{ "id": 4152838, "name": "VIKTORIA KING, a minor, by and through her parent, REVONDIA HARVEY-BARROW v. BEAUFORT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and JEFFREY MOSS, Superintendent, Beaufort County Schools, in his official capacity", "name_abbreviation": "King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort County Board of Education", "decision_date": "2010-10-08", "docket_number": "No. 480A09", "first_page": "368", "last_page": "393", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 N.C. 368" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "643 S.E.2d 920", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12638286 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/643/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 267", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5920475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "plurality" }, { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "plurality" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 U.S. 325", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11959437 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350", "parenthetical": "Powell, J., concurring" }, { "page": "740", "parenthetical": "Powell, J., concurring" }, { "page": "340" }, { "page": "733" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/469/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 U.S. 479", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6171794 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "237" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/364/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 330", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722480 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343", "parenthetical": "noting that strict scrutiny places \"a heavy burden of justification ... on the State\"" }, { "page": "284", "parenthetical": "noting that strict scrutiny places \"a heavy burden of justification ... on the State\"" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "285" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0330-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 783", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 776", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4730236 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0776-01" ] }, { "cite": "350 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "369", "parenthetical": "indicating that to survive strict scrutiny, a law \"must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interests at stake\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "83 N.C. App. 345", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8358568 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "indicating that to survive strict scrutiny, a law \"must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interests at stake\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/83/0345-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 N.E.2d 1088", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1096", "parenthetical": "\"[A] student's interest in a public education can be forfeited by violating school rules.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "421 Mass. 117", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mass.", "case_ids": [ 861535 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "131", "parenthetical": "\"[A] student's interest in a public education can be forfeited by violating school rules.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mass/421/0117-01" ] }, { "cite": "419 U.S. 565", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177671 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580", "parenthetical": "\"[O]ur schools are vast and complex. Some modicum- of discipline and order is essential if the educational function is to be performed.\"" }, { "page": "738", "parenthetical": "\"[O]ur schools are vast and complex. Some modicum- of discipline and order is essential if the educational function is to be performed.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/419/0565-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393", "parenthetical": "\"Under strict scrutiny, a challenged governmental action is unconstitutional if the State cannot establish that it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.\" (citation omitted)" }, { "page": "393", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219939 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377-78", "parenthetical": "\"Under strict scrutiny, a challenged governmental action is unconstitutional if the State cannot establish that it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.\" (citation omitted)" }, { "page": "377-78" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "248 Educ. L. Rep. 19", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "Educ. L. Rep.", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27-28", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004 WY 162", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "WY", "case_ids": [ 9173864 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 25" }, { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p3d/102/0868-01" ] }, { "cite": "714 A.2d 1012", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "case_ids": [ 11718011, 559343 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1014" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/a2d/714/1012-01", "/pa/552/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "552 Pa. 245", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Pa.", "case_ids": [ 559343 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/pa/552/0245-01" ] }, { "cite": "261 Neb. 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 1086934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488" }, { "page": "677" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/261/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.W.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "226 Mich. App. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Mich. App.", "case_ids": [ 487639 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379-81", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/mich-app/226/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "768 N.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 9424161 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ne2d/768/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "810 N.E.2d 637", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "642" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5433358 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "156 Fla. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Fla.", "case_ids": [ 1960287 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "225" }, { "page": "893" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/fla/156/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "17 Ariz. App. 91", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz. App.", "case_ids": [ 1228539 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "94" }, { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz-app/17/0091-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "455" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12167895 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 S.E.2d 138", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4735680, 4736315, 4735915, 4739582 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0281-04", "/nc/318/0281-03", "/nc/318/0281-02", "/nc/318/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 S.E.2d 222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "80 N.C. App. 683", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8525486 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/80/0683-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532" }, { "page": "531" }, { "page": "530" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "767" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he constitutional guarantee that tuition shall be free and the schools equally open to all is necessarily subject to reasonable regulations to enforce discipline by expulsion of the disorderly and protection of the morals and health of the pupils.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655779 ], "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-71" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/137/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "\"[E]qual access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process.\" (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "113" }, { "page": "113" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575668 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "\"[E]qual access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process.\" (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "618" }, { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255", "parenthetical": "\"Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he right to education provided in the state constitution is a right to a sound basic education.\"" }, { "page": "252" }, { "page": "347" }, { "page": "255" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "261" }, { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139626 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "347", "parenthetical": "\"Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.\" (emphasis added)" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "347" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 L. Ed. 2d 230", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "489 U.S. 1033", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12058720, 12058826, 12058891, 12059090, 12059189, 12059030, 12058651, 12058972, 12059262 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/489/1033-02", "/us/489/1033-03", "/us/489/1033-04", "/us/489/1033-07", "/us/489/1033-08", "/us/489/1033-06", "/us/489/1033-01", "/us/489/1033-05", "/us/489/1033-09" ] }, { "cite": "858 F.2d 945", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10532350 ], "year": 1988, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/858/0945-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 L. Ed. 2d 732", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "476 U.S. 1165", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12444, 12982, 12847 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/476/1165-02", "/us/476/1165-03", "/us/476/1165-01" ] }, { "cite": "310 S.E.2d 301", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "ordering remand where the trial court could not have been aware of the correct legal standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "310 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2394579 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "ordering remand where the trial court could not have been aware of the correct legal standard" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/310/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "applying intermediate scrutiny to state constitutional challenge" }, { "page": "765-66", "parenthetical": "\"Judicial districts will be sustained if the legislature's formulations advance important governmental interests ....\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151473 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524", "parenthetical": "applying intermediate scrutiny to state constitutional challenge" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 L. Ed. 2d 396", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "552 U.S. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 287", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3737474 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0287-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 U.S. 675", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6211457 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "686", "parenthetical": "\"We have recognized that 'maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures ....'