{ "id": 4152746, "name": "KIMBERLY S. SISK, Individually and as Guardian ad Litem of SLADE AXEL SISK, a minor v. TRANSYLVANIA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC.; ABBOTT LABORATORIES; and ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "Sisk v. Transylvania Community Hospital, Inc.", "decision_date": "2010-06-17", "docket_number": "No. 67PA09", "first_page": "172", "last_page": "184", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 N.C. 172" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642378 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162659 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0811-01" ] }, { "cite": "670 S.E.2d 352", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642378 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/670/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 198", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 543", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534339 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0543-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138288 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "540 S.E.2d 775", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "780" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "141 N.C. App. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9440648 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210-11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/141/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4764743 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 S.E.2d 362", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "quoting Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Fayetteville, 309 N.C. 726, 741, 309 S.E.2d 209, 219 (1983) (second alteration in original)" }, { "page": "369" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149685 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "100-01", "parenthetical": "quoting Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Fayetteville, 309 N.C. 726, 741, 309 S.E.2d 209, 219 (1983) (second alteration in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 426", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 288", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2503935 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0288-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S.E. 963", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1898, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appearance of [out-of-state] counsel is a matter of courtesy in each and every case, and on motion in each case, and only for the occasion on which it is allowed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 N.C. 824", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8662451 ], "year": 1898, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appearance of [out-of-state] counsel is a matter of courtesy in each and every case, and on motion in each case, and only for the occasion on which it is allowed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/122/0824-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 N.C. 513", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1898, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he appearance of [out-of-state] counsel is a matter of courtesy in each and every case, and on motion in each case, and only for the occasion on which it is allowed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 834", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569867 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 811", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4162659 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" }, { "page": "815" }, { "page": "815" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0811-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 938, "char_count": 29851, "ocr_confidence": 0.746, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5608223018104344e-07, "percentile": 0.6769010471266858 }, "sha256": "fdac9bf4c208e712bc7804e9d5b48425675cf12ad3653f16d73ba31b8893c0da", "simhash": "1:87cbd3ac7bce99f0", "word_count": 4784 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:37.384656+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "KIMBERLY S. SISK, Individually and as Guardian ad Litem of SLADE AXEL SISK, a minor v. TRANSYLVANIA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC.; ABBOTT LABORATORIES; and ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "EDMUNDS, Justice.\nIn this case we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked the pro hac vice status of two out-of-state attorneys pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.2. Recognizing the inherent power of the courts to control trials and discipline attorneys, as well as the important public interest in regulating out-of-state attorneys who practice law in this state, we hold that the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct do not limit the trial court\u2019s discretion to revoke pro hac vice status. Because we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nShortly after his birth on 19 October 2004, Slade Axel Sisk (Slade) contracted a rare form of meningitis caused by the bacteria Enterobacter sakazakii (also known as E. Sak) and suffered permanent brain damage. On 15 February 2007, Slade\u2019s mother, plaintiff Kimberly S. Sisk, individually and in her capacity as guardian ad litem, filed a complaint in Superior Court, Transylvania County, against defendants Abbott Laboratories, Abbott Laboratories, Inc. (collectively, Abbott), and Transylvania Community Hospital, Inc. (the Hospital).'