{ "id": 3787177, "name": "HUBERT CHAMBERS, Employee v. TRANSIT MANAGEMENT, Employer, SELF INSURED (COMPENSATION CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, Servicing Agent)", "name_abbreviation": "Chambers v. Transit Management", "decision_date": "2006-11-17", "docket_number": "No. 527A05", "first_page": "609", "last_page": "619", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "360 N.C. 609" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633565 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8320763 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0540-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633952 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986)" }, { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633565 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "374", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 S.E.2d 367", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "carried a door on head while climbing down a ladder" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 N.C. App. 73", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12122331 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76-77", "parenthetical": "carried a door on head while climbing down a ladder" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/86/0073-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "192", "parenthetical": "carried a heavy spotlight backwards up a flight of stairs" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "99 N.C. App. 767", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525056 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769", "parenthetical": "carried a heavy spotlight backwards up a flight of stairs" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/99/0767-01" ] }, { "cite": "563 S.E.2d 633", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635, 636-37", "parenthetical": "lifted a forty pound box of syrup out of truck" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "150 N.C. App. 480", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9081701 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481, 482-84", "parenthetical": "lifted a forty pound box of syrup out of truck" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/150/0480-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 778", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781, 785-86", "parenthetical": "slipped on rainwater" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 341", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9187488 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344, 352", "parenthetical": "slipped on rainwater" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0341-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 461", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463-64, 465-66", "parenthetical": "loading a box into a vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8916550 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294, 298", "parenthetical": "loading a box into a vehicle" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "88 N.C. App. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358100 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/88/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511542 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a worker must only show that the injury occurred at a 'judicially cognizable' point in time\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 N.C. App. 748", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9381469 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754", "parenthetical": "stating that \"a worker must only show that the injury occurred at a 'judicially cognizable' point in time\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/147/0748-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 S.E.2d 650", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 737", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556426, 2559318, 2557847, 2557592, 2559291 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0737-03", "/nc/339/0737-05", "/nc/339/0737-04", "/nc/339/0737-01", "/nc/339/0737-02" ] }, { "cite": "449 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "116 N.C. App. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525497 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/116/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 S.E.2d 52", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" }, { "page": "52-53", "parenthetical": "lifted box off floor" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "77 N.C. App. 450", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8523384 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "452" }, { "page": "451-52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/77/0450-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "788" }, { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "93 N.C. App. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8528036 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337" }, { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/93/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "23 S.