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Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C; 647, 676-77, 483 S.E.2d 396, 414, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 573-74, 364 S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4694780 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "237", "parenthetical": "overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C; 647, 676-77, 483 S.E.2d 396, 414, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 573-74, 364 S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (1988)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741422 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 S.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774343 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203-04" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "65 L. Ed. 2d 1137", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 907", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787596, 1787636, 1787637, 1787575, 1787641, 1787643 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0907-04", "/us/448/0907-02", "/us/448/0907-06", "/us/448/0907-01", "/us/448/0907-05", "/us/448/0907-03" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 510", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 306", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572332 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "100 L. Ed. 2d 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Ed. 2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549203 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197-98", "parenthetical": "finding submission of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was proper when elderly victim was attacked in his own home" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2553398 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31-32", "parenthetical": "finding submission of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was proper when elderly victim was attacked in his own home" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 L. Ed. 2d 681", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 986", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9065569, 9065057, 9065826, 9065096, 9065164, 9065006, 9065680, 9065617, 9065941, 9065237, 9065367, 9065755, 9065308, 9065502 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0986-09", "/us/538/0986-02", "/us/538/0986-13", "/us/538/0986-03", "/us/538/0986-04", "/us/538/0986-01", "/us/538/0986-11", "/us/538/0986-10", "/us/538/0986-14", "/us/538/0986-05", "/us/538/0986-07", "/us/538/0986-12", "/us/538/0986-06", "/us/538/0986-08" ] }, { "cite": "570 S.E.2d 440", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "486" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511396 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867702 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 459", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "900" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 576", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155854 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "149 L. Ed. 2d 641", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685069 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 L. Ed. 2d 224", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "448 S.E.2d 827", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "829" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 756", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550297 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "759-60" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0756-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 383", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4741706 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0383-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 752", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 355", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572408 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0355-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 870", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "887", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)" }, { "page": "898-99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511417 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12814 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "8" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "534 U.S. 840", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9118465, 9118499, 9118373, 9118213, 9118315, 9118412, 9118254, 9118191, 9118352, 9118287, 9118166, 9118236, 9118269, 9118143 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/534/0840-13", "/us/534/0840-14", "/us/534/0840-11", "/us/534/0840-04", "/us/534/0840-09", "/us/534/0840-12", "/us/534/0840-06", "/us/534/0840-03", "/us/534/0840-10", "/us/534/0840-08", "/us/534/0840-02", "/us/534/0840-05", "/us/534/0840-07", "/us/534/0840-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 334", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135908 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "132 L. Ed. 2d 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 826", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "847-48", "parenthetical": "holding the trial court's exclusion of evidence of remorse was not prejudicial because the defendant was allowed to admit other evidence of his remorse" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558011 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-54", "parenthetical": "holding the trial court's exclusion of evidence of remorse was not prejudicial because the defendant was allowed to admit other evidence of his remorse" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 L. Ed. 2d 559", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302" }, { "page": "301" }, { "page": "302" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571689 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160-61" }, { "page": "161" }, { "page": "160-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545734 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 467", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2528837 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0467-01" ] }, { "cite": "495 S.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369" }, { "page": "370" }, { "page": "370", "parenthetical": "finding defendant's acts of putting duct tape on the victim's wrists, forcing him to lie on the floor, and kicking him in the back twice were not inherent, inevitable parts of the robbery and thus constituted evidence supporting defendant's kidnapping conviction" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 555", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551295 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "559" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0555-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1332513, 1333762, 1333317, 1330854, 1331561, 1332010, 1333466, 1335833, 1334928, 1334225, 1331538, 1335700, 1335894, 1330809, 1330874, 1331419 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1135-09", "/us/513/1135-05", "/us/513/1135-08", "/us/513/1135-03", "/us/513/1135-15", "/us/513/1135-14", "/us/513/1135-04", "/us/513/1135-02", "/us/513/1135-12", "/us/513/1135-07", "/us/513/1135-11", "/us/513/1135-10", "/us/513/1135-16", "/us/513/1135-06", "/us/513/1135-01", "/us/513/1135-13" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 298", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550074 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 L. Ed. 2d 738", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 412", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2519104 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 L. Ed. 2d 819", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "588 S.E.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 583", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491887 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0583-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 L. Ed. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "no error to submit both rape and kidnapping as aggravating circumstances under subsection (e)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571533 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "454", "parenthetical": "no error to submit both rape and kidnapping as aggravating circumstances under subsection (e)(5)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 L. Ed. 2d 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54098 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34-35" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 L. Ed. 2d 965", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "finding no error in the trial court's submission of separate aggravating circumstances under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (e)(5) based on defendant's commission of a robbery and a kidnapping during the course of the murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155790 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "finding no error in the trial court's submission of separate aggravating circumstances under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (e)(5) based on defendant's commission of a robbery and a kidnapping during the course of the murder" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. 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Ed. 2d 603", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5540, 5547, 5516, 5166, 5366, 4823, 5560 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1022-04", "/us/494/1022-06", "/us/494/1022-03", "/us/494/1022-05", "/us/494/1022-01", "/us/494/1022-02", "/us/494/1022-07" ] }, { "cite": "354 S.E.2d 446", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4742893 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/319/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 L. Ed. 2d 895", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "512 U.S. 1254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 39539 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/512/1254-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 S.E.2d 144", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2530367 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" }, { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 L. Ed. 2d 438", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "516 U.S. 996", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 327648, 323393, 326465, 323750, 325863, 323400, 324649, 323181, 324686, 327215, 324016, 327313, 322994, 325336 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/516/0996-02", "/us/516/0996-01", "/us/516/0996-09", "/us/516/0996-13", "/us/516/0996-06", "/us/516/0996-07", "/us/516/0996-05", "/us/516/0996-04", "/us/516/0996-11", "/us/516/0996-12", "/us/516/0996-08", "/us/516/0996-10", "/us/516/0996-03", "/us/516/0996-14" ] }, { "cite": "456 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" }, { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "340 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 790141 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "218" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/340/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 391", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551309 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "412 