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Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 451, 509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835 (1999)" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "383" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 839", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11992065, 11991511, 11991589, 11992134, 11991687, 11991848, 11991914, 11991307, 11991372, 11991758, 11991442, 11991091, 11991990, 11991158 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0839-13", "/us/469/0839-06", "/us/469/0839-07", "/us/469/0839-14", "/us/469/0839-08", "/us/469/0839-10", "/us/469/0839-11", "/us/469/0839-03", "/us/469/0839-04", "/us/469/0839-09", "/us/469/0839-05", "/us/469/0839-01", "/us/469/0839-12", "/us/469/0839-02" ] }, { "cite": "311 S.E.2d 256", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2399643 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "400 S.E.2d 712", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729", "parenthetical": "questions concerning whether prospective jurors were \"strong enough\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 99", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2540746 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "questions concerning whether prospective jurors were \"strong enough\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0099-01" ] }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11200388, 11200773, 11201190, 11200487, 11200552, 11201129, 11200618, 11201387, 11200687, 11200441, 11201051, 11201277, 11200958 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/1135-01", "/us/526/1135-07", "/us/526/1135-11", "/us/526/1135-03", "/us/526/1135-04", "/us/526/1135-10", "/us/526/1135-05", "/us/526/1135-13", "/us/526/1135-06", "/us/526/1135-02", "/us/526/1135-09", "/us/526/1135-12", "/us/526/1135-08" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709", "parenthetical": "questions concerning \"courage\" of prospective jurors" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571564 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275", "parenthetical": "questions concerning \"courage\" of prospective jurors" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "307 S.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" }, { "page": "323" }, { "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4760257 ], "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0326-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 1123", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11768993, 11768609, 11768259, 11768294, 11768199, 11768841, 11768523, 11768781, 11768078, 11768143, 11768690, 11768915, 11768376, 11768027, 11768447 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/1123-15", "/us/517/1123-10", "/us/517/1123-05", "/us/517/1123-06", "/us/517/1123-04", "/us/517/1123-13", "/us/517/1123-09", "/us/517/1123-12", "/us/517/1123-02", "/us/517/1123-03", "/us/517/1123-11", "/us/517/1123-14", "/us/517/1123-07", "/us/517/1123-01", "/us/517/1123-08" ] }, { "cite": "461 S.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "674" }, { "page": "674" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 N.C. 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 793157 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/341/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 L. 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Ct.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 65", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739347 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68-69", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0065-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 707", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "710-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 711", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570161 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "716-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0711-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 U.S. 412", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204292 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "\"Events occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/475/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "473" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "520 S.E.2d 545", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "554", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 438, 446 S.E.2d 67, 68 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155790 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62-63", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 438, 446 S.E.2d 67, 68 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0048-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2397, "char_count": 89536, "ocr_confidence": 0.748, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2453941457343426e-07, "percentile": 0.6088754595345134 }, "sha256": "7ece10d01505b807a1b57dafa10210b2e84e6b7371d1374cd773094d0a0f0890", "simhash": "1:8729d03a366a4c7a", "word_count": 14048 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:47:03.529976+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEREMY DUSHANE MURRELL" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BRADY, Justice.\nLate in the evening on 21 August 2003, defendant approached Lawrence Matthew Harding, who was seated in his own vehicle in a parking lot adjacent to his place of employment. Defendant fatally shot Harding twice in the head and neck with a firearm and, after transporting him to Durham in the vehicle, placed his body inside the trunk and took from him a watch and approximately $130.00. Three days later, defendant abandoned the vehicle \u2014 along with Harding\u2019s body \u2014 near a bus station in Richmond, Virginia. The victim was not discovered until 29 August 2003, more than one week after the murder. Defendant was apprehended and subsequently convicted of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, and robbery with a dangerous weapon and was sentenced to death for the murder. We find no error in defendant\u2019s convictions or sentences and deny defendant\u2019s contemporaneously filed Motion for Appropriate Relief.\nPROCEDURAL BACKGROUND\nOn 6 July 2004, the Grand Jury of Forsyth County returned true bills of indictment charging defendant with first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and first-degree murder of Lawrence Matthew Harding. Defendant was tried capitally and, on 10 February 2006, was found guilty by a jury on all charges. With respect to the jury\u2019s verdict on the murder charge, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder on the basis of both the theory of malice, premeditation, and deliberation and under the felony murder rule.\nOn 17 February 2006, following the statutorily required sentencing hearing, the jury returned a binding recommendation that defendant be sentenced to death for the first-degree murder conviction, and judgment was entered accordingly by the trial court. Defendant was also sentenced within the presumptive range for the robbery with a dangerous weapon and first-degree kidnapping convictions.\nDefendant now appeals his first-degree murder conviction and sentence of death as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) and has asserted several assignments of error in a Motion for Appropriate Relief filed on 21 September 2007, during the pendency of his appeal. Defendant also moved to bypass the Court of Appeals in appealing his non-capital judgments, and this Court allowed the defendant\u2019s motion on 26 March 2007.\nFACTUAL BACKGROUND\nI. GUILT PHASE EVIDENCE\nThe State\u2019s evidence presented during the guilt phase of defendant\u2019s trial tended to show the following: That late in the evening on 21 August 2003, the victim, Matthew Harding, completed his regular food preparation shift at the restaurant where he was employed, South by Southwest in Winston-Salem. He received a paycheck for $331.00, left the restaurant, and entered his red Mitsubishi Lancer automobile, which was parked in an adjacent lot. He was last observed by a fellow employee in the same parking lot at approximately 10:30 p.m., seated in his stationary vehicle with the interior light turned on and the stereo playing at a high volume.\nA missing person report was filed with the Winston-Salem City Police Department on 22 August 2003 after the victim did not report for his scheduled shift at work and his father and stepmother were unable to contact him. Officer W.E. Kelsey, who took the report from the victim\u2019s parents, canvassed the restaurant\u2019s parking lot for evidence later the same day and retrieved a shell casing. On 29 August 2003, a red Mitsubishi Lancer with a North Carolina license plate number matching that of the victim\u2019s vehicle was discovered on Altamont Street in Richmond, Virginia, by the Richmond City Police Department.\nThe vehicle was seized and subsequently towed to the Virginia Medical Examiner\u2019s Office, where skeletal remains later identified as the victim\u2019s were discovered in the trunk. Investigators also recovered two projectile fragments from the floor of the rear passenger area of the vehicle and detected the presence of metal particles around a hole in the front passenger seat. An autopsy of the victim\u2019s remains conducted on 30 August 2003 revealed that he had suffered two gunshot wounds to the head and neck areas. The head wound would have been immediately incapacitating and fatal, whereas the wound traced from under the left side of his chin down through the soft tissue of his neck and into his spine might have been survivable but would have been painful and likely caused some paralysis; however, the autopsy did not reveal the order in which these wounds were inflicted.\nOne additional projectile was recovered during the autopsy. A ballistics expert tendered without objection from defendant testified that this projectile was consistent with a \u201ccaliber .380 auto full metal jacketed bullet\u201d and that the shell casing retrieved by Officer Kelsey from the South by Southwest parking lot in Winston-Salem was a fired Winchester caliber .380 auto cartridge case.\nThe State also presented the testimonies of several acquaintances of defendant. Mangus Daniels, at whose apartment defendant resided during the summer of 2003, testified that before the night of 21 August 2003, defendant had occasionally mentioned the possibility of robbing someone to obtain money. Daniels further testified that on 21 August 2003 he received a telephone call from defendant, who indicated that he had robbed someone. After a few days, defendant returned to Daniels\u2019 apartment, at which point defendant described having forced someone into a trunk at gunpoint and taken the vehicle to Virginia. Defendant further described the victim as \u201ca white guy\u201d and stated that he left him in good health, although defendant had shot into the trunk of the vehicle to keep the victim from making too much noise. In October 2003, prompted by a Winston-Salem newspaper account of a body discovered in Virginia, Daniels first confronted defendant during a telephone conversation and then initiated contact with Crime Stoppers, the victim\u2019s family, and law enforcement concerning the murder.\nDefendant also related to his girlfriend, Stacy Whitson, before 21 August 2003 that he wanted to rob someone for money. Defendant lived temporarily at Whitson\u2019s residence from 17 August 2003 until he was ultimately apprehended by law enforcement in October 2003. One day during October 2003, while at Whitson\u2019s residence, defendant returned a telephone call in response to a message he had received from Daniels. After speaking with Daniels, he said to Whitson, \u201cI didn\u2019t.want to get that phone call.\u201d Defendant then borrowed a vehicle belonging to Whitson\u2019s roommate in order to obtain a newspaper. Whitson later witnessed defendant balling up a newspaper and discarding it in the trash. Defendant also asked Whitson whether investigators could detect fingerprints on clothing.