{ "id": 3744653, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNIE SCOTT CARPENTER", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Carpenter", "decision_date": "2007-06-28", "docket_number": "No. 422A06", "first_page": "382", "last_page": "392", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "361 N.C. 382" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636325 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 N.C. App. 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8234343 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/179/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636325 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "541-42" }, { "page": "543", "parenthetical": "Elmore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/632/0538-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 833", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835, 836", "parenthetical": "holding that 28.3 grams of cocaine was a substantial amount sufficient to support the inference that defendant intended to sell the drugs" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556155 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659, 660", "parenthetical": "holding that 28.3 grams of cocaine was a substantial amount sufficient to support the inference that defendant intended to sell the drugs" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4703969 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 L. Ed. 2d 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "488 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1494036 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/488/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 594", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2567442 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0594-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 L. Ed. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1023", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 4836, 5158, 4882, 5207, 5176 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1023-04", "/us/494/1023-03", "/us/494/1023-05", "/us/494/1023-02", "/us/494/1023-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 8716319 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "635" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sc/289/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 396", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4774166 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0396-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 S.E.2d 470", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492599 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "299", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "406 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893" }, { "page": "890", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "890", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "890-91" }, { "page": "892" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2554614 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "303" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "305-06" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "432 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "\"The admissibility of evidence under [Rule 404(b)] is guided by two further constraints - similarity and temporal proximity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2532283 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412", "parenthetical": "\"The admissibility of evidence under [Rule 404(b)] is guided by two further constraints - similarity and temporal proximity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0402-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4773087 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "567 S.E.2d 120", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "122-23" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123" }, { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511282 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "155" }, { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574100 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "365-66", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596105 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "173-74" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4772378 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 762", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4714140 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770" }, { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0762-01" ] }, { "cite": "389 S.E.2d 48", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5306215 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0268-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1025, "char_count": 24339, "ocr_confidence": 0.767, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4571188300813225e-07, "percentile": 0.8051450103847754 }, "sha256": "5fcbd42f4174dc2dec6d1d086e7c0c12f3a958636d6160727d7d841392b80e86", "simhash": "1:1747c423212f0df2", "word_count": 4038 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:19:48.141297+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNIE SCOTT CARPENTER" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EDMUNDS, Justice.\nOn 21 April 2005, a jury convicted defendant Donnie Carpenter of one count of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. During the trial, the State introduced evidence pursuant to North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) of defendant\u2019s prior sale of cocaine and resulting felony conviction. Defendant contends this evidence was improperly admitted because his previous sale of cocaine, which occurred eight years before, lacked sufficient similarity with the crime for which he was being tried. Because we agree that the trial court\u2019s findings failed to establish sufficient similarity and that introduction of this past sale served only to show defendant\u2019s propensity to commit a similar crime, we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nAt trial, the State presented evidence that on the night of 11 March 2004, Lincolnton Police Officer Dennis Harris parked in a vacant lot across from the Gaston College campus. At approximately 10:00 p.m., he watched as a car backed out of a residential driveway and proceeded down the middle of the street. After following for about one block, Officer Harris conducted a routine traffic stop for being left of the center line. The car held four people, including defendant, who was sitting in the back seat. When Officer Harris approached the vehicle, he smelled marijuana and saw a bit of smoke inside, and accordingly conducted a search for drugs.