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768", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "774" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 671", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575737 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0671-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 14", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538239 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 915", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11124480, 11124386, 11124611, 11124518, 11124424, 11124587, 11124376, 11124398, 11124564, 11124503, 11124440, 11124409, 11124540, 11124350 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0915-08", "/us/525/0915-03", "/us/525/0915-14", "/us/525/0915-10", "/us/525/0915-06", "/us/525/0915-13", "/us/525/0915-02", "/us/525/0915-04", "/us/525/0915-12", "/us/525/0915-09", "/us/525/0915-07", "/us/525/0915-05", "/us/525/0915-11", "/us/525/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659874 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 617", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535758 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0617-01" ] }, { "cite": "472 S.E.2d 842", 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Ingle, 336 N.C. 617, 645, 445 S.E.2d 880, 895 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1020 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 798778 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Ingle, 336 N.C. 617, 645, 445 S.E.2d 880, 895 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1020 (1995)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/343/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "249 S.E.2d 387", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 95", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564743 ], "year": 1978, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0095-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 S.E.2d 53", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "60", "parenthetical": "citing Currence v. 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Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 387 (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "619" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3800510 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "214-15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0199-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" }, { "page": "302" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 118", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571689 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" }, { "page": "160-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0118-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2566216 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693", "parenthetical": "defendant must show deficient representation and prejudice to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "503 U.S. 159", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6223309 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/503/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 211", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "227-28" }, { "page": "227" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2556681 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200-01" }, { "page": "200-01" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "340 S.E.2d 80", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83-84", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4696125 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "39", "parenthetical": "internal citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 L. 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Ct.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787721 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "306-07" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "508 S.E.2d 496", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" }, { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571580 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "514 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "723" }, { "page": "723", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132300 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.C. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8697381 ], "year": 1878, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/79/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "79 N.C. 439", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1878, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 97", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "106", "parenthetical": "citing Coble v. Coble, 79 N.C. 439, 79 N.C. 589 (1878)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219899 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "citing Coble v. Coble, 79 N.C. 439, 79 N.C. 589 (1878)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "494 U.S. 1022", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5540, 5547, 5516, 5166, 5366, 4823, 5560 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/494/1022-04", "/us/494/1022-06", "/us/494/1022-03", "/us/494/1022-05", "/us/494/1022-01", "/us/494/1022-02", "/us/494/1022-07" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 430", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2485742 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 188", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2545734 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760257 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 131", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "151" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 N.C. 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2518881 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352-53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/338/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "591 S.E.2d 521", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 352-53, 451 S.E.2d 131, 151 (1994) and State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 360, 307 S.E.2d 304, 326 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 40", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2985125 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 352-53, 451 S.E.2d 131, 151 (1994) and State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 360, 307 S.E.2d 304, 326 (1983)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0040-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539346 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "487 S.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "740-41", "parenthetical": "defendant cannot show prejudice unless he has exhausted all peremptory challenges (citing State v. Mash, 328 N.C. 61, 64, 399 S.E.2d 307, 310 (1991))" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 608", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139328 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "defendant cannot show prejudice unless he has exhausted all peremptory challenges (citing State v. Mash, 328 N.C. 61, 64, 399 S.E.2d 307, 310 (1991))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0608-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 L. Ed. 2d 378", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 S. Ct. 505", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "748", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562785 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3789392 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 28", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 580", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795978 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0580-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 U.S. 83", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11716714 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/373/0083-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561617 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "128" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0105-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2030, "char_count": 61859, "ocr_confidence": 0.758, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.7699702894017952e-07, "percentile": 0.7112358674192975 }, "sha256": "b82f8986146293933a662912d207a4d8c1d352df4d187931913257b0f292a92b", "simhash": "1:8772dc22576a8876", "word_count": 9851 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:47:03.529976+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM HENRY RAINES" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRADY, Justice.\nDefendant William Henry Raines was found guilty by a jury on 6 September 2005 of the first-degree murders of Phillip Lester Holder and Pamela Kay Holder and robbery with a dangerous weapon of Phillip Holder. Defendant was sentenced to death for the first-degree murders. We find no error in defendant\u2019s convictions or sentences.\nPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\nThe Henderson County Grand Jury returned a true bill of indictment on 21 January 2003 charging defendant with robbery with a dangerous weapon and two superseding true bills of indictment on 17 March 2003 charging defendant with the first-degree murders of Phillip and Pamela Holder. Defendant was tried capitally, and on 6 September 2005 the jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. Following the required penalty proceeding, the jury made binding recommendations on 9 September 2005 that defendant be sentenced to death for each murder. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. The trial court also sentenced defendant to 100 to 129 months of active incarceration for the robbery with a dangerous weapon conviction. Defendant appeals the judgments of the trial court pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a).\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND\nDefendant first met Phillip Holder when defendant was approximately twelve years old. Defendant\u2019s father had recently died, and defendant\u2019s mother had demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to provide proper care for defendant and his siblings. After Phillip met defendant, he realized that defendant needed care and invited defendant over to the Holder residence. Eventually, the Holders encouraged defendant to live with them when defendant was a teenager. Defendant\u2019s mother told Patricia Holder, Phillip\u2019s mother, that defendant \u201ccan stay, and I don\u2019t care how long he stays.\u201d\nOnce defendant began living with the Holders, his life improved and he was hopeful about his future. Patricia cut defendant\u2019s hair and bought him clothes and shoes, and he began attending church with the family. Defendant and Phillip remained close friends throughout high school. Following defendant\u2019s graduation from high school, he abused alcohol, amphetamines, marijuana, and crack cocaine. From 1996 to 2001 defendant was convicted on seven different occasions of various offenses, including larceny and felony escape from prison. Following defendant\u2019s release from prison in July 2002, he resided with Phillip and his wife, Pamela Holder.\nThe Crimes\nOn 10 December 2002, Pamela gave defendant her credit card to purchase medication. However, instead of using it to purchase medication defendant and Heath Rice attempted to use the card very early the next morning to purchase consumer electronics at WalMart. Defendant intended to sell or trade these items in order to obtain cocaine. Asheville Police Officer Scott Early, who was also employed in a security guard capacity at Wal-Mart, telephoned Pamela to inquire whether defendant was authorized to use the card. Pamela and Phillip explained to Early that defendant was authorized to use the card to purchase medication, but not consumer electronics. Phillip informed Early that he did not want to prosecute defendant but rather asked Early to hold defendant until they could arrive at Wal-Mart. At approximately 3:30 a.m. on 11 December 2002, Phillip and Pamela arrived at Wal-Mart, picked up defendant, and departed. Defendant rode in Phillip\u2019s vehicle, and Pamela drove her vehicle separately.\nAt the State\u2019s request, defendant later related the events which transpired after they left Wal-Mart to Dr. Heidi Katrina Coppotelli, a licensed clinical psychologist. Defendant stated that Phillip was furious as they drove from Wal-Mart to the Holder residence. On the way home Phillip ran two blinking red lights in order to prevent defendant from jumping out of the vehicle. When they arrived at the residence, Phillip gave defendant a sleeping bag and instructed him to sleep in the shed and not in the family home. Defendant had already smoked a significant amount of crack cocaine that day and, after being sent to the shed, he smoked another couple of rocks of crack cocaine. Defendant stated that after smoking these rocks, he went \u201ccrazy\u201d for more. He grabbed a wrench and went to the Holders\u2019 door to ask whether he could use the restroom. The Holders allowed him into their home, and upon leaving the restroom defendant immediately struck Phillip in the head with the wrench and then hit Pamela. Defendant struck Pamela and Phillip several more times before retrieving firearms from the victims\u2019 bedroom. Defendant considered tying them up and attempting to obtain money for crack cocaine, but instead he shot each victim several times, killing them. When asked why he shot Phillip, defendant said it was \u201cjust better to kill him.\u201d Defendant then stole money and several of Phillip\u2019s firearms and left in Phillip\u2019s truck without changing clothes.\nLater in the day, Phillip\u2019s sister Jill Gilbert, along with her teenage son Austin, went to the victims\u2019 residence. Upon arrival, Gilbert and her son walked around the residence, peeking in the windows to observe whether anything was wrong because they had been unable to make contact with the victims that day. They observed ammunition strewn on the victims\u2019 son\u2019s bed, which they considered strange, given Phillip\u2019s usual tidiness. Eventually, Austin was able to gain entrance into the residence through a window. Austin found the bodies of Phillip and Pamela and then opened the front door to allow his mother to see inside, after which both of them waited outside for law enforcement to arrive.\nDeputies from the Henderson County Sheriff\u2019s Office arrived at the scene and determined that a number of firearms had been removed from the residence, and that the victims\u2019 credit cards were also missing. The State\u2019s evidence described defendant\u2019s movement throughout the rest of the day. Defendant took Phillip\u2019s truck, drove to a convenience store, and unsuccessfully attempted to cash a check drawn on Phillip\u2019s account. Defendant then traveled to Asheville Auto Sales where he sold Phillip\u2019s camper cover to William Hyatt for twenty dollars. Hyatt also bought twelve to thirteen firearms from defendant, and it was later determined that all of the purchased firearms belonged to Phillip Holder.\nEventually, Sergeant Richard Lane of the Greenville County (South Carolina) Sheriff\u2019s Office was dispatched to respond to a call about a parked truck, which, because of recent publicity, the caller believed might have been involved in the murders. When Sergeant Lane arrived at the scene, he found defendant in the truck and took him into custody without incident.\nDonald Jason, M.D., a physician, pathologist, and associate professor of pathology at Wake Forest University School of Medicine, performed autopsies on both Pamela and Phillip. Phillip had six linear blunt force wounds to his head that lacerated his scalp, some of which fractured his skull. He also had a gunshot wound above and between his eyes and a second gunshot wound to the back of the head. Projectiles from both of these gunshots entered his brain. A third gunshot wound was present on- the palm of his hand near the base of his thumb. Dr. Jason was unable to conclude whether blunt force trauma standing alone would have caused Phillip\u2019s death, but opined that either or both gunshot wounds to the head would have been fatal. Pamela had four linear blunt force wounds on her head, but no skull fractures. She had been shot twice, once in the back of the head with the bullet eventually entering her brain and once in her right shoulder. Both gunshots were consistent with her being shot while she was seated. Dr. Jason opined that the gunshot wound to the brain was the cause of death.\nDefendant presented evidence in the form of testimony from Dr. Coppotelli. Dr. Coppotelli had reviewed materials prepared by Debra Gray, a social worker, and had interviewed defendant at the State\u2019s request. Based upon her analysis, Dr. Coppotelli opined that defendant suffered from moderate depression and that when he decided to rob the Holders he had chosen to give in to his denied frustration of anger, his habitual denial of reality, and his indulgence of blaming his misery on others. She testified that defendant had an attachment disorder and a deep-seated fear of abandonment and that these issues triggered his explosive anger at the time of the murders.\nAfter deliberating upon these facts, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of robbery with a dangerous weapon. The trial court then advanced to the penalty proceeding as required by statute.\nPenalty Proceeding Evidence\nAt the penalty proceeding, the State presented victim impact evidence from various family members of the victims, including Pamela\u2019s sister, Phillip\u2019s sister, and Phillip\u2019s mother. The State also presented evidence from Captain Charles McDonald of the Henderson County Sheriff\u2019s Office Detention Center, who testified concerning defendant\u2019s behavior while awaiting trial.