{ "id": 3798499, "name": "IN RE THE ESTATE OF CANDICE LEIGH LUNSFORD, Deceased", "name_abbreviation": "In re the Estate of Lunsford", "decision_date": "2005-04-07", "docket_number": "No. 362A01-3", "first_page": "382", "last_page": "393", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 N.C. 382" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "585 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954606 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "592 S.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631120, 12631121, 12631122 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/592/0556-03", "/se2d/592/0556-01", "/se2d/592/0556-02" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 154", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631177, 12631121, 12631123, 12631124, 12631091, 12631126, 12631128, 12631100 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/593/0590-01", "/se2d/592/0556-01", "/se2d/592/0557-01", "/se2d/592/0558-02", "/se2d/590/0862-02", "/se2d/592/0559-03", "/se2d/592/0559-02", "/se2d/592/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 258", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491588 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575049 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 563", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "569" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560994 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 A.2d 873", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "393 Pa. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 1279617 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/393/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 564", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220080, 220180, 220038, 220136 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0490-02", "/nc/355/0490-01", "/nc/355/0490-04", "/nc/355/0490-03" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 210", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214" }, { "page": "252-53" }, { "page": "213-14" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "214" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9365265 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "44 S.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "\" '[P]arents are, regardless of any statute, under a legal as well as a moral duty to support, maintain, and care for their minor children.' \" (citation omitted)" }, { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "noting that \" 'parents are, regardless of any statute, under a legal as well as a moral duty to support, maintain, and care for their minor children' \" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 614", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "\" '[P]arents are, regardless of any statute, under a legal as well as a moral duty to support, maintain, and care for their minor children.' \" (citation omitted)" }, { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0614-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 U.S. 158", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 302055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/321/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533", "parenthetical": "stating that the \" 'custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents' \" (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 88 L. Ed. 645, 652 (1944))" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139523 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76", "parenthetical": "stating that the \" 'custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents' \" (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 88 L. Ed. 645, 652 (1944))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "229 N.C. 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12165913 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/229/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "485 S.E.2d 612", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "616-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139356 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608", "parenthetical": "referring to the parental duties of \"love,\" \"care,\" \"affection,\" \"support,\" and \"maintenance\"" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "608-09" }, { "page": "609" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 486", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568884 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "501" }, { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0486-01" ] }, { "cite": "291 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567694 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "582 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491711 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489-90" }, { "page": "491" }, { "page": "489" }, { "page": "489" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 S.E.2d 220", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 N.C. 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569875 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508-09" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/288/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138341 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "571" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 483", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "143 N.C. App. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11436709 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/143/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "585 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247", "parenthetical": "Lunsford II" }, { "page": "250-51" }, { "page": "251-53" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "251" }, { "page": "251" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8954606 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126", "parenthetical": "Lunsford II" }, { "page": "134" }, { "page": "133" }, { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0125-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1060, "char_count": 28717, "ocr_confidence": 0.729, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6085743118972508e-07, "percentile": 0.6851665869322884 }, "sha256": "908000ef3cd407839f0d6602fa52ba6640f01a5b07bd59bfe59fd1f0ec505373", "simhash": "1:af8d952774f7e4d6", "word_count": 4714 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:02.499353+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice NEWBY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "IN RE THE ESTATE OF CANDICE LEIGH LUNSFORD, Deceased" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Justice.\nThis appeal concerns the distribution of the estate of Candice Leigh Lunsford (Candice), who died intestate in an automobile accident on 30 June 1999, just nine days after her eighteenth birthday. Petitioner Dawn Collins Bean (Bean), Candice\u2019s mother and the administratrix of her estate, contends that Candice\u2019s father, respondent Randy Keith Lunsford (Lunsford), wilfully abandoned Candice during Candice\u2019s infancy and thus is not entitled to share in her estate under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 (2003). Lunsford claims that he did not abandon his daughter and that even if he did, he is still entitled to inherit from Candice because he was \u201cdeprived of the custody\u201d of Candice by a court of competent jurisdiction and has \u201csubstantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child\u201d under the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2).\nBean (then named Dawn Collins) and Lunsford were married on 1 November 1980, and Candice was born on 21 June 1981. The couple separated on 20 November 1982. On 30 January 1985, a Forsyth County district court entered a decree of absolute divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony between Bean and Lunsford and awarding Bean sole \u201ccare, custody and control\u201d of Candice. On 30 June 1999, Candice died intestate in an automobile accident. Bean was named administratrix of the estate. Pursuant to a wrongful death claim filed on behalf of Candice, the proceeds of a $100,000.00 liability insurance policy were tendered to her estate.\nOn 31 August 1999, Candice\u2019s estate sought a hearing before the Clerk of Superior Court of Surry County to determine if Lunsford was legally entitled to share in the distribution of the estate. After hearing and considering the evidence presented, the Clerk concluded that Lunsford was precluded from inheriting from Candice under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 on the ground that he had wilfully abandoned Candice during her minority.\nLunsford appealed for a trial de novo in Superior Court, which conducted its own evidentiary hearing. Among the evidence introduced at the hearing was Lunsford\u2019s admission that he was \u00e1 diagnosed alcoholic who \u201cgot in some trouble\u201d and \u201c[wjasn\u2019t ready to grow up\u201d at the time he married Bean. Bean testified that Lunsford visited Candice \u201c[n]o more than four or five times\u201d between November 1982 and March 1985, \u201cno[t] at all\u201d between March 1985 and 1990 and \u201c[m]aybe five or six times\u201d between 1990 and 1999. She also testified that Lunsford paid her under $100.00 in support over the course of Candice\u2019s entire life. The trial court reached the same conclusion as the Clerk of Superior Court in an order filed 3 March 2000.\nOn appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, with Chief Judge Eagles dissenting on the ground that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 should not apply because Candice was not a minor at the time of her death. In re Estate of Lunsford, 143 N.C. App. 646, 547 S.E.2d 483 (2001). On further appeal to this Court, we vacated and remanded for further remand to the trial court for additional findings as to whether Lunsford abandoned Candice and, if so, whether Lunsford \u201cresumed care and maintenance\u201d of Candice at least one year prior to her death or substantially complied \u201cwith all orders of the trial court requiring contribution to the support of the child.\u201d In re Estate of Lunsford, 354 N.C. 571, 571, 556 S.E.2d 292, 292 (2001).\nOn remand, the trial court conducted an in-chambers hearing during which the parties stipulated that the court would make additional findings of fact based solely on the transcript recorded at the prior evidentiary hearing. In compliance with this Court\u2019s order, the trial court made the following findings of fact relevant to Lunsford\u2019s care and maintenance of Candice:\n3. Bean and Lunsford separated from each other [o]n November 20, 1982.\n4. Lunsford was an alcoholic and too immature for responsibilities of family life and Bean did not want Lunsford to remain in the same household with their little daughter, [Candice].