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37-38", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's exclusion of defendant's self-serving hearsay statements to his psychologist, even though those statements were the basis for the psychologist's expert opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2511838 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "456-57", "parenthetical": "affirming the trial court's exclusion of defendant's self-serving hearsay statements to his psychologist, even though those statements were the basis for the psychologist's expert opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0446-01" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "308", "parenthetical": "stating that the bases for an expert's opinion are not automatically admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867623 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495", "parenthetical": "stating that the bases for an expert's opinion are not automatically admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 S.E.2d 407", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409", "parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred by failing to admit the basis for an expert's opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 454", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567620 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458", "parenthetical": "holding that the trial court erred by failing to admit the basis for an expert's opinion" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "856" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135893 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 553", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561", "parenthetical": "holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to grant the defendant an additional peremptory challenge following the reexamination and excusal for cause of a juror" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139330 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41", "parenthetical": "holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to grant the defendant an additional peremptory challenge following the reexamination and excusal for cause of a juror" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "381 S.E.2d 453", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court ha[s] no authority to increase the number of peremptory challenges .... \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491441 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he trial court ha[s] no authority to increase the number of peremptory challenges .... \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "140 L. Ed. 2d 473", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "523 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11511617, 11511362, 11511587, 11511493, 11511686, 11511560, 11511754, 11511659, 11511469, 11511728, 11511536, 11511441, 11511413, 11511389, 11511806 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/523/1024-10", "/us/523/1024-01", "/us/523/1024-09", "/us/523/1024-06", "/us/523/1024-12", "/us/523/1024-08", "/us/523/1024-14", "/us/523/1024-11", "/us/523/1024-05", "/us/523/1024-13", "/us/523/1024-07", "/us/523/1024-04", "/us/523/1024-03", "/us/523/1024-02", "/us/523/1024-15" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 44", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53983 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 412", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959771 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424" }, { "page": "852" }, { "page": "424-26" }, { "page": "852-53", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 L. Ed. 2d 54", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "725" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135728 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 547", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538239 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 315", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 952", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11134915, 11134949, 11134887, 11134987, 11135084, 11134969, 11134862, 11134899, 11134932, 11135001, 11135036, 11135069, 11135103 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0952-04", "/us/525/0952-06", "/us/525/0952-02", "/us/525/0952-08", "/us/525/0952-12", "/us/525/0952-07", "/us/525/0952-01", "/us/525/0952-03", "/us/525/0952-05", "/us/525/0952-09", "/us/525/0952-10", "/us/525/0952-11", "/us/525/0952-13" ] }, { "cite": "127 S.E. 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "189 N.C. 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8654168 ], "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/189/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 937", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1722", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 4, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "528 F.2d 819", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1079651 ], "year": 1975, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/528/0819-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556344 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 254", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "Carlton, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 549", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573008 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554", "parenthetical": "Carlton, J., concurring" }, { "page": "554" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0549-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 251", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "Brady, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491870 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "129-30", "parenthetical": "Brady, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0114-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2269, "char_count": 70218, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5492693606034472e-07, "percentile": 0.6743368049643048 }, "sha256": "ec0242d36ff1c75b84542ee39cbe3bd2bda4286b52a44bda0489856b6d24e68a", "simhash": "1:8f2bd006364e1c48", "word_count": 11247 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:02.499353+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice NEWBY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RECHE SMITH" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "WAINWRIGHT, Justice.\nOn 8 March 2002, defendant Reche Smith was convicted of first-degree murder and felony larceny. The jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. Following a capital sentencing hearing, the jury recommended a sentence of death for the murder. The trial court accordingly imposed a sentence of death for the murder and further imposed a sentence of fifteen to eighteen months imprisonment for the felony larceny.\nThe evidence at trial showed the following: At 6:00 a.m. on 10 March 2001, the victim, Charles King (King), was at his home in Plymouth, North Carolina, when defendant knocked on his door. King, wearing a bathrobe and thermal shirt and pants, answered the door, and defendant asked him for a glass of water. King invited defendant into his home and headed toward his kitchen to get the water. However, before King reached the kitchen, defendant grabbed King around his neck and choked him until he became unconscious. Defendant then bound King\u2019s wrists with clear packaging tape, went to another room in King\u2019s house, found a clock, and used the clock\u2019s extension cord first to bind King\u2019s wrists and then his ankles. Next defendant covered King\u2019s entire face, including his nose and mouth, with clear packaging tape and pushed King under a hospital bed. Defendant left King under the bed to die of asphyxiation while he searched King\u2019s house for something to steal. As King lay suffocating under his bed, defendant took $250 from an envelope in King\u2019s bedroom, $20 from King\u2019s wallet, King\u2019s cell phone, bank card, and car keys. After thirty minutes of searching King\u2019s house and stealing these items, defendant took King\u2019s car, drove to Williamston, North Carolina, rented a room at a motel, and bought crack cocaine.\nThe next day defendant drove King\u2019s car to a local Burger King, where he stole a woman\u2019s purse and drove away. A man at the restaurant saw the license plate number on King\u2019s car as defendant fled the restaurant. A Burger King cashier relayed the license plate number to a police officer.\nA short while later, Corporal Scott McDougal of the Williamston Police Department spotted the car defendant was driving. Several officers, including Deputy Jason Branch of the Martin County Sheriff\u2019s Department, pursued defendant. Eventually, defendant stopped his car and fled into the woods, where Deputy Branch overtook him on foot and arrested him.\nWhen Corporal McDougal arrived at the scene of the arrest, he examined 'the car defendant had been driving. Inside he found the purse defendant had just stolen, a set of keys, a cell phone, a knife, a homemade crack pipe, and a bank card bearing the name Charles King. Corporal McDougal also confirmed that the car defendant drove during the chase belonged to Charles King. The officers took defendant to the Martin County Sheriff\u2019s Department for questioning and later transported him to the Bertie-Martin Regional Jail.\nLater on 11 March 2001, defendant called his wife, Rita Smith (Rita), from whom he was separated, and claimed he was in jail for snatching a purse. Defendant then began to cry and told his wife he would never get out of jail because he killed someone in Plymouth. Rita then asked defendant to let her speak to the sheriff. She asked the sheriff why defendant was in jail. The sheriff replied that defendant had stolen a woman\u2019s purse and fled in a car registered to Charles King. After talking with defendant and the sheriff, Rita relayed the story to her mother and speculated that defendant killed King. Rita knew King because she had bought cologne from him in the past. Rita and her mother attempted to call King at his home, but no one answered.\nTwo days after the murder, Rita relayed the contents of her conversation with defendant to her friend, Brenda Jackson. Rita and Jackson again called King\u2019s home, but no one answered. After receiving no reply from King, Rita and Jackson called Detective John Floyd, Chief of Police in Plymouth, North Carolina. Jackson relayed information to Chief Floyd about defendant\u2019s conversation with Rita. Jackson asked Floyd to go by King\u2019s house to check on King\u2019s whereabouts.\nWhen Chief Floyd and Officer Heather Thompkins arrived at King\u2019s house, they knocked on the doors and received no answer. One officer gained entry to the house through a window and let the other one in through a door. Once inside, they noticed a bedroom had been ransacked. The officers discovered King\u2019s body under a hospital bed.