{ "id": 4152349, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF D.S.", "name_abbreviation": "In re D.S.", "decision_date": "2010-06-17", "docket_number": "No. 273PA09", "first_page": "184", "last_page": "194", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 N.C. 184" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "682 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "628 S.E.2d 760", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635608, 12635609, 12635610 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/628/0760-01", "/se2d/628/0760-02", "/se2d/628/0760-03" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 704", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633351 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "707-08", "parenthetical": "holding that the statutory timelines governing the scheduling of the initial post-disposition custody review hearing under section 7B-906(a), the filing of permanency planning orders under section 7B-907(c" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0704-01" ] }, { "cite": "650 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639340 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "458" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/650/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3794743 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 N.C. App. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8469558 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/168/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8437736 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "443-445", "parenthetical": "holding that the statutory timelines governing the scheduling of the initial post-disposition custody review hearing under section 7B-906(a), the filing of permanency planning orders under section 7B-907(c" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 14, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "828", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "828" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4737744 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81-82", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 N.C. App. 301", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8156253 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "303" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/186/0301-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 S.E.2d 709", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 16, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "711" }, { "page": "712" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "712" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "711" }, { "page": "711" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 919, "char_count": 25317, "ocr_confidence": 0.766, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.420248318162954e-07, "percentile": 0.878583847938625 }, "sha256": "4498f59d1e25a1498c7bf871495e6da48949d1a796f3edea203c0d61cebb9120", "simhash": "1:09d8f25f7527cd12", "word_count": 3975 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:37.384656+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF D.S." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Justice.\nHere we address whether a Robeson County juvenile court counselor (\u201cJCC\u201d) complied with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703 when the JCC filed a petition alleging D.S. to be delinquent, and if not, whether the failure to do so deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals determined that the JCC did not timely file the juvenile delinquency petition alleging sexual battery in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703. In re D.S., \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 682 S.E.2d 709, 711 (2009). Relying on a prior opinion from that court, which holds that such failure divests the district court of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals \u201cvacate [d] the sexual battery adjudication.\u201d Id. at \u2014, 682 S.E.2d at 710-11 (citing In re J.B., 186 N.C. App. 301, 303, 650 S.E.2d 457, 458 (2007)). Because we conclude that the JCC here timely filed the juvenile delinquency petition in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703, which in any event does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction, we reverse.\nThe record tends to show that in September 2007, D.S. and A.A. were fifth grade classmates. It was alleged that during class on 21 September 2007, D.S. touched A.A. multiple times on her buttocks and between her legs with a straw-like candy, known as Pixy Stix. Later A.A. told School Resource Officer Denise Ward (\u201cSRO Ward\u201d) what had occurred.