{ "id": 3740710, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WADDY NATHAN AGNEW", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Agnew", "decision_date": "2007-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 388PA06", "first_page": "333", "last_page": "338", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "361 N.C. 333" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636016, 12636017, 12636018, 12636019, 12636020, 12636021, 12636022, 12636023, 12636024, 12636025 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0743-02", "/se2d/630/0743-01", "/se2d/630/0743-03", "/se2d/630/0743-04", "/se2d/630/0743-05", "/se2d/630/0743-06", "/se2d/630/0743-07", "/se2d/630/0743-08", "/se2d/630/0743-09", "/se2d/630/0743-10" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "261 S.E.2d 183", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "185-86" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "184" }, { "page": "184" }, { "page": "185" }, { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573354 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" }, { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "270 S.E.2d 418", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421", "parenthetical": "citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(a)-(b)" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "421-22" }, { "page": "421" }, { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564646 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197", "parenthetical": "citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(a)-(b)" }, { "page": "198" }, { "page": "199" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0193-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 530, "char_count": 11246, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7255450494760318e-07, "percentile": 0.7046173348330347 }, "sha256": "326bd64b3c00bf3afef43f08f88d062f029ad4cbc8c0a55900a2035c58535e08", "simhash": "1:2369f2325ecca870", "word_count": 1834 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:19:48.141297+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WADDY NATHAN AGNEW" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY,. Justice.\nThis case presents the issue of whether N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(c) requires an independent judicial determination that a sufficient factual basis exists before a trial court accepts a guilty plea. We find it does and reverse the Court of Appeals.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn 8 March 2004, a grand jury indicted defendant for violating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95. The indictment stated in pertinent part:\n[O]n or about [23 April 2003] and in [Pitt County] the defendant named above unlawfully, willfully and feloniously did traffick cocaine by possession of in excess of 200 grams but less than 400 grams of a mixture containing cocaine, a controlled substance, included in Schedule II of the North Carolina Controlled Substance [sic] Act.\nDefendant pled guilty on 9 June 2004 in Pitt County Superior Court. The trial court asked defendant questions listed on the Transcript of Plea (Form AOC-CR-300, rev. 2/2000), which defendant had completed and signed. In response, defendant affirmed that, inter alia, he understood the charges against him and \u201cthat there [were] mandatory sentences and fines\u201d; he understood that he was giving up his right to a trial by jury; and he was \u201cin fact guilty.\u201d After addressing defendant, the trial court had the following exchange with defense counsel:\nThe Court: Do you stipulate that there is a factual basis to support this plea and waive a formal presentation of the evidence?\n[Defense Counsel]: Yes, sir.\nThe Court: Based upon that stipulation, the Court finds that there is a factual basis for the entry of the plea, that the defendant is satisfied with [h]is lawyer, that the defendant is competent to stand trial, that the plea is the informed choice of the defendant, and that the plea is made freely, voluntarily, and understandingly.\nPursuant to defendant\u2019s plea arrangement, the trial court ordered that sentencing be continued until scheduled by the State.\nOn 10 March 2005, a different superior court judge, the Honorable Clifton W. Everett, Jr., held the sentencing hearing. Before sentencing, defendant addressed the court and said he \u201cwould like to explain [his] case.\u201d Defendant proceeded to tell the trial court that he had never seen any evidence in his case; he had never possessed the drugs in question; he did not understand how he could be charged with trafficking by possession; he had been under the influence of marijuana when he pled guilty in June 2004; and he had been under the impression that he would receive probation for his cooperation with the prosecutor. Defendant further stated he wanted \u201cto make a motion as far as [his] plea to see if [he could] have a fair trial.\u201d\nTreating defendant\u2019s request as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court denied this motion and said to the prosecutor: \u201cTell me something about the case so I can sentence him.\u201d The prosecutor described how law enforcement had contact with a confidential informant who assisted them in setting up an undercover drug sale in which defendant gave the undercover officer $5,750 for 347.5 grams of cocaine. The prosecution also stated that at the time of arrest, \u201cdefendant was actually caught with his right hand inside one of the bags of cocaine.\u201d After this summary by the State and further colloquy between the trial court and defendant in which defendant continued to assert that he never possessed the drugs, the trial court entered a sentence of 70 to 84 months and imposed a $100,000 fine.\nDefendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which unanimously affirmed the trial court. The Court of Appeals held the trial court complied with the N.GG.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(c) factual basis requirement when accepting defendant\u2019s plea and the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his guilty plea on grounds that fair and just reasons did not exist to support withdrawal. We allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe question presented is whether the trial court complied with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(c) in determining there was a factual basis for defendant\u2019s guilty plea. Because a guilty plea waives certain fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to a trial by jury, our legislature has enacted laws to ensure guilty pleas are informed and voluntary. See State v. Sinclair, 301 N.C. 193, 197, 270 S.E.2d 418, 421 (1980) (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(a)-(b)). Additionally, guilty pleas must be substantiated in fact as prescribed by the statute at issue in this case:\nThe judge may not accept a plea of guilty or no contest without first determining that there is a factual basis for the plea. This determination may be based upon information including but not limited to:\n(1) A statement of the facts by the prosecutor.