{ "id": 3791894, "name": "KATHLYN MARIE STEIN and MICHAEL HOOTSTEIN v. ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, COOPERATIVE LEARNING CENTER (a/k/a WOLFE CREEK SCHOOL, now BUNCOMBE COMMUNITY SCHOOL WEST, at the time administered jointly by BLUE RIDGE HUMAN SERVICES FACILITIES, INC. and/or BLUE RIDGE MENTAL HEALTH and/or ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION and/or BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION), BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, BLUE RIDGE CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH, and BLUE RIDGE AREA AUTHORITY", "name_abbreviation": "Stein v. Asheville City Board of Education", "decision_date": "2006-03-03", "docket_number": "No. 128A05", "first_page": "321", "last_page": "332", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "360 N.C. 321" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8469183 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 770", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "772" }, { "page": "773", "parenthetical": "\"[O]ur general rule of law . . . declines to impose civil liability upon landowners for criminal acts committed by third persons.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136", "parenthetical": "defining a legal duty as \" ' \"an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another\" ' \"" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "134" }, { "page": "137", "parenthetical": "holding no duty when plaintiff failed to present evidence showing \"defendant commercial vendors should have recognized that [plaintiff], or anyone similarly situated[,] might be injured by their conduct\"" }, { "page": "206" }, { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571637 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204", "parenthetical": "defining a legal duty as \" ' \"an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another\" ' \"" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" }, { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. App. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523965 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534562, 2535915, 2539181, 2537523, 2539385 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0316-04", "/nc/336/0316-01", "/nc/336/0316-05", "/nc/336/0316-02", "/nc/336/0316-03" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 771", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8522145 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 313", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319", "parenthetical": "\"The element of foreseeability is a requisite of proximate cause.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9439355 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10", "parenthetical": "\"The element of foreseeability is a requisite of proximate cause.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment for the employer of a work release inmate who was not on the job when he broke into plaintiff's house and raped plaintiff" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12167953 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "affirming summary judgment for the employer of a work release inmate who was not on the job when he broke into plaintiff's house and raped plaintiff" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 S.E.2d 657", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "227 N.C. 572", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8626495 ], "year": 1947, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/227/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "38", "parenthetical": "Store owners are ordinarily \"not liable for injuries to [their] invitees which result from the intentional, criminal acts of third persons.\"" }, { "page": "38" }, { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "holding plaintiff stated a claim when she alleged she was on defendant store owner's premises during business hours to transact business and there sustained injuries from reasonably foreseeable and preventable criminal acts of a third person" }, { "page": "38" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 636", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575062 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638", "parenthetical": "Store owners are ordinarily \"not liable for injuries to [their] invitees which result from the intentional, criminal acts of third persons.\"" }, { "page": "638" }, { "page": "640" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0636-01" ] }, { "cite": "295 S.E.2d 436", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 13, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is a well-established doctrine that the mere fact of parenthood does not make individuals liable for the wrongful acts of their unemancipated minor children.