{ "id": 3787758, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VINCENT LAMONT HARRIS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Harris", "decision_date": "2005-12-16", "docket_number": "No. 548A04", "first_page": "145", "last_page": "155", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "360 N.C. 145" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "602 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411404 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 U.S. 296", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5868041 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/us/542/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633238 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "266-67", "parenthetical": "holding that the imposition of an aggravated sentence based on factors not found by the jury, other than facts to which a defendant has admitted or a prior conviction, is structural error and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796256 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440-41", "parenthetical": "holding that the imposition of an aggravated sentence based on factors not found by the jury, other than facts to which a defendant has admitted or a prior conviction, is structural error and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352", "parenthetical": "noting that in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support every element of an offense charged, \"we must be guided by the familiar rule that the evidence must be considered in the light favorable to the State\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4761933 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "noting that in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support every element of an offense charged, \"we must be guided by the familiar rule that the evidence must be considered in the light favorable to the State\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S.E.2d 355", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "255 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571320 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/255/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "781" }, { "page": "782", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 370", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4733537 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0370-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "68 N.C. App. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527718 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/68/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 110", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113" }, { "page": "115" }, { "page": "117", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561058 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37" }, { "page": "44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 363", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 733", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518633 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0733-01" ] }, { "cite": "602 S.E.2d 697", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" }, { "page": "703" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" }, { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 N.C. App. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8411404 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396" }, { "page": "393" }, { "page": "393" }, { "page": "393" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/166/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "542 U.S. 296", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5868041 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "holding that the statutory maximum for any offense is the \"maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant\" (emphasis omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/542/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633238 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding Blakely errors are structural errors and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" }, { "page": "274-88", "parenthetical": "Martin, J., Lake, C.J., Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0256-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14", "parenthetical": "Mitchell, J. (later C.J.), concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2552831 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "Mitchell, J. (later C.J.), concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3796256 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding Blakely errors are structural errors and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0425-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 926, "char_count": 24205, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.24897198103447e-08, "percentile": 0.47776878111426574 }, "sha256": "0893762905d7950c9f1e7b7a7385a1ed311edb751a51ffd84a48c23233d2b2a4", "simhash": "1:7e45722960af895e", "word_count": 4039 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:28:24.883894+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Justice LAKE and Justice MARTIN join in this concurring opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VINCENT LAMONT HARRIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Justice.\nThe issues before this Court are whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding (i) that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual encounter, and (ii) that prejudicial error occurred in defendant\u2019s conviction for common law robbery. For the reasons discussed herein, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals on these two issues.