\n(2) A written statement of the defendant.\n(3) An examination of the presentence report.\n(4) Sworn testimony, which may include reliable hearsay.\n(5) A statement of facts by the defense counsel.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(c) (2005).\nThe five sources listed in the statute are not exclusive, and therefore \u201c[t]he trial judge may consider any information properly brought to his attention.\u201d State v. Dickens, 299 N.C. 76, 79, 261 S.E.2d 183, 185-86 (1980). Nonetheless, such information \u201cmust appear in the record, so that an appellate court can determine whether the plea has been properly accepted.\u201d Sinclair, 301 N.C. at 198, 270 S.E.2d at 421. Further, in enumerating these five sources, the statute \u201ccontemplate[s] that some substantive material independent of the plea itself appear of record which tends to show that defendant is, in fact, guilty.\u201d Id. at 199, 270 S.E.2d at 421-22.\nIn the case sub judice, prior to accepting defendant\u2019s plea, the trial court had before it the indictment, defendant\u2019s Transcript of Plea, and defense counsel\u2019s oral stipulation that a factual basis existed. Defendant argues the trial court had no actual description of the conduct giving rise to the charge before accepting defendant\u2019s guilty plea and thus could not properly determine there was a factual basis under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(c). The State, relying on our decision in Dickens, argues the Transcript of Plea taken together with the indictment and defense counsel\u2019s stipulation provided adequate information for the trial court to determine that there was a factual basis.\nIn Dickens, the defendant sought a trial de novo in superior court after being convicted in district court of eight charges of issuing worthless checks. 299 N.C. at 82, 261 S.E.2d at 187. Before the superior court, the defendant entered pleas of not guilty and then subsequently changed his pleas to guilty. Id. at 76, 261 S.E.2d at 184. Almost immediately after judgment was entered on the guilty pleas, the defendant returned to the superior court and moved to withdraw his pleas. Id. at 77, 261 S.E.2d at 184. The superior court denied the motion to withdraw. Id. at 77, 261 S.E.2d at 185. On appeal before this Court, we concluded the superior court had sufficient information to determine there was a factual basis for the pleas because the record revealed that a district court judge found the defendant guilty after considering evidence and the defendant had admitted actual guilt on his Transcript of Plea. Id. at 82, 261 S.E.2d at 187.\nNine months later in Sinclair, this Court addressed whether the Transcript of Plea itself provided sufficient information for the trial court to determine the existence of a factual basis. We concluded the transcript was insufficient, reasoning that \u201c[i]f the plea itself constituted its own factual basis, the statute requiring a factual basis to support the plea would be meaningless.\u201d Sinclair, 301 N.C. at 199, 270 S.E.2d at 421. Further, this Court clarified our holding in Dickens by noting:\nIn State v. Dickens, we relied on the fact, appearing of record, that defendant had been duly convicted in the district court on the very charges to which he entered pleas of guilty in superior court in addition to his statement in his transcript that he was \u2018in fact\u2019 guilty to support our conclusion that a factual basis for the plea existed in the record.\nId. at 199, 270 S.E.2d at 422 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).\nIn this case, there was scant factual information before the trial court when defendant\u2019s guilty plea was accepted. As noted in Sinclair, the Transcript of Plea standing alone was inadequate. Similarly, defense counsel\u2019s stipulation to the existence of a factual basis was insufficient because the stipulation gave the trial court no additional substantive information about the case as required by statute. Likewise, the indictment simply stated the charge and did not provide any further factual description of defendant\u2019s particular alleged conduct. In sum, the transcript, defense counsel\u2019s stipulation, and the indictment taken together did not contain enough information for an independent judicial determination of defendant\u2019s actual guilt in the instant case.\nFinally, we note the summary of facts provided by the prosecution at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing could not serve as the factual basis in this case because that summary occurred months after the plea had been accepted. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(c) requires that the trial court make the determination of a factual basis when accepting the plea.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nWe conclude the trial court erred in accepting defendant\u2019s guilty plea because there was nothing in the record to support an independent judicial determination of a factual basis for the plea. Because we find the trial court erred in accepting defendant\u2019s guilty plea, we do not reach the issue of whether fair and just reasons exist for defendant to withdraw his plea. The Court of Appeals is reversed, and this case is remanded to that court for remand to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY,. Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Dahr Joseph Tanoury, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Kevin R Bradley for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WADDY NATHAN AGNEW\nNo. 388PA06\n(Filed 4 May 2007)\nCriminal Law\u2014 guilty plea \u2014 independent judicial determination \u2014 information before the court not sufficient\nThe trial court erred by accepting a guilty plea where there was nothing in the record to support an independent judicial determination of a factual basis for the plea. The transcript of plea was inadequate standing alone because the requirement of a factual basis would then be meaningless. Defense counsel\u2019s stipulation of a factual basis was insufficient because it gave the court no additional substantive evidence, the indictment simply stated the charge and did not provide any further factual description, and a summary of facts provided by the prosecution to a subsequent judge at defendant\u2019s sentencing hearing occurred months later rather than when the plea was accepted. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1022(c).\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, 178 N.C. App. 234, 630 S.E.2d 743 (2006), affirming a judgment dated 9 March 2005 entered by Judge Clifton W. Everett, Jr. in Superior Court, Pitt County, following denial of defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 February 2007.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Dahr Joseph Tanoury, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nKevin R Bradley for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0333-01", "first_page_order": 391, "last_page_order": 396 }