\"" }, { "page": "439-40" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "438" }, { "page": "439" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "441-43" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "443" }, { "page": "442" }, { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 618", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573268 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622", "parenthetical": "\"[I]t is a well-established doctrine that the mere fact of parenthood does not make individuals liable for the wrongful acts of their unemancipated minor children.\"" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "624" }, { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571622 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867686 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163" }, { "page": "165" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 N.E. 99", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99-100" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "248 N.Y. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.", "case_ids": [ 1905144 ], "year": 1928, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "342-44" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny/248/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "96 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "245 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8609392 ], "year": 1957, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/245/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 174", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 299", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2504877 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" }, { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0299-01" ] }, { "cite": "439 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531613 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "88 S.E.2d 333", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614735 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "341" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "151 S.E.2d 38", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563439 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "521" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/268/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220182 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86-89" }, { "page": "91", "parenthetical": "Tyson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "92" }, { "page": "90-91", "parenthetical": "Tyson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "Tyson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "83-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8469183 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260" }, { "page": "262" }, { "page": "246-251" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0243-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1228, "char_count": 29556, "ocr_confidence": 0.741, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.163528262022207e-07, "percentile": 0.9564789298526671 }, "sha256": "1df806c167c293b2b09c6977efb0bb621ca9270acc784217f756f3049a287300", "simhash": "1:3aa1b0a92627a95e", "word_count": 4709 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:28:24.883894+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Timmons-Goodson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "KATHLYN MARIE STEIN and MICHAEL HOOTSTEIN v. ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, COOPERATIVE LEARNING CENTER (a/k/a WOLFE CREEK SCHOOL, now BUNCOMBE COMMUNITY SCHOOL WEST, at the time administered jointly by BLUE RIDGE HUMAN SERVICES FACILITIES, INC. and/or BLUE RIDGE MENTAL HEALTH and/or ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION and/or BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION), BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, BLUE RIDGE CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH, and BLUE RIDGE AREA AUTHORITY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nThe issue is whether plaintiffs have stated a claim for negligence against defendant Blue Ridge Area Authority (\u201cdefendant\u201d) for damages resulting from the off-campus shooting of plaintiff Stein by students who attended defendant\u2019s school. We hold plaintiffs have not stated a valid claim, and we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPlaintiff Kathlyn Marie Stein (\u201cStein\u201d) and husband plaintiff Michael Hootstein filed suit against defendant alleging the following facts. Defendant is a political subdivision of the State, organized under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-101 through -200, that has waived sovereign immunity through the purchase of liability insurance. At the time of Stein\u2019s shooting, defendant operated the Cooperative Learning Center (\u201cCLC\u201d), a special school for behaviorally and emotionally handicapped children. The CLC adhered to an unwritten policy of not reporting violent or criminal student activities unless those activities were likely to expose offending students to substantial incarceration. CLC employees were instructed \u201cto look the other way\u201d when students engaged in, or made plans to engage in, violent or criminal acts.