\n5. Lunsford agreed with Bean and honored Bean\u2019s request to leave.\n11. Bean subsequently married Gary Bean (hereinafter \u201cGary\u201d) on March 30, 1985.\n12. From the date of separation of Bean and Lunsford, Lunsford visited with [Candice] sporadically on his own initiative.\n13. Sometimes, . . . Lunsford\u2019s mother, who had an established relationship with [Candice], occasionally picked up her granddaughter for a visit, and . . . Lunsford would occasionally spend time with his daughter then.\n14. As [Candice] grew older, either [Candice] or Lunsford would initiate phone calls, visits, or other relational contact.\n15. These limited visits between [Candice] and Lunsford usually coincided with lulls in [Lunsford\u2019s] alcoholism and/or an increase in the emotional stability of his private life.\n16. Just before [Candice\u2019s] untimely death, Lunsford attended [Candice\u2019s] high school graduation and both had initiated plans for furthering their father-daughter relationship.\n17. Throughout [Candice\u2019s] minority, Lunsford occasionally offered to pay Bean for some of the care and maintenance of [Candice]. However, Bean refused all such offers.\n18. At one point, after one such request, Bean did suggest Lunsford buy [Candice] some clothes [Candice] wanted, to which Lunsford readily complied.\n19. However, since the marriage of Bean to Gary, Gary has assisted Bean with the support of [Candice]; and they almost exclusively paid for [Candice\u2019s] necessaries.\nBased on these findings, the trial court concluded that Lunsford had wilfully abandoned Candice under the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 and that neither of the two exceptions to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 applied. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order on 16 April 2002 stating that Lunsford was barred from sharing in the proceeds of Candice\u2019s estate.\nOn appeal from the 16 April 2002 order, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Lunsford did not wilfully abandon Candice and was therefore not precluded from inheriting from her under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. In re Estate of Lunsford, 160 N.C. App. 125, 126, 585 S.E.2d 245, 247 (2003) (Lunsford II). The Court of Appeals further stated that even if Lunsford had wilfully abandoned Candice, he was nevertheless entitled to inherit under the second of the two statutory exceptions to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2, which provides that an abandoning parent may inherit from the abandoned child if the parent \u201c \u2018has been deprived of the custody of his or her child under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent has substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 132-34, 585 S.E.2d at 250-51 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2)). Judge Bryant dissented, id. at 134-37, 585 S.E.2d at 251-53, and Candice\u2019s estate filed a notice of appeal based on the dissent. This Court subsequently allowed Bean\u2019s petition for discretionary review as to the additional issue of whether Lunsford falls within the scope of the second of the two statutory exceptions to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. In re Estate of Lunsford, 358 N.C. 154, 592 S.E.2d 556 (2004). The two issues currently before this Court are therefore (1) whether Lunsford wilfully abandoned Candice under the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 and (2) if so, whether Lunsford is nonetheless entitled to inherit from Candice because he was \u201cdeprived of the custody\u201d of Candice by the 1985 divorce judgment and \u201chas substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2).\nI.\nUnder the Intestate Succession Act, a parent may inherit from a deceased child if the child dies without a surviving spouse or lineal descendants. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 29-15(3) (2003). If both parents survive the child under such circumstances, the child\u2019s estate is divided equally between them. Id. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2, however, a parent who has \u201cwilfully abandoned the care and maintenance of his or her child\u201d is barred from inheriting any portion of the child\u2019s estate unless the parent meets one of two statutory exceptions. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. Specifically, an abandoning parent may still inherit if (1) \u201cthe abandoning parent resumed its care and maintenance at least one year prior to the death of the child and continued the same until its death,\u201d or (2) \u201c[the] parent has been deprived of the custody of his or her child under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction and the parent has substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(1), (2). Our wrongful death statute mandates that wrongful death proceeds be distributed \u201cas provided in the Intestate Succession Act,\u201d and they are therefore subject to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 28A-18-2(a) (2003); Williford v. Williford, 288 N.C. 506, 508-09, 219 S.E.2d 220, 222 (1975).\nWe first address whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court\u2019s determination that Lunsford wilfully abandoned the care and maintenance of Candice under the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. Because neither party has assigned error to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, our review is limited to Lunsford\u2019s contention that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact do not support its conclusion of law. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a); see also Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C. 301, 309, 582 S.E.2d 247, 252 (2003); State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982).\nFor purposes of the Intestate Succession Act, parental abandonment has been defined as \u201c \u2018wil[l]ful or intentional conduct on the part of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.\u2019 \u201d McKinney, 357 N.C. at 489, 586 S.E.2d at 263 (quoting Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608 (1962)) (alteration in original). If a parent \u201c \u2018withholds his presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and wil[l]fully neglects to lend support and maintenance,\u2019 \u201d such parent is deemed to have relinquished all parental claims and to have abandoned the child. Id. at 489-90, 586 S.E.2d at 263 (alteration in original) (quoting Pratt, 257 N.C. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608). Abandonment has also been defined as \u201c \u2018wil[l]ful neglect and refusal to perform the natural and legal obligations of parental care and support.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 489, 586 S.E.2d at 263 (alteration in original) (quoting Pratt, 257 N.C. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608). \u201cWilful intent is an integral part of abandonment and this is a question of fact to be determined from the evidence.\u201d Pratt, 257 N.C. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608.\nIn the instant case, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusion that Lunsford wilfully abandoned the care and maintenance of Candice under the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. Even assuming that Candice refused to accept Lunsford\u2019s occasional offers of financial assistance, the trial court could reasonably have concluded that Lunsford\u2019s sporadic contacts with his daughter over a seventeen-year period failed to reflect the degree of \u201cpresence,\u201d \u201clove,\u201d \u201ccare,\u201d and \u201copportunity to display filial affection\u201d that defines non-abandoning parents. McKinney, 357 N.C. at 489-90, 586 S.E.2d at 263.\nIn re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 485 S.E.2d 612 (1997), an appeal arising out of an action to terminate parental rights, is relevant to this discussion. In Young, we held that a non-custodial mother who had only limited contact with her child over a period of six months had not abandoned her child. Id. at 251-52, 485 S.E.2d at 616-17. Young, however, is factually and procedurally distinguishable from the instant case.\nFirst, the record in Young indicated that members of the father\u2019s family who were caring for the child during the six-month period at issue had a hostile relationship with the non-custodial mother and that, for at least part of this time, the mother may not have known the location of her child. Id. In addition, the record included testimony regarding the mother\u2019s surgical treatment for breast cancer during the period of alleged abandonment, including testimony that she asked to see the child before her surgery and that the child\u2019s father denied this request. Id. In the present case, by contrast, Lunsford admittedly had only sporadic contacts with Candice over the last seventeen years of her life, as opposed to a mere six months, and the major factors preventing Lunsford from participating more fully in his daughter\u2019s life were his own alcoholism and immaturity.\nMoreover, the issue of abandonment in Young arose not from a dispute over inheritance rights, but in the context of an action to terminate parental rights. Thus, the father\u2019s burden of proof to show that the mother abandoned her child was not the \u201cpreponderance of the evidence\u201d standard applicable in most civil actions, see, e.g., Wyatt v. Queen City Coach Co., 229 N.C. 340, 342, 49 S.E.2d 650, 652 (1948), but the heightened evidentiary standard of \u201cclear, cogent, and convincing evidence,\u201d Young, 346 N.C. at 247, 485 S.E.2d at 614 (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-289.30(d), (e) (1995)). Thus, Young does not control our resolution of the present action.\nIn his brief, Lunsford argues that while the facts found by the trial court may support a conclusion that he provided little towards the maintenance of Candice, they do not support a conclusion that he intended to abandon her care. Because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 mandates that a parent who abandons the \u201ccare and maintenance\u201d of a child loses the right to inherit from that child, Lunsford contends, the abandonment of either \u201ccare\u201d or \u201cmaintenance\u201d alone is insufficient to trigger the statute. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 (emphasis added).\nIn support of his argument, Lunsford cites our decision in McKinney, where we held that a parent must \u201cresume both the \u2018care and maintenance\u2019 of the child\u201d to fall within the first exception to section 31A-2. McKinney, 357 N.C. at 491, 586 S.E.2d at 264 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(1)). Admittedly, McKinney describes the duty of \u201ccare\u201d as pertaining primarily to \u201clove and concern for the child,\u201d and the duty to provide \u201cmaintenance\u201d as referring more specifically to the \u201cfinancial support of a child during minority.