\nOn 13 March 2001, Dr. Paul Spence, M.D., conducted an autopsy on King at Pitt County Memorial Hospital. The autopsy revealed only one significant external injury, a scratch on King\u2019s left shin. Internal injuries were consistent with manual choking: bruises and bleeding into the muscles surrounding the voice box and bits of hemorrhage inside the structure of the thyroid cartilage. King\u2019s hands were swollen and purple-red in color, indicating King was alive at the time defendant bound him with the tape and electrical cord. Dr. Spence stated that King\u2019s death was caused by asphyxia resulting from blockage of the nose and mouth due to tape bound around the head. In Dr. Spence\u2019s estimation, once defendant placed tape on King\u2019s nose and mouth, King became brain dead in two to three minutes and his heart stopped after ten to twenty minutes. Dr. Spence also determined that King could have remained conscious for a portion of that time. Finally, Dr. Spence testified King could have regained consciousness after defendant choked him and been aware of his condition, but because of his lack of oxygen, King would have been unable to move.\nAdditional relevant facts will be presented when necessary to resolve specific assignments of error raised by defendant.\nJURY SELECTION\nDefendant first argues the trial court erred by denying his challenge for cause to prospective juror Charles Hassell. During voir dire, Hassell indicated he was strictly against drug use. Defense counsel then asked Hassell the following question:\n[Y]our position is such concerning drug use and abuse that in the event evidence came out in this trial that drug use was involved, it would affect or impair \u2014 substantially impair your ability to be fair and impartial; is that correct?\nHassell replied \u201cyes\u201d to this question. Defendant then challenged Hassell for cause.\nIn response, the trial court engaged in the following colloquy with Hassell:\nThe Court: Well let me \u2014 Mr. Hassell, let me ask you . . . just a couple of questions if I could. I don\u2019t mean to embarrass you. There are no right or wrong answers, and I want to make sure I understand what you\u2019re saying, and I\u2019m trying to frame the question in a way that \u2014 are you saying to me, sir, that your personal feelings about the use or use [sic] of or possession of drugs is such that it would interfere or prevent you from following the law in this \u2014 as I would instruct you as it relates to this case?\nMr. Hassell: Well, I could follow the law.\nThe Court: All right. Now \u2014 and so I want to make sure what you\u2019re saying \u2014 you know, many people don\u2019t like drugs, don\u2019t approve of drugs, and I don\u2019t believe that\u2019s the question that [the defense attorney] was asking you, and that may have been how\u2014 that may have been what you are saying. I don\u2019t know one way or the other.\nI\u2019m not trying to put words in your mouth, but I \u2014 I\u2019m just making sure I understand that\u2019s what you were saying or whether what you were saying is you didn\u2019t like drugs or are you saying to me that your feeling is such \u2014 I\u2019m asking you as to whether or not your personal feelings about particular crimes or particular types of conduct are such that it would overwhelm your reason and common sense and your ability to follow the law as I would instruct you on should we reach some aspect of the case that may relate to the consumption or use or possession of drugs?\nMr. Hassell: No. It wouldn\u2019t do that.\nThe Court: You would be able and could and would follow the law as I would instruct you on regardless of what your own personal feelings would be as it relates to the use or possession of or consumption of drugs; is that correct?\nMr. Hassell: Yes.\nThe Court: Are you sure of that answer, sir?\nMr. Hassell: Yeah.\nThe Court: All right. The Challenge for cause is denied.\nDefendant properly preserved error by exhausting the peremptory challenges available to him, renewing his challenge to prospective juror Hassell, and having his renewed challenge denied. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(h) (2003). However, in addition to preserving error, defendant must show error by (1) demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the challenge, and (2) showing defendant was prejudiced by this abuse of discretion. State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 68, 540 S.E.2d 713, 725 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2001).\nDefendant contends the trial court improperly rehabilitated Hassell with leading questions, despite the prohibition against reducing determinations of juror bias \u201cto question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism.\u201d Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 852 (1985). However, we conclude that the trial court did not lead Hassell to answer that he would follow the law. Rather, the trial court questioned Hassell in an effort to determine whether, despite Hassell\u2019s feelings about drug use, he could follow the law.\nWe further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant\u2019s challenge for cause. As the United States Supreme Court further stated in Wainwright:\nWhat common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made \u201cunmistakably clear\u201d; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. Despite this lack of clarity in the printed record, however, there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law.... [T]his is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror.\nId. at 424-26, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 852-53 (footnote omitted). Thus, we must give substantial weight to the trial court\u2019s determination that Hassell was not biased. We defer to the trial court who could see and hear Hassell, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant\u2019s challenge for cause. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nNext, defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to give him an additional peremptory challenge. Defendant claims he was entitled to an additional peremptory challenge because the trial court removed a seated juror for cause before the end of jury selection and after defendant had used all but one of his remaining peremptory challenges.\nAfter both defendant and the prosecution accepted prospective juror Gloria Cox, Cox brought the trial court a note from her doctor recommending that she be excused from jury duty because serving as a juror would be too stressful for her. The trial court dismissed Cox for cause. Defendant then requested an additional peremptory challenge, stating that he had undergone a substantial portion of jury selection believing that Cox would be a juror. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s request.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by failing to use its inherent authority to restore a peremptory challenge to remedy a prejudicial development in jury selection. However, we disagree. Although a trial court must grant a defendant an additional peremptory challenge if, upon reconsideration of the defendant\u2019s previously denied challenge for cause, \u201cthe judge determines that the juror should have been excused for cause,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(i) (2003), trial courts generally have no authority to grant additional peremptory challenges. See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 345 N.C. 184, 208, 481 S.E.2d 44, 57 (\u201c[T]he trial court ha[s] no authority to grant any additional peremptory challenges . . . .\u201d), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876, 139 L. Ed. 2d 134 (1997), and, cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1024, 140 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1998), and State v. Hunt, 325 N.C. 187, 198, 381 S.E.2d 453, 460 (1989) (\u201c[T]he trial court ha[s] no authority to increase the number of peremptory challenges .... \u201d). In fact, trial courts are \u201cprecluded from authorizing any party to exercise more peremptory challenges than specified by statute.\u201d State v. Dickens, 346 N.C. 26, 41, 484 S.E.2d 553, 561 (1997) (holding that the trial court did not err by refusing to grant the defendant an additional peremptory challenge following the reexamination and excusal for cause of a juror). Because the trial court had no authority to provide defendant with additional peremptory challenges, defendant\u2019s argument is without merit and we overrule this assignment of error.\nNext, defendant contends the trial court failed to comply with the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(a) requirement for random jury selection when it placed a prospective juror in a specific seat after that juror was randomly called to fill another seat. Prospective juror Jonas Simpson, who had been summoned in the initial group of venire members to be examined for fitness to serve, was not present when the clerk called his name. The trial court called another prospective juror in Simpson\u2019s place. The trial court then examined this prospective juror and two other prospective jurors. Following a recess, Simpson arrived at the courtroom. The trial court placed him in panel A, seat twelve, the panel and seat for which he was originally called. After the trial court and the prosecutor questioned Simpson, the trial court allowed the prosecutor\u2019s request to challenge Simpson for cause, finding that Simpson was unequivocally opposed to the death penalty.\nDefendant contends the trial court violated the \u00a7 15A-1214(a) requirement for random jury selection when it placed Simpson in a specific seat. However, defendant has waived review of this issue for two reasons. First, defendant failed to object to Simpson\u2019s placement in a non-random seat on constitutional grounds. \u201cConstitutional questions that are not raised and passed upon in the trial court will not ordinarily be considered on appeal.\u201d State v. Cummings, 353 N.C. 281, 292, 543 S.E.2d 849, 856, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 965, 151 L. Ed. 2d 286 (2001). Therefore, defendant has waived review of any constitutional issues. Second, defendant failed to preserve his alleged statutory violation for review because he failed to follow the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1211(c) procedure for challenging the randomness of jury selection. Subsection 15A-1211(c) states that all such challenges \u201c[m]ust be in writing,\u201d \u201c[m]ust specify the facts constituting the ground of challenge,\u201d and \u201c[m]ust be made and decided before any juror is examined.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1211(c)(2)-(4) (2003). These challenges must be made at the trial court level. Id. \u00a7 15A-1211(b) (2003). Defendant did not object to the trial court\u2019s placement of Simpson in a specific seat. Therefore, defendant has failed to preserve this issue for review, and we overrule his assignment of error.\nGUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE\nDefendant contends the trial court violated his constitutional right to present evidence by excluding the bases for his expert witness\u2019s opinion that he lacked the specific intent and the requisite mental state to commit murder. Dr. Holly Rogers, M.D., a staff psychiatrist at Duke University, testified that she diagnosed defendant as having cocaine dependence. She further testified that defendant\u2019s dependency on cocaine impaired his ability to reason, plan, and think.