\nIn March 1998 J.B. (age thirteen) and C.N. (age fifteen) were behaviorally and emotionally handicapped CLC students. J.B. suffered from an \u201carray of emotional problems\u201d including violent outbursts, drug abuse, and fear of parental abuse. C.N. had threatened others openly and expressed homicidal thoughts. His mother and three uncles abused drugs, and C.N. had twice assaulted a CLC teacher.\nAlong with other CLC students, J.B. and C.N. traveled to and from the CLC on a public school bus driven by Nancy Patton and monitored by Gail Guzman, an unpaid volunteer. While on the bus the week before 17 March 1998, Guzman overheard two conversations between J.B. and C.N. (\u201cthe conversations\u201d). During the first, C.N. told J.B. about a gun under his mattress at home. In the second, C.N. said, \u201cLet\u2019s rob somebody,\u201d to which J.B. replied, \u201cOkay.\u201d C.N. stated, \u201cI have the gun.\u201d J.B. responded, \u201cI\u2019ll kill them.\u201d Guzman repeated what she had heard to Patton, but neither adult informed school officials or law enforcement of the juveniles\u2019 comments.\nOn 17 March 1998, C.N. retrieved a gun from beneath his mattress. That same day, accompanied by eighteen-year-old Darryl Watkins and D.V. (age thirteen), J.B. and C.N. positioned themselves at an Asheville intersection. Between 7:00 p.m. and 8:15 p.m., the group approached three passing vehicles with the intent to rob and kill the drivers. At 8:15 p.m., using the gun C.N. had provided, J.B neared Stein\u2019s car and shot Stein in the head. The bullet entered just under her left ear, struck her second cervical vertebra, pierced an artery, and lodged in her right jaw. As a result of the shooting, Stein suffers from vascular problems, a spinal fracture, nerve damage, and post-traumatic stress disorder. All four assailants pled guilty to charges stemming from the attack.\nThe allegations of fact summarized above were contained in plaintiffs\u2019 initial and subsequent complaints. Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their initial complaint without prejudice. Thereafter plaintiffs filed a new complaint and an amended complaint. The amended complaint asserts causes of action for negligence per se and common law negligence; as part of those claims, it alleges Patton worked for defendant and Guzman monitored the bus \u201cwithin the course and scope of her duties\u201d to defendant. The trial court dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiffs sought review in the Court of Appeals.\nA divided Court of Appeals reversed the trial court\u2019s order granting defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss. Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 168 N.C. App. 243, 608 S.E.2d 80 (2005). The majority determined plaintiffs stated a claim for negligence by sufficiently alleging: (1) defendant had a legal duty to protect others from J.B. and C.N.; (2) defendant breached its duty when Patton and Guzman did not report the conversations as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245; and (3) defendant\u2019s breach proximately caused the injuries to Stein. Id. at 252-56, 608 S.E.2d at 86-89. The dissent maintained plaintiffs failed to allege a duty of care because their allegations conclusively show defendant lacked \u201cany ability or right to control [J.B. and C.N. at the time] plaintiffs were injured.\u201d Id. at 260, 608 S.E.2d at 91 (Tyson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Noting the conversations were \u201cnot specific to any time, place, or intended victim,\u201d the dissent also argued the majority\u2019s holding would impermissibly, render defendant \u201cliable to any victim, at any time or place, whom [J.B. and C.N.] might eventually \u2018rob\u2019 or \u2018kill.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 262, 608 S.E.2d at 92.\nDefendant filed a notice of appeal to this Court. As this is an appeal of right based solely on the dissent in the Court of Appeals, our review is limited to the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs\u2019 allegations against defendant. N.C. R. App. P. 16(b). .\nII. ANALYSIS\nWhen reviewing a complaint dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), we treat a plaintiff\u2019s factual allegations as true. Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002). Taken as true, plaintiffs\u2019 allegations cause concern. Our society remains in the shadow of the Columbine High School massacre and subsequent school shootings. The educators, staff members, and volunteers who accept the challenge of working with behaviorally and emotionally handicapped juveniles undoubtedly deserve praise; nonetheless, public school personnel who overhear students discussing robbery or homicide have a moral and civic obligation to respond appropriately. The power of the judiciary does not extend to purely moral or civic shortcomings, however. Absent legal grounds for visiting civil liability on defendant, our courts cannot offer plaintiffs the requested remedy.