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 N.C. 358", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630398 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/222/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 750", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 228", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491657 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 N.C. 296", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567798 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/305/0296-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 S.E.2d 822", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 670", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570404 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0670-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 488", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155778, 1155688, 1155729, 1155570, 1155866 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0473-01", "/nc/351/0473-05", "/nc/351/0473-04", "/nc/351/0473-02", "/nc/351/0473-03" ] }, { "cite": "524 S.E.2d 368", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "371" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "136 N.C. App. 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11239575 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/136/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 S.E.2d 15", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 378", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135825, 135887, 135583 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0378-01", "/nc/353/0378-03", "/nc/353/0378-02" ] }, { "cite": "534 S.E.2d 259", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 N.C. App. 620", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9497462 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "622" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/139/0620-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 S.E.2d 269", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491416 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "183" }, { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 N.C. App. 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9080773 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/151/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 S.E.2d 189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196, 200" }, { "page": "198-200" }, { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571831 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468, 475" }, { "page": "472-75" }, { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 44", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565283 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0044-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 105-06 (1981)" }, { "page": "365" }, { "page": "362" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707972 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 105-06 (1981)" }, { "page": "93-94" }, { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "3 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 N.C. 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8631990 ], "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/215/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779801 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788691 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42-43", "parenthetical": "citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 540", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8320763 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "542-43", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0540-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1096, "char_count": 25869, "ocr_confidence": 0.747, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.677273039884855e-07, "percentile": 0.9280514037691 }, "sha256": "1c1fb55287da9671930d75435556fbb719d8f8764d1b096b1250ab2b53b8d31a", "simhash": "1:3cb974ea64136247", "word_count": 4108 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:28:24.883894+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "Justice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "HUBERT CHAMBERS, Employee v. TRANSIT MANAGEMENT, Employer, SELF INSURED (COMPENSATION CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, Servicing Agent)" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PARKER, Chief Justice.\nThis case arises from proceedings before the North Carolina Industrial Commission (the Commission) and raises the issues of whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Commission\u2019s opinion and award concluding (i) that plaintiff\u2019s ulnar neuropathy was a compensable occupational disease pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13), (ii) that plaintiff suffered a cervical spine injury as a result of a specific traumatic incident pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6), (iii) that plaintiff\u2019s cervical spine condition was a compensable occupational disease pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13), and (iv) that plaintiff was entitled to continuing disability benefits pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-29. Because we determine that the Commission applied an incorrect legal standard in finding plaintiff\u2019s ulnar neuropathy and cervical spine condition to be compensable occupational diseases pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) and the cervical spine condition to be a specific traumatic incident pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6), we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals. We do not reach the question whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the Commission\u2019s award of continuing disability benefits under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-29.