{ "id": 4150084, "name": "CAROLINA BUILDING SERVICES' WINDOWS & DOORS, INC. v. BOARDWALK, LLC; MILLER BUILDING CORPORATION; DEBORAH C. LEE; SHANNON W. MYERS; JOHN C. CZERWINSKI and wife, JEANETTE M. CZERWINSKI; MANISH G. PATEL; ALLEN H. VAN DYKE and wife, PERRY G. VAN DYKE; GEORGE CORNELSON and wife, KIMBERLYE F. CORNELSON; AFSHIN GHAZI; and CHARLES H. HUNTLEY", "name_abbreviation": "Carolina Building Services' Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Boardwalk, LLC", "decision_date": "2008-04-11", "docket_number": "No. 444PA06", "first_page": "262", "last_page": "268", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 N.C. 262" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636233, 12636234, 12636235, 12636236, 12636237, 12636238, 12636239, 12636240, 12636241, 12636242, 12636243, 12636244, 12636245, 12636246, 12636247, 12636248, 12636249, 12636250, 12636251, 12636252, 12636253, 12636254 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0893-11", "/se2d/631/0893-01", "/se2d/631/0893-02", "/se2d/631/0893-03", "/se2d/631/0893-04", "/se2d/631/0893-05", "/se2d/631/0893-06", "/se2d/631/0893-07", "/se2d/631/0893-08", "/se2d/631/0893-09", "/se2d/631/0893-10", "/se2d/631/0893-15", "/se2d/631/0893-12", "/se2d/631/0893-13", "/se2d/631/0893-14", "/se2d/631/0893-16", "/se2d/631/0893-17", "/se2d/631/0893-18", "/se2d/631/0893-19", "/se2d/631/0893-20", "/se2d/631/0893-21", "/se2d/631/0893-22" ] }, { "cite": "178 N.C. 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App.", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634820 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "631 S.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636233, 12636234, 12636235, 12636236, 12636237, 12636238, 12636239, 12636240, 12636241, 12636242, 12636243, 12636244, 12636245, 12636246, 12636247, 12636248, 12636249, 12636250, 12636251, 12636252, 12636253, 12636254 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. COA05-1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/631/0893-11", "/se2d/631/0893-01", "/se2d/631/0893-02", "/se2d/631/0893-03", "/se2d/631/0893-04", "/se2d/631/0893-05", "/se2d/631/0893-06", "/se2d/631/0893-07", "/se2d/631/0893-08", "/se2d/631/0893-09", "/se2d/631/0893-10", "/se2d/631/0893-15", "/se2d/631/0893-12", "/se2d/631/0893-13", "/se2d/631/0893-14", "/se2d/631/0893-16", "/se2d/631/0893-17", "/se2d/631/0893-18", "/se2d/631/0893-19", "/se2d/631/0893-20", "/se2d/631/0893-21", "/se2d/631/0893-22" ] }, { "cite": "84 S.E. 1032", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. 632", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662047 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/168/0632-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 N.C. 723", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794819 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 S.E.2d 245", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 218", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3744803, 3740047, 3743632, 3746193, 3741711, 3743098, 3742972, 3745727 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0218-07", "/nc/361/0218-04", "/nc/361/0218-05", "/nc/361/0218-03", "/nc/361/0218-01", "/nc/361/0218-08", "/nc/361/0218-06", "/nc/361/0218-02" ] }, { "cite": "2006 WL 1984639", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*2-3", "parenthetical": "No. COA05-1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "178 N.C. App. 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "No. COA05-1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634820 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349" }, { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "noting that, with a claim of lien on funds, \"[p]rior to notice to the obligor, the subcontractor bears the risk of loss or nonpayment by the general contractor.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E.2d 101", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "105", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 715", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575818 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0715-01" ] }, { "cite": "587 S.