\nIn their amended complaint, plaintiffs assert statutory and common law imposed a legal duty on defendant to forestall the shooting of Stein. See generally Estate of Mullis v. Monroe Oil Co., 349 N.C. 196, 204, 505 S.E.2d 131, 136 (1998) (defining a legal duty as \u201c \u2018 \u201can obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another\u201d \u2019 \u201d). Plaintiffs submit defendant\u2019s breach of this duty exposed defendant to civil liability under two theories: (1) negligence per se for a violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245 (detailing the responsibilities of public school bus drivers and monitors), and (2) common law negligence. See id. at 200, 505 S.E.2d at 134. We consider the legal sufficiency of each cause of action in turn.\nA. NEGLIGENCE PER SE\n\u201c[T]he general rule in North Carolina is that the violation of a [public safety statute] constitutes negligence per se.\u201d Byers v. Standard Concrete Prods. Co., 268 N.C. 518, 521, 151 S.E.2d 38, 40 (1966). A public safety statute is one \u201cimpos[ing] upon [the defendant] a specific duty for the protection of others.\u201d Lutz Indus., Inc. v. Dixie Home Stores, 242 N.C. 332, 341, 88 S.E.2d 333, 339 (1955). Significantly, even when a defendant violates a public safety statute, the plaintiff is not entitled to damages unless the plaintiff belongs to \u201cthe class [of persons] intended to be protected by [the] statute,\u201d Baldwin v. GTE S., Inc., 335 N.C. 544, 546, 439 S.E.2d 108,109 (1994), and the statutory violation is \u201ca proximate cause of [the plaintiff\u2019s] injury,\u201d Hart v. Ivey, 332 N.C. 299, 303, 420 S.E.2d 174, 177 (1992).\nIn the case subjudice, plaintiffs allege N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245 obligated Patton and Guzman to report the conversations at issue to school officials. Plaintiffs contend that, had Patton or Guzman performed her statutory duty, the attack on Stein could have been thwarted. Plaintiffs further allege the acts and omissions of Patton and Guzman should be imputed to defendant. Although the Court of Appeals majority cited defendant\u2019s purported violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245 as an adequate allegation of breach when discussing plaintiffs\u2019 common law negligence claim, it did not directly address whether plaintiffs have successfully stated a claim for negligence per se.\nSection 115C-245 of our General Statutes reads in pertinent part:\n(b) The driver of a school bus . . . shall have complete authority over and responsibility for the operation of the bus and the maintaining of good order and conduct upon such bus, and shall report promptly to the principal any misconduct upon such bus or disregard or violation of the driver\u2019s instructions by any person riding upon such bus. The principal may take such action with reference to any such misconduct upon a school bus, or any violation of the instructions of the driver, as he might take if such misconduct or violation had occurred upon the grounds of the school.\n(d) The superintendent or superintendent\u2019s designee may, in his discretion, appoint a monitor for any bus assigned to any school. It shall be the duty of such monitor, subject to the direction of the driver of the bus, to preserve order upon the bus and do such other things as may be appropriate for the safety of the pupils and employees assigned to such bus while boarding such bus, alighting therefrom or being transported thereon, and to require such pupils and employees to conform to the rules and regulations established by the local board of education for the safety of pupils and employees upon school buses. Such monitors shall be unpaid volunteers who shall serve at the pleasure of the superintendent or superintendent\u2019s designee.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245 (2003) (emphasis added). Assuming arguendo the conversations were \u201cmisconduct\u201d within the meaning of N.C.G.S. 115C-245(b), the question becomes whether the alleged failure of Patton and Guzman to report them was negligence per se.\nOne could plausibly argue the General Assembly intended N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245 to be a public safety statute. Disorderly students can distract a bus driver, thereby imperiling the driver, other motorists, pedestrians, and themselves. By investing bus drivers with authority over, and responsibility for, good order and conduct on public school buses, subsection (b) seems designed to avoid hazards of this sort. Subsection (d) offers additional evidence that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245 is a public safety statute. This subsection fixes a \u201cduty\u201d on public school bus monitors \u201cto preserve order upon the bus and do such other things as may be appropriate\u201d to safeguard students and school system employees from injury while on the bus. Id. \u00a7 115C-245(d). These features are consistent with those of public safety statutes.