\nThe record shows that on 4 December 2000 plaintiff was employed by Transit Management of Charlotte (defendant) as a bus driver. Plaintiff had been so employed for approximately thirty years. Plaintiff drove two types of buses, the Flexible bus and the Nova bus; during the course of his routes plaintiff used both hands approximately ninety percent to one hundred percent of the time. On 4 December 2000 plaintiff was assigned a new bus route. At some point during his shift, plaintiff experienced severe pain in his left arm, shoulder, and neck. Plaintiff requested a relief driver approximately six hours into his shift.\nPlaintiff did not notify defendant\u2019s director of safety and administration until 14 December 2000 and did not file an Employee Injury and Illness Report until 18 December 2000. Plaintiff initially was unsure whether his conditions were related to his employment or arose from other factors, including yard work. An initial diagnosis stated that plaintiff noted no specific \u201cinciting event\u201d causing injury.\nFollowing visits to his family physician and several orthopedists, plaintiff was referred to Tim E. Adamson, M.D., a neurosurgeon, who diagnosed plaintiff with a \u201cdouble crush syndrome,\u201d which he described as a relationship between two injuries: a left ulnar nerve entrapment affecting the elbow and a cervical spine condition affecting the neck. Dr. Adamson performed two surgeries on plaintiff. Following a functional capacity evaluation indicating plaintiff\u2019s level of function at sedentary to light physical demand, Dr. Adamson gave plaintiff a thirty percent permanent partial impairment rating for his left arm.\nPlaintiff\u2019s claim was heard by Deputy Commissioner Nancy W. Gregory, who filed an opinion and award on 24 February 2003 denying plaintiff\u2019s claim for workers\u2019 compensation benefits. Plaintiff appealed to the Full Commission, which filed an opinion and award on 3 February 2004 reversing the deputy commissioner and concluding that plaintiff\u2019s ulnar nerve entrapment neuropathy and cervical spine condition were compensable occupational diseases and that the injury to the cervical spine qualified as a specific traumatic incident. The Commission also awarded plaintiff continuing disability benefits. The Court of Appeals concluded that the record sufficiently supported the Commission\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law.\nStandard of Review\nThe Commission has exclusive original jurisdiction over workers\u2019 compensation cases and has the duty to hear evidence and file its award, \u201ctogether with a statement of the findings of fact, rulings of law, and other matters pertinent to the questions at issue.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-84 (2005). Appellate review of an award from the Industrial Commission is generally limited to two issues: (i) whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and (ii) whether the conclusions of law are justified by the findings of fact. Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 42-43, 619 S.E.2d 491, 492 (2005) (citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986)). If the conclusions of the Commission are based upon a deficiency of evidence or misapprehension of the law, the case should be remanded so \u201c \u2018that the evidence [may] be considered in its true legal light.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 43, 619 S.E.2d at 492 (quoting McGill v. Town of Lumberton, 215 N.C. 752, 754, 3 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1939) (alteration in original)).\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13)\nSection 97-53(13) defines an occupational disease as: \u201cAny disease ... which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2005).\nFor an occupational disease to be compensable under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) it must be\n(1) characteristic of persons engaged in the particular trade or occupation in which the [plaintiff] is engaged; (2) not an ordinary disease of life to which the public generally is equally exposed with those engaged in that particular trade or occupation; and (3) there must be \u201ca causal connection between the disease and the [plaintiff\u2019s] employment.\u201d\nRutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yarn, 308 N.C. 85, 93, 301 S.E.2d 359, 365 (1983) (quoting Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 304 N.C. 44, 52, 283 S.E.2d 101, 105-06 (1981)) (citing Booker v. Duke Med. Ctr., 297 N.C. 458, 468, 475, 256 S.E.2d 189, 196, 200 (1979)).\nThis Court stated in Rutledge:\nTo satisfy the first and second elements it is not necessary that the disease originate exclusively from or be unique to the particular trade or occupation in question. All ordinary diseases of life are not excluded from the statute\u2019s coverage. Only such ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is exposed equally with workers in the particular trade or occupation are excluded.