\nSRO Ward filed a complaint with Robeson County JCC Chris Britt (\u201cMr. Britt\u201d) alleging D.S. to be delinquent for committing simple assault by \u201ctouching [A.A.] on her butt, [two] times with his hands\u201d on 21 September 2007, in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-33(a). Mr. Britt received the complaint on 25 September 2007, and on 10 October 2007, he approved the complaint for filing. Based thereon, Mr. Britt filed a juvenile delinquency petition alleging simple assault with the clerk of superior court. On 15 November 2007, Mr. Britt received a second complaint from SRO Ward regarding the same 21 September 2007 incident. This complaint alleged D.S. had violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.5 in that D.S. \u201cfor the purpose of sexual arousal or sexual gratification engage [d] in sexual contact, by placing his hand on the buttocks of . . . [A.A.], by force and against [her] will.\u201d On 16 November 2007, Mr. Britt approved this complaint for filing and filed a second juvenile delinquency petition with the clerk\u2019s office, this time alleging sexual battery.\nIn April 2008 the District Court in Robeson County entered an adjudication order finding D.S. delinquent for committing both offenses. The court then entered an order imposing a Level I disposition, which placed D.S. on probation for a period of up to twelve months. D.S. appealed the adjudication order to the Court of Appeals.\nIn the Court of Appeals D.S. argued that the trial court erred by adjudicating him delinquent of both simple assault and sexual battery. The Court of Appeals rejected D.S.\u2019s arguments as to simple assault and affirmed the trial court\u2019s delinquency adjudication based on that charge. Id. at \u2014, 682 S.E.2d at 712. However, the court agreed with D.S. that \u201cthe trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the second petition alleging sexual battery\u201d because the JCC did not file it within the time period mandated by section 7B-1703. Id. at-, 682 S.E.2d at 711. The court explained:\nIn the case before us, the [JCC] received all of the information regarding the allegations against [D.S.] on 25 September 2007, but failed to act swiftly when he filed the second petition over 50 days later. Because it was untimely filed, the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the second petition alleging sexual battery. Therefore, the order adjudicating D.S. as a delinquent juvenile on the allegations of sexual battery must be vacated.\nId. at -, 682 S.E.2d at 711. Having so concluded, the court \u201cvacate[d] the adjudication and disposition orders for D.S. on the allegations of sexual battery.\u201d Id. at-, 682 S.E.2d at 712.\nOn 6 July 2009, the State filed a petition for discretionary review with this Court seeking review of the following two issues:\nDid the Court of Appeals err by holding that the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703 are jurisdictional prerequisites in juvenile delinquency cases?\nEven if N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703 is a jurisdictional statute, did the Court of Appeals err by holding the trial court had no jurisdiction where the complaint alleging sexual battery was received by the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention one day prior to the filing of the juvenile petition?\nWe allowed the State\u2019s petition for discretionary review.\nThe State argues that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that: (1) The N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703 timing requirements are prerequisites for the district court to obtain subject matter jurisdiction in a juvenile delinquency case; and (2) Mr. Britt did not comply with these requirements. We agree, although we address these issues in reverse order.\nOur principal task here is to interpret the statute. In determining the meaning of a statute, this Court follows traditional rules of statutory construction.\nLegislative intent controls the meaning of a statute; and in ascertaining this intent, a court must consider the act as a whole, weighing the language of the statute, its spirit, and that which the statute seeks to accomplish. The statute\u2019s words should be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless the context requires them to be construed differently.\nShelton v. Morehead Mem\u2019l Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 81-82, 347 S.E.2d 824, 828 (1986) (citations omitted). Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law and are reviewed de novo. E.g., Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998) (citation omitted).\nThe statutory timeline for juvenile delinquency petitions is set forth in section 7B-1703, which provides in pertinent part:\n(a) The juvenile court counselor shall complete evaluation of a complaint within 15 days of receipt of the complaint, with an extension for a maximum of 15 additional days at the discretion of the chief court counselor. The juvenile court counselor shall decide within this time period whether a complaint shall be filed as a juvenile petition.