\nDefendant presented evidence from various witnesses concerning his childhood experiences of physical and verbal abuse. Additionally, defendant presented evidence that he had been assigned to classes for behaviorally and emotionally challenged students and that he had performed poorly in school until he began residing with the Holders. William Beal, a prison minister, testified that defendant began studying his Bible and expressed \u201churt\u201d for what had happened.\nThe jury found as aggravating circumstances in both murders that the murder was committed while defendant was committing or attempting to commit robbery, that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, and that the murder was part of a course of conduct in which defendant committed other crimes of violence against other persons. Additionally, the jury found that the murder of Phillip Holder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. One or more jurors found the statutory mitigating circumstances in both murders that defendant committed the murder under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance and that defendant\u2019s capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired. One or more jurors also found ten nonstatutory mitigating circumstances to exist. After finding that the mitigating circumstances were insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances and that the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstances, the jury returned binding recommendations of death, and the trial court entered judgment according to those recommendations.\nANALYSIS\nPretrial Matters\nDefendant and the State request that this Court review the personnel file of Lieutenant Jerry Rice of the Henderson County Sheriff\u2019s Office pursuant to State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 128, 235 S.E.2d 828, 842 (1977) and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Lieutenant Rice\u2019s personnel file is under seal as directed by the trial court. This Court has reviewed Lt. Rice\u2019s personnel file and determined that there is nothing of exculpatory value contained therein to which defendant would be entitled. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nJury Selection Issues\nDefendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to sua sponte declare a mistrial or, in the alternative, dismiss all prospective jurors who heard another prospective juror comment that he had read about the murders in the newspaper and that what he had read \u201csounded pretty incriminating.\u201d After discovering that the prospective juror had read about the murders in the newspaper, the trial court asked the prospective juror whether he could put aside \u201cwhatever [he] had read and decide the case based on the evidence that\u2019s presented\u201d in the trial, to which the prospective juror responded, \u201cI think I could.\u201d Defendant contends that this case is similar to State v. Gregory, 342 N.C. 580, 467 S.E.2d 28 (1996). In Gregory, this Court found defendant was denied a fair trial because a prospective juror stated during voir dire that she had worked with a lawyer who had previously represented the defendant in the case currently before the trial court, and as a result of that employment, she was privy to confidential information that was helpful to the State and this information might influence her decision. Id. at 582-83, 467 S.E.2d at 30-31. The instant case is distinguishable. First, the information about which the prospective juror was speaking was not confidential, but was publically disseminated. Nothing in the prospective juror\u2019s statement would lead other jurors to speculate as to any secret knowledge he may have had. Additionally, the prospective juror indicated that he would follow the trial court\u2019s instructions and only consider evidence properly admitted at trial. Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that he was prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s failure to sua sponte order a mistrial or excuse the prospective jurors present during the complained-of voir dire. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant assigns multiple instances of error concerning the trial court\u2019s limiting of his voir dire questioning of prospective jurors during jury selection. \u201cThis Court has previously stated that \u2018[i]n this jurisdiction counsel\u2019s exercise of the right to inquire into the fitness of jurors is subject to the trial judge\u2019s close supervision. The regulation of the manner and the extent of the inquiry rests largely in the trial judge\u2019s discretion.\u2019 \u201d State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 409, 628 S.E.2d 735, 742 (quoting State v. Bryant, 282 N.C. 92, 96, 191 S.E.2d 745, 748 (1972) (alteration in original), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 958 (1973), and cert. denied, 410 U.S. 987 (1973)), cert. denied, -U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 505, 166 L. Ed. 2d 378 (2006). Defendant asserts that he was not allowed to question certain jurors concerning whether they could consider certain types of mitigating evidence. Even assuming, arguendo, that defendant could demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion, defendant cannot show prejudice as he did not exhaust his peremptory challenges. See State v. Neal, 346 N.C. 608, 618, 487 S.E.2d 734, 740-41 (1997) (defendant cannot show prejudice unless he has exhausted all peremptory challenges (citing State v. Mash, 328 N.C. 61, 64, 399 S.E.2d 307, 310 (1991))), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1125 (1998). Consequently, these assignments of error are overruled.\nGuilt-Innocence Phase Issues\nEvidentiary Issues\nDefendant contends that the trial court committed plain error in failing to intervene sua sponte during certain portions of guilt-innocence phase testimony. Specifically, defendant argues the trial court should have intervened when Rhonda Whitaker, Pamela\u2019s sister, testified about how a member of the Sheriff\u2019s Office notified her of her sister\u2019s murder and about th\u00e9 reaction of Pamela\u2019s mother after being informed of her daughter\u2019s death, and when Patricia Holder testified about the reaction of the victims\u2019 son to the death of his parents. Because defendant failed to timely object to these statements, we review them only for plain error. Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that the statements were unduly prejudicial.\nGenerally, \u201ccharacter evidence of a victim is usually irrelevant during the guilt-innocence portion of a capital trial, as is victim-impact evidence.\u201d State v. Maske, 358 N.C. 40, 50, 591 S.E.2d 521, 528 (2004) (citing State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 352-53, 451 S.E.2d 131, 151 (1994) and State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 360, 307 S.E.2d 304, 326 (1983)). Because the evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt of first-degree murder was overwhelming, we cannot conclude that the jury would have reached a different verdict had the trial court excluded sua sponte Rhonda Whitaker\u2019s testimony concerning how she discovered her sister\u2019s death and her mother\u2019s reaction to the news.\nAs to the testimony of Patricia Holder, she was answering a line of questioning propounded by defendant, and therefore any error as to her testimony was invited. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(c) (2005) (\u201cA defendant is not prejudiced ... by error resulting from his own conduct.\u201d); State v. Jennings, 333 N.C. 579, 604, 430 S.E.2d 188, 200 (defendant may not invalidate a trial by introducing evidence on cross-examination otherwise inadmissible on direct examination (citing State v. Greene, 324 N.C. 1, 12, 376 S.E.2d 430, 438 (1989), judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990))), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1028 (1993). Even had this not been invited error, its exclusion certainly would not have changed the result of the trial. These assignments of error are therefore overruled.\nClosing Argument Issues\nDefendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling his objection to a portion of the prosecution\u2019s closing argument during the guilt-innocence phase when the prosecutor argued, \u201cAnd I appreciate them coming in here and saying, well, okay, we did it. Well, we wouldn\u2019t have if we didn\u2019t have that evidence. We would be in here with him saying I didn\u2019t do it.\u201d\nThis Court has set out a two-part analysis for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in overruling a defendant\u2019s objection in such cases: \u201c[T]his Court first determines if the remarks were improper. . . . Next, we determine if the remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and thus should have been excluded by the trial court.\u201d See State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002) (citing Coble v. Coble, 79 N.C. 439, 79 N.C. 589 (1878)).