\nId. (citing Booker, 297 N.C. at 472-75, 256 S.E.2d at 198-200). In cases where the employment exposed the worker to a greater risk of contracting the disease than the general public, the first two elements are satisfied. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 93-94, 301 S.E.2d at 365. \u201cThe greater risk in such cases provides the nexus between the disease and the employment which makes them an appropriate subject for workman\u2019s compensation.\u201d Booker, 297 N.C. at 475, 256 S.E.2d at 200.\nThe holding in Rutledge, which arose in the context of a claim for chronic obstructive lung disease, see 308 N.C. at 87, 301 S.E.2d at 362, also applies where other diseases are at issue. In Futrell v. Resinall Corporation the Court of Appeals applied the Rutledge test where a plaintiff contended that he contracted carpal tunnel syndrome as the result of his employment. 151 N.C. App. 456, 458-59, 566 S.E.2d 181, 183 (2002), aff'd per curiam, 357 N.C. 158, 579 S.E.2d 269 (2003).\nThe Court of Appeals correctly noted\nthere is no authority from this State which allows us to ignore the well-established requirement that a plaintiff seeking to prove an occupational disease show that the employment placed him at a greater risk for contracting the condition, even where the condition may have been aggravated but not originally caused by the plaintiffs employment.\nId. at 460, 566 S.E.2d at 184. The court explained that\n\u25a0if the first two elements of the Rutledge test were meant to be altered or ignored where a [plaintiff] simply argued aggravation or contribution as opposed to contraction, then our courts would not have consistently defined the third element of the Rutledge test as being met where the [plaintiff] can establish that the employment caused him to contract the disease, or where he can establish that it significantly contributed to or aggravated the disease. Rutledge and subsequent case law applying its three-prong test make clear that evidence tending to show that the employment simply aggravated or contributed to the employee\u2019s condition goes only to the issue of causation, the third element of the Rutledge test. Regardless of how an employee meets the causation prong . . . , the employee must nevertheless satisfy the remaining two prongs of the Rutledge test by establishing that the employment placed him at a greater risk for contracting the condition than the general public.\nId. (citing Norris v. Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc., 139 N.C. App. 620, 622, 534 S.E.2d 259, 261 (2000), cert. denied, 353 N.C. 378, 547 S.E.2d 15 (2001); Hardin v. Motor Panels, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 351, 354, 524 S.E.2d 368, 371, disc. rev. denied, 351 N.C. 473, 543 S.E.2d 488 (2000)).\nIn the instant case the Commission applied an incorrect standard of the law when it stated: \u201cWhere, as here, there is evidence of both causation and aggravation connected to particular aspects of an employee\u2019s job duties ... to which the general public is not exposed, compensability is logically and legally warranted.\u201d The Commission cites to this Court\u2019s decision in Walston v. Burlington Industries, however, the relevant language in Walston indicates that a disability caused by disease is compensable when \u201cthe disease is an occupational disease, or is aggravated or accelerated by causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to [plaintiff\u2019s] employment.\u201d 304 N.C. 670, 680, 285 S.E.2d 822, 828, amended on rehearing, 305 N.C. 296, 285 S.E.2d 822 (1982). In Walston this Court concluded that the plaintiff did not prove a causal connection between his diseases and his employment. Id. While Walston holds that the aggravation of a preexisting condition by an occupational disease is compensable, it does not alter the evidentiary burden that a plaintiff must meet to establish that his employment exposed him to a greater risk of contracting his disease relative to the general public.\nBased on the record before us, plaintiff has failed to establish that his employment placed him at a greater risk of contracting either his ulnar nerve entrapment or his cervical spine condition than the general public.\nIn a 20 June 2002 letter to plaintiff\u2019s attorney, Dr. Adamson wrote:\n2. ... I feel that [plaintiff\u2019s] occupation as a bus driver did place him slightly at higher risk than the general public.\n4. I am not familiar with any study depicting foraminal stenosis or ulnar entrapment neuropathy as direct occupational risks of bus drivers. I believe ulnar entrapment neuropathy is correlated to some degree with repetitive use of the arm and elbow and as a bus driver I would think [plaintiff] would be at risk for this. . . .\n5. I am not aware of any particular factors of bus driving that would place [plaintiff] at any greater risk for developing spondylotic disease of the cervical spine and subsequent foraminal stenosis.\n6. It is possible that [plaintiff\u2019s] job activities did aggravate foraminal stenosis although it is impossible to know this for certain.