\nIn her complaint plaintiff makes the following allegations. Slade\u2019s condition was caused by his ingestion of powdered Similac, an infant formula manufactured and sold by Abbott and provided to Slade by the Hospital. Powdered Similac is not sterile and should not have been given to Slade who, as a neonate, had an immature and compromised immune system. Although the Hospital knew or should have known the risks powdered infant formula poses to newborns, Abbott nevertheless failed to warn the Hospital that Similac could cause the type of meningitis contracted by Slade, and no defendant either informed plaintiff of the potential risks or advised plaintiff of the safe alternative of sterile liquid Similac. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages against Abbott based on negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty, and compensatory damages against the Hospital based on negligence.\nOn 9 May 2007, pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.1, out-of-state attorneys Stephen H. Meyer and Nicolas F. Stein were admitted pro hac vice to practice law in North Carolina for the limited purpose of representing plaintiff in her action against Abbott and the Hospital. On 17 October 2007, Abbott moved to disqualify plaintiff\u2019s out-of-state counsel because of their allegedly improper contact with one of Abbott\u2019s consulting experts.\nPlaintiff responded with a copy of an 18 October 2007 opinion and order signed by the circuit court judge presiding over Froman v. University Medical Center, No. 04-CT10681 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Ky.), a factually similar Kentucky case involving allegations of E. Sak contamination. In the opinion and order, the Kentucky judge denied Abbott\u2019s motion to disqualify attorneys Meyer and Stein for communicating with Abbott\u2019s consulting expert in Froman. According to the Kentucky court\u2019s order, the two attorneys first became aware of the identity of Abbott\u2019s expert during the course of an E. Sak contamination case against Abbott Laboratories captioned Hill v. University Medical Center, Inc., No. 04-CI-08866 (Jefferson Cir. Ct., Ky.). At that time, Abbott had entered into an agreement with its expert to provide consulting services in E. Sak cases. After the Hill case settled, but before the order of dismissal was entered, attorney Meyer contacted Abbott\u2019s expert in reference to the Froman case. At the time of the initial contact, Abbott was not yet a party in Froman, and Meyer was unaware of the agreement between Abbott and its expert. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was contemplating adding Abbott as a defendant and Meyer deliberately failed to advise the expert that Abbott was a potential defendant. After discussing the possibility of the expert providing services for the plaintiff in Froman, Meyer retained the expert. As a consequence, the expert found himself on both sides in Froman. Despite Abbott\u2019s claim that it had lost the services of its expert as a result of Meyer\u2019s action, in its opinion and order the Kentucky trial court denied Abbott\u2019s motion for sanctions, concluding that Abbott had failed to prove that the \u201cplaintiffs\u2019 counsel committed any knowing violation of ethical rules,\u201d nor did Abbott \u201cdemonstrate prejudice as a result of counsel\u2019s actions.\u201d\nOn 4 December 2007, Judge Richard L. Doughton granted Abbott\u2019s motion in the case at bar and entered an order \u201crevoking] the permission to practice of Nicholas F. Stein and Stephen H. Meyer previously granted.\u201d In accordance with plaintiff\u2019s request, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact included the following:\n4. Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer represented the Plaintiffs in a civil action in the State of Kentucky known as Hill v. University Medical Center, Inc. and Abbott Laboratories, Inc., filed in the Jefferson Circuit Court (04-CI-08866) involving E. Sak. In a mediation proceeding in this action, Abbott Laboratories provided to Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer a confidential document which disclosed the identity of Abbott\u2019s previously unidentified retained expert. At the time of this disclosure, Abbott and the. retained expert had a continuing contractual relationship, although Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer had no actual knowledge of the continuing contractual relationship.\n5. Prior to the dismissal of the Hill action, and while the action was pending, Mr. Meyer, with the knowledge of Mr. Stein, made ex parte contact with Abbott\u2019s retained expert in connection with another Kentucky civil action, Froman v. University Medical Center, Inc. (04-CI-10681)[,] involving E. Sak wherein Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer were counsel for the Plaintiffs.