{ "id": 4149478, "name": "BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL, Employee v. ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.), Third-Party Administrator", "name_abbreviation": "Hassell v. Onslow County Board of Education", "decision_date": "2008-06-12", "docket_number": "No. 172A07", "first_page": "299", "last_page": "310", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "362 N.C. 299" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637836 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8167523 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12631232, 12631233 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0191-02", "/se2d/594/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12631233, 12631235, 12631279, 12631280, 12631281 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/594/0191-01", "/se2d/594/0192-01", "/se2d/595/0150-01", "/se2d/595/0151-02", "/se2d/595/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "619 S.E.2d 491", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633952 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492", "parenthetical": "citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/619/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 S.E.2d 324", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637836 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331" }, { "page": "331-32", "parenthetical": "Wynn, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "331", "parenthetical": "majority" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/641/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "162 S.E.2d 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620", "parenthetical": "citing Anderson, 233 N.C. at 376, 64 S.E.2d at 268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2 N.C. App. 126", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8551409 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127-28", "parenthetical": "citing Anderson, 233 N.C. at 376, 64 S.E.2d at 268" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/2/0126-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 S.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "citing Henry, 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760" }, { "page": "268" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "233 N.C. 372", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8608280 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376", "parenthetical": "citing Henry, 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/233/0372-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 623", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 196", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560289, 8560267, 8560333, 8560306, 8560243 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0196-03", "/nc/300/0196-02", "/nc/300/0196-05", "/nc/300/0196-04", "/nc/300/0196-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 830", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "835" }, { "page": "835" }, { "page": "835" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "45 N.C. App. 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8548032 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "205" }, { "page": "204-06" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/45/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 S.E.2d 389", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "300 N.C. 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559969 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/300/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "57 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "761", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "231 N.C. 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8630523 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "479", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/231/0477-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 557", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "560-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "160 N.C. App. 560", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8957349 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "562-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/160/0560-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2544088 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369-70" }, { "page": "369-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 N.C. 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4707972 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101-02" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/308/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684964 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" }, { "page": "116" }, { "page": "116-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "141 S.