{ "id": 4152382, "name": "NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GUILFORD TECHNICAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE", "name_abbreviation": "North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Ass'n v. Board of Trustees", "decision_date": "2010-04-15", "docket_number": "No. 470PA07", "first_page": "102", "last_page": "114", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 N.C. 102" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639152 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8210863 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "648 S.E.2d 859", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639152 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862" }, { "page": "862" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/648/0859-01" ] }, { "cite": "2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 227", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "281 S.E.2d 16", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 623", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575050 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0623-01" ] }, { "cite": "60 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597374 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 394", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547559 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E. 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 4, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440-41" }, { "page": "440-41", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. 17", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8622511 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1936, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "21" }, { "page": "21" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/210/0017-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 S.E.2d 160", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161", "parenthetical": "\"G.S. [\u00a7] 97-7 extends the Workers' Compensation Act to the State. As an 'employer' under the Act, the State may not 'reject the provisions of [the] Article relative to payment and acceptance of compensation.' \" (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "89 N.C. App. 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8520176 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "58", "parenthetical": "\"G.S. [\u00a7] 97-7 extends the Workers' Compensation Act to the State. As an 'employer' under the Act, the State may not 'reject the provisions of [the] Article relative to payment and acceptance of compensation.' \" (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/89/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "186-87", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[irrespective of whether G.S. Chapter IB codifies the right to indemnification!" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "187" }, { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the abrogation of sovereign immunity\" does not \"impelf] such a strict construction as to thwart. . . obvious legislative intent\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568484 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "holding that \"[irrespective of whether G.S. Chapter IB codifies the right to indemnification!" }, { "page": "331" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564079 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0522-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "787", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8620036 ], "year": 1952, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/235/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 N.C. App. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8210863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/185/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "293 S.E.2d 182", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" }, { "page": "183" }, { "page": "326" }, { "page": "183" }, { "page": "332" }, { "page": "186-87" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "306 N.C. 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568484 ], "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/306/0324-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 S.E.2d 618", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "627", "parenthetical": "\"Waiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "307 N.C. 522", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564079 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "537-38", "parenthetical": "\"Waiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/307/0522-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1063, "char_count": 28864, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.867381330446283e-08, "percentile": 0.3680913443216188 }, "sha256": "8d6d45066bca51e0ba14614138f90da9dd0ffa84970cfd0d649c538d41edf866", "simhash": "1:6c258577161982dc", "word_count": 4470 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:37.384656+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Chief Justice PARKER and Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON join in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GUILFORD TECHNICAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Justice.