\nThe trial court ruled that Dr. Rogers could not testify that she based her opinion partly on statements defendant made to her and statements defendant made to his family members about his drug use on the day of the murder. The trial court based its decision to exclude this testimony on Rule of Evidence 403, which allows a court to exclude relevant evidence \u201cif its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2003). The trial court found defendant\u2019s hearsay statements to Dr. Rogers and his family self-serving. Because the statements were the only evidence that defendant used cocaine the day of the murder, the trial court further found the jury would have difficulty following a limiting instruction and understanding that the statements were not offered for the truth of the matter. The court excluded the statements, finding that, pursuant to Rule 403, the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury outweighed the statements\u2019 probative value.\nDefendant argues that this Court has consistently held that experts must be allowed to testify about the basis of their opinions. See, e.g., State v. Wade, 296 N.C. 454, 458, 251 S.E.2d 407, 409 (1979) (holding that the trial court erred by failing to admit the basis for an expert\u2019s opinion). However, as we have repeatedly stated, the bases for an expert\u2019s opinion are not automatically admissible. See, e.g., State v. Workman, 344 N.C. 482, 495, 476 S.E.2d 301, 308 (1996) (stating that the bases for an expert\u2019s opinion are not automatically admissible); and State v. Baldwin, 330 N.C. 446, 456-57, 412 S.E.2d 31, 37-38 (1992) (affirming the trial court\u2019s exclusion of defendant\u2019s self-serving hearsay statements to his psychologist, even though those statements were the basis for the psychologist\u2019s expert opinion). As in Baldwin, the trial court in this case found defendant\u2019s statements relevant to show the basis for an expert opinion, but that those statements were likely to confuse the jury. We conclude that the trial court properly applied Rule 403 to find that although relevant, the danger of the statements prejudicing, confusing, or misleading the jury outweighed the statements\u2019 probative value. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the statements and we overrule defendant\u2019s assignment of error.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to intervene during the prosecutor\u2019s guilt-innocence phase closing argument when the prosecutor interjected opinions concerning information outside the record.\nAs a preliminary matter, we note that closing argument should not include the personal knowledge or beliefs of the arguing attorney, especially when the knowledge or beliefs involve matters not based on the evidence. See State v. Flowers, 347 N.C. 1, 36-37, 489 S.E.2d 391, 412 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1135, 140 L. Ed. 2d 150 (1998); and State v. Solomon, 340 N.C. 212, 218, 456 S.E.2d 778, 783, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 996, 133 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1995). However, a prosecutor in a capital case has a duty to argue all the facts in evidence as well as all reasonable inferences stemming from these facts. State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 223 and 227, 433 S.E.2d 144, 152 and 154 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254, 129 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1994). While effectuating this duty, prosecutors should be granted wide latitude in their closing arguments. Solomon, 340 N.C. at 218, 456 S.E.2d at 783.\nDefendant contends the prosecutor improperly insinuated that defendant obtained a different psychologist because his first court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Matthews, did not \u201csay the right things.\u201d In fact, defendant only obtained a different psychologist after Dr. Matthews\u2019 license was suspended.\nDuring the prosecutor\u2019s guilt-innocence phase closing argument, he stated:\nThere\u2019s not one shred of evidence \u2014 oh yes you have a Dr.\u2014 Dr. Rogers who came in at $200 an hour that says that he\u2019s got a cocaine dependency based on some information that she received from \u2014 from talking to the defendant, talking to some family members, and looking over some records. . . .\nThe prosecutor also told the jury that Dr. Rogers, defendant\u2019s expert, had first seen defendant nearly a year after the crime. Next, the prosecutor asked the jury, \u201c[W]hat happened to Matthew, Dr. Matthew the one \u2014 one that saw him in September? Where\u2019s he? Didn\u2019t he say the right things?\u201d The trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the comment, \u201cDidn\u2019t he say the right things?\u201d\nHence, the trial court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the problematic remark which suggested that defendant\u2019s first expert may not have provided a favorable opinion to the defense. Although defendant failed to request a curative instruction, the trial court had instructed the jury at the beginning of the trial that, \u201c[w]hen [the trial court] sustain^] an objection to a question, you as a juror must disregard the question and answer, if one has been given, and draw no inference from the question or answer.\u201d\nDefendant further argues that the prosecutor\u2019s entire argument concerning Dr. Matthews was grossly improper. However, defendant\u2019s closing argument focused largely on Dr. Rogers\u2019 testimony that defendant\u2019s cocaine dependence and consumption on the day of the murder impeded defendant\u2019s ability to reason, plan, and think. Accordingly, the prosecutor was entitled to some latitude in responding to this argument. In any event, after thoroughly reviewing the prosecutor\u2019s argument, we conclude that the prosecutor was properly challenging the credibility of the opinion of defendant\u2019s expert. We thus find no error here and we overrule defendant\u2019s assignment of error.\nCAPITAL SENTENCING PROCEEDING\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to find as aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed during a kidnapping and that the murder was committed during a robbery. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5) (2003). Defendant argues that these aggravating circumstances were based on the same evidence and were thus duplicative.\nThe following are the relevant aggravating circumstances submitted to the jury:\n(1) Was this murder committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery?\n(2) Was this murder committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of kidnapping?\nSee id. (\u201cThe capital felony was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an aider or abettor, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any homicide, robbery, rape or a sex offense, arson, burglary, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.\u201d).\nEvery aggravating circumstance submitted by the trial court in a capital sentencing proceeding must be supported by independent evidence. State v. Quesinberry, 319 N.C. 228, 239, 354 S.E.2d 446, 452-53 (1987), judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022, 108 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990). However, if there is separate substantial evidence to support each submitted aggravating circumstance, it is not error for some evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances to overlap. State v. White, 355 N.C. 696, 709, 565 S.E.2d 55, 64 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1163, 154 L. Ed. 2d 900 (2003); State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 530, 453 S.E.2d 824, 851, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884, 133 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1995). More specific to the present case, when separate and distinct evidence supports two aggravating circumstances within the same statutory subsection, submission of each aggravating circumstance is proper. State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 76, 520 S.E.2d 545, 561 (1999) (finding no error in the trial court\u2019s submission of separate aggravating circumstances under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (e)(5) based on defendant\u2019s commission of a robbery and a kidnapping during the course of the murder), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245, 147 L. Ed. 2d 965 (2000); State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 34-35, 478 S.E.2d 163, 181 (1996), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124, 138 L. Ed. 2d 1022 (1997) (same); see also State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 454, 509 S.E.2d 178, 195 (1998) (no error to submit both rape and kidnapping as aggravating circumstances under subsection (e)(5)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1999). In short, aggravating circumstances may be submitted unless the supporting evidence completely overlaps. State v. Miller, 357 N.C. 583, 595, 588 S.E.2d 857, 866 (2003), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 159 L. Ed. 2d 819 (2004); State v. Moseley, 338 N.C. 1, 54, 449 S.E.2d 412, 444 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1091, 131 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1995). Accordingly, our analysis in the present case must begin with consideration of whether distinct evidence was presented to support a finding that defendant committed a robbery and a kidnapping during the course of the murder.\nA robbery occurs when a defendant feloniously takes money or goods of any value from the person of another against that person\u2019s will, by violence or by putting that person in fear. State v. Daniels, 337 N.C. 243, 267, 446 S.E.2d 298, 313 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1135, 130 L. Ed. 2d 895 (1995).\nA kidnapping occurs when a defendant unlawfully confines, restrains, or removes from one place to another, any other person sixteen years of age or over without the person\u2019s consent, \u201cfor the purpose of . . . [facilitating the commission of any felony.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-39(a)(2) (2003). However, a defendant is not guilty of kidnapping if the only evidence of restraint is that restraint which is an inherent, inevitable feature of another felony. State v. Beatty, 347 N.C. 555, 559, 495 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1998). The defendant is guilty of kidnapping if the defendant takes acts that cause additional restraint of the victim or increase the victim\u2019s helplessness and vulnerability. Id. at 559, 495 S.E.2d at 370.\nIn the present case, separate evidence supported the kidnapping and the robbery. Defendant robbed the victim by grabbing the victim around the neck and rendering him unconscious. At this point, defendant was free to steal the items he wanted and leave. However, defendant took the additional steps of binding the victim\u2019s wrists and ankles and taping his mouth. This binding and taping was not an inherent, inevitable part of the robbery. Rather, these forms of restraint exposed the victim to a greater danger than that inherent in the robbery and constituted a kidnapping. Accordingly, separate and distinct evidence supported the existence of both aggravating circumstances. See Cheek, 351 N.C. at 54-55 and 76, 520 S.E.2d at 549-50 and 561 (finding no error in submission of two (e)(5) aggravating circumstances based on both robbery and kidnapping during murder when co-defendants forced victim out of her car with a gun, struck her in the head, tied her up and placed her in the backseat or trunk, drove the car to Wilmington, and burned the vehicle with the victim in the trunk); Beatty, 347 N.C. at 559, 495 S.E.2d at 370 (finding defendant\u2019s acts of putting duct tape on the victim\u2019s wrists, forcing him to lie on the floor, and kicking him in the back twice were not inherent, inevitable parts of the robbery and thus constituted evidence supporting defendant\u2019s kidnapping conviction); Bond, 345 N.C. at 13 and 34-35, 478 S.E.2d at 168 and 181 (finding no error in submission of three (e)(5) aggravating circumstances based on a robbery and two kidnappings where defendants kidnapped two victims and forced them to drive around for hours while defendants forced one victim to assist them in several attempted robberies).