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573590 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "402", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 S.E.2d 272", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "274" }, { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "265 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575582 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433-34" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/265/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 411", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "413", "parenthetical": "citing Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 676", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571666 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680-81", "parenthetical": "citing Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0676-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 179", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4779801 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3788691 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "43", "parenthetical": "citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560408 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8167523 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/182/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 665", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 552", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491466 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0552-01" ] }, { "cite": "284 U.S. 636", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 1931, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "158 S.E. 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "200 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624472 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/200/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 S.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "246-47" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 710", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4749409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "712" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0710-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E.2d 598", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he various compensation acts were intended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying recovery.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560408 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he various compensation acts were intended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying recovery.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0287-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1126, "char_count": 28280, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.5894275489561187e-07, "percentile": 0.8871561623863012 }, "sha256": "e85d5fddd66b8d3aa8574d38c5837315de4e02c3510a702fbc421d8db450ee40", "simhash": "1:8021a45ac4a72c7e", "word_count": 4416 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:47:03.529976+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL, Employee v. ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.), Third-Party Administrator" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Justice.\nPlaintiff employee challenges the Industrial Commission\u2019s (\u201cCommission\u2019s\u201d) determination that she is not entitled to workers\u2019 compensation benefits because her \u201cgeneralized anxiety disorder\u201d (\u201cGAD\u201d) is not an occupational disease pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13). Guided by the well-established standard of appellate review, we hold that the Commission properly concluded that plaintiff\u2019s condition is not an occupational disease because she failed to prove either that her work increased her risk of GAD or significantly contributed to it. Consequently, we affirm the denial of the claim.\nFrom 1987 until February 2002, plaintiff was employed by the Onslow County Board of Education (\u201cdefendant\u201d) as a school teacher. Plaintiff worked at the elementary school level until approximately 1996, when she began teaching at Dixon Middle School (\u201cDixon Middle\u201d). During her time at Dixon Middle, plaintiff consistently had problems managing the classroom and maintaining order, which other teachers of the same students did not have. Plaintiff dreaded going to work because of student disciplinary problems and student disrespect for her, which included verbal and physical harassment. Parents and students complained to the administration about plaintiff\u2019s performance as a teacher.\nOver the course of her employment at Dixon Middle, plaintiff received numerous negative performance reviews and was required to enter into four \u201caction plans,\u201d which are mandated by law when a teacher ranks below the standard in any of the major teaching functions. On 25 January 2002, plaintiff began her fourth action plan with defendant.\nOn 25 February 2002, a curriculum specialist observed plaintiff\u2019s classroom and determined that plaintiff had failed to show improvement in the quality of her classroom instruction. In addition, plaintiff failed to submit timely information to the administration and missed a meeting with Dixon Middle\u2019s principal to address these problems.\nA few days later, the principal instructed plaintiff to continue working toward improving her classroom performance and told her that she was going to share the results of their meeting with the personnel department. The principal also asked plaintiff to sign a warning letter; plaintiff refused, left the school, and never returned to work. On 19 April 2002, plaintiff officially resigned her position with defendant, effective 3 June 2002.