\nRegardless of whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245 qualifies as a public safety statute, plaintiffs\u2019 claim for negligence per se is fatally defective. The plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245(d) reveals the General Assembly enacted the statute to ensure \u201cthe safety of the pupils and employees assigned to [public] school bus[es].\u201d Consequently, pupils and employees assigned to buses would constitute the protected class of persons with standing to sue for injuries proximately resulting from violations of the statute. Nothing in plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint suggests plaintiffs belong to the relevant protected class. Precedents of this Court therefore compel us to conclude plaintiffs have not stated a negligence per se claim. E.g., Hart, 332 N.C. at 303, 420 S.E.2d at 177.\nB. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE\nWe next evaluate whether plaintiffs sufficiently allege common law negligence. To state a claim for common law negligence, a plaintiff must allege: (1) a legal duty; (2) a breach thereof; and (3) injury proximately caused by the breach. See Kientz v. Carlton, 245 N.C. 236, 240, 96 S.E.2d 14, 17 (1957). Thus, the threshold question is whether plaintiffs successfully allege defendant had a legal duty to avert the attack on Stein. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 342-44, 162 N.E. 99, 99-100 (1928). \u201cIn the absence of a legal duty owed to the plaintiff by [the defendant], [the defendant] cannot be liable for negligence.\u201d Cassell v. Collins, 344 N.C. 160, 163, 472 S.E.2d 770, 772 (1996), overruled on other grounds by Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 507 S.E.2d 882 (1998). No legal duty exists unless the injury to the plaintiff was foreseeable and avoidable through due care. Mull\u00eds, 349 N.C. at 205, 505 S.E.2d at 137 (holding no duty when plaintiff failed to present evidence showing \u201cdefendant commercial vendors should have recognized that [plaintiff], or anyone similarly situated[,] might be injured by their conduct\u201d). Whether a plaintiff\u2019s injuries were foreseeable depends on the facts of the particular case. Id. at 206, 505 S.E.2d at 138.\nUnlike many cases involving common law negligence claims, here plaintiffs desire damages from defendant for the actions of third persons. There is no allegation defendant or its personnel encouraged, planned, or executed the shooting; rather, plaintiffs rest their claim on the failure of Patton and Guzman, and by imputation defendant, to take reasonable steps to frustrate the plans of J.B. and C.N.\nWe have often remarked the law\u2019s reluctance to burden individuals or organizations with a duty to prevent the criminal acts of others. Cassell, 344 N.C. at 165, 472 S.E.2d at 773 (\u201c[O]ur general rule of law . . . declines to impose civil liability upon landowners for criminal acts committed by third persons.\u201d); Moore v. Crumpton, 306 N.C. 618, 622, 295 S.E.2d 436, 439 (1982) (\u201c[I]t is a well-established doctrine that the mere fact of parenthood does not make individuals liable for the wrongful acts of their unemancipated minor children.\u201d); Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 303 N.C. 636, 638, 281 S.E.2d 36, 38 (1981) (Store owners are ordinarily \u201cnot liable for injuries to [their] invitees which result from the intentional, criminal acts of third persons.\u201d). Our cases typically regard such acts as unforeseeable and \u201cindependent, intervening cause[s] absolving the [defendant] of liability.\u201d Foster, 303 N.C. at 638, 281 S.E.2d at 38.\nNotwithstanding the general rule, we have held a defendant may be liable for the criminal acts of another when the defendant\u2019s relationship with the plaintiff or the third person justifies making the defendant answerable civilly for the harm to the plaintiff. For example, we determined a common carrier must exercise reasonable care to protect its passengers from foreseeable assaults. Smith v. Camel City Cab Co., 227 N.C. 572, 574, 42 S.E.2d 657, 658-59 (1947); see Foster, 303 N.C. at 640, 281 S.E.2d at 39 (holding plaintiff stated a claim when she alleged she was on defendant store owner\u2019s premises during business hours to transact business and there sustained injuries from reasonably foreseeable and preventable criminal acts of a third person). Similarly, we decided a parent who knows or should know of his unemancipated minor child\u2019s dangerous propensities may have a legal duty to \u201cexercise reasonable control over the child so as to prevent injury to others.\u201d Moore, 306 N.C. at 622, 295 S.E.2d at 439-40.\nIn the instant case, plaintiffs assert liability founded on defendant\u2019s relationship with the third persons who injured them. Hence, the legal sufficiency of plaintiffs\u2019 claim hinges on whether defendant\u2019s relationship with J.B. and C.N. amounted to a \u201cspecial relationship\u201d requiring defendant to use due care to avert the attack on Stein. The amended complaint alleges defendant knew J.B. and C.N. were emotionally and behaviorally handicapped children and \u201chad custody of [J.B. and C.N.] . . . and/or had the ability or right to control [the juveniles] at the pertinent time.