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8958040 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "650-51" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794819 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "269" }, { "page": "269" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0263-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 745, "char_count": 17084, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.4726535056150146e-07, "percentile": 0.8066852546229529 }, "sha256": "420daab04986f6afef424a6d7342ae0e0fdbc4bb644a5aefc242a867cd5e4cd9", "simhash": "1:075fab7624c2d1f7", "word_count": 2744 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:47:03.529976+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice BRADY joins in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "CAROLINA BUILDING SERVICES\u2019 WINDOWS & DOORS, INC. v. BOARDWALK, LLC; MILLER BUILDING CORPORATION; DEBORAH C. LEE; SHANNON W. MYERS; JOHN C. CZERWINSKI and wife, JEANETTE M. CZERWINSKI; MANISH G. PATEL; ALLEN H. VAN DYKE and wife, PERRY G. VAN DYKE; GEORGE CORNELSON and wife, KIMBERLYE F. CORNELSON; AFSHIN GHAZI; and CHARLES H. HUNTLEY" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nThis case presents the question of whether a default judgment in favor of an owner against a general contractor can form the basis for extinguishing a subcontractor\u2019s lien on property under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23. We hold a default judgment cannot be used for this purpose.\nBefore September 2001, Boardwalk, LLC (\u201cBoardwalk\u201d) entered into a contract with Miller Building Corporation (\u201cMiller\u201d) whereby Miller agreed to serve as the general contractor for Boardwalk\u2019s condominium project. In February 2002, well before completion of the project, Miller removed its personnel and equipment from the job site. Miller failed to fully pay its subcontractors, including Carolina Building Services\u2019 Windows and Doors, Inc. (\u201cCarolina Building\u201d).\nCarolina Building gave notice of a lien on funds to Boardwalk on 22 February 2002 and filed a subrogation lien on Boardwalk\u2019s property on 25 February 2002. On 24 April 2002, Carolina Building filed suit against Boardwalk and Miller asserting claims b\u00e1sed on the liens, breach of contract against Miller, and quantum meruit. There is no dispute that Carolina Building furnished nearly $189,704.41 worth of materials to Miller, which were used on Boardwalk\u2019s property and for which Miller failed to pay. Miller never answered or appeared, and Carolina Building obtained an entry of default against Miller on 28 June 2002 and a default judgment on 10 December 2002.\nOver two years later on 24 June 2004, Boardwalk filed a cross-claim against Miller alleging negligence and breach of contract. Again, Miller did not answer or appear. Boardwalk obtained an entry of default against Miller on 26 January 2005. Boardwalk then sought a default judgment in the amount of $185,420.38 against Miller. Carolina Building objected to the entry of that judgment. Boardwalk\u2019s motion for default judgment against Miller was consolidated with Boardwalk\u2019s and Carolina Building\u2019s cross-motions for summary judgment, and the matter was heard on 28 February and 1 March 2005.\nBoardwalk presented affidavits asserting it incurred excess costs to complete the project thereby preventing Carolina Building from any monetary recovery against Boardwalk under the lien statutes. In opposition, Carolina Building presented an affidavit asserting Boardwalk completed the project for less than its contract price with Miller. The trial court concluded Carolina Building lacked standing to contest a default judgment in an action between Boardwalk and Miller and entered a default judgment against Miller on Boardwalk\u2019s crossclaim in the amount of $172,265.63, the difference asserted in Boardwalk\u2019s affidavits between the contract price and the cost to complete the project. Next, despite the competing affidavits presented by Boardwalk and Carolina Building, the trial court granted summary judgment for Boardwalk as to Carolina Building\u2019s claims, relying solely on the default judgment against Miller.\nThe Court of Appeals found the trial court did not err in holding Carolina Building lacked standing to object to Boardwalk\u2019s motion for default judgment against Miller. Carolina Bldg. Servs. \u2019 Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Boardwalk, LLC, 178 N.C. App. 561, 631 S.E.2d 893, 2006 WL 1984639, at *2-3 (July 18, 2006) (No. COA05-1030) (unpublished). As to Carolina Building\u2019s lien on funds, the Court of Appeals held summary judgment for Boardwalk was appropriate because both parties agreed that Boardwalk did not owe Miller any sum of money on 22 February 2002 (the date Boardwalk received notice of the lien on funds) and Boardwalk paid no funds to Miller after receiving Carolina Building\u2019s notice. Id., at *6. Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Boardwalk as to Carolina Building\u2019s lien on real property because the lien was subrogated to Miller\u2019s rights and that the default judgment in favor of Boardwalk against Miller meant that Miller had no right to a lien against Boardwalk\u2019s real property. Id., at *7. On 25 January 2007, we allowed Carolina Building\u2019s petition for discretionary review as to the last issue addressed by the Court of Appeals: whether a default judgment for an owner against a general contractor who does not appear may be the basis for extinguishing a subcontractor\u2019s lien on the owner\u2019s real property. Carolina Bldg. Servs.