\" (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733)" }, { "page": "560", "parenthetical": "\"We have recognized that 'maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures ....'\" (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733)" }, { "page": "560", "parenthetical": "\"Given the school's need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.\" (emphasis added)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/478/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 197", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637343 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "199", "parenthetical": "quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111, 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "562 S.E.2d 377", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 219939 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617146 ], "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768-69" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 S.E.2d 106", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "113", "parenthetical": "access to education" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 609", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575668 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "618", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "618" }, { "page": "618" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0609-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "254" }, { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "255", "parenthetical": "quality of education" }, { "page": "255-56" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139626 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "457 U.S. 202", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187607 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221-23" }, { "page": "801-03" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/457/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 W. Va. 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "W. Va.", "case_ids": [ 11898423 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "532", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" }, { "page": "351", "parenthetical": "footnote omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/w-va/200/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 U.S. 169", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1782829 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "279", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/408/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 728", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 328", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150627 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0328-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 U.S. 535", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 368014 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "right to procreate" }, { "parenthetical": "right to procreate" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/316/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "415 U.S. 651", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6179827 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1974, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/415/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 U.S. 618", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177874 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "right to interstate travel" }, { "parenthetical": "right to interstate travel" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/394/0618-01" ] }, { "cite": "405 U.S. 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11721475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "right to vote" }, { "parenthetical": "right to vote" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/405/0134-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 U.S. 113", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11957048 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "right to abortion" }, { "parenthetical": "right to abortion" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/410/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 U.S. 374", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6183806 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "right to marry" }, { "parenthetical": "right to marry" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/434/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 Vand. L. Rev. 793", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Vand. L. Rev.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "862-71", "parenthetical": "concluding that strict scrutiny, especially when fundamental rights are involved, is not always \"fatal in fact\" in federal cases" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "393 U.S. 503", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11318417 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507", "parenthetical": "recognizing the \"comprehensive authority\" of school officials to control conduct in the schools within \"fundamental constitutional safeguards\"" }, { "page": "738", "parenthetical": "recognizing the \"comprehensive authority\" of school officials to control conduct in the schools within \"fundamental constitutional safeguards\"" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "741" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "741", "parenthetical": "stating that a student's conduct that \"materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder\" is not \"immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/393/0503-01" ] }, { "cite": "269 S.E.2d 142", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561018 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "346", "parenthetical": "equal protection" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 657", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535852 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "681" }, { "page": "681" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0657-01" ] }, { "cite": "594 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" }, { "page": "15", "parenthetical": "due process and equal protection" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2986939 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "554 U.S. 570", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3677081 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/554/0570-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350-51", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151071 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172-73", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "according this right \"to all children . . ., regardless of their respective ages or needs,\" id. at 172, 675 S.E.2d at 350" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987054 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617", "parenthetical": "according this right \"to all children . . ., regardless of their respective ages or needs,\" id. at 172, 675 S.E.2d at 350" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "489 S.E.2d 880", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "888" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 97", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551301 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0097-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3736123 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111, 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "558 S.E.2d 490", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 161", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220182 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "166" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0161-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 121", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132031 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "765-66", "parenthetical": "holding that \"the right to vote in superior court elections on substantially equal terms is a quasi-fundamental right\" that is \"reviewed under intermediate scrutiny\"" }, { "page": "765", "parenthetical": "applying intermediate scrutiny when considering equal protection challenges to judicial districts allegedly drawn in violation of the N.C. Constitution and analogizing that controversy to federal cases considering challenges based on rights guaranteed under the First Amendment" }, { "page": "764-66" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 518", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151473 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0518-01" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "261", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he administration of the pub-lie schools of the state is best left to the legislative and executive branches of government.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "requiring that a school principal and superintendent act together in issuing a long-term suspension" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "352 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "84 N.C. App. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 12167895 ], "year": 1987, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/84/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 S.E.2d 527", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "223 N.C. 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8617146 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1944, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" }, { "page": "769" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/223/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 S.E. 46", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "47", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655779 ], "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-71", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/137/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 336", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139626 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0336-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "771" }, { "page": "770-71" }, { "page": "770-71" }, { "page": "772-73", "parenthetical": "Geer, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 278", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "illustrating the funding challenges facing our local boards of education" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 500", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151702 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "501-02", "parenthetical": "illustrating the funding challenges facing our local boards of education" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0500-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1904, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 365", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "379", "parenthetical": "clarifying that the constitutional right we articulated in Leandro, the right to the opportunity to receive a sound basic education, is vested in all this state's children" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987054 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0605-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2058, "char_count": 67104, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.375868642546084e-08, "percentile": 0.4419970044585611 }, "sha256": "9b5bc6bbd9f3db10dea9440a88eb9c0d3b93d9e575f3e6c183863856719ce449", "simhash": "1:19c040af470f0ec2", "word_count": 10189 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:37.384656+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice HUDSON joins in this opinion concurring in part and dissenting in paid." ], "parties": [ "VIKTORIA KING, a minor, by and through her parent, REVONDIA HARVEY-BARROW v. BEAUFORT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and JEFFREY MOSS, Superintendent, Beaufort County Schools, in his official capacity" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Justice.