\n6. At the time of the ex parte contact by Mr. Meyer with Abbott\u2019s retained expert, Abbott Laboratories was not named as a defendant in Froman. However, Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer had already contemplated adding Abbott as an[] additional defendant in the Froman suit. Notwithstanding this contemplation, Mr. Meyer contacted Abbott\u2019s retained expert, employed him as a retained expert, and intentionally did not advise Abbott\u2019s retained expert that he was contemplating a claim against Abbott Laboratories. This conduct by Mr. Meyer was condoned by Mr. Stein who admitted in argument to this Court that \u201cwe wanted to keep him (referring to Abbott\u2019s retained expert) in the black\u201d with regard to their contemplation of making a claim against Abbott.\n7. Abbott\u2019s retained expert was an unrepresented person, likely not experienced in dealing with legal matters.\n8. On February 15, 2007, this action was filed in the Superior Court of Transylvania County by Bruce E. Elmore, Jr., an attorney in good standing licensed to practice law in the State of North Carolina. On May 7, 2007, Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer were admitted to limited practice in the State of North Carolina for the sole purpose of appearing in this action. On June 4, 2007, Abbott\u2019s counsel first learned that Abbott\u2019s retained expert had been approached by Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer.\n9. As a result of the actions of . Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer, Abbott has been deprived of the services of its retained expert and has been injured in its defense of this action.\nBased upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded as a matter of law:\n1. Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.2, this Court has the discretionary authority to summarily revoke the permission granted to Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.1, on its own motion and in its discretion.\n2. The conduct of Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer in making ex parte contact with Abbott\u2019s retained expert, without Abbott\u2019s knowledge and permission, during the pendency of the Hill litigation was inappropriate and constitutes the appearance of an impropriety.\n3. The conduct of Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer in contacting Abbott\u2019s retained expert, an unrepresented person, without disclosing that their interests were in conflict with Abbott, constitutes the appearance of impropriety and is inconsistent with fair dealings as reflected in Rule 4.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.\n4. This Court has balanced the limited, but substantial right of the plaintiff to select her attorneys against the conduct of Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer and in doing so has taken judicial notice that there are many competent and capable North Carolina lawyers who are able to proceed to trial in complicated litigation in addition to Mr. Elmore. This Court concludes that the conduct set forth above outweighs the plaintiff\u2019s right to select counsel.\nPlaintiff appealed, contending that (1) the trial court erred by concluding that the conduct of attorneys Meyer and Stein violated the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, and (2) the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law were not supported by competent \u00e9vidence in the record. Sisk, 194 N.C. App. at 812, 670 S.E.2d at 353. On 6 January 2009, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court\u2019s disqualification order, finding that the trial court was acting under a \u201cmisapprehension of law\u201d when it determined that the actions taken in Kentucky by plaintiff\u2019s out-of-state counsel violated the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. at 815, 670 S.E.2d at 355.\nAs the Court of Appeals correctly noted, an attorney is not subject to discipline under the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct if the attorney\u2019s conduct conforms to the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of that conduct will occur. N.C. St. B. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 8.5(b)(2) (\u201cDisciplinary authority; Choice of law\u201d), 2010 Ann. R. N.C. 759, 880. Apparently assuming that the predominant effect of the conduct would occur in Kentucky, the Court of Appeals held that because counsel\u2019s behavior did not violate the rules of that state, Rule 8.5 did not allow the conduct to be subject to discipline under the rules of North Carolina. Sisk, 194 N.C. App. at 815, 670 S.E.2d at 355. The Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court\u2019s misapprehension \u201cwas material and changed the outcome,\u201d and therefore, \u201cthe trial court\u2019s subsequent disqualification of counsel was manifestly unsupported by reason and constituted an abuse of discretion. \u201d/d.