{ "id": 4151659, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF J.D.B.", "name_abbreviation": "In re J.D.B.", "decision_date": "2009-12-11", "docket_number": "No. 190A09", "first_page": "664", "last_page": "689", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "363 N.C. 664" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "674 S.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "644 S.E.2d 270", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638338, 12638339, 12638340, 12638341, 12638342, 12638343, 12638344, 12638345, 12638346, 12638347 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/644/0270-02", "/se2d/644/0270-01", "/se2d/644/0270-03", "/se2d/644/0270-04", "/se2d/644/0270-05", "/se2d/644/0270-06", "/se2d/644/0270-07", "/se2d/644/0270-08", "/se2d/644/0270-09", "/se2d/644/0270-10" ] }, { "cite": "28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(1)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 652", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5869197 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S. 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"/nc/356/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 1156", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5954496, 3438538, 5882348, 5904846, 3432719, 5866896, 5947982, 5941907, 5884692, 5964821, 5953528, 3439161, 5932858, 5911709 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/1156-09", "/us/543/1156-11", "/us/543/1156-01", "/us/543/1156-14", "/us/543/1156-03", "/us/543/1156-08", "/us/543/1156-13", "/us/543/1156-02", "/us/543/1156-10", "/us/543/1156-04", "/us/543/1156-06", "/us/543/1156-07", "/us/543/1156-05", "/us/543/1156-12" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "738", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "738", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986879 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, 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1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "445-46" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633373, 12633374, 12633375, 12633376, 12633377, 12633378, 12633379, 12633380, 12633381, 12633382, 12633383, 12633384, 12633385, 12633386, 12633387, 12633388, 12633389, 12633390, 12633391, 12633392, 12633393, 12633394, 12633395 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0738-10", "/se2d/615/0738-01", "/se2d/615/0738-02", "/se2d/615/0738-03", "/se2d/615/0738-04", "/se2d/615/0738-05", "/se2d/615/0738-06", "/se2d/615/0738-07", "/se2d/615/0738-08", "/se2d/615/0738-09", "/se2d/615/0738-16", "/se2d/615/0738-11", "/se2d/615/0738-12", 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Rev.", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "260 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "599", "parenthetical": "stating this Court's intent \"to carefully balance the State's police power interest in preserving order and its parens patriae interest in a delinquent child's welfare with the child's constitutional right to due process\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573829 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652", "parenthetical": "stating this Court's intent \"to carefully balance the State's police power interest in preserving order and its parens patriae interest in a delinquent child's welfare with the child's constitutional right to due process\"" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 570", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3803150 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575", "parenthetical": "\"Our courts have consistently recognized that '[t]he [Sjtate has a greater duty to protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile proceeding than in a criminal prosecution.' \" (alterations in original) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 L. Ed. 2d 122", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "468 U.S. 420", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11338811 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/468/0420-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 1156", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5954496, 3438538, 5882348, 5904846, 3432719, 5866896, 5947982, 5941907, 5884692, 5964821, 5953528, 3439161, 5932858, 5911709 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/1156-09", "/us/543/1156-11", "/us/543/1156-01", "/us/543/1156-14", "/us/543/1156-03", "/us/543/1156-08", "/us/543/1156-13", "/us/543/1156-02", "/us/543/1156-10", "/us/543/1156-04", "/us/543/1156-06", "/us/543/1156-07", "/us/543/1156-05", "/us/543/1156-12" ] }, { "cite": "597 S.E.2d 724", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "733", "parenthetical": "second and third alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986879 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391", "parenthetical": "second and third alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 652", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5869197 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting" }, { "page": "958-59", "parenthetical": "Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "954", "parenthetical": "majority" }, { "page": "669" }, { "page": "954-55", "parenthetical": "O'Connor, J., concurring" }, { "page": "674" }, { "page": "958", "parenthetical": "Breyer, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "958", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 342", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" }, { "page": "344" }, { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150506 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 730", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "737", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "737" }, { "page": "737" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 565", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507201 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" }, { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. Ed. 2d 177", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11525121, 11525092, 11524582, 11524807, 11524710, 11525031, 11524847, 11524689, 11524884, 11524761, 11524635, 11524924, 11524734, 11524959 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0900-14", "/us/522/0900-13", "/us/522/0900-01", "/us/522/0900-07", "/us/522/0900-04", "/us/522/0900-12", "/us/522/0900-08", "/us/522/0900-03", "/us/522/0900-09", "/us/522/0900-06", "/us/522/0900-02", "/us/522/0900-10", "/us/522/0900-05", "/us/522/0900-11" ] }, { "cite": "483 S.E.2d 396", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 647", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53878 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0647-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 S.E.2d 823", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966)" }, { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 332", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135584 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "337", "parenthetical": "quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966)" }, { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0332-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 436", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12046400 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" }, { "page": "706" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0436-01" ] }, { "cite": "674 S.E.2d 795", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802", "parenthetical": "2009" }, { "page": "802", "parenthetical": "Beasley, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 2 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1867, "char_count": 65009, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.148605899880299e-07, "percentile": 0.9114147195454252 }, "sha256": "75249e6ad1eecd9cbbac15e8f9599e0f8d9c1182a7a36a54f27bdb078c4f3df1", "simhash": "1:2091d0027505493f", "word_count": 10460 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:39.869638+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF J.D.B." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nThis case presents the issue of whether a juvenile who made incriminating revelations to law enforcement officers was in police custody such that the officers should have afforded him the protections of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a), which codifies and expands for the juvenile context the safeguards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). Because we hold that the Court of Appeals properly concluded that the juvenile was not in custody when he incriminated himself, we affirm the decision of that court.\nTwo juvenile petitions were filed against the juvenile J.D.B. on 19 October 2005, each alleging one count of breaking and entering and one count of larceny. On 1 December 2005, counsel for J.D.B. filed a motion to suppress certain statements and evidence. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the motion to suppress on 13 December 2005. The trial court did not make findings of fact or conclusions of law at that time. In a transcript of admission filed on 24 January 2006, J.D.B. admitted to all four counts alleged in the juvenile petitions of 19 October 2005, but renewed his objection to the denial of his motion to suppress. Also on 24 January 2006, the trial court entered an order adjudicating J.D.B. delinquent. J.D.B. appealed, inter alia, the denial of his motion to suppress.