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R. App. P. 10(b)(1) and defendant did not \"specifically and distinctly\" assign plain error as required by N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684963 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 S.E.2d 458", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4778292 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "421 S.E.2d 577", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507119 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0439-01" ] }, { "cite": "464 S.E.2d 448", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Upchurch, 332 N.C. 439, 421 S.E.2d 577 (1992); State v. Mitchell, 317 N.C. 661, 346 S.E.2d 458 (1986)" }, { "page": "457" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795939 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Upchurch, 332 N.C. 439, 421 S.E.2d 577 (1992); State v. Mitchell, 317 N.C. 661, 346 S.E.2d 458 (1986)" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "535", "parenthetical": "Brady, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2985125 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62", "parenthetical": "Brady, J., concurring" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "531 S.E.2d 428", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 158", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685078 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0158-01" ] }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "5", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575103 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 S.E.2d 410", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "421" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571388 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 163", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 70-71, 277 S.E.2d 410, 421 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54098 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 70-71, 277 S.E.2d 410, 421 (1981)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1777, "char_count": 49535, "ocr_confidence": 0.772, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.519760342599042e-07, "percentile": 0.9235889814425474 }, "sha256": "d404771f7672b811783499a887cd66e5807bd340f3bc875cdb1b8a654ffaada5", "simhash": "1:c36a4c30676e0e42", "word_count": 8162 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:19:48.141297+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER EDWARD GOSS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRADY, Justice.\nOn 22 September 2003, defendant Christopher Edward Goss stabbed his neighbor Deborah Sturgill Veler to death in her home, inflicting over fifty sharp-force wounds to her back, neck, face, hands, and arms using knives from her kitchen. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, and a jury returned a binding recommendation that defendant be sentenced to death. On 8 February 2005, the trial court entered judgment sentencing defendant accordingly.\nBACKGROUND\nAt trial, Kenneth Courtner testified that at approximately noon on Sunday, 21 September 2003, he took his three-year-old son Devin, the grandson of Deborah Sturgill Veler (the victim), to stay overnight with his grandmother at her residence in Jefferson, North Carolina. Denise Veler Courtner, Devin\u2019s mother and the victim\u2019s daughter, had made arrangements to pick up Devin at approximately 6:30 a.m. the next morning, 22 September 2003, at a church parking lot adjacent to State Highway 221.\nNancy Kerley, Devin\u2019s paternal grandmother, testified that sometime after 6:30 a.m. on 22 September 2003 she was driving to work when she passed the church parking lot where the victim had arranged to meet Ms. Courtner. Ms. Kerley observed Ms. Courtner sitting in a truck in the parking lot and stopped to speak with her, whereupon Ms. Kerley learned that Ms. Courtner had been waiting for her mother for approximately one hour. Eventually, Ms. Kerley decided to drive to the victim\u2019s residence, and Ms. Courtner contacted law enforcement to request that an officer be sent to check on her mother.\nAshe County Deputy Sheriff Rob Powers was dispatched to the victim\u2019s residence in response to Ms. Courtner\u2019s request. When Deputy Powers arrived at the residence at approximately 9:15 a.m., he observed Ms. Kerley knocking at the front door of the residence. A neighbor, Rita Wagoner Jordan, testified that she arrived at the scene at about the same time as Deputy Powers, having overheard the dispatch on her police radio scanner. After Deputy Powers began knocking, he eventually observed Devin inside the residence. Ms. Kerley and Deputy Powers were able to instruct Devin to open the front door, at which time he jumped into the arms of Ms. Jordan, appearing to be \u201chungry, tired, sleepy, [and] in shock.\u201d Deputy Powers then entered the residence and found the victim\u2019s body on the living room floor.\nI. STATE\u2019S INVESTIGATION\nA subsequent investigation of the crime scene by law enforcement officials uncovered evidence that the murder may have occurred during the commission of a burglary and a sexual assault on the victim. There was also a substantial amount of blood discovered at the residence, which later testing indicated came from two individuals. Investigators performed a neighborhood canvas on 22 September 2003 and again on 24 September 2003. On both dates, an investigator went to the residence of Jim and Anna Lee Goss, defendant\u2019s parents, where defendant resided at the time. On each occasion, defendant was interviewed and denied having left his parents\u2019 house at any time during the night of the victim\u2019s murder.\nOn 12 October 2003, defendant was booked on unrelated charges by the Jefferson Police Department. During this process, acting Police Chief David Larry Neaves observed a cut on defendant\u2019s arm that caused him to suspect defendant may have been involved in the murder. The same evening, while defendant was still in custody, Chief Neaves and North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Steve Wilson questioned defendant about the murder. Defendant waived his Miranda rights and agreed to answer their questions. During the interrogation, defendant gave an account of his whereabouts on 21 and 22 September 2003 that was inconsistent with statements he had provided previously. However, defendant again denied any involvement in the murder and explained that the cut on his arm resulted from a piece of broken glass falling on him while he was cleaning the garage windows at his parents\u2019 house.