\nOn 30 April 2009, this Court allowed both Abbott\u2019s petition for discretionary review and plaintiff\u2019s conditional petition for discretionary review as to additional issues. Before this Court, Abbott contends that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering that plaintiff\u2019s out-of-state counsel be disqualified from the instant case and that the Court of Appeals failed to accord sufficient deference to the trial court\u2019s exercise of its discretion. In her conditional petition, plaintiff challenges certain findings of fact made by the trial court and also argues that the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that the actions of the attorneys violated the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. Plaintiff further contends that, in any event, the trial court erred in revoking Stein\u2019s pro hac vice status for action taken solely by Meyer. This Court later allowed the Hospital to file a brief and appear at the hearing of this appeal. Because certain issues raised in plaintiff\u2019s conditional petition involve the findings of fact and conclusions of law that underlie and support the trial court\u2019s discretionary decision to revoke pro hac vice status, we will first address these concerns before turning to the trial court\u2019s subsequent exercise of its discretion.\nWe begin our analysis by considering a trial court\u2019s power to grant and revoke pro hac vice status. This status \u201cis ... not a right but a discretionary privilege which allows out-of-state attorneys to appear pro hac vice in a state\u2019s courts without meeting the state\u2019s bar admission requirements.\u201d In re Smith, 301 N.C. 621, 629, 272 S.E.2d 834, 840 (1981). North Carolina General Statute section 84-4.1 gives the trial court discretionary authority to grant such status to an appropriately qualified attorney, while section 84-4.2 gives the trial court corresponding authority summarily to revoke an order granting pro hac vice admission on the court\u2019s own motion and in its discretion. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 84-4.1, -4.2 (2009). Even before enactment of these statutes, this Court treated admission to practice pro hac vice as a privilege that the trial court has discretion to grant, deny, or revoke. See Manning v. Roanoke & Tar River R.R. Co., 122 N.C. 513, 516, 122 N.C. 824, 828, 28 S.E. 963, 964 (1898) (\u201c[T]he appearance of [out-of-state] counsel is a matter of courtesy in each and every case, and on motion in each case, and only for the occasion on which it is allowed.\u201d). \u201cDecisions regarding whether to disqualify counsel are within the discretion of the trial judge and, absent an abuse of discretion, a trial judge\u2019s ruling on a motion to disqualify will not be disturbed on appeal.\u201d Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 295, 420 S.E.2d 426, 430 (1992). Our review of a trial court\u2019s decision to revoke pro hac vice status is no less deferential.\n(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of North Carolina, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:\n(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and\n(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer\u2019s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer is not subject to discipline if the lawyer\u2019s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer\u2019s conduct will occur.\nPlaintiff argues that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are not supported by evidence in the record and therefore do not in turn support its conclusions of law. In addition, and more specifically, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by concluding as a matter of law that the conduct of the attorneys violated the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. The trial court conducted a hearing on defendants\u2019 motion, during which it considered submissions of the parties and arguments of counsel. In response to plaintiff\u2019s request, the trial court made nine findings of fact and four conclusions of law in its order allowing defendant Abbott\u2019s motion and revoking the pro hac vice status of attorneys Meyer and Stein, as quoted in part above.\n\u201c \u2018[Findings of fact made by the trial judge are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if . . . there is evidence to the contrary.\u2019 \u201d Tillman v. Commercial Credit Loans, Inc., 362 N.C. 93, 100-01, 655 S.E.2d 362, 369 (2008) (quoting Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Fayetteville, 309 N.C. 726, 741, 309 S.E.2d 209, 219 (1983) (second alteration in original)). The trial court\u2019s findings of fact included, in relevant part, that before the dismissal of the Hill litigation, plaintiff\u2019s counsel made ex parte contact with Abbott\u2019s retained expert, an unrepresented person, but deliberately kept him ignorant as to potential claims against Abbott. The trial court also found that as a result of the conduct of plaintiff\u2019s counsel, \u201cAbbott has been deprived of the services of its retained expert and has been injured in its defense of this action.