\nThe Court of Appeals remanded in pertinent part \u201cto allow the trial court to make the findings of fact necessary to support its determination that [J.D.B.] was not in custody at the time he was questioned.\u201d In re J.B., 183 N.C. App. 299, 644 S.E.2d 270, 2007 WL 1412457, at *5 (2007) (unpublished). On remand, the trial court entered an order on 16 October 2007 in which it made findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its denial of J.D.B.\u2019s motion to suppress. The trial court found as follows:\n1. On September 24, 2005, [two homes in Chapel Hill] were broken into and various items were stolen, including jewelry [and] a digital camera.\n2. J.D.B.], at the time 13 years old, was interviewed by police on the same day as the break-ins after he was seen behind a residence in the same neighborhood.\n3. It was later that the police were informed that [J.D.B.] had been seen in possession of a digital camera at school, which camera turned out to be the camera stolen [on September 24, 2005].\n4. Investigator Joseph DiCostanzo of the Chapel Hill Police Department was assigned the investigation and went to the juvenile\u2019s school to speak with him.\n5. [J.D.B.] is in the seventh grade and enrolled in special education classes.\n6. [J.D.B.] was escorted from his class and into a conference room to be interviewed. Present in the room were. Investigator DiCostanzo, Assistant Principal David Lyons, a school resource officer and an intern. The door was closed, but not locked.\n7. [J.D.B.] was not administered Miranda warning[s] and was not offered the opportunity to speak to a parent or guardian prior to the commencement of questioning. Additionally, no parent or guardian was contacted prior to [J.D.B.]\u2019s removal from class.\n8. Investigator DiCostanzo asked [J.D.B.] if he would agree to answer questions about recent break-ins. [J.D.B.] consented.\n9. [J.D.B.] stated that he had been in the neighborhood looking for work mowing lawns and initially denied any criminal activity.\n10. Lyons then encouraged [J.D.B.] to \u201cdo the right thing\u201d and tell the truth.\n11. The investigator questioned him further and confronted him with the fact that the camera had been found.\n12. Upon [J.D.B.]\u2019s inquiry as to whether he would still be in trouble if he gave the items back, the investigator responded.that it would be helpful, but that the matter was still going to court and that he may have to seek a secure custody order.\n13. [J.D.B.] then confessed to entering the houses and taking certain items together with another juvenile.\n14. The investigator informed [J.D.B.] that he did not have to speak with him and that he was free to leave. He asked him if [he] understood that he was not under arrest and did not have to talk with the investigator.\n15. [J.D.B.] indicated by nodding \u201cyes\u201d that he understood that he did not have to talk to the officer and that he was free to leave. He continued to provide more details regarding where certain items could be located.\n16. [J.D.B.] wrote a statement regarding his involvement in the crime.\n17. The bell rang signaling the end of the day and [J.D.B.] was allowed to leave to catch his bus home.\n18. The interview lasted from 30 to 45 minutes.\n19. The investigator had informed [J.D.B.] that he would see him later and would be speaking to his grandmother and aunt.\n20. Investigator DiCostanzo and Officer Hunter went to the home of [J.D.B.], but found no one home. When [J.D.B.] arrived, he told the officers they could look around and he would show them where the jewelry was located.\n21. Investigator DiCostanzo informed [J.D.B.] that he needed to obtain a search warrant and left Officer Hunter to wait outside [J.D.B. ]\u2019s home.\n22. While awaiting the search warrant, [J.D.B.] brought a ring to the officer from inside the home.\n23. Upon the investigator\u2019s return with the warrant, [J.D.B.] entered the home with the officers and handed them several stolen items and led the investigator to where other items could be found on the roof of a gas station down the road. During the entire time that the officers were at his residence and travelling with him to the BP station, no parent or guardian was contacted or advised of the situation. [J.D.B.] \u2022 was not advised of his Miranda warnings or told he had the right to speak to or have a parent or guardian present.\n24. Investigator DiCostanzo left his card and a copy of the search warrant at [J.D.B.]\u2019s residence.\n25. All of [J.D.B. ]\u2019s responses to the officer\u2019s questions were appropriately responsive, indicating that he was capable of understanding the fact that he did not have to answer questions.\n26. All of [J.D.B.]\u2019s responses to counsel during the suppression hearing were appropriately responsive.\nJ.D.B. again appealed the denial of his motion to suppress. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, concluding that \u201cJ.D.B. was not in custody during his interactions with officers.\u201d In re J.D.B., \u2014 N.C. App.-, -, 674 S.E.2d 795, 800 (2009). J.D.B. then appealed as of right to this Court on the basis of the dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals, which would have held that J.D.B. was in custody when he incriminated himself to police officers. Id. at -, 674 S.E.2d at 801 (Beasley, J., dissenting). The dissenting judge opined, \u201c[T]hat J.D.B. was a middle school aged child is certainly among the circumstances relevant to\u201d whether J.D.B. was in custody. Id. at \u2014, 674 S.E.2d at 802 (citing State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 339-40, 543 S.E.2d 823, 828 (2001)).\nWe begin our review by noting that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are uncontested and therefore, binding on this Court. E.g., Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (citations omitted). Our consideration is limited to de novo review of the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law. State v. Wilkerson, 363 N.C. 382, 430, 683 S.E.2d 174, 203 (2009) (citing State v. Hyatt, 355 N.C. 642, 653, 566 S.E.2d 61, 69 (2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1133, 123 S. Ct. 916, 154 L. Ed. 2d 823 (2003)).\nJ.D.B. argues that he was in police custody when he incriminated himself and thus, that his rights were violated when he was interrogated without proper warnings under Miranda and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a). The United States Supreme Court held in Miranda\nthat when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the [Fifth Amendment] privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. . . . [The individual] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.\n384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S. Ct. at 1630, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726 (emphasis added). For the juvenile setting, our General Statutes codify and enhance the protections required under Miranda:\n(a) Any juvenile in custody must be advised prior to questioning:\n(1) That the juvenile has a right to remain silent;\n(2) That any statement the juvenile does make can be and may be used against the juvenile;\n(3) That the juvenile has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; and\n(4) That the juvenile has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will be appointed for the juvenile if the juvenile is not represented and wants representation.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a) (2007) (emphasis added).\nThe protections of Miranda and section 7B-2101(a) apply only to custodial interrogations by law enforcement. \u201c \u2018[I]n determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u2019 \u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at 827 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 118 S. Ct. 248, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997)). This inquiry requires application of \u201can objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.\u201d State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citations omitted). Notably, the inquiry as to \u201c \u2018whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest,\u2019 \u201d Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at 827 (quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at 405), is not equivalent to the broader \u201cfree to leave\u201d test that \u201chas long been used for determining, under the Fourth Amendment, whether a person has been seized,\u201d id. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497, 509 (1980)). \u201cCircumstances supporting an objective showing that one is \u2018in custody\u2019 might include a police officer standing guard at the door, locked doors or application of handcuffs.\u201d Id. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828.\nThe uniquely structured nature of the school environment inherently deprives students of some freedom of action. However, the typical restrictions of the school setting apply to all students and do not constitute a \u201csignificant\u201d deprivation of freedom of action under the test set forth in Greene. 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737. For a student in the school setting to be deemed in custody, law enforcement must subject the student to \u201c \u2018restraint on freedom of movement\u2019 \u201d that goes well beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school environment in general. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at 827 (quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at 405).