{ "id": 3796233, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID FRANKLIN HURT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hurt", "decision_date": "2005-08-19", "docket_number": "No. 192A04", "first_page": "840", "last_page": "846", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "359 N.C. 840" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918253 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796256 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "479 U.S. 314", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6215700 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322-23" }, { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/479/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 U.S. 466", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9413911 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" }, { "page": "490" }, { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/530/0466-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 S.E.2d 96", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "96 N.C. App. 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523269 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "505" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/96/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779755 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "398 S.E.2d 319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Moore, 317 N.C. 275, 279, 345 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1986)" }, { "page": "321" }, { "page": "322", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "322" }, { "page": "323" }, { "page": "323" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2494759 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613-14", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Moore, 317 N.C. 275, 279, 345 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1986)" }, { "page": "612" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "497 S.E.2d 276", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that the meaning of any legislative enactment is controlled by the intent of the legislature and that legislative purpose is to be first ascertained from the plain language of the statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659938 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "\"It is well settled that the meaning of any legislative enactment is controlled by the intent of the legislature and that legislative purpose is to be first ascertained from the plain language of the statute.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 U.S. 296", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5868041 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413-14" }, { "page": "413" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/542/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 51", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "163 N.C. App. 429", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8918253 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/163/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796256 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 485PA04" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633238 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 485PA04" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. 485PA04" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 600, "char_count": 15888, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.671606728248794e-07, "percentile": 0.8909741455969055 }, "sha256": "fc382de9fae8d41ac4870b3660971eb825bd2b1e5f9e878f6de8c3f93e01da76", "simhash": "1:2845675e452784ec", "word_count": 2533 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:11:02.499353+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Justice LAKE and Justice NEWBY join in this concurring and dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID FRANKLIN HURT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRADY, Justice.\nThis matter is before the Court oh (1) the State\u2019s direct appeal of the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating defendant\u2019s sentence and remanding defendant\u2019s case to the trial court for resentencing, and (2) defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief filed in this Court on 25 June 2004, during the pendency of the State\u2019s appeal. Regarding the State\u2019s direct appeal, this Court must determine whether the fact that a criminal \u201cdefendant joined with one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy for robbery of [the] victim\u201d is a proper nonstatutory aggravating factor to be considered during sentencing. Regarding defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief, this Court must determine whether the trial court violated defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial by imposing an aggravated sentence based upon judicial findings of fact.\nWe conclude that the fact that a criminal defendant joined with one other person in the commission of an offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy for robbery of the victim is \u201creasonably related to the purposes of sentencing\u201d set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.12; thus, the fact is a proper nonstatutory aggravating factor and may be considered during sentencing pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(20). However, we further conclude that the trial court committed structural error in imposing an aggravated sentence based upon judicial findings of fact. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand defendant\u2019s case to Caldwell County Superior Court for resentencing consistent with State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425,-S.E.2d-, 2005 N.C. LEXIS 695 (July 1, 2005) (No. 485PA04) and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004).\nBACKGROUND\nOn 26 August 2002 defendant pleaded guilty to the second-degree murder of Howard Nelson Cook in Caldwell County Superior Court. During sentencing, the trial judge found that defendant had a prior record level of III and also found the existence of three aggravating and five mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. Determining that the factors in aggravation outweighed the factors in mitigation, the judge sentenced defendant in the aggravated range of 276 months minimum to 341 months maximum imprisonment.\nIn so doing, the trial judge altered the \u201cFelony Judgment Findings of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors (Structured Sentencing)\u201d worksheet by crossing out part of the section 15A-1340.16(d)(2) aggravating factor listed therein. Specifically, the judge crossed out the words \u201cmore than\u201d in the phrase \u201cmore than one other person.