\nDefendant Vincent Lamont Harris was indicted on 24 June 2002 for the offenses of first-degree kidnapping, second-degree rape, and common law robbery. Defendant was tried at the 24 February 2003 criminal session of Superior Court, Granville County. The jury acquitted defendant of the first-degree kidnapping charge, but found defendant guilty on the charges of second-degree rape and common law robbery. The trial court found two aggravating factors, namely, that the offenses were especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and that defendant is a predator. Defendant was sentenced to a minimum term of 188 months and a maximum term of 235 months imprisonment for the second-degree rape conviction and to a minimum term of 26 months and a maximum term of 32 months imprisonment for the common law robbery conviction, with the sentences to run consecutively.\nAt trial the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that late on the night of 13 April 2002, the victim, a sixteen-year-old high school student, was approached from behind by defendant as she was walking to a friend\u2019s house in Oxford, North Carolina. Defendant was twenty-eight years old, married, and the father of three children. Defendant walked with his arm around the victim and asked if she smoked marijuana. The victim replied in the negative, indicating that she had quit. Soon afterwards defendant grabbed her by the neck and threw her into an alleyway between a house and a church. Defendant then made her get up, pulled her behind the house, threw her down again, and pulled off her pants and underwear. Defendant forced his penis into the victim\u2019s vagina. When she tried to scream, he put his hand over her mouth and told her to be quiet. Next, defendant turned the victim over and forced his penis into her rectum. The victim screamed, and defendant covered her mouth, again telling her to be quiet. Defendant stood up and ordered the victim to pull up her pants and help him look for his lost cell phone. Then defendant again threw the victim to the ground, pulled her pants down, and forced his penis into her vagina. The victim testified that she could not scream and that defendant told her \u201c[She] better not look at him so [she] wouldn\u2019t be able to identify him with the police.\u201d\nAccording to the State\u2019s evidence, defendant asked the victim if she had any money. When she replied in the negative, defendant forced the victim to give him her six rings and told her that if she told anybody he would come back and kill her. The victim testified that she wore these rings all the time, that the one with her birthstone was a Christmas gift from her mother, and that two of the others were passed down from her grandmother to her mother to her. The victim further testified that defendant directed her to go around the church to leave and that the two left the scene in different directions. The victim continued on to her friend\u2019s house where she spent the night.\nThe next day when the victim returned home, she told her mother what had happened to her; and her mother took her to the police station. After giving her statement to Detective Shelly Chauvaux, the victim was referred to Maria Parham Hospital, where she underwent a rape kit evaluation conducted by nurse Wendy Medlin, Director of the District Nine Sexual Assault Program. At trial nurse Medlin testified as to what the victim had told her concerning the events on the night of 13 April 2002. Nurse Medlin also testified that her examination of the victim revealed that the victim had multiple lacerations, bruising, and tears in her anus and vagina and that her cervix was also \u201cvery bruised and swollen, red.\u201d\nDefendant\u2019s evidence at trial tended to show that he and the victim had consensual, vaginal intercourse on 13 April 2002. Defendant testified that he first met the victim that night around 11:00 p.m. at the Texaco, where they talked and made plans to \u201chook up\u201d later. Defendant did not know the victim; and in this conversation, which lasted approximately seven minutes, the victim told him that her boyfriend was angry with her because she got caught having sex in the woods. As planned, around midnight the two met up again and they walked, talked, and smoked marijuana together. According to defendant they then went behind the church where the victim took off her sweat pants and underwear and willingly had sex with defendant for approximately twenty minutes. Afterwards she gave defendant her rings in exchange for a dime bag of marijuana, having a value of approximately twenty dollars. They then walked away in different directions.\nOn cross-examination of the victim, the trial court did not allow testimony regarding the victim\u2019s sexual activity with her boyfriend earlier on the day of 13 April 2002. As required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(d), the trial court heard in camera testimony by the victim concerning this sexual activity. In the hearing the victim testified that she and her boyfriend had \u201cattempted to\u201d have sex. Regarding this attempted sexual act, the victim stated that she was not hurt in any way and that they did not attempt anal intercourse:\nQ. [Victim], when you attempted to have sex with [your boyfriend], did he hurt you in any way?\nA. No, ma\u2019am\nQ. Did you attempt any anal intercourse? Did you have anal intercourse with [your boyfriend]?\nA. No, ma\u2019am.\nThe court then pressed for clarification on whether there had been any penetration during this earlier sexual encounter:\nThe Court: [T]he boy with whom you tried to have sex earlier that day, did he put his penis into your vagina?\nA. No, not quite.\nThe Court: Not quite. Did he attempt to?\nA. Yes, sir.\nWhen questioned why she did not have sex, the victim responded, \u201cBecause it didn\u2019t \u2014 something told me it wasn\u2019t right. It didn\u2019t feel right. That it \u2014 something told \u2014 I had the gut instinct that it would be wrong and that something bad would happen.\u201d\nApplying the rape shield law, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412, to this testimony, the trial court ruled the evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual activity on 13 April 2002 inadmissable and stated the following:\nUntil I have a version that says that she was somehow just promiscuously wandering around having sex with this, that and the other all the time, I don\u2019t have that there. And even there doesn\u2019t mean necessarily that she consented in this case.