\nIn the instant case, J.D.B. was escorted from class to a conference room, where Investigator DiCostanzo was present along with an assistant principal, one of the assistant principal\u2019s interns, and the school resource officer. The school resource officer\u2019s minimal participation in the questioning of J.D.B. did not render that questioning custodial in nature. See In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 248, 675 S.E.2d 342, 344 (2009) (stating in circumstances similar to those in the instant case: \u201c[W]e are not prepared ... to conclude that the presence and participation of the school resource officer . . . rendered the questioning of respondent juvenile a \u2018custodial interrogation,\u2019 requiring Miranda warnings and the protections of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101.\u201d). Moreover, there is no indication in the trial court\u2019s'findings that J.D.B. was restrained in any way or that anyone stood guard at the conference room door. \u201cThe door was closed, but not locked.\u201d By asking J.D.B. \u201cif he would agree to answer questions about recent break-ins,\u201d Investigator DiCostanzo indicated that J.D.B. was not required to do so. Investigator DiCostanzo began his questions only after J.D.B. said he was willing to answer. After J.D.B. \u201cinitially denied any criminal activity,\u201d Investigator DiCostanzo informed J.D.B. that the stolen digital camera had been recovered. J.D.B. then asked \u201cwhether he would still be in trouble if he gave the items back,\u201d and Investigator DiCostanzo responded that, although the matter was \u201cgoing to court\u201d regardless, J.D.B.\u2019s cooperation \u201cwould be helpful.\u201d It was then that J.D.B. \u201cconfessed to entering the houses and taking certain items together with another juvenile.\u201d Upon objective consideration of the totality of the circumstances surrounding J.D.B.\u2019s confession, we determine that there were not sufficient \u201cindicia of formal arrest\u201d to justify a conclusion that J.D.B. \u201chad been formally arrested or had had his freedom of movement restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u201d Id. (citing Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338-40, 543 S.E.2d at 827-28).\nImmediately following J.D.B.\u2019s initial confession, Investigator DiCostanzo \u201cinformed [J.D.B.] that he did not have to speak with him and that he was free to leave. He asked him if [he] understood that he was not under arrest and did not have to talk with the investigator,\u201d and J.D.B. \u201cindicated by nodding \u2018yes\u2019 that he understood.\u201d After J.D.B. acknowledged that he understood he was not under arrest and was free to leave, J.D.B. continued to provide information about the break-ins and \u201cwrote a statement regarding his involvement in the crime.\u201d After the interview, which \u201clasted from 30 to 45 minutes,\u201d J.D.B. left the conference room without hindrance. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977) (per curiam) (in which the Supreme Court of the United States determined that a suspect was not in custody when his freedom to leave the police station to which he had come voluntarily was not \u201crestricted in any way\u201d and the suspect \u201cdid in fact leave the police station without hindrance\u201d). Later that same day, Investigator DiCostanzo and another police officer accompanied J.D.B. as he willingly located and surrendered numerous stolen items. The trial court\u2019s findings of fact with respect to this later encounter (numbered 19-24) contain insufficient indicia of \u201c \u2018restraint on [J.D.B.\u2019s] freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest\u2019 \u201d to support a conclusion that J.D.B. was in police custody. Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338, 543 S.E.2d at 827 (quoting Gaines, 345 N.C. at 662, 483 S.E.2d at 405).\nJ.D.B. argues, as did the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals, that the inquiry into whether he was in custody should take into consideration J.D.B.\u2019s age and his status as a special education student. This Court has not accounted for such matters in conducting the proper custody inquiry in the past. In the recent case of In re W.R., for example, we considered whether the questioning of a fourteen-year-old juvenile was custodial in nature. 363 N.C. at 246-48, 675 S.E.2d at 343-44. In reversing the Court of Appeals\u2019 holding that the juvenile was in custody, we applied the objective \u201creasonable person\u201d standard, id. at 248, 675 S.E.2d at 344 (citing Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 338-40, 543 S.E.2d at 827-28), and at no point did we consider the juvenile\u2019s age.\nWe reiterate that the custody inquiry is \u201can objective test as to whether \u00e1 reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.\u201d Greene, 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737 (citations omitted). While \u201c[w]e have consistently held that a defendant\u2019s subnormal mental capacity is a factor to be considered when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver of rights has been made,\u201d State v. Fincher, 309 N.C. 1, 8, 305 S.E.2d 685, 690 (1983) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), subjective mental characteristics are not relevant regarding whether \u201ca reasonable person\u201d would believe he had been placed under the equivalent of a formal arrest, Greene, 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737 (emphasis added). This Court adheres to the view that \u201cthe custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect\u2019s individual characteristics\u2014 including his age \u2014 could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.\u201d Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2151-52, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 954 (2004) (citing Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96, 97 S. Ct. at 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d at 719). Under the circumstances of the case sub judice, we decline to extend the test for custody to include consideration of the age and academic standing of an individual subjected to questioning by police.\nBecause we conclude that J.D.B. was not in custody when he incriminated himself to the police, we hold that he was not entitled to the protections of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a) and Miranda v. Arizona. The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the trial court\u2019s denial of J.D.B.\u2019s motion to suppress. Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.\nAFFIRMED.\n. We are aware that Alvarado is not binding on this Court because the Supreme Court of the United States merely held in that case that \u201c[t]he state court considered the proper factors and reached a reasonable conclusion\u201d and, thus, that an application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. \u00a7 2254(d)(1) should not have been granted. 541 U.S. at 669, 124 S. Ct. at 2152, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 954. We nonetheless consider Alvarado persuasive.", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice BRADY\ndissenting.\nThe issue in this case is whether J.D.B., a thirteen year old special education student at Smith Middle School in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, was significantly deprived of his freedom of movement and thus entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a) before being interrogated by law enforcement officers and school officials in a closed conference room of the middle school. The majority\u2019s conclusion stands in stark contrast to our State\u2019s public policy of aiding, supporting, and protecting juveniles. The manner in which school officials and law enforcement interrogated J.D.B. more resembles hunters carefully and selectively targeting their prey than a fair juvenile investigation consistent with our General Statutes. Because I believe the Juvenile Code affords heightened protections against self-incrimination to juveniles, especially in the restrictive environment of a public middle school, I respectfully dissent.\nTension has long existed between the interests of law enforcement in conducting efficient criminal investigations and the individual\u2019s constitutional right against self-incrimination. Throughout American history the \u201cincommunicado\u201d nature of police investigations has led to the use of physical violence and psychological coercion to elicit criminal confessions. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1966). In response to these abuses, the Supreme Court of the United States decision in Miranda v. Arizona unequivocally established that law enforcement officers must administer specific warnings \u201cto protect an individual\u2019s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the inherently compelling context of custodial interrogations by police officers.\u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436). The North Carolina General Assembly has taken additional steps to protect a juvenile\u2019s right against self-incrimination in the North Carolina Juvenile Code, which provides that before custodial questioning, a juvenile must be advised:\n(1) That [he] has the right to remain silent;\n(2) That any statement [he] does make can be and may be used against [him];\n(3) That [he] has a right to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning; and\n(4) That [he] has a right to consult with an attorney and that one will be appointed for [him] if [he] is not represented and wants representation.