\u2019 Windows & Doors, Inc. v. Boardwalk, LLC, 361 N.C. 218, 642 S.E.2d 245 (2007).\nWe decide this issue by examining the statutory scheme provided by the General Assembly in Chapter 44A. Recently, this Court dealt with a question concerning a lien on funds under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 44A-18 and 44A-20 and stated:\nThe materialman\u2019s lien statute is remedial in that it seeks to protect the interests of those who supply labor and materials that improve the value of the owner\u2019s property. A remedial statute must be construed broadly \u201cin the light of the evils sought to be eliminated, the remedies intended to be applied, and the objective to be attained.\u201d\nO & M Indus. v. Smith Eng\u2019g Co., 360 N.C. 263, 268, 624 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2006) (citations omitted). Likewise, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23 is a remedial statute that must be construed broadly.\nWhen certain notice and perfection requirements are met, a first tier subcontractor is subrogated to the claim of lien on real property of the contractor. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23(a) (1999). This is \u201ca separate right of subrogation to the lien of the contractor who deals with the owner, distinct from the rights contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-18,\u201d Elec. Supply Co. of Durham, Inc. v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 660, 403 S.E.2d 291, 297 (1991), meaning \u201cthe subcontractor may assert whatever lien that the contractor who dealt with the owner has against the owner\u2019s real property relating to the project,\u201d id. at 661, 403 S.E.2d at 297 (citing Powell & Powell v. King Lumber Co., 168 N.C. 723, 729, 168 N.C. 632, 638, 84 S.E. 1032, 1035 (1915)).\nIn pertinent part, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23 states: \u201cUpon the filing of the notice and claim of lien and the commencement of the action, no action of the contractor shall be effective to prejudice the rights of the subcontractor without his written consent.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23(a). The parties agree that Carolina Building properly filed a notice and claim of lien and properly commenced the action. It is also uncontested that Miller defaulted after Carolina Building commenced its action and that Carolina Building did not provide written consent allowing Miller\u2019s actions to prejudice its rights. However, the parties disagree whether Miller\u2019s default constituted an \u201caction.\u201d\nCarolina Building presented an affidavit that raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning Boardwalk\u2019s liability to Miller based on a lien against Boardwalk\u2019s real property. Rather than consider this affidavit, the trial court focused on the default judgment for Boardwalk against Miller. By its plain meaning, an action is \u201c[a] thing done.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 31 (8th ed. 2004). Thus, Miller\u2019s choice not to defend Boardwalk\u2019s claims constituted an \u201caction\u201d which prejudiced the rights of Carolina Building contrary to the statutory mandate of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23. Carolina Building should have an opportunity to present its evidence concerning the merits of recovery under its lien on real property.\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed as to the issue before this Court on discretionary review. The remaining issues addressed by the Court of Appeals are not before this Court, and its decision as to those issues remains undisturbed. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON,\ndissenting.\nNotwithstanding the default judgment in favor of Boardwalk, the majority declares that the trial court erred in relying upon the default judgment against Miller in granting summary judgment to Boardwalk, and that Carolina Building may pursue its claim to recovery on its lien on real property owned by Boardwalk. In so holding, the majority sub silentio overrules the settled law of default judgments in North Carolina. The majority moreover contravenes the lien law hierarchy created by N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 44A-7 to -23.1 therefore respectfully dissent.\nI must first note that the majority\u2019s decision strays beyond the boundaries set by this Court when it agreed to entertain the case. The majority acknowledges that in allowing discretionary review, we limited the scope of our review to the second issue only, which is \u201cwhether a default judgment for an owner against a general contractor who does not appear may be the basis for extinguishing a subcontractor\u2019s lien on the owner\u2019s real property.