\nHere we address whether sovereign immunity bars the North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association (\u201cNCIGA\u201d) from being reimbursed by Guilford Technical Community College (\u201cGTCC\u201d) through its Board of Trustees, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l) (2001) of the Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the \u201cGuaranty Act\u201d), N.C.G.S. chapter 58, article 48. Plaintiff NCIGA seeks reimbursement for payments NCIGA made on workers\u2019 compensation claims filed by GTCC\u2019s employees after GTCC\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier became insolvent and was liquidated. The Court of Appeals determined that there was no \u201cclear proof that the State ha[d] waived [its] sovereign immunity pursuant to the reimbursement provision of the Guaranty Act\u201d and held that GTCC\u2019s motion to dismiss should have been allowed based on sovereign immunity grounds. N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass\u2019n v. Bd. of Trs., 185 N.C. App. 518, 523, 648 S.E.2d 859, 862 (2007). Because we conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-7 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is a plain and unmistakable waiver of sovereign immunity for the underlying claims involved here, which renders an additional waiver of sovereign immunity in the Guaranty Act itself unnecessary, we reverse.\nI. Background\nNCIGA is a \u201cnonprofit, unincorporated legal entity\u201d created and governed by the Guaranty Act. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-25 (2007). \u201cAll insurers defined as member insurers in G.S. 58-48-20(6)\u201d are required to be \u201cmembers of the [NCIGA] as a condition of their authority to transact insurance in this State.\u201d Id. \u201c \u2018Member insurer\u2019 means any person who (i) writes any kind of insurance to which th[e Guaranty Act] applies ... and (ii) is licensed and authorized to transact insurance in this State.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-20(6) (2007). Under the Guaranty Act, when an insurer becomes insolvent and is liquidated by the insurance regulator of this or another state, NCIGA becomes \u201cobligated\u201d to pay for \u201ccovered claims\u201d on behalf of the insolvent insurer in accordance section 58-48-35. \u201cFor purposes of administration and assessment,\u201d NCIGA is \u201cdivided into three separate accounts: (i) the automobile insurance account; (ii) the workers\u2019 compensation account; and (iii) the account for all other insurance to which the [Guaranty Act] applies.\u201d Id. \u00a7 58-48-25. Only the workers\u2019 compensation account is at issue here.\nGTCC is a two-year accredited community college operating under N.C.G.S. chapter 115D. At some time before 31 December 2000, GTCC purchased a workers\u2019 compensation insurance policy from Reliance Insurance Company (\u201cReliance\u201d). Reliance was domiciled in Pennsylvania and on 3 October 2001, was declared insolvent and placed into liquidation by the Pennsylvania insurance commissioner.\nThereafter, under the Guaranty Act, NCIGA allegedly began to make payments on workers\u2019 compensation claims against GTCC. Before making these payments, NCIGA did hot dispute that these were \u201c \u2018[c]overed claim[s]\u201d as defined by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-20(4), which provides:\n(4) \u201cCovered claim\u201d means an unpaid claim, including one of unearned premiums, which is in excess of fifty dollars ($50.00) and arises out of and is within the coverage and not in excess of the applicable limits of an insurance policy to which [the Guaranty Act] applies as issued by an insurer, if such insurer becomes an insolvent insurer after the effective date of this Article and (i) the claimant or insured is a resident of this State at the time of the insured event; or (ii) the property from which the claim arises is permanently located in this State. \u201cCovered claim\u201d shall not include any amount awarded as punitive or exemplary damages; sought as a return of premium under any retrospective rating plan; or due any reinsurer, insurer, insurance pool, or underwriting association, as subrogation or contribution recoveries or otherwise.\nId. \u00a7 58-48-20(4) (2001). NCIGA sought reimbursement from GTCC for these payments under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l), which states in pertinent part:\n(al) The [NCIGA] shall have the right to recover from the following persons the amount of any \u201ccovered claim\u201d paid on behalf of such person pursuant to this Article:\n(1) Any insured whose net worth on December 31 of the year next preceding the date the insurer becomes insolvent exceeds fifty million dollars ($50,000,000) and whose liability obligations to other persons are satisfied in whole or in part by payments under this Article^]\nId. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l) (2001). GTCC has not disputed that its net worth exceeded fifty million dollars as of 31 December 2000, but it has denied NCIGA is entitled to reimbursement, arguing that sovereign immunity bars NCIGA\u2019s claim.\nOn 20 September 2005, NCIGA filed a declaratory judgment complaint in the Superior Court in Wake County seeking \u201ca judicial determination . . . whether GTCC is obligated to reimburse the NCIGA under the terms of the Guaranty Act in connection with the . . . payments expended by the NCIGA in connection with \u2018covered claims\u2019 arising from the insolvency of Reliance.