\u201d He also added the words \u201cfor robbery of victim\u201d to the end of the listed aggravator. The resulting aggravating factor, \u201cThe defendant joined with one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy for robbery of victim,\u201d differs significantly from the statutory aggravating factor set forth in section 15A-1340.16(d)(2), which states, \u201cThe defendant joined with more than one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nDefendant appealed his sentence to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing that the above-described aggravating factor found by the trial judge was improper. Defendant contended, and a majority of the Court of Appeals agreed, that because the General Assembly has already determined that increased culpability stems from a defendant\u2019s participation with more than one other person in committing an offense, a defendant\u2019s joint criminal action with one other person is insufficient to support the finding of a nonstatutory aggravating factor pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(20). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals vacated defendant\u2019s sentence and remanded the case for a new sentencing proceeding. State v. Hurt, 163 N.C. App. 429, 435, 594 S.E.2d 51, 56 (2004).\nBecause the fact that defendant united with another individual to accomplish the robbery and murder of Mr. Cook increases his culpability for the crime, we hold that this fact may properly be considered as a nonstatutory aggravating factor which is reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(b)(2). Thus, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, but remand defendant\u2019s case to Caldwell County Superior Court on the alternative ground raised by defendant in his motion for appropriate relief pursuant to Allen, 359 N.C. 425,-S.E.2d-, 2005 N.C. LEXIS 695 and Blakely v. Washington,-U.S.-, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403.\nANALYSIS\nThe Structured Sentencing Act divides aggravating factors into two classes, statutory and nonstatutory. Statutory aggravating factors are enumerated in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(1)-(19). One such statutory aggravating factor set forth in section 15A-1340.16(d)(2) may be proved by evidence that \u201c[t]he defendant joined with more than one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(2) (2003) (emphasis added). The plain language of section 15A-1340.16(d)(2) requires that the defendant have joined with at least two other individuals in the commission of a crime. See State v. Bates, 348 N.C. 29, 34, 497 S.E.2d 276, 279 (1998) (\u201cIt is well settled that the meaning of any legislative enactment is controlled by the intent of the legislature and that legislative purpose is to be first ascertained from the plain language of the statute.\u201d). Here, the factor actually found by the judge provides that defendant joined with one other individual in the murder of Mr. Cook; thus, the factor differs significantly from section 15A-1340.16(d)(2) and cannot properly be classified as a \u201cstatutory\u201d aggravating factor.\nHowever, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(20) permits a fact finder to consider \u201c[a]ny other aggravating factor reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(20) (2003) (emphasis added). Such \u201cother\u201d factors found to be \u201creasonably related to the purposes of sentencing\u201d are commonly known as non-statutory aggravating factors.\nThe \u201cpurposes of sentencing\u201d are explicitly set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.12:\nThe primary purposes of sentencing a person convicted of a crime are to impose a punishment commensurate with the injury the offense has caused, taking into account factors that may diminish or increase the offender\u2019s culpability, to protect the public by restraining offenders; to assist the offender toward rehabilitation and restoration to the community as a lawful citizen; and to provide a general deterrent to criminal behavior.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.12 (2003) (emphasis added). We conclude from section 15A-1340.12 that \u201cfactors that may diminish or increase the offender\u2019s culpability\u201d are \u201creasonably related to the purposes of sentencing\u201d and will support a finding of a nonstatutory aggravating factor under section 15A-1340.16(d)(20).\nIn State v. Manning, this Court held that evidence which would not support a statutory aggravating factor may be sufficient to support a nonstatutory aggravating factor if it is \u201c \u2018reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing.\u2019 \u201d State v. Manning, 327 N.C. 608, 613-14, 398 S.E.2d 319, 322 (1990) (quoting State v. Moore, 317 N.C. 275, 279, 345 S.E.2d 217, 220 (1986)). The sole issue considered by this Court in Manning was \u201cwhether pecuniary gain may be used as a nonstatutory aggravating factor in the absence of any evidence that defendant was hired or paid to commit an offense.\u201d 327 N.C. at 612, 398 S.E.2d at 321. At the outset, the Court noted its prior holdings that \u201c \u2018in order to find [the statutory factor that the offense was committed for hire or pecuniary gain] in aggravation, there must be evidence that the defendant was paid or hired to commit the offense.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 613, 398 S.E.2d at 322 (citation omitted). However, this Court concluded, \u201c[s]ince pecuniary gain as an incentive to commit a crime is reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing, it can be a nonstatutory aggravating factor unless there is something to preclude its use.\u201d Id. at 614, 398 S.E.2d at 322. Accordingly, we reversed the opinion of the Court of Appeals in which that court-had stated: \u201cA trial court should not be allowed to assign in aggravation a factor as nonstatutory where the statute clearly prohibits its use as a statutory aggravating factor.\u201d State v. Manning, 96 N.C. App. 502, 505, 386 S.E.2d 96, 97 (1989), rev\u2019d, 327 N.C. at 615, 398 S.E.2d at 323.\nSimilarly, there is insufficient evidence to support the section 15A-1340.16(d)(2) aggravating factor in the case sub judice. Section 15A-1340.16(d)(2) cannot apply to aggravate a defendant\u2019s sentence unless the State proves that \u201c[t]he defendant joined with more than one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy.\u201d However, we conclude that accomplishment of a robbery and murder by uniting with one other individual is a factor that may \u201cincrease the offender\u2019s culpability\u201d and, therefore, is \u201creasonably related to the purposes of sentencing.\u201d The perpetrator of such a crime is more culpable by reason of his method, in which two aggressors work violence against a single victim. As in Manning, \u201ca sentence greater than the presumptive is warranted for purposes of deterrence as well as protection of the unsuspecting public.\u201d 327 N.C. at 615, 398 S.E.2d at 323. For this reason, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which vacated defendant\u2019s sentence and granted a new sentencing hearing based upon that court\u2019s finding of an improper aggravating factor.