\u201d\nMost of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are uncontested. However, plaintiff contends that there was no evidence to support the trial court\u2019s finding that counsel contacted Abbott\u2019s expert prior to the dismissal of the Hill action and insufficient evidence that counsel\u2019s conduct caused Abbott to lose the expert\u2019s help in the case at bar. As to the former claim, plaintiff argues that the parties had agreed to a dismissal in Hill and had swapped pertinent paperwork when the expert was contacted, but concedes in her brief that the dismissal had not been filed. Although plaintiff contends that the fact that the formality of filing occurred after the contact was immaterial, the trial court\u2019s finding of fact is supported by competent evidence.\nAs to plaintiff\u2019s latter claim, the exhibits before the trial court included the declaration of attorney June K. Ghezzi, who represents Abbott in E. Sak litigation. Attorney Ghezzi averred under oath that, after Abbott\u2019s expert realized he had been contacted by attorneys Stein and Meyer on behalf of the plaintiff in the Froman litigation, the expert would not return telephone calls, letters, or messages and had no contact with attorney Ghezzi or any other attorney with her firm. These statements support the trial court\u2019s finding of fact that counsel\u2019s conduct deprived Abbott of the services of its retained expert. Accordingly, after thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that the two findings of fact contested by plaintiff are supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.\nTurning next to the conclusions of law, we observe that, while generally \u201c [conclusions of law drawn by the trial court from its findings of fact are reviewable de novo on appeal,\u201d id. at 101, 655 S.E.2d at 369, when reviewing the conclusions of law in the instant order, reached in the context of the trial court\u2019s exercise of its discretion, we need determine only whether they are the result of a reasoned decision based upon the specific language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.2. Smith v. Beaufort Cty. Hosp. Ass\u2019n, 141 N.C. App. 203, 210-11, 540 S.E.2d 775, 780 (2000) (stating that section 84-4.2 expressly gives judges discretion summarily to revoke pro hac vice admissions previously allowed and that because the trial court\u2019s \u201cconclusion of law is clearly the result of a reasoned decision,\u201d the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the revocation), aff\u2019d per curiam, 354 N.C. 212, 552 S.E.2d 139 (2001).\nFirst, the trial court concluded as a matter of law that \u201c[p]ursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.2, [it had] the discretionary authority to summarily revoke the permission granted to Mr. Stein and Mr. Meyer under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.1, on its own motion and in its discretion.\u201d As noted above, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.2 provides the trial court precisely this discretion to issue such a summary revocation and therefore expressly supports the trial court\u2019s first conclusion of law.\nThe trial court next concluded that Stein and Meyer\u2019s \u201cex parte contact with Abbott\u2019s retained expert, without Abbott\u2019s knowledge and permission, during the pendency of the Hill litigation was inappropriate and constitutes the appearance of an impropriety.\u201d This conclusion of law is a reasoned decision supported by the trial court\u2019s findings of fact and is consistent with the trial court\u2019s exercise of its discretion under section 84-4.2.\nWe now turn to the trial court\u2019s third conclusion of law, that the conduct of Meyer and Stein in contacting Abbott\u2019s unrepresented expert \u201cwithout disclosing that their interests were in conflict with Abbott, constitutes the appearance of impropriety and is inconsistent with fair dealings as reflected in Rule 4.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.\u201d This conclusion of law is in two parts, the second of which cites for the first time the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court of Appeals held, and plaintiff argues before us, that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiff\u2019s attorneys violated the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct:\nBecause a Kentucky court had already determined that Mr. Meyer\u2019s and Mr. Stein\u2019s actions in a prior Kentucky case did not violate its ethical rules, Rule 8.5 prohibits their actions from now being determined to be subject to disciplinary action pursuant to the North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct.\nSisk, 194 N.C. App. at 815, 670 S.E.2d at 355. The Court of Appeals determined that \u201c[t]he trial court\u2019s conclusions were based upon a misapprehension of law and such misapprehension was material and changed the outcome.\u201d Id. Consequently, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court had abused its discretion and reversed the trial court. Id.