\u201d NCIGA sought an adjudication that \u201cunder the express terms of the Guaranty Act,\u201d specifically N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l), GTCC is obligated to reimburse NCIGA for: (1) \u201cthe $324,013.00 expended [on workers\u2019 compensation claims] by the NCIGA through August 19, 2005 made in connection with the insolvency of Reliance\u201d and (2) \u201cNCIGA\u2019s continuing administration and handling of \u2018covered [workers\u2019 compensation] claims\u2019 against GTCC arising from the insolvency of Reliance.\u201d\nGTCC moved to dismiss NCIGA\u2019s complaint under Civil Procedure Rules. 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) on the sole ground that NCIGA\u2019s claims for reimbursement against GTCC \u00e1re barred by sovereign immunity. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) (2007). NCIGA asserted that the North Carolina General Assembly \u201chas waived GTCC\u2019s sovereign immunity relative to worker[s\u2019] compensation claims\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-7 and \u201chas expressly authorized the State and community college institutions to purchase workers\u2019 compensation insurance\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115D-23. In addition, NCIGA noted that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l) gives NCIGA the right to recover \u201cthe full amount of any \u2018covered claim\u2019 from any insured\u201d who meets the fifty million dollar net worth requirement. In sum, NCIGA contended that because of the explicit waiver of sovereign immunity in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-7 and because, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115D-23, GTCC has been statutorily authorized to become an \u201cinsured\u201d to cover the liabilities imposed by the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, GTCC could not \u201cassert sovereign immunity to avoid its responsibility to reimburse the NCIGA\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l). In an order entered on 27 January 2006, the trial court denied GTCC\u2019s motion to dismiss.\nIn a unanimous opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that NCIGA could not \u201cdefeat GTCC\u2019s sovereign immunity defense.\u201d Guar. Ass\u2019n v. Bd. of Trs., 185 N.C. App. at 524, 648 S.E.2d at 862.\nOn 25 September 2007, NCIGA filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court, which we allowed on 11 December 2008.\nII. Analysis\nUnder the Guaranty Act, NCIGA\u2019s obligation to pay an employer\u2019s \u201ccovered [workers\u2019 compensation] claims\u201d arises when the employer procures workers\u2019 compensation insurance from a licensed and authorized insurer that then becomes insolvent. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 58-48-20(5), -48-35 (2007), -48-20(4) (2001). The Guaranty Act also gives NCIGA the right to reimbursement if it has made payments on workers\u2019 compensation claims for a high net worth employer whose insurer is insolvent. See Id. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l). Thus, both NCIGA\u2019s obligations to pay an employer\u2019s (here, GTCC\u2019s) workers\u2019 compensation claims and its right to obtain reimbursement from \u201c[a]ny insured\u201d high net worth employer arise from GTCC\u2019s having elected to insure its underlying workers\u2019 compensation liability with Reliance. Id. Yet, the Guaranty Act is essentially silent on the question of sovereign immunity, and the term \u201cinsured\u201d is not defined therein.\nThis Court has long held:\nIt is an established principle of jurisprudence, resting on grounds of sound public policy, that a state may not be sued in its own courts or elsewhere unless by statute it has consented to be sued or has otherwise waived its immunity from suit.\nBy application of this principle, a subordinate division of the state, or agency exercising statutory governmental functions . . . may be sued only when and as authorized by statute.\nSmith v. Hefner, 235 N.C. 1, 6, 68 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1952) (citations omitted). \u201cWaiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed.\u201d Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 537-38, 299 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1983) (citations omitted). Consistent with these rules of construction, we have held that an express statutory waiver of sovereign immunity for a substantive claim made under one statute can continue and apply to a subsequent action seeking reimbursement from the State under a separate statute when the subsequent action \u201carises out of\u2019 the underlying substantive claim. Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 332, 293 S.E.2d 182, 186-87 (1982) (holding that \u201c[irrespective of whether G.S. Chapter IB codifies the right to indemnification!)] .... [t]he right to indemnification arises out of a tort claim, the State\u2019s immunity to which was abrogated by the Tort Claims Act,\" and consequently, \u201cthe State may be joined as a third-party defendant, whether in an action for contribution or in an action for indemnification, in the State courts\u201d (emphasis added)). Similarly, the central issue before us here involves reimbursement that \u201carises out of\u2019 a substantive workers\u2019 compensation claim, \u201cthe State\u2019s immunity to which was abrogated by\u201d section 97-7 of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Id. at 332, 293 S.E.2d at 187.