\u201d Id. A broader view of our cases, however, suggests that these parental duties are interrelated components of a parent\u2019s overall responsibilities for his or her minor children. See, e.g., Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 76, 484 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1997) (stating that the \u201c \u2018custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents\u2019 \u201d (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 88 L. Ed. 645, 652 (1944))); Pratt, 257 N.C. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608 (referring to the parental duties of \u201clove,\u201d \u201ccare,\u201d \u201caffection,\u201d \u201csupport,\u201d and \u201cmaintenance\u201d); Wells v. Wells, 227 N.C. 614, 618, 44 S.E.2d 31, 34 (1947) (\u201c \u2018[P]arents are, regardless of any statute, under a legal as well as a moral duty to support, maintain, and care for their minor children.\u2019 \u201d (citation omitted)). Thus, we do not read McKinney to suggest that the duties of \u201ccare\u201d and \u201cmaintenance\u201d are distinct and severable for purposes of the definition of abandonment in section 31A-2.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals in Davis v. MacMillan bolsters this conclusion. See Davis v. MacMillan, 148 N.C. App. 248, 558 S.E.2d 210, disc. rev. denied, 355 N.C. 490, 563 S.E.2d 564 (2002). Davis construed N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-40, a statute which prohibits the distribution of workers\u2019 compensation death benefits to \u201ca parent who has willfully abandoned the care and maintenance of his or her child.\u201d Id. at 253, 558 S.E.2d at 214 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-40 (1987)). In Davis, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to receive such benefits even if he had abandoned the \u201ccare\u201d of his minor child prior to the child\u2019s death because he continued to pay child support and thus did not abandon the child\u2019s \u201cmaintenance.\u201d Id. at 252-53, 558 S.E.2d at 213-14. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that \u201cthe words \u2018care and maintenance\u2019 are not to be read separately but instead combined to define a parent\u2019s overall responsibilities.\u201d Id. at 253, 558 S.E.2d at 214. In support of this construction, the Court of Appeals looked to the phrasing of the exception in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-40, which provides that an abandoning parent may receive workers\u2019 compensation benefits if the parent \u201c \u2018resumed [his or her] care and maintenance\u2019 \u201d and continued the same for at least one year until the child\u2019s death or majority. Id. (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-40). The Court of Appeals reasoned that if the abandonment of two independent duties were required to bar a parent from sharing in workers\u2019 compensation death benefits, \u201cthe renewed assumption of either care or maintenance\u201d for a year prior to the child\u2019s death or majority \u201cwould necessarily rehabilitate the parent.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded, the fact that the same \u201ccare and maintenance\u201d language was employed in both parts of the statute demonstrates that \u201cthe words are indivisible, representing a single concept.\u201d Id.\nWe believe this reasoning is persuasive and applicable to the case at bar. The operative language in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 is nearly identical to that in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-40. Both statutes provide that a parent who has abandoned the \u201ccare and maintenance\u201d of a child loses the right to receive a specified benefit upon the child\u2019s death. And both provide an exception when the parent has resumed the \u201ccare and maintenance\u201d of the child at least one year prior to the child\u2019s death or majority. Accordingly, we reject Lunsford\u2019s argument that a parent is not precluded from inheriting under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 if that parent abandons the \u201cmaintenance\u201d but not the \u201ccare\u201d of his or her child.\nLunsford next argues that under the Pratt definition of abandonment, even sporadic and occasional contacts with a child foreclose a determination that a parent possessed \u201ca settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child.\u201d McKinney, 357 N.C. at 489, 586 S.E.2d at 263 (quoting Pratt, 257 N.C. at 501, 126 S.E.2d at 608). According to Lunsford, abandonment requires \u201cthe cessation of meaningful relations, obstinate refusal and outright neglect of legal obligations,\u201d and a parent who has made \u201csome effort\u201d to care or provide for the child cannot be said to have abandoned that child.