\u201d We did not grant discretionary review to the first issue, which was that Carolina Building \u201clacked standing to object to Boardwalk\u2019s motion for default judgment against Miller.\u201d Thus, under the law of this case, Carolina Building has no standing to argue the merits of any defense Miller may have had to Boardwalk\u2019s claim against it. Yet the majority\u2019s resolution of the case contradicts itself and expressly allows Carolina Building to argue the merits of Miller\u2019s right to a lien against Boardwalk\u2019s real property. The majority thereby improperly reverses the opinion of the Court of Appeals not only as to the second issue, but as to the first issue as well.\nUnder our lien statutes, there are only two methods by which a subcontractor may assert lien rights against the owner\u2019s real property: (1) a direct liability lien pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a744A-20(d); and (2) a subrogation lien pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a744A-23, as we have here. Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23, a subcontractor seeking a claim of lien on real property must first give notice of claim of lien upon funds pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 44A18-19. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23(a). The notice of claim of lien upon funds statute\ncreates a risk shifting mechanism for subcontractors. Prior to notice to the obligor, the subcontractor bears the risk of loss or nonpayment by the general contractor. When notice is served, the risk shifts to the obligor to the extent that the obligor is holding funds. With this notice the burden of assuring payment of the subcontractor\u2019s lien shifts to the obligor who owns the project, is receiving construction funds, and receives the benefit of the subcontractor\u2019s labor and materials. The owner is, thus, put on notice of a general contractor\u2019s potential breach and is apprised of the need to take precautions necessary to protect the project and to ensure that subcontractors remain on the job. .\nO & M Indus. v. Smith Eng\u2019r Co., 360 N.C. 263, 269, 624 S.E.2d 345, 349 (2006). Once notice of claim of lien upon funds is given, the subcontractor, \u201cmay, to the extent of this claim, enforce the claim of lien on real property of the contractor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23(a). A subcontractor\u2019s claim of lien on real property is subrogated to the contractor\u2019s claim of lien on real property, and the lien is therefore necessarily limited to the amount of money the owner owes the contractor. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23(a); Electric Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Electrical Co., 328 N.C. 651, 661, 403 S.E.2d 291, 297 (1991). If the general contractor has no right to a lien, the first tier subcontractor likewise has no such right. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23(a); Watson Elec. Constr. Co. v. Summit Cos., 160 N.C. App. 647, 650-51, 587 S.E.2d 87, 91 (2003).\nIn the present case, it is undisputed that any claim by Carolina Building on Boardwalk\u2019s real property is subrogated to Miller\u2019s claim. Both parties also agree that after receiving Carolina Building\u2019s notice, Boardwalk paid no funds to Miller. Carolina Building\u2019s claim on Boardwalk\u2019s real property is therefore limited to the amount of money owed by Boardwalk to Miller. The entry of default and default judgment entered against Miller conclusively established that Boardwalk owed no money to Miller and Miller had no claim of lien upon Boardwalk\u2019s real property. \u201c \u2018Once the default is established defendant has no further standing to contest the factual allegations of plaintiff\u2019s claim for relief. If he wishes an opportunity to challenge plaintiff\u2019s right to recover, his only recourse is to show good cause for setting aside the default... and, failing that, to contest the amount of recovery.\u2019 \u201d Bell v. Martin, 299 N.C. 715, 721, 264 S.E.2d 101, 105 (1980) (citation omitted) (quoting Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure \u00a7 2688 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)). The default judgment entered here has not been set aside. As it is judicially established that Miller has no right to claim of lien on Boardwalk\u2019s property, it follows that, as the subcontractor, Carolina Building can have no claim of lien on Boardwalk\u2019s property. As such, Boardwalk was entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Boardwalk.