{ "id": 2986640, "name": "ALBERTA McRAE, Employee v. TOASTMASTER, INC., Employer SELF-INSURED (CORPORATE CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, Servicing Agent)", "name_abbreviation": "McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc.", "decision_date": "2004-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 287A03", "first_page": "488", "last_page": "501", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "358 N.C. 488" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 913", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9185958 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11912671 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "342 S.E.2d 798", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808-09", "parenthetical": "holding that an injured employee shall retain benefit eligibility if the employee's age, inexperience, lack of education, or any other preexisting factor preclude the employee from procuring alternative employment" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4704100 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443-44", "parenthetical": "holding that an injured employee shall retain benefit eligibility if the employee's age, inexperience, lack of education, or any other preexisting factor preclude the employee from procuring alternative employment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "189 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807", "parenthetical": "holding, in essence, that when an industrial injury renders an employee unable to earn wages, the employer is not alleviated of benefit obligations if the employee's lack of education or experience prevents the employee from finding alternative employment within the marketplace" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 N.C. App. 253", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8549521 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/15/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "500 S.E.2d 86", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551329, 551235, 551326, 551111 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0671-03", "/nc/347/0671-04", "/nc/347/0671-02", "/nc/347/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "491 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 529", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11798491 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "534" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0529-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882", "parenthetical": "holding that \"our Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees . . ., and its benefits should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575029 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "holding that \"our Workmen's Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees . . ., and its benefits should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/273/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "holding that evidence tending to support a plaintiff's claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and \"plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" }, { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573590 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 397", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 15, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "refusal of injured employee to accept suitable employment shall result in suspension of compensation" }, { "page": "401", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "401", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "401" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "401" }, { "parenthetical": "part three of defendant's initial three-part burden" }, { "parenthetical": "outlining plaintiff's burden when defendant satisfies all three elements of the three-part test" }, { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "123 N.C. App. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11912671 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "refusal of injured employee to accept suitable employment shall result in suspension of compensation" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "233-34" }, { "page": "234" }, { "page": "234" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/123/0228-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1064, "char_count": 33048, "ocr_confidence": 0.726, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2817431020201187e-06, "percentile": 0.9890982061116305 }, "sha256": "16e69c2cb304f5f7baa07517266112b5e7720ce2940c87a2d0379f186dfed1a5", "simhash": "1:fde7fd893403fe4c", "word_count": 5062 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:12:52.416221+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ALBERTA McRAE, Employee v. TOASTMASTER, INC., Employer SELF-INSURED (CORPORATE CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, Servicing Agent)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "LAKE, Chief Justice.\nThis case arises out of an employment dispute that ultimately resulted both in plaintiffs termination and in her loss of workers\u2019 compensation benefits. The sole issue presented on appeal to this Court is whether defendant-employer provided competent evidence showing that plaintiff\u2019s failure to perform her assigned job duties was not related to her prior compensable injury under workers\u2019 compensation. The Court of Appeals held there was such competent evidence, thereby denying plaintiff additional benefits. For the reasons set forth herein, we reverse.