{ "id": 4151028, "name": "WILLIAM LAWSON BROWN, III v. MARK P. ELLIS", "name_abbreviation": "Brown v. Ellis", "decision_date": "2009-06-18", "docket_number": "No. 389PA07", "first_page": "360", "last_page": "364", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "363 N.C. 360" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638767 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8186900 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0547-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637346 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "citing Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 675, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "646 S.E.2d 408", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638767 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/646/0408-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 674", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558922 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0674-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 114", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3744223 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119", "parenthetical": "citing Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 675, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0114-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 N.C. App. 547", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8186900 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/184/0547-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 415, "char_count": 8747, "ocr_confidence": 0.72, "pagerank": { "raw": 9.861048670545303e-08, "percentile": 0.5344269106036684 }, "sha256": "a35d0e20e25f04854a880643cfa76a587e5d6a2dbecd53a67d56ad40deb3531d", "simhash": "1:2ebf4bbde05c03cb", "word_count": 1300 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:39.869638+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "WILLIAM LAWSON BROWN, III v. MARK P. ELLIS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PER CURIAM.\nThe issue on appeal is whether plaintiff alleged sufficient facts in his complaint to support the trial court\u2019s determination that personal jurisdiction over defendant exists under North Carolina\u2019s long-arm statute. We conclude the allegations set forth in the complaint permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1- 75.4(4)(a), and we therefore reverse and remand this case to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.\nPlaintiff filed his verified complaint in Superior Court, Guilford County, alleging causes of action against defendant for alienation of affection and criminal conversation. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged he resided in Guilford County, North Carolina, with his wife and daughter, and that defendant resided in Orange County, California. According to the complaint, plaintiff\u2019s wife and defendant were both employed by the same parent company and worked together on numerous occasions. Plaintiff alleged defendant willfully alienated the affections of plaintiff\u2019s wife by, among other actions, \u201cinitiating frequent and inappropriate, and unnecessary telephone and e-mail conversations with [plaintiff\u2019s wife] on an almost daily basis.\u201d The telephone conversations between defendant and plaintiff\u2019s wife \u201coften occurred in the presence of plaintiff and his minor child\u201d and \u201cinvolved discussions of .defendant\u2019s sexual and romantic relationship with plaintiffs spouse.\u201d Plaintiff alleged that \u201cthrough numerous telephone calls and e-mails to plaintiff\u2019s spouse, [defendant] has arranged to meet, and has met with plaintiff\u2019s spouse on numerous occasions outside the State of North Carolina, under the pretense of businessAelated travel.\u201d\nThe complaint further alleged that plaintiffs wife and defendant committed adultery during these business trips, which further alienated and destroyed the marital relationship between plaintiff and his wife. In support of his complaint, plaintiff submitted an affidavit alleging that \u201cthe majority of defendant\u2019s conduct which constitutes an alienation of affections occurred within the jurisdiction of North Carolina\u201d and that \u201c[e]vidence as to the frequent electronic and telephonic contact between defendant and plaintiff\u2019s spouse can be established through records and witnesses located in the State of North Carolina.\u201d\nDefendant moved for dismissal pursuant to Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(2) on the ground that no personal jurisdiction existed. Defendant submitted an affidavit in support of his motion to dismiss stating he had \u201cnever set foot in the State of North Carolina.\u201d Defendant averred that he communicated with plaintiff\u2019s wife via telephone and electronic mail, but characterized these conversations as \u201cwork related\u201d with \u201cthe normal pleasantries associated with a friendly working relationship.\u201d\nUpon reviewing plaintiff\u2019s verified complaint, as well as the affidavits filed by plaintiff and defendant, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, finding that personal jurisdiction over defendant existed and that the exercise of personal jurisdiction did not violate due process. Defendant did not immediately appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.\nThe case continued to trial. Upon hearing the evidence, the jury determined that defendant was liable to plaintiff for alienation of affections and awarded plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which concluded that North Carolina could not exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant because, according to the Court of Appeals, there was \u201cno evidence that defendant solicited plaintiff\u2019s wife while she was in North Carolina.