\nOn 24 October 2003, investigators served a warrant on defendant for the seizure of hair and blood samples. After defendant provided these samples and was transported back to the Ashe County Jail, defendant asked to speak with Chief Neaves and Special Agent Wilson and was taken to an interrogation room, where he waived his Miranda rights again. Special Agent Wilson then asked defendant what he wanted to share, and defendant immediately responded that he had \u201ckilled\u201d the victim.\nII. DEFENDANT\u2019S CONFESSION\nThereafter, defendant provided a statement that contained, inter alia, the following facts: At about 3:00 p.m. on Sunday, 21 September 2003, defendant walked from his parents\u2019 house to a 7-Eleven convenience store in West Jefferson to purchase beer, carrying with him a duffle bag. As defendant was returning from the store, the victim stopped her sport utility vehicle (SUV) and offered him a ride. Defendant accepted and got into the front passenger seat. Devin was also in the vehicle. While on their way, the victim asked defendant whether he knew her daughter, Denise, and he replied that he did. When they arrived at the victim\u2019s residence, she asked defendant whether he wanted to return later that night, and he indicated that he would do so.\nDefendant returned to his parents\u2019 house, entering through the basement door, and consumed eight or nine of the beers he had purchased. At approximately 11:00 p.m., he returned to the victim\u2019s residence. When he arrived, he knocked on the front door and was invited in by the victim, who led defendant to a couch in the living room. Devin was apparently asleep in a nearby bedroom at the time. Defendant and the victim then engaged in some casual conversation until the victim ultimately returned to the subject of her daughter Denise. She asked defendant whether he had fathered one of Denise\u2019s children, and he denied the accusation. She further inquired about a party that defendant and Denise had attended years earlier and said Denise claimed that defendant had raped her at the party. Defendant stood up and stated his intention to leave, but the victim pointed at him and told him, \u201cYou\u2019re not going nowhere.\u201d\nAs the victim was pointing at defendant, she poked her finger into his forehead. Defendant reacted to this by striking her on the nose with the palm of his hand. The victim said she intended to call the police and rushed into her bedroom. Although she attempted to close the door behind her, defendant followed her, grabbed her hair, and threw her onto the bed. A struggle ensued on the bed as defendant hit the victim \u201ca few times.\u201d Defendant released the victim and she started to run, but he grabbed her and pushed her down. She then escaped his grasp, but again he was able to wrestle her down to the floor. Defendant inquired as to whether the victim still intended to call the police, and she replied, \u201cYes.\u201d Although defendant pleaded with her to calm down, she cursed at him and told him he was \u201cgoing to pay for this.\u201d Defendant then struck the victim several times in the face and the back of her head until she stopped moving. He took a break to smoke a cigarette and think about what he was doing.\nDefendant left the victim\u2019s residence and returned to his parents\u2019 house, where he collected a change of clothes, a hammer, and some duct tape, placing these items in his duffle bag. He walked back to the victim\u2019s residence and pushed open the locked rear double doors with the intention \u201cto make it look like a robbery or breaking and entering\u201d and with the hope that the victim would forget who had assaulted her. He went into the kitchen and began to ransack it, but as he did so the victim raised her head and saw .him. Defendant got on top of the victim and told her to calm down and not to call the police. When she indicated that she would not follow his instructions, defendant bound her hands behind her back using his duct t\u00e1pe and also bound her feet together. He then struck her repeatedly until she once again stopped moving.\nShortly after defendant resumed ransacking the house, the victim regained consciousness and started to scream. Defendant asked her to be quiet and to remember that she did not know who he was. The victim stated that defendant was \u201cgoing to jail.\u201d Defendant then walked to the kitchen and obtained a ten-inch long knife belonging to the victim. He returned to the victim, straddled her, and began to stab her in the back, \u201cnot kind of hard at first, maybe four times.\u201d He paused a moment and then stabbed her five more times in the back, harder and deeper than before. The victim was silent and did not struggle.\nDefendant at this point asked aloud, \u201cWhat the hell am I doing?\u201d He laid the knife on the victim\u2019s back and returned to the kitchen, but when he heard her mumble something, he obtained a second, longer knife. Defendant straddled the victim again and stabbed her five to eight more times on the left side of her back. He then left the second knife in her body, stood up and saw that the victim was still breathing though she remained silent, and used another knife to slit her throat \u201cto make sure she died.\u201d\nDefendant soon realized he had cut himself on the left forearm and that he was bleeding \u201cquite a bit.\u201d He removed his shirt and wrapped it around his arm in an attempt to stop the bleeding. Then he went to the bedroom to check on Devin. While there, defendant observed he was still bleeding and that some of this blood had gotten onto the bed. After \u201cjust walking around thinking what to do,\u201d defendant returned to the victim and observed that she was no longer breathing. He noted the time on a nearby clock was 3:45 a.m.\nIn his statement, defendant further described the actions he took after the murder. He first changed out of his clothes and put on the clothes he had obtained from his parents\u2019 house, placing the old clothes in his duffle bag. He then walked back to his parents\u2019 house, cleaned some blood from his chest and shoulder, and bandaged the cut on his left forearm. For the third time, he returned to the victim\u2019s residence, again through the rear double doors, but this time he was wearing black leather gloves. He took several actions \u201cjust to make it look crazy,\u201d including pulling down the victim\u2019s pants and panties and pouring out a container of lotion onto her buttocks and legs. He placed an envelope on which he had written \u201c[y]ou owe me money\u201d on the victim\u2019s buttocks and put a pair of eyeglasses and a small knife on top of the envelope. He wrote \u201cI will Mil\u201d on the couch, \u201ctrying to make it look like somebody crazy did that to [the victim].