\nAt the outset, we note the significance of the circumstances of the case at bar. Only a handful of cases concerning the termination of injured employees have been scrutinized by the state\u2019s appellate courts \u2014 -and none by this Court. We thus recognize that our decision here will impact many workers\u2019 compensation claims that involve an employee who is not performing his work-related duties at preinjury levels. In its consideration of the instant case, the Court of Appeals applied a balancing test originally established in Seagraves v. Austin Co. of Greensboro, 123 N.C. App. 228, 472 S.E.2d 397 (1996), and concluded that plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that she was entitled to continued benefits after being terminated from employment for misconduct. As a consequence of this holding, we therefore must determine whether: (1) the test in Seagraves is the appropriate means for deciding a case of this nature, and, if so, (2) whether the test was appropriately applied in this instance.\nI.\nIn 1996, plaintiff Alberta McRae began working as an assembler for defendant, Toastmaster, Inc. Her initial duties required her to peel Uniform Product Code (UPC) labels from a roll and place them on boxes. After working in this position for six months, plaintiff was transferred to a different department, where she installed clock components.\nSometime in 1997, plaintiff began experiencing pain and numbness in her right hand. In January 1998, plaintiff visited the company nurse, complaining of continuing discomfort in her hand. She was referred to the Occupational Health Center at Scotland Memorial Hospital and was placed on light-duty work through mid-February.\nPlaintiffs symptoms persisted throughout the first half of 1998, and in June she obtained permission to see an orthopedic surgeon. She was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome and initially treated with medication. In July 1998, plaintiff informed the surgeon that she had experienced some improvement in her condition; however, in September 1998, she returned to the doctor complaining of problems with both hands. Soon thereafter, plaintiff was diagnosed with bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. During this period, plaintiffs doctor recommended that plaintiff refrain from clock assembling duties at work. In response, defendant assigned plaintiff to other light-duty work assignments.\nIn late October 1998, plaintiff had surgery on her right wrist. Similar surgery on her left wrist was performed about a month later. In the wake of her surgeries, plaintiff briefly returned to clock assembling, but she continued to feel discomfort performing the tasks required. Plaintiffs doctor finally advised her to avoid such work permanently.\nSometime in April 1999, defendant reassigned plaintiff to her duties as a UPC box labeler \u2014 her original position with the company. However, in the weeks that followed, plaintiff failed to label the boxes as required. When she was reprimanded by the company for her miscues, plaintiff could not explain why she missed so many boxes, although she would later testify at her workers\u2019 compensation hearing that she had some difficulty with her hands while trying to peel the individual labels off their roll.\nOn 5 May 1999, defendant terminated plaintiffs employment with the company. Defendant admitted liability for benefits related to plaintiffs carpal tunnel syndrome surgery, paid plaintiff compensation for the periods of work she missed due to her surgery, and paid plaintiffs medical bills that were associated with her hand injuries.\nPlaintiff then sought additional relief for the continuation of benefit payments and complied with all necessary procedures to procure a hearing before a deputy commissioner of the North Carolina Industrial Commission. In an order filed 9 February 2001, the deputy commissioner found that: (1) although plaintiff was terminated for errors she committed as a UPC labeler, her errors were not intentional and did not constitute misconduct; (2) there was a serious question regarding whether the labeling job was suitable for plaintiff in view of her hand ailments and the repetitive pinching and hand movements required by the position; and (3) she continued to have some residual symptoms in her hands while performing the job.\nAs a result of these findings, the deputy commissioner concluded that: (1) since plaintiff was not terminated for misconduct, she did not constructively refuse suitable employment; and (2) plaintiff is therefore entitled to elect between receiving compensation for her disability and compensation for her actual wage loss, whichever proves to be the \u201cmore munificent remedy.\u201d\nThe deputy commissioner then calculated plaintiffs disability award at a rate of $166.67 per week, to begin the week after her termination. The deputy commissioner also ordered that such payments continue, as applicable, until plaintiff returned to work or if unable to do so, through her lifetime.\nDefendant appealed to the full Commission. The Commission, with one commissioner dissenting, filed an opinion and award on 18 April 2002, finding that the greater weight of the evidence \u201cfailfed] to establish that plaintiff could not perform the UPC labeler position [due to her injuries].\u201d The majority went on to find that plaintiffs failure to perform her labeling duties constituted \u201ca failure to accept a suitable position reasonably offered by her employer.\u201d The Commission\u2019s majority then concluded that plaintiff \u201cwas terminated for misconduct and she thereby constructively refused suitable employment.