{ "id": 3787905, "name": "IN RE ADOPTION OF BABY GIRL ANDERSON", "name_abbreviation": "In re Adoption of Anderson", "decision_date": "2006-01-27", "docket_number": "No. 448PA04", "first_page": "271", "last_page": "279", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "360 N.C. 271" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8997903 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138551 ], "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0188-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4764743 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "n.1" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 13, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "191" }, { "page": "145" }, { "page": "197" }, { "page": "148-49" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "emphases added" }, { "page": "196" }, { "page": "149", "parenthetical": "\"The interests of the child and all other parties are best served by an objective test that requires . . . tangible support.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "598 S.E.2d 638", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "165 N.C. App. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8997903 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/165/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 188", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138551 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" }, { "page": "198" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0188-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 844, "char_count": 19509, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.236544124604714e-07, "percentile": 0.7796406276968271 }, "sha256": "194b570dffd9b2c5aa6f34063285335e467ab14bc8edbb6e4d2afb3be7ab43dd", "simhash": "1:0b0cb64a84bc3210", "word_count": 3059 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:28:24.883894+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "IN RE ADOPTION OF BABY GIRL ANDERSON" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nThe issue is whether the consent of respondent Michael Avery must be obtained before petitioners\u2019 adoption of his biological daughter may proceed. Because respondent merely offered support but did not provide the actual financial support mandated under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601, we hold his consent to the adoption is not required.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn autumn of 2001, Kristine Anderson and respondent began a monogamous relationship while enrolled at Onslow County\u2019s Northside High School. Anderson conceived respondent\u2019s child sometime in the spring of 2002 and confirmed her pregnancy in June or July. During July or August of 2002, Anderson informed respondent of her plan to place the baby for adoption. Although respondent initially agreed to this course of action, he withdrew his consent after discussing the matter with his mother. On 18 September 2002, respondent quit high school. Anderson subsequently gave birth to N.A. on 6 January 2003.\nOn 9 or 10 January 2003, respondent received notice of petitioners\u2019 petition to adopt N.A. On 10 January 2003, petitioners filed a motion asking the Wake County Clerk of Court to determine whether respondent\u2019s consent to the adoption was necessary under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601 (permitting adoptions to proceed without the consent of putative fathers who fail to meet its requirements). Petitioners submitted an affidavit from Anderson, who asserted she and respondent were unwed and that respondent had never provided \u201cfinancial or in-kind assistance\u201d to her or their child. Respondent timely filed an opposition to the proposed adoption. In an order dated 27 January 2003, the Clerk of Court decided the adoption could proceed without respondent\u2019s consent. Respondent thereafter filed a notice of appeal to the district court for review de novo.\nDuring its 17 February 2003 session, the district court conducted a hearing on the matter. Most of the evidence concerned whether respondent had complied with the support prong of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601, which directs putative fathers who desire a role in the adoption process to provide, \u201cin accordance with [their] financial means, reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the biological mother during or after the term of pregnancy.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) (2005). The evidence showed respondent had an employment history going back to 1999, with stints at Food Lion, Little Caesars, and Citgo. At the time of hearing, respondent worked for the International House of Pancakes. Respondent lived with his parents while Anderson was pregnant and paid nothing for rent, utilities, food, or clothing. Following testimony from Anderson, respondent, respondent\u2019s sister, and four of respondent\u2019s former classmates, the trial court entered the below findings of fact concerning respondent\u2019s efforts to furnish support to Anderson during her pregnancy:\n15. The Respondent acknowledges that he never provided any actual financial support to Ms. Anderson; however, he and four high school students testified that he offered her money at school during . . . September, October, and November of 2002 but that she rejected his offers. The [testimony of] witnesses at trial . . . ranged from offers of support having been made between \u201cthree or four times\u201d up to \u201csix to eight times.\u201d The Respondent testified that he offered her money six to seven times at school. Ms. Anderson testified that he never offered her money at school. All the testimony regarding offers made at school is not consistent with the Respondent\u2019s] having dropped out on September 18, 2002.