\nThe State argues that the statement made by the prosecutor was not improper because he was merely expounding upon defense counsel\u2019s statement during closing arguments that he would like to \u201cstand up here and say find him not guilty. But I\u2019m not doing that.\u201d Defendant asserts that the argument made by the prosecutor was a personal attack that called into question the integrity and professionalism of the defense attorneys. Even assuming arguendo that the prosecutor\u2019s statements were improper, we conclude that such statements were not unfairly prejudicial to defendant.\nThis case is somewhat analogous to State v. Rivera, 350 N.C. 285, 514 S.E.2d 720 (1999). In Rivera, the prosecution told the jury that defense counsel \u201cdisplayed one of the best poker faces as we introduced [a witness] in the history of this courthouse.\u201d Id. at 290-91, 514 S.E.2d at 723. After this Court voiced its displeasure with the statement, it wrote: \u201cAlthough the comment of the prosecutor in this case was not extreme, it did not meet the standard of \u2018dignity and propriety\u2019 required of all trial counsel by Rule 12 of the General Rules of Practice for the Superior and District Courts.\u201d Id. at 291, 514 S.E.2d at 723 (emphasis added).\nSimilar to Rivera, the prosecutor\u2019s comment in this case was neither appropriate nor laudable, but it was not extreme. Considering the overwhelming amount of evidence presented by the prosecution that defendant was guilty of first-degree murder, and given that the prosecutor\u2019s comment is confounding as to its true meaning, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant\u2019s objection. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant also contends the trial court erred by failing to intervene ex mero motu during guilt-innocence phase closing arguments when a prosecutor stated:\nAnd then there\u2019s [sic] these things that the Judge will tell you that you may consider in deciding whether or not he acted in deliberate fashion. Lack of provocation by the victim. Now, what is provocation? The Defense would have you believe that when Philip Raines [sic] said, you\u2019re out of here, you\u2019re not staying.here anymore, that that was provocation.\nWell, again, members of the jury. I hope that\u2019s not the case and that we\u2019re not going to set that sort of precedent here. Because the next guy that gets fired out there is going to say, oops, provocation, I\u2019m going to kill the boss. You know? Hearing something you don\u2019t like is not provocation and an excuse to kill or a way to avoid a first degree murder charge. It just simply isn\u2019t.\nDefendant did not make a timely objection.\nIn State v. Allen, this Court explained review of allegedly improper remarks that do not draw a defendant\u2019s objection:\nIn a hotly contested trial, such as a capital case, \u201c[t]he scope of jury arguments is left largely to the control and discretion of the trial court, and trial counsel will be granted wide latitude.\u201d State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 419, 508 S.E.2d 496, 519 (1998). Counsel may argue any facts in the record and any reasonable inference that may be drawn from any facts in the record. See id. Here, defendant did not object to any statements now complained of during the arguments before the trial court and now argues the trial court should have intervened ex mero motu. However, we will not find error in a trial court\u2019s failure to intervene in closing arguments ex mero motu unless the remarks were so grossly improper they rendered the trial and conviction fundamentally unfair. Id. at 419-20, 508 S.E.2d at 519.\n360 N.C. 297, 306-07, 626 S.E.2d 271, 280 (alteration in original), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 127 S. Ct. 164, 166 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2006).\nWe determine that the prosecutor\u2019s statement was not \u201cso grossly improper [as to] renderf] the trial and conviction fundamentally unfair.\u201d Id. It appears from the record that the prosecution was attempting to apply the law to this case, rather than making an improper statement of the law and, contrary to defendant\u2019s assertion, the prosecutor was not encouraging jury nullification of North Carolina law on provocation. In the broader context of the prosecutor\u2019s argument, he was simply encouraging the jury to find defendant guilty of first-degree murder rather than second-degree murder because Phillip\u2019s insistence that defendant could not sleep in the house did not amount to sufficient provocation. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that it was necessary to \u201cunderstand and apply the law as I give it to you,\u201d after which the trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements of first-degree and second-degree murder. This assignment of error is overruled.\nJury Form Issue\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in submitting a verdict form to the jury which stated in part:\nWE, THE MEMBERS OF THE JURY RETURN THE UNANIMOUS VERDICT AS FOLLOWS:\n_ GUILTY OF FIRST DEGREE MURDER OF [VICTIM]\nIF YOU ANSWER \u201cYES\u201d, IS IT: (You should answer both,\nand you may answer \u201cyes\u201d to either or both)\n__ A. PREMEDITATION AND DELIBERATION?\n__ B. UNDER THE FIRST DEGREE FELONY MURDER RULE?\nDefendant asserts that this verdict form violated his constitutional rights as it suggested to the jurors that they were expected to find defendant guilty of first-degree murder when it told them, \u201cYou should answer both, and you may answer \u2018yes\u2019 to either or both\u201d the-ones for first-degree murder. This argument is without merit, as the verdict form was not improper or misleading. There is no indication that the jury would have been confused. It was instructed to answer under what theory it convicted defendant of first-degree murder only if it found defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Additionally, the verdict form included other options: guilty of second-degree murder and not guilty. The verdict form correctly stated that the jury must have found defendant guilty of either deliberate and premeditated murder or of felony murder to properly convict him of first-degree murder. As worded, this form did not nullify the other options available to the jury. This assignment of error is overruled.\nPenalty Proceeding Issues\nEvidentiary Issues\nDefendant asserts that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to Jill Gilbert\u2019s testimony concerning defendant\u2019s childhood. Ms. Gilbert, Phillip\u2019s sister, testified that \u201cI don\u2019t think that anything that relates back to his childhood could have made something this \u2014 this horrible \u2014 [.]\u201d Defendant objected to this statement, and the trial court overruled the objection.\nVictim impact statements are relevant and admissible to aid the jury in its decision whether to recommend a sentence of death. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991). North Carolina law allows victim impact testimony by statute. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-833 (2005); State v. Roache, 358 N.C. 243, 314-15, 595 S.E.2d 381, 426-27 (2004). The admissibility of victim impact testimony is limited by the requirement that the evidence not be so prejudicial it renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair. See State v. Nicholson, 355 N.C. 1, 38-40, 558 S.E.2d 109, 135-36, cert. denied, 537 U.S. 845 (2002).\nAllen, 360 N.C. at 310, 626 S.E.2d at 282. Victim impact testimony is admissible to show the effect the victim\u2019s death had on friends and family members; however, the victim\u2019s family members\u2019 and friends\u2019 \u201ccharacterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate s\u00e9ntence\u201d are inappropriate. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 830 n.2. We are not persuaded that Jill Gilbert\u2019s incomplete sentence was so prejudicial it rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair. After defendant\u2019s objection, Ms. Gilbert did not complete her thought or even her sentence. Instead, she continued to talk about other matters of which defendant does not complain. The jury did not hear Ms. Gilbert\u2019s complete thought, nor will this Court speculate whether Ms. Gilbert was attempting to ask the jurors to give little weight to defendant\u2019s mitigating evidence. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant further contends that the trial court committed plain error in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights when it admitted evidence from Captain Charles McDonald of the Henderson County Sheriff\u2019s Office Detention Center. Defendant argues that this testimony violated his Confrontation Clause rights and his right to free speech. Because defendant failed to object on these grounds at trial, we consider only whether the trial court committed plain error. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(4).\n\u201cA reversal for plain error is only appropriate in the most exceptional cases.