\nThe majority does not expressly address the interplay between N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23 and the law of default judgments, but determines that Carolina Building is entitled to \u201can opportunity to present its evidence concerning the merits of recovery under its lien on real property.\u201d The majority thereby necessarily concludes that the default judgment entered here has no effect and may be regarded as a nullity in the face of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23(a)\u2019s provision that \u201cno action of the contractor shall be effective to prejudice the rights of the subcontractor.\u201d The majority offers no authority in support of its holding beyond a mere definition of the word \u201caction.\u201d This holding fundamentally contradicts the settled law of default judgments in this State and ignores the lien law hierarchy created by N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 44A-7 to -23. Notably, the majority makes no attempt to limit its holding to situations involving contractors and subcontractors, which throws into question the continued validity of default judgments in this State. If a validly-entered default judgment may no longer be relied upon by a property owner against a lien claim by a subcontractor, it begs the question to what other statutorily-based, judicially-created exceptions Rule 55 might be vulnerable. Ironically, the basis of Carolina Building\u2019s established claim to monies owed it by Miller \u2014 a default judgment entered against Miller in the same action \u2014 is the very same type of judgment Carolina Building and the majority deem ineffectual in the present case.\nThe factual scenario of the instant case is an all too common one, which is why the General Assembly established the lien protections of Chapter 44A. In a case between two innocent parties, as we have here, the risk must fall on the party better placed to protect its interest. Compare O & M Indus. v. Smith Eng\u2019r Co., 360 N.C. at 269, 624 S.E.2d at 349 (noting that, with a claim of lien on funds, \u201c[p]rior to notice to the obligor, the subcontractor bears the risk of loss or nonpayment by the general contractor.\u201d). Carolina Building could have earlier filed for a lien and thus better protected itself from potential loss. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-18(5) (providing that a lien on funds will secure amounts earned by the claimant, even before amounts are due or performance is complete). I fear that the majority\u2019s broad holding may have many unanticipated consequences for our State\u2019s jurisprudence.\nJustice BRADY joins in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Erwin and Eleazer, P.A., by L. Holmes Eleazer, Jr., Fenton T. Erwin, Jr., and Lex M. Erwin, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Johnston, Allison & Hord, P.A., by Martin L. White and Greg C. Ahlum, for defendant-appellee Boardwalk, LLC; and Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, by D. Christopher Osborn, for defendant-appellees individual unit owners." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CAROLINA BUILDING SERVICES\u2019 WINDOWS & DOORS, INC. v. BOARDWALK, LLC; MILLER BUILDING CORPORATION; DEBORAH C. LEE; SHANNON W. MYERS; JOHN C. CZERWINSKI and wife, JEANETTE M. CZERWINSKI; MANISH G. PATEL; ALLEN H. VAN DYKE and wife, PERRY G. VAN DYKE; GEORGE CORNELSON and wife, KIMBERLYE F. CORNELSON; AFSHIN GHAZI; and CHARLES H. HUNTLEY\nNo. 444PA06\n(Filed 11 April 2008)\nLiens\u2014 subcontractor\u2019s \u2014 not extinguished by default of general contractor\nA default judgment in favor of an owner against a general contractor cannot be used as the basis for extinguishing a subcontractor\u2019s lien under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44A-23. In this case, the subcontractor (Carolina Building) presented an affidavit that raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning the property owner\u2019s liability to the contractor, and summary judgment should not have been granted for the property owner (Boardwalk) on Carolina Building\u2019s lien.\nJustice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting.\nJustice BRADY joins in this dissenting opinion.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of the unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, 178 N.C. App. 561, 631 S.E.2d 893 (2006), affirming orders entered on 28 March 2005 by Judge Larry Ford in Superior Court, Iredell County. Heard in the Supreme Court 13 September 2007.\nErwin and Eleazer, P.A., by L. Holmes Eleazer, Jr., Fenton T. Erwin, Jr., and Lex M. Erwin, for plaintiff-appellant.\nJohnston, Allison & Hord, P.A., by Martin L. White and Greg C. Ahlum, for defendant-appellee Boardwalk, LLC; and Horack, Talley, Pharr & Lowndes, by D. Christopher Osborn, for defendant-appellees individual unit owners." }, "file_name": "0262-01", "first_page_order": 340, "last_page_order": 346 }