\nAnother of defendant\u2019s acquaintances, Bennie Cameron, testified that he was aware defendant possessed a firearm sometime before 21 August 2003 and that defendant had stated his intention to rob someone, put the individual in the trunk of his or her own vehicle, and take the vehicle to Durham. Defendant also indicated to Cameron that he knew of a \u201cchop shop\u201d in Durham. In August 2003, defendant visited Cameron\u2019s apartment and indicated he had robbed someone and put the individual in the trunk. Defendant further indicated that he had obtained approximately $130.00 from the victim, whom he had transported to Virginia.\nAt about 11:00 p.m. on 21 August 2003, Alonzo Dingle, a friend of defendant who resided in Durham at the time, left work and returned to his apartment. Dingle heard a knock on the door as he was showering, and when he opened the door he observed defendant standing outside, smiling and wearing no shirt. According to testimony from Dingle, defendant requested his assistance in placing a dead body in the trunk of a vehicle. Defendant made several similar requests as he and Dingle spent some time inside the apartment, but Dingle did not believe defendant was serious.\nEventually, defendant convinced Dingle to follow him to the parking lot outside his apartment, where Dingle observed a white male inside a Mitsubishi Lancer with his head positioned on the floor of the front passenger area, one leg across the driver\u2019s seat and the other between the two front seats extending into the rear of the vehicle. Dingle testified that he observed no blood at this time and that he thought defendant and the other man were playing a joke on him.\nDefendant subsequently drove the vehicle to a nearby neighborhood, with the victim\u2019s body situated in the same manner and Dingle seated in the rear. Defendant parked the vehicle on the street, moved around to the front passenger side, opened the door, and dragged the body out of the vehicle. At this point, Dingle observed the man\u2019s face was covered with blood and that he was not moving. Dingle then refused defendant\u2019s request for assistance and watched as defendant placed the body inside the trunk of the vehicle. When Dingle asked defendant what had happened, defendant explained that he needed to eat.\nAdditionally, the State introduced into evidence a recorded statement defendant made to law enforcement on 28 October 2003. Defendant\u2019s account of the events surrounding the victim\u2019s death on 21 August 2003 was as follows: He knew the victim, although not by name, from a previous encounter during which the victim had purchased marijuana from defendant. Sometime after 9:00 p.m. on 21 August 2003, while defendant was standing near an intersection in Winston-Salem, he was approached by the victim, who wished to again purchase marijuana, but defendant shook his head \u201cno\u201d to communicate that he did not have any marijuana at the time.\nDefendant next saw the victim sometime later in the evening seated in his vehicle in a parking lot near a hotel and listening to music. By this time, defendant had obtained about an ounce of marijuana and was carrying in his right pants pocket a .380 caliber handgun, which he had borrowed from Dingle. Without speaking, defendant entered the vehicle through the front passenger side door to initiate the sale of marijuana to the victim in exchange for cash, in similar fashion as the two had done previously. A struggle ensued, apparently initiated by the victim attempting to \u201csnatch\u201d the marijuana, during which defendant \u201cpanicked\u201d and removed the handgun from his pocket with his right hand. The victim subsequently pulled at defendant\u2019s right hand, which caused the handgun to discharge once into the victim\u2019s face or head.\nDefendant repositioned the victim from the driver\u2019s seat to the front passenger seat of the vehicle, so that the victim was upside down with his head positioned near the floorboard. Defendant departed the scene operating the victim\u2019s vehicle, eventually merged onto Interstate 40, and drove east. He considered taking the victim to a hospital but, as he continued driving, the victim said to him, \u201cFinish me off.\u201d As defendant described: \u201cA few seconds later, he said, \u2018Please,\u2019 and he said, \u2018Please\u2019 again. And, he said, that\u2019s, that\u2019s when he got,-got to me personally and that\u2019s when the ... So, that\u2019s when it, cause he twitched and I shot him.\u201d After this second shot was fired, it appeared to defendant the victim was dead, and he noticed no further movement or other signs of life from the body.\nAccording to defendant, he arrived at Dingle\u2019s apartment in Durham between 10:00 and 11:00 p.m. on 21 August 2003, with the victim\u2019s body situated in the same manner as before. When defendant explained to Dingle what had happened and requested his assistance, Dingle retrieved a pair of gloves and a hat. After some discussion, the two men decided to dispose of the body somewhere in Durham and traveled around town in the vehicle for thirty minutes to an hour with defendant operating the vehicle, the victim\u2019s body in the front passenger seat, and Dingle seated in the rear behind defendant. Ultimately, they decided to stop the vehicle and place the body inside the trunk, and Dingle assisted defendant in doing so.\nAfter defendant and Dingle returned to the Durham apartment in the same vehicle, defendant showered and followed Dingle\u2019s advice to dispose of his own clothes and the victim\u2019s cellular phone, placing these items in trash bags and discarding them in the garbage dumpster outside of Dingle\u2019s apartment. Dingle also advised defendant to dispose of the vehicle, along with the victim\u2019s body, in some location outside of the state.\nDefendant departed Dingle\u2019s apartment and returned to the vehicle with the handgun, the victim\u2019s watch, and approximately $115.00 or $120.00 he had taken from the victim\u2019s wallet. He traveled north on an unspecified route until he reached Richmond, Virginia, in the early morning hours of 22 August 2003, at which point he decided he would dispose of the remaining evidence in that city. During the next three days, defendant drove the vehicle around the Richmond area and as far north as Washington, D.C., while the victim\u2019s body remained in the trunk. Defendant placed several calls from his cellular phone \u2014 to Whitson, Daniels, and his father \u2014 and at one point attended a screening of a horror film at an unspecified public movie theater. On 24 August 2003, defendant abandoned the vehicle, along with the body, in a secluded area near a bus station in Richmond. He discarded the keys to the vehicle, sold the .380 caliber handgun for $90.00, and used the proceeds to purchase a bus ticket to return to Winston-Salem. Once he arrived in Winston-Salem, defendant returned to Daniels\u2019 residence in a taxi.\nDefendant did not introduce evidence during the guilt phase of his trial.\nII. PENALTY PROCEEDING EVIDENCE\nThe State introduced as victim impact evidence the testimony of Judy Harding, the victim\u2019s stepmother, who described how much he was missed by his family.\nDefendant introduced as mitigating evidence the testimonies of defendant\u2019s family members, including his father and sister, detailing how defendant was adversely affected during childhood by his mother\u2019s paranoid schizophrenia and the mental problems his father suffered as a result of a head injury.\nClaudia Reeves Coleman, Ph.D., a licensed clinical psychologist with a practice in Raleigh, was tendered by defendant without objection as an expert in forensic psychology. Dr. Coleman testified that she diagnosed defendant as having suffered from a mood disorder since childhood; that defendant was thus prone to panic and anxiety attacks, depression, and poor impulse control; and that he was at a higher than normal risk for developing a schizophrenic disorder as a consequence of his family\u2019s mental health history. Dr. Coleman\u2019s opinion was that, at the time of the murder, defendant was suffering from a significant mood disorder which impaired his capacity to conform his conduct to the law.\nThe jury found as aggravating circumstances that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain, that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery with a dangerous weapon, and that the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in the commission of first-degree kidnapping. One or more jurors found the statutory mitigating circumstances that defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity and that the murder was committed while defendant was under a mental or emotional disturbance. Several nonstatutory mitigating circumstances were also found to exist by one or more jurors.\nThe jury unanimously found the mitigating circumstances insufficient to outweigh the aggravating circumstances, and further found that the aggravating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for imposition of the death penalty when considered with the mitigating circumstances. Accordingly, the jury entered its binding recommendation that defendant be sentenced to death for the murder conviction.\nANALYSIS\nI. PRETRIAL ISSUES\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s 30 January 2006 order denying his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. Defendant moved before trial to suppress an inculpatory statement he made to law enforcement on 28 October 2003, following his arrest on 24 October 2003, on the basis that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel before making this statement.\nAt the conclusion of the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court made, inter alia, the following findings of fact: On 24 October 2003, defendant was questioned by police investigators for approximately three hours at the Winston-Salem City Police Department. Immediately after this interview, during which defendant \u201cdid not make any admissions of any type ... in any way,\u201d defendant was arrested for first-degree kidnapping and robbery with a dangerous weapon of Matthew Harding, but was not charged with murder. Detective D.L. Elmes subsequently transported defendant to the Forsyth County jail and gave defendant his business card in case defendant wished to speak with him or \u201cwanted to get anything off his chest.\u201d\nAt approximately 8:00 a.m. on 28 October 2003, defendant initiated contact with investigators by placing a telephone call from the county jail to the number listed on Detective Elmes\u2019 business card and leaving a voice mail message requesting to meet with him. When the investigators arrived at the jail, they advised defendant of his Miranda rights. Defendant stated that he understood these rights and wanted to answer questions, indicated that he was aware he had already been appointed counsel, and responded that he did not wish to have an attorney present during questioning but instead chose to waive the appearance of his appointed counsel. Before making his statement, defendant told the investigators, \u201cI want y\u2019all to help me.\u201d\nBased upon its findings of fact, the trial court concluded that defendant\u2019s statement to investigators \u201cwas made freely, voluntarily, and understandingly and . . . without promise of hope or reward . . . and without force or pressure.\u201d The court determined that the statement was admissible as a result.\nAlthough defendant assigned error to the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, he has failed to make any argument on appeal that these findings were unsupported by competent evidence. Thus, we are bound by the trial court\u2019s findings of fact, and our review on appeal is limited to a determination of whether these findings support the lower court\u2019s conclusions of law. See State v. Cheek, 351 N.C. 48, 62-63, 520 S.E.2d 545, 554 (1999) (citing State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 438, 446 S.E.2d 67, 68 (1994)), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245 (2000).\nDefendant asserts that his waiver of the right to have an attorney present during questioning was not knowing and voluntary because he \u201ccould not possibly waive a right that he did not know existed.\u201d However, defendant does not contend that investigators did not apprise him of his right to have an attorney present. Rather, he argues that certain steps should have been taken to notify the North Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services (IDS) that defendant might potentially become a capital defendant. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7A-498.1 to -498.8 (2007) (\u201cIndigent Defense Services Act\u201d); Indigent Def. Servs. Rules, Subpart 2A (\u201cAppointment and Compensation of Trial Counsel in Capital Cases\u201d), reprinted in 2008 Ann. R. N.C. 974-79. Yet the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Miranda v. Arizona expressly dispels any notion that the failure of investigators to obtain counsel for a defendant constitutes a violation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination:\nThis does not mean, as some have suggested, that each police station must have a \u2018station house lawyer\u2019 present at all times to advise prisoners. It does mean, however, that if police propose to interrogate a person they must make known to him that he is entitled to a lawyer and that if he cannot afford one, a lawyer will be provided for him prior to any interrogation.\n384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966) (emphasis added). Whether defendant was advised of the provisions of the IDS rules pertaining to the appointment of counsel in capital cases is immaterial to a determination under Miranda of whether defendant was informed \u201cthat if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.\u201d Id. at 473; see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 422 (1986) (\u201cEvents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional right.\u201d).\nIn this regard, the instant case is easily distinguishable from State v. Steptoe, in which the defendant clearly communicated his desire to have a lawyer and to speak with an attorney, and only after the investigators \u201cdiscouraged the appointment of counsel\u201d did the defendant issue a statement. 296 N.C. 711, 716-17, 252 S.E.2d 707, 710-11 (1979). Here, in contrast, defendant had already been appointed counsel but waived his Miranda rights and elected not to have counsel present when making his statement to investigators after initiating contact with them. The trial court did not err in concluding that defendant\u2019s waiver was knowing and voluntary and that his statement to investigators on 28 October 2003 was thus admissible. Defendant\u2019s assignments of error related to this issue are overruled.\nII. JURY SELECTION ISSUES\nA. Prosecutor\u2019s Characterization of \u201cMitigating Circumstances \u201d\nDefendant contends that the trial court erred during jury selection by permitting the prosecutor, over defendant\u2019s objection, to misrepresent the law with regard to mitigating circumstances. Our trial courts have traditionally been afforded broad discretion to rule upon the manner and extent of jury voir dire, and this Court will not disturb such a ruling on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Polke, 361 N.C. 65, 68-69, 638 S.E.2d 189, 191 (2006) (citations omitted), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 128 S. Ct. 70, 169 L. Ed. 2d 55 (2007).\nBefore trial, defendant filed a written motion \u201cTo Prohibit the DA from Improperly Defining a Mitigating Circumstance.\u201d At a pretrial hearing on defendant\u2019s motion on 12 January 2006, the trial court reserved its ruling on the motion, instructing both sides to \u201cfollow the statute\u201d and to note an objection in the event opposing counsel made \u201cany improper statement of the law.\u201d\nDuring the State\u2019s jury voir dire questioning on 30 January 2006, the prosecutor stated without objection: \u201cA mitigating circumstance, if you cho[o]se to believe it, could make this crime more deserving of life imprisonment.\u201d However, defense counsel did object to two similar remarks made by the prosecutor later in the proceeding, and these objections were sustained.\nOn the morning of 31 January 2006, defendant filed a written motion to prohibit the prosecutor from \u201cincorrectly defining aggravating and mitigating circumstances.\u201d The trial court held a brief hearing on defendant\u2019s motion and again declined to enter a ruling, but noted defendant\u2019s continuing objection \u201cto [the prosecutor\u2019s] questions.\u201d\nAs in State v. Frye, the prosecutor\u2019s remarks during voir dire \u201cwere shorthand summaries of the definition!] of . . . mitigating circumstances\u201d and \u201cwere substantially correct, even if slightly slanted toward the State\u2019s perspective.\u201d See 341 N.C. 470, 491, 461 S.E.2d 664, 674 (1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1123 (1996). Thus, the trial court\u2019s rulings upon defendant\u2019s motions and objections were not \u201cmanifestly unsupported by reason or so arbitrary that they could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Polke, 361 N.C. at 69, 638 S.E.2d at 191 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nB. The Prosecutor\u2019s Use of the Phrase \u201cIntestinal Fortitude\u201d\nDefendant also challenges on appeal a question asked individually of prospective jurors by the prosecutor at jury selection: Whether the individual possessed the \u201cintestinal fortitude\u201d to vote for a sentence of death. Defendant initially noted his objection to the prosecutor\u2019s use of this phrase and was overruled, but thereafter failed to preserve this assignment of error for appellate review with further timely objection. Alternatively, defendant has asserted plain error.\nRegardless of the applicable standard of review, we find no error related to this issue, plain or otherwise. Defendant attempts to distinguish this Court\u2019s previous decision in State v. Oliver, 309 N.C. 326, 307 S.E.2d 304 (1983). In Oliver, this Court found no error in the prosecutor\u2019s use of the words \u201cbackbone\u201d and \u201cintestinal fortitude,\u201d respectively, when questioning two prospective jurors \u201cwho equivocated on imposition of the death penalty\u201d for the specific purpose of determining, \u201cin light of their equivocation, whether they could comply with the law.\u201d Id. at 355, 307 S.E.2d at 323. The Court held that the defendants had failed to demonstrate prejudice since \u201cthese comments could be viewed as favorable, rather than unfavorable to defendants\u2019 position as they tended to encourage jurors who equivocated on imposition of the death penalty to serve.\u201d Id.\nAs stated in Oliver, we review prosecutorial remarks in light of both the context in which they were made and \u201cthe overall factual circumstances to which they referred.\u201d Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, no less than in Oliver, the prosecutor\u2019s questions \u201cwere made not to badger or intimidate these [prospective jurors], but rather to determine . . . whether they could comply with the law.\u201d Id. It is evident from the transcript of jury selection proceedings that the prosecutor intended this question of \u201cintestinal fortitude\u201d to elicit from prospective jurors answers which would have provided grounds for a challenge for cause. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1212(8), (9) (2007). In fact, the phrase \u201cintestinal fortitude\u201d was simply substituted when defendant\u2019s objection to the word \u201ccourage\u201d was sustained.\nMoreover, this Court has previously found no abuse of discretion or prejudicial error with respect to similar inquiries which have implicated a prospective juror\u2019s metaphorical physiological capacity to recommend a sentence of death when called upon to do so by law. See, e.g., State v. Flippen, 349 N.C. 264, 275, 506 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1998) (questions concerning \u201ccourage\u201d of prospective jurors), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1135 (1999); State v. Smith, 328 N.C. 99, 130, 400 S.E.2d 712, 729 (1991) (questions concerning whether prospective jurors were \u201cstrong enough\u201d); State v. Hinson, 310 N.C. 245, 252, 311 S.E.2d 256, 261 (question concerning \u201cbackbone\u201d of an equivocating prospective juror), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 839 (1984). Similarly, the prosecutor\u2019s question in the instant case was not posed to prospective jurors in a way that might affect their impartiality, and the trial court therefore committed no prejudicial error in overruling defendant\u2019s objection.\nDefendant also argues, without citing any authority, that his trial counsel were ineffective to the extent they failed to note a timely objection to the prosecutor\u2019s questions. As we have applied an abuse of discretion standard of review to defendant\u2019s argument and have found this argument to be without merit, we need not reach any ineffective assistance of counsel claims related to this issue as they have been rendered moot.\nAccordingly, defendant\u2019s related assignments of error are overruled.\nIII. PENALTY PROCEEDING ISSUES\nA. Prosecution\u2019s Closing Argument\nDefendant raises several issues by assignment of error and argument in his brief concerning the prosecution\u2019s closing argument at the penalty proceeding on 16 February 2006.\nDefendant first contends that the prosecution misrepresented the law with regard to mitigating circumstances. The prosecutor suggested more than once during closing argument that mitigating evidence would have to \u201clessen the severity of this crime.\u201d However, defense counsel failed to object to any of these remarks at trial. Thus, we review the remarks for whether they \u201cwere so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu.\" State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 358, 572 S.E.2d 108, 135 (2002) (citing State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 451, 509 S.E.2d 178, 193 (1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835 (1999)), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040 (2003).\nAs with defendant\u2019s similar assignment of error concerning prosecutorial remarks made during jury selection, we find that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks at closing argument \u201cwere shorthand summaries of the definition[] of . . . mitigating circumstances\u201d and \u201cwere substantially correct, even if slightly slanted toward the State\u2019s perspective.\u201d Frye, 341 N.C. at 491, 461 S.E.2d at 674. Because these remarks were at least \u201csubstantially correct,\u201d it does not stand to reason that they were in any way \u201cgrossly improper.\u201d Id. These assignments of error are overruled.\nDefendant next contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the following portion of the prosecution\u2019s closing argument:\nYou also saw Dr. [Steve] Kramer sitting in the front row, somebody on the State\u2019s witness list. Defense may make \u2014 make a comment about why didn\u2019t the State call Dr. Kramer? Well, what is the net effect of zero? Zero. The cumulative effect of zero is zero. You want more testimony to tell you that this defendant is not schizophrenic?\nWe apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the trial court\u2019s decision to overrule defendant\u2019s timely objection. State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 606, 652 S.E.2d 216, 229 (2007) (citing State v. Jones, 355 N.C. 117, 131, 558 S.E.2d 97, 106 (2002)), cert. denied,-U.S. -, 128 S. Ct. 1682, 170 L. Ed. 2d 377 (2008). Under this standard, we apply a two-part analysis: \u201c \u2018[T]his Court first determines if the remarks were improper .... Next, we determine if the remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and thus should have been excluded by the trial court.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 606-07, 652 S.E.2d at 229 (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106 (alterations in original)).\nDefendant asserts that the jury was erroneously permitted to infer from the prosecutor\u2019s line of argument that Dr. Kramer\u2019s testimony would have been favorable to the State had he been called as a witness and qualified as a mental health expert. However, the only aspect of Dr. Kramer\u2019s potential testimony that was even conceivably suggested by the State\u2019s closing argument was an assessment, with which defendant\u2019s own mental health expert witness concurred, that defendant was not schizophrenic. Even assuming, arguendo, the impropriety of the prosecutor\u2019s reference to Dr. Kramer, defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice.\nThus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by overruling defendant\u2019s objection to these remarks. Accordingly, this assignment of error is overruled.\nDefendant next assigns error to the trial court\u2019s failure to intervene ex mero motu during the prosecution\u2019s closing argument when the prosecutor implored jurors to \u201cfind the inner strength to carry out justice.\u201d Since defendant failed to object to the prosecutor\u2019s remarks, we must determine whether these remarks were \u201c \u2018so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero motu.\u2019 \u201d State v. Walters, 357 N.C. 68, 101, 588 S.E.2d 344, 364 (quoting Barden, 356 N.C. at 358, 572 S.E.2d at 135), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 971 (2003).\nDefendant provides no authority or legal analysis to demonstrate that the language \u201cfind the inner strength to carry out justice\u201d was in any way grossly improper. Defendant argues instead that the cumulative effect of the prosecutor\u2019s questions during jury selection concerning jurors\u2019 \u201cintestinal fortitude\u201d to vote for the death penalty and the prosecutor\u2019s repeated remarks at closing argument imploring jurors to \u201cfind the inner strength to carry out justice\u201d was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a new sentencing hearing. Relatedly, defendant asserts that the prosecutor\u2019s question during jury selection concerning whether prospective jurors possessed the \u201cintestinal fortitude\u201d to vote for the death penalty was recalled in the minds of the jurors at closing argument when the prosecutor stated, \u201cWe asked you in jury selection if you were strong enough to do this.\u201d\nAs set forth above, we can discern no prejudicial error in the trial court\u2019s decision to allow the prosecutor\u2019s inquiry into the \u201cintestinal fortitude\u201d of prospective jurors to vote for a sentence of death. Absent any further analysis from defendant specifically addressing the prosecutor\u2019s remarks at closing argument, we are unable to hold that these remarks rose to the level of gross impropriety. Moreover, defendant has not carried his burden under the Strickland test with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claims he sets forth related to this issue. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring a defendant to show both that trial counsel\u2019s performance was \u201cdeficient\u201d and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result). Accordingly, defendant\u2019s assignments of error are overruled.\nDefendant contends that the following portion of the prosecution\u2019s closing argument prompted the jury to consider defendant\u2019s evidence in mitigation as evidence in support of an aggravating circumstance instead:\nConsider whether [defendant] has shown signs in his childhood of emotional disturbance as evidenced by prolonged crying spells or periods of staring at nothing or unwillingness to engage with other children or inability to tolerate being touched. He had temper tantrums when he was a toddler. He had a bad temper. He would throw fits when he didn\u2019t get what he wanted, I believe, was the testimony. Perhaps his personality for murder was already formed.\nThe trial court overruled defense counsel\u2019s objection to this argument. Thus, we determine whether the trial court abused its discretion and therefore, whether its ruling \u201ccould not have been the result of a reasoned decision.\u201d Peterson, 361 N.C. at 606, 652 S.E.2d at 229 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106).\nSpecifically, defendant characterizes the statement, \u201cPerhaps his personality for murder was already formed,\u201d as an invitation to jurors to vote for a sentence of death because o/the mitigating evidence he presented at the penalty proceeding. However, it is well established that \u201c \u2018statements contained in closing arguments to the jury are not to be placed in isolation or taken out of context on appeal.\u2019 \u201d See State v. Thompson, 359 N.C. 77, 110, 604 S.E.2d 850, 873 (2004) (quoting State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 188, 443 S.E.2d 14, 41, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1046 (1994)), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 830 (2005). The prosecutor\u2019s line of argument from which the challenged remarks have been extracted can be traced back for seven pages of transcript and continues on for approximately -eleven pages \u2014 for a total of eighteen transcript pages. This line of argument served the prosecutor\u2019s purpose of calling into question the weight jurors ought to assign to each individual item of defendant\u2019s mitigating evidence. At one point, the prosecutor stated to the jury that defendant would \u201churl grapes around the courtroom\u201d in the form of mitigating circumstances \u201c[a]nd even though there are 41 of them, when you put 41 grapes on a scale with four watermelons, we know that it\u2019s not going to weigh more than four watermelons.\u201d\nViewed in this context, it is readily apparent that the prosecutor was not in any way suggesting defendant had formed a \u201cpersonality for murder\u201d as a toddler, but rather was using a skeptical tone to advocate the opposite conclusion: That, in the prosecutor\u2019s view, defendant\u2019s early temper tantrums should not be significant factors in jurors\u2019 consideration of defendant\u2019s mitigating evidence.\nFor this reason, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant\u2019s objection to this argument; therefore, this assignment of error is overruled.\nFinally, defendant contends that prosecutors expressed their personal desires, opinions, or beliefs during closing argument when advocating that the jury return a binding recommendation of death and that these remarks were grossly improper. Specifically, defendant assigns error to the following:\n[T]here are going to be four questions. I want you to answer yes, yes to every one of them, and then I want you to write \u2014 I want your foreperson to write on that last line death, because I want you to do justice, I want you to give a punishment that is appropriate for the crime.\nAdditionally, the prosecution encouraged the jury to \u201canswer those questions yes, yes, yes, and yes. The recommendation in this case is death.\u201d\nBecause defendant did not object when these remarks were made, we review them for whether they were \u201c \u2018so grossly improper that the trial court erred in failing to intervene ex mero mo tu.\u2019 \u201d Walters, 357 N.C. at 101, 588 S.E.2d at 364 (quoting Barden, 356 N.C. at 358, 572 S.E.2d at 135). Defendant cites this Court\u2019s decision in Jones to support his assertion that the prosecutor\u2019s argument was grossly improper. See 355 N.C. at 135, 558 S.E.2d at 108 (stating that closing argument must be \u201cdevoid of counsel\u2019s personal opinion\u201d); see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1230(a) (2007) (stating that during closing argument to the jury \u201can attorney may not . . . express his personal belief as to the truth or falsity of the evidence or as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant\u201d); N.C. St. B. R. Prof. Conduct 3.4(e), 2008 Ann. R. N.C. 759, 848-49 (stating that \u201c[a] lawyer shall not... in trial. . . state a personal opinion as to the justness of the cause\u201d).\nIn Jones, this Court vacated the defendant\u2019s death sentence and awarded,a new sentencing hearing after holding that the trial court \u201cabused its discretion by affording the prosecution undue latitude in its closing arguments at sentencing.\u201d 355 N.C. at 135, 558 S.E.2d at 109. Two distinct sets of remarks were found by the Court in Jones to exceed the bounds of permissible argument. First, the prosecutor had been permitted, over the defendant\u2019s objection, to state the following:\n[PROSECUTOR]: Thank you, judge. The United States of America, a great country, indeed around the world for its freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of privacy in your own home. But with those freedoms comes individual responsibility that every citizen of this country must realize; that to have these freedoms, one is responsible for their own conduct; one is responsible for their own behavior.\nA year ago the Columbine shootings; five years ago Oklahoma City bombings. When this nation faces such tragedy\u2014\n[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\n[PROSECUTOR]: \u2014the laws of this country come in to bring order to that tragedy, to speak to that tragedy. Here we are addressing a tragedy of a man\u2019s life. The tragedy not of this defendant, the tragedy of [the victim]....\nId. at 132 n.2, 558 S.E.2d at 107 n.2. Second, the trial court did not intervene ex mero mo tu to prevent the prosecutor from describing the defendant as a \u201cquitter,\u201d a \u201closer,\u201d \u201cworthless,\u201d \u201cas mean as they come,\u201d and \u201clower than the dirt on a snake\u2019s belly.\u201d Id. at 133, 558 S.E.2d at 107.\nIn sharp contrast with Jones, the case at bar presents this Court with a closing argument well within the \u201cwide latitude\u201d of what is permissible, as the prosecutor merely sought to fulfill the well-recognized \u201cduty to advocate zealously that the facts in evidence warrant imposition of the death penalty.\u201d Williams, 350 N.C. at 25, 510 S.E.2d at 642 (citing State v. Conner, 345 N.C. 319, 334, 480 S.E.2d 626, 633, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 876 (1997)). Thus, the prosecutor was advocating the State\u2019s position as to the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form rather than expressing a personal opinion or desire that defendant be sentenced to death. Defendant\u2019s argument is without merit, and consequently, his related assignments of error are overruled.\nB. Trial Court\u2019s Instructions on Mitigating Circumstances\nDefendant contends that the trial court gave an incorrect definition of mitigating circumstances in its final charge to the jury at the close of the penalty proceeding. He challenges the following portion of the trial court\u2019s final charge to the jury at the conclusion of the penalty proceeding, although no timely objection was raised at the charge conference or made contemporaneously with the instructions:\nA mitigating circumstance is a fact or group of facts which do not \u2014 which do not constitute a justification or excuse for a killing or reduce it to a lesser degree of crime than first degree murder, but which may be considered as extenuating or reducing the moral culpability of the killing or as making it less deserving of the extreme punishment than other first degree murders.\nOur law identifies several possible mitigating circumstances; however, in considering issue two, it is your duty \u2014 it would be your duty to consider as a mitigating circumstance any aspect of the defendant\u2019s character or record or any circumstances of this murder that the defendant contends is a basis for a sentence less than death and to consider any other circumstances arising from the evidence which you deem to have mitigating value.\nBecause defendant did not object to the trial court\u2019s jury instructions, this assignment of error was not preserved for appellate review. See State v. Hardy, 353 N.C. 122, 131, 540 S.E.2d 334, 342 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 840 (2001).\nAlternatively, defendant asserts plain error; however, this Court has repeatedly upheld virtually identical instructions. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 350 N.C. 1, 32-34, 510 S.E.2d 626, 647, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 880 (1999); State v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542, 564, 476 S.E.2d 658, 669-70 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1147 (1997); State v. Skipper, 337 N.C. 1, 52-53, 446 S.E.2d 252, 280-81 (1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1134 (1995), superseded by statute on other grounds, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2002, as recognized in State v. Price, 337 N.C. 756, 448 S.E.2d 827 (1994). Thus, there was no error in the trial court\u2019s instructions, plain or otherwise. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nC. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Concerning (f)(7) Mitigator (\u201cthe age of the defendant at the time of the crime\u201d)\nAlthough the trial court properly submitted and instructed the jury on the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not object to a number of questions asked by the prosecution and the trial court during jury selection concerning prospective jurors\u2019 \u201csympathy\u201d for defendant on account of his age. Further, defendant contends that these questions were prejudicial because they prevented the jury from considering the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, defendant\u2019s age at the time of the murder, in its sentencing deliberations. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(7) (2007).\nAmong other questions cited by defendant, the prosecutor asked prospective jurors whether they would \u201cbe sympathetic to this defendant because of his age\u201d; whether they agreed \u201cthat the law must apply the same to everyone regardless of their age, sex, and race\u201d; and whether they agreed that \u201ca decision based upon somebody\u2019s age, race, or sex would be unlawful.\u201d At one point during the State\u2019s jury voir dire questioning, the trial court interjected and asked prospective jurors whether they understood that \u201cdeciding this case based on a person\u2019s age, race, religion, or sex\u201d would be \u201cmorally wrong\u201d in addition to being \u201cunlawful.\u201d The prosecutor thereafter characterized \u201cbasing [a] decision on sex, age, or race\u201d as both \u201cunlawful\u201d and \u201cimmoral\u201d when questioning prospective jurors.\nThis Court has long recognized the two components of a defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claims brought under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as set forth in Strickland v. Washington. State v. Goss, 361 N.C. 610, 623, 651 S.E.2d 867, 875 (2007) (citations omitted); State v. Campbell, 359 N.C. 644, 690, 617 S.E.2d 1, 30 (2005) (citations omitted), cert, denied, 547 U.S. 1073 (2006). First, defendant must demonstrate that his trial counsel\u2019s performance was \u201cdeficient,\u201d such that the errors committed were \u201cso serious that counsel was not functioning as the \u2018counsel\u2019 guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Second, defendant is required to show prejudice resulting from trial counsel\u2019s \u201cdeficient performance,\u201d which \u201crequires showing that counsel\u2019s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.\u201d Id. \u201cUnless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.\u201d Id.\nThis Court has previously held that a prosecutor may \u201c \u2018inquirfe] into the sympathies of prospective jurors in the exercise of [the State\u2019s] right to secure an unbiased jury.\u2019 \u201d See State v. Anderson, 350 N.C. 152, 170-71, 513 S.E.2d 296, 308, (quoting State v. McKoy, 323 N.C. 1, 15, 372 S.E.2d 12, 19 (1988), sentence vacated on other grounds, 494 U.S. 433 (1990)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 973 (1999). Defendant contends that the questions asked of prospective jurors by the State and the trial court in the present case were not permissible inquiries into the bias of prospective jurors. Instead, in effect defendant argues that these were \u201chypothetical questions involving the existence of a mitigating circumstance\u201d and thus, impermissible because they were \u201cdesigned to elicit in advance what the juror\u2019s decision will be under a certain state of the evidence or upon a given state of facts.\u201d See id. at 170, 513 S.E.2d at 307 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\nIt is far from clear that the questions asked by the prosecutor and the trial court were directed toward the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance of defendant\u2019s age rather than toward any bias which may have affected prospective jurors during the guilt phase of the trial because of defendant\u2019s age. Regardless, we are not persuaded that the performance of defendant\u2019s trial counsel \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness\u201d as is required to show that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Indeed, as defendant acknowledges, his trial counsel made repeated references to defendant\u2019s youth throughout the penalty proceeding and stated the following in closing argument:\nThe defendant\u2019s age at the time of the crime was a mitigating factor. He was twenty-four. He had not finished college. The State wants you to believe he had apartments and lived with women, but what was he doing? He was living in somebody\u2019s dorm room. He had lived with various people that kicked him out. And I would contend that that\u2019s not evidence that he had established some home and was living through life as a mature person. And I think you can consider his age. That is a statutory mitigating factor. He was young.\nMoreover, as the trial court submitted the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance and did not err in its instructions to the jury on this mitigator, there is nothing in the trial transcript and record to support a conclusion that defendant\u2019s trial counsel did not act reasonably to ensure the jury fully considered defendant\u2019s age as a mitigator in its sentencing deliberations.\nBecause it would have been reasonable for trial counsel to interpret the questions asked of prospective jurors concerning defendant\u2019s age as permissible inquiries into potential bias, and because counsel sufficiently advocated during the penalty proceeding that the jury find the (f)(7) mitigating circumstance, we conclude that defendant has not demonstrated the first component of his. ineffective assistance of counsel claim \u2014 that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient. Consequently, defendant\u2019s claim is without merit, and his related assignments of error are overruled.\nD. Trial Court\u2019s Instructions on (e)(6) Aggravator (that \u201c[tjhe capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain\u201d)\nDefendant asserts plain error and a violation of his rights to due process in the following instruction given by the trial court concerning the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance \u2014 -whether the murder \u201cwas committed for pecuniary gain\u201d:\nA murder is committed for pecuniary gain if the defendant, when he commits it, has obtained or intends or expects to obtain money or some other thing, in this case the victim\u2019s automobile, which can be valued in money, either as compensation for committing it or as a result of the death of the victim.\nIf you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that when the defendant killed the victim, the defendant took or intended to take the victim's automobile, then you would find this aggravating circumstance and would so indicate by having your foreperson write yes in the space after this aggravating circumstance on the issues and recommendation form.\n(Emphasis added.) See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(6) (2007). The jury subsequently found the (e)(6) aggravator to exist.\nDefendant contends that the italicized portion of the above instruction relieved the State of its burden of proving that the murder was committed for the purpose of pecuniary gain and of thereby showing that \u201cthe taking was [not] a mere act of opportunism committed after a murder was perpetrated for another reason.\u201d See State v. Maske, 358 N.C. 40, 54, 591 S.E.2d 521, 530 (2004). However, this Court has rejected several previous challenges to virtually identical instructions. See Barden, 356 N.C. at 383, 572 S.E.2d at 149-50 (citing, inter alia, State v. Davis, 353 N.C. 1, 35-37, 539 S.E.2d 243, 266-67 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 839 (2001)). In the instant case, as was true in the cases cited above, the trial court sufficiently informed the jury regarding the circumstances which would support a finding of \u201csome causal connection between the murder and the pecuniary gain at the time the killing occurfred],\u201d Maske, 358 N.C. at 54, 591 S.E.2d at 530 (citations omitted), with its instructions that the pecuniary gain must have been \u201c[obtained] as compensation for committing [the murder]\u201d or \u201c[intended or expected] as a result of the death of the victim.\u201d\nThus, defendant has failed to demonstrate any error in these instructions, much less plain error. Defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled, as it is without merit.\nAlternatively, defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective, depriving defendant of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to the effective assistance of counsel, by failing to note a timely objection to the trial court\u2019s instructions on the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance. Since we have found no error in the challenged instructions, defendant has not demonstrated that his trial counsel\u2019s performance \u201cfell below an objective standard of reasonableness,\u201d and his claim is without merit as a result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Thus, defendant\u2019s assignment of error is overruled.\nIV. DEFENDANT\u2019S MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF\nOn 21 September 2007, defendant filed with this Court a Motion for Appropriate Relief from his sentence of death pursuant to Article 89 of the Criminal Procedure Act. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-1415, -1418 (2007). Through this motion, defendant assigns error to (1) the allegedly false testimony of State\u2019s witness Bennie Cameron; (2) the allegedly false testimony of State\u2019s witness Alonzo Dingle; and (3) the prosecutors\u2019 closing remarks, trial strategy, and direct examination pertaining to victim impact evidence. Moreover, defendant effectively contends that each assignment of error resulted in an invalid sentence as a matter of law and in his prayer for relief asks us to vacate his sentence of death or, in the alternative, remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on these claims. See id. \u00a7 15A-1415(b)(8). This Court allowed oral argument on defendant\u2019s motion contemporaneously with argument concerning his direct appeal, and we have determined that the merits of this motion can be decided based upon the materials before us. See id. \u00a7 15A-1418(b).\nWe note at the outset that a capital defendant\u2019s Motion for Appropriate Relief filed pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1418 would ordinarily be subject to denial on statutory procedural grounds if \u201c[u]pon a previous appeal the defendant was in a position to adequately raise the ground or issue underlying the present motion but did not do so.\u201d Id. \u00a7 15A-1419(a)(3) (2007). The fact that each of defendant\u2019s three stated grounds for relief are based upon assignments of error contained in the record on appeal, and therefore, could have been presented by argument in defendant\u2019s brief, demonstrates that defendant \u201cwas in a position to adequately raise the ground[s] or issue[s] underlying the present motion\u201d on direct appeal. Id. In State v. Price, this Court applied section 15A-1419(a)(3) to a defendant\u2019s Motion for Appropriate Relief filed during the pendency of his direct appeal, stating:\nMotions for appropriate relief generally allow defendants to raise arguments that could not have been raised in an original appeal, such as claims based on newly discovered evidence and claims based on rights arising by reason of later constitutional decisions announcing new principles or changes in the law. We agree with the State that statutes governing motions for appropriate relief were not intended to circumvent the orderly briefing of arguments on appeal. Motions for appropriate relief may not be used to add to an appeal new arguments which could have been raised in the briefs originally filed. Both of the arguments now raised by defendant in the motion for appropriate relief could have been raised in his original appeal. Therefore, defendant\u2019s motion for appropriate relief is subject to being dismissed.\n331 N.C. 620, 630, 418 S.E.2d 169, 174 (1992) (internal citation omitted), sentence vacated on other grounds, 506 U.S. 1043 (1993).