\nSuch a definition appears nowhere in our case law and overstates the threshold for abandonment as defined in Pratt. Indeed, Pratt expressly held that abandonment requires neither continuous absence nor an utter lack of concern on the part of the abandoning parent. Pratt, 257 N.C. at 503, 126 S.E.2d at 609. As explained in Pratt, a child\u2019s physical and emotional needs are constant, and a parent\u2019s duties to care for and maintain a child cannot be discharged on an ad hoc, intermittent basis. Id. at 502, 126 S.E.2d at 608-09. Thus, the fact that Lunsford and Candice had \u201csome relationship\u201d during lulls in Lunsford\u2019s alcoholism and had formulated plans to develop their relationship does not foreclose a determination of abandonment. Abandonment is not an \u201c \u2018ambulatory thing the legal effects of which a delinquent parent may dissipate at will by the expression of a desire for the return of the discarded child.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 502, 126 S.E.2d at 609 (quoting In re Adoption of Bair, 393 Pa. 296, 307, 141 A.2d 873, 879 (1958) (citation omitted)).\nThus, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact amply support its conclusion that Lunsford wilfully abandoned Candice within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2.\nII.\nWe next address whether Lunsford falls within the second statutory exception to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. This exception applies when an abandoning parent (1) \u201chas been deprived of the custody of his or her child under an order of a court of competent jurisdiction\u201d and (2) \u201chas substantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2).\nIn the instant case, the trial court determined on remand that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) was inapplicable because Lunsford failed to meet the requirements of the second prong of the exception. The trial court found that the 1985 divorce decree \u201cconsidered the issue of child support\u201d but \u201cmade no order whether child support was to be paid by either parent.\u201d Reasoning that Lunsford could not substantially comply with all orders \u201crequiring contribution\u201d to the support of his child because \u201cno order to pay child support was issued,\u201d the trial court concluded that the statutory exception was inapplicable to the instant facts. The Court of Appeals reversed, stating that because the district court \u201cconsidered\u201d the issue of child support, Lunsford \u201ccomplied with the only order in existence addressing the question of child support\u201d and thus fell within the scope of the exception. Lunsford II, 160 N.C. App. at 134, 585 S.E.2d at 251.\nIt is well settled that \u201c[w]here the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning.\u201d Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (1990). Here, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) provides that an abandoning parent may inherit from an abandoned child if the parent has \u201csubstantially complied with all orders of the court requiring contribution to the support of the child.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) (emphasis added). By its express language, therefore, the statutory exception may not be invoked where a court order has not \u201crequirfed]\u201d the payment of child support.\nOur construction of the statute is consistent with the intent of the legislature in enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. The primary rule of statutory construction is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Quick v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 287 N.C. 47, 56, 213 S.E.2d 563, 569 (1975); Buck v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 265 N.C. 285, 290, 144 S.E.2d 34, 37 (1965). In McKinney, this Court examined the common law background and legislative history of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 and concluded that \u201cthe legislative intent behind N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 was both to discourage parents from shirking their responsibility of support to their children and to prevent an abandoning parent from reaping an undeserved bonanza.\u201d McKinney, 357 N.C. at 489, 586 S.E.2d at 263. We also stated that the General Assembly had demonstrated its \u201cunwillingness to allow an abandoning parent to take from an abandoned adult child as the result of a mechanical application of the rules of intestate succession.\u201d Id. at 492, 586 S.E.2d at 265.\nIn analyzing the legislative intent behind the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) exception, the Court of Appeals reached the eminently reasonable conclusion that \u201c[t]he exception essentially states that ... a parent should not be denied the right to participate in intestate succession if he limits his role in his child\u2019s life to the- parameters set out by a court.\u201d Lunsford II, 160 N.C. App. at 133, 585 S.E.2d at 251. We agree, at least when the abandoning parent complies with the express terms of a court order requiring contribution to the support of the child. An exception to the general rule of disinheritance is justified under such circumstances, because the legislative intent underlying section 31A-2 is not effectuated by the disinheritance of a non-custodial parent who provides the court-ordered level of material support. Put simply, a parent who \u201climits his role in his child\u2019s life to the parameters set out by a court\u201d has not \u201cshirk[ed] [his] responsibility\u201d to that child. Thus, our construction of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) effectuates the legislative intent behind that exception.