\nThe Workers\u2019 Compensation Act contains a clear and unmistakable waiver of the State\u2019s and its subdivisions\u2019 sovereign immunity with respect to workers\u2019 compensation claims by their employees. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-7 (2007). The Act provides, in pertinent part:\nNeither the State nor any municipal corporation within the State, nor any political subdivision thereof, nor any employee of the State or of any such corporation or subdivision, shall have the right to reject the provisions of this Article relative to payment and acceptance of compensation... [provided, that all such corporations or subdivisions are hereby authorized to self-insure or purchase insurance to secure its liability under this Article and to include thereunder the liability of such subordinate governmental agencies as the county board of health, the school board, and other political and quasi-political subdivisions supported in whole or in part by the municipal corporation or political subdivision of the State.\nId.; see Estes v. N.C. State Univ., 89 N.C. App. 55, 58, 365 S.E.2d 160, 161 (1988) (\u201cG.S. [\u00a7] 97-7 extends the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to the State. As an \u2018employer\u2019 under the Act, the State may not \u2018reject the provisions of [the] Article relative to payment and acceptance of compensation.\u2019 \u201d (second alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Further, section 115D-23 specifically applies the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act to institutional employees of the state\u2019s community colleges. The statute requires the State Board of Community Colleges to \u201cmake the necessary arrangements to carry out those provisions of Chapter 97\u201d for its employees and authorizes the board of trustees of each community college \u201cto purchase insurance to cover workers\u2019 compensation liability.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115D-23 (2007).\nThe General Assembly has mandated that every employer subject to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act maintain the ability to pay compensation benefits, either by purchasing workers\u2019 compensation\ninsurance from an \u201cauthorized corporation, association, organization, or in any mutual insurance association formed by a group of employers so authorized\u201d or by self-insuring. Id. \u00a7 97-93 (2007). \u201cThe term \u2018employer\u2019 \u201d includes, inter alia, \u201cthe State and all political subdivisions thereof, [and] all public and quasi-public corporations therein.\u201d Id. \u00a7 97-2(3) (2007). In section 115D-23 the General Assembly has specifically \u201cauthorized\u201d the \u201cboard of trustees\u201d of each community college \u201cto purchase insurance to cover workers\u2019 compensation liability\u201d if the institution elects not to self-insure. Id. \u00a7 115D-23. If an employer, including the State and its entities, elects to purchase workers\u2019 compensation insurance, it still must comply with the provisions of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and the Guaranty Act by purchasing insurance only from an entity that is licensed and authorized to transact insurance business in this State.\nHowever, even if an employer purchases insurance to secure its liability, the employer still remains primarily liable to its injured employees for any claims that fall under Chapter 97 in the event its insurer becomes insolvent. See id. \u00a7 97-94 (2007); Roberts v. City Ice & Coal Co., 210 N.C. 17, 21, 185 S.E. 438, 440-41 (1936). As this Court stated in Roberts:\nStanding alone, the proposition that the employer under the Workers\u2019] Compensation Act should be relieved of liability for the compensation to his injured employee by reason of the insolvency of his insurance carrier would present no serious difficulty. The liability of the employer under the award is primary. He, by contract, may secure liability insurance for his protection, but his obligation to the injured employee is unimpaired. Into the construction of every act must be read the purpose of the Legislature, and the underlying purpose in this instance (Workers\u2019] Compensation Act) was to give relief to workfers]. This relief in the nature of things had to be charged against the employer.\nThe primary consideration is compensation for injured employees. The title and theory of the act import the idea of compensation for work[ers] and their dependents.\nThe statute requires the employer to insure and keep insured his liability or furnish proof of his own ability to pay the compensation. It is further provided that insolvency of the employer shall not relieve the insurer, and manifestly the insolvency of the insurer should not relieve the insured, nothing else appearing. The obligation of the insurance company is to insure the employer against liability under the act, and while the statute gives to insurer the right of subrogation, that is for the benefit of the insurer and not intended to impair the right of the injured work[er] to compensation from the insured employer.\n210 N.C. at 21, 185 S.E. at 440-41 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, according to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act and the principle enunciated in Roberts, GTCC remained at all times primarily liable on any workers\u2019 compensation claims at issue here.