\nThis case presents the question of whether the Beaufort County School Board and its superintendent (defendants) violated state law by denying Viktoria King (plaintiff) access to alternative education during her long-term suspension from school. After considering longstanding precedent affording school officials discretion in administering student disciplinary codes and recent cases recognizing a state constitutional right to a sound basic education, we hold that defendants must articulate a reason for denying plaintiff access to alternative education during her long-term suspension.\nOn 18 January 2008, plaintiff, a sophomore at Southside High School in Beaufort County, participated in a fight involving numerous students. She received a ten-day suspension for her involvement in the fight. The principal at Southside High School also recommended that plaintiff receive a long-term suspension. On 1 February 2008, the Beaufort County Superintendent, Jeffrey Moss, adopted the principal\u2019s recommendation and suspended plaintiff for the remainder of the 2007-2008 school year without offering her alternative education. Plaintiff timely appealed the suspension to a panel of central office administrators. On 13 February 2008, the panel conducted a due process hearing and subsequently upheld the decision.\nOn 20 February 2008, plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior Court seeking injunctive and declaratory relief. Plaintiff alleged that defendants violated her state constitutional right to a sound basic education by failing to provide her access to alternative education. Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, requesting that the trial court order defendants to provide educational services to plaintiff during her suspension. The trial court denied this motion and dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint pursuant to Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(7) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, affirmed the trial court\u2019s ruling in favor of defendants. King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, 683 S.E.2d 767 (2009).\nPlaintiff alleges that defendants\u2019 denial of alternative education during her long-term suspension is a violation of the state constitution. Before this Court plaintiff repeatedly emphasized the importance of requiring defendants to articulate a reason for denying her access to alternative education. While the state constitution requires defendants to provide a reason for refusing alternative education to plaintiff, we decline plaintiff\u2019s invitation to create a constitutional right to alternative education for students who violate lawful school rules.\nThe General Assembly has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme specifying the powers and duties of local school boards and school officials in connection with school discipline and alternative education. The statute vests school officials with the authority to issue long-term suspensions to students \u201cwho willfully violate [] the policies of conduct established by the local board of education.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-391(c) (2009). Section 115C-47(32a) requires local boards of education to \u201cestablish at least one alternative learning program and... adopt guidelines for assigning students to alternative learning programs.\u201d Id. \u00a7 115C-47(32a) (2009). In addition to mandating alternative learning programs, the General Assembly requires local boards of education to create \u201cstrategies for providing alternative learning programs, when feasible and appropriate, for students who are subject to long term suspension or expulsion.\u201d Id. The statute encourages school boards to incorporate these strategies into their \u201csafe school plans,\u201d which are \u201cdesigned to provide that every school... is safe, secure, and orderly----\u201d Id.; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-105.47 (2009). This comprehensive scheme grants long-term suspended students a statutory right to receive alternative education when feasible and appropriate.\nIn acknowledging a statutory right to alternative education, we stress that a fundamental right to alternative education does not exist under the state constitution. Nevertheless, insofar as the General Assembly has provided a statutory right to alternative education, a suspended student excluded from alternative education has a state constitutional right to know the reason for her exclusion. This right arises from the equal access provisions of Article IX, Section 2(1) of the North Carolina Constitution. See Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 347, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997) (\u201cArticle I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.\u201d (emphasis added)); Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 618, 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1980) (\u201c[E]qual access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process.\u201d (citations omitted)). Because exclusion from alternative education potentially infringes on a student\u2019s state constitutional right to equal educational access, school administrators must articulate a reason when they exclude a long-term suspended student from alternative education.\nHaving observed that our holding does not recognize a state constitutional right to alternative education, we consider the standard of review to be applied when a suspended student is denied access to alternative education. The present case requires us to harmonize the rational basis test employed in school discipline cases with the strict scrutiny analysis that formed a part of this Court\u2019s constitutional holding in school funding cases. Compare Hutchins v. [Sch. Comm. of] Durham, 137 N.C. 68, 70-71, 49 S.E. 46, 47 (1904) (\u201c[T]he constitutional guarantee that tuition shall be free and the schools equally open to all is necessarily subject to reasonable regulations to enforce discipline by expulsion of the disorderly and protection of the morals and health of the pupils.\u201d (citations omitted)), with Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (\u201c[T]he right to education provided in the state constitution is a right to a sound basic education.\u201d). The tension between these differing standards of review must be resolved in a manner that (1) protects student access to educational opportunities, while (2) preserving the discretion of school officials to maintain safe and orderly schools.\nNorth Carolina courts have historically accorded school administrators great deference in the exercise of their disciplinary authority. For instance, in Coggins ex rel. Coggins v. Board of Education, this Court upheld the school board\u2019s decision to bar students from participating in certain organizations. 223 N.C. 763; 770, 28 S.E.2d 527, 532 (1944). In so doing, we noted that \u201cthe local board is the final authority so long as it acts in good faith and refrains from adopting regulations which are clearly arbitrary or unreasonable.\u201d Id. at 769, 28 S.E.2d at 531. In Craig ex rel. Craig v. Buncombe County Board of Education, the Court of Appeals upheld the decision of school officials to suspend students for smoking on campus since the school\u2019s \u201clegitimate concerns\u201d were \u201creasonably related to the educational process and thus provide [d] a rational basis for the regulation.\u201d 80 N.C. App. 683, 686, 343 S.E.2d 222, 224 (1986) (citation omitted), disc. rev. denied and appeal dismissed, 318 N.C. 281, 348 S.E.2d 138 (1986). Indeed, the Court of Appeals observed that \u201ca student may be constitutionally suspended or expelled for misconduct whenever the conduct is of a type the school may legitimately prohibit.\u201d In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 176, 352 S.E.2d 449, 455 (1987).\nDespite this well-established precedent, plaintiff urges this Court to adopt strict scrutiny for school disciplinary determinations. Most courts, however, review school disciplinary decisions using a more deferential standard. See, e.g., Tucson Pub. Sch., Dist. No. 1 v. Green ex rel. Askew, 17 Ariz. App. 91, 94, 495 P.2d 861, 864 (1972); Satan Fraternity v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction; 156 Fla. 222, 225, 22 So. 2d 892, 893 (1945); Wilson v. Hinsdale Elementary Sch. Dist. 181, 349 Ill. App. 3d 243, 248, 810 N.E.2d 637, 642 (2004); S. Gibson Sch. Bd. v. Soliman, 768 N.E.2d 437, 442 (Ind. 2002); Davis v. Hillsdale Cmty. Sch. Dist., 226 Mich. App. 375, 379-81, 573 N.W.2d 77, 79 (1997) (per curiam); Busch v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 261 Neb. 484, 488, 623 N.W.2d 672, 677 (2001); Hamilton v. Unionville-Chadds Ford Sch. Dist., 552 Pa. 245, 247, 714 A.2d 1012, 1014 (1998). Even the Supreme Court of Wyoming, one of the few state courts to apply strict scrutiny in this context, acknowledges that \u201cschool districts are in the best position to judge the student\u2019s actions in light of all the surrounding circumstances and tailor the appropriate punishment to fit the unique circumstances of each student\u2019s situation.\u201d In Re RM, 2004 WY 162, \u00b6 25, 102 P.3d 868, 876 (Wyo. 2004). Put simply, \u201cthe special context of public schools requires a more lenient approach to reviewing the decisions of school officials, and the professional judgments of school officials on school safety and student discipline issues are entitled to appropriate judicial deference.\u201d John Dayton & Anne Proffitt Dupre, Searching for Guidance in Public School Search and Seizure Law: From T.L.O. to Redding, 248 Educ. L. Rep. 19, 27-28 (2009) (citations omitted).\nAt the same time, we have held strict scrutiny applicable to some educational issues. In Leandro v. State, this Court applied strict scrutiny to the question of whether the state had failed to provide students in low-income districts \u201ca sufficient education to meet the minimal standard for a constitutionally adequate education.\u201d 346 N.C. at 342, 488 S.E.2d at 252. Within the context of school funding, the Court concluded that \u201cArticle I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution combine to guarantee every child of this state an opportunity to receive a sound basic education in our public schools.\u201d Id. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255. In contrast to our school discipline cases, Leandro placed the burden on the state \u201cto establish that [its] actions denying this fundamental right [were] \u2018necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (citation omitted); see Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377-78, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002) (\u201cUnder strict scrutiny, a challenged governmental action is unconstitutional if the State cannot establish that it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling governmental interest.\u201d (citation omitted)).\nBut Leandro does not immunize students from the consequences of their own misconduct. A critical distinction exists between the state uniformly denying students in low-income districts access to a sound basic education and the state offering all students a sound basic education but temporarily removing students who engage in misconduct that disrupts the sound basic education of their peers. As we have said, \u201cThe right to attend school and claim the benefits afforded by the public school system is the right to attend subject to all lawful rules and regulations prescribed for the government thereof.\u201d Coggins, 223 N.C. at 767, 28 S.E.2d at 530. School administrators undeniably possess both freedom and flexibility to punish students who disrupt the educational process or endanger other students. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580, 42 L. Ed. 2d 725, 738 (1975) (\u201c[O]ur schools are vast and complex. Some modicum- of discipline and order is essential if the educational function is to be performed.\u201d); Doe v. Superintendent of Sch. of Worcester, 421 Mass. 117, 131, 653 N.E.2d 1088, 1096 (1995) (\u201c[A] student\u2019s interest in a public education can be forfeited by violating school rules.\u201d (citations omitted)).\nNotwithstanding the long history of judicial deference to the disciplinary determinations of school administrators, plaintiff argues that her Leandro right to a sound basic education requires us to apply strict scrutiny to defendants\u2019 decision to deny her alternative education. We reject plaintiff\u2019s attempt to sever the alternative education determination from her own misbehavior. These matters are legally inseparable in that administrative procedures for the provision of alternative education are inextricably linked with administrative planning for school safety. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-47(32a) (encouraging local school boards to incorporate their strategies for providing alternative education to long-term suspended students into their safe school plans); id. \u00a7 115C-105.47(b)(3) (indicating that safe school plans must include mechanisms to provide alternative education placements for \u201cseriously disruptive\u201d students).\nIn any event, adoption of strict scrutiny to review disciplinary determinations would necessarily require judges to routinely substitute their own views, for those of school administrators. Amicus North Carolina School Boards Association observes: \u201c[Plaintiff] invites this Court to do something that the General Assembly has been unwilling to do: force schools to provide alternative educational services to students who are temporarily removed from school due to their own dangerous or disruptive behavior.\u201d We agree with amicus that adoption of strict scrutiny for disciplinary and alternative education decisions by school officials would render \u201clong-term suspension practically unusable as a form of student discipline and flood[] the courts with litigation regarding a myriad of discretionary administrative decisions.\u201d Defendant school board adds: \u201cUnder Plaintiff\u2019s radical interpretation of Leandro, . . . courts would be called upon to micro-manage student discipline matters in protracted litigation challenging good faith efforts by the legislature and local boards to maintain safe and orderly schools.\u201d We are unwilling to go so far.\nStrict scrutiny fails to accord sufficient respect for school officials\u2019 informed judgments regarding the provision of alternative education and imposes untenable administrative burdens. In each case in which a school administrator determines that an alternative education placement is inappropriate, the school must prove its disciplinary decision is narrowly tailored to effectuate a compelling interest. See, e.g., Stephenson, 355 N.C. at 377-78, 562 S.E.2d at 393 (citations omitted); Treants Enters., Inc. v. Onslow Cty., 83 N.C. App. 345, 351, 350 S.E.2d 365, 369 (1986) (indicating that to survive strict scrutiny, a law \u201cmust be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate interests at stake\u201d (citations omitted)), aff\u2019d, 320 N.C. 776, 360 S.E.2d 783 (1987); see also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 284 (1972) (noting that strict scrutiny places \u201ca heavy burden of justification ... on the State\u201d); Blumstein, 405 U.S. at 343, 31 L. Ed. 2d at 285 (\u201cAnd if there are other, reasonable ways to achieve those goals with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity, a State may not choose the way of greater interference. If it acts at all, it must choose \u2018less drastic means.\u2019 \u201d (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231, 237 (1960))).\nBecause of the unworkable burdens it imposes on school administrators, applying strict scrutiny to long-term suspensions jeopardizes the safety of the greater school community and impedes the educational progress of the suspended student\u2019s peers. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350, 83 L. Ed. 2d 720, 740 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (\u201cThe primary duty of school officials and teachers, as the Court states, is the education and training of young people. . . . Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. And apart from education, the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other children, and also to protect teachers . . . .\u201d). In contrast to regulatory statutes and criminal codes enacted by legislative bodies, school disciplinary rules are not drafted to withstand strict scrutiny in courts of law. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 294, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546, 568 (2004) (plurality) (noting that in the context of constitutional review of statutes, \u201cstrict scrutiny readily, and almost always, results in invalidation\u201d); Ann L. Majestic, Jean M. Cary & Janine M. Murphy, Chapter 18: Student Conduct Issues, in Education Law in North Carolina \u00a7 1802.A.1, at 18-5 (2001) (\u201c[S]chool officials have the difficult task of drafting rules that anticipate and define most misbehavior with specificity and also contain some broad, general phrases that will cover unanticipated misconduct.\u201d (emphasis added)). Indeed, the United States Constitution does not require school rules to withstand such scrutiny. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549, 560 (1986) (\u201cWe have recognized that \u2018maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures ....\u2019\u201d (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340, 83 L. Ed. 2d at 733)); id. at 686, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 560 (\u201cGiven the school\u2019s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process, the school disciplinary rules need not be as detailed as a criminal code which imposes criminal sanctions.\u201d (emphasis added)). Consequently, application of strict scrutiny to the student disciplinary process operates to the detriment of our public school communities.\nRational basis review, on the other hand, does not adequately protect student access to educational opportunities or guard against arbitrary decisions or inadvertent errors by school officials. Under this standard, \u201c [i]t is not necessary for courts to determine the actual goal or purpose of the government action at issue; instead, any conceivable legitimate purpose is sufficient.\u201d In re R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287, 295, 643 S.E.2d 920, 924 (emphasis added) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1024, 169 L. Ed. 2d 396 (2007). As applied to alternative education determinations, rational basis review undoubtedly upholds administrative decisions even in the absence of a proffered reason, as plaintiff experienced in the present case. But this Court\u2019s previous recognition of state constitutional rights to equal educational access and a sound basic education compels more exacting review. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261; Sneed, 299 N.C. at 618, 264 S.E.2d at 113.\nAccordingly, we hold that alternative education decisions for students who receive long-term suspensions are reviewed under the state constitutional standard of intermediate scrutiny. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 524, 681 S.E.2d 759, 764 (2009) (applying intermediate scrutiny to state constitutional challenge). Under the state intermediate scrutiny standard, school administrators must articulate an important or significant reason for denying students access to alternative education; however, the reasons supporting their decisions do not need to be compelling. See, e.g., id. at 526-27, 681 S.E.2d at 765-66 (\u201cJudicial districts will be sustained if the legislature\u2019s formulations advance important governmental interests ....\u201d). In the school disciplinary context, intermediate scrutiny strikes a practical balance between protecting student access to educational opportunities and empowering school officials to maintain safe and orderly schools.\nState law requires local boards of education to establish at least one alternative learning program and create strategies for assigning long-term suspended students to it when feasible and appropriate. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-47(32a). Since the General Assembly has chosen to grant this statutory right to long-term suspended students, school administrators cannot arbitrarily deny access without violating the state constitution. See N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7 2; Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347, 488 S.E.2d at 255; Sneed, 299 N.C. at 618, 264 S.E.2d at 113.\nSchool administrators are not required to provide alternative education to every suspended student, especially those students who forfeit this statutory right through their own misbehavior. Because the safety and educational interests of all students receiving alternative education must be protected, students who exhibit violent behavior, threaten staff or other students, substantially disrupt the learning process, or otherwise engage in serious misconduct may be denied access. For these students, school officials will have little or no difficulty articulating an important or significant reason for denying access to alternative education under the state standard of intermediate review.\nWe believe considerations of fairness, institutional transparency, and public trust are generally best effectuated when government provides a reason for its denial of services. In the present case, defendants did not articulate any reason for denying plaintiff access to alternative education during her semester-long suspension. The record indicates only that plaintiff participated in \u201ca fight involving numerous students\u201d at Southside High School. Because the people of North Carolina \u201chave a right to the privilege of education,\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 15, the requirement that school administrators articulate an important or significant reason for denying educational services is not unduly burdensome.\nEven though defendants may have concluded plaintiff\u2019s violent behavior made her a threat to students and staff if she were placed in an alternative learning facility, it is not the role of this Court to speculate why plaintiff was denied alternative education. Nevertheless, when defendants suspended plaintiff for misbehavior they did not have the benefit of this Court\u2019s harmonization of our decision in Leandro with the standards of review applicable to school discipline cases. Cf. State v. McDowell, 310 N.C. 61, 74, 310 S.E.2d 301, 310 (1984) (ordering remand where the trial court could not have been aware of the correct legal standard), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1165, 90 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1986), overruled on other grounds by McDowell v. Dixon, 858 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033, 103 L. Ed. 2d 230 (1989). Accordingly, on remand, defendants should be afforded the opportunity to explain why they denied plaintiff access to alternative education.\nWe therefore reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court for further remand to the trial court for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nNo school system in the State of North Carolina can deprive students of all state-funded educational opportunities, unless it is absolutely necessary. I believe the Constitution of North Carolina and precedent from this Court made this guarantee to the children of our state. Today\u2019s decision retreats from that promise. Because I would hold the right to education to be a fundamental right that is indivisible and not subject to parceling, I disagree with today\u2019s decision.