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a) (2007).\nAn individual is entitled to Miranda warnings and the protections of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 when it is apparent from the \u201ctotality of the circumstances\u201d that there is a \u201cformal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u201d State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 399-400, 597 S.E.2d 724, 738 (2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156 (2005). The primary inquiry is \u201c \u2018whether a reasonable person in defendant\u2019s position, under the totality of the circumstances, would have believed that he was under arrest or was restrained in his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u2019 \u201d State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 337, 572 S.E.2d 108, 123 (2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 339-40, 543 S.E.2d at 828), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040 (2003).\nUltimately, the analysis in the instant case hinges upon whether defendant\u2019s age should be taken into consideration under the reasonable person standard when analyzing the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. The majority contends that Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), should persuade this Court to not consider the age of the subject under the reasonable person standard. In Alvarado, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that \u201c[t]he Miranda custody inquiry is an objective test,\u201d id. at 667, and because \u201cconsideration of a suspect\u2019s individual characteristics \u2014 including his age \u2014 could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry,\u201d id. at 668, age was irrelevant to a reasonable person\u2019s belief in a Miranda custody analysis. Id. Alvarado is not controlling in an analysis of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. See State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 106, 343 S.E.2d 518, 521 (1986) (\u201cIn resolving [issues under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-595] . . . cases decided under the fifth and sixth amendments to the United States Constitution are not controlling ....\u201d) overruled in part on other grounds by Buchanan, 353 N.C. at 340, 543 S.E.2d at 828. When analyzing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-595, the predecessor provision of the Juvenile Code governing juvenile interrogations, this Court has found it appropriate to consider the subject\u2019s age under the reasonable person standard of the Miranda \u201cin custody\u201d analysis. In State v. Smith this Court considered whether a sixteen year old was subjected to a custodial interrogation under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-595. Id. at 102-08, 343 S.E.2d at 519-22. After considering the totality of the circumstances, including the length of the questioning and the constant presence of armed law enforcement officers, this Court determined that a person of \u201cdefendant\u2019s age and experience\u201d would have believed he was in custody. Id. at 105, 343 S.E.2d at 520. Thus, the age of the defendant was a key consideration in determining whether a reasonable juvenile would have believed he was \u201cin custody\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-595.\nBy failing to consider' age, the majority\u2019s reasonable person standard is too rigid to apply to provisions of the Juvenile Code. It is logical that age should be considered as part of the reasonable person standard in a custody analysis under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. The many noble goals of the Juvenile Code include \u201cprotect[ing] the constitutional rights of juveniles\u201d and their families and \u201cprovid[ing] uniform procedures that assure fairness and equity.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1500(4) (2007). The entire Code was created to ensure unique services for juveniles because of the special circumstances inherent in their youth; to ignore age when interpreting any section of the Juvenile Code defies common sense and the very purpose of the Code.\nFurthermore, a defendant\u2019s age is often considered throughout our jurisprudence and General Statutes. For example, under civil common law, there is a rebuttable presumption that juveniles between the ages of seven and fourteen are incapable of contributory negligence, and children under seven are \u201cconclusively presumed to be incapable of contributory negligence.\u201d See Welch v. Jenkins, 271 N.C. 138, 142, 155 S.E.2d 763, 766 (1967) (citations omitted). In the criminal context, those under the age of six cannot be charged with a crime. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1501(7) (2007). In North Carolina we have a separate juvenile court for youthful offenders; jurisdiction can be transferred to a superior court only if the juvenile is at least thirteen years old when the alleged felony was committed, if the juvenile has received proper notice and a hearing, and probable cause has been found. Id. \u00a7 7B-2200 (2007). Additionally, the Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the Eighth Amendment forbids imposition of the death penalty on offenders under the age of eighteen when their crimes were committed. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005). The rationale behind these laws is practical and just. The perceptions, cognitive abilities, and moral development of juveniles are different from those of adults; thus, the law rightly takes this into account when dealing with juvenile offenders. The majority\u2019s failure to consider J.D.B.\u2019s juvenile status in its reasonable person standard runs contrary to our established juvenile jurisprudence.\nFurthermore, the arguments for excluding consideration of age under the reasonable person standard outlined in Alvarado are not present in the instant case. Alvarado\u2019s rationale for excluding age from a custody inquiry was to \u201cgive clear guidance to the police,\u201d 541 U.S. at 668, so that law enforcement officers are not forced to \u201canticipat[e] the frailties or idiosyncra[s]ies of every person whom they question,\u201d id. at 667 (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 n.35 (1984) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, the difficulty of guessing defendant\u2019s age is nonexistent. Investigator DiCostanzo sought out J.D.B. at a middle school, where he knew J.D.B. was a seventh-grade student. All seventh graders are juveniles, roughly between the ages of twelve and fourteen, and as Investigator DiCostanzo testified, he was able to obtain J.D.B.\u2019s exact age from school records. Therefore, defendant\u2019s \u201cfrailty\u201d \u2014 his youth \u2014 was evident from the very location Investigator DiCostanzo selected to conduct the interrogation. Additionally, Investigator DiCostanzo was a juvenile investigator with the Chapel Hill Police Department, specially trained in dealing with juveniles and educated in laws concerning their rights. The Chapel Hill Police Department Policy Manual explicitly states:\nEven if the juvenile is not in custody, it is good practice to have him sign a Miranda Rights waiver form before issuing a statement. If the juvenile does not sign a waiver, the officer must document that the juvenile is told that he is not under arrest and free to leave at any time, and that he agreed to talk.\nChapel Hill Police Dep\u2019t, Policy Manual No. 2-12 (Juvenile Response), at 4 (Dec. 15, 2006 (revised)) (emphasis added). In order to protect J.D.B.\u2019s rights and fulfill the purpose of the Juvenile Code, Investigator DiCostanzo should have read J.D.B. his rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 before soliciting any statement, just as the Chapel Hill Police Department Policy Manual advises.\nBecause consideration of a subject\u2019s youth is particularly pertinent in analyzing any provision of the Juvenile Code, especially when doing so creates no undue burden on law enforcement officers, the proper inquiry in the instant case when determining whether defendant was in custody for the purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 should be whether, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable juvenile in defendant\u2019s position would have believed he was under formal arrest or was restrained in his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. The majority concludes that there were not sufficient \u201cindicia of formal arrest\u201d to conclude that J.D.B. was in custody because the findings of fact do not indicate that J.D.B. was physically restrained or that the conference room door was guarded or locked. While it is true that handcuffs were never applied to J.D.B. and the closed door of the room where he was detained was not locked, this does not mean he was not restrained. The majority\u2019s analysis ignores the Court\u2019s obligation to consider the totality of the circumstances and \u201cthe unique facts surrounding each incriminating statement.\u201d Garcia, 358 N.C. at 399, 597 S.E.2d at 738 (citations omitted). An examination of the totality of the circumstances leads to the conclusion that a reasonable juvenile in J.D.B.\u2019s position would have believed he was restrained in his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest.\nFirst, the location of the interrogation must be considered. In any planned interrogation, law enforcement carefully chooses the location before questioning begins. The gold standard in enhanced interrogation preparation and training, utilized by both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is the Army Field Manual on Human Intelligence Collector Operations. The Manual states:\nWhen conducting . . . operations, the location of the questioning will have psychological effects on the source. The questioning location should be chosen and set up to correspond to the effect that the [officer] wants to project and his planned approach techniques. For example, meeting in a social type situation such as a restaurant may place the source at ease. Meeting in an apartment projects informality while meeting in an office projects more formality. Meeting at the source\u2019s home normally places him at a psychological advantage, while meeting in the [officer\u2019s] work area gives the [officer] a psychological edge.\nU.S. Dep\u2019t of the Army, Field Manual 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations para. 7-12 (Sept. 6, 2006). As a trained investigator would know, the location of the interrogation in the instant case certainly would have a psychological effect on a reasonable person in J.D.B.\u2019s position. A middle school is a restrictive environment. Unlike a university campus, where people may freely come and go, middle school students are not free to leave the campus without permission, and visitors to the school, including parents and guardians of students, must upon arrival report their presence and receive permission to be at the facility. Moreover, students at middle schools are instructed to obey the requests and directives of adults. The Student Handbook at Smith Middle School, where J.D.B. attended, instructs students to \u201c[f]ollow directions of all teachers/adults the first time they are given,\u201d \u201c[s]top moving when an adult addresses\u201d them, and \u201c[w]alk away only after the adult has dismissed\u201d them.\nLaw enforcement in the instant case took advantage of the middle school\u2019s restrictive environment and its psychological effect by choosing to interrogate J.D.B. there, instead of at his home or in any other public, more neutral location. Certainly, if the larceny J.D.B. was suspected of committing had occurred on school grounds, law enforcement might understandably investigate suspects there, at the scene of the crime. However, the larceny in question occurred in a residential subdivision, not on the school campus. Law enforcement investigators could have first attempted to question J.D.B. at his residence. Instead, the school was selected as the interrogation site, a location where any reasonable juvenile in J.D.B.\u2019s position would not only be at a psychological disadvantage, but where he would be defenseless, without the protection of a parent or guardian. It is troubling that in the instant case a public middle school, which should be an environment where children feel safe and protected, became a place where a law enforcement investigator claimed a tactical advantage over a juvenile.\nNot only was J.D.B., or any reasonable juvenile in his position, at a disadvantage because of the location of the interrogation, but also by the manner in which it was conducted. J.D.B. was sitting in a classroom with his peers when the class was suddenly interrupted by Officer Gurley, Smith Middle School\u2019s resource officer. Officer Gurley removed J.D.B. from the classroom and escorted him to a school conference room. J.D.B. could have been asked by his teacher or any other school official to report to the conference room; instead, he was escorted by a uniformed, armed police officer. The only logical reason for Officer Gurley to escort J.D.B. was to restrain his freedom of movement; J.D.B. had no choice but to comply with his removal from the classroom and Officer Gurley\u2019s instructions to walk to the conference room. If J.D.B. had refused to accompany Officer Gurley he likely would have faced disciplinary action from the school. Therefore, J.D.B.\u2019s freedom of movement was restricted from the moment he was removed from his classroom by Officer Gurley.\nWhen J.D.B. arrived at the conference room, he was met by three other authoritative adults: Mr. Lyons, the school assistant principal; Mr. Benson, an intern with the school; and Investigator DiCostanzo of the Chapel Hill Police Department. J.B.D. was directed to take a seat at a conference table and the door to the office was closed. Investigator DiCostanzo was not in uniform,- but dressed in a suit jacket and tie, and he introduced himself to J.D.B. as a juvenile investigator. That a special investigator from the police department, dressed in business attire, was making a special trip to the school would alert any reasonable middle school student that something serious was taking place, something more than a casual conversation about joining the Police Athletic League or participating in the Youth Partnership for Crime Prevention.\nWith these facts alone, there is enough evidence to conclude that a reasonable juvenile in J.D.B.\u2019s position would have believed he was restrained in his movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. The majority states that \u201c[f]or a student in the school setting to be deemed in custody, law enforcement must subject the student to \u2018restraint on freedom of movement\u2019 that goes well beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school environment in general.\u201d If removal from a middle school classroom and being physically escorted by a uniformed, armed police officer to a closed conference room inhabited by four authoritative adults does not qualify as procedures that go well beyond the \u201ctypical restrictions\u201d of a \u201cschool environment in general,\u201d it is hard to imagine any set of circumstances that the majority would label as a sufficient restraint on movement.\nAt this point in the interrogation, as noted above, the Chapel Hill Police Department Policy Manual instructs that before any questioning began, Investigator DiCostanzo should have informed J.D.B. of his rights under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. Had Investigator DiCostanzo simply followed the Manual, this case likely would not be before us. Instead, Investigator DiCostanzo immediately began the interrogation. J.D.B. was never told he was free to leave or that he was entitled to have a parent, guardian, or attorney present. When Investigator DiCostanzo began questioning J.D.B. about the larceny, J.D.B. denied any involvement. Yet, Assistant Principal Lyons urged J.D.B. to \u201cdo the right thing\u201d and tell the truth. Investigator DiCostanzo continued to pressure J.D.B. to talk by confronting him with information that a stolen camera had been found. Still, at this point no one had advised J.D.B. of his rights. When J.D.B. inquired of Investigator DiCostanzo what would happen if the stolen items were returned, Investigator DiCostanzo replied that it would be helpful, but the matter would still have to go to court. Next, Investigator DiCostanzo informed J.D.B. that he might be forced to obtain a secure custody order for J.D.B. unless it was apparent that J.D.B. was not going to steal again. Investigator DiCostanzo explained to J.D.B. that a secure custody order would give law enforcement the right to hold J.D.B. in juvenile detention. To a reasonable person in J.D.B.\u2019s position, this remark certainly qualifies as an indicium of formal arrest. Moreover, Investigator DiCostanzo\u2019s statement was nothing short of a veiled threat that J.D.B. would be physically detained unless he confessed. At this point, J.D.B. had already denied any involvement in the larceny, yet he was not permitted to leave; rather, he was encouraged to \u201cdo the right thing\u201d and threatened with juvenile detention. A reasonable middle school student in J.D.B.\u2019s position, after being physically escorted by a uniformed, armed officer to a closed conference room with four authoritative adults, would have considered himself to be physically restrained to the point of formal arrest. Moreover, under school policy, J.D.B. was not free to leave until he was dismissed by an adult. Furthermore, Investigator DiCostanzo, a special juvenile investigator with the Chapel Hill Police Department, threatened to hold J.D.B. in juvenile detention, unless he divulged all his knowledge of the larceny. The totality of these circumstances leads to no other conclusion than that J.D.B. was \u201cin custody.\u201d\nNot surprisingly, after Investigator DiCostanzo\u2019s threat of a secure custody order, J.D.B. made incriminating statements linking him to the larceny. When J.D.B. made these statements he had not been advised of his rights. Investigator DiCostanzo\u2019s subsequent statements informing J.D.B. that he did not have to answer any questions and that he was free to leave are therefore irrelevant to this analysis. What these statements in fact do is exhibit crafty and highly questionable investigative tactics. Investigator DiCostanzo\u2019s warning was too little, too late, after J.D.B.\u2019s constitutional rights had been circumvented.\nThe Standards Manual of the Law Enforcement Agency Accreditation Program states: \u201cWhen dealing with juveniles, law enforcement officers should always make use of the least coercive among reasonable alternatives, consistent with preserving public safety, order, and individual liberty.