\n\u201c \u2018Legislative intent controls the meaning of a statute; and in ascertaining this intent, a court must consider the act as a whole, weighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute seeks to accomplish.\u2019 \u201d Hyler v. GTE Prods., Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993) (citations omitted), superseded in part by statute, Workers\u2019 Compensation Reform Act of 1994, ch. 679, sec. 2.5, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 394, 399-400 (enacting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-25.1 (2007)). As noted by this Court, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is a remedial statutory scheme:\nWhere radical and systematic changes have been made in setting up a system of such wide scope as we find in the Workers\u2019] Compensation Act, and one so markedly remedial in its nature, the break with the past must necessarily be viewed with liberality in order to accomplish its purposes; and its provisions, liberally construed, given that effectiveness which alone will protect the act from erosion and regression.\nEssick v. City of Lexington, 232 N.C. 200, 208, 60 S.E.2d 106, 112 (1950) (emphasis added). \u201c \u2018[T]he underlying purpose ... [of the] (Workers\u2019] Compensation Act) [is] to give relief to work[ers].\u2019 \u201d Roberts, 210 N.C. at 21, 185 S.E. at 440 (citation omitted). Thus, the \u201cprimary consideration\u201d in enacting the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act was to compensate injured employees. Id. Because, in general, the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act is the exclusive means for employees to recover compensation due to work-related injury or illness, carryinout this remedial purpose is its core function. As such, the waiver of sovereign immunity in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-7 should be construed and applied to statutes, such as the Guaranty Act, in a manner that effectuates the primary purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act.\nEnacted in 1971, the Guaranty Act \u201cha[s] one basic purpose: to better protect North Carolina claimants and policyholders.\u201d State ex rel. Ingram v. Reserve Ins. Co., 303 N.C. 623, 627-28, 281 S.E.2d 16, 19 (1981). As our legislature has stated:\nThe purpose of [the Guaranty Act] is to provide a mechanism .for the payment of covered claims under certain insurance policies, to avoid excessive delay in payment, and to avoid financial loss to claimants or policyholders because of the insolvency of an insurer, to assist in the detection and prevention of insurer insolvencies, and to provide an association to assess the cost of such protection among insurers.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-5 (2007). With regard to workers\u2019 compensation claims, the Guaranty Act ensures that employees will be compensated in a timely manner even when the employer\u2019s insurer becomes insolvent. See id. \u00a7 58-48-35. As such, the provisions of the Guaranty Act pertaining to NCIGA\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation account are intended to promote the goals of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, and as our legislature has instructed, the Guaranty Act \u201cshall be liberally construed to effect the purpose under G.S. 58-48-5 which shall constitute an aid and guide to [its] interpretation.\u201d Id. \u00a7 58-48-15 (2007).\nSection 58-40-50(al)(l) allows NCIGA\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation account to be reimbursed by high net worth employers, who are well situated to absorb the impact of their insurer\u2019s insolvency, thereby reflecting the legislature\u2019s intent that the funds be replenished for the benefit of other potential workers\u2019 compensation claimants. Reimbursement by high net worth employers also ensures that funds are available to pay the claims of smaller employers, who are less likely to be able to pay workers\u2019 compensation claims in the event their insurer becomes insolvent and who may be at greater risk of insolvency themselves. In addition, the Guaranty Act provides greater protection for workers\u2019 compensation claims than for claims arising from other forms of insurance that are subject to the Guaranty Act. See id. \u00a7 58-48-35(a)(l) (stating, inter alia, that: (1) although NCIGA\u2019s \u201cobligation includes only the amount of each covered claim that is in excess of fifty dollars ($50.00) and is less than three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000),\u201d NCIGA \u201cshall pay the full amount of a covered claim for benefits under [] workers\u2019 compensation insuranceand (2) NCIGA is not obligated to \u201cpay a claimant\u2019s covered claim, except a claimant\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation claim if... [t]he insured had primary coverage at the time of the loss with a solvent insurer\u201d in a minimum amount specified by statute, (emphases added)).