\nIn March 2002 psychologist Dennis Chestnut (\u201cDr. Chestnut\u201d) examined plaintiff. Dr. Chestnut found that plaintiff was experiencing a severe emotional crisis, and he considered hospitalizing her. He diagnosed her with GAD, medically excused her from work, and stated that she was unable to return to teaching. Dr. Chestnut continued to treat plaintiff on an ongoing basis. He stated that in his opinion, plaintiff\u2019s \u201c \u2018job was driving her crazy\u2019 \u201d and that her work experience was a major stressor in her life.\nBefore the Commission, plaintiff contended that her GAD was an occupational disease caused by a hostile and abusive classroom environment. The Commission disagreed, concluding that \u201cplaintiff did not prove that her [GAD] is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to her employment,\u201d and thus, her GAD was not compensable as an occupational disease. Plaintiff appealed.\nIn the Court of Appeals, plaintiff argued that her GAD was compensable as an occupational disease and that the evidence did not support certain of the Commission\u2019s findings of fact. She argued further that these findings did not support the Commission\u2019s conclusion of law that she failed to prove that her GAD was an occupational disease. Instead, plaintiff contended that the Commission should have found that her GAD was an occupational disease which arose from an abusive and dangerous work environment. In a divided opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Commission\u2019s opinion and award. Hassell v. Onslow Cty. Bd. of Educ., 182 N.C. App. 1, 12, 641 S.E.2d 324, 331 (2007). The majority upheld all of the Commission\u2019s factual findings and conclusions of law and determined that plaintiff had failed to prove that her position as a teacher at Dixon Middle \u201cplaced her at an increased risk of developing an occupational disease\u201d or that her work was a significant contributing factor in the development of her illness. Id. at 11-12, 641 S.E.2d at 331.\nIn his dissent, Judge Wynn agreed with plaintiff that the Commission \u201cerred by finding that her employment at Dixon Middle School did not place her at an increased risk of developing an anxiety disorder\u201d and by concluding that plaintiff\u2019s GAD was not compensable as an occupational disease. Id. at 12, 641 S.E.2d at 331-32 (Wynn, J., dissenting). The dissent expressed concern that the Commission improperly implied that the test of compensation involves \u201capportioning blame,\u201d and Judge Wynn further concluded that certain findings of fact made by the Commission were not supported by any competent evidence, to wit: (1) that plaintiff\u2019s \u201canxiety centered around her principal\u201d; and (2) that the work/classroom environment was caused by plaintiff\u2019s \u201cinadequate\u201d job performance and thus resulted from her failings as a teacher. Id. at 13-14, 641 S.E.2d at 332. Although specific findings of fact are not discussed in the dissent, the matters addressed by the dissent are raised primarily in findings eleven, twelve, and thirteen, which are quoted below:\n11. Dr. Chestnut explained that plaintiff\u2019s anxiety focused on her difficulty with the principal.\n[Plaintiff] had gotten a new administrator, and she felt that the new administrator was not supportive of her . . . the new administrator did not feel that [plaintiff] was doing a good job, and that regardless of how hard she worked or regardless of what she did, that the administrator was going to find something wrong with it. . . . [S]he felt that the administrator was not supportive when she made decisions in reference to students. (Brackets in original.)\nDr. Chestnut testified that the overall job quality of plaintiff\u2019s work experience exacerbated and/or caused her generalized anxiety. Yet,.Dr. Chestnut also testified that in mental health, experts do not necessarily speak of correlation or causation. Dr. Chestnut stated that AXIS evaluations were designed to be able to make a deferential diagnosis rather than to get into causality or correlation. Dr. Chestnut did state that plaintiff\u2019s employment with defendant exposed her to an increased risk of developing an anxiety disorder as compared to members of the general public not so employed. Dr. Chestnut stated that plaintiff\u2019s \u201cjob was driving her crazy\u201d and that plaintiff\u2019s total job experience was a major stressor in her life. Dr. Chestnut did not indicate, however, that another person in the same work environment or experience would develop Generalized Anxiety Disorder. Dr. Chestnut conceded that Generalized Anxiety Disorder is the most prevalent psychiatric disorder reported in the United States.\n12. The Commission gives little weight to the opinions of Dr. Chestnut concerning causation and increased risk of plaintiff\u2019s mental condition. Dr. Chestnut stated that the focus of his treatment was to be supportive of plaintiff, that he could not speak to the validity of plaintiff\u2019s complaints about the school work, and that he only dealt with plaintiff\u2019s perceptions. There is no testimony in Dr. Chestnut\u2019s deposition that he reviewed any of plaintiff\u2019s employment records or that he considered any concurrent personal stressors in plaintiff\u2019s life in formulating his opinions.