\nIn Price, this Court exercised its discretion to reach the merits of the defendant\u2019s claims notwithstanding the applicability of section 15A-1419(a)(3). See 331 N.C. at 630, 418 S.E.2d at 174-75. In fact, the version of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1419(b) which was applicable when Price was decided expressly provided for such an exercise of discretion \u201cin the interest of justice and for good cause shown.\u201d See Act of June 21, 1996, ch. 719, sec. 2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 1996) 389, 391. However, the General Assembly has since amended section 15A-1419(b), which currently provides:\n(b) The court shall deny the motion under any of the circumstances specified in this section, unless the defendant can demonstrate:\n(1) Good cause for excusing the grounds for denial listed in subsection (a) of this section and can demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the defendant\u2019s claim; or\n(2) That failure to consider the defendant\u2019s claim will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1419 (2007) (emphasis added) (as amended by ch. 719, sec. 2, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws (Reg. Sess. 1996) at 391-92). Thus, our state\u2019s appellate courts may excuse the grounds for denial set forth in section 15A-1419(a) only if a defendant can demonstrate (1) \u201cgood cause\u201d resulting in \u201cactual prejudice,\u201d as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1419(c), (d), or (2) that a \u201cfundamental miscarriage of justice,\u201d as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1419(e), would otherwise result. \u25a0\nBecause defendant filed his brief after filing his Motion for Appropriate Relief and incorporates by reference in his brief each of the three stated grounds for relief set forth in his motion, and because defendant was evidently acting upon a good faith misunderstanding of the law, we hold that defendant, under these particular circumstances, did adequately raise on appeal each of the grounds underlying the motion in his brief. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1419(a)(3). After careful review of defendant\u2019s several arguments, we find they are all meritless. Accordingly, we overrule defendant\u2019s related assignments of error and deny his Motion for Appropriate Relief.\nA. State\u2019s Witness Bennie Cameron\nDefendant first contends that the prosecution allowed State\u2019s witness Bennie Cameron to perjure himself concerning his prior convictions, current charges, and discussions with the Durham County District Attorney\u2019s office. Defendant also alleges that he received ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the impeachment of Cameron on cross-examination, that defendant\u2019s right to effective assistance of conflict-free counsel was violated, and that defendant was sentenced to death upon materially false and unreliable information in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights. Defendant\u2019s arguments are without merit.\n[I]t is established that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. Further, with regard to the knowing use of perjured testimony, the Supreme Court has established a standard of materiality under which the knowing use of perjured testimony requires a conviction to be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Thus, [w]hen a defendant shows that testimony was in fact false, material, and knowingly and intentionally used by the State to obtain his conviction, he is entitled to a new trial.\nState v. Williams, 341 N.C. 1, 16, 459 S.E.2d 208, 217 (1995) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), cert, denied, 516 U.S. 1128 (1996).\nDefendant asserts that Bennie Cameron testified falsely concerning \u201cpending charges in Durham.\u201d At trial, defense counsel questioned Cameron concerning charges filed against \u201cKevin Jermaine McAdoo,\u201d which defendant contends has been identified by fingerprint comparison as an alias of Cameron. Defense counsel asked Cameron if he had any pending charges in Durham. He responded that he did not. This statement was in fact true, even assuming that Cameron and McAdoo are the same person, since the supporting documentation provided by defendant and the testimony at trial show that the charges against McAdoo were dismissed with leave for failure to appear. Although the charges were subject to reinstatement, they were not pending at the time of the challenged testimony.\nEven assuming, arguendo, that this testimony was false, defendant has presented no supporting evidence for his assertion that the prosecution \u201cknowingly and intentionally\u201d allowed Cameron to testify falsely concerning these matters. Moreover, even had sufficient evidence been provided by affidavit or other supporting documentation to demonstrate such knowledge by the prosecutors, Cameron\u2019s testimony on this peripheral issue concerning charges dismissed in another district attorney\u2019s jurisdiction was simply not material. See State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 353, 451 S.E.2d 131, 151 (1994) (holding that counsel is not allowed to cross-examine witnesses on pending charges). Unlike State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162,163-64, 484 S.E.2d 377, 378 (1997), in which the State\u2019s witness faced pending charges within the same jurisdiction in which he testified, any charges pending against Cameron were being handled in a different jurisdiction, and defendant provides no supporting documentation of any discussion between the two district attorneys\u2019 offices to demonstrate that Cameron\u2019s testimony was biased in this respect. Moreover, this case is unlike Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), in which the trial court had refused to allow defense counsel to question a witness as to his probationary status when the witness was afraid he might be charged with the crime for which the defendant was on trial. Id. at 312-14. In the instant case, there is no indication that Cameron feared being charged with the victim\u2019s murder. Thus, Cameron\u2019s allegedly false testimony was clearly not material to defendant\u2019s trial.'\nDefendant also argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel during the cross-examination of Cameron. We disagree. Defense counsel\u2019s performance at trial was far from deficient. Counsel not only confronted Cameron about his numerous prior convictions, but also questioned him concerning the charges under his alleged alias and any conversations with the district attorney regarding the disposition of the alleged charges against him. Defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Cameron spanned twenty-nine pages of transcript and we cannot say that her performance in impeaching Cameron was deficient. Thus, defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance of counsel claim must fail. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.\nDefendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because it was revealed during defense counsel Lisa Costner\u2019s cross-examination of Cameron that she had represented him on a previous charge that resulted in a conviction. However, the transcript also reveals that Costner did not recall Cameron or her representation of him, nor did she discuss defendant\u2019s case with Cameron. Defendant did not object at trial to this potential conflict of interest and has failed to show that this asserted conflict of interest \u201c \u2018adversely affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\u2019 \u201d State v. Walls, 342 N.C. 1, 39-40, 463 S.E.2d 738, 757 (1995) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980)), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1197 (1996). As noted above, Costner sufficiently cross-examined Cameron and adequately raised issues concerning his credibility. Thus, defendant\u2019s arguments relating to Cameron\u2019s testimony lack merit, and his related assignments of error are overruled.\nB. State\u2019s Witness Alonzo Dingle\nDefendant next contends that the prosecution was permitted to present false testimony from State\u2019s witness Alonzo Dingle concerning whether he observed blood on defendant\u2019s person when defendant first arrived at Dingle\u2019s apartment on the night of the murder. According to Detective Elmes\u2019 report of his unrecorded interview with Dingle, Dingle told investigators that he had observed blood on defendant\u2019s person at this point in time, whereas in Dingle\u2019s recorded interview he indicated that this was not the case and he had not observed any blood until defendant later removed the body from the passenger side of the vehicle. Although Dingle\u2019s statements are inconsistent, it cannot be said that the prosecution knowingly submitted false testimony for the jury\u2019s consideration based solely on the fact that the prosecutors submitted evidence which may have conflicted with Dingle\u2019s prior statements. As this Court has stated, \u201c[T]here is a difference between the knowing presentation of false testimony and knowing that testimony conflicts in some manner. It is for the jury to decide issues of fact when conflicting information is elicited by either party.\u201d State v. Allen, 360 N.C. 297, 305, 626 S.E.2d 271, 279 (citation omitted), cert. denied, \u2014 U.S. \u2014, 127 S. Ct. 164, 166 L. Ed. 2d 116 (2006).\nMoreover, defendant\u2019s assertion that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to properly cross-examine Dingle concerning his statement and failed to request a jury instruction on accomplice testimony must fail. At trial, defense counsel questioned Dingle concerning his recollection of the events in a manner designed to raise a suspicion in jurors\u2019 minds that Dingle\u2019s account was fictional. Counsel further impeached Dingle with his conflicting accounts of these events. Thus, counsel\u2019s performance met the constitutionally required \u201cobjective standard of reasonableness.\u201d See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Additionally, even had counsel requested a jury instruction on accomplice testimony, it would not have been a proper instruction. There was no evidence that Dingle was an accessory before the fact, and \u201c[ejvidence that a witness was an accessory after the fact does not subject [the witness\u2019s] testimony to rules relating to accomplice testimony.\u201d State v. Cabey, 307 N.C. 496, 501, 299 S.E.2d 194, 197 (1983). Moreover, as defendant was not entitled to such an instruction, the failure of the trial court to give the instruction could not constitute plain error. Accordingly, defendant\u2019s assignment of error related to Dingle\u2019s testimony is overruled.\nC. Prosecutors\u2019 Closing Argument Remarks, Trial Strategy, and Direct Examination Pertaining to Victim Impact Evidence\nFinally, defendant has raised several assignments of error pertaining to victim impact evidence presented by the State during the penalty proceeding. Defendant first challenges the prosecutor\u2019s remarks during penalty proceeding closing argument that the victim\u2019s family placed numerous telephone calls to his cellular phone following his death. The prosecutor argued:\nMR. O\u2019NEILL: And what did Alonzo Dingle tell you? ... I heard the phone, some phone kept ringing, kept ringing, kept ringing, kept ringing. That was Matthew\u2019s family trying to find their kid\u2014\nMS. COSTNER: Objection.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nMR. O\u2019NEILL: \u2014trying to find their baby.\nDefendant argues that this was patently false, as discovery records show that all of the calls placed to the victim\u2019s cellular phone were not made by concerned family members, but by friends. \u201cThis Court has articulated a two-part analysis for determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in such cases. \u2018[T]his Court first determines if the remarks were improper .... Next, we determine if the remarks were of such a magnitude that their inclusion prejudiced defendant, and thus should have been excluded by the trial court.