\nViktoria King was a sophomore at Southside High School in Beaufort County during the 2007-2008 school year. On 18 January 2008, multiple fights broke out among students after dismissal of school, including one allegedly between Viktoria and another student. For her involvement in the fight, Viktoria was suspended for five months, the remainder of the school year. The Beaufort Superintendent subsequently denied her, without explanation, access to all public educational options.\nThe question presented to this Court is whether Viktoria King\u2019s complaint was sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Viktoria claims that her constitutional right to a sound basic education was violated by depriving her of all state-funded educational opportunities during her long-term suspension. Because her alleged facts, if proved, would establish the violation of a fundamental right, I agree with the decision to reverse the opinion of the Court of Appeals upholding dismissal of Viktoria\u2019s claim.\nI disagree, however, with the majority\u2019s application of intermediate scrutiny. The North Carolina Constitution and precedent from this Court firmly establish for every child of this state a constitutionally-rooted fundamental right to the opportunity for a sound basic education. Accordingly, a purported violation of this right, including the cessation of all state-funded educational services, should be strictly scrutinized.\nWhen presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the question is \u201cwhether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.under some [recognized] legal theory.\u201d Isenhour v. Hutto, 350 N.C. 601, 604, 517 S.E.2d 121, 124 (1999) (alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 12(b)(6) (2009). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is proper when either \u201c(1) the complaint on its face reveals that no law supports the plaintiffs claim; (2) the complaint on its face reveals the absence of facts sufficient to make a good claim; or (3) the complaint discloses some fact that necessarily defeats the plaintiffs claim.\u201d Wood v. Guilford Cty., 355 N.C. 161, 166, 558 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2002) (citation omitted). \u201cIn ruling upon such a motion, the complaint is to be liberally construed . . . .\u201d Shepard v. Ocwen Fed. Bank, 361 N.C. 137, 139, 638 S.E.2d 197, 199 (2006) (quoting Meyer v. Walls, 347 N.C. 97, 111, 489 S.E.2d 880, 888 (1997)).\nIn her complaint, plaintiff invokes the fundamental right to an opportunity for a sound basic education. Our North Carolina Constitution guarantees that \u201c[t]he people have a right to the privilege of education, and it is the duty of the State to guard and maintain that right.\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 15. In addition, Article IX is exclusively dedicated to education, whose importance is described in the very first section: \u201cReligion, morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools, libraries, and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.\u201d Id. art. IX, \u00a7 1. Not coincidentally, this right to education appears beside other indisputably fundamental rights, such as religious liberty, freedom of speech and press, and freedom from ex post facto laws. Id. art. I, \u00a7\u00a7 13, 14, 16.\nIn light of the emphasis that the framers of the North Carolina Constitution placed on education, this Court has recognized our constitution to establish the right to an opportunity for a sound basic education. And until today, the Court has never parsed this right to give it varying levels of protection depending on the context. Thirty years ago, in Sneed v. Greensboro City Board of Education, this Court concluded that \u201cequal access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right, guaranteed by our state constitution and protected by considerations of procedural due process.\u201d 299 N.C. 609, 618, 264 S.E.2d 106, 113 (1980) (emphasis added) (holding the right to attend school could not be made contingent on the ability to pay). We reaffirmed this right in Leandro v. State, declaring that the North Carolina Constitution confers upon \u201cevery child ... a fundamental right to a sound basic education which would prepare the child to participate fully in society as it existed in his or her lifetime.\u201d 346 N.C. 336, 348, 488 S.E.2d 249, 255 (1997) (emphasis added).\nAgain in Hoke County Board of Education v. State, this Court understood our constitution and Leandro to confer on each child an \u201cindividual right of an opportunity to a sound basic education.\u201d 358 N.C. 605, 617, 599 S.E.2d 365, 378 (2004) (according this right \u201cto all children . . ., regardless of their respective ages or needs,\u201d id. at 172, 675 S.E.2d at 350). And as recently as last year, we considered the right to education fundamental yet again, stating, \u201cThe general and uniform system of public schools indicates a fundamental right to a sound basic education.\u201d Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 363 N.C. 165, 172-73, 675 S.E.2d 345, 350-51 (2009) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (allowing the assignment of students to year-round schools without parental consent). The majority and I agree that our case law recognizes a fundamental right to the opportunity for a sound basic education, but we part ways when it comes to splintering that right.\nPut simply, the right to education is indivisible and cannot cease to be fundamental. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, _, 171 L. Ed. 2d 637, 683 (2008). \u201cThe very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government \u2014 even the Third Branch of Government \u2014 the power to decide on \u00e1 case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.\u201d Id. None of the preceding cases contains any suggestion that the fundamental right to the opportunity for a sound basic education is limited to any particular context. As a result, I would hold this right to protect students from a complete termination of state-funded educational services during long-term suspensions. To hold otherwise would allow schools to grant every child an equal opportunity to enter school and then deprive them of all public education when it is less than necessary to do so.\nThe framers of our constitution and justices of this Court have held the right to the \u201cprivilege of education\u201d to be of fundamental interest to the well-being of this state, as education prepares \u201cstudents to participate and compete in the society in which they live and work.\u201d Leandro, 346 N.C. at 345, 488 S.E.2d at 254. Indeed, the right to public education is a cornerstone of our democracy. For these reasons, I decline to segment the constitutionally mandated \u201cprivilege of education\u201d in this state. Education is an indivisible fundamental right, and it remains so in the context of long-term suspensions.\nBecause we are dealing with a fundamental right, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review to determine whether that right has been unconstitutionally infringed by a government action. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180, 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004); State ex rel. Utils. Comm\u2019n v. Carolina Util. Customers Ass\u2019n, Inc., 336 N.C. 657, 681, 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (1994); Texfi Indus., Inc. v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11, 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980). In fact in Leandro, which involved a challenge to disparate funding of local school systems that resulted in discrepancies in academic and extracurricular opportunities, this Court applied strict scrutiny. Under that analysis, when a fundamental right to a sound basic education is interfered with, the State must show that the interference is \u201cnecessary to promote, a compelling governmental interest.\u201d Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, a State action infringing upon \u201cthe exercise of a fundamental right\u201d must be \u201cnarrowly tailored.\u201d Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 377, 562 S.E.2d 377, 393 (2002) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The application of strict scrutiny also shifts the burden of proof, requiring the governmental entity to prove that infringement of the right was necessary to'further a compelling state interest. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (citation omitted).\nNo participant in this appeal suggests that local boards of education lack a compelling interest in ensuring safe and orderly schools. No one disputes that this compelling governmental interest operates in every long-term suspension or expulsion for fighting, other violent behavior, or any conduct that threatens the orderly administration of the schools. Cf. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 21 L. Ed. 2d 731, 738 (1969) (recognizing the \u201ccomprehensive authority\u201d of school officials to control conduct in the schools within \u201cfundamental constitutional safeguards\u201d). Accordingly, strict scrutiny only requires school administrators to consider whether a long-term suspension or expulsion without some alternative educational option is necessary to achieve safety and order. If denial of an alternative education program is not necessary to further a compelling state interest, then such action is not narrowly tailored and must be reversed.\nIn other words, if it is possible to provide a student who has infringed a school rule with some form of education without jeopardizing the safety of others, then that opportunity should be provided. If a safe and orderly school environment can be maintained without barring a student from every single state-funded educational service, then such a barrier should not be erected.\nThe analysis now turns to whether plaintiff has alleged facts that, \u201ctreated as true, state a claim upon which relief can be granted.\u201d Wood, 355 N.C. at 166, 558 S.E.2d at 494 (citing Isenhour, 350 N.C. at 604, 517 S.E.2d at 124). First, plaintiff sufficiently alleges interference with her fundamental right to an opportunity for education. Complete termination of educational services from January 18 until the end of the school year interferes with this fundamental right.\nPlaintiff further alleges that this complete deprivation of all educational services was unnecessary and therefore not narrowly tailored. Both parties agree that defendants did not provide a reason for denying plaintiff access to any alternative education program during her suspension. It is also undisputed that plaintiff was denied access to an alternative education program during her long-term suspension because of her participation in a fight.\nWhat is still unclear, however, is the exact reasoning upon which defendants denied plaintiff access to an alternative school. Nevertheless, if it is true that plaintiff was suspended for fighting, and no other factors contributed to defendants\u2019 decision, then it was not necessary to deny plaintiff access to all educational services. It is unnecessary to the maintenance of a fruitful learning environment that every participant of every fight be both suspended and denied access to an alternative education program. Accordingly, plaintiff\u2019s factual allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.