{
  "id": 4150491,
  "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KELCIE LEE ANDREW MORTON",
  "name_abbreviation": "State v. Morton",
  "decision_date": "2009-12-11",
  "docket_number": "No. 347A09",
  "first_page": "737",
  "last_page": "738",
  "citations": [
    {
      "type": "official",
      "cite": "363 N.C. 737"
    }
  ],
  "court": {
    "name_abbreviation": "N.C.",
    "id": 9292,
    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
  },
  "jurisdiction": {
    "id": 5,
    "name_long": "North Carolina",
    "name": "N.C."
  },
  "cites_to": [
    {
      "cite": "679 S.E.2d 437",
      "category": "reporters:state_regional",
      "reporter": "S.E.2d",
      "year": 2009,
      "opinion_index": -1
    }
  ],
  "analysis": {
    "cardinality": 134,
    "char_count": 1454,
    "ocr_confidence": 0.71,
    "pagerank": {
      "raw": 1.0417561518279478e-07,
      "percentile": 0.551072475653986
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    "sha256": "8fd2e8670a09272f44474a994a988ca9c523af2578c0a64c4d48af1336ceca65",
    "simhash": "1:28f9f6af03a1846b",
    "word_count": 232
  },
  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:19:39.869638+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
  },
  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KELCIE LEE ANDREW MORTON"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PER CURIAM.\nFor the reasons stated in Section I of the dissenting opinion, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the remaining issues.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PER CURIAM."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.",
      "Mercedes O. Chut for defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. KELCIE LEE ANDREW MORTON\nNo. 347A09\n(Filed 11 December 2009)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 frisk of defendant for weapons \u2014 reasonable suspicion\nThe decision of the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress scales and cocaine seized during a search of defendant\u2019s person is reversed for the reason stated in the Court of Appeals dissenting opinion that, under the totality of the circumstances, officers had reasonable suspicion to frisk defendant for a weapon based upon a confidential informant\u2019s tip that defendant was involved in a recent drive-by shooting, the fact defendant was wearing gang colors, and information received from other informants and anonymous tipsters that defendant was selling drugs in the area.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 198 N.C. App.-, 679 S.E.2d 437 (2009), vacating judgments entered 25 April 2008 by Judge W. Osmond Smith, III in Superior Court, Person County. Heard in the Supreme Court 18 November 2009.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Derrick C. Mertz, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nMercedes O. Chut for defendant-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0737-01",
  "first_page_order": 775,
  "last_page_order": 776
}