\nIII. Conclusion\nThe legislative intent behind the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act has always been to provide workers secure, timely compensation. The provisions of the Guaranty Act, both those involving the payment of workers\u2019 compensation claims due to insurer insolvency and those requiring repayment of said amounts by affected employers with a high net worth, are designed to further this purpose. The legislature has clearly waived sovereign immunity through the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for claims by governmental employees, and this waiver applies to the provisions of the Guaranty Act involving workers\u2019 compensation insurance. This interpretation follows the longstanding requirement that a statutory waiver of immunity be strictly construed, in accordance with a clearly expressed legislative intent. See Teachy, 306 N.C. at 331, 293 S.E.2d at 186 (stating that \u201cthe abrogation of sovereign immunity\u201d does not \u201cimpelf] such a strict construction as to thwart. . . obvious legislative intent\u201d (citations omitted)). Thus, we conclude that the legislature has clearly and explicitly waived sovereign immunity for these underlying workers\u2019 compensation claims, that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l) applies to GTCC, and that GTCC\u2019s motion to dismiss should not have been allowed. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and instruct that court to reinstate the order of the trial court.\nREVERSED.\n. Effective 10 June 2003, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-50(al) was amended. Act of June 5, 2003,, ch. 167, sec. 2, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws 227, 229. The amendment \u201capplies to claims associated with insurers that become insolvent on or after that date.\u201d Id., sec. 5, at 230. Because this case involves claims associated with an insurer insolvency that occurred before 10 June 2003, the pre-amended version of the statute is the version we review here.\n. Effective 10 June 2003, the definition of \u201c \u2018[cjovered claim\u2019 \u201d was amended. Ch. 167, sec. 1, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws at 228. For the reason stated in footnote one, the preamendment definition applies here. The amendment added the following to the end of subsection (4): \u201c \u2018Covered claim\u2019 also shall not include . . . claims of any claimant whose net worth exceeds fifty million dollars ... on December 31 of the year preceding the date the insurer becomes insolvent.\u201d Id. Prospectively, the situation here should no longer arise, as NCIGA would presumably no longer pay workers\u2019 compensation claims in lieu of an insolvent insurer of a high net worth employer, like GTCC, who would simply remain liable under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-94 (2007). This decision thus applies only to a limited pool of employers and insurers.\n. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-10.1 (2007) (\u201cIf the employee and the employer are subject to and have complied with the provisions of [the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act], then the rights and remedies herein granted to the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or personal representative shall exclude all other rights and remedies of the employee, his dependents, next of kin, or representative as against the employer at common law or otherwise on account of such injury or death.\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice EDMUNDS\ndissenting.\nBriefly stated, the issue in this case is whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars NCIGA from recovering from GTCC funds paid by NCIGA to cover workers\u2019 compensation claims filed against GTCC once Reliance Insurance Company, which had carried GTCC\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation policy, became insolvent.\nThe Insurance Guaranty Association Act creating NCIGA contains no waiver of sovereign immunity. N.C.G.S. ch. 58, art. 48 (2009). The majority nevertheless applies the waiver in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 97-7, in which the General Assembly expressly waived sovereign immunity for workers\u2019 compensation claims brought against the State. That statute also permits governmental entities to purchase insurance to secure their liability under the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. Id. \u00a7 97-7 (2009). However, no workers\u2019 compensation claims directly underlie this case. Every worker who had a valid covered claim apparently has been compensated or will be compensated by NCIGA. The question now is whether GTCC must reimburse NCIGA. Because no workers\u2019 compensation claims are at stake, the waiver of sovereign immunity in section 97-7 is inapplicable. In the absence of an applicable waiver, sovereign immunity applies and GTCC is not liable.\nAlthough the majority cites Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 293 S.E.2d 182 (1982), as authority for its interpretation that waivers found in one statute can be portaged over to another statute, that case is distinguishable. In Teachy, the plaintiff sued the defendants for wrongful death arising out of a traffic collision. Id. at 325, 293 S.E.2d at 183. The defendants then filed a third-party complaint against the North Carolina Department of Transportation, alleging that a traffic light at the intersection where the accident occurred had been maintained negligently. Id. at 326, 293 S.E.2d at 183. When the State argued that'sovereign immunity shielded it from suit, we found that the common-law \u201cright to indemnification of a passively negligent tort-feasor from an actively negligent tort-feasor\u201d arose out of the underlying tort claim and that the State had waived immunity from such indemnification claims in the Tort Claims Act. Id. at 332, 293 S.E.2d at 186-87. Thus, the tort theory of negligence directly underlay both the plaintiff\u2019s original claim and the defendants\u2019 subsequent claim against DOT, and the Tort Claims Act waived sovereign immunity in such suits.