\u201d\nDefendant took several additional actions to conceal his identity and to mislead investigators: He used a dampened towel to wipe down the handle of a knife and to wipe off what he thought was blood on the wall above the victim\u2019s bed, used scissors to cut out bloody parts of the top sheet and mattress on the victim\u2019s bed, went to a rear window on the ground floor and tried to pry it open with his hammer until the lock broke, cut the telephone line, and spread credit cards on top of the victim\u2019s body. He placed the pieces of duct tape that he removed from the victim\u2019s arms and legs and the pieces of bed sheet and mattress he had removed from the victim\u2019s bed in his duffle bag. Defendant took seventeen dollars from the victim\u2019s Mtchen counter-top and her vehicle keys and checked the house to make sure he did not forget anything. He then drove her SUV to the rear of a nearby grocery store in order to dispose of his hat and duffle bag. Returning to the victim\u2019s residence, he parked the vehicle in the same place it was before and wiped it down to remove fingerprints.\nDefendant went into the victim\u2019s residence once more to retrieve his hammer and smoke a cigarette. He also went upstairs to check on Devin, returned the victim\u2019s vehicle keys to the Mtchen countertop, and turned off all the lights before leaving through the back door of the residence and walking back to his parents\u2019 house, entering through the basement door to his room. He smoked another cigarette and reflected on what he had done, then went to sleep at approximately 5:00 a.m.\nAt the conclusion of his statement, defendant explained that he stabbed the victim because he could not calm her down or convince her not to call the police and that \u201c[i]f she had agreed not to tell on [him], [he] would not have Mlled her.\u201d\nIII. DEFENDANT\u2019S CONVICTION AND APPEAL AS OF RIGHT\nOn 15 December 2003, the Ashe County Grand Jury returned a true bill of indictment charging defendant with the first-degree murder of Deborah Sturgill Veler. On 2 February 2005, following defendant\u2019s trial in Ashe County Superior Court, a jury returned its verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and deliberation and under the felony murder rule. On 8 February 2005, following a sentencing hearing, the jury returned its binding recommendation that defendant be sentenced to death. The same day, the trial court entered its judgment consistent with the jury\u2019s recommendations. Defendant now appeals his conviction and sentence of death to this Court as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a).\nANALYSIS\nI. JURY SELECTION\nDefendant assigns error to the reopening of voir dire of two prospective jurors based upon the trial court\u2019s finding that both had provided incorrect statements in response to the State\u2019s initial voir dire questioning. The governing statute provides in part:\n(g) If at any time after a juror has been accepted by a party, and before the jury is impaneled, it is discovered that the juror has made an incorrect statement during voir dire or that some other good reason exists:\n(1) The judge may examine, or permit counsel to examine, the juror to determine whether there is a basis for challenge for cause.\n(2) If the judge determines there is a basis for challenge for cause, he must excuse the juror or sustain any challenge for cause that has been made.\n(3) If the judge determines there is no basis for challenge for cause, any party who has not exhausted his peremptory challenges may challenge the juror.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(g) (2005). It is well settled that \u201cthe decision to reopen voir dire rests in the trial court\u2019s discretion\u201d and the trial court\u2019s decision will not be overturned absent an abuse of that discretion. See State v. Bond, 345 N.C. 1, 19, 478 S.E.2d 163, 172 (1996) (citing State v. Parton, 303 N.C. 55, 70-71, 277 S.E.2d 410, 421 (1981)), cert. denied, 521 U.S. 1124 (1997). Applying this standard of review to the instant case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court\u2019s decision to reopen voir dire of either juror.\nDuring the State\u2019s voir dire on 18 January 2005, prospective jurors Jason Ryan Brown and Dennis Jeffrey Dancy were both questioned as to whether they had \u201c[a]ny close friends or relatives who have either been a witness, a defendant, or a victim in a criminal case.\u201d The record indicates that neither Brown nor Dancy raised his hand to respond in the affirmative.\nOn 19 January 2005, the State passed a panel of twelve jurors that it found acceptable \u2014 including Brown and Dancy \u2014 to the defense. Subsequently, and before the jury was impaneled, it came to the State\u2019s attention that both jurors had relatives who had been defendants in criminal cases, although neither had indicated this when asked initially. When Dancy was questioned by defense counsel on voir dire, he mentioned for the first time that he had \u201c[s]ome cousins that have been convicted of capital crimes.\u201d Additionally, the State was informed by law enforcement officers that Brown\u2019s biological father had been convicted of murder and that his uncle was a fugitive from justice suspected of murder.\nDefendant exercised eight peremptory challenges following his voir dire of the twelve prospective jurors and found four of them acceptable, including Brown and Dancy. The State then moved to reopen voir dire of Brown and Dancy, and the trial court allowed these motions pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(g) over defendant\u2019s objection. After further questioning of Brown and Dancy, the State exercised a peremptory challenge for both of these prospective jurors.\nWith regard to Brown and Dancy, defendant contends that the two prospective jurors did not answer the prosecutor\u2019s initial question incorrectly because that question \u201cwent only to \u2018close family members or friends.\u2019 \u201d Thus, defendant argues, since neither Brown\u2019s biological father and uncle nor Dancy\u2019s distant cousins can be considered \u201cclose family members,\u201d the trial court abused its discretion by reopening voir dire as to Brown and Dancy. Defendant relies in part on what he refers to as an \u201cacknowledgment\u201d of prosecutors that the question was an inquiry into \u201cclose family members or friends.\u201d This reliance is misplaced for two reasons: First, the statement cited by defendant as an \u201cacknowledgment\u201d was not uttered by the prosecutor who actually conducted the voir dire. Second, throughout the hearing on the State\u2019s motions to reopen voir dire the word \u201crelative\u201d is used by prosecutors at least three times and the phrase \u201cclose family members\u201d only once \u2014 the instance cited by defendant.