\u201d Brown v. Ellis, 184 N.C. App. 547, 549, 646 S.E.2d 408, 411 (2007). In light of its disposition of the case, the Court of Appeals' declined to reach the additional issues presented on appeal by defendant, including his constitutional argument that exercise of personal jurisdiction over him would violate due process of law. Id. at 550, 646 S.E.2d at 411. This Court allowed plaintiff\u2019s petition for discretionary review to review the decision.\nTo ascertain whether North Carolina may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, we employ a two-step analysis. Jurisdiction over the action must first be authorized by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4. Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 361 N.C. 114, 119, 638 S.E.2d 203, 208 (2006) (citing Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C. 674, 675, 231 S.E.2d 629, 630 (1977)). \u201cSecond, if the long-arm statute permits consideration of the action, exercise of jurisdiction must not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.\u201d Id. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals determined the trial court erred in concluding that jurisdiction was authorized pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-75.4. In light of this determination, consideration of the second step in the analysis\u2014 that of due process \u2014 was unnecessary, and the Court of Appeals declined to address the issue.\nPersonal jurisdiction may properly be asserted under our long-arm statute\nin any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury . . . [solicitation or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the defendant.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(4)(a) (2007).\nIn the instant case, defendant argues the complaint failed to allege that plaintiffs wife was in North Carolina at the time she received defendant\u2019s telephone calls and e-mail. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant, concluding there was \u201cno evidence that defendant solicited plaintiff\u2019s wife while she was in North Carolina.\u201d Brown, 184 N.C. App. at 549, 646 S.E.2d at 411. We believe this reading of plaintiff\u2019s complaint to be overly strict. Plaintiff alleged that he resided in Guilford County with his wife and daughter and that defendant \u201cinitiat[ed] frequent and inappropriate, and unnecessary telephone and e-mail conversations with [plaintiff\u2019s wife] on an almost daily basis.\u201d According to the complaint, defendant and plaintiff\u2019s wife discussed their \u201csexual and romantic relationship\u201d in the presence of pl\u00e1intiff and his minor child. In his supporting affidavit, plaintiff specifically averred that defendant\u2019s alienation of his wife\u2019s affections \u201coccurred within the jurisdiction of North Carolina.\u201d Although the complaint does not specifically state that plaintiff\u2019s wife was physically located in North Carolina during the telephonic and e-mail communications, that fact is nevertheless apparent from the complaint. In his own affidavit, defendant never denied that he telephoned or e-mailed plaintiffs spouse in North Carolina; rather, he merely characterized the conversations as work related. We conclude plaintiffs complaint alleges sufficient facts to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(4)(a). We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court for consideration of defendant\u2019s remaining issues.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.", "type": "majority", "author": "PER CURIAM." } ], "attorneys": [ "Wyrick, Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson; and Nix and Cecil, by Lee M. Cecil, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Forman Rossabi Black, P.A., by T. Keith Black and William F. Patterson, Jr., for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "WILLIAM LAWSON BROWN, III v. MARK P. ELLIS\nNo. 389PA07\n(Filed 18 June 2009)\nJurisdiction\u2014 nonresident defendant \u2014 telephone and e-mail communications \u2014 long-arm statute\nPlaintiff\u2019s complaint alleged sufficient facts to authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 l-75.4(4)(a) in an action for alienation of affection and criminal conversation, although the complaint did not specifically state that plaintiff\u2019s wife was physically located in North Carolina at the time she received telephonic and e-mail communications from defendant, where plaintiff alleged that he resided in Guilford County with his wife and daughter; defendant initiated frequent and inappropriate telephone and e-mail conversations with plaintiff\u2019s wife on an almost daily basis; defendant and plaintiff\u2019s wife discussed their sexual and romantic relationship in the presence of plaintiff and his minor child; and defendant\u2019s alienation of his wife\u2019s affections occurred within the jurisdiction of North Carolina.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 184 N.C. App. 547, 646 S.E.2d 408 (2007), vacating a judgment dated 2 February 2005 entered by Judge Melzer A. Morgan Jr. in Superior Court, Guilford County. Heard in the Supreme Court 31 March 2009.\nWyrick, Robbins Yates & Ponton LLP, by K. Edward Greene and Tobias S. Hampson; and Nix and Cecil, by Lee M. Cecil, for plaintiff-appellant.\nForman Rossabi Black, P.A., by T. Keith Black and William F. Patterson, Jr., for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0360-01", "first_page_order": 398, "last_page_order": 402 }