\u2019 \u201d Peterson, 361 N.C. at 606-07, 652 S.E.2d at 229 (quoting Jones, 355 N.C. at 131, 558 S.E.2d at 106 (alterations in original)). Even assuming, arguendo, that the prosecutor\u2019s remarks were improper, defendant cannot show that the trial court\u2019s failure to sustain his objection was prejudicial. The challenged remarks were obviously made for the purpose of showing the love the victim\u2019s family felt toward him. Moreover, considering (1) the evidence detailed above as to the impact of the victim\u2019s death on his family, (2) the fact someone was concerned of his whereabouts as indicated by the ringing of his cellular phone, and (3) the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury that \u201cif your recollection of the evidence differs from that of the Court or of the district attorneys, you are to rely solely upon your recollection of the evidence in your deliberations,\u201d defendant cannot demonstrate prejudice.\nAdditionally, defendant asserts that the prosecution tried to \u201ckeep the victim\u2019s attempt to purchase marijuana from the jury by eliciting incomplete information from Detective Rowe\u201d and by arguing to the jury that defense counsel\u2019s exploration of the issue was an attempt to \u201csmear the victim.\u201d However, the jury was allowed to hear the relevant evidence through defense counsel\u2019s cross-examination of Detective Rowe, in which Detective Rowe stated affirmatively that he had information that \u201cthe victim was trying to purchase drugs at the time that he was shot.\u201d Thus, even had the prosecutor attempted to \u201cconceal\u201d this evidence, it came before the jury and defendant cannot show prejudice.\nFinally, defendant asserts that the prosecutor posed questions assuming facts not in evidence by asking witnesses about medication used by the victim\u2019s father. The prosecution asked both the victim\u2019s stepmother and his grandmother whether his father was taking medication and, if so, why. On both occasions, the trial court sustained defense counsel\u2019s objection to the question of why the victim\u2019s father was taking medication. \u201cThis Court has held that where the trial court sustains defendant\u2019s objection, he has no grounds to except, and there is no prejudice.\u201d State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 341, 561 S.E.2d 245, 259 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1006 (2002). Thus, defendant\u2019s argument is without merit. Defendant\u2019s related assignments of error are overruled, and his Motion for Appropriate Relief is denied.\nV. PRESERVATION ISSUES\nDefendant assigns error to the trial court\u2019s instruction to the jury on the (f)(2) mitigating circumstance, contending it was plainly erroneous for the trial court to state that being \u201cunder the influence of mental or emotional disturbance,\u201d see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(2) (2007), is similar to acting \u201cin the heat of passion upon adequate provocation.\u201d This Court has previously upheld the language used by the trial court. See State v. Wilkinson, 344 N.C. 198, 218-20, 474 S.E.2d 375, 385-87 (1996). Although defendant bases his challenge of these instructions on apparently novel grounds, his bare contention that the trial court\u2019s characterization is unfounded does not compel us to overrule our previous holding that the trial court\u2019s instruction \u201cclearly did not prevent the jury from considering any evidence tending to support this mitigating circumstance.\u201d Id. at 219-20, 474 S.E.2d at 386-87. Accordingly, we overrule defendant\u2019s assignment of error as without merit.\nDefendant also contends that the trial court\u2019s instructions to the jury on the (f)(2) (\u201cmental or emotional disturbance\u201d) and (f)(6) (impaired capacity) mitigating circumstances were plainly erroneous and violated his state and federal constitutional rights because these instructions limited the evidence the jury could consider in support of these circumstances. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(f)(2), (f)(6) (2007). We have reviewed defendant\u2019s argument and decline to overrule this Court\u2019s previous holding that this argument is without merit. See State v. Carroll, 356 N.C. 526, 552, 573 S.E.2d 899, 915-16 (2002), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 949 (2003).\nAdditionally, defendant argues the following: (1) the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad; (2) the trial court erred in instructing the jury to answer \u201cyes\u201d for Issue Three of the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form even if the jury found that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances were of equal weight; (3) the trial court erred in instructing jurors that, in considering Issues Three and Four of the Issues and Recommendation as to Punishment form, they \u201cmay\u201d consider the mitigating circumstances found in response to Issue Two; (4) the trial court erred in instructing jurors that they could ignore nonstatutory mitigating circumstances if they deemed the evidence to have no mitigating value; and (5) the death penalty is inherently cruel and unusual, and North Carolina\u2019s capital sentencing procedure is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. After reviewing defendant\u2019s several arguments, we decline to overrule this Court\u2019s numerous holdings that these contentions are all meritless. State v. Duke, 360 N.C. 110, 136-42, 623 S.E.2d 11, 28-32 (2005), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 127 S. Ct. 130, 166 L. Ed. 2d 96 (2006).\nVI. PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW\nHaving determined that defendant\u2019s trial and capital sentencing proceeding were free of prejudicial error, we must further determine: \u201c(1) whether the record supports the aggravating circumstances found by the jury and upon which the sentence of death was based; (2) whether the death sentence was entered under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor; and (3) whether the death sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the facts of the crime and the defendant.\u201d State v. Raines, 362 N.C. 1, 24, 653 S.E.2d 126, 141 (2007) (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2) (2005)).\nThe jury found four aggravating circumstances: (1) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain; (2) the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (3) the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in robbery with a dangerous weapon; and (4) the murder was committed while defendant was engaged in first-degree kidnapping. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-2000(e)(5), (e)(6), (e)(9) (2007). We find the record supports each of these aggravating circumstances.\nFirst, the testimony of Bennie Cameron supported the jury\u2019s finding that defendant committed\u2019 the murder for pecuniary gain\u2014 namely, the victim\u2019s vehicle \u2014 since defendant stated to Cameron before 21 August 2003 that he would rob someone, put the individual in the trunk of his or her own vehicle, and take the vehicle to Durham, where defendant knew of a \u201cchop shop,\u201d referring to \u201ca place where stolen automobiles are stripped of salable parts.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s at 202.\nAdditionally, the State offered (1) considerable testimony from those who associated with defendant before the murder that defendant apparently intended to rob someone for money; (2) defendant\u2019s statements to Mangus Daniels afterward that he had robbed someone at gunpoint; and (3) defendant\u2019s statement to investigators that he had taken money from the victim. Thus, the record supports the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance as to robbery with a dangerous weapon to obtain the victim\u2019s money. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-87(a) (2007).\nDefendant\u2019s statements to investigators,- in conjunction with what he related to several acquaintances, tended to prove that the victim \u2014 while he remained alive \u2014 was unlawfully transported in his own vehicle without his consent and for the purpose of robbery or the infliction of serious bodily harm. This finding would support the (e)(5) aggravating circumstance as to first-degree kidnapping. See id. \u00a7 14-39 (2007) (providing that \u201cthe offense is kidnapping in the first degree\u201d if the victim was \u201cnot released by the defendant in a safe place\u201d or was \u201cseriously injured\u201d).\nFinally, defendant\u2019s statement to investigators tended to show that defendant, although he considered taking the victim to a hospital after the initial discharge of the handgun, fired a second, fatal shot at the helpless victim as he lay upside down on the front passenger side of the vehicle and after he begged defendant to put him out of his misery. This evidence, in turn, supports the jury\u2019s finding of the (e)(9) aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel.\nWe find no indication in the record that the sentence of death recommended by the jury was imposed \u201cunder the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor.\u201d See id. \u00a7 15A-2000(d)(2); Raines, 362 N.C. at 25, 653 S.E.2d at 141. \u201cIn such circumstances we will not disturb the jurors\u2019 weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.\u201d Raines, 362 N.C. at 25, 653 S.E.2d at 141.\nLastly, we determine whether defendant\u2019s sentence is proportionate, considering both the individual defendant and the crime for which he was convicted. See id. \u201cUltimately, proportionality review rests upon the experienced judgments of the members of the Court.\u201d Goss, 361 N.C. at 629, 651 S.E.2d at 879 (citing State v. Elliott, 360 N.C. 400, 425, 628 S.E.2d 735, 752, cert. denied,-U.S.-, 127 S. Ct. 505, 166 L. Ed. 2d 378 (2006)). \u201cIn its determination, the Court must compare defendant\u2019s case with all similar cases in this jurisdiction, though we are not bound to cite each of these.\u201d See id. at 629, 651 S.E.2d at 879 (citing State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 477-78, 648 S.E.2d 788, 812 (2007), cert. denied,-U.S.-, 128 S. Ct. 1888, 170 L. Ed. 2d 760 (2008)).\nThis Court has previously found a sentence of death disproportionate in only eight cases. State v. Kemmerlin, 356 N.C. 446, 573 S.E.2d 870 (2002); State v. Benson, 323 N.C. 318, 372 S.E.2d 517 (1988); State v. Stokes, 319 N.C. 1, 352 S.E.2d 653 (1987); State v. Rogers, 316 N.C. 203, 341 S.E.2d 713 (1986), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 483 S.E.2d 396, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900 (1997), and by State v. Vandiver, 321 N.C. 570, 364 S.E.2d 373 (1988); State v. Young, 312 N.C. 669, 325 S.E.2d 181 (1985); State v. Hill, 311 N.C. 465, 319 S.E.'2d 163 (1984); State v. Bondurant, 309 N.C. 674, 309 S.E.2d 170 (1983); and State v. Jackson, 309 N.C. 26, 305 S.E.2d 703 (1983).\nOnly in Stokes and Bondurant did the juries find the aggravating circumstance that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. However,\n[i]n Stokes, the defendant was seventeen years old and the only one of four assailants to receive the death penalty. In Bondurant, the defendant showed immediate remorse for his actions and even directed the victim\u2019s transport to the hospital, hoping to see the victim live.\nCummings, 361 N.C. at 478, 648 S.E.2d at 812 (citations omitted). In contrast, in the case now before us, defendant was twenty-four years old at the time of the murder and was also the sole assailant. Moreover, although defendant stated to investigators that he killed the victim only because the victim repeatedly pleaded with him to do so, none of defendant\u2019s subsequent actions following the victim\u2019s death demonstrated any remorse. In fact, defendant took considerable steps to conceal his involvement in the murder \u2014 including abandoning the body in a remote location outside of the state.\nAccordingly, after careful consideration, we find the sentence of death proportionate in light of this defendant and the crime for which he was convicted.\nCONCLUSION\nAll remaining assignments of error presented by defendant but not set forth in his brief or argued on appeal are deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6); see also Goss, 361 N.C. at 630, 651 S.E.2d at 879 (citations omitted). We conclude that defendant received a fair trial and sentencing proceeding, that his convictions and sentence were free of error, and that the sentence of death is not disproportionate to the crime for which he was convicted. As detailed above, we also deny defendant\u2019s Motion for Appropriate Relief.