\u201d Comm\u2019n on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc., Standards for Law Enforcement Agencies ch. 44 (Juvenile Operations), at 44-1 (4th ed. Jan. 1999). The actions of law enforcement in the instant case are inconsistent with these standards and evince a disregard for the protection of juvenile rights. It is disheartening and alarming that today\u2019s majority opinion condones the highly coercive actions of law enforcement in the instant case, which will only encourage law enforcement to disregard the provisions and procedures of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 in the future. Even radical Muslims suspected of terrorism are afforded broader constitutional protections than the majority wishes to give juveniles in J.D.B.\u2019s position. Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, - U.S. \u2014 , 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that alien enemy combatants detained at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, are entitled to certain constitutional privileges). The overriding goal of North Carolina\u2019s Juvenile Code is to protect the constitutional rights and best interests of juveniles and their families. Today\u2019s majority opinion is inconsistent with this goal. I would hold that because a reasonable person in J.D.B.\u2019s position was in custody for the purposes of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101, our state laws entitled J.D.B. to be informed of his rights before the interrogation began. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\n. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-595 formerly governed juvenile interrogations and its provisions are nearly identical to the current N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-595 (1986).\n. Additionally, amici argue that refusal to follow an order given by a school official can ultimately lead to criminal charges under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-288.4, which provides that a person who willfully engages in disorderly conduct by \u201c[d]isrupt[ing], disturbing] or interfering] with the teaching of students ... or disturbing] the peace, order or discipline at any . . . educational institution\u201d is \u201cguilty of a Class 2 misdemeanor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-288.4(a)(6) (2007). Under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-378 (2007) parents can also be prosecuted for violating the Compulsory Attendance Law if their children fail to attend school.\n. A juvenile held under a secure custody order is entitled to far fewer protections than an adult taken into custody. Once an adult defendant is taken into police custody he is required to be brought before a magistrate for a hearing \u201cwithout unnecessary delay\u201d pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-501 (2007). At this appearance, the magistrate must release the defendant in accordance with Article 26 of Chapter \u00cd5A, or commit the defendant to a detention facility pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-521, pending further proceedings in the case. Id. \u00a7 15A-511(e) (2007). After appearing before a magistrate, an adult criminal defendant must be brought before a district court judge for an initial appearance within 96 hours of being taken into custody to determine the sufficiency of the charges against the defendant and to inform the defendant of his rights, including the right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel. Id. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-601 to 604 (2007). The district court judge is also required to review the defendant\u2019s eligibility for release pursuant to Article 26 Chapter 15A, and to schedule a probable cause hearing for the defendant, unless the right to such hearing waived. Id. \u00a7\u00a7 15A-605 to 606 (2007). Further, if a grand jury returns a bill of indictment \u201cas not a true bill, the presiding judge must immediately examine the case records to determine if the defendant is in custody or subject to bail or conditions of pretrial release.\u201d Id. \u00a7 15A-629 (2007). Unlike these procedures afforded to adult defendants, which ensure hearings for pretrial release are held immediately, juveniles who are held under secure custody orders can be detained for up to five calendar days before receiving a hearing on the merits to determine the need for continued custody. See id. \u00a7 7B-1906 (2007).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice BRADY" }, { "text": "Justice HUDSON\ndissenting.\nBecause I believe the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law reflect an incorrect application of the law to the facts found, I respectfully dissent. \u201cThe determination of whether an interrogation is conducted while a person is in custody involves reaching a conclusion of law. While this conclusion may rest upon factual findings, it is a legal conclusion, fully reviewable, and not a finding of fact.\u201d State v. Greene, 332 N.C. 565, 577, 422 S.E.2d 730, 737 (1992) (citation omitted).\nAccordingly,... we review the trial court\u2019s conclusions of law for legal accuracy and to ensure that those conclusions reflect[] a correct application of [law] to the facts found. In doing so, this Court must look first to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and second to the effect those circumstances would have on a reasonable person.\nState v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 391, 597 S.E.2d 724, 733 (2004) (second and third alterations in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156, 161 L. Ed. 2d 122 (2005).\n\u201cIn Miranda, the Supreme Court defined \u2018custodial interrogation\u2019 as \u2018questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.\u2019 \u201d State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 337, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 706 (1966)). \u201c[I]n determining whether a suspect [is] in custody, an appellate court must examine all the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; but the definitive inquiry is whether there was a formal arrest or a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.\u201d State v. Gaines, 345 N.C. 647, 662, 483 S.E.2d 396, 405 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). \u201cThe test for determining whether a person is in custody is an objective test as to whether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would believe himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.\u201d Greene, 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737 (citations omitted).\nHere, the trial court determined that J.D.B. was not subjected to custodial interrogation when he was questioned at Smith Middle School. In doing so, the trial court made the following pertinent conclusions of law, which were challenged on appeal:\n1. [J.D.B.] was not in custody when he was brought to the conference room to speak to . . . [I]nvestigator [DiCostanzo].\n2. The mere presence of . . . [I]nvestigator [DiCostanzo] and the school resource officer did not convert the meeting into a custodial interrogation.\n3. [J.D.B.] was informed that he was free to leave and that he did not have to answer any questions, but chose to stay and volunteer more information.\nIn my view, the trial court\u2019s uncontested and binding findings of fact pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the interrogation lead to the conclusion that \u201ca reasonable person in the position of the defendant would [have] believe[d] himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.\u201d Id. As such, I would hold that: (1) J.D.B. was subjected to custodial interrogation at Smith Middle School; (2) J.D.B. should have been Mirandized and provided the enhanced protections for juveniles contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101; and (3) as a result, the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nAccording to the majority, because the school environment \u201cinherently deprives students of some freedom of action,\u201d for a juvenile \u201cto be deemed in custody,\u201d the restraint that law enforcement imposes on the juvenile\u2019s freedom of action or movement while questioning the juvenile at school must go \u201cwell beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school environment in general.\u201d I disagree with this reasoning, primarily because of its potential to seriously undermine the enhanced protections afforded to juveniles by the North Carolina General Assembly, for example, as in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. See In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 575, 614 S.E.2d 296, 299 (2005) (\u201cOur courts have consistently recognized that \u2018[t]he [Sjtate has a greater duty to protect the rights of a respondent in a juvenile proceeding than in a criminal prosecution.\u2019 \u201d (alterations in original) (citations omitted)); In re Vinson, 298 N.C. 640, 652, 260 S.E.2d 591, 599 (1979) (stating this Court\u2019s intent \u201cto carefully balance the State\u2019s police power interest in preserving order and its parens patriae interest in a delinquent child\u2019s welfare with the child\u2019s constitutional right to due process\u201d). I fear that the majority here actually affords juveniles less protection when questioned by law enforcement officers at school, as compared to elsewhere. In my opinion, in the school environment, where juveniles are faced with a variety of negative consequences \u2014 including potential criminal charges \u2014 for refusing to comply with the requests or commands of authority figures, the circumstances are inherently more coercive and require more, not less, careful protection of the rights of the juvenile.