\nSince this appeal seeks review of a motion to dismiss, principles of judicial restraint do not allow this Court to determine whether defendants\u2019 decision to bar plaintiff from all alternative educational programs will actually withstand a strict scrutiny analysis. That analysis depends upon the strength of defendants\u2019 rationale for the decision as determined by the finder of fact. Indeed, defendants may prove it was necessary to deny plaintiff access to all educational services, see Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 793, 862-71 (2006) (concluding that strict scrutiny, especially when fundamental rights are involved, is not always \u201cfatal in fact\u201d in federal cases), but this Court\u2019s role is not to prospectively define the contours of narrow tailoring. Our state constitution does not require a student to receive public educational services regardless of how dangerous that student is to the school population, but it does prohibit state interference with this right unless absolutely necessary to do so. Accordingly, while this Court has previously recognized the authority of school officials to punish and discipline students in order to maintain a safe and secure educational environment, such authority does not empower school officials to implement punishments that violate a student\u2019s constitutional rights. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 741. At this stage, it will be for the trial court to decide whether the defendants\u2019 reasons for this denial are narrowly tailored and necessary to advance a compelling state interest.\nHaving explained why I agree with the majority that dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s claim was inappropriate, I now address my disagreement with the legal analysis put forth by the majority to support the application of intermediate scrutiny.\nFirst, the majority opinion \u201cdoes not recognize a state constitutional right to alternative education,\u201d but nonetheless goes on to consider the appropriate constitutional standard of review when a suspended student alleges an infringement of her \u201cstatutory right to alternative education.\u201d I find it novel to apply a constitutional standard of review to determine whether a statute has been violated. The majority seeks to \u201charmonize\u201d the application of the rational basis test with the strict scrutiny test, citing various cases in which these tests were applied for the purpose of determining whether constitutional rights were violated by state action. However, the rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny standards of review traditionally have been applied to determine whether a government action violates individual rights having constitutional roots, not those created by statute. Classic examples of this application at the federal level include Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 54 L. Ed. 2d 618, (1978) (right to marry); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973) (right to abortion); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 31 L. Ed. 2d 92 (1972) (right to vote); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600 (1969) (right to interstate travel), overruled in part on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 39 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1974); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942) (right to procreate). In North Carolina, this Court has also used these standards of review to evaluate constitutional claims. Rhyne, 358 N.C. at 180, 594 S.E.2d at 15 (due process and equal protection); Leandro, 346 N.C. at 348, 488 S.E.2d at 255 (quality of education); Carolina Util. Customers Ass\u2019n, Inc., 336 N.C. at 681, 446 S.E.2d at 346 (equal protection); Sneed, 299 N.C. at 618, 264 S.E.2d at 113 (access to education).\nWhile the majority tries to resolve this problem by naming the constitutional hook of \u201cequal educational access,\u201d this solution is based on a flawed syllogism. The majority acknowledges (1) that Sneed recognized the state constitutional right to equal educational access as a fundamental right, Sneed, 299 N.C. at 618, 264 S.E.2d at 113'(\u201c[Equal access to participation in our public school system is a fundamental right . . . .\u201d), and (2) that \u201cexclusion from alternative education potentially infringes on a student\u2019s state constitutional right to equal educational access.\u201d Yet the majority somehow concludes merely that \u201cschool administrators must articulate a reason when they exclude a long-term suspended student from alternative education.\u201d In my view, this conclusion does not follow. The logically sound conclusion is that the exclusion from alternative education programs and all other educational services potentially infringes upon a fundamental right. As the majority agrees that interference with a fundamental right requires a strict scrutiny analysis, strict scrutiny should be applied in this case.\nSecond, even in the context of an alleged constitutional violation, intermediate scrutiny is the incorrect standard for determining whether the right to an opportunity to a sound basic education has been violated. Until today, this Court has uniformly applied strict scrutiny in cases involving the right to education. While the majority opinion relies on Coggins ex rel. Coggins v. Board of Education for the proposition that school disciplinary decisions are subject only to rational basis review, the student in Coggins only challenged limitations on his participation in \u201csecret societies known as Greek letter fraternities,\u201d not a denial of all educational services. 223 N.C. 763, 768-69, 28 S.E.2d 527, 531 (1944). In fact, the challenged rule made \u201cno attempt to deny plaintiff any instruction afforded by class work or by the required curriculum of the school.\u201d Id. at 769, 28 S.E.2d at 531. Thus, the reliance by the majority on Coggins is misplaced.\nPartitioning the right to education into subcategories, each with a different standard of review, also has uncertain and unexplained implications for what has long been considered a vested fundamental right of every North Carolina student. At best, the right to a sound basic education is transformed into a quasi-fundamental right in the student discipline context, cf. Blankenship, 363 N.C. at 526-27, 681 S.E.2d at 765-66 (holding that \u201cthe right to vote in superior court elections on substantially equal terms is a quasi-fundamental right\u201d that is \u201creviewed under intermediate scrutiny\u201d), and it remains fundamental in all other contexts. At worst, this decision has rewritten our constitution and overruled thirty years of precedent from this Court collectively establishing that the right to the opportunity for a sound basic education is fundamental. Whatever the precise parameters of today\u2019s holding, the intermediate scrutiny standard is incompatible with Article I, Section 15; Article IX; and three decades of precedent.\nEqually troubling is that intermediate review, in practice, will be no more exacting than the exceedingly deferential rational basis standard, which requires only that the regulation be reasonably related to some conceivable legitimate end. Standley v. Town of Woodfin, 362 N.C. 328, 332, 661 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008) (citations omitted). As noted above, school districts always have an important, indeed compelling, interest in maintaining safe and orderly schools. A denial of alternative educational opportunities will ordinarily be substantially related to maintaining safety and order simply because the offender is dissociated from the school environment. The majority essentially concedes this point, stating that \u201cschool officials will have little or no difficulty articulating an important or significant reason for denying access to alternative education.\u201d Thus, the intermediate standard of review will be toothless in the student discipline context and grossly inadequate to protect a fundamental right. I agree with the Supreme Court of the United States, which proclaimed, \u201cThe vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools.\u201d Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180, 33 L. Ed. 2d 266, 279 (1972) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\nThere also is no reason to believe that applying strict scrutiny would bring about the exaggerated consequences imagined by the majority. Strict scrutiny will not \u201cimmunize individuals from the consequences of their own misconduct,\u201d because at times, it may be necessary to remove a student from all state-funded public education to ensure the safety and order of all schools, traditional and alternative. Cf. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513, 21 L. Ed. 2d at 741 (stating that a student\u2019s conduct that \u201cmaterially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder\u201d is not \u201cimmunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech\u201d). For the same reason, strict scrutiny review would not prohibit long-term suspensions. Strict scrutiny is satisfied on a showing that it is necessary to remove a long-term suspended or expelled student without an alternative educational option in order to maintain safety and discipline in the schools. To that end, plaintiff and her amici point out that alternative education need not take any particular form. Alternative learning options might include computer- and Internet-based learning programs. \u201c[I]n all but the most extreme cases the State will be able to provide reasonable state-funded educational opportunities and services .... Under such circumstances, providing educational opportunities and services to [long-term suspended or expelled] children is constitutionally mandated.\u201d Cathe A. v. Doddridge Cty. Bd. of Educ., 200 W. Va. 521, 532, 490 S.E.2d 340, 351 (1997) (footnote omitted).\nFurther, this case marks only the second time our Court has applied intermediate scrutiny, and it is the first application in a statutory context. See Blankenship v. Bartlett, 363 N.C. 518, 526, 681 S.E.2d 759, 765 (2009) (applying intermediate scrutiny when considering equal protection challenges to judicial districts allegedly drawn in violation of the N.C. Constitution and analogizing that controversy to federal cases considering challenges based on rights guaranteed under the First Amendment). I must note, however, that Blankenship adopted the intermediate standard of review from federal jurisprudence and Plyler v. Doe. Id. at 524-27, 681 S.E.2d at 764-66. la Plyler, the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to Texas\u2019s withholding of free public education from the children of undocumented aliens, concluding that the right to education is only \u201cquasi-fundamental\u201d ' under the Federal Constitution, since that right is not expressly or impliedly guaranteed therein and the children were not a suspect class. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-23, 72 L. Ed. 2d 786, 801-03 (1982). By contrast, this Court has already determined the right to the opportunity for a sound basic education to be fundamental. Leandro, 346 N.C. at 348, 488 S.E.2d at 255-56. For the above reasons the intermediate standard of review is inappropriate for student discipline decisions that infringe upon the fundamental right to the opportunity for a sound basic education.\nIn my view, if it is possible to provide a student with some form of educational services during her long-term suspension without jeopardizing the safety and security of others, then that opportunity must be provided. This Court should simply apply the North Carolina Constitution as it is written and according to precedent from this Court. The complaint sufficiently alleges that defendants infringed plaintiff\u2019s fundamental right to the opportunity for a sound basic education by unnecessarily removing her from all public school educational options without an alternative educational option.\nBecause plaintiff sufficiently alleged deprivation of a fundamental right, I would reverse the decision by the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s complaint. Therefore, I concur with the majority decision to reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this matter to the trial court. I conclude, however, that strict scrutiny, not intermediate scrutiny, is the proper standard of review. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the analysis and holding of the majority as to the correct standard of review on remand.\nJustice HUDSON joins in this opinion concurring in part and dissenting in paid.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON" }, { "text": "Justice NEWBY\ndissenting.\nFor over one hundred years, our courts have refrained from interfering with a disciplinary decision of our professional educators and elected officials unless that decision is shown to be irrational. Today\u2019s majority decision unnecessarily departs from that practice. While I agree with the general proposition that school officials ought not remove a student from the public school system unless they have a proper reason for doing so, I disagree with the majority\u2019s conclusion that our courts should second-guess our school officials\u2019 reasonable disciplinary decisions. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\nPlaintiff was disciplined for her involvement in a fight at South-side High School on 18 January 2008. According to her complaint, such behavior is a violation of the Student Code of Conduct Policy for the Beaufort County Schools (\u201cthe Policy\u201d) and exposes her to a penalty of removal for up to ten days and a possible long-term suspension. Pursuant to the Policy, plaintiff was suspended for ten days and ultimately received a long-term suspension. Plaintiff filed a statutory administrative appeal, but her suspension was upheld.\nNow plaintiff asserts a claim that the North Carolina Constitution mandates that she have access to an alternative education program while she is under long-term suspension. In her complaint plaintiff precisely contended that she has a fundamental right to \u201cthe opportunity to obtain a sound, basic education.\u201d She alleged that defendants denied her that fundamental right by suspending her \u201cthrough the end of the school year and denjying] her any access to educational services during her suspension.\u201d She argued that the denial w\u00e1s unconstitutional unless defendants \u201cdemonstrate that the denial is necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.\u201d Plaintiff sought injunctive and declaratory relief specifically tailored to this claim.\nThe trial court dismissed plaintiffs claim. The trial court determined, inter alia, that plaintiff\u2019s claim should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) because her allegations \u201cfail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.\u201d The court provided three alternative grounds for its dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). First, the court explained that the statutory administrative appeal afforded by our legislature to students under long-term suspension is an adequate state law remedy precluding plaintiff\u2019s direct action under the North Carolina Constitution. Second, the court reasoned that defendants\u2019 decision to deny plaintiff access to an alternative education program is not subject to strict scrutiny, and, relying on precedent from the Court of Appeals, concluded that there is \u201cno affirmative duty to provide\u201d access to such programs \u201cabsent a legislative mandate.\u201d Third, the court stated that even if strict scrutiny were the appropriate standard, school officials may lawfully temporarily halt the provision of educational services, as occurred here.\nThe Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s claim under Rule 12(b)(6). King ex rel. Harvey-Barrow v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ., \u2014N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 683 S.E.2d 767, 771 (2009). The Court of Appeals majority concluded that school disciplinary decisions are not subject to strict scrutiny. See id. at \u2014, 683 S.E.2d at 770-71. Rather, that court relied upon its prior decision in In re Jackson, 84 N.C. App. 167, 352 S.E.2d 449 (1987), which held that school disciplinary decisions are subject to rational basis review. King,-N.C. App. at-, 683 S.E.2d at 770-71. The dissenting judge reasoned that our opinion in Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 488 S.E.2d 249 (1997), required that the decision denying plaintiff access to an alternative education program be subjected to strict scrutiny and concluded that plaintiff had adequately stated a claim. -N.C. App. at \u2014, 683 S.E.2d at 772-73 (Geer, J., dissenting).\nIn my view, the Court of Appeals properly affirmed the trial court\u2019s dismissal of plaintiff\u2019s claim. As the majority observes, there is no fundamental, constitutional right to an alternative education program. Our precedent indicates that our courts review school disciplinary decisions for a rational basis. Because plaintiff has not alleged that defendants arbitrarily denied her access to an alternative education program, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nWe have historically refrained from intruding upon the reasonable disciplinary decisions of our local school officials. See Hutchins v. [Sch. Comm, of] Durham, 137 N.C. 78, 80, 137 N.C. 68, 70-71, 49 S.E. 46, 47 (1904) (citations omitted). For example, in Coggins ex rel. Coggins v. Board of Education, 223 N.C. 763, 769, 28 S.E.2d 527, 531 (1944), we explained that courts review school board disciplinary rules for \u201cunreasonableness\u201d and will intervene when faced with a \u201cclearly arbitrary or unreasonable\u201d regulation. Id. Aside from \u201cthe unreasonableness of such a rule,\u201d we stated that complaints about disciplinary decisions of our local school officials \u201craise questions essentially political in nature, and the remedy, if any, is at the ballot box.\u201d Id. As the majority notes, our historical deference accords with the practice in almost all our sister states.\nOur recent decisions in Hoke County Board of Education v. State, 358 N.C. 605, 599 S.E.2d 365 (2004), and Leandro left intact the deference afforded the disciplinary decisions of school officials. In Hoke County and Leandro we elucidated our children\u2019s fundamental right under the state constitution to a qualitatively sound basic education. Hoke Cty., 358 N.C. at 609, 599 S.E.2d at 373; Leandro, 346 N.C. at 346, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (citation omitted). We applied strict scrutiny to the alleged violations of that right in those cases. Hoke Cty., 358 N.C. at 609, 599 S.E.2d at 373; Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (citation omitted). However, as the majority illustrates, there is a fundamental distinction between our schools failing to afford a qualitatively sound education and disciplining students following their misbehavior. Accordingly, Hoke County and Leandro did not raise the level of scrutiny to which we subject the disciplinary decisions of our local school officials.\nThe courts\u2019 limited role in disciplinary matters safeguards the constitutional province of our coordinate branches of government. The people of this state have vested control and management of our public schools in the legislative and executive branches of our government. N.C. Const, art. IX, \u00a7\u00a7 2(1), 5; see also Leandro, 346 N.C. at 357, 488 S.E.2d at 261 (\u201c[T]he administration of the pub-lie schools of the state is best left to the legislative and executive branches of government.\u201d).\nThose branches have constructed a detailed scheme by which to operate our public schools so as to protect the schools\u2019 paramount mission: education. To promote academic achievement by all students, our General Assembly has determined that \u201call schools should be safe, secure, and orderly.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-105.45 (2009). Accordingly, the legislature has required local school boards to adopt plans designed to maintain safety, id. \u00a7 115C-105.47(a) (2009), and \u201cpolicies . . . governing the conduct of students,\u201d id. \u00a7 115C-391(a) (2009). A student may be removed from our schools for a willful violation of the local school board\u2019s policies governing conduct, subject to numerous procedural safeguards. Id. \u00a7 115C-391(c) (2009).\nStudents receive a myriad of procedural protections to guard against an erroneous determination of a school policy violation and the arbitrary imposition of discipline. The General Assembly has provided for several levels of review of a long-term suspension decision. See id. (requiring that a school principal and superintendent act together in issuing a long-term suspension); id. \u00a7 115C-391(e) (2009) (allowing a decision to issue a long-term suspension to be appealed to the local school board and making that decision subject to judicial review under Article 4 of Chapter 150B of the General Statutes). Like the board in Beaufort County, many local school boards have provided another level of procedural protection by allowing for an initial review hearing before a panel of central office administrators. The parent of a student recommended for expulsion or long-term suspension must also be given written notice of the proposed action. Id. \u00a7 115C-391(d5) (2009) (requiring the notice to contain information on the student\u2019s conduct, the school\u2019s conduct policy, the hearing process, the right to have an attorney represent the student, whether an advocate other than an attorney may assist the student, and the parent\u2019s right to review the student\u2019s school records). These procedural protections ensure that a student will not be subjected to the possibility of being excluded from all educational opportunities unless that student has actually committed a willful violation of school policy.\nFor those students found to have violated local school board policies, the General Assembly has provided for potential additional educational opportunities, despite no constitutional obligation to do so. Each local school board must create one alternative education program and adopt \u201cguidelines for assigning students to\u201d it. Id. \u00a7 115C-47(32a) (2009). As the majority notes, the General Assembly has allowed local school boards to determine when it is \u201cfeasible and appropriate\u201d to assign students subject to long-term suspension to the local school board\u2019s alternative education program. Id.\nThe statutory structure enacted by the General Assembly affords local school officials flexibility in managing our public schools. That flexibility demonstrates a recognition that denial of admission to an alternative education program may act as an additional deterrent against disruptive behavior in our public schools. Further, it may serve to maintain a safe and orderly environment in an alternative school, especially in a case like the one presently before the Court in which numerous students were involved in a violent disturbance. Also, the legislature appears to understand that mandating alternative education, whether that means admission to an alternative school or participation in some other learning program, tailored to every student who has willfully violated school board policy could devour the already scarce resources available to our schools to provide all our children the opportunity to obtain a sound basic education. See Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Educ. v. Beaufort Cty. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs, 363 N.C. 500, 501-02, 681 S.E.2d 278, 280 (2009) (illustrating the funding challenges facing our local boards of education).\nUsing its immense \u201chistory and expertise\u201d in education, Hoke Cty., 358 N.C. at 645, 599 S.E.2d at 395, our General Assembly has, along with the various local school boards, accomplished a considerable task. As required when administering discipline in our schools, the political branches of our government have balanced divergent interests- \u2014 -including the misbehaving student\u2019s interest in obtaining an education, other students\u2019 interests in having an unimpeded opportunity to obtain an education, and the interests of all students, teachers, and administrators to interact in a safe environment- \u2014 with, inter alia, scarce financial, human, and capital resources. See Hoke Cty., 358 N.C. at 620, 599 S.E.2d at 379 (clarifying that the constitutional right we articulated in Leandro, the right to the opportunity to receive a sound basic education, is vested in all this state\u2019s children).