\nAfter first searching the driver, Officer Harris removed defendant from the vehicle and conducted a pat-down. In the pocket of defendant\u2019s sweatshirt, Officer Harris found a small red tube containing twelve unpackaged rocks of crack cocaine, each within average dosage range and weighing a total of 1.6 grams. He also found two bags of marijuana in defendant\u2019s right sock.\nOfficer Harris secured the drugs for evidence and handcuffed defendant. He then searched the interior of the car and the two female passengers who had been in the vehicle. After finding no additional contraband, he released the driver and female passengers and took defendant into custody.\nThe State indicted defendant for one felony count of possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 90-95(a). Although he was also indicted for one felony count of possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana, the State later reduced the marijuana charge to misdemeanor possession, and defendant\u2019s conviction on that charge is not before us on this appeal.\nTo establish defendant\u2019s intent to sell or deliver cocaine, the State introduced the testimony of Lincolnton Police Chief Dean Abernathy, who had been a narcotics officer in 1996 when he conducted an undercover drug operation leading to defendant\u2019s conviction for the sale and delivery of cocaine. At the start of Chief Abernathy\u2019s testimony, defendant objected, contending this and other evidence from the 1996 offense was inadmissible under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b), N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-l,dRule 404(b) (2005), and that the prejudicial effect of the evidence would substantially outweigh its probative value. The State responded that defendant\u2019s prior offense of selling cocaine was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show defendant\u2019s intent to sell cocaine in 2004.\nThe trial court conducted a voir dire examination of Chief Abernathy. He testified that he was a lieutenant in charge of narcotics investigations in 1996. On the afternoon of 12 September 1996, Chief Abernathy gave a paid police informant a $100 bill and a body wire. The informant then drove to a high crime area in Lincolnton, with the police following at a discreet distance, listening to and recording the informant\u2019s conversations via the body wire. At approximately 3:13 p.m., the informant stopped his car and spoke to defendant, who was standing in a yard adjacent to the street. The informant paid defendant $80.00 for six rocks of crack cocaine, which weighed a total of .82 grams. Chief Abernathy had provided the informant a \u201cBC Powder\u201d plastic package to hold the cocaine rocks, and the informant returned that container with the crack cocaine to Chief Abernathy following the purchase. Defendant was later arrested in March 1997 and pleaded guilty to the sale and delivery of crack cocaine.\nAt the completion of the voir dire examination, and after considering arguments of counsel, the trial court made findings of fact as to the circumstances of and quantity of drugs involved in each offense. The trial court observed that the average dosage unit of a rock of crack cocaine is between .05 and .12 grams. In neither instance was the cocaine possessed by defendant individually packaged. The court further found that defendant\u2019s 1997 plea of guilty to the sale or delivery of .82 grams of crack cocaine supported an inference that his \u2022 2004 possession of the larger quantity of 1.6 grams of crack cocaine was with intent to sell. Based on these findings, the trial court held that evidence of defendant\u2019s 1997 conviction was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show defendant\u2019s intent. However, the trial court denied admission of defendant\u2019s 1997 indictment on the grounds that its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative value.\nWhen the jxny returned, the State called Chief Abernathy as a witness to describe the 1996 drug sale, played the audiotape recording of the drug sale, and introduced the defendant\u2019s transcript of plea and judgment. Defendant continually renewed his objections to the introduction of this evidence. The trial court admitted the evidence, then instructed the jury that the evidence could be considered only for the purpose of considering whether\ndefendant had the intent which is a necessary element of the crime that is charged in this case. If you believe this evidence you may consider it but only for the limited purpose of showing intent. You may not consider this evidence to prove the character of the defendant or that he acted in conformity therewith on the date of this offense.\nThe court repeated the essence of this instruction in the final charge to the jury before it began deliberations.\nThe jury convicted defendant of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine, and defendant appealed, assigning error to the admission of evidence of the 1996 crime. In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision to admit evidence of the 1996 crime under Rule 404(b), determining that the trial court reasonably concluded the 1996 and 2004 crimes were sufficiently similar and that the 1996 crime was relevant to show defendant\u2019s intent to sell or deliver cocaine in 2004. State v. Carpenter, \u2014 N.C. App. -, -, 632 S.E.2d 538, 541-42 (2006). The dissenting judge, however, argued that the only similarity between the two offenses was that \u201cdefendant previously sold cocaine and is now charged with selling cocaine.