\u201d As a result, the majority reduced plaintiffs benefit award to $166.67 for sixteen weeks.\nThe Commission\u2019s dissenting opinion, in essence, concurred with the deputy commissioner\u2019s view, concluding that plaintiff\u2019s inability to keep up with the demands of the UPC labeling job was caused by her compensable occupational disease. Plaintiff was under doctor\u2019s orders to avoid \u201c \u2018repetitious pushing, pulling, gripping, pinching[,] and fingering,\u2019 \u201d which, in the dissent\u2019s reasoning, constituted the core duties of a UPC box labeler. Thus, because plaintiff was assigned a task that required her to perform the same type of repetitive hand functions that had effected her original injuries, it could not be appropriately determined that plaintiff had refused \u2014 constructively or otherwise \u2014 a suitable offer of employment.\nUpon review by the Court of Appeals, a majority affirmed the full Commission\u2019s opinion and award, concluding that: (1) defendant-employer had provided competent evidence that plaintiff\u2019s failure to perform her UPC labeling duties was not related to her prior compensable injury, and (2) plaintiff had failed to present any evidence of disability, and any presumption of such disability ended when plaintiff returned to work. The Court of Appeals\u2019 majority thus affirmed the Commission\u2019s conclusions that plaintiff had constructively refused suitable employment and that she was entitled only to a reduced award.\nThe Court of Appeals\u2019 dissenting opinion concluded that the evidence was susceptible to only two interpretations \u2014 -plaintiff\u2019s failure to perform tasks previously accomplished was attributable to either her intervening injury or negligence \u2014 neither of which meets the legal criteria required to establish misconduct or a constructive refusal of suitable employment. The dissent\u2019s paramount concern focused on the potential prospective effect of the majority\u2019s holding, which, according to the dissent, would expand an employer\u2019s right to terminate an injured employee well beyond the narrow parameters recognized under existing law.\nII.\nOn appeal to this Court, plaintiff argues that the majorities on the Industrial Commission and the Court of Appeals decided her case under a misapprehension of the law. In sum, she contends that her conduct under the circumstances did not amount to either: (1) misconduct that would justify her termination without regard for her compensable injury, or (2) a refusal \u2014 actual or constructive \u2014 to engage in suitable employment.\nIn Seagraves, the Court of Appeals examined the question of whether an employee can be deemed to have refused suitable employment, thereby precluding injury-related benefits, if she is terminated for misconduct that is unrelated to her workplace injuries. 123 N.C. App. 228, 472 S.E.2d 397; see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-32 (2003) (refusal of injured employee to accept suitable employment shall result in suspension of compensation); and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-32.1 (2003) (if an employee\u2019s trial return to work is unsuccessful, his or her right to continuing compensation shall be unimpaired unless terminated or suspended thereafter pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act). In its analysis in Seagraves, the court acknowledged that the underlying purpose of the North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is to \u201cprovide compensation to workers whose earning capacity is diminished or destroyed by injury arising from their employment\u201d and took note of \u201cthe liberal construction which has long been accorded its provisions.\u201d 123 N.C. App. at 233, 472 S.E.2d at 401 (citations omitted). As a result of both the Act\u2019s purpose and history, the court concluded that \u201cwhere an employee, who has sustained a compensable injury and has been provided ... rehabilitative employment, is terminated... for misconduct..., such termination does not automatically constitute a constructive refusal to accept [suitable] employment so as to bar the employee from receiving benefits[.]\u201d Id. at 233-34, 472 S.E.2d at 401 (emphasis added).\nIn lieu of an employee\u2019s termination for misconduct serving as an automatic bar to benefits, the court in Seagraves adopted a test that measures whether the employee\u2019s loss of earning capacity is attributable to the wrongful act that caused the employee\u2019s termination from employment, in which case benefits would be barred, or whether such loss of earning capacity is due to the employee\u2019s work-related disability, in which case the employee would be entitled to benefits intended for such disability. Id. at 234, 472 S.E.2d at 401. Thus, under the Seagraves\u2019 test, to bar payment of benefits, an employer must demonstrate initially that: (1) the employee was terminated for misconduct; (2) the same misconduct would have resulted in the termination of a nondisabled employee; and (3) the termination was unrelated to the employee\u2019s compensable injury. Id.\nAn employer\u2019s successful demonstration of such evidence is \u201cdeemed to constitute a constructive refusal\u201d by the employee to perform suitable work, a circumstance that would bar benefits for lost earnings, \u201cunless the employee is then able to show that his or her inability to find or hold other employment... at a wage comparable to that earned prior to the injury[] is due to the work-related disability.