\nInstead, the record reveals that the actual question asked by the. State was an inquiry into \u201c[a]ny close friends or relatives.\u201d This phrase is open to two interpretations with regard to the adjective \u201cclose.\u201d One is that this adjective modifies both \u201cfriends\u201d and \u201crelatives.\u201d The other is that it only modifies \u201cfriends\u201d and therefore the word \u201crelatives\u201d remains unmodified. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by relying upon the latter interpretation in determining whether Brown and Dancy provided incorrect statements during the State\u2019s voir dire:\nDefendant further argues that Brown had no \u201cfamily relationship\u201d with his biological father and uncle, \u201c[b]oth as a practical fact and as a matter of law,\u201d as he had been adopted as a teenager. Defendant cites Crumpton v. Mitchell, 303 N.C. 657, 281 S.E.2d 1 (1981), to support his contention that legal adoption terminates \u201call family ties with a biological parent and his kin.\u201d However, the Court in Crumpton merely stated that \u201cthe legal relationship with the child\u2019s natural parents and family would by virtue of the adoption order be completely severed.\u201d Id. at 663, 281 S.E.2d at 5 (emphasis added). Defendant cites no case, statute, or any other authority that suggests the term \u201crelative\u201d in its well-accepted usage does not apply to an individual\u2019s biological father. In fact, the dictionary definition of. \u201crelative\u201d tends to support the opposite conclusion. See Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1315 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the term as \u201c[a] person connected with another by blood or affinity; a person who is kin with another\u201d); Miriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 987 (10th ed. 1999) (defining the term as \u201ca person connected with another by blood or affinity\u201d).\nDefendant does not specifically address whether Dancy\u2019s cousins could be considered \u201crelatives,\u201d but only whether these are included under \u201cclose family members.\u201d Nevertheless, defendant broadly asserts that the State \u201cnever inquired about distant cousins.\u201d Again, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to interpret the State\u2019s use of \u201crelatives\u201d as unmodified by the word \u201cclose.\u201d Thus, it would have also been within the trial court\u2019s discretion to interpret the State\u2019s question as an inquiry into anyone connected to the prospective jurors \u201cby blood or affinity,\u201d to include \u201cdistant\u201d cousins.\nDefendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion by reopening voir dire as to either Brown or Dancy. Rather, the record supports a finding that these two prospective jurors made incorrect statements in the initial voir dire questioning by the State. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nII. GUILT-INNOCENCE PHASE PROCEEDINGS\nA. Right to Counsel During Psgchiatric Evaluation\nDefendant assigns error to an order of the trial court barring him from consulting with counsel during his mid-trial psychiatric evaluation by the State\u2019s mental health expert, asserting that this was a violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to counsel. The timing of the evaluation apparently resulted from a breakdown of communication between prosecutors and defense counsel during pretrial preparation. On 10 December 2004, when the State\u2019s expert, Robert S. Brown, Jr., M.D., a board-certified forensic psychiatrist on the clinical faculty at the University of Virginia, attempted to evaluate defendant, it was without the prior knowledge of defense counsel. Consequently, when Dr. Brown advised defendant of his right to remain silent, defendant exercised that right, thus terminating the interview. Although the State subsequently informed defense counsel of defendant\u2019s refusal, no additional attempts were made by either side to arrange another evaluation.\nInstead, on the second day of the State\u2019s case-in-chief, the State moved to bar the testimony of defendant\u2019s own mental health expert pursuant to State v. Braxton, 352 N.C. 158, 531 S.E.2d 428 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1130 (2001), on the basis of defendant\u2019s refusal to submit to the State\u2019s evaluation. When the State made its motion, it was the first time the trial judge was apprised of the issue. In an effort to remedy the situation in a manner that would be fair to both parties and to spare defendant the harsh consequence of having the only evidence in support of his theory of defense barred, the trial court ordered the 27 January 2005 examination that is the subject of defendant\u2019s assignment of error. However, the trial court also admonished the State for its delay in bringing the matter to the court\u2019s attention. Needless to say, better communication between the attorneys on both sides would have spared all of the parties this unnecessary burden. See State v. Maske, 358 N.C. 40, 62, 591 S.E.2d 521, 535 (2004) (Brady, J., concurring) (noting how such lapses of judgment by counsel in capital cases \u201care unacceptable given the gravity of the setting, the dwindling resources available to our judiciary, and the expanding caseload of the judiciary\u201d (citation omitted)).\nDefendant\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s order deprived him of his right to counsel was not preserved as a consequence of his failure to timely object at trial. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1). To the contrary, the following exchange took place between the trial court and defense counsel:\nCourt: He doesn\u2019t have any right to call for you to come in or right to go talk to you or anything else. He needs to understand that and you need to fully tell him that under these cases, the examination is the doctor\u2019s. When he finishes with it, then he comes back and talks to you after it\u2019s over.\n[Defense Counsel]: That\u2019s fine, Judge.\n\u201cEven alleged errors arising under the Constitution of the United States are waived if defendant does not raise them in the trial court.\u201d State v. Jaynes, 342 N.C. 249, 263, 464 S.E.2d 448, 457 (1995) (citing State v. Upchurch, 332 N.C. 439, 421 S.E.2d 577 (1992); State v. Mitchell, 317 N.C. 661, 346 S.E.2d 458 (1986)), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024 (1996); see also State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 465, 533 S.E.2d 168, 234 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931 (2001); State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 410, 412, 508 S.E.2d 496, 514-15 (1998) (citing Jaynes). Defendant also failed to assign plain error to the trial court\u2019s order. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4) (stating a defendant must \u201cspecifically and distinctly\u201d assign plain error to preserve a question for appellate review that is otherwise waived pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1)); see also, e.g., Golphin, 352 N.C. at 465, 533 S.E.2d at 234 (holding that a capital defendant\u2019s argument was waived when it was not preserved under N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1) and defendant did not \u201cspecifically and distinctly\u201d assign plain error as required by N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4)). This assignment of error has therefore been waived and is dismissed. See Jaynes, 342 N.C. at 263, 464 S.E.2d at 457.\nB. Defense Counsel\u2019s \u201cConcession\u201d During Closing Argument\nDefendant asserts that his state and federal constitutional rights to the effective assistance of counsel were denied when defense counsel stated in closing arguments that \u201c[defendant\u2019s] statement alone guarantees he\u2019ll serve a substantial amount of time in prison and face the terrible consequences of a first degree murder conviction.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Defendant contends that this amounts to a concession of defendant\u2019s guilt of first-degree murder and that, because this concession was made without his consent, the statement was per se ineffective assistance of counsel and would therefore warrant a new trial.\nGenerally, this Court \u201cindulges the presumption that trial counsel\u2019s representation is within the boundaries of acceptable professional conduct,\u201d giving counsel \u201cwide latitude in matters of strategy.\u201d State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 690, 617 S.E.2d 1, 30 (2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1073 (2006). To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a defendant must show that trial counsel\u2019s conduct \u201c \u2018fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.\u2019 \u201d See id. at 690, 617 S.E.2d at 29 (quoting State v. Braswell, 312 N.C. 553, 561-62, 324 S.E.2d 241, 248 (1985) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984))). This requires a showing that, first, trial counsel\u2019s performance was so deficient that he or she \u201cwas not functioning as the \u2018counsel\u2019 guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,\u201d and second, this deficient performance prejudiced the defense, such that the errors committed by trial counsel deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (internal quotation marks omitted)).\nIn State v. Harbison, this Court held that\n[w]hen counsel admits his client\u2019s guilt without first obtaining the client\u2019s consent, the client\u2019s rights to a fair trial and to put the State to the burden of proof are completely swept away. The practical effect is the same as if counsel had entered a plea of guilty without the client\u2019s consent. Counsel in such situations denies the client\u2019s right to have the issue of guilt or innocence decided by a jury.\n315 N.C. 175, 180, 337 S.E.2d 504, 507 (1985) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1123 (1986). More recently, in State v. Matthews, this Court stated that \u201cHarbison error\u201d amounts to a per se violation of a defendant\u2019s right to the effective assistance of counsel. 358 N.C. 102, 109, 591 S.E.2d 535, 540-41 (2004). Here, defendant asserts that the statement in question was Harbison error. We disagree.\nIn Harbison, the defendant maintained throughout the trial that he had acted in self-defense when the State\u2019s evidence tended to show that he shot his former girlfriend and shot and killed a man who was with her at the time. 315 N.C. at 177, 337 S.E.2d at 505-06. Although counsel for the defendant adhered to this theory of self-defense when cross-examining the State\u2019s witnesses and presenting the defendant\u2019s case-in-chief, during closing arguments counsel expressed his personal opinion that the defendant should be found guilty of manslaughter:\nLadies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I know some of you and have had dealings with some of you. I know that you want to leave here with a clear conscious [sic] and I want to leave here also with a clear conscious [sic], I have my opinion as to what happened on that April night, and I don\u2019t feel that [the defendant] should be found innocent. I think he should do some time to think about what he has done. I think you should find him guilty of manslaughter and not first degree.\nId. at 177-78, 337 S.E.2d at 506. The Court found this concession of guilt a per se violation of the defendant\u2019s right to the effective assistance of counsel and, accordingly, arrested the judgments against the defendant and awarded him a new trial. Id. at 180-81, 337 S.E.2d at 507-08.\nIn Matthews, the defense counsel made the following statement in closing arguments:\nThere are three possible verdicts in that case. . . . You have a possible verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. . . .\nYou have a possible verdict of guilty of second-degree murder. And then the third possibility is not guilty. I\u2019ve been practicing law twenty-four years and I\u2019ve been in this position many times. And this is probably the first time I\u2019ve come up in front of the jury and said you ought not to even consider that last possibility.\n358 N.C. at 106, 591 S.E.2d at 539. Trial counsel later added, \u201cWhen you look at the evidence . . . you\u2019re going to find that he\u2019s guilty of second-degree murder.\u201d Id. Noting that counsel made this concession of guilt apparently without advising his client, this Court held this was Harbison error and awarded the defendant a new trial. Id. at 109, 591 S.E.2d at 540-41.\nA review of the record in the instant case demonstrates that the statement of defense counsel to which defendant assigns error clearly did not amount to Harbison error. Rather, when this statement is viewed in the context of defense counsel\u2019s entire closing argument, it appears that his reference to first-degree murder was accidental and went unnoticed. The final words of the closing argument bear this out:\nAnd as you go back into that jury room, I only ask that you keep that open mind as you deliberate, that you consider the evidence objectively, clearly, in consultation with each other, that you remember the rage, the freaking out, the out of control that\u2019s evident from the State\u2019s own evidence, and you return the verdict that the evidence supports, guilty of second degree murder. Thank you.