\nWe acknowledge that it would be inequitable to permit a parent who has complied with a child support order to inherit, while disinheriting a parent who has voluntarily supplied the same degree of support. Cf. Wells, 227 N.C. at 618, 44 S.E.2d at 34 (noting that \u201c \u2018parents are, regardless of any statute, under a legal as well as a moral duty to support, maintain, and care for their minor children\u2019 \u201d (citation omitted)). We do not believe, however, that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 would support such an incongruous result. If a parent voluntarily provides adequate \u201ccare and maintenance\u201d for purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2, that parent cannot be said to have abandoned the child in the first instance. As an exception to the general rule of disinheritance, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) comes into play only when a parent has failed to provide care and support of his or her own volition. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the exception provides that a parent should not be penalized for his or her failure to exceed the terms of a judicial child support order. Lunsford II, 160 N.C. App. at 133, 585 S.E.2d at 251. Accordingly, the statute should not be applied to the disadvantage of a parent who voluntarily provides adequate care and support. Such a parent can hardly be deemed in law to have abandoned his or her child.\nApplying these principles to the case at bar, Lunsford is subject. to disinheritance and does not qualify to inherit from his deceased child under the statutory exception. Lunsford did not voluntarily provide Candice with an adequate level of care and support and therefore abandoned the child under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2. Because he did not comply with the terms of a court order requiring support to be paid, Lunsford may not invoke the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) exception.\nIn conclusion, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact provide ample support for its conclusion of law that Lunsford wilfully abandoned Candice under the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2, and neither of the statutory exceptions to section 31A-2 applies to the instant case. Lunsford is not entitled to share in any part of Candice\u2019s estate. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nREVERSED.\nJustice NEWBY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. Subsequent to Lunsford\u2019s first appeal, this Court held in McKinney v. Richitetti that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2 precludes an abandoning parent from inheriting from a child of any age, provided the child was initially abandoned during his or her infancy and neither statutory exception applied to the facts at hand. McKinney v. Richitetti, 357 N.C. 483, 586 S.E.2d 258 (2003).", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Royster and Royster, by Stephen G. Royster and Michael D. Beal, for petitioner-appellant.", "Law Offices of Jonathans. Dills, RA., by Jonathan S. Dills and Daniel B. Anthony, for respondent-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE THE ESTATE OF CANDICE LEIGH LUNSFORD, Deceased\nNo. 362A01-3\n(Filed 7 April 2005)\n1. Intestate Succession\u2014 willful abandonment of child\u2014 findings sufficient\nThe trial court\u2019s findings of fact amply supported its conclusion that a father wilfully abandoned his child within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2, and therefore could not inherit from her estate, where the parents were divorced while the child was an infant, the husband admitted that he had been alcoholic and immature, he seldom visited his daughter (perhaps eleven times from 1982 to 1995, coinciding with Iulls in his alcoholism), he provided less than $100 in support (although the mother refused his offers of more), but he had attended his daughter\u2019s high school graduation shortly before her death and made plans with her to further their relationship. A child\u2019s needs are constant and a parent\u2019s duties cannot be discharged on an intermittent basis. Moreover, \u201ccare and maintenance\u201d as used in the statute represents a single, indivisible concept and the argument that a parent may inherit if he abandons maintenance but not care is rejected.\n2. Intestate Succession\u2014 abandonment of child \u2014 exception for court order \u2014 not applicable\nA divorced father seeking to inherit from his daughter\u2019s estate did not qualify for the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 31A-2(2) exception to the prohibition on inheritance by parents who abandon their children. That exception applies to those who are deprived of custody by court order and who substantially comply with support orders; here, the divorce decree did not order that support be paid and the failure to provide an adequate level of care and support did not result from compliance with that order.\nJustice Newby did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 160 N.C. App. 125, 585 S.E.2d 245 (2003), reversing a judgment entered 16 April 2002 by Judge L. Todd Burke in Superior Court, Surry County. On 5 February 2004, the Supreme Court granted appellant\u2019s petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 September 2004.\nRoyster and Royster, by Stephen G. Royster and Michael D. Beal, for petitioner-appellant.\nLaw Offices of Jonathans. Dills, RA., by Jonathan S. Dills and Daniel B. Anthony, for respondent-appellee." }, "file_name": "0382-01", "first_page_order": 420, "last_page_order": 431 }