\nI think the Rape Shield law is designed to protect women from the shotgun defense that if she would do it with Jack, she\u2019d do it with Jim.... And I think the only time it really becomes pertinent, this prior sexual behavior if defendant testifies that she was raped and up until that time \u2014 well, there is some \u2014 something very significant about the physical activity of some prior event that could have caused the same thing.\nI think here, even if there\u2019s prior sex, the tearing really is a red \u2014 in some way a red herring. It\u2019s not really \u2014 whether it is tearing during consensual or nonconsensual sex, it\u2019s not really directly dispositive of whether there is a consent between her and Mr. Harris, one way or the other.\nOn defendant\u2019s appeal a divided panel of the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded for a new trial. State v. Harris, 166 N.C. App. 386, 602 S.E.2d 697 (2004). The Court of Appeals majority found error in the trial court\u2019s application of the rape shield law and determined that \u201cthe evidence of the prior sexual encounter on the day of the alleged rape should be admitted.\u201d Id. at 393, 602 S.E.2d at 701. The majority reasoned:\nIn this case the evidence is relevant and probative as to whether or not the victim consented to having sex with defendant. Had she consented, then it is within reason that no physical evidence of vaginal injury on the victim was caused by defendant. Thus, if the jury found the lacerations on the vagina (which evidence was used by the State to prove the rape) to have been caused by the attempted sexual encounter earlier that day, they could still harbor reasonable doubt as to whether or not the victim consented to having sex with defendant.\nId. Regarding the conviction for common law robbery, the Court of Appeals majority concluded that the victim\u2019s credibility on the rape issue was essential to \u201call charges stemming from the entire criminal transaction.\u201d Therefore, the common law robbery conviction was also reversed and remanded. Id.\nJudge Levinson dissented in part and concurred in part, finding no error in defendant\u2019s convictions for second-degree rape and common law robbery, but agreeing with the majority\u2019s decision to remand the case for resentencing in light of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). Harris, 166 N.C. App. at 396, 602 S.E.2d at 703. The State gave notice of appeal to this Court based on the dissenting opinion, which deemed the evidence of prior sexual activity properly excluded under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412.\nIn its appeal to this Court, the State contends that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing defendant\u2019s convictions. More specifically, the State argues that evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual activity was properly excluded under Rule 412 of the Rules of Evidence. We agree.\nIn pertinent part, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412 provides:\n(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless such behavior:\n(2) Is evidence of specific instances of sexual .behavior offered for the purpose of showing that the act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(2) (2003).\nThis Court has stated that \u201c[t]he Rape Shield Statute provides that \u2018the sexual behavior of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution\u2019 except in four very narrow situations.\u201d State v. Herring, 322 N.C. 733, 743, 370 S.E.2d 363, 370 (1988). The application of one of these exceptions is the basis for defendant\u2019s argument that a jury should be allowed to hear evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual activity. Although presenting a defense of consent, defendant also argues that a jury could infer that the victim\u2019s injuries were a result of the earlier encounter on 13 April 2002, thereby accounting for the \u201cphysical evidence of the alleged force\u201d which was used to convict him of rape.\nIn construing the prior codification of the rape shield statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-58.6, this Court discussed the evolution of the admissibility of prior sexual conduct evidence and concluded that the statute was a \u201ccodification of this jurisdiction\u2019s rule of relevance as that rule specifically applies to the past sexual behavior of rape victims.\u201d State v. Fortney, 301 N.C. 31, 37, 269 S.E.2d 110, 113 (1980). In dicta the Court acknowledged that the predecessor to the statutory exception at issue here is \u201cclearly intended, inter alia, to allow evidence showing the source of sperm, injuries or pregnancy to be someone or something other than the defendant.\u201d Id. at 41, 269 S.E.2d at 115. In Fortney, as in the present case, defendant asserted consent as a defense. Holding that the evidence of semen stains defendant sought to have admitted was inadmissible, this Court stated:\nSuch evidence is not probative of the victim\u2019s consent to the acts complained of. Indeed, the only inference such evidence raises is that the victim had had sex with two individuals other than the defendant at some time prior to the night of the rape. Without a showing of more, this is precisely the kind of evidence the statute was designed to keep out because it is irrelevant and tends to prejudice the jury, while causing social harm by discouraging rape victims from reporting and prosecuting the crime.\nNaked inferences of prior sexual activity by a rape victim with third persons, without more, are irrelevant to the defense of consent in a rape trial.\nId. at 43-44, 269 S.E.2d at 117 (footnote omitted).\nThe Court of Appeals distinguished Fortney from the instant case on the basis that \u201cthe sexual activity sought to be admitted before the jury relates to a sexual encounter by the victim on the day of the alleged rape.