\nThe decision to interview a student at school could be made to take advantage of the student\u2019s minority [age]. Questioning the student at school, the officer not only takes advantage of the student\u2019s compulsory presence at school and the background norm of submission to authority, but also chooses to interact with the student at a time when the student will not be in the presence of a parent, the figure most likely to have the inclination or ability to either arrange for the presence of counsel or to advise the youth to refuse to answer the officer\u2019s questions.\nPaul Holland, Schooling Miranda: Policing Interrogation in the Twenty-First Century Schoolhouse, 52 Loy. L. Rev. 39, 85 n.175 (2006) [hereinafter Holland, Schooling Miranda], I am particularly concerned about creating an incentive for an investigating police officer to enter a middle school to question a juvenile about crimes that may have occurred away from school grounds and to take advantage of the more restrictive school atmosphere without providing the protections of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. I am also concerned about the potential disruption of the learning atmosphere in the school, especially, but not exclusively, for the affected juvenile if this practice became widespread.\nEven under the majority\u2019s analysis, though, I believe the record here establishes that the restraint on J.D.B.\u2019s freedom of action or movement went \u201cwell beyond the limitations that are characteristic of the school environment in general\u201d and thus, subjected J.D.B. to \u201ccustodial interrogation.\u201d The school resource officer, who was a uniformed police officer, came to thirteen-year-old J.D.B.\u2019s classroom, removed him from class, and \u201cescorted\u201d him to a conference room where two school officials and Investigator DiCostanzo were waiting for him. No effort was made to contact J.D.B.\u2019s parent or guardian before his removal from class or his questioning. For the entire interrogation, which lasted thirty to forty-five minutes, J.D.B. was isolated in a closed-door conference room in the presence of four authority figures, including two law enforcement officers. Contrary to the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law, Investigator DiCostanzo, an outside police officer, was not merely present. Rather, it appears that he directed and controlled the interrogation process, which was designed to determine J.D.B.\u2019s role in nonviolent crimes alleged to have occurred outside of school grounds and for which he was a suspect. Despite J.D.B.\u2019s repeated denials of any involvement in the criminal activity, Investigator DiCostanzo continued to question him. At some point during Investigator DiCostanzo\u2019s questioning, Assistant Principal David Lyons encouraged J.D.B. to \u201c \u2018do the right thing\u2019 and tell the truth.\u201d Thereafter, Officer DiCostanzo continued to question J.D.B., confronted him with the stolen camera, and indicated that others had seen the camera in J.D.B.\u2019s possession. Then, J.D.B. made his first incriminating statement, asking if \u201che would still be in trouble if he gave the items back,\u201d also indicating that J.D.B. believed he was currently \u201cin trouble.\u201d Investigator DiCostanzo responded that either way \u201cthe matter was still going to court\u201d and that he might \u201chave to seek a secure custody order,\u201d explaining to J.D.B. that such an order confines a juvenile to a detention center until his court date. After this sequence of events, J.D.B. confessed. I would conclude that considering all of the above circumstances, \u201ca reasonable person in [J.D.B.\u2019s] position ... would [have] believe[d] himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way\u201d by the time Investigator DiCostanzo confronted J.D.B. with the stolen camera. Greene, 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737.\nIn reaching the opposite conclusion, the majority emphasizes that: (1) Investigator DiCostanzo told J.D.B. that he was free to leave, asked him if he understood that he was not under arrest and did not have to speak to him, and that J.D.B. nodded his head indicating he understood; and (2) J.D.B. was not subjected to severe or direct physical restraint, such as an officer standing guard at the door. However, Investigator DiCostanzo did not inform J.D.B. that he was free to leave and not under arrest until after J.D.B. had incriminated himself in response to the interrogation, without having been informed of his Miranda and juvenile statutory rights. I would conclude that this process violated both Miranda and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 (a) and (b) and that the motion to suppress should have been allowed. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 (2007); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 604, 159 L. Ed. 2d 643, 650 (2004) (plurality) (stating that \u201cmidstream recitation of [Miranda] warnings after interrogation and unwarned confession\u201d does \u201cnot effectively comply with Miranda\u2019s constitutional requirement\u201d); see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a)(3) (stating that a juvenile who is in custody \u201cmust [also] be advised prior to questioning\u201d of his \u201cright to have a parent, guardian, or custodian present during questioning\u201d); id. \u00a7 7B-2101(b) (stating that for juveniles, such as J.D.B., who are \u201cless than 14 years of age, no in-custody admission or confession resulting from interrogation may be admitted into evidence unless the confession or admission was made in the presence of the juvenile\u2019s parent, guardian, custodian, or attorney\u201d).\nWith regard to stronger indicia of physical control, such as handcuffs or an officer standing guard at the door, this Court has never held that one or more of these indicia must be present to support a determination that an individual is in custody. In fact, in Buchanan this Court stated: \u201cCircumstances supporting an objective showing that one is \u2018in custody\u2019 might[, not must,] include a police officer standing guard at the door, locked doors or application of handcuffs.\u201d 353 N.C. at 339, 543 S.E.2d at 828 (emphasis added). Thus, the absence of such forms of restraint, while a relevant consideration in this inquiry, is not dispositive. Furthermore, \u201c[United States Supreme Court] cases establish that, even if the police do not tell a suspect he is under arrest; do not handcuff him, do not lock him in a cell, and do not threaten him, he may nonetheless ... be in custody for Miranda purposes.\u201d Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 675, 158 L. Ed. 2d 938, 958-59 (2004) (Breyer, Stevens, Souter & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325-26, 128 L. Ed. 2d 293, 300-01 (1994) (per curiam); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 335 (1984)). Here, law enforcement questioned a thirteen-year-old seventh-grader about nonviolent offenses while he was at school, in a closed room, and in the presence of four authority figures, all adults. Taken with the sequence of events in the interrogation itself, I conclude that J.D.B. was subjected to a custodial interrogation.\nAs support for its determination that J.D.B. was not subjected to custodial interrogation, the majority cites our recent opinion in In re W.R., 363 N.C. 244, 675 S.E.2d 342 (2009). However, that case is both procedurally and factually distinguishable from this one and is of limited to no precedential value in resolving the custody issue here.\nIn In re W.R., unlike here, the juvenile failed to make a motion to suppress or to object when his incriminatory statements were offered into evidence, and the juvenile did not assert at the trial level that his incriminatory statements were obtained in violation of either the Fifth Amendment or N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101. Id. at 247, 675 S.E.2d at 344. As a result, this Court\u2019s review was for plain error. Id. In addition, because \u201cno evidence was presented and no findings were made as to ... the school resource officer\u2019s actual participation in the questioning of W.R.[,] ... the custodial or noncustodial nature of the interrogation])] .... [or] whether the statements were freely and voluntarily made,\u201d this Court stated:\nAfter careful review, we are not prepared based on the limited record before this Court to conclude that the presence and participation of the school resource officer at the request of school administrators conducting the investigation rendered the questioning of respondent juvenile a \u201ccustodial interrogation,\u201d requiring Miranda warnings and the protections of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101.\n363 N.C. at 248, 675 S.E.2d at 344. In other words, the record pertaining to law enforcement\u2019s role in W.R.\u2019s interrogation was insufficient for this Court to make a determination that the interrogation was custodial.