\u201d Id. at -, 632 S.E.2d at 543 (Elmore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Thus, we must consider whether defendant\u2019s 1996 possession and sale of .82 grams of crack cocaine makes it more probable that he intended to sell 1.6 grams of the same drug in 2004.\nNorth Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides:\n(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. \u2014 Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, entrapment or accident.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b). We have characterized Rule 404(b) as a \u201cgeneral rule of inclusion of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the crime charged.\u201d State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d 48, 54 (1990). However, we have also observed that Rule 404(b) is \u201cconsistent with North Carolina practice prior to [the Rule\u2019s] enactment.\u201d State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 770, 340 S.E.2d 350, 356 (1986); accord State v. McKoy, 317 N.C. 519, 525, 347 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1986). Before the enactment of Rule 404(b), North Carolina courts followed \u201c[t]he general rule . . . that in a prosecution for a particular crime, the State cannot offer evidence tending to show that the accused has committed another distinct, independent, or separate offense. This is true even though the other offense is of the same nature as the crime charged.\u201d State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 173, 81 S.E.2d 364, 365 (1954) (citations omitted); see also DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. at 769, 340 S.E.2d at 355 (\u201cSince State v. McClain ... it has been accepted as an established principle in North Carolina that \u2018the State may not offer proof of another crime independent of and distinct from the crime for which defendant is being prosecuted even though the separate offense is of the same nature as the charged crime.\u2019 \u201d) (quoting State v. Williams, 303 N.C. 507, 513, 279 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1981)). As we explained in McClain, the general rule \u201crests on these cogent reasons\u201d:\n(1) Logically, the commission of an independent offense is not proof in itself of the commission of another crime.\n(2) Evidence of the commission by the accused of crimes unconnected with that for which he is being tried, when offered by the State in chief, violates the rule which forbids the State initially to attack the character of the accused, and also the rule that bad character may not be proved by particular acts, and is, therefore, inadmissible for that purpose.\n(3) Proof that a defendant has been guilty of another crime equally heinous prompts to a ready acceptance of and belief in the prosecution\u2019s theory that he is guilty of the crime charged. Its effect is to predispose the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of innocence.\n(4) Furthermore, it is clear that evidence of other crimes compels the defendant to meet charges of which the indictment gives him no information, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of issues, and thus diverts the attention of the jury from the charge immediately before it. The rule may be said to be an application of the principle that the evidence must be confined to the point in issue in the case on trial.\n240 N.C. at 173-74, 81 S.E.2d at 365-66 (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also McKoy, 317 N.C. at 526, 347 S.E.2d at 378. Thus, while we have interpreted Rule 404(b) broadly, we have also long acknowledged that evidence of prior convictions must be carefully evaluated by the trial court.\nAccordingly, we have observed that evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) \u201cshould be carefully scrutinized in order to adequately safeguard against the improper introduction of character evidence against the accused.\u201d State v. Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. 150, 154, 567 S.E.2d 120, 122 (2002). When evidence of a prior crime is introduced, the \u201c \u2018natural and inevitable tendency\u2019 \u201d for a judge or jury \u201c \u2018is to give excessive weight to the vicious record of crime thus exhibited and either to allow it to bear too strongly on the present charge or to take the proof of it as justifying a condemnation, irrespective of the accused\u2019s guilt of the present charge.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 154, 567 S.E.2d at 122-23 (quoting IA John Henry Wigmore, Evidence \u00a7 58.2, at 1212 (Peter Tillers ed., 1983)). Indeed, \u201c[t]he dangerous tendency of [Rule 404(b)] evidence to mislead and raise a legally spurious presumption of guilt requires that its admissibility should be subjected to strict scrutiny by the courts.\u201d State v. Johnson, 317 N.C. 417, 430, 347 S.E.2d 7, 15 (1986).\nIn light of the perils inherent in introducing prior crimes under Rule 404(b), several constraints have been placed on the admission of such evidence. Our Rules of Evidence require that in order for the prior crime to be admissible, it must be relevant to the currently alleged crime. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 401 (2005) (\u201c \u2018Relevant evidence\u2019 means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.\u201d); id., Rule 402 (2005) (\u201cEvidence which is not relevant is not admissible.\u201d). In addition, \u201cthe rule of inclusion described in Coffey is constrained by the requirements of similarity and temporal proximity.\u201d Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 154, 567 S.E.2d at 123; see also State v. Lynch, 334 N.C. 402, 412, 432 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1993) (\u201cThe admissibility of evidence under [Rule 404(b)] is guided by two further constraints \u2014 similarity and temporal proximity.\u201d). This Court has stated that \u201cremoteness in time is less significant when the prior conduct is used to show intent, motive, knowledge, or lack of accident; remoteness in time generally affects only the weight to be given such evidence, not its admissibility.