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). In other words, a showing of employee misconduct is not dispositive on the issue of benefits if the employee can demonstrate that his or her subsequent failure to perform suitable work or find comparable work was the direct result of the employee\u2019s work-related injuries. Under Seagraves, the employee would be entitled to benefits if he or she can demonstrate that work-related injuries, and not the circumstances of the employee\u2019s termination, prevented the employee from either performing alternative duties or finding comparable employment opportunities.\nWe note that the pertinent inquiry under Seagraves is not focused on determining whether an employer may fire an injured employee for misconduct unrelated to his injuries; it is clear that an employer may do so. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. \u00a7 95-241(b) (2003). Rather, the relevant question is determining whether, upon firing an injured employee for such misconduct, an employer can nevertheless be held responsible for continuing to pay injury benefits to the terminated employee.\nThe court in Seagraves defended its balancing test as a fair and effective means for protecting the interests of both employers and injured employees. 123 N.C. App. at 233-34, 472 S.E.2d at 401. On the one hand, the test serves to protect injured employees from unscrupulous employers who might fire them in order to avoid paying them their due benefits. On the other hand, according to the lower court, the test simultaneously serves employers as a shield against injured employees who engage in unacceptable conduct while employed in rehabilitative settings. Id.\nThis Court\u2019s review of the Seagraves\u2019 test reveals that its proper application, as dictated by the Court of Appeals, can and will produce results that square with the underlying intent of our state\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation laws. In our view, the test provides a forum of inquiry that guides a fact finder through the relevant circumstances in order to resolve the ultimate issue: Is a former employee\u2019s failure to procure comparable employment the result of his or her job-related injuries or the result of the employee\u2019s termination for misconduct? In disputes like the one at bar, the critical area of inquiry into the circumstances of an injured employee\u2019s termination is to determine from the evidence whether the employee\u2019s failure to perform is due to an inability to perform or an unwillingness to perform.\nIf, on the one hand, the greater weight of the evidence shows that the former employee is a victim of job-related injuries, the original employer remains responsible for benefit obligations arising out of the employee\u2019s job-related injury. Under such circumstances, the fact that the employee was fired for unrelated misconduct is irrelevant because the employee\u2019s termination has no bearing on either the employee\u2019s existing compensable injury or how that injury affects his or her ability to find other employment. In our view, any rule that would allow employers to evade benefit payments simply because the recipient-employee was terminated for misconduct could be open to abuse. Such a rule could give employers an incentive to find circumstances that would constitute misconduct by employees who were previously injured on the job. We also recognize that the current benefit scheme faces the potential for abuse by employees. If injury-related benefits continued without regard to an employee\u2019s misconduct, injured employees conceivably could commit misconduct in order to be terminated without suffering the appropriate financial consequences.\nOn the other hand, if the terminated-for-misconduct employee fails to show by the greater weight of the evidence that his or her inability to find or perform comparable employment is due to the employee\u2019s work-related injuries, the employer is then freed of further benefit responsibilities. Under such circumstances, the employee would be held accountable for his or her misconduct, which would be deemed tantamount to a constructive refusal to perform suitable work duties. As a consequence of such refusal, the employee would forfeit the right to benefits, pursuant to section 97-32, which provides that \u201c[i]f an injured employee refuses employment procured for him suitable to his capacity[,] he shall not be entitled to any compensation at any time during the continuance of such refusal.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-32.\nThe test in Seagraves is intended to weigh the actions and interests of employer and employee alike. Ultimately, the Seagraves rule aims to provide a means by which the Industrial Commission can determine if the circumstances surrounding a termination warrant preclusion or discontinuation of injury-related benefits. As such, we conclude that this test is an appropriate means to decide cases of this nature.\nIII.\nIn adopting the Seagraves\u2019 test for determining an injured employee\u2019s right to continuing benefits after being terminated for misconduct, we turn our attention to the case sub judice, and consider whether the test was appropriately applied in this instance. We note that the case at bar has sparked deeply divided opinions among those who have considered it previously. To this point, seven decision-making officials have reviewed this matter. Four of them have agreed with the defendant-employer and three have favored the employee\u2019s position.\nIn considering this issue, we reiterate that when reviewing Industrial Commission decisions, appellate courts must examine \u201cwhether any competent evidence supports the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and whether [those] findings . . . support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law.