\u201d State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 138, 623 S.E.2d 11, 29 (2005), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 127 S. Ct. 130, 166 L. Ed. 2d 96 (2006). Indeed,\n[b]efore deciding that an error by the trial court amounts to \u201cplain error,\u201d the appellate court must be convinced that absent the error the jury probably would have reached a different verdict. In other words, the appellate court must determine that the error in question \u201ctilted the scales\u201d and caused the jury to reach its verdict convicting the defendant. Therefore, the test for \u201cplain error\u201d places a much heavier burden upon the defendant than that imposed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443 upon defendants who have preserved their rights by timely objection. This is so in part at least because the defendant could have prevented any error by making a timely objection. Cf. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(c) (defendant not prejudiced by error resulting from his own conduct).\nState v. Walker, 316 N.C. 33, 39, 340 S.E.2d 80, 83-84 (1986) (internal citations omitted). With Walker\u2019s standard guiding our decision, we hold that the trial court did not commit plain error in admitting this evidence because its admission was not erroneous.\nWe turn first to defendant\u2019s argument that the testimony of Captain McDonald violated his Confrontation Clause rights. Defendant contends that when McDonald read from various detention center incident reports, he interjected \u201ctestimonial\u201d statements which should have been excluded under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The detention center incident reports at issue have little, if any, relation to testimonial evidence. Instead, these reports are more like business records, which \u201cby their nature [are] not testimonial.\u201d Id. at 56. It is not necessary that the detention center incident reports meet every requirement of an admissible business record under Rule of Evidence 803(6) because the Rules of Evidence are not controlling in a capital penalty proceeding. See State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 200-01, 451 S.E.2d 211, 227-28 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1135 (1995). However, use of the Rules is helpful in determining whether the statement has sufficient indicia of reliability. Rule 803(6) provides that the hearsay rule does not exclude records of regularly conducted activity, which are defined as:\nA memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term \u201cbusiness\u201d as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 803(6) (2005).\nMcDonald testified that he was in charge of the facilities at the detention center, that he was familiar with the record keeping policies, that he frequently viewed incident reports, that it was policy for an incident report to be prepared after each incident, and that disciplinary action is to be documented when it occurs. There is no indication in the record that the reports were prepared for use in later legal proceedings. Instead, the record indicates that these reports were created as internal documents concerning administration of the detention center. The statements contained in the report from detention officers and other inmates were not taken in such a manner as to be testimonial or to be used during later criminal proceedings. The detention center incident reports are not testimonial in nature, nor are the statements contained therein testimonial. As a result, their admission did not violate defendant\u2019s Confrontation Clause rights or the analogous rights under the North Carolina Constitution.\nSecond, defendant contends that because one of these reports indicated that defendant called another inmate by a racial epithet, its admission violated his rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Defendant asserts that this evidence was not relevant to any issue in the capital sentencing proceeding as both the victims were of the same race as defendant, and therefore admission of the evidence was improper under Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992). We disagree. In Dawson, the Supreme Court of the United States noted that the defendant\u2019s membership in the Aryan Brotherhood, a white supremacist organization, was irrelevant to his crime as it did not involve race. Id. at 166. The instant case is clearly distinguishable. The report indicated that the racial epithet was used when defendant was holding a mop handle in the air and cursing at another inmate. This context and the inflammatory nature of the word used by defendant were relevant to rebut the submitted mitigating circumstance that \u201cdefendant has demonstrated an ability to adapt to prison life.\u201d Accordingly, the evidence was relevant and admissible. Because admission of these detention center reports was not erroneous, defendant cannot show plain error.\nDefendant additionally contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object on these constitutional grounds at trial. Because we hold that the evidence complained of was admissible even if defense counsel had objected, we reject defendant\u2019s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as defendant cannot show prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (defendant must show deficient representation and prejudice to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim). We overrule these assignments of error.\nDefendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in not permitting him to introduce evidence during the sentencing proceeding that he was sexually abused by his father. Defendant had sought to introduce evidence from Debra Gray, a clinical social worker retained by the defense to prepare defendant\u2019s psychosocial history. Defense counsel submitted a proffer to the trial court, outside the presence of the jury, that Ms. Gray would testify concerning an \u201cinterview that Ms. Gray did with [defendant\u2019s sister] who related to her that she knows [the sexual abuse] happened to [defendant], that she saw it.\u201d We note initially that defendant did not raise any constitutional issue during trial in regards to the admission of this evidence. -Accordingly, we will not consider the merits of defendant\u2019s constitutional arguments. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(b)(1);. see also State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 321-22, 372 S.E.2d 517, 519 (1988).\nMoreover, while the Rules of Evidence only serve as guidelines in capital penalty proceedings, the trial court may properly exclude hearsay statements which lack sufficient indicia of reliability or lack a proper foundation. See Rose, 339 N.C. at 200-01, 451 S.E.2d at 227. In sustaining the prosecution\u2019s objection to admission of evidence of the alleged' abuse, the trial court considered that defendant had denied that any such sexual abuse had taken place and that the declarant was available to testify. We cannot say that the trial court erred in determining that the proposed hearsay statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is thus overruled.\nDefendant contends that the trial court violated his federal and state constitutional rights by prohibiting the defense from presenting evidence concerning the chaotic and abusive nature of defendant\u2019s family unless defense counsel could establish that each incident directly affected defendant in some way. We note initially that defendant was allowed to present substantial evidence concerning his childhood and that of his siblings at both the guilt-innocence phase and penalty proceedings. Proposed mitigating evidence is relevant when it \u201csheds light on defendant\u2019s age, character, education, environment, habits, mentality, propensities, or criminal record, or on the circumstances of the offense for which defendant was being sentenced.\u201d State v. Locklear, 349 N.C. 118, 159, 505 S.E.2d 277, 301 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1075 (1999).\nOur review of the record indicates that the trial court did not exclude evidence of defendant\u2019s environment, but insisted that defendant\u2019s witness first explain the factual basis for her conclusion that defendant grew up in an injurious environment. The trial court instructed defense counsel that the evidence which led to these conclusions would have to be somehow \u201ctied back to\u201d defendant. We cannot say the trial court erred in requiring defense counsel to lay the proper foundation to establish that the evidence was relevant and not merely a recital of \u201cfeelings, actions, and conduct of third parties [which] have no mitigating value as to defendant and are irrelevant in capital sentencing proceedings.\u201d State v. Smith, 359 N.C. 199, 214-15, 607 S.E.2d 607, 619 (citing Locklear, 349 N.C. at 160-61, 505 S.E.2d at 302), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 850 (2005).