\u201d State v. Stager, 329 N.C. 278, 307, 406 S.E.2d 876, 893 (1991). Nevertheless, we note that the two offenses in the case at bar are separated by eight years. Moreover, as to the \u201csimilarity\u201d component, evidence of a prior bad act must constitute \u201c \u2018substantial evidence tending to support a reasonable finding by the jury that the defendant committed [a] similar act.\u2019 \u201d Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 155, 567 S.E.2d at 123 (quoting Stager, 329 N.C. at 303, 406 S.E.2d at 890 (alteration in original)). \u201cUnder Rule 404(b) a prior act or crime is \u2018similar\u2019 if there are \u2018some unusual facts present in both crimes ....\u2019\u201d Stager, 329 N.C. at 304, 406 S.E.2d at 890 (citations omitted). Finally, if the propounder of the evidence is able to establish that a prior bad act is both relevant and meets the requirements of Rule 404(b), the trial court must balance the danger of undue prejudice against the probative value of the evidence, pursuant to Rule 403. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 403 (2005).\nDefendant\u2019s prior drug conviction could be relevant to the instant offense under Rule 401. However, if the only relevancy is to show defendant\u2019s character \u201c \u2018or his disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the one charged,\u2019 \u201d it is inadmissible under Rule 404(b). State v. Artis, 325 N.C. 278, 299, 384 S.E.2d 470, 481 (1989) (quoting State v. Young, 317 N.C. 396, 412, 346 S.E.2d 626, 635 (1986)), judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1023, 108 L. Ed. 2d 604 (1990). Accordingly, we next consider whether evidence of the prior offense is permitted by Rule 404(b). Defendant contends evidence related to his 1996 sale of cocaine lacked sufficient similarity with his 2004 alleged crime of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine. The State responds that the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law were supported by its findings of fact. We begin with the State\u2019s contentions.\nThe State argues that defendant possessed significantly large quantities of cocaine in each case and that in each case the individual rocks were of a similar dosage size. However, these purported similarities do not stand up to scrutiny. In defendant\u2019s 1996 sale, six rocks were involved, while defendant possessed twelve rocks in the case at bar. The total weight of cocaine in the instant case, 1.6 grams, is almost twice the .82 grams of cocaine that defendant sold in 1996. At most, the trial court found that both cases involved multiple dosages of crack cocaine but made no findings as to the significance of these quantities. Thus, the findings do not establish whether these amounts are pertinent to defendant\u2019s alleged intent to sell and distribute. Moreover, we see more differences than similarities when both the quantity and weight of the contraband in the two cases differ by almost precisely 100 percent.\nThe State also claims the trial court correctly identified a similarity between the 1996 sale of cocaine and the 2004 alleged crime because, in both instances, the crack cocaine rocks were not individually wrapped. This finding is accurate. However, as Chief Abernathy later explained in his testimony before the jury, rocks of crack cocaine are not normally individually packaged:\nQ. Now, based on your training and experience what is the way in which crack cocaine is sold?\nA. By a dosage unit.\nQ. And what is a dosage unit?\nA. A rock, one rock.\nQ. And are these rocks usually packaged in some kind of paper or plastic?\nA. Not normally. Sometimes you did get them packaged, but not normally, no.\nQ. Now, you testified that based on your experience crack is not generally packaged in a package by the person who is selling it?\nA. Under these circumstances, no, not normally. During drive-up buys and whatever, no, it\u2019s usually loose.\nWe acknowledge that this testimony was given at trial, after the trial court made its ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. Nevertheless, this testimony establishes that the supposed similarity between 1996 and 2004 describes only generic behavior. When the State\u2019s efforts to show similarities between crimes establish no more than \u201ccharacteristics inherent to most\u201d crimes of that type, the State has \u201cfailed to show... that sufficient similarities existed\u201d for the purposes of Rule 404(b). Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 155, 567 S.E.2d at 123. In Al-Bayyinah, we deemed the \u201cuse of a weapon, a demand for money, [and] immediate flight\u201d to be generic because those characteristics were \u201cinherent to most armed robberies\u201d and thus inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Id. For the same reasons, the lack of individual packaging of these cocaine rocks is neither an \u201cunusual fact\u201d nor a \u201cparticularly similar act\u201d common to defendant\u2019s 1996 crime and his 2004 alleged offense. Stager, 329 N.C. at 304, 406 S.E.2d at 890-91; State v. Green, 321 N.C. 594, 603, 365 S.E.2d 587, 593, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 900, 102 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1988); State v. Riddick, 316 N.C. 127, 133, 340 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1986).\nIn response, defendant argues that the offenses were not similar. In 1996, the crime took place in the afternoon in a high crime area when defendant sold six rocks of crack cocaine to a police informant who approached him to make a purchase. The informant placed these rocks in a \u201cBC Powder\u201d plastic package provided by the police. In 2004, defendant was a passenger in a car stopped at night for a routine traffic offense across from a community college. The police officer searched defendant and found twelve rocks of crack cocaine in defendant\u2019s small cylindrical tube, but did not discover normal indices of drug selling, such as scales, a pager, or cash.