\nWe also note that defendant alludes to the trial court\u2019s failure to instruct the jury specifically that it should not use the same evidence to support a finding of both (e)(5) aggravating circumstances submitted. Indeed, a trial court\u2019s instructions should ensure that jurors will not use the same evidence to find more than one aggravating circumstance. State v. Gay, 334 N.C. 467, 495, 434 S.E.2d 840, 856 (1993). In the present case, the trial court\u2019s jury instruction, given pursuant to 1 N.C.P.I. \u2014 Crim. 210.25 (2001), provided that: \u201c[Kjidnapping is the unlawful restraint of another person without \u2014 without their consent for the purpose of facilitating the commission of robbery, which restraint was a separate complete act independent of and apart from the robbery.\u201d (Emphasis added). We must assume that the jury obeyed this instruction and identified evidence of separate restraint separate from the robbery. See State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 618, 430 S.E.2d 188, 208 (stating that jurors are assumed to follow a trial court\u2019s instructions in a criminal case), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028, 126 L. Ed. 2d 602 (1993). In any event, the trial court\u2019s jury instructions did not constitute prejudicial error.\nWe conclude this assignment of error is without merit.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding the following mitigating evidence: defendant\u2019s expression of remorse that was offered via testimony from defendant\u2019s mother and a minister; defendant\u2019s adjustment to incarceration that was shown by defendant\u2019s behavior compared to other inmates and by defendant\u2019s willingness to take on responsibilities not given to other inmates; and defendant\u2019s practice of religion in a manner that helped other inmates; and defendant\u2019s support if given a life sentence via the expectation that various people would make regular visits to see defendant in prison.\nWhile a trial court should allow the jury to consider any mitigating evidence related to a defendant\u2019s character and record or the circumstances of the crime, the feelings, actions, and conduct of third parties have no mitigating value as to defendant and are irrelevant in capital sentencing proceedings. State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 160-61, 505 S.E.2d 277, 302 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1075, 143 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1999). For example, Locklear held that the trial court properly excluded mitigating evidence attacking the character of the victim of one of the defendant\u2019s prior assaults because the evidence did not \u201cshed[] light on defendant\u2019s age, character, education, environment, habits, mentality, propensities, or criminal record, or on the circumstances of the offense for which defendant was being sentenced\u201d. Id. at 159, 505 S.E.2d at 301.\nWe turn first to defendant\u2019s proposed evidence revealing his remorse for the killings. In the present case, the trial court submitted a non-statutory mitigating circumstance that \u201cthe defendant has expressed remorse for the crime.\u201d Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow presentation of certain evidence supporting this mitigating circumstance.\nDefendant references the following exchange during the testimony of defendant\u2019s mother:\n[Defense Counsel]: What have you actually observed and heard from him concerning this matter.\n[Mother]: He\u2019s very sorry. I know if it had not been for the crack\u2014\n[Prosecutor]: Objection, if Your Honor please.\nThe Court: Sustained.\n[Defense Counsel]: Now don\u2019t tell me what you know, okay.\n[Mother]: Okay.\n[Prosecutor]: But you say he was- \u2014 he\u2019s very sorry.\n[Mother]: Yes.\nThe trial court sustained an objection to defendant\u2019s mother\u2019s statement as to what she \u201cknow[s].\u201d This testimony was clearly an irrelevant statement of a third party\u2019s feelings concerning punishment. See Locklear, 349 N.C. at 161, 505 S.E.2d at 302. Even assuming arguendo that the trial court erred in excluding the statement from defendant\u2019s mother, defendant was not prejudiced by this exclusion because defendant\u2019s mother immediately testified that defendant was sorry. See State v. Jones, 339 N.C. 114, 153-54, 451 S.E.2d 826, 847-48 (1994) (holding the trial court\u2019s exclusion of evidence of remorse was not prejudicial because the defendant was allowed to admit other evidence of his remorse), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1169, 132 L. Ed. 2d 873 (1995).\nDefendant also argues that the trial court erred in excluding testimony from prison minister Christopher Bryant concerning defendant\u2019s remorse. Based on our review of the record, it appears Bryant was going to testify about defendant\u2019s consideration of suicide and his feelings about his children and mother. We conclude that such evidence is irrelevant to defendant\u2019s character and record or the circumstances of the crime. See State v. Hardy, 353 N.C. 122, 132-33, 540 S.E.2d 334, 343 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 840, 151 L. Ed. 2d 56 (2001).\nWe turn next to defendant\u2019s evidence that he was adjusting well to life in prison. At defendant\u2019s request, the trial court submitted a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance that defendant had demonstrated good behavior while in jail awaiting trial. Defendant argues that the trial court improperly excluded testimony supporting this mitigating circumstance. Defendant was permitted to present testimony from John Wright, the chief jailer at the Washington County Jail, that defendant was given duties at the jail including buffing and waxing floors, that defendant is a good inmate who has helped the jail staff maintain order in the jail by calming inmates who are \u201cfussfing]\u201d or \u201cquarrelfling]\u201d with each other, and that defendant has never caused problems or received a reprimand while in jail.\nA capital defendant is permitted to introduce evidence from a disinterested witness that the defendant has adjusted well to confinement. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d 1, 9 (1986). The Court in Skipper found such testimony to be especially warranted because the prosecutor in that case argued that the defendant could not be trusted to act appropriately if he were returned to prison. Id. at 8, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 9.\nSimilarly, in the present case, the prosecutor argued that the only way to insure that defendant would not kill again was for the jury to sentence defendant to death. However, the trial court appropriately allowed defendant to present mitigation evidence from John Wright that defendant had made a good adjustment to jail. This permitted the jury to infer that defendant would not kill again if given a life sentence. The trial court excluded only defendant\u2019s proposed evidence relating to how defendant\u2019s conduct and duties in jail related to other inmates\u2019 conduct and duties. This evidence did not bear on whether defendant would kill again if given a life sentence. Moreover, the excluded evidence was irrelevant to defendant\u2019s character and record or the circumstances of defendant\u2019s crime. See Locklear, 349 N.C. at 160-61, 505 S.E.2d at 302.\nDefendant also refers in his brief to excluded evidence showing he had family members who would support him if he received a life sentence. Again, this evidence is not related to defendant\u2019s character and record or the circumstances of defendant\u2019s crime and is thus irrelevant for sentencing purposes.\nThe Court next turns to defendant\u2019s proposed evidence concerning his religious beliefs. At defendant\u2019s request, the trial court submitted the following nonstatutory mitigating circumstance to the jury: \u201cThe defendant has exhibited religious beliefs and practices since incarcerated in the Washington County Jail while awaiting trial and sentencing on this matter.\u201d Defendant\u2019s brief appears to identify Christopher Bryant\u2019s proposed testimony concerning defendant\u2019s practice of ministering to other inmates as the critical excluded evidence on this issue. Our review of the record reveals that defendant was allowed to present Bryant\u2019s testimony that Bryant met defendant while ministering to inmates, that defendant willingly attended Friday night services at the jail for about one year, and that defendant approached Bryant during this time. The trial court excluded Bryant\u2019s testimony that defendant\u2019s involvement in the services was \u201cdedicated because he didn\u2019t have to', but he did help other inmates.\u201d This testimony improperly focused on the opinion of a third party rather than defendant\u2019s character and record or the circumstances surrounding defendant\u2019s crime. See id. The trial court properly excluded this testimony.\nThis assignment of error is without merit.\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to intervene during the prosecutor\u2019s sentencing phase closing argument when the prosecutor interjected opinions concerning information outside the record and made unfair emotional appeals to jurors.\nDefendant assigns error to the following portion of the prosecutor\u2019s sentencing phase closing argument:\nI would say to you, if you choose not to exercise the option of the death penalty, can you guarantee that Reche Smith would not get a piece of tape, a cord sometime and kill again, can you? He\u2019s killed now. The only way to insure that he won\u2019t kill again is the death penalty.\nJustice \u2014 -justice is making sure that Reche Smith is not ever going to do this again. You \u2014 you ladies and gentlemen, you are the only thing standing between the defendant. The only way that you can be sure that this man will never kill again, walk out again is to give him the death penalty.\nDefendant suggests that this argument was improper because defendant could not \u201cwalk out again\u201d if given a life sentence because defendant would never be eligible for parole.\nWe first note that defendant failed to object to this argument. \u201c \u2018[T]he impropriety of the argument must be gross indeed in order for this Court to hold that a trial judge abused his discretion in not recognizing and correcting ex mero mo tu an argument which defense counsel apparently did not believe was prejudicial when he heard it.\u2019 \u201d State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 470, 573 S.E.2d 870, 887 (2002) (quoting State v. Johnson, 298 N.C. 355, 369, 259 S.E.2d 752, 761 (1979)). In such a circumstance, the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument \u201cis subject to appellate review for the existence of gross improprieties which make it plain that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to correct the prejudicial matters ex mero mo tu.