\nSpecifically, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in prohibiting defense witnesses from testifying about the arrest of defendant\u2019s father for allegedly sexually abusing defendant\u2019s sister. We cannot discern from the record what the testimony of the witnesses would have been had the trial court not sustained the prosecution\u2019s objection. In such cases the law is well settled:\n[I]n order for a party to preserve for appellate review the exclusion of evidence, the significance of the excluded evidence must be made to appear in the record and a specific offer of proof is required unless the significance of the evidence is obvious from the record. We also held that the essential content or substance of the witness\u2019 testimony must be shown before we can ascertain whether prejudicial error occurred.\nState v. Simpson, 314 N.C. 359, 370, 334 S.E.2d 53, 60 (1985) (citing Currence v. Hardin, 296 N.C. 95, 249 S.E.2d 387 (1978)). In both situations complained of by defendant, the trial court allowed the witness to testify that defendant\u2019s father had been arrested when defendant was a child. However, when defense counsel asked each witness why defendant\u2019s father had been arrested, the trial court sustained the prosecution\u2019s objection. Defense counsel then proceeded to other questions without making an offer of proof or requesting that the witness be allowed to answer outside the presence of the jury. We will not engage in speculation as to the answers each witness would have provided. These assignments of error are overruled.\nClosing Argument Issues\nDefendant next argues that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu during penalty proceeding closing arguments when the prosecutor created a scenario of the crime which defendant asserts could not reasonably be inferred from the evidence. One prosecutor argued that Phillip Holder was conscious, begged for his life, and attempted to reason with defendant before defendant killed his wife and him. This same prosecutor asked concerning Pamela Holder: \u201cDo you think she begged for her life?\u201d Another prosecutor argued that defendant often blames other people for his plights and suggested that defendant was probably blaming the prosecutor right now for \u201ctrying to give me the death penalty.\u201d Defendant failed to enter a timely objection to any of these remarks.\n\u201cProsecutors may create a scenario of the crime committed as long as the record contains sufficient evidence from which the scenario is reasonably inferable.\u201d State v. Bishop, 343 N.C. 518, 543, 472 S.E.2d 842, 855 (1996) (citing State v. Ingle, 336 N.C. 617, 645, 445 S.E.2d 880, 895 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1020 (1995)), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1097 (1997). \u201c[T]his Court has repeatedly found no impropriety when the prosecutor asks the jury to imagine the fear and emotions of a victim.\u201d State v. Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 109, 499 S.E.2d 431, 447 (citations omitted), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 915 (1998).\nHere, it was reasonable to infer from the evidence that the Holders may have pleaded for their lives. Pamela was found in a recliner, slumped with her buttocks on the edge of the chair and her legs straight out. Her hair and arm were across her face. Dr. Jason testified that she may or may not have been unconscious after being struck with the wrench. It was reasonable to infer that Pamela saw defendant approaching with the firearm and raised her arm over her face in a defensive manner. It was also reasonable to infer that she would have asked that her life be spared. Dr. Jason testified that Phillip was beaten with the wrench before being shot. It was reasonable to infer that Phillip was conscious before being shot, as Dr. Jason testified that Phillip\u2019s palm had a defensive gunshot wound and that blood found on Phillip\u2019s jeans indicated that he was upright for a significant period of time after he began bleeding. It would only be natural that a conscious Phillip would have asked that their lives be spared.\nMoreover, the remark by a prosecutor that defendant might have been blaming that prosecutor for \u201ctrying to give me the death penalty,\u201d which was couched in a series of arguments that no one but defendant was to blame for his predicament, was so innocuous that it does not even come near the level of gross impropriety. It appears from the record that the prosecutor was simply arguing to jurors that they should feel no guilt or blame if they were to find that defendant\u2019s crimes were worthy of death. See State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 188, 443 S.E.2d 14, 41 (stating that the prosecutor\u2019s duty is \u201cto strenuously pursue the goal of persuading the jury that the facts of the particular case at hand warrant imposition of the death penalty\u201d (citing State v. Myers, 299 N.C. 671, 680, 263 S.E.2d 768, 774 (1980))), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046 (1994).\nWhile the prosecution\u2019s comments concerning the final moments of the victims\u2019 lives may have neared the edge of the latitude given counsel during closing arguments to make inferences from the evidence, we cannot say that the remarks were grossly improper so as to require the trial court to intervene ex mero motu. See State v. Cummings, 352 N.C. 600, 621-22, 536 S.E.2d 36, 52 (2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 997 (2001). Additionally, the trial court instructed jurors that \u201cif your recollection differs from that of the Court or the lawyers, you are to rely solely upon your own recollection of the evidence during your deliberations.\u201d These assignments of error are overruled.\nDefendant also asserts that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu when a prosecutor argued during penalty proceeding closing arguments that many of the mitigating circumstances submitted by defendant had no connection to the crime. However, defendant\u2019s argument fails to take into account the prosecutor\u2019s complete statement. The prosecutor was not telling the jury that the mitigators must have a nexus to the crime. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004) (stating that certain mental capacity evidence need not find a nexus to the crime to be relevant mitigating evidence). Instead, the prosecutor argued: \u201cWhere is the connection? Why does it make what he did to Philip and Pam Holder less deserving of the ultimate penalty? We are here to talk about and deal with what happened on December the 11th, 2002.\u201d Taken in context, it is clear that the prosecutor was not arguing that the mitigating evidence must be connected to the crime, but that the evidence did not have mitigating value in that it did not make defendant \u201cless deserving of the ultimate penalty.\u201d This Court has stated that \u201cprosecutors may legitimately attempt to deprecate or belittle the significance of mitigating circumstances.\u201d State v. Basden, 339 N.C. 288, 305, 451 S.E.2d 238, 247 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1152 (1995). The prosecutor\u2019s remarks were not improper, and thus, the trial court did not err in failing to intervene ex mero motu. This assignment of error is overruled.\nJury Instruction Issues\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s failure to submit a peremptory instruction on the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(2) mitigating circumstance of whether defendant \u201cwas under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance\u201d at the time of the murders.\nIt is well established a defendant is entitled to peremptory instructions on a mitigating circumstance.whenever the evidence supporting the mitigating circumstance is uncontroverted. See State v. Holden, 338 N.C. 394, 402-03, 450 S.E.2d 878, 882 (1994). \u201c[W]e have held that it is not error for a trial court in a capital case to refuse to give requested instructions where counsel failed to submit the instructions to the trial court in writing.\u201d State v. White, 349 N.C. 535, 570, 508 S.E.2d 253, 275 (1998)[, cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1026 (1999)].\nDuke, 360 N.C. at 131, 623 S.E.2d at 25 (first alteration in original). Neither party has pointed us to, nor can we find in the record, defendant\u2019s written request for such an instruction. However, even if defendant had submitted the proposed instruction to the trial court, he would not have been entitled to such an instruction. The evidence was not uncontroverted that defendant acted \u201cunder the influence of mental or emotional disturbance\u201d at the time of the crime. While there was sufficient evidence for the jury to so find, there was also evidence that showed defendant created a ruse to enter the Holder residence and had the mental capacity at the time of the murders to steal various items of personal property from the residence to sell. The evidence here was not conclusive and incontrovertible, and jurors could have been justified in rejecting the mitigator, as the evidence could have been taken to show deliberation as opposed to the actions of an emotionally disturbed person. This assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in submitting the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance in addition to the aggravating circumstance that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5), (6) (2005). Generally speaking, \u201cin cases of premeditated murder in which there was also a robbery with a dangerous weapon with an underlying motive of pecuniary gain, it is only permissible to submit either the (e)(5) or (e)(6) aggravating circumstance, as \u2018one plainly comprises the other.