\n... I feel that bus driving . . . could be a causative or aggravating factor related to ulnar entrapment neuropathy.\nNowhere in this letter does Dr. Adamson satisfactorily distinguish between the risk faced by plaintiff of contracting his conditions and the risk of aggravating a preexisting condition relative to the general public; rather his statement obscures this distinction by suggesting that plaintiffs employment \u201ccould be a causative or aggravating factor\u201d relating to his elbow condition. Dr. Adamson\u2019s statement in heading 2 does correspond to a question asked by plaintiff\u2019s attorney in a 6 June 2002 letter regarding whether \u201cthe job duties performed by [plaintiff] place him at increased risk for developing ulnar entrapment neuropathy in the left arm as opposed to this occurring to someone in the general public,\u201d but this statement is contradicted by Dr. Adamson\u2019s later deposition testimony.\nAt deposition, plaintiff\u2019s attorney asked Dr. Adamson: \u201cWould the type of physical activity [plaintiff] performed in his job as a bus driver . . . place him at an increased risk of either aggravating or developing a left ulnar neuropathy which you diagnosed and treated?\u201d Dr. Adamson responded, \u201cThe statement of aggravation of the ulnar neuropathy I believe is very accurate. . . . There is some debate now medically . . . about whether the actual repetitive nature actually causes the entrapment neuropathy, but I think that isn\u2019t as clear cut as we would like it to be.\u201d Plaintiff\u2019s attorney then repeated the question, to which Dr. Adamson responded, \u201cI would believe so, yes.\u201d From this testimony alone, it is not clear whether Dr. Adamson believed that plaintiff\u2019s employment placed him at a greater risk of contracting his condition than the general population.\nThe ambiguity of Dr. Adamson\u2019s testimony on direct was clarified on cross-examination when the following exchange occurred:\nQ. . . . I want to make sure I\u2019m clear on what you have indicated, am I correct in understanding that in your opinion, you\u2019re not able to say that the bus driving activities caused the ulnar neuropathy, but that it could have aggravated the ulnar neuropathy?\nA. I think that\u2019s correct.\nQ. And the same thing was basically true for the neck condition, the condition as treated there?\nA. Sure.\nMuch of Dr. Adamson\u2019s testimony is speculation. Although \u201c[d]octors are trained not to rule out medical possibilities no matter how remote[,]\u201d a \u201cmere possibility has never been legally competent to prove causation.\u201d Holley v. ACTS, Inc., 357 N.C. 228, 234, 581 S.E.2d 750, 754 (2003) (citations omitted). To establish the necessary causal relationship for compensation under the Act, \u201cthe evidence must be such as to take the case out of the realm of conjecture and remote possibility.\u201d Gilmore v. Hoke Cty. Bd. of Educ., 222 N.C. 358, 365, 23 S.E.2d 292, 296 (1942). Dr. Adamson\u2019s statements are insufficient to establish the necessary causal relationship for plaintiff\u2019s conditions to be compensable as occupational diseases.\nThe Full Commission relied on Dr. Adamson\u2019s testimony in its findings of fact, determining plaintiff\u2019s \u201cjob duties with defendant caused or aggravated the conditions for which treatment was rendered and that plaintiff\u2019s job placed him at an increased risk of developing these conditions.\u201d Dr. Adamson made relevant statements on both direct and cross-examination as well as in his correspondence with plaintiff\u2019s attorney. The Commission appears to have relied solely on Dr. Adamson\u2019s direct examination testimony to the exclusion of his clarifying testimony on cross-examination. Considering Dr. Adamson\u2019s testimony on cross-examination, plaintiff produced no evidence that his employment exposed him to a greater risk of contracting an occupational disease relative to the general public.\nThe Commission\u2019s emphatic reliance on the ambiguous portions of Dr. Adamson\u2019s testimony, together with its inconsistent statement of the law under Rutledge, indicates that the Commission acted under a misapprehension of the law. If Dr. Adamson was ambiguous with respect to plaintiffs risk of contracting his ulnar neuropathy relative to the general public, he was absolutely clear in his 20 June 2002 letter that plaintiff faced no greater risk of contracting his cervical spine condition than did the general public. The Commission incorrectly applied the law and did not rely upon competent evidence in its findings that plaintiff\u2019s ulnar neuropathy and spondylotic disease of the cervical spine were compensable occupational diseases. Accordingly, we conclude that the Commission erred in concluding that plaintiff sustained a compensable occupational disease within the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13).\nN.C.G.S. $ 97-2(6)\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cInjury and personal injury\u201d shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment, and shall not include a disease in any form, except where it results naturally and unavoidably from the accident. With respect to back injuries, however, where injury to the back arises out of and in the course of the employment and is the direct result of a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned, \u201cinjury by accident\u201d shall be construed to include any disabling physical injury to the back arising out of and causally related to such incident.