\nHowever, in focusing on the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Court of Appeals did not consider the trial court\u2019s independent inherent authority to discipline attorneys. In North Carolina there are two methods for enforcing attorney discipline. In re Delk, 336 N.C. 543, 550, 444 S.E.2d 198, 201 (1994). Under the first method, discipline may be imposed when the Council of the State Bar proceeds against an attorney pursuant to statute. Id; see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-28 (2009). Under the second, a court possesses inherent authority to discipline attorneys. In re Delk, 336 N.C. at 550, 444 S.E.2d. at 201. This authority is not limited by the rules of the State Bar. Id; see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-36 (2009) (\u201cNothing contained in this Article shall be construed as disabling or abridging the inherent powers of the court to deal with its attorneys.\u201d). An attorney admitted pro hac vice is as much subject to this inherent authority of the court as is an attorney licensed in North Carolina, and the discretion summarily to revoke pro hac vice status pursuant to section 84-4.2 is entirely consistent with the inherent disciplinary powers of the court. Thus, while the choice of law provision of Rule 8.5 may control conduct that the Council of the State Bar can discipline, that rule abridges neither a trial court\u2019s inherent authority to discipline attorney misconduct nor its discretion to revoke pro hac vice status under section 84-4.2.\nNevertheless, in exercising its discretion, a trial court may consider the Rules of Professional Conduct when deciding whether to revoke pro hac vice status. Rule 4.3 of the North Carolina Revised Rules of Professional Conduct provides in pertinent part:\nIn dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer shall not:\n(b) state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer\u2019s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.\nN.C. St. B. Rev. R. Prof. Conduct 4.3 (\u201cDealing with unrepresented person\u201d), 2010 Ann. R. N.C. 759, 849. Moreover, the official comment to the rule states that \u201c[t]o avoid a misunderstanding, a lawyer will typically need to identify the lawyer\u2019s client and, where necessary, explain that the client has interests opposed to those of the unrepresented person.\u201d Id. cmt. para. 1.\nHere the trial court found as fact that \u201cAbbott\u2019s retained expert was an unrepresented person, likely not experienced in dealing with legal matters.\u201d It further found that \u201cMr. Meyer contacted Abbott\u2019s retained expert, employed him as a retained expert, and intentionally did not advise [him] that he was contemplating a claim against Abbott Laboratories.\u201d These findings of fact adequately support both parts of the trial court\u2019s dual conclusion of law that the conduct of plaintiff\u2019s counsel (1) \u201cconstituted] the appearance of impropriety\u201d and (2) \u201c[was] inconsistent with fair dealings as reflected in Rule 4.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.\u201d (Emphasis added.) As to the latter conclusion, this Court has not previously considered the extent to which Rule 4.3 applies to expert witnesses. However, we need not address whether the conduct of the attorneys violated this rule because the trial court\u2019s carefully worded conclusion of law states only that counsel\u2019s conduct was inconsistent with it.\nThe trial court\u2019s invocation of Rule 4.3 for guidance, therefore, does not indicate either a misapprehension of the rule or an inappropriate reliance on it. To the contrary, the trial court displayed a nuanced understanding of the discretion accorded it under section 84-4.2. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court was not acting under a \u201cmisapprehension of law\u201d when it reached its decision here.\nIn its fourth and final conclusion of law, the trial court balanced plaintiff\u2019s substantial right to select attorneys of her choice against the conduct of Meyer and Stein. In so doing, the court took judicial' notice that many North Carolina lawyers are capable of handling plaintiff\u2019s case, indicating that the trial court gave adequate regard to the interests of both parties. In light of these findings, the trial court\u2019s conclusion that \u201cthe conduct set forth . . . outweighs the plaintiff\u2019s right to select counsel\u201d is fully supported.\nAfter reviewing the trial court\u2019s carefully considered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking the pro hac vice admission of attorneys Meyer and Stein.\nFinally, plaintiff asks us to consider whether the trial court erred in revoking the pro hac vice status of attorney Stein for the conduct of attorney Meyer. However, the trial court found as fact that Meyer acted with the knowledge and condonation of Stein and that Stein admitted in court that he and Meyer wanted to keep Abbott\u2019s expert \u201cin the black,\u201d that is, ignorant of possible defendants, while contacting him. This finding of fact by the trial court concerning Stein\u2019s involvement is supported by competent evidence and justifies the trial court\u2019s discretionary decision to revoke Stein\u2019s admission.