\u201d Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000). The Commission\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal when supported by such competent evidence, \u201ceven though there [is] evidence that would support findings to the contrary.\u201d Jones v. Myrtle Desk Co., 264 N.C. 401, 402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965). However, evidence tending to support a plaintiff\u2019s claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and \u201cplaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.\u201d Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998); see also Hollman v. City of Raleigh, 273 N.C. 240, 252, 159 S.E.2d 874, 882 (1968) (holding that \u201cour Workmen\u2019s Compensation Act should be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose to provide compensation for injured employees . . ., and its benefits should not be denied by a technical, narrow, and strict construction\u201d). The Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. are reviewed de novo. Grantham v. R.G. Barry Corp., 127 N.C. App. 529, 534, 491 S.E.2d 678, 681 (1997), disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 671, 500 S.E.2d 86 (1998). Although this Court\u2019s review of the case is limited to the decision of the Court of Appeals, our examination will necessarily include an analysis of whether that court properly utilized the applicable standard of appellate review and whether its conclusions find support within that standard\u2019s framework. In order to do so, this Court must also review whether the evidence presented before the Commission supports its factual findings, and whether those findings support the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law in its opinion.\nIn applying the Seagraves\u2019 test, with respect to the burden of proof, the Commission must determine first if the employer has met its burden of showing that the employee was terminated for misconduct, that such misconduct would have resulted in the termination of a nondisabled employee, and that the termination was unrelated to the employee\u2019s compensable injury. Assuming the employer has satisfied such burden, the Commission must then determine if the employee has demonstrated that her inability to perform work assignments for the employer, or to procure commensurate work from other prospective employers, is a consequence of her work-related injury.\nAt the Commission hearing, defendant-employer presented evidence showing that in the aftermath of her work-related injury, plaintiff-employee failed to adequately perform her assigned duties. After her injury, plaintiff was assigned the task of applying UPC labels to boxes. Under normal conditions, according to the Commission\u2019s order, plaintiff was expected to label approximately 1,000 boxes a day. Prior to her injury, plaintiff performed the assigned duties without incident. However, when she returned to the labeler position, post injury, she failed to label the requisite number of boxes..Between mid-April 1999 and early May 1999, plaintiff was reprimanded on several occasions for missing labels. The series of omissions eventually resulted in her termination on 5 May 1999.\nA review of the record reveals that there is some competent evidence demonstrating that plaintiff failed to perform her assigned duties as a UPC labeler during the period in question. Thus, this Court will not fault the Commission\u2019s finding of fact to that effect. Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553; Jones, 264 N.C. at 402, 141 S.E.2d at 633. In addition, this Court also concludes that the circumstances demonstrated, by the greater weight of the evidence, that plaintiff was terminated for misconduct (failure to adequately perform), and that her actions would have resulted in the termination of a nondisabled employee. Thus, defendant has satisfied its burden on two of the three initial requirements under Seagraves. 123 N.C. App. at 234, 472 S.E.2d at 401.\nWe now examine whether defendant has shown by the greater weight of the evidence that plaintiff\u2019s termination was unrelated to her compensable injury, id. (part three of defendant\u2019s initial three-part burden), and, if so, whether plaintiff has countered by demonstrating that her failure to perform her post-injury duties or to procure commensurate work from other employers was due to her work-related injuries, id. (outlining plaintiff\u2019s burden when defendant satisfies all three elements of the three-part test). In essence, defendant argues that the Commission\u2019s extant findings show plaintiff\u2019s termination was not related to her injury while plaintiff contends that those same findings demonstrate that her injuries prevented her from performing her duties or from finding commensurate employment. As a consequence, we review in turn the Commission\u2019s findings as they pertain to: (1) defendant\u2019s contention that plaintiff\u2019s termination was unrelated to her job-related injury versus plaintiff\u2019s contention that her injuries prevented her from performing her duties, and (2) plaintiff\u2019s contention that her inability to find commensurate employment was due to her job-related injury.\nIn its opinion and award, the Commission found that \u201c[t]he greater weight of the evidence ... fails to establish that plaintiff could not perform the UPC labeler position.