\n(b) Except as provided in G.S. 7B-1706, if the juvenile court counselor determines that a complaint should be filed as a petition, the counselor shall file the petition as soon as practicable, but in any event within 15 days after the complaint is received, with an extension for a maximum \u00f3f 15 additional days at the discretion of the chief court counselor. The juvenile court counselor shall .assist the complainant when necessary with the preparation and filing of the petition, shall include on it the date and the words \u201cApproved for Filing\u201d, shall sign it, and shall transmit it to the clerk of superior court.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703(a), (b) (2007).\nHere we first hold that the JCC, Mr. Britt, complied with the statute. Section 7B-1703 states that a JCC has \u201c15 days after the complaint is received, with an extension for a maximum of 15 additional days at the discretion of the chief court counselor,\u201d to file a complaint as a juvenile petition. Id. \u00a7 7B-1703(b). Thus, we look for the meaning of the phrase \u201cafter the complaint is received.\u201d Id.\nThe State argues that the Court of Appeals interpreted the term \u201ccomplaint\u201d in a manner that completely contravenes the plain language of section 7B-1703. Specifically, the State contends that (1) a \u201ccomplaint\u201d is a written, sworn document that contains the allegation^) against the juvenile; (2) as evidenced by Chapter 7B, Article 17, the JCC\u2019s role in screening and evaluating a complaint is largely ministerial and limited to considering the specific charge(s) alleged therein; (3) Mr. Britt could not have filed a petition alleging sexual battery based upon the first complaint, which did not allege that D.S. had committed sexual battery; (4) because the second complaint contained new allegations, that complaint was \u201creceived\u201d by Mr. Britt on 15 November 2007; and (5) therefore, Mr. Britt complied with section 7B-1703 by filing the petition alleging sexual battery the next day, 16 November 2007.\nThe juvenile responds that 15 November 2007 could only qualify as the date Mr. Britt \u201creceived\u201d the second complaint if the second complaint was based on new information or evidence, not merely new allegations. Further, he contends that Mr.' Britt essentially \u201cbur[ied] his head in the sand and ignore [d] the facts\u201d behind the first complaint and that Mr. Britt should have conducted a \u201creasonable investigation based on the facts [that were] readily available\u201d at the time. Had Mr. Britt done so, the juvenile maintains, Mr. Britt would or should have known to include the sexual battery allegation in the first petition.\nThe Court of Appeals explicitly acknowledged that two complaints were filed here. In re D.S.,-N.C. App. at-, 682 S.E.2d at 711. Despite this finding, the court appeared to conclude that because both petitions apparently arose from the same incident, and because Mr. Britt learned of these facts when he received the first complaint, the date he \u201creceived\u201d the complaint alleging sexual battery was 25 September 2007, not 15 November 2007. Id. at \u2022 \u2014 , 682 S.E.2d at 711. In reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals treated the underlying allegations, rather than the document itself, as the \u201ccomplaint\u201d and emphasized the JCC\u2019s obligation \u201cto act swiftly\u201d in dealing with juvenile delinquency complaints. Id. at-, 682 S.E.2d at 711.\nWhile the term \u201ccomplaint\u201d is not defined in Chapter 7B, it is defined in the North Carolina Administrative Code as: \u201cA written allegation that a juvenile is delinquent or undisciplined with a signature verifying that the allegation is true. A complaint initiates the intake process.\u201d 28 NCAC 4A.0101 (Apr. 2003); see also Lou A. Newman et al., North Carolina Juvenile Defender Manual 78 (John Rubin ed., School of Gov\u2019t, Chapel Hill, N.C. 2008) [hereinafter Newman, Juvenile Defender] (stating that a \u201c[c]omplaint is the report from a law enforcement officer or from a member of the community made to the [JCC]\u2019s office alleging delinquent acts committed by a juvenile\u201d). The Administrative Code further provides:\n(a) Complaints-Complaints alleging that a juvenile \u2022 is undisciplined or delinquent are accepted by a juvenile court counselor for evaluation. All complaints shall be in writing and must contain the following:\n(1) The juvenile\u2019s name;\n(2) The juvenile\u2019s age and date of birth;\n(3) The name of the juvenile\u2019s parents, guardians, or custodians;\n(4) The juvenile\u2019s home address;\n(5) The facts supporting any allegation that a juvenile is undisciplined or delinquent;\n(6) The date the complaint is received by the court counselor;\n(7) The complainant\u2019s name, address, and telephone number; and\n(8) The complainant\u2019s signature, verified before an official authorized to administer oaths.\n28 NCAC 4A .0102 (Apr. 2003). These provisions, which define \u201ccomplaint\u201d and specify its requisite contents, indicate, as the State suggests, that a \u201ccomplaint\u201d is a written and sworn document whose primary purpose is to articulate specific allegation(s) of delinquency to the JCC.