\u201d Harris, 166 N.C. App. at 393, 602 S.E.2d at 701. Acknowledging that \u201cevidence of intercourse on the same day is clearly not always admissible[,]\u201d id. (citing State v. Rhinehart, 68 N.C. App. 615, 316 S.E.2d 118 (1984)), the Court of Appeals nonetheless concluded that the evidence was \u201crelevant and probative as to whether or not the victim consented to having sex with defendant.\u201d Id. Before this Court, defendant urges that the dicta in Fortney interpreting the statute is applicable. We do not agree.\nSimilarly, defendant\u2019s reliance on State v. Ollis, 318 N.C. 370, 348 S.E.2d 777 (1986), is misplaced. In Ollis, the victim testified in camera that on the same day the defendant raped her, another man had \u201c \u2018done the samething [sic].\u2019 \u201d Ollis, 318 N.C. at 376, 348 S.E.2d at 781. Arguing that the evidence was admissible under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412(b)(2), the defendant sought to question the victim concerning the sexual acts of this other man; but the trial court concluded the evidence was irrelevant and excluded it. Id.\nOn appeal this Court agreed with the defendant that the evidence should have been admitted. At trial, the medical doctor who examined the victim testified that the victim \u201cdid receive or has been the object of inappropriate physical and sexual abuse.\u201d Ollis, 318 N.C. at 375, 348 S.E.2d at 781. Accordingly, evidence regarding the sexual acts of another man, if admitted, \u201cwould have provided an alternative explanation for the medical evidence presented . . . and falls within exception (b)(2) of Rule 412.\u201d Id. at 376, 348 S.E.2d at 781. We further-stated that\nwe are not able to say that the jury would not have had a reasonable doubt about the defendant\u2019s guilt if they had known that the only physical evidence corroborating the victim\u2019s testimony of rape was possibly attributable to the acts of a man other than the defendant. We find that exclusion of that evidence was prejudicial to the defendant in presenting his defense to the charge of rape.\nId. at 377, 348 S.E.2d at 782 (citation omitted).\nOllis, however, is distinguishable from the present case in significant ways; namely, in Ollis: (i) evidence of the other sexual activity that this Court ruled should be admitted, as described by the victim, involved completed sexual intercourse; (ii) the other sexual activity occurred immediately after the alleged rape by defendant; (iii) the sexual activity with the other man was not consensual; and, finally, (iv) the defendant denied any sexual activity with the alleged victim and, therefore, did not rely on consent as a defense.\nIn the present case, defendant\u2019s arguments for admission of the excluded evidence must fail. Defendant admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the victim but asserted that the victim consented. Hence, the critical question, as the trial court noted, was not who inflicted the injuries; but rather, did the victim consent to having sexual intercourse with defendant? The Court of Appeals majority reasoned that had the jury known that a possibility existed that the victim\u2019s boyfriend inflicted the injuries, then the jury could have had a reasonable doubt as to whether the victim consented to sexual relations with defendant. Harris, 166 N.C. App. at 393, 602 S.E.2d at 701. However, based on the evidence presented during the in camera hearing and before the jury, this analysis would have required the jury to engage in pure speculation and conjecture.\nNo evidence proffered at the in camera hearing supports an inference that the victim\u2019s prior sexual activity was forced or caused any injuries. The victim\u2019s testimony was unequivocal that her boyfriend did not penetrate her during the previous consensual attempt at sexual intercourse. Moreover, nurse Medlin, who was qualified as an expert in the field of forensic sexual assault nursing, testified that injury to the cervix was not common during consensual sex. Nurse Medlin also opined that the injuries she observed on the vietim, internally and externally, \u201cwere consistent with those of others who have complained of sexual assault[,]\u201d and she stated that \u201ctypically in a consensual act you would only have one injury to one location of the body. [This victim] had multiple injuries to numerous places in the vaginal and anal area.\u201d\nIn this case, where consent is the defense, evidence of the prior sexual activity is precisely the type evidence the rape shield statute is intended to proscribe. The victim described an earlier sexual encounter that was consensual and was unlikely to have produced the type and number of injuries the expert testimony verified that she suffered. On this record, given the purpose of the rape shield statute, we hold that evidence of the victim\u2019s consensual attempt at sexual intercourse with her boyfriend is not probative on the issue of whether she consented to sexual activity with defendant, and the trial court properly excluded it pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412. See Fortney, 301 N.C. at 44, 269 S.E.2d at 117. Moreover, even assuming that the excluded evidence was probative, we conclude that the probative value, if any, to defendant was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the State and the prosecuting witness. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2003). Therefore, on the issue of second-degree rape, we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nThe State also argues that the Court of Appeals majority erred in holding that defendant\u2019s conviction for common law robbery should be reversed on the basis that \u201cthe victim\u2019s credibility after cross-examination as to her prior sexual encounter is essential to support all charges stemming from the entire criminal transaction.\u201d Harris, 166 N-C. App. at 393, 602 S.E.2d at 701. Having determined that the evidence of prior sexual activity was properly excluded, we agree with the State. Common law robbery is \u201cthe felonious taking of money or goods of any value from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear.\u201d State v. Stewart, 255 N.C. 571, 572, 122 S.E.2d 355, 356 (1961). In the present case the evidence tended to show that after forcing the victim behind a building and raping her twice, defendant took six rings from her and threatened to kill her if she told anyone. Viewed in the light most favorable to the State, this evidence is sufficient to support the conviction for common law robbery. See, e.g., State v. Jerrett, 309 N.C. 239, 263, 307 S.E.2d 339, 352 (1983) (noting that in determining whether there is sufficient evidence to support every element of an offense charged, \u201cwe must be guided by the familiar rule that the evidence must be considered in the light favorable to the State\u201d). Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals decision reversing defendant\u2019s conviction for common law robbery.\nFinally, although this issue was not briefed to this Court, we affirm the Court of Appeals holding that the case must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the basis of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at \u2014, 159 L. Ed. 2d at 413 (holding that the statutory maximum for any offense is the \u201cmaximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant\u201d (emphasis omitted)) and State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 440-41, 444 & n.5, 615 S.E.2d 256, 266-67, 269 & n.5 (2005) (holding that the imposition of an aggravated sentence based on factors not found by the jury, other than facts to which a defendant has admitted or a prior conviction, is structural error and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals as to defendant\u2019s convictions for second-degree rape and common law robbery is reversed, and the decision of that court as to the remand for resentencing is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice NEWBY,\nconcurring.\nI agree with this Court\u2019s resolution of the rape shield issue presented by the case sub judice. Furthermore, I acknowledge that State v. Allen, 359 N.C. 425, 615 S.E.2d 256 (2005) (holding Blakely errors are structural errors and not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt), required the majority to affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand for resentencing. I joined the opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part from Allen, and I continue to believe the reasoning of the concurring and dissenting opinion was correct. Id. at 452-73, 615 S.E.2d at 274-88 (Martin, J., Lake, C.J., Newby, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing Blakely errors are subject to harmless error analysis). However, the doctrine of stare decisis, which compels courts to honor binding precedent absent extraordinary circumstances, demands that I now accept Allen as authoritative and concur in the decision of the majority in the instant case. State v. Camacho, 337 N.C. 224, 235, 446 S.E.2d 8,14 (1994) (Mitchell, J. (later C.J.), concurring).\nChief Justice LAKE and Justice MARTIN join in this concurring opinion.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Justice NEWBY," } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by David L. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Thomas R. Sallenger for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. VINCENT LAMONT HARRIS\nNo. 548A04\n(Filed 16 December 2005)\n1. Rape\u2014 rape shield statute \u2014 prior sexual encounter on same day\nThe trial court did not err in a second-degree rape case by excluding evidence of the victim\u2019s prior sexual encounter with her boyfriend earlier on the same day as the alleged rape even though defendant presented a defense of consent, and defendant\u2019s conviction for second-degree rape is reinstated because: (1) no evidence proffered at the in camera hearing supported an inference that the victim\u2019s prior sexual activity was forced or caused any injuries; (2) where consent is the defense, evidence of the prior sexual activity is precisely the type of evidence the rape shield statute under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 412 is intended to proscribe when in the instant case the victim described an earlier sexual encounter that was consensual and was unlikely to have produced the type and number of injuries the expert testimony verified that she suffered; (3) given the purpose of the rape shield statute, evidence of the victim\u2019s consensual attempt at sexual intercourse with her boyfriend is not probative on the issue of whether she consented to sexual activity with defendant; and (4) even assuming that the excluded evidence was probative, it was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the State and the prosecuting witness.\n2. Robbery\u2014 common law \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe Court of Appeals erred in a second-degree rape and common law robbery case by holding that defendant\u2019s conviction for common law robbery should be reversed on the basis that the victim\u2019s credibility after cross-examination as to her prior sexual encounter is essential to support all charges stemming from the entire criminal transaction, because: (1) the evidence of prior sexual activity was properly excluded; and (2) viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction for common law robbery.\n3. Sentencing\u2014 resentencing \u2014 aggravated sentence \u2014 Blakely\nThe Court of Appeals holding that a second-degree rape and common law robbery case must be remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the basis of Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), is affirmed.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 166 N.C. App. 386, 602 S.E.2d 697 (2004), reversing judgments entered on 27 February 2003 by Abraham Penn Jones in Superior Court, Granville County and granting defendant a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 March 2005.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by David L. Elliott, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nThomas R. Sallenger for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0145-01", "first_page_order": 217, "last_page_order": 227 }