\n(Emphasis added.) In fact, the only issue even contested at defendant\u2019s trial was whether he had committed first-degree or second-degree murder, and trial counsel\u2019s entire closing argument was directed toward undercutting the two theories of first-degree murder advanced by the State: felony murder and murder committed with premeditation and deliberation.\nDefendant would have this Court interpret Harbison to allow a defendant to seize upon a lapsus linguae uttered by trial counsel in order to be awarded a new trial. However, we are unconvinced that the statement in question amounted to a concession of defendant\u2019s guilt of first-degree murder. Absent such a concession, defendant has the burden of showing that his trial counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, a burden which defendant has failed to carry. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nC. Argument by Prosecutor Concerning Attack of Rob Willis\nDefendant contends that the trial court should have intervened ex mero mo tu during the State\u2019s closing argument. At trial, the State presented testimony of Rob Willis, who was confined with defendant in the Ashe County Jail for a period of time. This testimony tended to prove that defendant assaulted Willis in retaliation for reporting to authorities an incriminating statement defendant had made to him in regard to the murder. Over defendant\u2019s objection, the trial court admitted this evidence for the limited purpose of showing defendant\u2019s consciousness of guilt at the time of the offense. During closing argument, the prosecutor made the following statements:\nI want to touch on another thing with regard to eliminating [the victim] who was a witness. [Defendant] thought that, you know, he had assaulted her in a very bad way, and when he came back, it would be the State\u2019s contention that he did that for the purpose of eliminating her ability to testify against him, to put him back in jail. You know, people tend to do things repeatedly. He, basically, attempted to do the same thing by eliminating a witness with regard to Rob Willis in the jail. That is Rob Willis, he knew, was going to testify against him, perhaps. And what did he do with regard to Rob Willis? Does that show his ability to plan and think ahead.\nDefendant asserts that the trial court\u2019s failure to bar these statements of the prosecutor constitutes reversible error because the prosecutor was arguing the evidence for a different, inadmissible purpose\u2014 namely, to prove defendant\u2019s bad character \u2014 in violation of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a) (2005).\nWe note for purposes of review that defendant did not object to these statements at trial. Thus, \u201cthe prosecutor\u2019s argument is subject to limited appellate review for gross improprieties which make it plain that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to correct the prejudicial matters ex mero motu.\" State v. Alston, 341 N.C. 198, 239, 461 S.E.2d 687, 709 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 (1996); see also State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 133, 558 S.E.2d 97; 107 (2002); State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 451, 509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835 (1999); State v. Tyler, 346 N.C. 187, 205, 485 S.E.2d 599, 609, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1001 (1997).\nGenerally, \u201cprosecutors are given wide latitude in the scope of their argument\u201d and may \u201cargue to the jury the law, the facts in evidence, and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.\u201d Alston, 341 N.C. at 239, 461 S.E.2d at 709-10 (citing State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 398, 428 S.E.2d 118, 144, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948 (1993)).' Statements or remarks in closing argument \u201cmust be viewed in context and in light of the overall factual circumstances to which they refer.\u201d Id. at 239, 461 S.E.2d at 709 (citation omitted). Additionally, as a general rule, a trial court cures any prejudice resulting from a prosecutor\u2019s misstatements of law by giving a proper instruction to the jury. See Trull, 349 N.C. at 452, 509 S.E.2d at 194.\nEven if we assume arguendo that the closing argument in this case was grossly improper, we conclude that any prejudice to defendant was cured by the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury following closing arguments. The trial court stated in these instructions that the State\u2019s evidence as to Willis could only be considered for the limited purposes of showing defendant\u2019s consciousness of guilt and as a basis for expert opinion regarding defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the alleged murder. Because defendant cannot show that the trial court failed to correct any prejudice that might have resulted from the State\u2019s closing argument, this assignment of error is overruled.\nIII. PRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant raises three preservation issues. First, defendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury on Issue 4 of the issues and recommendations as to punishment form, which requires the jury to determine whether the aggravating circumstances are sufficiently substantial to impose the death penalty. Defendant objects to the instruction requiring that the jury must unanimously fail to find the aggravating circumstances sufficiently substantial before they can answer this issue in the negative. This Court rejected the same argument in State v. McCarver, 341 N.C. 364, 390, 462 S.E.2d 25, 39 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996), and again in State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 422, 628 S.E.2d 735, 750, cert. denied, -U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 505, 166 L. Ed. 2d 378 (2006). We similarly decline to overrule this precedent in the present case.\nSecond, defendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury that it had the \u201cduty\u201d to impose the death penalty if it found that the mitigating circumstances failed to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. This argument was rejected in State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 57, 446 S.E.2d 252, 283-84 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134 (1995), and again in Elliott, 360 N.C. at 422, 628 S.E.2d at 750. We also reject defendant\u2019s argument in this case.