\n16. Considering the school calendar, the attendance records of the student witnesses and the Respondent, and the Respondent\u2019s withdrawal from school on September 18, 2002, it is unlikely that the Respondent made as many as six to eight offers at school. The Respondent may have offered Ms. Anderson cash at school on more than one occasion; however,... he failed to ever provide Ms. Anderson with any tangible or actual support.\n17. Some time during the late summer of 2002, prior to September 22, 2002, the Respondent\u2019s mother told Ms. Anderson that she would be welcome to come stay with the Respondent\u2019s family . . . ; however, Ms. Anderson did not accept that offer. . . .\n18. On September 22, 2002, the Respondent, Ms. Anderson, and their parents conducted a \u201cfamily meeting\u201d to discuss the pregnancy. At no time during this meeting did the Respondent or his parents make any offers to provide financial support to Ms. Anderson or the baby.\n19. During the term of the pregnancy, the Respondent had the ability to provide financial support or other tangible support to Ms. Anderson; however, he failed to do so. The Respondent did manage to purchase a car in the amount of $1,000 for himself during the fall of 2002.\n20. The Respondent did make some effort to provide support to Ms. Anderson. In December of 2002, the Respondent and his sister drove to the Andersons\u2019 residence. The Respondent went to the front door and attempted to hand deliver an envelope containing a letter and a check in the amount of $100.00. Ms. Anderson\u2019s father answered the door and refused to accept the envelope. The Respondent offered no documentary evidence of the check or letter at trial.\n21. On December 22, 2002, the Respondent\u2019s attorney sent a letter to Ms. Anderson in which the Respondent acknowledged paternity, offered financial assistance to Ms. Anderson and the baby, and gave notice that he was not willing to consent to the adoption... .\n(Emphasis added.)\nBased on its findings of fact, the trial court concluded respondent\u2019s consent to adoption was not required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601 since respondent had \u201cfail[ed] to provide actual support to Ms. Anderson or the baby.\u201d The court cited In re Adoption of Byrd, 354 N.C. 188, 552 S.E.2d 142 (2001) as controlling precedent. According to the trial court, Byrd holds \u201cthat [mere] offers of support by [the putative father] or by third parties are not sufficient.\u201d The court dismissed respondent\u2019s opposition with prejudice.\nThe Court of Appeals reversed. In re Adoption of Anderson, 165 N.C. App. 413, 598 S.E.2d 638 (2004). In so doing, the court distinguished between the \u201coffers\u201d of support at issue in Byrd and respondent\u2019s \u201ctenders\u201d of support to Anderson. Id. at 419 n.1, 598 S.E.2d 642 n.1 (\u201cWe use the word \u2018tender\u2019 . . . with great deliberateness. The[] tenders [by respondent] are distinguishable from . . . the alleged \u2018offers\u2019 made in [Byrd].\"'). In the opinion of the Court of Appeals, while the offers of the Byrd putative father fell short of \u201ctangible support,\u201d the alleged tenders of respondent \u201ccould meet Byrd\u2019s requirement of tangible support.\u201d Id. at 417, 598 S.E.2d at 641.\nUnlike Byrd, all of [respondent\u2019s] attempts to impart support were made before N.A. was born. . . . [Assuming at least some money was tendered at school, [respondent] provided tangible money and a tangible document expressing a willingness to provide assistance. These provisions were made directly to Ms. Anderson. We hold this falls within the contemplation of Byrd and the statute as requiring the putative father to \u201cprovide []\u201d payments of support. . . . [Respondent] sufficiently tendered support in tangible form such that it had to be directly rebuffed. .. .\nId. at 419-20, 598 S.E.2d at 642 (citations omitted). The Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court for additional findings of fact regarding respondent\u2019s alleged schoolhouse tenders and a fresh determination of whether respondent\u2019s tenders constituted reasonable and consistent payments in fulfillment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601. Id. at 421, 598 S.E.2d at 643. We allowed petitioners\u2019 petition for discretionary review.\nII. ANALYSIS\nPetitioners argue the Court of Appeals\u2019 distinction between tenders and offers conflicts with this Court\u2019s decision in Byrd. Petitioners contend respondent never provided the actual, tangible support Byrd requires. Respondent maintains he proffered tangible support to Anderson in compliance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601 and Byrd. Holding to the contrary, respondent warns, would permit mothers to thwart the rights of putative fathers simply by declining to accept support.\nChapter 48 of our General Statutes governs adoption procedures in North Carolina. In enacting the Chapter, the General Assembly recognized the public interest in \u201cestablish[ing] a clear judicial process for adoptions, . . . promoting] the integrity and finality of adoptions, [and] structuring] services to adopted children, biological parents, and adoptive parents that will provide for the needs and protect the interests of all parties to an adoption, particularly adopted minors.