\u201d State v. Harris, 319 N.C. 383, 387, 354 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1987).\nWhile it would be improper for a prosecutor to argue that a defendant\u2019s parole eligibility should affect the jury\u2019s sentencing considerations, see, e.g., State v. Price, 337 N.C. 756, 759-60, 448 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1021, 131 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1995), a prosecutor may urge the jury to reach a death sentence based on a fear of the defendant\u2019s future dangerousness. State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 627, 536 S.E.2d 36, 55 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997, 149 L. Ed. 2d 641 (2001). In the present case, the prosecutor momentarily mentioned that defendant might \u201cwalk out again,\u201d but the prosecutor never specifically mentioned defendant\u2019s being paroled or leaving prison. Further, defendant\u2019s closing argument in sentencing began with defendant\u2019s attorney informing the jury that its guilty verdict \u201cassured that [defendant] will die in prison\u201d and that the remaining question for sentencing was \u201cwill [defendant] die in prison when his [M]aker calls him or will [defendant] die in prison strapped to a gurney with a needle in his arm \u2014 .\u201d Accordingly, when both parties\u2019 closing arguments are read in their entirety, we cannot conclude that the jury believed that defendant might one day leave prison.\nMoreover, our review of the record indicates that on at least four occasions, the trial court instructed the jury that if they did not recommend sentencing defendant to death, they must recommend sentencing him to \u201clife imprisonment without parole.\u201d Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury that \u201c [i]f [they] unanimously recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without parole, [the trial court] will impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole.\u201d The trial court alluded to only two possible sentences, death or life imprisonment without parole. Therefore, if the jury followed these instructions, they knew of only these two possible sentences. We must presume that the jury followed these instructions. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the prosecutor\u2019s statement constituted prejudicial error sufficient to require a new sentencing hearing.\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nNext, defendant argues that the trial court erred in submitting the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) (2003). Defendant contends that this aggravating circumstance was not supported by the evidence and is unconstitutionally vague.\nTurning first to the evidence supporting the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance, we note that \u201c[t]he trial court, in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the existence of an aggravating circumstance, must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State.\u201d State v. Frogge, 351 N.C. 576, 586, 528 S.E.2d 893, 900, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 994, 148 L. Ed. 2d 459 (2000). \u201c \u2018The State is entitled to every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence, contradictions and discrepancies are for the jury to resolve, and all evidence admitted that is favorable to the State is to be considered.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting State v. Leary, 344 N.C. 109, 119, 472 S.E.2d 753, 759 (1996)). \u201cThe (e)(9) aggravating circumstance can be submitted when the killing is agonizing or dehumanizing to the victim; when the killing is conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous to the victim; or when the murder shows the defendant\u2019s mind was unusually depraved, beyond the depravity normally present in first-degree murder.\u201d State v. Prevatte, 356 N.C. 178, 261, 570 S.E.2d 440, 486 (2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 986, 155 L. Ed. 2d 681 (2003).\nThe evidence in this case supports each of the situations described in Prevatte:\nExpert testimony showed the victim was still alive when defendant bound his hands and feet. Defendant then covered King\u2019s head, including King\u2019s nose and mouth, with tape and ultimately caused King to suffocate to death. The State\u2019s expert, Dr. Spence, estimated that once defendant placed tape on King\u2019s nose and mouth, King became brain dead in two to three minutes and his heart stopped beating after ten to twenty minutes. Dr. Spence further testified it was \u201ccertainly possible [the victim] could have been aware of his condition, but because of the \u2014 because of the injury to his neck, because of the taping around his face could not have the oxygen supply, the ability to \u2014 to actually move or to defend himself.\u201d This evidence shows the killing was agonizing or dehumanizing to the victim.\nAdditionally, evidence showed the victim was a seventy-three-year-old man who was attacked in his own home at the mercy of a younger, stronger attacker. See State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 31-32, 405 S.E.2d 179, 197-98 (1991) (finding submission of especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was proper when elderly victim was attacked in his own home). Defendant choked King until King became unconscious, then bound him, covered his face in tape, and left him to die under a hospital bed. This evidence shows the killing was conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous to the victim.\nFinally, the evidence shows defendant\u2019s mind was unusually depraved, beyond the depravity normally present in first-degree murder. Defendant gained entry to the victim\u2019s house by preying upon King\u2019s Good Samaritan instincts. Defendant knocked on King\u2019s door and asked him for a glass of water. After King invited defendant into his home and went to get the water, defendant grabbed King and choked him around his neck until King became unconscious. After binding King and taping his face, defendant remained in the victim\u2019s home for thirty minutes, searching for items to steal while King suffocated and ultimately died under his bed with his arms and legs bound and his face covered in tape.\nThe above evidence shows that the facts of this case unquestionably supported submission of the (e)(9) especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance.\nAs to defendant\u2019s allegation that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000 (e)(9) is unconstitutionally vague, this Court has previously held that the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance in subsection (e)(9) is not unconstitutionally vague. See State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 388-92, 428 S.E.2d 118, 139-41, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993). Having reevaluated this prior holding, we find no reason to depart from precedent, and we recognize again the constitutionality of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance.\nThis assignment of error is overruled.\nPRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant raises nine additional issues which this Court has previously decided contrary to his position: (1) the trial court violated defendant\u2019s statutory and constitutional rights and committed plain error by telling the sentencing jury that it must be unanimous to answer \u201cno\u201d at Issues One, Three, and Four on the Issues and Recommendation sheet; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it had a duty to return a death sentence if it made certain findings; (3) the trial court\u2019s instructions defining the burden of proof applicable to mitigating circumstances violated defendant\u2019s constitutional rights because the court used the inherently ambiguous and vague terms \u201csatisfaction\u201d and \u201csatisfy,\u201d thus permitting jurors to establish for themselves the legal standard to be applied to the evidence; (4) the trial court committed reversible error by instructing jurors to decide whether nonstatutory mitigating circumstances have mitigating value; (5) the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury on a definition of aggravation which was unconstitutionally broad; (6) the trial court committed reversible error by its use of the term \u201cmay\u201d in sentencing issues Three and Four, thereby making consideration of proven mitigation discretionary with the sentencing jurors; (7) the trial court committed reversible error in its penalty phase instructions, which allowed each juror in deciding Issues Three and Four to consider only the mitigation found by that juror at Issue Two, thereby limiting the full and free consideration of mitigation required by the state and federal Constitutions; (8) the North Carolina death penalty statute is unconstitutional; and (9) the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the murder indictment where it unconstitutionally failed to allege all the elements of first-degree murder. Defendant makes these arguments to allow this Court to reexamine its prior holdings and to preserve these issues for any possible further judicial review. We have carefully considered defendant\u2019s arguments on these issues and find no compelling reason to depart from our prior holdings. Therefore, we overrule defendant\u2019s assignments of error.\nPROPORTIONALITY REVIEW\nHaving found no error in either the guilt-innocence phase or the sentencing proceeding of defendant\u2019s trial, we must determine: (1) whether the evidence supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury; (2) whether the jury\u2019s imposition of the death penalty was influenced by \u201cpassion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor\u201d; and (3) whether the death sentence is \u201cexcessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) (2003).\nIn the present case, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and under the first-degree felony murder rule. Following a capital sentencing proceeding, the jury found the following aggravating circumstances:\n(1) This murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery, id. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5);\n(2) This murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of kidnapping, id.;\n(3) This murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9).\nThe jury also found the existence of the following statutory mitigating circumstance submitted for consideration:\n(1)The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired, id. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(6) (2003).\nAdditionally, of the thirteen nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted for consideration, the jury found the following four to exist:\n(1) The defendant\u2019s mother, when he was a child, was not a positive influence in his life.\n(2) The defendant, as a child, was raised in a dysfunctional and unstable environment.\n(3) The defendant has a history of drug use and abuse.\n(4) The defendant confessed at an early state of the investigation to John Floyd and Dwight Rawlings.\nAfter reviewing the records, transcripts, briefs, and oral arguments, we conclude that the evidence supports these aggravating circumstances. Additionally, we conclude, based on a thorough review of the record, that the sentence of death was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor. Thus, the final statutory duty of this Court is to conduct a proportionality review.