\u201d\nAs previously mentioned, the dissent in the Court of Appeals argued that plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint falls short of alleging negligence inasmuch as its allegations show defendant lacked custody or control of J.B. and C.N. at the time of the shooting. Stein, 168 N.C. App. at 260, 608 S.E.2d at 90-91 (Tyson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (\u201c \u2018[T]he pertinent time\u2019 in a negligence action [is] when plaintiffs suffered injury: the time of the shooting.\u201d). Conceding defendant possessed no authority over the juveniles when Stein was attacked, the Court of Appeals majority did not deem the point dispositive:\nDefendant!] contend[s]... no duty existed because plaintiffs cannot establish that defendant[] had custody or the ability to control the students after school hours, when the shooting occurred. This argument relates to the question of proximate cause rather than duty. Plaintiffs\u2019 complaint does not argue that defendant[] breached [its] duty by failing to control the students at the time that they were shooting plaintiff Kathlyn Stein, but rather that the breach occurred while the students were on the bus, at a time when . . . defendant]] did have custody and control over the students. In other words, the negligence occurred not at 7:00 p.m., but rather while the students were on school property and . . . defendant[] had custody and the legal right to control them.\nId. at 254-55, 608 S.E.2d at 88.\nThe Court of Appeals majority applied an incorrect rule of law. We have never held the ability of an otherwise legally blameless defendant to control a third person at the time of the third person\u2019s criminal acts is unrelated to the question of legal duty, and we decline to do so now. For common law negligence purposes, no special relationship exists between a defendant and a third person unless (1) the defendant knows or should know of the third person\u2019s violent propensities and (2) the defendant has the ability and opportunity to control the third person at the time of the third person\u2019s criminal acts. Only after a plaintiff has sufficiently alleged and proved a special relationship between the defendant and the third person will the finder of fact reach the issue of breach, that is, \u201cwhether the [defendant] exercised reasonable care under all of the circumstances.\u201d Moore, 306 N.C. at 624, 295 S.E.2d at 440.\nOur holding accords with this Court\u2019s decision in Moore v. Crumpton. In Moore, the plaintiff brought a personal injury action against the defendant parents for her rape at the hands of their son, John, Jr. Id. at 619, 295 S.E.2d at 438. The plaintiff alleged the parents knew or should have known that their son\u2019s drug abuse and \u201cdangerous mental state and disposition\u201d made it foreseeable he would intentionally injure others. Id. at 619-20, 295 S.E.2d at 438. She alleged her rape was the proximate result of the parents\u2019 negligent failure to control John, Jr. Id. at 620, 295 S.E.2d at 438. The trial court granted the parents\u2019 motions for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at 622, 295 S.E.2d at 439.\nOn appeal, this Court held a parent may be liable for not exercising reasonable control over a child if the parent (1) had the ability and opportunity to control his child and (2) knew or should have known of the necessity for exercising such control. Id. at 623, 295 S.E.2d at 440. Turning to the facts of Moore, the Court upheld- summary judgment for both parents, first reasoning that neither parent knew or should have known of the necessity for controlling John, Jr. Id. at 626-28, 295 S.E.2d at 441-43. Despite being aware of John, Jr.\u2019s persistent drug problems, his impregnation of a young girl, and his assault on another person, the parents \u201chad no recent information to indicate that another assault might occur or that John, Jr. might become involved in a forcible rape.\u201d Id. at 627, 295 S.E.2d at 442.\nThis Court further concluded neither parent had the ability to control seventeen-year-old John, Jr. at the time of the rape. It noted the parents\u2019 marital separation shortly before the incident had left John, Jr. \u201cunder the exclusive care and control of his father.\u201d Id. at 626, 295.S.E.2d at 441. On the night of the rape, the mother \u201cwas at the beach, far away . . . and had had no regular contact with or responsibility for\u201d John, Jr. since the separation. Id. As for the father, having \u201ctotal responsibility for John, Jr. and one other child [made it] almost impossible for him to watch [John, Jr.] twenty-. four hours a day.