\nChapter 7B, Article 17, entitled \u201cScreening of Delinquency and Undisciplined Complaints,\u201d entrusts the JCC the primary responsibility for \u201cintake,\u201d defined as \u201c[t]he with process of screening and evaluating a complaint alleging that a juvenile is delinquent ... to determine whether the complaint should be filed as a petition,\u201d and articulates the JCC\u2019s responsibilities and the guidelines for fulfilling them. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1501(13), -1700 to -1707 (2007). As with the section 7B-1703 timelines, which begin to run \u201cwhen the complaint is received,\u201d the JCC\u2019s initial intake responsibility regarding a juvenile delinquency matter begins \u201c[w]hen a complaint is received.\u201d Id. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1701, -1703. \u201cThe pleading in a juvenile action is the petition,\u201d and a juvenile delinquency \u201caction is commenced by the filing of a petition in the . . . office\u201d of the clerk of superior court. N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1801, -1804 (2007); see also Newman, Juvenile Defender 78 (stating that the petition \u201cis the document filed in the office of the clerk of superior court initiating a juvenile court proceeding\u201d). At oral argument the parties indicated that complainants, especially law enforcement officers, typically file a complaint by using one of the AOC\u2019s standard petition forms, and generally, the complaint and petition are the same document. The State further indicated that when this is done, the \u201ccomplaint\u201d becomes the \u201cpetition\u201d when the JCC marks the \u201cApproved for Filing\u201d box on the AOC form, dates and signs the form, and files it with the clerk of superior court. See Newman, Juvenile Defender 78 (\u201cThe complaint is typically recorded on the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) juvenile petition form.\u201d). It appears that SRO Ward followed this course of action here, submitting the first complaint on the AOC petition form used for misdemeanor assaults (AOC-J-312, Rev. 7/06) and the second complaint on the AOC\u2019s general juvenile delinquency petition form (AOC-J-310, Rev. 7/06).\nThese authorities governing the JCC\u2019s intake obligations support the State\u2019s argument that the JCC\u2019s function is strictly limited, and consequently, that Mr. Britt need not have filed a petition alleging sexual battery based on the allegations contained in the first complaint. We conclude that the natural and ordinary meaning of the phrase, \u201cwhen the complaint is received,\u201d is the date on which the JCC\u2019s office receives a document alleging that a juvenile is delinquent, and we further conclude that nothing about \u201cthe context requires [this phrase] to be construed differently.\u201d Shelton, 318 N.C. at 82, 347 S.E.2d at 828.\nUnder the juvenile code, once the JCC receives a complaint, the JCC must \u201cmake a preliminary determination\u201d as to whether he is statutorily barred from filing or whether he is obligated to \u201cfile the complaint as a petition.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1701. The JCC must \u201cwithout further inquiry... refuse authorization to file the complaint as a petition\u201d if the complaint does not state a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court, does not contain sufficient facts to legally support the charge alleged therein, or is frivolous. Id. If the JCC \u201cfinds reasonable grounds to believe that the juvenile has committed one of the . . . nondivertible offenses\u201d specified in section 7B-1701, the JCC must, \u201cwithout further inquiry,.. . authorize the complaint to be filed as a petition.\u201d Id. When, as here, the JCC\u2019s authority, or lack thereof, to file a complaint as a petition is not specifically mandated by section 7B-1701, the JCC must conduct an evaluation to \u201cdetermine whether a complaint should be filed as a petition, the juvenile [should be] diverted [to a diversion plan] pursuant to G.S. 7B-1706, or the case [should be] resolved without further action.\u201d Id. \u00a7 7B-1702. Section 7B-1703 instructs the JCC to decide whether to file the complaint as a petition and if he decides to do so, to file the petition in accordance with the timelines contained therein. Id. \u00a7 7B-1703. Nothing in these provisions suggests, as D.S. argues, that the JCC is permitted, let alone obligated, to investigate beyond the specific allegations contained in the complaint to determine every possible criminal offense that may arise or to include additional allegations in the petition that were not specifically articulated in the complaint. However, the JCC is expressly prohibited from \u201cengaging] in field investigations to substantiate complaints [and from] . . . producing] supplementary evidence\u201d during the entire \u201cintake\u201d process, although the JCC is permitted to \u201crefer complainants to law enforcement agencies for those purposes.