\nNO ERROR; MOTION FOR APPROPRIATE RELIEF DENIED.\n. \u201cChop shop\u201d is defined as \u201ca place where stolen automobiles are stripped of salable parts.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 202 (10th ed. 1993) [hereinafter Merriam-Webster\u2019s].\n. Before making a recorded statement, defendant provided law enforcement an inconsistent account of events in which he stated that a third, unidentified individual shot the victim in the face while defendant and the victim were both seated in the vehicle engaged in the drug transaction.\n. We note that Part 2 of the IDS rules \u201cplaces with [IDS] the responsibility for appointing and compensating counsel in capital cases.\u201d Indigent Def. Servs. Rules, Part 2, reprinted in 2008 Ann. R. N.C. 973 (emphasis added).\n. In his brief, defendant describes other instances in which the prosecutor made reference to Dr. Kramer, both during jury selection and during the penalty proceeding, and discusses at length the facts surrounding the prosecutor\u2019s decision not to call Dr. Kramer as a witness. However, defendant has not preserved any of these matters for appellate review either through assignment of error or by \u201cspecifically and distinctly\u201d contending plain error. Thus, our consideration is limited to the objected-to portion of the prosecution\u2019s closing argument quoted above. See N.C. R. App. R 10(c).\n. Defense counsel did object to the submission of the (e)(6) aggravating circumstance to the jury, but not to the precise wording of the trial court\u2019s jury instruction.", "type": "majority", "author": "BRADY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Amy C. Kunstling, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender; and Paul M. Green for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. JEREMY DUSHANE MURRELL\nNo. 484A06\n(Filed 27 August 2008)\n1. Confessions and Incriminating Statements\u2014 waiver of rights after appointment of counsel \u2014 knowing and voluntary \u2014 knowledge of indigent services rules not required\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree murder prosecution by concluding that defendant\u2019s waiver of his rights was knowing and voluntary and that his statement to investigators was admissible. Counsel had been appointed but defendant waived his rights and elected not to have counsel present when making his statement to investigators after initiating contact. Whether defendant was advised of the provisions of IDS (indigent services) rules about the appointment of counsel in capital cases is immaterial to a determination under Miranda.\n2. Jury\u2014 voir dire \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s remarks \u2014 definition of mitigating circumstance \u2014 shorthand summary\nThe prosecutor\u2019s remarks during voir dire in a first-degree murder prosecution that \u201cA mitigating circumstance, if you choose to believe it, could make this crime more deserving of life imprisonment,\u201d were substantially correct shorthand summaries of the definition of mitigating circumstances and thus were not grossly improper.\n3. Jury\u2014 selection \u2014 ability to impose death penalty\nThere was no plain error in a first-degree murder prosecution where the prosecutor was allowed to ask whether prospective jurors had the \u201cintestinal fortitude\u201d to vote for a death sentence. The question was not posed in a way that might affect the jurors\u2019 impartiality and it is evident that the intent was to elicit answers which would have provided grounds for a challenge for cause.\n4. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s closing argument \u2014 mitigating circumstances\nThere was no plain error in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant contended that the prosecutor misrepresented the law regarding mitigating circumstances by suggesting that mitigating evidence would have to lessen the severity of the crime. The remarks were at least substantially correct, and cannot then be said to be grossly improper.\n5. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s closing argument \u2014 witness not called\nThe court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument regarding a witness whom the State did not call. Defendant did not demonstrate prejudice because the only aspect of the witness\u2019s testimony possibly suggested by the State\u2019s argument was the assessment that defendant was not schizophrenic, with which defendant\u2019s own expert agreed.\n6. Sentencing\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s closing argument \u2014 ability to vote for death penalty\nThere was no gross impropriety in a first-degree murder prosecution in the trial court not intervening ex mero motu in the prosecutor\u2019s arguments about having the inner strength to carry out justice and having the intestinal fortitude to vote for the death penalty.\n7. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 prosecutor\u2019s argument \u2014 use of mitigating evidence\nThe trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder prosecution by overruling defendant\u2019s objection to the prosecution\u2019s alleged argument that the jury should consider mitigation evidence in support of an aggravating circumstance. In context, the argument was that defendant\u2019s childhood temper tantrums should not be significant factors in the consideration of defendant\u2019s mitigating evidence.\n8. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 prosecution\u2019s closing argument \u2014 contention for State\u2019s position rather than personal opinion\nThere was no gross impropriety in a first-degree murder prosecution where the prosecutors argued that they wanted the jury to return a recommendation of death. They were advocating the State\u2019s position rather than expressing a personal opinion.\n9. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 mitigating circumstances \u2014 definition\nThere was no error, plain or otherwise, in the court\u2019s definition of mitigating circumstances in the sentencing phase of a first-degree murder prosecution.\n10. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 questions to jurors about sympathy for defendant \u2014 no objection\nThere was no ineffective assistance of counsel in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant contended that his trial counsel was ineffective in not objecting to questions concerning prospective jurors\u2019 sympathy for defendant because of his age. It would have been reasonable for trial counsel to interpret the questions as permissible inquiries into potential bias, and counsel sufficiently advocated the age of defendant as a mitigator.\n11. Sentencing\u2014 capital \u2014 aggravating circumstances \u2014 pecuniary gain \u2014 causal connection \u2014 instructions\nThe trial court\u2019s instructions on the pecuniary gain aggravating circumstance in a capital sentencing proceeding sufficiently informed the jury regarding the circumstances which would support a finding of some causal connection between the murder and the pecuniary gain at the time the killing occurred when the court instructed that the pecuniary gain must have been \u201c[obtained] as compensation for committing [the murder]\u201d or \u201c[intended or expected] as a result of the death of the victim.\u201d\n12. Criminal Law\u2014 motion for appropriate relief \u2014 issues adequately raised\nUnder these particular circumstances, a defendant adequately raised on appeal each of the grounds underlying a motion for appropriate relief. Defendant filed his brief after filing his motion for appropriate relief and incorporated by reference into the brief each of the grounds for relief from the motion, and was evidently acting upon a good faith misunderstanding of the law.\n13. Criminal Law\u2014 perjured testimony \u2014 prior convictions\u2014 not knowingly allowed\nThere was no error, and no prejudice even assuming error, where the defendant in a first-degree murder prosecution alleged that a witness was allowed to perjure himself concerning prior convictions, current charges, and discussions with a district attorney\u2019s office. The testimony about pending charges was true at that time, and defendant presented no evidence to support the assertion that the prosecution knowingly and intentionally allowed false testimony.\n14. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 cross-examination of State\u2019s witness\nA first-degree murder defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel in the cross-examination of a State\u2019s witness.\n15. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel \u2014 conflict of interest\nA first-degree murder defendant received effective assistance of counsel where one of his attorneys had represented a State\u2019s witness previously, but the transcript revealed that the attorney did not remember the witness or her representation of him, nor did she discuss defendant\u2019s case with the witness. Defendant did not object at trial, or show that the potential conflict affected his lawyer\u2019s performance.\n16. Criminal Law\u2014 inconsistent statements by State\u2019s witness \u2014 not the knowing presentation of false testimony\nFalse testimony was not permitted from a witness for the prosecution where the witness made inconsistent statements. Issues of fact are of the jury to resolve.\n17. Constitutional Law\u2014 effective assistance of counsel\u2014 cross-examination and request for instructions\nA first-degree murder defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel in the cross examination of a State\u2019s witness and in the lack of a request for an instruction on accomplice testimony. Counsel\u2019s performance met the constitutionally required objective standard of reasonableness, and evidence of being an accessory after the fact does not subject the witness\u2019s testimony to rules regarding accomplice testimony.\n18. Criminal Law\u2014 prosecutor\u2019s closing argument \u2014 not prejudicial\nA first-degree murder defendant could not show that the failure to sustain his objection to the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument was prejudicial, even assuming the argument was improper. The argument concerned defendant ignoring the ringing of the victim\u2019s cell phone after the crime as the victim\u2019s family tried to find him; the challenged remarks were made to show the family\u2019s love of the victim.\n19. Criminal Law\u2014 keeping facts from jury \u2014 corrected on cross-examination \u2014 not prejudicial\nThere was no prejudice in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant argued that the prosecution had tried to keep from the jury the victim\u2019s attempt to buy marijuana. The jury heard the evidence through cross-examination of a detective.\n20. Criminal Law\u2014 questions assuming facts not in evidence\u2014 objections sustained \u2014 not prejudicial\nThere was no prejudice in a first-degree murder prosecution where defendant asserted that the prosecution had asked questions assuming facts not in evidence, but defendant\u2019s objections had been sustained.\n21. Sentencing\u2014 death penalty \u2014 not disproportionate\nA death sentence was not disproportionate where the evidence supported the aggravating circumstances, there was no indication that the verdict was rendered under the influence of passion or any other arbitrary factor, and the sentence was proportionate in light of the defendant and the crime.\nAppeal as of right pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-27(a) from a judgment imposing a sentence of death entered on 17 February 2006 by Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Superior Court, Forsyth County, following a jury verdict finding defendant guilty of first-degree murder. On 26 March 2007, the Supreme Court allowed defendant\u2019s motion to bypass the Court of Appeals as to his appeal of additional judgments. On 21 September 2007, defendant filed a motion for appropriate relief with the Supreme Court. Heard in the Supreme Court 6 May 2008.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Amy C. Kunstling, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nStaples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Benjamin Dowling-Sendor, Assistant Appellate Defender; and Paul M. Green for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0375-01", "first_page_order": 453, "last_page_order": 490 }