\nIn Al-Bayyinah, we found two robberies to be dissimilar from each other when the facts and circumstances differed: 356 N.C. at 155, 567 S.E.2d at 123. Those two robberies were themselves deemed dissimilar from a third robbery, in which the robber surprised the victim from behind, hit him on the back of the head, and stabbed him. Id. We concluded that \u201csubstantial evidence of similarity among the prior bad acts and the crimes charged is . . . lacking.\u201d Id. By way of contrast, we found numerous significant similarities between two shootings in Stager, when:\nIn the first Splitt robbery, the robber rushed into the store and immediately demanded money, while in the second, the robber pretended to be a legitimate customer before demanding money. In the first robbery, the man used a gun; in the second, gasoline and a lighter. The first robbery took place in the early morning, and the second occurred at night. The first robber was masked, while the second was not.\n(1) each of the defendant\u2019s husbands had died as a result of a single gunshot wound, (2) the weapon in each case was a .25 caliber semi-automatic handgun, (3) both weapons were purchased for the defendant\u2019s protection, (4) both men were shot in the early morning hours, (5) the defendant discovered both victims after their respective shootings, (6) the defendant was the last person in the immediate company of both victims, (7) both victims died in the bed that they shared with the defendant, and (8) the defendant benefitted from life insurance proceeds resulting from both deaths.\n329 N.C. at 305-06, 406 S.E.2d at 892.\nWhile some of the disparities between defendant\u2019s 1996 offense and the case at bar might be peripheral standing alone, we consider them in their totality. The 1996 sale and the alleged 2004 possession with intent to sell differed in numerous material aspects. Neither the collective weight of the crack cocaine nor the unpackaged state of the rocks, whether considered as separate factors or together, makes the past crime and the instant offense \u201csimilar\u201d as we have interpreted that term in this context. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s 1996 sale of cocaine, as a prior bad act, did not constitute \u201csubstantial evidence tending to support a reasonable finding by the jury that the defendant committed [a] similar act,\u201d and hence was inadmissible under Rule 404(b). Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 155, 567 S.E.2d at 123 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nWe next consider whether the trial court\u2019s error in admitting this evidence was prejudicial. \u201cA defendant is prejudiced by errors . . . when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2005); see also Al-Bayyinah, 356 N.C. at 157, 567 S.E.2d at 124. The only other evidence of defendant\u2019s intent to sell or deliver that we perceive in the record is the quantity of drugs. While this Court recognizes that \u201c[t]he mere quantity of the controlled substance alone may suffice to support the inference of an intent to transfer, sell or deliver,\u201d State v. Morgan, 329 N.C. 654, 659, 660, 406 S.E.2d 833, 835, 836 (1991) (holding that 28.3 grams of cocaine was a substantial amount sufficient to support the inference that defendant intended to sell the drugs), the quantity here was not great. The inference afforded by the amount of drugs in defendant\u2019s possession does not outweigh the prejudice caused by the erroneous admission of his prior conviction. Accordingly, we deem the error prejudicial. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a).. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court with instructions to vacate defendant\u2019s conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or deliver and to further remand this case to the trial court for a new trial.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED; NEW TRIAL.", "type": "majority", "author": "EDMUNDS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Douglas A. Johnston, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "M. Victoria Jayne for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. DONNIE SCOTT CARPENTER\nNo. 422A06\n(Filed 28 June 2007)\nEvidence\u2014 prior crimes or bad acts \u2014 sale of cocaine \u2014 prejudicial error\nThe trial court erred in a possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine case by admitting under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(b) evidence of defendant\u2019s prior sale of cocaine in 1996 and resulting felony conviction, and defendant\u2019s conviction is vacated and remanded for a new trial, because: (1) the two offenses in the case at bar are separated by eight years, and evidence related to defendant\u2019s 1996 sale of cocaine lacked sufficient similarity with his 2004 alleged crime of possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine; (2) at most, the trial court found that both cases involved multiple dosages of crack cocaine but made no findings as to the significance of these quantities, and there were more differences than similarities when both the quantity and weight of the contraband in the two cases differ by almost precisely 100 percent; (3) although in both instances the crack cocaine rocks were not individually wrapped, an officer testified that rocks of crack cocaine are not normally individually packaged; and (4) the inference afforded by the amount of drugs in defendant\u2019s possession does not outweigh the prejudice caused by the erroneous admission of his prior conviction.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 179 N.C. App. 79, 632 S.E.2d 538 (2006), finding no error in defendant\u2019s trial which resulted in a judgment entered 21 April 2005 by Judge Timothy S. Kincaid in Superior Court, Lincoln County. Heard in the Supreme Court 9 January 2007.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Douglas A. Johnston, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nM. Victoria Jayne for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0382-01", "first_page_order": 440, "last_page_order": 450 }