\nFinally, defendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s definition of mitigating circumstances contained in its instructions to the jury as being too narrow and precluding the jury from considering all relevant mitigating information. Again, this Court previously rejected the same argument. See State v. Conaway, 339 N.C. 487, 533-34, 453 S.E.2d 824, 853-54, cert. denied, 516 U.S. 884 (1995); Skipper, 337 N.C. at 52-53, 446 S.E.2d at 280-81. We decline to overrule this established precedent in the present case.\nAccordingly, these three assignments of error are overruled.\nIV. PROPORTIONALITY ISSUES\nHaving determined that defendant\u2019s trial and sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we must now consider:\n(1) whether the record supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury and upon which the sentence of death was based; (2) whether the death sentence was entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the facts of the crime and the defendant.\nState v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 477, 648 S.E.2d 788, 811 (2007) (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) (2005)).\nIn this case, the jury found two aggravating circumstances to exist beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) defendant committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(4) (2005), and (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) (2005). The State\u2019s evidence clearly supports both of these aggravating circumstances. From defendant\u2019s confession alone, a jury could have found that he committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding lawful arrest, as he admitted that he would not have committed the murder if the victim had agreed not to call the police to report his assault upon her. This evidence was sufficient to support the (e)(4) aggravating circumstance.\nAlso from defendant\u2019s confession alone, a jury could have found that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Defendant twice beat the victim into an unconscious state in an apparent effort to make her forget he was ever at the residence. He needlessly-stabbed her over fifty times with at least two different knives, pausing several times between series of stabs, thereby prolonging the victim\u2019s suffering. Only after inflicting multiple wounds to the victim\u2019s back did defendant finally inflict a wound calculated to end her life, slitting her throat as she was gasping her final breaths. Lastly, defendant left the victim\u2019s three-year-old grandson alone in the residence after the murder, making it highly probable that the child would awaken to discover his grandmother dead on the living room floor, half naked in a pool of blood with knives protruding from her body. This evidence was sufficient to support the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance.\nThere is no indication anywhere in the record that the jury was under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor when it recommended a sentence of death for defendant. As it appears instead that the jury carefully considered and weighed each of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and entered a reasoned decision in accordance with the law, we are compelled to leave the jury\u2019s recommendation of death undisturbed.\nFinally, this Court must determine whether defendant\u2019s sentence is disproportionate. Ultimately, proportionality review rests upon the experienced judgments of the members of the Court. Elliott, 360 N.C. at 425, 628 S.E.2d at 752 (citations omitted). In its determination, the Court must compare defendant\u2019s case with all similar cases in this jurisdiction, though we are not bound to cite each of these. See Cummings, 361 N.C. at 477-78, 648 S.E.2d at 812 (citations omitted). Although defendant asserts that this process is vague and arbitrary in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights, we decline any invitation from defendant to depart from this well-settled practice. See Elliott, 360 N.C. at 425, 628 S.E.2d at 752; McNeill, 360 N.C. at 254, 624 S.E.2d at 344.\nThere have been eight cases in which this Court has determined that the death sentence was disproportionate. State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 573 S.E.2d 870 (2002); State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983). As the Court noted in State v. Cummings, in only two of these eight cases, Stokes and Bondurant, did the jury find the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel:\nIn Stokes, the defendant was seventeen years old and the only one of four assailants to receive the death penalty. 319 N.C. at 3-4, 21, 352 S.E.2d at 654-55, 664. In Bondurant, the defendant showed immediate remorse for his actions and even directed the victim\u2019s transport to the hospital, hoping to see the victim live. 309 N.C. at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 182-83.\n361 N.C. at 478, 648 S.E.2d at 812.\nStokes and Bondurant can easily be distinguished from this case. Defendant here was the only assailant, was twenty-eight-years old at the time of the offense, sought no medical treatment for the victim, and failed to show any immediate remorse for the murder, instead expending considerable time and effort toward concealing his identity and misleading investigators. Also in contrast to the defendant in Bondurant, defendant here did not readily and immediately admit his guilt. See Bondurant, 309 N.C. at 694, 309 S.E.2d at 182-83. He did so only after becoming the primary focus of the murder investigation and being ordered to submit hair and blood samples that he knew would implicate him in the murder. Accordingly, after careful review, we find that defendant\u2019s sentence of death is proportionate to the crime he committed.\nV. CONCLUSION\nThe remaining assignments of error presented by defendant and not set out or argued in his brief are deemed abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6); Cummings, 361 N.C. at 479, 648 S.E.2d at 812-13 (citing McNeill, 360 N.C. at 241, 624 S.E.2d at 336). We conclude that defendant received a fair trial and sentencing proceeding, that his conviction and sentence were free from prejudicial error, and that the sentence of death is not disproportionate to the crime for which defendant was convicted.\nNO ERROR.