\u201d Id. \u00a7 7B-1700. Viewing these statutory provisions in conjunction with the Administrative Code provisions that define the term \u201ccomplaint\u201d and articulate its requisite components, and given the strictly defined role our legislature intended for the JCC during intake, Mr. Britt need not have filed a petition alleging sexual battery based on the first complaint because, even though that complaint alleged that D.S. had touched A.A. on her buttocks and between her legs, it did not allege that D.S. had committed sexual battery or had touched A.A. for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification.\nMoreover, while we agree with the Court of Appeals and D.S. that some of the purposes and policies articulated in section 7B-1500 and the timelines contained in section 7B-1703 indicate that our legislature intended for juvenile delinquency cases to be resolved expeditiously, we do not believe we are thereby required to deviate from the plain and ordinary meaning of the phrase \u201cafter the complaint is received.\u201d In addition to the need for swift action that the Court of Appeals and D.S. emphasize, section 7B-1500 articulates the following purposes and policies underlying the statutes related to undisciplined and delinquent juveniles:\n(1) To protect the public from acts of delinquency.\n(2) To deter delinquency and crime, including patterns of repeat offending:\na. By providing swift, effective dispositions that emphasize the juvenile offender\u2019s accountability for the juvenile\u2019s actions; and\nb. By providing appropriate rehabilitative services to juveniles and their families. \u2022\n(3) To provide an effective system of intake services for the screening and evaluation of complaints and, in appropriate cases, where court intervention is not necessary to ensure public' safety, to refer juveniles to community-based resources.\n(4) To provide uniform procedures that assure fairness and equity; that protect the constitutional rights of juveniles, parents, and victims; and that encourage the court and others involved with juvenile offenders to proceed with all possible speed in making and implementing determinations required by this Subchapter.\nId. \u00a7 7B-1500 (2007); see also id. \u00a7 7B-2500 (2007) (stating that \u201c[t]he purpose of dispositions in juvenile actions is to design an appropriate plan to meet the needs of the juvenile and to achieve the objectives of the State in exercising jurisdiction, including the protection of the public,\u201d and in \u201cdevelop[ing] a disposition in each case,\u201d courts should \u201c[e]mphasize[] accountability and responsibility\u201d by the juvenile and the adult who is responsible for the juvenile and \u201c[p]rovide[] the appropriate consequences, treatment, training, and rehabilitation to assist the juvenile toward becoming a nonoffending, responsible, and productive member of the community\u201d). Nothing in these statutory provisions indicates our legislature\u2019s intent to elevate the expediency of the JCC\u2019s intake obligations over these other articulated purposes, as the Court of Appeals appeared to conclude and D.S. argues here. Further, the Court of Appeals\u2019 and D.S.\u2019s proffered interpretation of section 7B-1703 undermines the other stated purposes articulated in sections 7B-1500 and 7B-2500.\nWe further conclude that our legislature did not intend the timing requirements of section 7B-1703 to be jurisdictional. Without mentioning section 7B-1601, \u201cJurisdiction over delinquent juveniles,\u201d D.S. argues that Mr. Britt\u2019s alleged failure to comply with the timeline at issue deprived the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. \u00a7 7B-1601 (2007). In Chapter 7B, Article 16, entitled \u201cJurisdiction,\u201d the legislature gave district courts broad jurisdiction over delinquent juvenile cases. Id. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-1600 to -1604 (2007). \u201cThe court has exclusive, original jurisdiction over any case involving a juvenile who is alleged to be delinquent. For purposes of determining jurisdiction, the age of the juvenile at the time of the alleged offense governs.\u201d Id. \u00a7 7B-1601(a). N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1501(4) defines \u201c \u2018Court\u2019 \u201d as \u201c[t]he district court division of the General Court of Justice,\u201d and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1501(7) defines \u201c[delinquent juvenile\u201d as \u201c[a]ny juvenile who, while less than 16 years of age but at least 6 years of age, commits a crime or infraction under State law or under an ordinance of local government ... or who commits indirect contempt by a juvenile as defined in G.S. 5A-31\u201d. Id. \u00a7 7B-1501(4), -(7) (2007).\nOn its face section 7B-1703 does not mention jurisdiction, nor does it indicate that a JCC\u2019s failure to meet the timing requirements contained therein divests the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. We believe that had the legislature intended section 7B-1703 to implicate subject matter jurisdiction, the legislature would have either included these requirements in Chapter 7B, Article 16 or expressly stated so in section 7B-1703 itself. See id. \u00a7 7B-1802 (2007) (\u201cThe petition shall allege the facts that invoke jurisdiction over the juvenile.