\nWe now consider whether the imposition of an aggravated sentence violated defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to jury trial as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403. In Blakely, the Court reaffirmed its previous holding that the right to jury trial requires jurors to find sentencing facts which increase the penalty for a crime \u201cbeyond the prescribed statutory- maximum.\u201d Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 455 (2000); see also Blakely, 542 U.S. at -, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 413-14. The \u201cstatutory maximum\u201d is \u201cthe maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.\u201d Blakely, 542 U.S at-, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 413. Accordingly, \u201c[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed presumptive range must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d Allen, 359 N.C. at 437,-S.E.2d at-, 2005 N.C. LEXIS 695, at *26 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at -, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 412 and Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455). Because defendant\u2019s case was on direct appeal when Blakely was issued, this rule governs the question sub judice. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322-23, 93 L. Ed. 2d 649, 658 (1987).\nHere, the trial court found the existence of three aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) \u201cThe offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel,\u201d (2) \u201cThe defendant joined with one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy for robbery of [the] victim,\u201d and (3) defendant \u201ctook property, to wit, $4.00 by force and placed victim with threats of bodily harm.\u201d Based upon these findings, the trial court sentenced defendant to an aggravated sentence of 276 months minimum and 341 months maximum imprisonment. Because defendant\u2019s sentence exceeds the \u201cstatutory maximum\u201d and the increased penalty is supported only by the judicial findings of fact listed above, defendant\u2019s sentence violates Blakely. In Allen, this Court held that \u201cBlakely errors arising under North Carolina\u2019s Structured Sentencing Act are structural and, therefore, reversible per se.\u201d Allen, 359 N.C. at-, 444 S.E.2d at-, 2005 N.C. LEXIS 695, at *42. Accordingly, we allow defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief.\nFor the reasons stated above, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, but remand this case to Caldwell County Superior Court for resentencing pursuant to Allen, 359 N.C. 425,-S.E.2d -, 2005 N.C. LEXIS 695 and Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403. During resentencing, it is appropriate to consider whether \u201cdefendant joined with one other person in committing the offense and was not charged with committing a conspiracy for robbery of [the] victim\u201d as an aggravating factor.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\n. AOC-CR-605, Rev. 11/97.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRADY, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice MARTIN,\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nI concur in the majority\u2019s holding that the nonstatutory aggravating factor at issue is \u201creasonably related to the purposes of sentencing\u201d and thus valid under North Carolina law. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(20) (2003).\nFor the reasons stated in my separate opinion in State v. Allen, however, I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that Blakely errors are not amenable to harmless-error review. State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 444, 615 S.E.2d 256,-(July 1, 2005) (No. 485PA04) (Martin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Accordingly, I dissent from the majority\u2019s decision to allow defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief without considering whether the instant Blakely violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\nChief Justice LAKE and Justice NEWBY join in this concurring and dissenting opinion.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Justice MARTIN," } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Lisa Bradley Dawson and Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State-appellant.", "Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Barbara S. Blackman, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DAVID FRANKLIN HURT\nNo. 192A04\n(Filed 19 August 2005)\n1. Sentencing\u2014 nonstatutory aggravating factor \u2014 joint criminal action with one other person\nThe Court of Appeals erred in a second-degree murder case by vacating defendant\u2019s sentence based on its determination that a defendant\u2019s joint criminal action with one other person is insufficient to support the finding of a nonstatutory aggravating factor under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.16(d)(20), because: (1) factors that may diminish or increase the offender\u2019s culpability are reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing and will support a finding of a nonstatutory aggravating factor under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A~1340.16(d)(20); and (2) accomplishment of a robbery and murder by uniting with one other individual is a factor that may increase the offender\u2019s culpability and is thus reasonably related to the purposes of sentencing.\n2. Sentencing\u2014 aggravated sentence based upon judicial findings of fact \u2014 Blakely error\nDefendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief in a second-degree murder case is allowed because the' trial court violated defendant\u2019s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in a second-degree murder case by imposing an aggravated sentence based upon judicial findings of aggravating factors, and the case is remanded to superior court for resentencing consistent with State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425 (2005).\nJustice Martin concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nChief Justice Lake and Justice Newby joining in concurring and dissenting opinion.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 163 N.C. App. 429, 594 S.E.2d 51 (2004), reversing a judgment entered 26 August 2002 by Judge Claude S. Sitton in Superior Court, Caldwell County, in which defendant was sentenced to a minimum prison term of 276 months and a maximum term of 341 months. On 25 June 2004, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief. By an order issued 4 March 2005, this Court permitted both parties to submit briefs and make oral argument on the motion for appropriate relief at the same time the direct appeal was heard. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 May 2005.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Lisa Bradley Dawson and Robert C. Montgomery, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State-appellant.\nStaples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Barbara S. Blackman, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0840-01", "first_page_order": 878, "last_page_order": 884 }