\nIn contrast, the majority here bootstraps a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity that is applicable only to workers\u2019 compensation claims into a suit over insurance liability brought by plaintiff NCIGA against defendant GTCC under the Insurance Guaranty Association Act, not the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act. The original claims between GTCC and the injured workers involved workers\u2019 compensation liability and were insured by third party Reliance. The majority\u2019s determination, that the workers\u2019 compensation waiver in section 97-7 reaches as far as claims by a fourth party (NCIGA) for indemnification of the insurance liability of insolvent third party Reliance, is an unwarranted extension of the holding in Teachy.\nThe majority correctly notes that this Court historically has been reluctant to find exceptions to the long-standing doctrine of sovereign immunity when the General Assembly has not explicitly set out a waiver. See Guthrie v. N.C. State Ports Auth., 307 N.C. 522, 537-38, 299 S.E.2d 618, 627 (1983) (\u201cWaiver of sovereign immunity may not be lightly inferred and State statutes waiving this immunity, being in derogation of the sovereign right to immunity, must be strictly construed.\u201d) (citation omitted). While I agree with the majority that the 2003 amendments to the applicable statutes may prevent a repetition of the immediate issue presented here, the majority\u2019s methodology is contrary to the letter and the spirit of Guthrie and invites creative attempts to circumvent sovereign immunity. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\nChief Justice PARKER and Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON join in this dissenting opinion.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice EDMUNDS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Christopher J. Blake and Leslie Lane Mize, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Sidney S. Eagles, Jr. and Matthew N. Leerberg, for defendant-appellee.", "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Christopher G. Browning, Jr., Solicitor General; John F. Maddrey, Assistant solicitor General; and Gary R. Govert, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina, amicus curiae.", "North Carolina League of Municipalities, by Andrew L. Romanet, Jr., General Counsel, and Gregory F. Schwitzgebel, III, Senior Assistant General Counsel; and North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, by James B. Blackburn, III, General Counsel, amici .curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "NORTH CAROLINA INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF GUILFORD TECHNICAL COMMUNITY COLLEGE\nNo. 470PA07\n(Filed 15 April 2010)\nImmunity\u2014 sovereign \u2014 waiver\u2014workers\u2019 compensation insurance \u2014 insurance guaranty association\nThe doctrine of sovereign immunity did not bar the North Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association (NCIGA) from being reimbursed by Guilford Technical Community College (GTCC) pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-48-50(al)(l) for payments NCIGA made on workers\u2019 compensation claims filed by GTCC employees after GTCC\u2019s workers\u2019 compensation insurance carrier became insolvent and was liquidated. The legislature has waived sovereign immunity through the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act for claims by governmental employees, and this waiver applies to the provisions of the Insurance Guarantee Association Act involving workers\u2019 compensation insurance to effectuate the primary purpose of the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act, which is to provide workers secure, timely compensation. N.C.G.S. 97-7.\nJustice EDMUNDS dissenting.\nChief Justice PARKER and Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON join in this dissenting opinion.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 185 N.C. App. 518, 648 S.E.2d 859 (2007), reversing an order denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss entered on 27 January 2006 by Judge A. Leon Stanback, Jr. in Superior Court, Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court 30 March 2009.\nNelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough LLP, by Christopher J. Blake and Leslie Lane Mize, for plaintiff-appellant.\nSmith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Sidney S. Eagles, Jr. and Matthew N. Leerberg, for defendant-appellee.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Christopher G. Browning, Jr., Solicitor General; John F. Maddrey, Assistant solicitor General; and Gary R. Govert, Special Deputy Attorney General, for State of North Carolina, amicus curiae.\nNorth Carolina League of Municipalities, by Andrew L. Romanet, Jr., General Counsel, and Gregory F. Schwitzgebel, III, Senior Assistant General Counsel; and North Carolina Association of County Commissioners, by James B. Blackburn, III, General Counsel, amici .curiae." }, "file_name": "0102-01", "first_page_order": 196, "last_page_order": 208 }