{ "id": 4152986, "name": "JULIA CATHERINE BOSEMAN, Plaintiff v. MELISSA ANN JARRELL, Defendant and MELISSA ANN JARRELL, Third-Party Plaintiff v. JULIA CATHERINE BOSEMAN and NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Third-Party Plaintiff", "name_abbreviation": "Boseman v. Jarrell", "decision_date": "2010-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 416PA08-2", "first_page": "537", "last_page": "561", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "364 N.C. 537" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640930 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67" }, { "page": "67" }, { "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "67-68" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68-69" }, { "page": "68-70" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "617 S.E.2d 675", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633747 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680", "parenthetical": "\"It is outside the realm of this Court's function as the judiciary to modify statutory law.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/617/0675-01" ] }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637106 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792", "parenthetical": "determining that a court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a subsequent custody review hearing since the court's subject matter jurisdiction was not invoked at the outset of a juvenile case" }, { "page": "790", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "790", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "790" }, { "page": "793", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "837", "parenthetical": "\" 'The purpose ... of the pleadings] is] to give jurisdiction of the subject matter of litigation ....'\" (quoting Peoples v. Norwood, 94 N.C. 144, 149, 94 N.C. 167, 172 (1886))" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 343", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150875 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "346-47", "parenthetical": "\" 'The purpose ... of the pleadings] is] to give jurisdiction of the subject matter of litigation ....'\" (quoting Peoples v. Norwood, 94 N.C. 144, 149, 94 N.C. 167, 172 (1886))" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0343-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158635 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "608 S.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795678 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 901", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 397", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2551903 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0397-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 528", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 10, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" }, { "page": "534", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "534-35" }, { "page": "534" }, { "page": "534-35" }, { "page": "537", "parenthetical": "\"Knowing that the child was her natural child, but not plaintiff's, she represented to the child and to others that plaintiff was the child's natural father.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "536-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139523 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "79" }, { "page": "82-83" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 S.E.2d 499", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" }, { "page": "503", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138519 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 N.C. 829", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1870, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "64 N.C. 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683465 ], "year": 1870, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/64/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 N.C. App. 123", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8353010 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130", "parenthetical": "\"It is outside the realm of this Court's function as the judiciary to modify statutory law.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/173/0123-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219548 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 S.E.2d 806", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "808" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 N.C. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568279 ], "year": 1964, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/262/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "174 S.E.2d 793", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "804", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 641", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8563176 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0641-01" ] }, { "cite": "13 S.E. 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1891, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "109 N.C. 29", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8648998 ], "year": 1891, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/109/0029-01" ] }, { "cite": "109 N.C. 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8648932 ], "year": 1891, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/109/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "128 S.E. 20", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23-24", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "189 N.C. 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8655003 ], "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/189/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.E. 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8605475 ], "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E.2d 429", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624642 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467-68", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 S.E.2d 311", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313", "parenthetical": "\"The passage of time, however great, does not affect the validity of a judgment; it cannot render a void judgment valid.\" (citations and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 N.C. 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8627851 ], "year": 1942, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365", "parenthetical": "\"The passage of time, however great, does not affect the validity of a judgment; it cannot render a void judgment valid.\" (citations and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/221/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 S.