\u201d). Because the legislature did neither, we conclude that it did not intend for the section 7B-1703 timelines to function as prerequisites for district court jurisdiction over allegedly delinquent juveniles. We note that this decision is consistent with the conclusions reached in prior North Carolina appellate decisions that have addressed Chapter 7B timeline requirements and jurisdiction, particularly in the contexts of abuse, neglect, and dependency and termination of parental rights. See, e.g., In re C.L.C., 171 N.C. App. 438, 443-445, 615 S.E.2d 704, 707-08 (2005) (holding that the statutory timelines governing the scheduling of the initial post-disposition custody review hearing under section 7B-906(a), the filing of permanency planning orders under section 7B-907(c), and the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights under section 7B-907(e) are \u201c \u2018directory, rather than mandatory and thus, not jurisdictional\u2019 \u201d (quoting In re B.M., 168 N.C. App. 350, 354, 607 S.E.2d 698, 701 (2005))), aff\u2019d per curiam in part and disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 360 N.C. 475, 628 S.E.2d 760 (2006).\nWe conclude that the JCC here (Mr. Britt) complied with the time-lines contained in section 7B-1703 by filing the juvenile petition alleging sexual battery one day after receiving the juvenile complaint alleging sexual battery. Moreover, we conclude that our legislature did not intend for these timelines to implicate subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the issues before this Court on appeal and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of D.S.\u2019s remaining assignments of error related to the sexual battery adjudication.\nREVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.\n. The Administrative Code provisions regarding \u201cJuvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention\u201d are implemented by the Department of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention under the rulemaking authority granted to it by our legislature. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 143B-512(a), -516 (2007); see also 28 NCAC 1A .0101 (Apr. 2003).\n. \u201c \u2018Intake\u2019 \u201d is defined by statute as: \u201cThe process of screening and evaluating a complaint alleging that a juvenile is delinquent or undisciplined to determine whether the complaint should be filed as a petition.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1501(13) (2007).\n. JCC is defined as: \u201cA person responsible for intake services and court supervision services to juveniles under the supervision of the chief court counselor.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1501(18a) (2007).", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Peter Wood for juvenile-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF D.S.\nNo. 273PA09\n(Filed 17 June 2010)\nJuveniles \u2014 delinquency\u2014timeliness of filing petition \u2014 subject matter jurisdiction\nThe Court of Appeals erred by concluding that a juvenile court counselor (JCC) failed to timely file a juvenile delinquency petition alleging sexual battery in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703, and the case is reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the juvenile\u2019s remaining assignments of error related to the sexual battery adjudication because: (1) the JCC could not have filed a petition alleging sexual battery based upon the first complaint which did not allege that the juvenile had committed sexual battery, the second complaint contained new allegations of sexual battery, and the JCC complied with the timelines contained in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703 by filing the juvenile petition alleging sexual battery one day after receiving that complaint; and (2) nothing in the pertinent provisions suggested that the JCC is permitted, let alone obligated, to investigate beyond the specific allegations contained in the complaint to determine every possible criminal offense that may arise or to include additional allegations in the petition that were not specifically articulated in the complaint. Furthermore, the legislature did not intend for the N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1703 timelines to function as prerequisites for district court subject matter jurisdiction over allegedly delinquent juveniles.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, 197 N.C. App. -, 682 S.E.2d 709 (2009), affirming in part and vacating in part adjudication and disposition orders entered 16 April 2008 by Judge James G. Bell in District Court, Robeson County. Heard in the Supreme Court 6 January 2010.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by LaToya B. Powell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nPeter Wood for juvenile-appellee." }, "file_name": "0184-01", "first_page_order": 278, "last_page_order": 288 }