\n13. Although plaintiff developed an anxiety disorder, her psychological condition was not the result of anything caused by defendant or because she was required to do anything unusual as a teacher. Plaintiff was in a stressful classroom environment that was caused by her inadequate job performance and inability to perform her job duties as a teaching professional. Considering all the evidence presented, the Commission finds that there was nothing unusual about plaintiff\u2019s job with defendant or what was expected of her as compared to any person similarly situated. The work plaintiff was asked to perform by defendant was the same kind of work any teacher is required to do. Plaintiff was merely asked to perform her job in the manner it should have been performed. Plaintiff was responsible for the bad environment in her classroom.\nPlaintiff gave notice of appeal to this Court on the basis of the dissenting opinion, arguing that the majority in the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the Commission\u2019s decision that her GAD did not entitle her to workers\u2019 compensation benefits for an occupational disease pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13). Relying upon the dissent, she contends that the majority erred: (1) by upholding the Commission\u2019s finding of fact that she was \u201cresponsible\u201d for causing the injurious environment and by thereby relying upon fault to deny her claim; (2) by ignoring Dr. Chestnut\u2019s testimony and upholding the Commission\u2019s findings that her GAD centered around and was caused by problems with her principal and her substandard job performance; and (3) by concluding that she failed to prove that her employment placed her at an increased risk of developing GAD.\nPlaintiff first asserts that the Court of Appeals majority \u201cerred when it upheld the Commission\u2019s finding of fact that plaintiff was at fault in causing the injurious environment and relied upon that finding of fault as a basis for denial of [plaintiff\u2019s] claim.\u201d In connection with this, she discusses only finding of fact thirteen, quoted above, which does not use the word \u201cfault,\u201d but does appear to attribute the cause of her allegedly disabling condition to her inability to control her class. Plaintiff contends that the Commission erred when it based its denial of workers\u2019 compensation benefits upon its finding that plaintiff was \u201cresponsible\u201d for, or essentially at fault, in creating the hostile classroom \u00e9nvironment and that the Court of Appeals majority erred by upholding the Commission based upon the same reasoning.\nThis Court has stated unequivocally that the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was \u201cintended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying recovery\u201d and that \u201c[t]he only ground set out in the statute upon which compensation may be denied on account of the fault of the employee is when the injury is occasioned by his intoxication or willful intention to injure himself or another.\u201d Hartley v. N.C. Prison Dep\u2019t, 258 N.C. 287, 290, 128 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-12 (2007). Thus, except as expressly provided in the statute (as in section 97-12, which is not involved here), fault has no place in the workers\u2019 compensation system. Although finding thirteen does not use the word \u201cfault,\u201d any language in that finding implying that fault plays a role in determining the compensability of this claim is irrelevant and inappropriate. We expressly disavow any language from the Commission\u2019s opinion and that of the Court of Appeals which can be read as indicating that plaintiff\u2019s fault or responsibility for her condition \u2014 including specifically the Court of Appeals\u2019 statement that \u201cplaintiff herself created the stressful work environment\u201d \u2014 was a valid reason to deny her claim. Hassell, 182 N.C. App. at 12, 641 S.E.2d at 331 (majority). The General Assembly has not specified such as a basis for denial of a workers\u2019 compensation claim, and we decline to do so here.\nPlaintiff next argues that the Commission did not give sufficient weight to Dr. Chestnut\u2019s testimony on causation, specifically contending that the \u201cspecious reasons given by the Commission majority do not indicate that it seriously considered or weighed Dr. Chestnut\u2019s testimony before rejecting it.\u201d Plaintiff also asserts that the testimony of Dr. Chestnut, who was the only expert to testify, clearly showed that he believed her GAD was caused by the hostile classroom environment and that there is no competent evidence in the record to support the Commission\u2019s finding and conclusion that her anxiety resulted instead from her difficulty with the principal. This argument centers on findings eleven and twelve, quoted above. We disagree with plaintiff\u2019s contentions.\nThe applicable standard of appellate review in workers\u2019 compensation cases is well established. Appellate review of an opinion and award from the Industrial Commission is generally limited to determining: \u201c(1) whether the findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, and (2) whether the conclusions of law are justified by the findings of fact.\u201d Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 43, 619 S.E.2d 491, 492 (2005) (citing Hendrix v. Linn-Corriher Corp., 317 N.C. 179, 186, 345 S.E.2d 374, 379 (1986)).\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and the decisions of this Court clearly state that the Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 97-84 to -86 (2007); Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 680-81, 509 S.E.2d 411, 413 (1998) (citing Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. 