\u201d N.C.G.S. 48-l-100(a) (2005). Section 48-3-601 makes mandatory the consent of certain individuals before a trial court may grant an adoption petition. These individuals include the minor himself whenever he is twelve or more years of age, as well as the mother of the minor and the mother\u2019s husband at the time of the minor\u2019s birth. Id. The consent of an unwed putative father in circumstances such as those of the instant case is not obligatory unless he has assumed some of the burdens of parenthood. Specifically, the putative father has rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601 if he:\n4. Before . . . the filing of the [adoption] petition . . . acknowledge [s] his paternity of the minor and\nII. [P]rovide[s], in accordance with his financial means, reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the biological mother during or after the term of pregnancy, or the support of the minor, or both, which may include the payment of medical expenses, living expenses, or other tangible means of support, and has regularly visited or communicated, or attempted to visit or communicate with the biological mother during or after the term of pregnancy, or with the minor, or with both....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601 (2)(b)(4)(II) (emphasis added).\nOur Court construed N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) (\u201cthe subsection\u201d) in Byrd. There the paternal grandmother offered O\u2019Donnell, the expectant mother, a place to live and help with medical bills and other costs, all of which O\u2019Donnell declined. 354 N.C. at 190, 552 S.E.2d at 144. On the day O\u2019Donnell gave birth, the putative father purchased a $100 money order for her; however, the money order did not reach O\u2019Donnell until after the petitioners had filed for adoption. Id. at 191, 552 S.E.2d at 145. Holding the adoption could proceed without the father\u2019s consent, the Court opined that \u201cattempts or offers of support, made by the putative father or another on his behalf, are not sufficient for purposes of the statute;\u201d it further observed that the money order \u201carrived too late, as the statute . . . provides for the relevant time period to end at the filing of the adoption petition.\u201d Id. at 197, 552 S.E.2d at 148-49. In arriving at the outcome of Byrd, the Court explained what the subsection demands of putative fathers:\n[The putative father] must have satisfied . . . three prerequisites . . . prior to the filing of the adoption petition, in order for his consent to be required. [He] must have acknowledged paternity, made reasonable and consistent support payments for the mother or child or both in accordance with his financial means, and regularly communicated or attempted to communicate with the mother and child. Under the mandate of the statute, a putative father\u2019s failure to satisfy any of these requirements before the filing of the adoption petition would render his consent to the adoption unnecessary.\nId. at 194, 552 S.E.2d at 146 (emphases added).\nIn the case sub judice, respondent\u2019s acknowledgment of paternity and communication with Anderson are not at issue. The sole dispute before us is whether respondent \u201cmade reasonable and consistent support payments ... in accordance with his financial means.\u201d Id. If he did not, then petitioners may adopt N.A. without his consent. Id.\nAfter careful consideration, we deem the Court of Appeals\u2019 distinction between offers and tenders unconvincing. A tender in this context is nothing more than \u201c[a] valid or sufficient offer of performance.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1507 (8th ed. 2004) (emphasis added). Thus, the analysis of the Court of Appeals begs the question of whether mere offers can satisfy the subsection\u2019s support prong. This Court addressed precisely that question in Byrd:\nThe \u201csupport\u201d required under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) is not specifically defined. We believe, however, that \u201csupport\u201d is best understood within the context of the statute as actual, real and tangible support, and that attempts or offers of support do not suffice. Statutory language supports this conclusion. While \u201cattempted\u201d communication [with mother and child] satisfies the statute, there is no such language used to describe the support requirement. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II). Presumably, the General Assembly intended a different meaning for the support prong of the test because of the differing language \u2014 one that excludes attempt to provide support. The statute also states that support may include \u201cthe payment of medical expenses, living expenses, or other tangible means of support,\" thus reflecting actual support provided. Id.\nId. at 196, 552 S:E.2d at 148 (first emphasis added).\nWe see no reason to modify Byrd\u2019s bright-line rule. The rule comports with the language of the subsection and reflects the importance of \u201ca clear judicial process for adoptions.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-1-100(a). See also Byrd, 354 N.C. at 198, 552 S.E.2d at 149 (\u201cThe interests of the child and all other parties are best served by an objective test that requires . . . tangible support.\u201d) The Court of Appeals\u2019 offer/tender approach represents a departure from Byrd, and we reject it.\nHaving reaffirmed that mere offers of support are insufficient under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II), we next determine whether the record permits a conclusion concerning respondent\u2019s compliance with the subsection\u2019s support prong. Our examination of the record shows the trial court relied on an abundance of competent evidence when making its findings of fact (something no party challenges), and consequently, those findings are binding on appeal. Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Fayetteville, 309 N.C. 726, 741, 309 S.E.2d 209, 219 (1983). Quoted above, the court\u2019s findings indicate respondent could have provided support for Anderson during her pregnancy, but instead spent $1,000 on an automobile for himself. According to his own testimony, respondent made approximately $240 per week in the fall of 2002 and had practically no expenses apart from the $100 he paid each month for automobile insurance. In other words, despite possessing adequate wherewithal, respondent \u201cnever provided any actual financial [payments] to Ms. Anderson,\u201d much less the reasonable and consistent payments required under the subsection.\nThe trial court did find that respondent offered Anderson support on several occasions towards the end of her pregnancy. In December of 2002, respondent went to the Anderson residence in an unsuccessful effort to deliver an envelope containing a check for $100; he likewise had his attorney send Anderson a letter declaring his willingness to furnish financial assistance to her and the baby. Additionally, respondent \u201cmay have\u201d offered Anderson cash at schqol more than once during the fall of 2002. Though the Court of Appeals characterized the envelope and the letter as \u201ctangible provisions of support,\u201d we hold that respondent\u2019s offers complied with neither the text of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601 nor Byrd\u2019s interpretation of the same.\nNotwithstanding respondent\u2019s arguments to the contrary, our resolution of the instant case does not grant biological mothers the power to thwart the rights of putative fathers. The subsection obliges putative fathers to demonstrate parental responsibility with reasonable and consistent payments \u201cfor the support of the biological mother.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(II) (emphasis added). The legislature\u2019s deliberate use of \u201cfor\u201d rather than \u201cto\u201d suggests the payments contemplated by the subsection need not always go directly to the mother. So long as the father makes reasonable and consistent payments for the support of mother or child, the mother\u2019s refusal to accept assistance cannot defeat his paternal interest. Here, respondent could have supplied the requisite support any number of ways, such as opening a bank account or establishing a trust fund for the benefit of Anderson or their child. Had he done so, Anderson\u2019s intransigence would not have prevented him from creating a payment record through regular deposits into the account or trust fund in accordance with his financial resources. By doing nothing more than sporadically offering support to Anderson, respondent left the support prong of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601 unsatisfied and himself without standing to obstruct the adoption of N.A.\nIII. DISPOSITION\nPursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601, respondent\u2019s consent to petitioners\u2019 adoption of N.A. is not required. We therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and instruct that court to reinstate the judgment of the trial court. Respondent\u2019s conditional petition for discretionary review is dismissed as improvidently allowed.\nREVERSED; DISCRETIONARY REVIEW IMPROVIDENTLY ALLOWED IN PART.\n. Section 48-9-104 of the General Statutes protects petitioners\u2019 identities from disclosure. Petitioners have had physical custody of N.A. since on or about 14 January 2003.\n. Section 48-3-601 also requires the consent of a putative father in other situations. For example, a putative father acquires the right to consent if he timely acknowledges paternity and either (1) \u201c[i]s obligated to support the minor under written agreement or by court order\u201d or (2) \u201c[a]fter the minor\u2019s birth but before the minor\u2019s placement for adoption or the mother\u2019s relinquishment, has married or attempted to marry the mother of the minor by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601(2)(b)(4)(I)&(III) (2005).", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Herring, McBennett, Mills & Finkelstein, P.L.L.C., by Bobby D. Mills, E. Parker Herring, and Stephen W. Petersen, for petitioner-appellants/appellees.", "Manning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for respondent-appellee/appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE ADOPTION OF BABY GIRL ANDERSON\nNo. 448PA04\n(Filed 27 January 2006)\nAdoption\u2014 father\u2019s consent \u2014 not required \u2014 support offered but not accepted\nRespondent\u2019s consent to adoption of his biological daughter was not required because his attempts to offer financial support were rejected by the mother. The bright line rule of In re Adoption of Byrd, 354 N.C. 188, is not modified; attempts or offers of support will not suffice. However, the mother\u2019s refusal to accept assistance cannot defeat the father\u2019s paternal interest as long as the father makes reasonable and consistent payments for the support of the child, such as to a bank account or trust fund. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-601.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 165 N.C. App. 413, 598 S.E.2d 638 (2004), reversing and remanding an order entered on 7 March 2003 by Judge Alice C. Stubbs in District Court, Wake County. On 3 March 2005, the Supreme Court allowed respondent\u2019s conditional petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 November 2005.\nHerring, McBennett, Mills & Finkelstein, P.L.L.C., by Bobby D. Mills, E. Parker Herring, and Stephen W. Petersen, for petitioner-appellants/appellees.\nManning, Fulton & Skinner, P.A., by Michael S. Harrell, for respondent-appellee/appellant." }, "file_name": "0271-01", "first_page_order": 343, "last_page_order": 351 }