\nAlso numerous important facts bearing on the custody issue distinguish In re W.R. from this case. There, unlike here: (1) the assistant principal and the principal, not a law enforcement officer, took the juvenile out of class and \u201cescorted\u201d him to the principal\u2019s office after a concerned parent called the school and stated that the juvenile had possessed a knife at school and on the school bus the previous day; (2) both school administrators questioned the juvenile about the alleged \u201cin school\u201d incident and not about crimes alleged to have occurred outside of school grounds; (3) the school resource officer apparently was not present at the start of questioning and left the room at various points; (4) no outside police officer participated; and (5) school administrators, not law enforcement, controlled the questioning. Id. at 246, 675 S.E.2d at 343.\nIn further contrast to the majority, I believe J.D.B.\u2019s age, thirteen, (and his status as a middle school student) are relevant considerations in determining \u201cwhether a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would [have] believe [d] himself to be in custody or that he had been deprived of his freedom of action in some significant way.\u201d Greene, 332 N.C. at 577, 422 S.E.2d at 737. In support of its conclusion that a juvenile\u2019s age should not be considered as part of the custody analysis, the majority: (1) states that this Court has not previously considered an individual\u2019s age in conducting the custody inquiry, citing In re W.R. in support; and (2) relies on language from Yarborough v. Alvarado, which states that an \u201cargument [exists] that the custody inquiry states an objective rule designed to give clear guidance to the police, while consideration of a suspect\u2019s individual characteristics \u2014 including his age \u2014 could be viewed as creating a subjective inquiry.\u201d 541 U.S. at 668, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 954 (majority) (citation omitted). I do not find this reasoning persuasive here. The dissent in the Court of Appeals correctly noted that not considering age \u201cwould lead to the absurd result that, when required to determine whether a \u2018reasonable person in the defendant\u2019s situation\u2019 would consider himself in custody, courts would apply exactly the same analysis, regardless of whether the individual was eight or thirty-eight years old.\u201d In re J.D.B., - N.C. App. at -, 674 S.E.2d. at 802 (2009) (Beasley, J. dissenting) (citation omitted).\nNeither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has held squarely that age can never be relevant to the custody inquiry. Nor did we conduct a custody analysis in In re W.R. without considering the juvenile\u2019s age. Rather, as noted above, this Court simply determined that the record on appeal regarding the role of law enforcement in questioning the juvenile was insufficient on the custody issue. The majority concedes that Alvarado is not binding authority on this Court. Furthermore, while the Supreme Court there held that the state court\u2019s failure to consider the defendant\u2019s age (seventeen) was reasonable in considering custody under Miranda, I conclude that the matter is very different when the interrogation is conducted in school. As Justice O\u2019Connor stated in her concurring opinion in Alvarado, \u201cThere may be cases in which a suspect\u2019s age will be relevant to the \u2018custody\u2019 inquiry under Miranda.\u201d 541 U.S. at 669, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 954-55 (O\u2019Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). I share the view expressed by Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion, that a juvenile\u2019s youth \u201cis not a special quality, but rather a widely shared characteristic th\u00e1t generates commonsense conclusions about behavior and perception.\u201d Id. at 674, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 958 (Breyer, J., dissenting).\nIt is clear from the enhanced protections given to juveniles that our General Assembly considers age very important under state law, especially when the juvenile is under fourteen, like J.D.B. \u201cTo focus on the circumstance of age in a case like this does not complicate the \u2018in custody\u2019 inquiry.\u201d Id. at 674-75 , 158 L. Ed. 2d at 958 (citation omitted).\nOutside officers conducting interviews at schools are likely doing so only when they are looking for a specific student and thus are likely to already know the student\u2019s age. Even if they do not, these officers rely on school staff to assist them in establishing contact with the student. These staff members, of course, have access to the student\u2019s records, which will include the age. Seen in this context, courts considering the age of the suspect are not imposing an extra burden of intuition or information on officers but are instead seeing the interrogation in its full context, as it is likely seen by those involved.\nHolland, Schooling Miranda 85 (footnote omitted). Here, Investigator DiCostanzo specifically testified that he had been informed by school administrators that J.D.B. was thirteen years old before questioning him.\nIn sum, I would hold that, under all these circumstances, including his age, J.D.B. was in custody while being questioned at Smith Middle School; consequently, his constitutional and juvenile statutory rights were violated due to law enforcement\u2019s failure to Mirandize him or to comply with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101 and the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nJustice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.\n. J.D.B. also argues, and the dissent in the Court of Appeals appears to suggest, that J.D.B.\u2019s enrollment in \u201cspecial education classes\u201d is a relevant factor to consider in conducting the custody analysis. See In re J.D.B., - N.C. App. -, -, 674 S.E.2d 795, 802 (2009) (Beasley, J., dissenting). Because the record is silent as to the nature and extent of J.D.B.\u2019s academic status and whether Investigator DiCostanzo knew or reasonably could have known about it, I have not considered J.D.B.\u2019s status as a special education student.\n. In In re R.H., a panel of the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court did not err in denying the juvenile\u2019s motion to suppress his confession because the juvenile was not in custody. In re R.H., 171 N.C. App. 514, 615 S.E.2d 738, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1309 (2005) (unpublished). There, the juvenile was questioned by an outside law enforcement officer at school regarding a purported crime away from school grounds. 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 1309, at *2. Even though that case was unpublished, the differences between how the officer approached his questioning of the juvenile there and here are striking. There, before questioning the juvenile, the officer obtained permission from the fourteen-year-old\u2019s mother to talk to him at school and explained to him that \u201che was not under arrest,\u201d that he \u201ccould leave and return to class at any time and that regardless of what [the] juvenile told him that day, he would not arrest [him].\u201d Id., at *4. By contrast with what happened here, I believe the approach taken by the officer in that case can be squared with Miranda and the enhanced statutory protections for juveniles.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Lisa Skinner Lefler for juvenile-appellant.", "S. Hannah Demeritt, Barbara Fedders, and Mark Dorosin for the University of North Carolina School of Law Center for Civil Rights, University of North Carolina School of Law Juvenile Justice Clinic, Office of the Juvenile Defender, and Advocates for Children\u2019s Services, Legal Aid of North Carolina, amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF J.D.B.\nNo. 190A09\n(Filed 11 December 2009)\nJuveniles\u2014 questioning at school \u2014 not custodial\nA thirteen-year old special education student being questioned at school about a breaking and entering and larceny in a subdivision was not in custody and was not entitled to Miranda protections as applied to juveniles in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-2101(a), and the denial of his motion to suppress was affirmed. The custody inquiry is designed to give police clear guidance and is an objective test about whether a reasonable person believes himself to be under the equivalent of arrest; consideration of individual characteristics, including age, would create a subjective inquiry.\nJustice BRADY dissenting.\nJustice HUDSON dissenting.\nJustice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of \u25a0 a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 196 N.C. App. \u2014, 674 S.E.2d 795 (2009), affirming an order entered on 16 October 2007, nunc pro tunc, 13 December 2005, by Judge Joseph Moody Buckner in District Court, Orange County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 10 September 2009.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nLisa Skinner Lefler for juvenile-appellant.\nS. Hannah Demeritt, Barbara Fedders, and Mark Dorosin for the University of North Carolina School of Law Center for Civil Rights, University of North Carolina School of Law Juvenile Justice Clinic, Office of the Juvenile Defender, and Advocates for Children\u2019s Services, Legal Aid of North Carolina, amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0664-01", "first_page_order": 702, "last_page_order": 727 }