\u201d Moore, 306 N.C. at 628, 295 S.E.2d at 443. John, Jr. \u201capparently left home [to rape the plaintiff] after midnight. . . when parents ordinarily would not be expected to be engaged in maintaining surveillance of their children.\u201d Id. at 626, 295 S.E.2d at 442. Short of \u201cphysically restraining [John, Jr.] and placing him under twenty-four hour . . . observation,\u201d the father could not have prevented the harm to the plaintiff. Id. at 627, 295 S.E.2d at 442; see also O\u2019Connor v. Corbett Lumber Corp., 84 N.C. App. 178, 352 S.E.2d 267 (1987) (affirming summary judgment for the employer of a work release inmate who was not on the job when he broke into plaintiff\u2019s house and raped plaintiff).\nHere defendant\u2019s position appears analogous to that of the mother in Moore. Though the conversations arguably alerted defendant to the criminal designs of J.B. and C.N., but see Stein, 168 N.C. App. at 262, 608 S.E.2d at 92 (Tyson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (characterizing the conversations as \u201cnot specific to any time, place, or intended victim\u201d), plaintiffs\u2019 allegations establish J.B. and C.N. were entirely outside of defendant\u2019s custody and control at the time of the shooting. Whatever authority Patton and Guzman could have otherwise wielded over J.B. and C.N. terminated once the juveniles exited the bus. The shooting occurred about 8:15 p.m. at an Asheville intersection, well after normal school hours and not on property belonging to, or under the supervision of, defendant. Nowhere does plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint suggest J.B. and C.N. were then truant due to defendant\u2019s inadequate oversight. In sum, while plaintiffs allege violent tendencies on the part of J.B. and C.N., their complaint offers no basis for believing defendant had the ability or the opportunity to control J.B. and C.N. during the attack on Stein. The complaint therefore fails to allege the special relationship necessary to render defendant liable for the harm to plaintiffs by third persons.\nIII. DISPOSITION\nBased on the factual allegations in plaintiffs\u2019 complaint, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245 did not require defendant to safeguard plaintiffs. Moreover, defendant had no common law duty to prevent the attack on Stein. Consistent with our case law, we regard the shooting as the regrettable, but ultimately unforeseeable, criminal act of third persons. E.g., Foster, 303 N.C. at 638, 281 S.E.2d at 38. The trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 claims for negligence per se and common law negligence. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.\nREVERSED.\nJustice TIMMONS-GOODSON did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. According to plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint, the Blue Ridge Area Authority comprises the Blue Ridge Center for Mental Health, Cooperative Learning Center, Blue Ridge Human Services Facilities, Inc., Blue Ridge Mental Health, and the Authority itself.\n. Plaintiffs also named the Buncombe County Board of Education and the Asheville City Board of Education as defendants. The trial court eventually dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 claims against both boards. A unanimous Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal in favor of the Asheville City Board and concluded plaintiffs\u2019 appeal from dismissal in favor of the Buncombe County Board was untimely filed. Stein, 168 N.C. App. at 246-251, 608 S.E.2d at 83-86. These determinations are not before this Court.\n. These statutes authorize area authorities, such as defendant, which are charged with \u201cplanning, budgeting, implementing, and monitoring of . . . community-based mental health, developmental disabilities, and substance abuse services.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 122C-117 (2003).\n. The amended complaint also asserts a cause of action for plaintiff Hootstein\u2019s loss of consortium.\n. Foreseeability is also an element of proximate cause. See Williamson v. Liptzin, 141 N.C. App. 1, 10, 539 S.E.2d 313, 319 (2000) (\u201cThe element of foreseeability is a requisite of proximate cause.\u201d). Given that we hold no duty existed, we do not reach the question of proximate cause.\n. Nor, apparently, has the Court of Appeals heretofore so held. In King v. Durham Cty. Mental Health Developmental Disabilities and Substance Abuse Auth., 113 N.C. App. 341, 439 S.E.2d 771, disc. rev. denied, 336 N.C. 316, 445 S.E.2d 396 (1994), for example, seventeen-year-old Mohammed Thompson fatally shot Sherri King after escaping from the defendants\u2019 facility for youths with violent tendencies. Id. at 342-43, 439 S.E.2d at 772-73. The Court of Appeals held the defendants were hot liable for Thompson\u2019s actions because Thompson voluntarily resided at the facility and \u201c[i]t [could] therefore [not] be said that any of the defendants had custody of Thompson or .. . the ability or [legal] right to control him.\u201d Id. at 347, 439 S.E.2d at 775.