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6) (2005).\nIn the instant case the Commission\u2019s findings of fact stated that plaintiff suffered compensable injury and \u201cwas unable to return to work because of his occupational disease and specific traumatic incident.\u201d The Commission found that \u201c[t]he sudden pain to plaintiff\u2019s neck on December 4, 2000, qualifies under North Carolina law as a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeals noted that it is well settled that its review of the Commission\u2019s decisions \u201cis limited to the determination of whether there is competent evidence to support the Commission\u2019s Findings of Fact and whether those findings support the Conclusions of Law.\u201d Chambers v. Transit Mgmt., 172 N.C. App. 540, 542-43, 616 S.E.2d 372, 374 (2005) (citations omitted). In affirming the Commission the Court of Appeals held that the \u201crecord contains sufficient evidence to support the facts found by the Commission\u201d and its \u201cconclusion . . . that plaintiff is entitled to disability income as compensation for his injury resulting from a specific traumatic incident.\u201d Id. at 544, 616 S.E.2d at 375. We disagree.\nThe plain language of the statute requires that the injury be \u201cthe direct result of a specific traumatic incident.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6). The Commission concluded there was evidence of a specific traumatic incident, but only supported that conclusion by a finding that the \u201csudden pain to plaintiff\u2019s neck on December 4, 2000, qualifies ... as a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned.\u201d Plaintiff, however, described a gradual onset of pain. Daniel B. Murrey, M.D., an orthopedist who treated plaintiff before Dr. Adamson, noted that plaintiff described a \u201cgradual onset of left arm pain while he was driving\u201d and knew of \u201cno particular inciting event.\u201d In fact, plaintiff revealed that he might have injured himself doing yard work. Randy Mullenex, director of safety and administration for defendant, testified that he asked plaintiff whether his injury could have resulted from yard work and plaintiff replied, \u201cI don\u2019t know.\u201d When asked why he believed his job caused or contributed to this flareup, plaintiff replied, \u201cBecause I had no prior problems, none at all with my left arm or my hand or anything of that nature. And \u2014 but I still couldn\u2019t be a hundred percent sure that it wasn\u2019t coming from something else.\u201d\nWe conclude that the evidence is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements enunciated by the General Assembly in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6) and that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the Commission relied on competent evidence in determining that a specific traumatic incident occurred.\nPrevious decisions of the Court of Appeals are inconsistent with the holding in Chambers, la. Livingston v. James C. Fields & Co., 93 N.C. App. 336, 377 S.E.2d 788 (1989) the court addressed a similar situation where an employee experienced a gradual onset of back pain. The court noted that \u201c[a] \u2018specific traumatic incident\u2019 means the \u2018injury must not have developed gradually but must have occurred at a cognizable time.\u2019 Bradley v. E.B. Sportswear, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 450, 452, 335 S.E.2d 52, 53 (1985). In this context, \u2018cognizable\u2019 means capable of being judicially known and determined.\u201d Livingston, 93 N.C. App. at 337, 377 S.E.2d at 788.\nThe court expounded on its view of judicially cognizable time in Fish v. Steelcase, Inc., 116 N.C. App. 703, 449 S.E.2d 233 (1994), cert. denied, 339 N.C. 737, 454 S.E.2d 650 (1995).\nJudicially cognizable does not mean \u201cascertainable on an exact date.\u201d Instead, the term should be read to describe a showing by plaintiff which enables the Industrial Commission to determine when, within a reasonable period, the specific injury occurred. The evidence must show that there was some event that caused the injury, not a gradual deterioration.\nId. at 709, 449 S.E.2d at 238. In the instant case no competent evidence in the record supports a finding that plaintiff experienced an event within a judicially cognizable time causing his back injury. Plaintiff must demonstrate a causal connection between the specific traumatic event and the injury. See Livingston, 93 N.C. App. at 337, 377 S.E.2d at 789. Contra Zimmerman v. Eagle Elec. Mfg. Co., 147 N.C. App. 748, 754, 556 S.E.2d 678, 681 (2001) (stating that \u201ca worker must only show that the injury occurred at a \u2018judicially cognizable\u2019 point in time\u201d), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 356 N.C. 425, 571 S.E.2d 587 (2002).\nHere, plaintiff presented evidence that he experienced pain on a particular date but he presented no evidence linking that pain to the occurrence of an injury. The statute defines an \u201cinjury by accident\u201d to an employee\u2019s back to be an injury that is \u201cthe direct result of a specific traumatic incident\u201d and \u201ccausally related to such incident.