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRADY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Ann B. Petersen for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. CHRISTOPHER EDWARD GOSS\nNo. 316A05\n(Filed 9 November 2007)\n1. Jury\u2014 capital selection \u2014 reopening of voir dire \u2014 incorrect statements\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital first-degree murder case by reopening the voir dire of two prospective jurors based upon the trial court\u2019s finding that both had provided incorrect statements in response to the State\u2019s initial voir dire questioning when it was discovered before the jury was impaneled that two jurors had relatives who had been defendants in criminal cases, although neither had indicated this when asked initially, because: (1) the record reveals that the actual question asked by the State was an inquiry into any close friends or relatives; (2) defendant cites no case, statute, or any other authority that suggests the term \u201crelative\u201d in its well-accepted usage does not apply to an individual's biological father even if the child had been adopted; and (3) it would have also been within the trial court\u2019s discretion to interpret the State\u2019s question as an inquiry into anyone connected to the prospective jurors \u201cby blood or affinity\u201d so that \u201crelatives\u201d would include \u201cdistant\u201d cousins. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1214(g).\n2. Constitutional Law\u2014 right to counsel \u2014 no right to consult attorney during psychiatric evaluation\nThe trial court did not err in a capital first-degree murder case by barring defendant from consulting with counsel during his mid-trial psychiatric evaluation by the State\u2019s mental health expert that resulted from a breakdown of communication between prosecutors and defense counsel during pretrial preparation, because: (1) in an effort to remedy the situation in a manner that would be fair to both parties and to spare defendant the harsh consequence of having the testimony of his own mental health expert and the only evidence in support of his theory of defense barred, the trial court ordered the mid-trial examination that is the subject of defendant\u2019s assignment of error; and (2) defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s order deprived him of his right to counsel was not preserved as a consequence of his failure to timely object at trial, and defendant also failed to assign plain error to the trial court\u2019s order.\n3. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 admission of client\u2019s guilt without obtaining permission\u2014 lapsus linguae\nThe trial court did not violate defendant\u2019s right to effective assistance of counsel in a capital first-degree murder case by allowing defense counsel to state during closing arguments that defendant\u2019s statement alone guarantees he\u2019ll serve a substantial amount of time in prison and face the terrible consequences of a first-degree murder conviction, because: (1) a review of the record in the instant case demonstrated that defense counsel\u2019s pertinent statement did not amount to Harbison error; (2) when this statement is viewed in the context of defense counsel\u2019s entire closing argument, it appears that the reference to first-degree murder was accidental and went unnoticed; (3) the only issue contested at defendant\u2019s trial was whether he committed first-degree or second-degree murder, and trial counsel\u2019s entire closing argument was directed toward undercutting the two theories of first-degree murder advanced by the State; and (4) the statement in question did not amount to a concession of defendant\u2019s guilt of first-degree murder, and absent such a concession, defendant failed to carry his burden of showing that his trial counsel\u2019s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.\n4. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 consciousness of guilt\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a capital first-degree murder case by failing to intervene ex mero motu during the State\u2019s closing argument that defendant assaulted another inmate while in jail in retaliation for reporting to authorities an incriminating statement defendant had made to him in regard to the murder in this case, because: (1) even assuming arguendo that the closing argument was grossly improper, any prejudice to defendant was cured by the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury following closing arguments stating that the State\u2019s evidence regarding the jail inmate could only be considered for the limited purposes of showing defendant\u2019s consciousness of guilt and as a basis for expert opinion regarding defendant\u2019s mental state at the time of the alleged murder; and (2) defendant cannot show that the trial court failed to correct any prejudice that might have resulted from the State\u2019s closing argument.\n5. Sentencing\u2014 death penalty \u2014 proportionality\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by sentencing defendant to the death penalty, because: (1) two aggravating circumstances were found including the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(4) aggravating circumstance that defendant committed the murder for the purpose of avoiding a lawful arrest, and the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (2) defendant needlessly stabbed the victim over fifty times with at least two different knives, pausing several times between series of stabs, thereby prolonging the victim\u2019s suffering; (3) defendant left the victim\u2019s three-year-old grandson alone in the residence after the murder, making it highly probable that the child would awaken to discover his grandmother dead on the living room floor, half naked in a pool of blood with knives protruding from her body; (4) defendant was the only assailant, was twenty-eight-years old at the time of the offense, sought no medical treatment for the victim, failed to show any immediate remorse for the murder, and instead expended considerable time and effort toward concealing his identity and misleading investigators; and (5) defendant did not readily and immediately admit his guilt, but instead did so only after becoming the primary focus of the murder investigation and being ordered to submit hair and blood samples that he knew would implicate him in the murder.\n6. Appeal and Error\u2014 preservation of issues \u2014 failure to argue\nThe remaining assignments of error presented by defendant and not set out or argued in his brief are deemed abandoned under N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered by Judge Richard L. Doughton on 8 February 2005 in Superior Court, Ashe County, upon a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Heard in the Supreme Court 11 September 2007.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Barry S. McNeill, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nAnn B. Petersen for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0610-01", "first_page_order": 668, "last_page_order": 688 }