\u2019 \u201d State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 467, 648 S.E.2d 788, 805 (2007) (quoting State v. Quesinberry, 319 N.C. 228, 238, 354 S.E.2d 446, 452 (1987), judgment vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 1022 (1990)). However, this is not the case when there is separate evidence that tends to prove both aggravators. See State v. East, 345 N.C. 535, 553-54, 481 S.E.2d 652, 664-65, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 918 (1997). In the instant case, the trial court instructed the jury to consider only the theft of the firearms, credit cards, and checks in determining whether the (e)(6) pecuniary gain circumstance was present and to not consider the vehicle theft in making that determination. As to the (e)(5) aggravator, the trial court instructed the jury to consider only the evidence related to the theft of the truck. The trial court properly submitted both aggravating circumstances to the jury. This assignment of error is overruled.\nPRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant argues that: (1) the short-form murder indictment was insufficient to charge him with first-degree murder in that it failed to allege all the elements of first-degree murder; (2) the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury to answer \u201cyes\u201d for Issue Three of the Issues and Recommendations as to Punishment Form even if the weight of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances were of equal weight; (4) the trial court erred in instructing the jury to refuse to give effect to nonstatutory mitigating circumstances if the jurors found them to have no mitigating value; (5) the trial court erred in instructing the jury that it was the defendant\u2019s burden to \u201csatisfy\u201d the jurors of the existence of mitigating circumstances; (6) the trial court erred in instructing the jurors that in considering Issues Three and Four of the Issues and Recommendations as to Punishment Form, they \u201cmay\u201d consider the mitigating circumstances found in response to Issue Two; and (7) the death penalty is inherently cruel and unusual, and North Carolina\u2019s sentencing procedure is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. We have considered all of defendant\u2019s arguments and decline to overrule our prior precedent holding these arguments to be without merit. See Duke, 360 N.C. at 136-42, 623 S.E.2d at 28-32.\nPROPORTIONALITY\nAs we have concluded that defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free from prejudicial error, we now consider: (1) whether the record supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury and upon which the sentence of death was based; (2) whether the death sentence was entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the facts of the crime and the defendant. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) (2005).\nThe jury found three aggravating circumstances as to defendant\u2019s murder of Pamela Holder: (1) the murder was committed while defendant was committing or attempting to commit robbery, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5); (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(6); and (3) the murder was part of a course of conduct in which defendant engaged and that course of conduct included the commission by defendant of other crimes of violence against other persons, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(ll) (2005). In addition to the three aggravating circumstances found as to the murder of Pamela, jurors also found that Phillip\u2019s murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(9) (2005).\nThe record indicates that defendant stole various items from the Holder residence, including firearms and credit cards. This is sufficient to support the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance. The record also shows that defendant stole Phillip\u2019s truck immediately after committing the murders. This is sufficient to support the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance. Moreover, sufficient evidence showed that defendant\u2019s actions in murdering each victim were part of the course of conduct which resulted in other crimes of violence to another person \u2014 the other victim. This is sufficient to satisfy the (e)(ll) aggravating circumstance. There is also sufficient evidence to support the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance as to the murder of Phillip Holder. Defendant brutally beat Phillip with a wrench and then shot him three times because it was \u201cjust better to kill him.\u201d\nThere is no indication in the record that the jury was under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor in determining defendant\u2019s sentence. In such circumstances we will not disturb the jurors\u2019 weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.\nOur final statutory duty is to determine whether defendant\u2019s sentence is proportionate, considering defendant and his crimes. In making this determination, we consider \u201call cases which are roughly similar in facts to the instant case, although we are not constrained to cite each and every case we have used for comparison.\u201d State v. McNeill, 360 N.C. 231, 254, 624 S.E.2d 329, 344 (citing State v. AlBayyinah, 359 N.C. 741, 761, 616 S.E.2d 500, 514 (2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1076 (2006)), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 127 S. Ct. 396, 166 L. Ed. 2d 281 (2006). \u201cAlthough we \u2018compare this case with the cases in which we have found the death penalty to be proportionate. ... we will not undertake to discuss or cite all of those cases each time we carry out that duty.\u2019 \u201d State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 429, 597 S.E.2d 724, 756 (2004) (quoting State v. McCollum, 334 N.C. 208, 244, 433 S.E.2d 144, 164 (1993), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1254 (1994)), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156 (2005). \u201c[O]nly in the most clear and extraordinary situations may we properly declare a sentence of death which has been recommended by the jury and ordered by the trial court to be disproportionate.\u201d State v. Chandler, 342 N.C. 742, 764, 467 S.E.2d 636, 648, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 875 (1996). The determination of proportionality of an individual defendant\u2019s sentence is ultimately dependent upon the sound judgment and experience of the members of this Court. See McNeill, 360 N.C. at 253, 624 S.E.2d at 344 (citing State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. at 426, 597 S.E.2d at 754).\nThere have been eight cases in which this Court has determined that a defendant\u2019s sentence was disproportionate. State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 573 S.E.2d 870 (2002); State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\nDefendant\u2019s case is unlike any case in which we have found a death sentence disproportionate. \u201c[W]e have never found a death sentence disproportionate in a double-murder case.\u201d State v. Sidden, 347 N.C. 218, 235, 491 S.E.2d 225, 234 (1997) (citing State v. Conner, 345 N.C. 319, 338, 480 S.E.2d 626, 635, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876 (1997)), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1097 (1998). We decline to do so in this case. We also consider the brutality of defendant\u2019s murders in determining proportionality. See Duke, 360 N.C. at 144, 623 S.E.2d at 33 (citations omitted). The victims were two of the few people who ever showed any affection and concern for defendant, yet he brutally beat both of them with a wrench and then mercilessly fired bullets into their skulls for monetary gain. Defendant\u2019s sentence is not disproportionate.\nCONCLUSION\nDefendant has assigned other instances of error, but has not provided any argument or supporting authority for these assignments in his brief. Those assignments of error are considered abandoned and are dismissed. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6); McNeill, 360 N.C. at 241, 624 S.E.2d at 336.\nWe conclude defendant received a fair trial and sentencing proceeding and we find no error in his convictions or his sentences. We additionally conclude that defendant\u2019s sentence of death is not disproportionate.\nNO ERROR.\n. Throughout the record Phillip Holder\u2019s name appears interchangeably as \u201cPhillip\u201d and \u201cPhilip.