\nFor the foregoing reasons we reverse the Court of Appeals and instruct that court to reinstate the trial court\u2019s order revoking the pro hac vice admissions of attorneys Meyer and Stein.\nREVERSED.\n. Specifically, Rule 8.5 provides in pertinent part:\n. As adumbrated above, because we base our holding on the inherent power of the trial court, we need not address the Court of Appeals tacit assumption that the predominant effect of the actions of attorneys Meyer and Stein would not be in North Carolina.", "type": "majority", "author": "EDMUNDS, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Office of Michael W. Patrick, by Michael W. Patrick, for plaintiff-appellee/appellant.", "Roberts & Stevens, P.A., by James W. Williams and Ann-Patton Homthal, for defendant-appellants/appellees Abbott Laboratories and Abbott Laboratories, Inc.", "Van Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes and Davis, P.A., by Roy W. Davis, Jr., for defendant-appellee Transylvania Community Hospital, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "KIMBERLY S. SISK, Individually and as Guardian ad Litem of SLADE AXEL SISK, a minor v. TRANSYLVANIA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, INC.; ABBOTT LABORATORIES; and ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC.\nNo. 67PA09\n(Filed 17 June 2010)\n1. Attorneys\u2014 pro hac vice admission \u2014 revocation\u2014court\u2019s discretion\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.1 gives the trial court discretionary authority to grant pro hac vice status to an appropriately qualified attorney, while N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.2 gives the court the authority to summarily revoke that status on its own motion and in its discretion. Even before the statutes were enacted, pro hac vice admission was treated by the Supreme Court as a privilege that the trial court has the discretion to grant, deny, or revoke.\n2. Attorneys\u2014 pro hac vice admission \u2014 revocation\u2014ex parte contact with witness \u2014 findings supported by evidence\nWhere the trial court had revoked the pro hac vice admission of two attorneys for ex parte contact with an expert in actions in another state, the court\u2019s findings about contact with the witness and prejudice to defendant Abbott were supported by the evidence.\n3. Attorneys\u2014 pro hac vice admission \u2014 revocation\u2014discretionary authority of court\nThe trial court\u2019s conclusion that it had the discretionary authority to summarily revoke the pro hac vice admission of two attorneys was supported by statutes.\n4. Attorneys\u2014 pro hac vice admission \u2014 revocation\u2014ex parte contact with witness\nWhere the trial court revoked the pro hac vice admission of two attorneys, its conclusion that ex parte contact with a defense expert in actions in another state was inappropriate and constitutes the appearance of impropriety was a reasoned decision supported by the findings.\n5. Attorneys\u2014 pro hac vice admission \u2014 revocation\u2014inherent authority to discipline attorneys \u2014 not limited by State Bar\nThe trial court\u2019s inherent authority to discipline attorneys is not limited by the rules of the State Bar, but the trial court may consider the Rules of Professional Conduct when deciding whether to revoke pro hac vice status. The trial court\u2019s invocation of Rule 4.3 of the Rules of Professional Conduct for guidance in this case does not indicate either a misapprehension of the rule or ah inappropriate reliance on it, and the conclusion that the ex parte contact with the defense witness constituted an appearance of impropriety and was inconsistent with the fair dealings reflected in Rule 4.3 was supported by the findings.\n6. Attorneys\u2014 pro hac vice admission revoked \u2014 plaintiff\u2019s right to select counsel \u2014 outweighed by conduct\nWhere the trial court revoked the pro hac vice admission of two attorneys, the conclusion that the attorneys\u2019 conduct outweighed the plaintiff\u2019s right to select counsel was fully supported by the findings.\n7. Attorneys\u2014 pro hac vice admission \u2014 revoked for two attorneys for conduct of one\nThe trial court\u2018s discretionary decision to revoke the pro hac vice admission of two attorneys was justified, even though only one attorney had ex parte contact with a defense witness, where both attorneys had knowledge of and approved the contact, and both intended to keep the defense expert ignorant of the possible conflict of interest.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, 194 N.C. App. 811, 670 S.E.2d 352 (2009), reversing an order entered 4 December 2007 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Superior Court, Transylvania County. Heard in the Supreme Court 17 November 2009.\nLaw Office of Michael W. Patrick, by Michael W. Patrick, for plaintiff-appellee/appellant.\nRoberts & Stevens, P.A., by James W. Williams and Ann-Patton Homthal, for defendant-appellants/appellees Abbott Laboratories and Abbott Laboratories, Inc.\nVan Winkle, Buck, Wall, Starnes and Davis, P.A., by Roy W. Davis, Jr., for defendant-appellee Transylvania Community Hospital, Inc." }, "file_name": "0172-01", "first_page_order": 266, "last_page_order": 278 }