\nTo maintain this balance this Court should, as it has historically done, give reasonable deference to our coordinate branches of government and the professional educators and administrators retained to manage our public schools. Rational basis review gives appropriate deference while simultaneously ensuring that there is a legitimate reason for a student\u2019s exclusion, allowing our school officials to administer our schools free of judicial micromanagement. On the other hand, under intermediate and strict scrutiny school officials must establish both the reason for their decision and that their reason is appropriately weighty. Such requirements unduly burden our school officials and place our trial courts in the position of second-guessing their decisions. Accordingly, the judicial branch should not determine whether school officials\u2019 reason for denying a student access to alternative education as a disciplinary matter is \u201cimportant\u201d or \u201csignificant,\u201d as opposed to \u201creasonable.\u201d Such an intrusion will weigh heavily on both our courts and our schools. Coggins, 223 N.C. at 769, 28 S.E.2d at 531.\nTo be sure, there is much in the majority\u2019s decision with which I agree. Initially, the majority correctly determines \u201cthat a fundamental right to alternative education does not exist under the state constitution.\u201d Additionally, the majority properly recognizes that our constitution affords a right to equal educational access. However, I disagree that the equal educational access provision of our constitution mandates that plaintiff be told the reason for her exclusion from an alternative education program, a remedy she failed to request. Perhaps if plaintiff had alleged defendants treated her differently than those similarly situated because of some immutable characteristic, then our constitution would afford heightened scrutiny of defendants\u2019 decision. But that is not the case before us.\nIn my view, today\u2019s decision has altered the administrative framework established for our public schools by our constitution and our General Statutes. Plaintiff here concedes that defendants complied with all statutory obligations in the handling of her long-term suspension. Nonetheless, after today\u2019s decision our local school boards and administrators have less control and flexibility in making disciplinary decisions than that granted to them by our legislature. Because I see no justification to depart from our well-settled precedent subjecting school disciplinary decisions to rational basis review, and because plaintiff did not allege defendants arbitrarily denied her access to an alternative education program, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals concluding that the trial court properly dismissed plaintiff\u2019s claim. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\n. Plaintiff also alleged in the trial court that the statute under which she was excluded from school is unconstitutional, but she has since abandoned that claim.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice NEWBY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Children\u2019s Law Clinic, Duke Law School, by Jane Wettach; and Advocates for Children\u2019s Services, Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Erwin Byrd and Lewis Pitts, for plaintiff-appellant.", "Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Curtis H. Allen III, for defendant-appellee Beaufort County Board of Education.", "Edelstein and Payne, by M. Travis Payne, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.", "University of North Carolina School of Law Center for Civil Rights, by Marjc Dorosin and Benita N. Jones, for Advancement Project, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., Legal Aid of Western Ohio, Inc., Advocates for Children of New York, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, American Civil Liberties Union, Barton Child Law & Policy Clinic, Center for Civil Rights at UNC School of Law, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School, Children and Family Justice Center; Children\u2019s Law Center of Massachusetts, Connecticut Legal Services, Inc., Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Education Law Center, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, Legal Aid Society of Birmingham, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago; NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., National Association of Counsel for Children, National Association of Social Workers, National Children\u2019s Law Network, National Economic and Social Rights Initiative, New York Law School Racial Justice Project, Public Counsel, Southern Poverty Law Center, TeamChild, University of Tennessee College of Law Education Law Practicum, Sharon A. Boume-Clarke, Melissa Kenney Ngaruri, Heather E. Price, Russell Skiba, Anita Wadhwa, and Julie Waterstone, amici curiae.", "Laurie Gallagher for Council for Children\u2019s Rights, amicus curiae.", "Jack Holtzman for North Carolina-Justice Center, Concerned Citizens for the Betterment of Beaufort County Schools, Parents Supporting Parents, Tamar Birckhead, American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, Center for Death Penalty Litigation, Inc., Office of the Juvenile Defender, North Carolina Black Leadership Caucus, and NC Conference of NAACP Branches, amici curiae.", "Robert F. Orr and Charles L. Becton, amici curiae.", "Campbell Shatley, PLLC, by Christopher Z. Campbell; and Allison B. Schafer, General Counsel, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae.", "Ann McColl, General Counsel; and William A. Tobin, Social Science Research Institute, Duke University, for North Carolina Association of School Administrators, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "VIKTORIA KING, a minor, by and through her parent, REVONDIA HARVEY-BARROW v. BEAUFORT COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION and JEFFREY MOSS, Superintendent, Beaufort County Schools, in his official capacity\nNo. 480A09\n(Filed 8 October 2010)\n1. Long-term suspension\u2014 alternative education \u2014 reasons for exclusion\nWhile the denial of alternative education to a high school student during her long-term suspension for a willful violation of a lawful school rule is not a violation of the state constitution, a long-term suspended student has a statutory right to receive alternative education when feasible and appropriate, and a suspended student excluded from alternative education has a state constitutional right to be informed by school administrators of the reason for the exclusion because the exclusion from alternative education potentially infringes on the student\u2019s right to equal educational access under N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 2(1).\n2. Schools and Education\u2014 long-term suspension \u2014 alternative education \u2014 reasons for exclusion \u2014 standard of scrutiny\nAlternative education decisions for students who receive long-term suspensions are reviewed under the state constitutional standard of intermediate scrutiny because: (1) strict scrutiny fails to accord sufficient respect for school officials\u2019 informed judgments regarding the provision of alternative education and imposes untenable administrative burdens, and applying strict scrutiny to long-term suspensions jeopardizes the safety of the greater school community and impedes the educational progress of the suspended students\u2019 peers; (2) rational basis review does not adequately protect student access to educational opportunities or guard against arbitrary decisions or inadvertent errors by school officials; (3) under the state intermediate scrutiny standard, school administrators must articulate an important or significant reason for denying students access to alternative education, although the reasons supporting their decisions do not need to be compelling; (4) in the school disciplinary context, intermediate scrutiny strikes a practical balance between protecting student access to educational opportunities and empowering school officials to maintain safe and orderly schools; and (5) the requirement that school administrators articulate an important or significant reason for denying educational services is not unduly burdensome since the people of North Carolina \u201chave a right to the privilege of education.\u201d N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 15.\nJustice TIMMONS-GOODSON concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJustice HUDSON joining in opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJustice NEWBY dissenting.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 200 N.C. App. -, 683 S.E.2d 767 (2009), affirming an order entered 16 May 2008 by Judge William C. Griffin, Jr. in Superior Court, Beaufort County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 22 March 2010.\nChildren\u2019s Law Clinic, Duke Law School, by Jane Wettach; and Advocates for Children\u2019s Services, Legal Aid of North Carolina, Inc., by Erwin Byrd and Lewis Pitts, for plaintiff-appellant.\nTharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Curtis H. Allen III, for defendant-appellee Beaufort County Board of Education.\nEdelstein and Payne, by M. Travis Payne, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.\nUniversity of North Carolina School of Law Center for Civil Rights, by Marjc Dorosin and Benita N. Jones, for Advancement Project, Advocates for Basic Legal Equality, Inc., Legal Aid of Western Ohio, Inc., Advocates for Children of New York, Alabama Disabilities Advocacy Program, American Civil Liberties Union, Barton Child Law & Policy Clinic, Center for Civil Rights at UNC School of Law, Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice at Harvard Law School, Children and Family Justice Center; Children\u2019s Law Center of Massachusetts, Connecticut Legal Services, Inc., Council of Parent Attorneys and Advocates, Education Law Center, Juvenile Justice Project of Louisiana, Legal Aid Society of Birmingham, Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago; NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., National Association of Counsel for Children, National Association of Social Workers, National Children\u2019s Law Network, National Economic and Social Rights Initiative, New York Law School Racial Justice Project, Public Counsel, Southern Poverty Law Center, TeamChild, University of Tennessee College of Law Education Law Practicum, Sharon A. Boume-Clarke, Melissa Kenney Ngaruri, Heather E. Price, Russell Skiba, Anita Wadhwa, and Julie Waterstone, amici curiae.\nLaurie Gallagher for Council for Children\u2019s Rights, amicus curiae.\nJack Holtzman for North Carolina-Justice Center, Concerned Citizens for the Betterment of Beaufort County Schools, Parents Supporting Parents, Tamar Birckhead, American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Southern Coalition for Social Justice, Center for Death Penalty Litigation, Inc., Office of the Juvenile Defender, North Carolina Black Leadership Caucus, and NC Conference of NAACP Branches, amici curiae.\nRobert F. Orr and Charles L. Becton, amici curiae.\nCampbell Shatley, PLLC, by Christopher Z. Campbell; and Allison B. Schafer, General Counsel, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae.\nAnn McColl, General Counsel; and William A. Tobin, Social Science Research Institute, Duke University, for North Carolina Association of School Administrators, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0368-01", "first_page_order": 462, "last_page_order": 487 }