431, 433-34, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965)). Section 97-86 states that the award of the Commission \u201cshall be conclusive and binding as to all questions of fact.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-86. This Court has explained that the Commission\u2019s findings of fact \u201care conclusive on appeal when supported by competent evidence, even though there be evidence that would support findings to the contrary.\u201d E.g., Jones v. Myrtle Desk Co., 264 N.C. 401, 402, 141 S.E.2d 632, 633 (1965) (per curiam). \u201cThus, on appeal, this Court \u2018does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court\u2019s duty goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the finding.\u2019 \u201d Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414 (quoting Anderson, 265 N.C. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at 274 (citation omitted)). \u201cThe evidence tending to support plaintiff\u2019s claim is to be viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.\u201d Id. (citation omitted); accord Deese v. Champion Int\u2019l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 115, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553 (2000).\nHere, plaintiff\u2019s claim for occupational GAD was filed under the catch-all disease provision of North Carolina\u2019s Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, which encompasses, \u201c[a]ny disease . . . which is proven to be due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade, occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the employment.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13) (2007). In 1983 this Court explained definitively that this provision does not require that the disease originate exclusively from or be unique to the particular occupation. Rutledge v. Tultex Corp./Kings Yam, 308 N.C. 85, 101-02, 301 S.E.2d 359, 369-70 (1983). Instead, a plaintiff worker satisfies the elements of this statute if she shows that her employment\nexposed [her] to a greater risk of contracting [the] disease than members of the public generally, and [that] the . . . exposure . . . significantly contributed to, or was a significant causal factor in, the disease\u2019s development. This is so even if other non-work-related factors also make significant contributions, or were significant causal factors.\nId. at 101, 301 S.E.2d at 369-70. Since Rutledge, this two-pronged proof requirement for an occupational disease, increased risk and significant contribution, has been approved and applied repeatedly by this Court and the Court of Appeals. E.g., Wilkins v. J.R Stevens & Co., 333 N.C. 449, 453, 426 S.E.2d 675, 677 (1993); James v. Perdue Farms, Inc., 160 N.C. App. 560, 562-63, 586 S.E.2d 557, 560-61 (2003), disc. rev. denied, 358 N.C. 234, 594 S.E.2d 191 (2004).\nPlaintiff has the burden of proving that her claim is compensable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and specifically here, that her claim qualifies as an occupational disease. E.g., Henry v. A.C. Lawrence Leather Co., 231 N.C. 477, 479, 57 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1950) (citations omitted). In cases involving \u201ccomplicated medical questions far removed from the ordinary experience and knowledge of laymen, only an expert can give competent opinion evidence as to the cause of the injury.\u201d Click v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 300 N.C. 164, 167, 265 S.E.2d 389, 391 (1980) (citations omitted). The Commission \u201cmay not wholly disregard competent evidence\u201d; however, as the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to be given to witness testimony, the Commission \u201cmay believe all or a part or none of any witness\u2019s testimony.\u201d Harrell v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835 (citation omitted), disc. rev. denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980); see also Anderson v. N. W. Motor Co., 233 N.C. 372, 376, 64 S.E.2d 265, 268 (1951) (citing Henry, 231 N.C. 477, 57 S.E.2d 760); accord Deese, 352 N.C. at 116, 530 S.E.2d at 553. The Commission is not required to accept the testimony of a witness, even if the testimony is uncontradicted. Morgan v. Thomasville Furn. Indus., 2 N.C. App. 126, 127-28, 162 S.E.2d 619, 620 (1968) (citing Anderson, 233 N.C. at 376, 64 S.E.2d at 268). Nor is the Commission required to offer reasons for its credibility determinations. In Deese, this Court stated:\nThis Court in Adams [v. AVX Corp.J made it clear that the Commission does not have to explain its findings of fact by attempting to distinguish which evidence or witnesses it finds credible. Requiring the Commission to explain its credibility determinations and allowing the Court of Appeals to review the Commission\u2019s explanation of those credibility determinations would be inconsistent with our legal system\u2019s tradition of not requiring the fact finder to explain why he or she believes one witness over another or believes one piece of evidence is more credible than another. The Commission\u2019s credibility determinations . . . cannot be the basis for reversing the Commission\u2019s order absent other error.\n352 N.C. at 116-17, 530 S.E.2d at 553.\nHere, while the Commission did include reasons for its credibility determinations in finding of fact twelve, it was not required to do so. After examining the record, we conclude that here, unlike in Harrell, 45 N.C. App. at 204-06, 262 S.E.2d at 835, the Commission considered the expert\u2019s testimony, but decided to afford it little weight, as it may do. Plaintiff\u2019s argument that the Commission improperly ignored Dr. Chestnut\u2019s opinion is without merit.