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6). The onset of plaintiff\u2019s pain on 4 December 2000, without more, does not establish evidence of a specific traumatic incident. The Court of Appeals has held that \u201c[t]he onset of pain is not a \u2018specific traumatic incident\u2019 that will determine whether compensation will be allowed pursuant to the act; pain is, rather, as a general rule, the result of a \u2018specific traumatic incident.\u2019 \u201d Roach v. Lupoli Constr. Co., 88 N.C. App. 271, 273, 362 S.E.2d 823, 824 (1987).\nNone of plaintiff\u2019s evidence establishes a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned that can be construed as an \u201cinjury by accident\u201d to plaintiff\u2019s back as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6) and prior decisions of the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Moore v. Fed. Express, 162 N.C. App. 292, 294, 298, 590 S.E.2d 461, 463-64, 465-66 (2004) (loading a box into a vehicle); Whitfield v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 158 N.C. App. 341, 344, 352, 581 S.E.2d 778, 781, 785-86 (2003) (slipped on rainwater); Ruffin v. Compass Grp. USA, 150 N.C. App. 480, 481, 482-84, 563 S.E.2d 633, 635, 636-37 (2002) (lifted a forty pound box of syrup out of truck); Beam v. Floyd\u2019s Creek Baptist Church, 99 N.C. App. 767, 769, 394 S.E.2d 191, 192 (1990) (carried a heavy spotlight backwards up a flight of stairs); Kelly v. Carolina Components, 86 N.C. App. 73, 76-77, 356 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1987) (carried a door on head while climbing down a ladder); Bradley, 77 N.C. App. at 451-52, 335 S.E.2d at 52-53 (lifted box off floor). Plaintiff having failed to produce competent evidence of a specific incident that caused his injury, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the Commission\u2019s opinion and award.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Industrial Commission\u2019s opinion and award. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJustice MARTIN did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "PARKER, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Sellers, Hinshaw, Ayers, Dortch & Lyons, P.A., by Robert A. Whitlow and John F Ayers III, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Smith Law. Firm, P.C., by John Brem Smith; and Hedrick Eatman Gardner & Kincheloe, LLP, by Jennifer Ingram Mitchell and M. Duane Jones, for defendant-appellant.", "Samuel A. Scudder, S. Neal Camak, George W. Lennon, and Charles R. Hassell, Jr., Counsel for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HUBERT CHAMBERS, Employee v. TRANSIT MANAGEMENT, Employer, SELF INSURED (COMPENSATION CLAIMS SOLUTIONS, Servicing Agent)\nNo. 527A05\n(Filed 17 November 2006)\nWorkers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 occupational disease \u2014 specific traumatic event\nThe Industrial Commission erred in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that plaintiff employee bus driver\u2019s ulnar nerve entrapment neuropathy and cervical spine condition were compensable occupational diseases and that the injury to the cervical spine qualified as a specific traumatic incident, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, because: (1) the Commission applied an incorrect legal standard in finding plaintiff\u2019s ulnar neuropathy and cervical spine condition to be compensable occupational diseases pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) and the cervical spine condition to be a specific traumatic incident pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-2(6); (2) plaintiff failed to establish that his employment placed him at a greater risk of contracting either his ulnar nerve entrapment or his cervical spine condition than the general public; and (3) the evidence is not sufficient to satisfy the requirements enunciated by the General Assembly in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 9742(6) that a specific traumatic incident occurred when plaintiff presented evidence that he experienced pain on a particular date but he presented no evidence linking that pain to the occurrence of an injury, and none of plaintiff\u2019s evidence establishes a specific traumatic incident of the work assigned that can be construed as an injury by accident to plaintiff\u2019s back.\nJustice Martin did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 172 N.C. App. 540, 616 S.E.2d 372 (2005), affirming an opinion and award filed 3 February 2004 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. On 3 November 2005, the Supreme Court allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court 14 March 2006.\nSellers, Hinshaw, Ayers, Dortch & Lyons, P.A., by Robert A. Whitlow and John F Ayers III, for plaintiff-appellee.\nSmith Law. Firm, P.C., by John Brem Smith; and Hedrick Eatman Gardner & Kincheloe, LLP, by Jennifer Ingram Mitchell and M. Duane Jones, for defendant-appellant.\nSamuel A. Scudder, S. Neal Camak, George W. Lennon, and Charles R. Hassell, Jr., Counsel for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0609-01", "first_page_order": 681, "last_page_order": 691 }