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "438" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569949 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "662" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787934 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593", "parenthetical": "determining that a court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a subsequent custody review hearing since the court's subject matter jurisdiction was not invoked at the outset of a juvenile case" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "590" }, { "page": "595" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.C. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650639 ], "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/94/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.C. 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "694 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153021 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0214-01" ] }, { "cite": "59 S.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 36, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" }, { "page": "839" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8597527 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215" }, { "page": "215" }, { "page": "215" }, { "page": "215" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381" }, { "page": "381-82" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he only avenue by which [defendant] can contest the adoption is to show that it was void ab initio, a legal nullity.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640930 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "621 S.E.2d 622", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634382 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/621/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "613 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633075 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/613/0729-01" ] }, { "cite": "624 S.E.2d 626", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634920 ], "weight": 14, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "noting that \"the General Assembly recognized the public interest in establishing a clear judicial process for adoptions\" and \"promoting the integrity and finality of adoptions\" (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/624/0626-01" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640930 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 62", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3786785, 3788034, 3798050, 3797129, 3787149, 3794510, 3794229, 3786329 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0062-02", "/nc/360/0062-05", "/nc/360/0062-08", "/nc/360/0062-06", "/nc/360/0062-01", "/nc/360/0062-03", "/nc/360/0062-07", "/nc/360/0062-04" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8435077 ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "219" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 34", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570733 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40-41" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0034-01" ] }, { "cite": "2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 255", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787905 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275-76", "parenthetical": "noting that \"the General Assembly recognized the public interest in establishing a clear judicial process for adoptions\" and \"promoting the integrity and finality of adoptions\" (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E. 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that, partly because of the strong public policy in favor of marriage and maintaining familial relationships and rights, the marriage of an underage female without the parental consent required by statute was not void but voidable" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. 697", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628961 ], "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that, partly because of the strong public policy in favor of marriage and maintaining familial relationships and rights, the marriage of an underage female without the parental consent required by statute was not void but voidable" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/196/0697-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 S.E.2d 767", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "770", "parenthetical": "stating that a judgment, \"even if irregular or even erroneous was binding on the parties, unless set aside or reversed on appeal. . . provided the court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "242 N.C. 88", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8609544 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "92", "parenthetical": "stating that a judgment, \"even if irregular or even erroneous was binding on the parties, unless set aside or reversed on appeal. . . provided the court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/242/0088-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777", "parenthetical": "\" 'An irregular order, one issued contrary to the method of practice and procedure established by law, is voidable.' . . . An erroneous order may be remedied by appeal; it may not be attacked collaterally.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 669", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4730978 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "676", "parenthetical": "\" 'An irregular order, one issued contrary to the method of practice and procedure established by law, is voidable.' . . . An erroneous order may be remedied by appeal; it may not be attacked collaterally.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0669-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650625 ], "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166", "parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the parties are voluntarily before the [c]ourt, and ... a judgment is entered in favor of one party and against another, such judgment is valid, although not granted according to the orderly course of procedure.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/94/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 S.E.2d 94", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 713", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219599 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "719-20" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 S.E.2d 179", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "317 N.C. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4771715 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/317/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "61 L. Ed. 2d 297", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "442 U.S. 929", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1531938, 1532133, 1531912, 1532170, 1532010, 1532202, 1532021, 1531990, 1532122, 1532092, 1531806 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/us/442/0929-02", "/us/442/0929-01", "/us/442/0929-10", "/us/442/0929-08", "/us/442/0929-11", "/us/442/0929-03", "/us/442/0929-04", "/us/442/0929-09", "/us/442/0929-05", "/us/442/0929-06", "/us/442/0929-07" ] }, { "cite": "250 S.E.2d 890", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "911", "parenthetical": "third alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "296 N.C. 109", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565310 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146", "parenthetical": "third alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/296/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 S.E.2d 673", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "678", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "244 N.C. 84", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2219548 ], "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "90", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/244/0084-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S.E. 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "9" }, { "page": "9" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "190 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8605475 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" }, { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/190/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.C. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8650639 ], "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "\"[W]hen the parties are voluntarily before the [c]ourt, and ... a judgment is entered in favor of one party and against another, such judgment is valid, although not granted according to the orderly course of procedure.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/94/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 214", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153021 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0214-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1921, "char_count": 63552, "ocr_confidence": 0.742, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.2515620000094e-07, "percentile": 0.7816042556921272 }, "sha256": "ec1c3a1fd54ecaca13a85ff179103baa7b6fd44d57920fa7b8d5d9bcd774a53e", "simhash": "1:800996432cebf4c0", "word_count": 10186 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:08:37.384656+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JULIA CATHERINE BOSEMAN, Plaintiff v. MELISSA ANN JARRELL, Defendant and MELISSA ANN JARRELL, Third-Party Plaintiff v. JULIA CATHERINE BOSEMAN and NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Third-Party Plaintiff" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nIn this case we must' determine the validity of an adoption decree entered in the Durham County District Court at the request of Wilmington residents. If the decree is invalid, we must also determine whether defendant acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected, paramount parental status. Because the General Assembly did not vest our courts with subject matter jurisdiction to create the type of adoption attempted here, we hold that the adoption decree at issue is void ab initio. However, we also conclude that by intentionally creating a family unit in which defendant permanently shared parental responsibilities with plaintiff, defendant acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status. Thus, the District Court, New Hanover County, (\u201cthe trial court\u201d) did not err by utilizing the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard to make its custody award. As such, we reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision that the adoption decree is valid and affirm as modified its conclusion leaving undisturbed the trial court\u2019s decision that the parties are entitled to joint custody of the child.\nPlaintiff and defendant (collectively, \u201cthe parties\u201d) met in 1998. At that time, plaintiff lived in Wilmington, North Carolina, and defendant lived in Rhode Island. The first time they met, they \u201cdiscussed their desires to have children.\u201d Roughly one month later, the parties began a romantic relationship. From the outset, the parties continued to voice their desires to have a child. In the spring of 1999, defendant moved from Rhode Island to Wilmington, and the parties began living together as domestic partners.\nIn May of 2000 the parties initiated the process of having a child. They decided that defendant would actually bear the child, but both parties would otherwise jointly participate in the conception process. The parties agreed to choose an anonymous sperm donor and researched and discussed the available options. They also attended the medical appointments necessary both to impregnate defendant and to address her prenatal care. Plaintiff read to the minor child \u201cin the womb and played music for him.\u201d Plaintiff also cared for defendant during the pregnancy and was present for the delivery. Defendant eventually gave birth to the minor child in October of 2002, and the parties jointly selected his first name.\nFollowing the child\u2019s birth, the parties held themselves out as the parents of the minor child. They gave the minor child a hyphenated last name composed of both their last names. They also \u201chad a baptismal ceremony for the child at the plaintiff\u2019s church during which they publicly presented themselves to family and friends as parents of the child.\u201d Further, each of the parties integrated the minor child into their respective families and each family accepted the minor child.\nWithin the home, the parties shared \u201can equal role\u201d in parenting. Plaintiff\u2019s parenting skills were found to be \u201cvery attentive, very loving, hands on and fun.\u201d Defendant was found to be \u201cvery hands-on and patient in parenting\u201d and to \u201creprimand[] [the minor child] by talking to him in a nice way.\u201d As a result of occupational responsibilities, each party was occasionally required to be temporarily away from their home. During such an absence, the party at home would care for the child. Moreover, the minor child treated each of the parties as a parent. The child refers to plaintiff as \u201cMom\u201d and to defendant as \u201cMommy.\u201d As the trial court stated, the minor child \u201cshows lots of love and respect for both parties.\u201d -\u201cEach party agrees that the other is and has been a good parent,\u201d and defendant even \u201ctestified that she thinks it is important for the plaintiff to be in\u201d the minor child\u2019s life.\nIn 2004 the parties discussed the prospect of plaintiff adopting the minor child. The parties sought an adoption by which plaintiff would become a legal, adoptive parent while defendant would remain the minor child\u2019s legal, biological parent. According to defendant, in 2005 plaintiff stated \u201cthat she had \u2018found a way\u2019 \u201d to adopt the minor child. Plaintiff informed defendant that the type of adoption they sought was \u201cbeing approved in Durham County, NC.