\nPlaintiff\u2019s next argument, that the Commission\u2019s finding that \u201cDr. Chestnut explained that plaintiff\u2019s anxiety focused on her difficulty with the principal\u201d is not supported by any competent evidence, also fails. Dr. Chestnut testified that plaintiff \u201cwas constantly in fear of not doing something, not pleasing somebody; you know, that fear was there, and . . . it\u2019s documented that. . . this is not satisfactory, this is not satisfactory.\u201d He further stated that plaintiff\u2019s \u201cdifficulties with her administrator .... increased her anxiety .... to push it to a clinical syndrome.\u201d While Dr. Chestnut did testify that what was going to happen with the children was where he \u201csaw the greatest level of apprehension,\u201d this Court may not re-weigh the evidence, given that the Commission has already weighed the evidence, as is its role under statute. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-86; Anderson v. Lincoln Constr. Co., 265 N.C. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at 274; Harrell, 45 N.C. App. at 205, 262 S.E.2d at 835. This Court\u2019s duty is merely to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending to support the Commission\u2019s finding, and here, this portion of the Commission\u2019s finding is supported by competent evidence. Anderson, 265 N.C. at 434, 144 S.E.2d at 274.\nIn sum, we conclude that the challenged portions of findings of fact eleven and twelve are supported by competent evidence and do not demonstrate that the Commission ignored Dr. Chestnut\u2019s testimony. Rather, the record shows that the Commission considered Dr. Chestnut\u2019s testimony and decided to give \u201clittle weight to [his] opinions . . . concerning causation and increased risk of plaintiff\u2019s mental condition.\u201d\nOnce the Commission decided on the basis of lack of credibility and weight not to accept Dr. Chestnut\u2019s opinions, it determined that plaintiff had failed to carry her burden of establishing either increased risk or significant contribution as required by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-53(13), as explained by Rutledge and its progeny. Without Dr. Chestnut\u2019s opinions, plaintiff had no expert medical evidence to establish that her GAD was an occupational disease. See, e.g., Click, 300 N.C. at 167, 265 S.E.2d at 391. Consequently, the Commission properly concluded that \u201cplaintiff did not prove that her mental illness is due to causes and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to her employment,\u201d and that she is \u201cnot entitled to compensation under . . . [section] 97-53(13).\u201d\nFor the reasons stated above, the opinion of the Court of Appeals affirming the Commission\u2019s opinion is affirmed as modified herein.\nMODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON,\ndissenting.\nBecause I believe that the majority has erroneously upheld the denial of workers\u2019 compensation benefits on the basis of fault or contributory negligence, I respectfully dissent.\nWhile the majority disavows any language from the Commission premising compensability on the absence of fault, it fails to address whether the Commission and Court of Appeals majority relied on this erroneous premise. In acknowledging an error in the proceedings below, yet upholding the result, it appears that the majority\u2019s treatment of plaintiff\u2019s argument omits a piece of the puzzle.\nThe majority acknowledges that any language in Finding Thirteen implying that fault plays a role in determining compensability is \u201cirrelevant and inappropriate.\u201d However, the majority fails to evaluate the impact of the application of this erroneous standard. In the wider scheme of our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act as well as in the context of this case, the omitted piece is neither inconsequential nor tangential.\nWe have previously observed that one of the purposes of our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was to abolish the \u201cunholy trinity\u201d of employer defenses which generally precluded any recovery by the injured worker at common law: contributory negligence; assumption of risk; and the fellow-servant rule. Pleasant v. Johnson, 312 N.C. 710, 711, 325 S.E.2d 244, 246 (1985) (citation omitted). \u201c \u2018Contributory negligence involves the notion of some fault or breach of duty on the part of the employee.\u2019 \u201d Hamilton v. S. Ry. Co., 200 N.C. 543, 561, 158 S.E. 75, 85 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 636 (1931).\nIn this case, the critical finding that plaintiff argues, but which the majority largely sidesteps in its analysis, is Finding of Fact 13:\n13. Although plaintiff developed an anxiety disorder, her psychological condition was not the result of anything caused by defendant or because she was required to do anything unusual as a teacher. Plaintiff was in a stressful classroom environment that was caused by her inadequate job performance and inability to perform her job duties as a teaching professional. Considering all the evidence presented, the Commission finds that there was nothing unusual about plaintiff\u2019s job with defendant or what was expected of her as compared to any person similarly situated. The work plaintiff was asked to perform by defendant was the same kind of work any teacher is required to do. Plaintiff was merely asked to perform her job in the manner it should have been performed. Plaintiff was responsible for the bad environment in her classroom.