\u201d\n. The prospective juror was later excused because of his statement that he would not condemn someone to death. Therefore, the issue, as in Gregory, is whether defendant was prejudiced by the other jurors\u2019 exposure to the statements at issue.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRADY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper; Attorney General, by Joan M. Cunningham, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, and Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Jonathan E. Broun, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. WILLIAM HENRY RAINES\nNo. 211A06\n(Filed 7 December 2007)\n1. Jury\u2014 selection \u2014 potential juror \u2014 remark about reading material in newspapers\nThe trial court did not err by not declaring a mistrial or dismissing the entire pool after a prospective juror (who was himself later dismissed for a different reason) said that he had read incriminating material about the case in the newspapers.\n2. Jury\u2014 selection \u2014 voir dire limited \u2014 peremptory challenges not exhausted \u2014 no prejudice\nA defendant who did not exhaust his peremptory challenges could not show prejudice from the judge\u2019s limiting of his voir dire questioning of prospective jurors, even assuming abuse of discretion.\n3. Evidence\u2014 discovery of body \u2014 reaction of parent \u2014 not prejudicial\nThere was no prejudice from the admission of testimony about how a witness discovered her sister\u2019s death and about her mother\u2019s reaction to the news where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.\n4. Evidence\u2014 reaction of victims\u2019 son to death of parents\u2014 invited and not prejudicial\nThere was no prejudice from the admission of testimony about the reaction of the victims\u2019 son to the death of his parents where the exclusion of the testimony would not have changed the result. Moreover, the testimony came during a line of questioning by defendant, and any error was invited.\n5. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 improprety\u2014not prejudicial\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing a portion of the State\u2019s closing argument which defendant asserted was a personal attack upon counsel. The prosecutor\u2019s comment was neither laudable nor appropriate, but it was not extreme, the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, and the argument was confounding as to its true meaning.\n6. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 whether murder was provoked \u2014 not argument for jury nullification\nA prosecutor\u2019s argument about whether a murder defendant was provoked (to which defendant did not object) was not so prejudicial as to require intervention ex mero motu. The prosecutor was not arguing for jury nullification as defendant contended, but that the jury should find defendant guilty of first-degree rather than second-degree murder. Moreover, the court instructed the jury that it was necessary to understand and apply the law as given.\n7. Criminal Law\u2014 verdict form \u2014 not misleading\nThere was no error in the language in the verdict form in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant asserted that the form suggested to the jurors that they were expected to find defendant guilty. The form was not improper or misleading, it did not nullify other options available to the jury, and there is no indication that the jury would have been confused.\n8. Evidence\u2014 victim impact testimony \u2014 unfinished statement \u2014 not prejudicial\nThere was no prejudicial error in victim impact testimony in a first-degree murder sentencing hearing where the sister of one of the victims, who also knew defendant, began a sentence which was not finished after an objection. The jury did not hear the complete thought, and the appellate court will not speculate that the witness was asking the jury to minimize mitigating evidence.\n9.Constitutional Law\u2014 Confrontation Clause \u2014 capital sentencing \u2014 detention center reports\nThe Confrontation Clause rights of a first-degree murder defendant were not violated in a capital sentencing hearing where an officer at a detention center read from detention center incident reports. The reports were not testimonial in nature, nor were the statements contained therein testimonial. They were more like business records.\n10. Constitutional Law\u2014 First Amendment \u2014 defendant\u2019s use of racial epithet in prison \u2014 admissible in capital sentencing\nThe First Amendment rights of a first-degree murder defendant were not violated in a capital sentencing hearing by the admission of a detention center report recounting defendant\u2019s use of a racial epithet toward another inmate. The context of the incident and the inflammatory nature of the word used by defendant were relevant to rebut the mitigating circumstance that defendant had demonstrated an ability to adapt to prison life.\n11. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 no prejudice\nDefendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel at a capital sentencing proceeding through his attorney\u2019s failure to object to certain evidence where he could not show prejudice.\n12. Sentencing\u2014 hearsay \u2014 insufficient indicia of reliability\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by determining that proposed hearsay about sexual abuse suffered by defendant lacked sufficient indicia of reliability. While the Rules of Evidence serve only as guidelines in capital penalty proceedings, the court may properly exclude hearsay statements which lack sufficient indicia of reliability or a sufficient foundation.\n13. Sentencing\u2014 defendant\u2019s childhood \u2014 basis for opinion required \u2014 offer of proof required\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by insisting that defendant\u2019s witness explain the basis for her conclusion that defendant grew up in an injurious environment. Moreover, the appellate court will not speculate about excluded answers for which no offer of proof was made.\n14. Sentencing\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 final moments of victims\u2019 lives \u2014 defendant shifting blame \u2014 not grossly improper\nA prosecutor\u2019s closing arguments in the penalty phase of a first-degree murder prosecution concerning the final moments of the murdered victims\u2019 lives was not so grossly improper as to require intervention ex mero motu. A remark that defendant was probably blaming the prosecutor for trying to give him the death penalty was part of an argument that no one but defendant was to blame for his predicament and comes nowhere close to the level of gross impropriety.\n15. Sentencing\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 mitigating value\nA prosecutor at a first-degree murder sentencing hearing did not argue that mitigating evidence must be connected to the crime, but that the evidence did not have mitigating value.\n16. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 mitigating circumstances \u2014 mental or emotional disturbance \u2014 peremptory instruction not given \u2014 no written request \u2014 evidence controverted\nThe trial court did not err by not giving a peremptory instruction in a capital sentencing proceeding that defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance. There is no record of defendant\u2019s written request for the instruction; even so, defendant was not entitled to it because the evidence was controverted and the jury would have been justified in rejecting it.\n17. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 robbery and pecuniary gain\nThe trial court did not err in a capital sentencing proceeding by submitting the aggravating circumstances of pecuniary gain and that the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery where there was separate evidence of the aggravators.\n18. Sentencing\u2014 death \u2014 proportionality\nSentences of death were proportionate, considering the brutality of the crimes and that the case was unlike any which have been found disproportionate, where defendant brutally beat both victims with a wrench and then fired bullets into their skulls for monetary gain.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from judgments imposing a sentence of death entered by Judge Ronald K. Payne on 9 September 2005 in Superior Court, Henderson County, upon jury verdicts finding defendant guilty of two counts of first-degree murder. On 31 October 2006, the Supreme Court allowed defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of an additional judgment. Heard in the Supreme Court 15 October 2007.\nRoy Cooper; Attorney General, by Joan M. Cunningham, Assistant Attorney General, and Robert C. Montgomery, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender, and Center for Death Penalty Litigation, by Jonathan E. Broun, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0001-01", "first_page_order": 79, "last_page_order": 104 }