\u201d (Emphasis added.) In support of this finding of fact, the Commission also found that: (1) plaintiff did not explain to her superiors why she missed the boxes; (2) plaintiff testified that she had some difficulty with her hands while performing the labeling job; (3) although plaintiff had residual symptoms, in view of her inability to remember certain pertinent information, it was not clear that she actually remembered having problems with the repetitive movements required by the labeler job; and (4) plaintiff\u2019s medical doctor, on 10 May 1999, issued permanent restrictions against activities involving repetitive pushing, pulling, gripping, fingering, and pinching. From this evidence, the Commission determined, under finding of fact number nine, that \u201cthe evidence shows that plaintiff was able to perform the UPC label position satisfactorily before her injury, and there was no evidence that plaintiff sought medical attention or otherwise was not mentally or physically able to perform the UPC labeler position after her recovery from the [carpal tunnel syndrome] surgery.\u201d\nIn our view, the problem with the majority\u2019s finding of fact number nine is two-fold: First, the evidence itself, as reflected by the Commission\u2019s opinion and award, suggests that plaintiff was indeed experiencing difficulties with her labeling duties. Plaintiff testified that she had trouble with her hands while labeling, and the Commission acknowledged, in finding of fact number six, that she also had \u201cresidual symptoms.\u201d In addition, the Court notes that plaintiff made a return visit to her medical doctor on 13 April 1999, and that less than a month later, on 10 May 1999, the physician issued further restrictions on her duties. Thus, if anything, the evidence relied on by the Commission\u2019s majority indicates that plaintiff was having continuing problems in the wake of, and as a result of, her injuries. See Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (holding that evidence tending to support a plaintiff\u2019s claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and \u201cplaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence\u201d).\nSecond, and perhaps more troubling, is the fact that the Commission\u2019s opinion is bereft of any evidence proffered by defendant that would support the quoted portion of finding of fact number nine. The test in Seagraves makes it incumbent on a defendant to show, by the greater weight of the evidence, that a plaintiff\u2019s termination was unrelated to his or her work-related injuries; the burden is not on a plaintiff to show that the termination was so related. A careful reading of the Commission\u2019s opinion reveals the majority reached finding of fact number nine because plaintiff failed to demonstrate adequately that her termination was tied to her injuries and not because defendant had shown by the greater weight of the evidence that the termination was not related to plaintiff\u2019s injuries. This burden shift is improper and compels this Court to conclude that the Commission\u2019s majority erred when it found that \u201cthere was no evidence that plaintiff. . . was not mentally or physically able to perform the UPC labeler position.\u201d\nIn sum, we find no competent evidence referenced in the Commission\u2019s opinion and award that supports a showing by the company-defendant that the plaintiff-employee\u2019s termination was unrelated to her injuries. The initial burden is on the company to demonstrate by a greater weight of the evidence that the termination of the employee was not related to the employee\u2019s injuries. A defendant-company cannot meet this burden by showing that a plaintiff-employee failed to show otherwise. It is not incumbent on the plaintiff-employee to make such a showing. Rather, the burden is on the defendant-company to produce evidence that demonstrates the employee was mentally and physically able to perform the duties assigned to her. In the instant case, we find no such evidence in the majority\u2019s findings.\nIn addition, the Court notes that the evidence and testimony indicate plaintiffs efforts toward finding subsequent commensurate employment may have been compromised by both market conditions and her lack of work experience. Neither circumstance may serve as a means for defendant to sidestep its benefit obligations. See Mabe v. North Carolina Granite Corp., 15 N.C. App. 253, 256, 189 S.E.2d 804, 807 (1972) (holding, in essence, that when an industrial injury renders an employee unable to earn wages, the employer is not alleviated of benefit obligations if the employee\u2019s lack of education or experience prevents the employee from finding alternative employment within the marketplace); see also Peoples v. Cone Mills Corp., 316 N.C. 426, 443-44, 342 S.E.2d 798, 808-09 (1986) (holding that an injured employee shall retain benefit eligibility if the employee\u2019s age, inexperience, lack of education, or any other preexisting factor preclude the employee from procuring alternative employment).\nBecause this Court has concluded that the Commission\u2019s opinion and award does not reflect that the company met its initial burden of showing that plaintiff\u2019s termination was unrelated to her work-related injuries, we find it unnecessary at this time to consider whether plaintiff has shown that her inability to procure commensurate employment was due to her injuries. If, upon remand, the Commission properly concludes that the evidence presented shows that defendant terminated plaintiff without regard to her injuries, we instruct the Commission to then determine whether plaintiff has shown, by the greater weight of the evidence, that her work-related injuries prevented her: (1) from performing her duties as a UPC labeler, or (2) from finding alternative commensurate employment. Seagraves, 123 N.C. App. at 234, 472 S.E.2d at 401. If plaintiff makes this showing, she is entitled to continued benefits. Id. If she fails to do so, the company is alleviated of future injury-related benefit obligations. Id.