\n(emphasis added). The above language reflects almost a textbook definition of contributory negligence, a defense that the Commission may not consider under our Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The Conclusions of Law similarly reflect language that imputes fault to plaintiff and denies recovery on that basis:\n2. Mental illness which results from failing to perform one\u2019s job duties ... is not compensable ....\n3. In the present case, plaintiff\u2019s stress and anxiety disorder developed from her inability to perform her job in accordance with defendant\u2019s requirements.\nDenying compensation on the basis of plaintiff\u2019s own fault is contrary to the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Hartley v. N.C. Prison Dep\u2019t, 258 N.C. 287, 290, 128 S.E.2d 598, 600 (1962) (\u201c[T]he various compensation acts were intended to eliminate the fault of the workman as a basis for denying recovery.\u201d (citations omitted)). The only exceptions to this rule concern intoxication or intentional injuries. Id.\nDespite the explicit declarations of the majority, I fear that today\u2019s decision will open the door for future denials of workers\u2019 compensation benefits on the basis of the injured employee\u2019s own less than exemplary workmanship.\u2019 Furthermore, such a spectacle will inevitably draw this Court into a morass of endless litigation seeking to separate innocent from blameworthy injuries.\nThis is exactly the situation the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act sought to avert by excluding common law defenses. Whitaker v. Town of Scotland Neck, 357 N.C. 552, 556, 597 S.E.2d 665, 667 (2003) (\u201c[T]he North Carolina Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was created to ensure that injured employees receive sure and certain recovery for their work-related injuries without having to prove negligence on the part of the employer or defend against charges of contributory negligence.\u201d (citing Pleasant, 312 NC. at 712, 325 S.E.2d at 246-47)) Since I fear that today\u2019s ruling departs from that, I respectfully dissent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON," } ], "attorneys": [ "Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., P.A., by Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., for plaintiff - appellant.", "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by John F. Maddrey, Assistant Solicitor General, for defendant-appellee Onslow County Board of Education.", "George W. Lennon for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BARBARA KATRINA HASSELL, Employee v. ONSLOW COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Employer, SELF-INSURED (KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC.), Third-Party Administrator\nNo. 172A07\n(Filed 12 June 2008)\n1. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 fault \u2014 inappropriateness\nFault has no place in the workers\u2019 compensation system, except as expressly provided by statute. In a workers\u2019 compensation action involving a teacher who claimed compensation for generalized anxiety disorder, any language in a finding implying that plaintiff\u2019s fault or responsibility for her condition plays a role in determining the compensability of the claim is irrelevant, inappropriate, and disavowed.\n2. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 testimony of psychologist \u2014 afforded little weight\nThe Industrial Commission in a workers\u2019 compensation case did not improperly ignore a psychologist\u2019s opinion. The Commission considered the expert\u2019s testimony but decided to afford it little weight, as it may do.\n3. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 finding about testimony \u2014 supported by evidence\nThe Industrial Commission\u2019s finding in a workers\u2019 compensation case concerning the testimony of plaintiff\u2019s psychologist was supported by competent evidence.\n4. Workers\u2019 Compensation\u2014 teacher \u2014 generalized anxiety disorder \u2014 occupational disease \u2014 not proven\nThe Industrial Commission did not err in a workers\u2019 compensation case by concluding that a teacher did not prove that her mental illness was due to causes and conditions peculiar to her employment where the Commission had decided not to accept her psychologist\u2019s opinions. Without those opinions, plaintiff had no expert evidence to establish that her generalized anxiety disorder was an occupational disease.\nJustice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 182 N.C. App. 1, 641 S.E.2d 324 (2007), affirming an opinion and award filed on 5 October 2005 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 October 2007.\nRalph T. Bryant, Jr., P.A., by Ralph T. Bryant, Jr., for plaintiff - appellant.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by John F. Maddrey, Assistant Solicitor General, for defendant-appellee Onslow County Board of Education.\nGeorge W. Lennon for the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers, amicus curiae.\n. By order filed 7 May 2008, this Court allowed Mr. Bryant to withdraw as counsel for plaintiff." }, "file_name": "0299-01", "first_page_order": 377, "last_page_order": 388 }