\nIn Pangbum v. Saad, 73 N.C. App. 336, 326 S.E.2d 365 (1985), the Court of Appeals held the plaintiff sufficiently stated a claim against the defendant psychiatrist for the wrongful discharge of a patient who stabbed her following his release. Id. at 337, 326 S.E.2d at 366. Unlike Thompson\u2019s situation in King, the patient in Pangbum was involuntarily committed to the defendant\u2019s care. Id. at 347, 326 S.E.2d at 372. Thus, the defendant could have controlled the patient at the time of the stabbing but for the wrongful release.", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Orbock Ruark & Dillard, RG., by Mark A. Leach, for plaintiffappellees.", "Patrick, Harper & Dixon L.L.P., by David W. Hood and Michael J. Barnett, for defendant-appellants Cooperative Learning Center, Blue Ridge Human Services Facilities, Inc., Blue Ridge Mental Health, Blue Ridge Center for Mental Health, and Blue Ridge Area Authority." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KATHLYN MARIE STEIN and MICHAEL HOOTSTEIN v. ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION, COOPERATIVE LEARNING CENTER (a/k/a WOLFE CREEK SCHOOL, now BUNCOMBE COMMUNITY SCHOOL WEST, at the time administered jointly by BLUE RIDGE HUMAN SERVICES FACILITIES, INC. and/or BLUE RIDGE MENTAL HEALTH and/or ASHEVILLE CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION and/or BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION), BUNCOMBE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, BLUE RIDGE CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH, and BLUE RIDGE AREA AUTHORITY\nNo. 128A05\n(Filed 3 March 2006)\n1. Negligence\u2014 per se \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) plaintiffs\u2019 claims of negligence per se resulting from the off-campus shooting of plaintiff wife by students who attended defendant\u2019s school for behaviorally and emotionally handicapped juveniles, because: (1) although violation of a public safety statute generally constitutes negligence per se, the school bus driver and bus monitor were not obligated under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245(d) to report conversations they overheard by the students about robbery and homicide not specific to any time, place, or intended victim when the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-245(d) reveals the General Assembly enacted the statute to ensure the safety of the pupils and employees assigned to public school buses; and (2) pupils and employees assigned to buses would constitute the protected class of persons with standing to sue for injuries proximately resulting from violations of the statute, and nothing in plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint suggests plaintiffs belong to the relevant protected class.\n2. Negligence\u2014 common law \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by dismissing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) plaintiffs\u2019 claim of common law negligence resulting from the off-campus shooting of plaintiff wife by students who attended defendant\u2019s school for behaviorally and emotionally handicapped juveniles, because: (1) for common law negligence purposes, no special relationship exists between a defendant and a third person unless the defendant knows or should know of the third person\u2019s violent propensities and defendant has the ability and opportunity to control the third person at the time of the third person\u2019s criminal acts; (2) while plaintiffs allege violent tendencies on the part of the students, the complaint offers no basis for believing defendant had the ability or the opportunity to control the students during the attack on plaintiff when the shooting occurred about 8:15 p.m. at an intersection well after normal school hours and not on property belonging to or under the supervision of defendant, and nowhere does plaintiffs\u2019 amended complaint suggest the students were then truant due to defendant\u2019s inadequate oversight; and (3) the complaint fails to allege the special relationship necessary to render defendant liable for the harm to plaintiffs by third persons.\nJustice Timmons-Goodson did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 168 N.C. App. 243, 608 S.E.2d 80 (2005), on orders entered 8 August 2003, 13 August 2003, and 8 September 2003 by Judge Zoro J. Guice, Jr. and an order signed by Judge James E. Lanning on 11 June 2001, all in Superior Court, Buncombe County. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 13 August 2003 order, reversed the 8 September 2003 order, and dismissed plaintiffs\u2019 appeal from the 11 June 2001 and 8 August 2003 orders. Heard in the Supreme Court 12 September 2005.\nOrbock Ruark & Dillard, RG., by Mark A. Leach, for plaintiffappellees.\nPatrick, Harper & Dixon L.L.P., by David W. Hood and Michael J. Barnett, for defendant-appellants Cooperative Learning Center, Blue Ridge Human Services Facilities, Inc., Blue Ridge Mental Health, Blue Ridge Center for Mental Health, and Blue Ridge Area Authority." }, "file_name": "0321-01", "first_page_order": 393, "last_page_order": 404 }