\nWe therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court for further remand to the Industrial Commission for reconsideration in line with Seagraves and the attendant directives contained herein.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\n. The noted citation has been alternately referred to as \"Seagraves\u201d and \u201cSeagroves\u201d since its publication in 1996. As the record demonstrates that the plaintiff\u2019s name was Cheryl D. \u201cSeagraves,\u201d this Court will cite to the case as \u201cSeagraves v. Austin Co. of Greensboro.\u201d\n. The Court notes that under Seagraves, the question of whether an employee\u2019s termination was unrelated to her injury is separate from the question of whether the employee\u2019s injury prevented her from procuring commensurate employment. Thus, in future cases, the Industrial Commission should make findings of fact that specifically address each question in turn.\n. We note that the Commission\u2019s majority additionally erred when it included a conclusion of law under the aegis of its findings of fact. In the final sentence of finding of fact number nine, the Commission\u2019s majority stated that \u201c[plaintiff\u2019s failure to perform the UPC labeler position under the facts of this case constitutes a failure to accept a suitable position reasonably offered by her employer.\u201d (Emphasis added.) While the issue of whether plaintiff failed to perform her duties is a question of fact, the determination of whether plaintiff\u2019s failings constituted a constructive refusal to accept suitable employment is a question of law. The distinction is significant, as an appellate court\u2019s standard of review of the Commission\u2019s findings of fact is markedly different from its standard for reviewing the Commission\u2019s conclusions of law. Thus, we urge commissioners to exercise care when differentiating between the two entities in the future.", "type": "majority", "author": "LAKE, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "H. Bright Lindler and Charles R. Hassell, Jr., for plaintiff - appellant.", "Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Kirk D. Kuhns and Jaye E. Bingham, for defendant-appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ALBERTA McRAE, Employee v. TOASTMASTER, INC., Employer SELF-INSURED (CORPORATE CLAIMS MANAGEMENT, Servicing Agent)\nNo. 287A03\n(Filed 25 June 2004)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 Seagraves test \u2014 injured employee\u2019s right to continuing benefits \u2014 termination for misconduct\nOur Supreme Court adopts the Seagraves, 123 N.C. App. 228 (2003), test for determining an injured employee\u2019s right to continuing workers\u2019 compensation benefits after being terminated for misconduct whereby an employer must demonstrate initially that the employee was terminated for misconduct, the same misconduct would have resulted in the termination of a nondisabled employee, and the termination was unrelated to the employee\u2019s compensable injury, in order to find that an employee constructively refused suitable work, thus barring workers\u2019 compensation benefits for lost earnings unless the employee is then able to show that his inability to find or hold other employment at a wage comparable to that earned prior to the injury is due to the work-related injury.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation \u2014 constructive refusal of suitable employment \u2014 termination for misconduct unrelated to workplace injuries\nThe Industrial Commission erred in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that defendant employer met its burden of providing competent evidence that plaintiff employee\u2019s failure to perform her UPC labeling duties was not related to her prior compensable injury under workers\u2019 compensation, which thereby led to her termination for misconduct and denial of additional workers\u2019 compensation benefits based on an alleged failure to accept a suitable position reasonably offered by her employer, because: (1) the evidence relied upon by the Commission\u2019s majority indicated that plaintiff was having continuing problems in the wake of, and as a result of, her injuries; (2) there was no competent evidence referenced in the Commission\u2019s opinion and award that supported a showing by defendant employer that plaintiff employee\u2019s termination was unrelated to her injuries, and defendant cannot meet this burden by showing that plaintiff failed to show otherwise; and (3) evidence and testimony indicated plaintiff\u2019s efforts toward finding subsequent commensurate employment may have been compromised by both market conditions and her lack of work experience, neither of which may serve as a means for defendant employer to sidestep its benefit obligations.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 158 N.C. App. 70, 579 S.E.2d 913 (2003), affirming an opinion and award entered by the North Carolina Industrial Commission on 18 April 2002. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 October 2003.\nH. Bright Lindler and Charles R. Hassell, Jr., for plaintiff - appellant.\nCranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Kirk D. Kuhns and Jaye E. Bingham, for defendant-appellees." }, "file_name": "0488-01", "first_page_order": 520, "last_page_order": 533 }