\nThe purpose of proportionality review is to \u201celiminate the possibility that a person will be sentenced to die by the action of an aberrant jury.\u201d State v. Holden, 321 N.C. 125, 164-65, 362 S.E.2d 513, 537 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061, 100 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1988). Proportionality review also acts \u201c[a]s a check against the capricious or random imposition of the death penalty.\u201d State v. Barfield, 298 N.C. 306, 354, 259 S.E.2d 510, 544 (1979), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1137 (1980), (overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 203-04, 344 S.E.2d 775, 782 (1986)). In conducting proportionality review, we compare the present case with other cases in which this Court concluded that the death penalty was disproportionate. McCollum, 334 N.C. at 240, 433 S.E.2d at 162.\nWe have found the death sentence disproportionate in eight cases. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. at 489, 573 S.E.2d at 898-99; State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 328, 372 S.E.2d 517, 523 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 27, 352 S.E.2d 653, 668 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 237, 341 S.E.2d 713, 733 (1986) (overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C; 647, 676-77, 483 S.E.2d 396, 414, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 573-74, 364 S.E.2d 373, 375-76 (1988)); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 691, 325 S.E.2d 181, 194 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 479, 319 S.E.2d 163, 172 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 694, 309 S.E.2d 170, 183 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 46, 305 S.E.2d 703, 717 (1983).\nWe conclude that this case is not substantially similar to any case in which this Court has found the death penalty disproportionate. Defendant was convicted on the basis of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and under the first-degree felony murder rule. \u201cThe finding of premeditation and deliberation indicates a more cold-blooded and calculated crime.\u201d State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 341, 384 S.E.2d 470, 506 (1989), judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990). Further, this Court has repeatedly noted that \u201ca finding of first-degree murder based on theories of premeditation and deliberation and of felony murder is significant.\u201d State v. Bone, 354 N.C. 1, 22, 550 S.E.2d 482, 495 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 152 L. Ed. 2d 231 (2002).\nDefendant attacked the seventy-three-year-old victim in the victim\u2019s own home. See State v. Adams, 347 N.C. 48, 77, 490 S.E.2d 220, 236 (1997) (noting that \u201c[a] murder in the home \u2018shocks the conscience, not only because a life was senselessly taken, but because it was taken [at] an especially private place, one [where] a person has a right to feel secure\u2019 \u201d) (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Brown, 320 N.C. 179, 231, 358 S.E.2d 1, 34, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 970, 98 L. Ed. 2d 406 (1987)), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1096, 139 L. Ed. 2d 878 (1998). Defendant grabbed the victim around the neck and strangled him by pressing on the victim\u2019s neck with defendant\u2019s forearm. While the victim was still alive, defendant bound the victim\u2019s hands and legs and wrapped tape around the victim\u2019s face. There was testimony at trial that the victim did not die immediately but instead was forced to struggle helplessly to free himself even as he slowly died from asphyxiation. The facts of the present case clearly distinguish this case from those in which this Court has held a death sentence disproportionate.\nWe also compare this case with the cases in which this Court has found the death penalty to be proportionate. McCollum, 334 N.C. at 244, 433 S.E.2d at 164. Although we review all cases in the pool of \u201csimilar cases\u201d when engaging in our statutorily mandated duty of proportionality review, \u201cwe will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out that duty.\u201d Id.; accord State v. Gregory, 348 N.C. 203, 213, 499 S.E.2d 753, 760, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 952, 142 L. Ed. 2d 315 (1998). After thoroughly analyzing the present case, we conclude that this case is more similar to cases in which we have found the sentence of death proportionate than to those in which we have found it disproportionate.\nWhether a sentence of death is \u201cdisproportionate in a particular case ultimately rest[s] upon the \u2018experienced judgments\u2019 of the members of this Court.\u201d State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 198, 443 S.E.2d 14, 47, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046, 130 L. Ed. 2d 547 (1994). Therefore, based upon the crime defendant committed and the record of this case, we are convinced the sentence of death recommended by the jury and ordered by the trial court in the instant case is not disproportionate or excessive.\nAccordingly, we conclude defendant received a fair trial and capital sentencing proceeding, free from prejudicial error. The judgment and sentence entered by the trial court must therefore be left undisturbed.\nNO ERROR.\nJustice NEWBY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "WAINWRIGHT, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice BRADY\nconcurring.\nA prosecutor\u2019s representations to a court or trier of fact should be accurate, trustworthy, and based upon a good faith understanding of the law and facts of a particular case. I write separately to emphasize the special responsibility of North Carolina prosecutors to promote justice and fair play in the criminal courts. I believe that portions of the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument in this case misrepresented the law and practice in North Carolina and were misleading to the jury. Notwithstanding this specific concern, I agree with the majority that defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error.\nResponsibility is an essential and unavoidable counterpart to authority. It is axiomatic that \u201c[f]rom everyone to whom much has been given, much will be required; and from the one to whom much has been entrusted, even more will be demanded.\u201d Luke 12:48 (New Revised Standard Version). As I have noted in the past, North Carolina\u2019s district attorneys are vested with broad authority and discretion to try criminal actions in superior and district court. See N.C. Const. art. IV, \u00a7 18. \u201cThe district attorney decides who shall be initially charged, drafts criminal indictments for submission to the grand jury, prepares informations, decides which cases are ripe for dismissal, negotiates pleas (and does so in a majority of cases), and most recently, was given the statutory authority to decide which first-degree homicide cases warrant capital prosecution, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2004 (2002).\u201d State v. Spivey, 357 N.C. 114, 129-30, 579 S.E.2d 251, 261 (2003) (Brady, J., dissenting). District attorneys, therefore, are entrusted by the State with unique authority in the criminal courts and possess a coordinate responsibility to exercise that authority with care.\nDistrict attorneys who neglect these responsibilities \u201crisk inviting the legislature to scrutinize . . . and perhaps diminish\u201d their authority. State v. Mitchell, 298 N.C. 549, 554, 259 S.E.2d 254, 257 (1979) (Carlton, J., concurring). Consider the recent legislative reformation which diminished North Carolina district attorneys\u2019 calendaring power. Until 1 January 2000, district attorneys enjoyed complete functional control over criminal court dockets. The district attorney decided which cases to set for trial and announced on the morning of court the order in which cases remaining on the calendar would be heard. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3 (a), (a1) (1995). North Carolina was singular among the fifty states in granting this degree of control over criminal dockets to district attorneys. John Rubin, 1999 Legislation Affecting Criminal Law and Procedure, in Administration of Just. Bull. (Inst. of Gov\u2019t, Chapel Hill, N.C., No. 99/05), Oct. 1999 at 9; Affiliate News, in 23 Champion No. 10 (Nat\u2019l Ass\u2019n of Crim. Def. Lawyers, Washington, D.C.), Dec. 1999, at 17, 70.\nHowever, in recent decades, judges and members of the bar began expressing concern over perceived questionable calendaring practices of some district attorneys. See generally, Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 451 S.E.2d 858 (1994); Shirley v. North Carolina, 528 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1975); N.C. Bar Ass\u2019n Found. Admin. of Justice Study Comm., Case Docketing and Calendaring and Rotation of North Carolina Superior Court Judges, Final Report 54-65 (Final Report, Aug. 1978). In 1999, the General Assembly responded, repealing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.3 and enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.4 in its place. Act of July 15, 1999, ch. 428 secs. 1,2 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1722, 1722-1724. Section 7A-49.4 limits the authority of district attorneys and sets firm rules for the calendaring of criminal cases.\nPresently, an administrative setting must be calendared in every felony case \u201cwithin 60 days of [a defendant\u2019s] indictment or service of notice of indictment.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.4(b) (2005). At that setting the trial judge must set administrative deadlines for discovery, arraignment, and motions. Id. If the parties do not agree on a trial date before the final administrative setting, the district attorney must propose a date at that time. Id. Additionally, the district attorney must publish the trial calendar at least ten working days before cases on the calendar are set for trial, and the calendar must list cases in the anticipated order that they will be tried. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-49.4 (e) (2005). Section 7A-49.4(e) also cautions that the calendar \u201cshould not contain cases that the district attorney does not reasonably expect to be called for trial.\u201d Id. This response by the General Assembly is a signal to district attorneys in North Carolina that conduct which invites criticism of the criminal justice system or of the legal profession should be \u201czealously guard[ed] against.\u201d Mitchell, 298 N.C. at 554, 259 S.E.2d at 257 (Carlton, J., concurring).\nHere, during defendant\u2019s 1999 capital sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor told the jury that \u201c[t]he only way that you can be sure that [defendant] will never kill again, walk out again is to give him the death penalty.\u201d (Emphasis added.) This statement was inaccurate, misleading, and unfounded in law. Criminal defendants who are convicted of first-degree murder do not \u201cwalk out\u201d of the North Carolina Department of Correction, absent an unlikely pardon by the Governor.\nIn North Carolina, a defendant who is sentenced to life imprisonment remains confined to prison until the expiration of his natural life with no opportunity for parole. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2002 (2003). In fact, in 1998, the General Assembly repealed N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1380.5, which had provided biennial review of a defendant\u2019s life sentence by a superior court judge after the defendant had served twenty-five years of imprisonment. Current Operations Appropriations and Capital Improvement Appropriations Act of 1998, ch. 212, sec. 19.4(q), 1998 N.C. Sess. Laws 937, 1232 (repealing Article 85B of Chapter 15A of the North Carolina General Statutes). Because North Carolina\u2019s General Statutes now require permanent imprisonment of criminal defendants who have been sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, the prosecutor\u2019s argument that jurors should recommend a death sentence to insure defendant never \u201cwalk[s] out\u201d and harms another person was improper.\nMoreover, I am unpersuaded by the State\u2019s recent assertion that the prosecutor\u2019s statement addressed defendant\u2019s ability to \u201cwalk out\u201d of a prison cell and hurt another inmate. Immediately after asking jurors to \u201cinsure\u201d that defendant would not \u201cwalk out again\u201d by recommending a death sentence, the prosecutor stressed that jurors now had an opportunity to \u201c \u2018do something about violence\u2019 \u201d and asked jurors, \u201c \u2018Why don\u2019t they do something about victim\u2019s rights?\u2019 \u201d The prosecutor then told jurors that they were \u201cthe moral conscience of this community.\u201d After reviewing the transcript, I believe the prosecutor meant, and jurors understood, that defendant might \u201cwalk out\u201d of prison into the community at large.\nWhile I agree with the majority that defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor\u2019s improper argument, I encourage North Carolina prosecutors to heed the paramount responsibilities which accompany their authority. \u201cA prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate; the prosecutor\u2019s duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.\u201d Rev. R. Prof. Conduct N.C. St. B. 3.8 (Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor) cmt. [1], 2005 Ann. R. N.C. 755-56. To that end, prosecutors must carefully guard the truth and accuracy of their statements within the criminal courts \u2014 especially statements to a jury. In this way, prosecutors may remain faithful stewards of their authority and \u201cthe most responsible officers] of the court. . . \u2018its right arm.\u2019 \u201d State v. McAfee, 189 N.C. 320, 321, 127 S.E. 204, 205 (1925).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Justice BRADY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joan M. Cunningham, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr. for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RECHE SMITH\nNo. 360A02\n(Filed 4 February 2005)\n1. Jury\u2014 selection \u2014 challenge for cause \u2014 deference to trial court\u2019s determination\nThe denial of a challenge for cause was not an abuse of discretion where the court questioned the juror about his feelings about drugs and whether he could follow the law, the questions were not leading, and deference must be paid to the trial judge, who can see and hear the prospective juror.\n2. Jury\u2014 selection \u2014 additional peremptory challenge\nThe failure to grant an additional peremptory challenge after a seated juror was removed before, the end of jury selection was not error. There is no general authority to grant additional peremptory challenges (although the trial court may grant an additional peremptory challenge if it reconsiders and grants a denied challenge for cause).\n3. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 randomness of jury selection \u2014 not raised at trial\nDefendant waived review of an issue concerning the randomness of jury selection by not objecting at trial. Constitutional issues not raised and passed upon at trial are not ordinarily considered on appeal, and there are statutory procedures for challenging randomness which include raising the challenge at trial. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1211(c).\n4. Evidence\u2014 expert \u2014 exclusion of basis of testimony\nThe basis of an expert\u2019s opinion is not automatically admissible. Here, the exclusion of the basis for a psychiatrist\u2019s opinion that a first-degree murder suspect was cocaine dependent with impaired thinking ability was excluded because it was based in part on self-serving statements defendant made to her and to his family about his drug use on the day of the murder. The trial court properly applied N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 to find that the probative value of the statements was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.\n5. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s closing argument \u2014 opinions\nThere was no error in the guilt phase of a capital murder prosecution when the prosecutor argued that defendant had obtained a second psychologist because his first did not say the right things (in fact, a new psychologist was obtained only after the license of the first was suspended). The court sustained defendant\u2019s objection to the problematic remark and had instructed the jury at the beginning of the trial to disregard the question and answer when an objection was sustained. Moreover, the prosecutor was entitled to some latitude in responding to defendant\u2019s closing argument, which was based on the cocaine dependency conclusion of the second psychiatrist.\n6. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 separate evidence for two circumstances\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by allowing the jury to find the aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed during a kidnapping and that it was committed during a robbery. Defendant robbed the victim by choking him until he lost unconsciousness, and kidnapped the victim by taking the additional steps of binding his wrists and ankles and taping his mouth. Defendant was free to steal what he wanted and leave after the victim was unconscious.\n7. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 instructions\u2014use of same evidence for two aggravating circumstances\nThere was no prejudicial error in a capital sentencing proceeding where the court did not instruct the jury specifically that it should not use the same evidence to support the aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed during a robbery and that it was committed during a kidnapping, but the court\u2019s instruction on kidnapping included the requirement that the restraint be an act separate and independent from the robbery.\n8. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 mitigating evidence \u2014 feelings and conduct of third parties\nWhile the trial court should allow the jury to consider any mitigating evidence related to a defendant\u2019s character and record or the circumstances of the crime, the feelings, actions and conduct of third parties have no mitigating value and are irrelevant in capital sentencing proceedings.\n9.Sentencing\u2014 evidence \u2014 remorse\u2014third party\u2019s feelings\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by excluding evidence of defendant\u2019s expression of remorse. The evidence was an irrelevant statement of a third party\u2019s feelings and was not relevant to defendant\u2019s character, his record, or his crime. Even if the evidence should have been admitted, there was no prejudice because other evidence to the same effect was admitted.\n10. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 defendant\u2019s feelings about suicide and family \u2014 irrelevant\nTestimony in a capital sentencing proceeding about defendant\u2019s consideration of suicide and about his feelings for his family was irrelevant to his character, his record, and his crime.\n11. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 defendant\u2019s effect on other inmates\u2014 irrelevant\nEvidence in a capital sentencing proceeding about the effect of defendant\u2019s conduct on other inmates was irrelevant and there was no error in its exclusion. The court allowed defendant to present evidence that defendant had made a good adjustment to jail.\n12. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 support of family members\u2014 irrelevant\nEvidence in a capital sentencing proceeding that defendant had family members who would support him if he received a life sentence was not related to defendant\u2019s record, his character, or his crime, and is irrelevant.\n13. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 defendant\u2019s religious practices in jail \u2014 irrelevant\nEvidence in a capital sentencing proceeding about defendant\u2019s religious practices in jail was properly excluded because it focused on the opinion of a third party rather than on defendant\u2019s character, his record, and his crime.\n14. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 ensuring defendant will not walk out again\nThere was no plain error in a capital sentencing proceeding where the prosecutor argued that the death penalty was the only way to ensure defendant would not \u201cwalk out again.\u201d The prosecutor did not specifically mention defendant being paroled or leaving prison; the jury could not have believed that defendant might one day leave prison after hearing both closing arguments in their entirety; and, if the jury followed the court\u2019s instructions as presumed, the only possible sentences were death or life without parole.\n15. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe aggravating circumstance that a murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel was correctly submitted in a capital sentencing proceeding where defendant gained entry to the victim\u2019s house by preying on the victim\u2019s good Samaritan instincts, and killed the victim in a manner that was agonizing, dehumanizing, conscienceless, pitiless, or unnecessarily torturous.\n16. Sentencing\u2014 death sentence \u2014 proportionate\nA death penalty was proportionate where defendant attacked a seventy-three-year-old victim in his own home, strangled him by the neck, bound him and wrapped tape around his face, and left him to struggle as he slowly died from asphyxiation.\nJustice Newby did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nJustice Brady concurring.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Judge Thomas D. Haigwood on 13 March 2002 in Superior Court, Washington County, upon a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder in a case in which defendant was tried capitally. Defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to an additional judgment imposed for felony larceny was allowed on 22 July 2002. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 October 2004 by special session in the Old Chowan County Courthouse in the Town of Edenton pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 TA-lO(a).\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joan M. Cunningham, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nM. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr. for defendant-appellant.\n. This is the first case the Supreme Court has heard outside Raleigh in one hundred and forty-four years. This Court last heard cases outside Raleigh during its August 1860 term when it met in Morganton, North Carolina." }, "file_name": "0199-01", "first_page_order": 237, "last_page_order": 266 }