceeds one-half of an ounce of marijuana or one-twentieth of an ounce of hashish, \u201cthe violation shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor\u201d; and if the substance exceeds one and one-half ounces of marijuana or three-twentieths of an ounce of hashish, or consists of any quantity of synthetic tetrahydrocannabinols, \u201cthe violation shall be punishable as a Class I felony\u201d); see cf. State v. Mitchell, 336 N.C. 22, 27, 442 S.E.2d 24, 26 (1994) (noting, in passing, that under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(4), the State must prove that the defendant possessed more than one and one-half ounces of marijuana to convict the defendant of \u201cthe felony\u201d); State v. Sullivan, 111 N.C. App. 441, 443, 432 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1993) (referring to a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-56.1 as a \u201cfelony-grade breaking into a coin-operated machine\u201d where the defendant had a prior conviction for such a violation) (emphasis added).\n\u201cIt is well settled that the General Assembly and not the judiciary determines the minimum and maximum punishment which may be imposed on those convicted of crimes. The legislature alone can prescribe the punishment for those crimes.\u201d Perry, 316 N.C. at 101, 340 S.E.2d at 459. Part and parcel of the General Assembly\u2019s authority to prescribe criminal punishment is its authority to classify criminal offenses. In adopting defendant\u2019s narrow interpretation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), the Court of Appeals improvidently rewrote our General Statutes by, in essence, judicially reclassifying dozens of crimes as misdemeanors in contravention of the General Assembly\u2019s authority and long-standing practice. Accordingly, we conclude that under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), the offense of possession of cocaine is classified as a felony for all purposes.\nIV.\nFinally, in the present case, Jones, 161 N.C. App. 60, 588 S.E.2d 5, a panel of the Court of Appeals concluded that possession of cocaine was a misdemeanor, despite a prior published decision by another panel of that court holding that possession of cocaine is a felony. See State v. Chavis, 134 N.C. App. 546, 555, 518 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1999) (concluding that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) \u201cclearly states that the possession of any amount of cocaine is a felony\u201d), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 351 N.C. 362, 542 S.E.2d 220 (2000). In a subsequent decision for which this Court has also allowed discretionary review, State v. Sneed, 161 N.C. App. 331, 588 S.E.2d 74 (2003), another panel of the Court of Appeals acknowledged that court\u2019s prior holding in Chavis, but followed Jones and its independent review of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90~95(d)(2) to conclude that possession of cocaine is a misdemeanor. Given that Chavis, Jones, and Sneed concern the interpretation of the same statute, the Court of Appeals panel in the present action, Jones, and the panel in Sneed effectively overruled the Court of Appeals decision in Chavis. In so doing, the two panels ignored a well-established rule of appellate law: \u201cWhere a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.\u201d In re Appeal from Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of Sedimentation Pollution Control Act, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989). While we recognize that a panel of the Court of Appeals may disagree with, or even find error in, an opinion by a prior panel and may duly note its disagreement or point out that error in its opinion, the panel is bound by that prior decision until it is overturned by a higher court.\nIn conclusion, because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) classifies possession of cocaine as a felony, defendant\u2019s 1991 conviction for possession of cocaine was sufficient to serve as an underlying felony for his habitual felon indictment, and thus, defendant\u2019s habitual felon indictment was valid.\nAccordingly, we reverse in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court for further remand to the Superior Court, Forsyth County, for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.\n. We note that the indictments refer to defendant as \u201cNorman Wayne Jones aka Norman Waynetta Jones aka Norman Dewayne Jones aka Norman Wayneth Jones.\u201d The Judgment and Commitment Order refers to defendant as \u201cJones, Norman.\u201d He is referred to by all of these names throughout the record on appeal. To remain consistent, we refer to him as Norman Wayne Jones.\n. Defendant\u2019s habitual felon indictment was also supported by a 1993 conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver a counterfeit controlled substance and a 1995 conviction for possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine. Although both of these convictions are controlled substance violations, they are not at issue in this case.\n. Although the trial court orally announced defendant\u2019s sentence in open court, it appears that defendant\u2019s sentencing term was inadvertently omitted from the Judgment and Commitment Order. Because the Court of Appeals vacated defendant\u2019s judgment for reasons unrelated to the issue discussed in this case, defendant\u2019s judgment remains vacated regardless of our decision here. We therefore find it unnecessary to direct the trial court to correct this and other errors in the Judgment and Commitment Order.\n. The Court of Appeals also vacated defendant\u2019s guilty plea to possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine based upon its determination that defendant\u2019s plea agreement was invalid for reasons unrelated to the issue before this Court. Jones, 161 N.C. App. at 67, 588 S.E.2d at 11.\n. Defendant\u2019s 12 November 1991 conviction for possession of cocaine was governed by a prior version of section 90-95(d)(2). See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) (Supp. 1991) (amended 1993). Although section 90-95(d)(2) has been subsequently amended on several occasions, the text of the statute relevant to the issue presented by this appeal remains the same today as it appeared in November 1991. For convenience, we refer only to the current version of section 90-95(d)(2) in our opinion.\n. The principal provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act were contained in Chapter 15A, Article 81A of the North Carolina General Statutes; the Act also \u201cresulted in revisions to other portions of the General Statutes.\u201d State v. Ahearn, 307 N.C. 584, 594 n.1, 300 S.E.2d 689, 695 n.1 (1983).", "type": "majority", "author": "BRADY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Daniel R O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorney General, and William R Hart, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Constance E. Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendantappellee.", "Marshall Hurley, PLLC, by Marshall Hurley, for Families Against Mandatory M\u00ednimums; and Charles E. Daye and Paul M. Green, for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. NORMAN WAYNE JONES\nNo. 591PA03\n(Filed 25 June 2004)\n1. Drugs \u2014 possession of cocaine-felony-habitual felon support\nPossession of cocaine is a felony under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2) and can therefore serve as an underlying felony to an habitual felon indictment because the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(d)(2), the statute\u2019s legislative history, the terminology used in other statutes, and the General Assembly\u2019s acquiescence in the longstanding practice in our criminal justice system of classifying possession of cocaine as a felony all indicate the intent of the General Assembly to classify possession of cocaine as a felony offense.\n2. Appeal and Error-Court of Appeals-panel bound by prior decision\nA panel of the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that possession of cocaine is a misdemeanor when a prior decision of that court held that possession of cocaine is a felony because the panel is bound by the prior decision until it is overturned by a higher court.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 161 N.C. App. 60, 588 S.E.2d 5 (2003), vacating and remanding a judgment entered 24 May 2002 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in the Supreme Court 18 February 2004.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Daniel R O\u2019Brien, Assistant Attorney General, and William R Hart, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Constance E. Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendantappellee.\nMarshall Hurley, PLLC, by Marshall Hurley, for Families Against Mandatory M\u00ednimums; and Charles E. Daye and Paul M. Green, for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0473-01", "first_page_order": 505, "last_page_order": 519 }