\u201d\nShortly thereafter, in June of 2005, the parties asked the'District Court, Durham County, (\u201cthe adoption court\u201d) to make plaintiff an adoptive parent of the minor child while not also terminating defendant\u2019s relationship with the child. To accomplish their goal, the parties requested in the petition and accompanying motions that the adoption court not comply with (1) the statutory requirement under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-606(9) that defendant\u2019s written consent to the adoption contain an acknowledgment that the adoption decree would terminate her parental rights and (2) the statutory requirement of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-l-106(c) that an adoption decree \u201csevers the relationship of parent and child between the individual adopted and that individual\u2019s biological or previous adoptive parents.\u201d Defendant\u2019s consent to the adoption reiterated these conditions and was contingent on the non-enforcement of these statutory provisions.\nOn 10 August 2005, the adoption court agreed to the parties\u2019 request, determined defendant\u2019s limited consent was sufficient, and entered an adoption decree. The decree stated that it \u201ceffects a complete substitution of families for all legal purposes and establishes the relationship of parent and child... between... petitioner and the individual being adopted,\u201d while simultaneously \u201cnot sever[ing] the relationship of parent and child between the individual adopted and that individual\u2019s biological mother.\u201d After finding that the Division of Social Services would not index this type of adoption, the adoption court instructed the clerk \u201cnot ... to comply with\u201d a statutory requirement that the clerk of court transmit a copy of the adoption decree to the Division, instead ordering that the clerk \u201csecurely maintain this file in the clerk\u2019s office.\u201d\nIn May of 2006, the parties ceased their relationship. Subsequently, plaintiff, without being ordered to do so, continued to provide \u201cmost of the financial support for the partnership\u201d and for the minor child. Nonetheless, defendant limited plaintiff\u2019s contact with the minor child following the parties\u2019 separation. She did so while admitting \u201cthat the plaintiff is a very good parent who loves [the minor child] and that [the minor child] loves [plaintiff].\u201d\nRelying in part on the adoption decree, plaintiff filed in the trial court a complaint and an amended complaint seeking custody of the minor child. In response, defendant attacked the adoption decree, arguing that it was void ab initio, and contended that plaintiff otherwise could not seek custody of the minor child.\nThe trial court ultimately awarded the parties joint legal custody of the minor child. That court did not reach the merits of defendant\u2019s contention regarding the validity of the Durham County adoption decree. The trial court reasoned that it did \u201cnot have jurisdiction to declare void\u201d another District Court Judge\u2019s order entered in another judicial district in North Carolina. Thus, the court determined that plaintiff \u201cis a parent of the minor child ... in that the aforementioned Decree of Adoption has not been found to be void by this court or any other court.\u201d The court also concluded that \u201cdefendant has acted inconsistent with her paramount parental rights and responsibilities.\u201d Then, after determining that the \u201cparties are fit and proper persons to have custody of their minor son,\u201d the court applied the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard to conclude that the parties should have \u201cjoint legal custody of the minor child.\u201d Defendant appealed.\nThe Court of Appeals concluded that the adoption decree in this case is valid and left intact the trial court\u2019s custody determination. Boseman v. Jarrell, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, 681 S.E.2d 374 (2009). After reviewing Chapter 48 of our General Statutes, the Court of Appeals concluded that the adoption in this case comports with the \u201cintent and purposes\u201d of both our adoption law as a whole and \u201cthe specific provisions\u201d of it at issue here. Id. at-, 681 S.E.2d at 381. The Court of Appeals stated that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607(a) prevents defendant from otherwise challenging the adoption decree\u2019s propriety, and, therefore, the decree causes plaintiff to be a legal parent of the minor child. Id. at-, 681 S.E.2d at 381-82. The Court of Appeals also determined that plaintiff\u2019s status as a parent and the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the parties \u201care fit and proper persons for custody of the child, fully support [the trial court\u2019s] custody award.\u201d Id. at-, 681 S.E.2d at 381. On 28 January 2010, we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision.\nDefendant contends that a court is prohibited from choosing not to enforce the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-l-106(c) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-606(9). Defendant argues that these provisions are mandatory in an adoption proceeding under Chapter 48 of our General Statutes. Because the adoption court crafted a remedy not recognized by the adoption statutes, defendant maintains that the adoption court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter the adoption decree at issue in this case, and the decree is, therefore, void ab initio. Plaintiff responds that the adoption court \u201cwas acting within its subject matter jurisdiction to preside over adoption proceedings\u201d as set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-100. Further, plaintiff asserts that, given the General Assembly\u2019s desire to have Chapter 48 \u201cliberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-l-100(d) (2009), these statutory provisions do not have to be enforced in every adoption proceeding because they are designed only to protect the biological parent.\nThe law governing adoptions in North Carolina is wholly statutory. Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N.C. 212, 215, 59 S.E.2d 836, 839 (1950). \u201cAdoption is a status unknown to common law . ...\u201d Id. Thus, to determine whether a court may proceed under Chapter 48 while choosing not to enforce the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-l-106(c) and N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-606(9), we must examine the text of our adoption statutes.\nThrough Chapter 48 of our General Statutes, our legislature has provided for three types of adoptions of minor children. The first is referred to as a \u201cdirect placement\u201d adoption. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-202(a) (2009). In that type of adoption, our legislature envisioned a complete substitution of families. Id. \u00a7 48-l-106(a) (2009). A \u201cparent or guardian must personally select a prospective adoptive parent,\u201d id. \u00a7 48-3-202(a), and is required to \u201cexecute a consent to the minor\u2019s adoption pursuant to [N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 48-3-601 to 48-3-610],\u201d id. \u00a7 48-3-201(b) (2009), acknowledging that the adoption will terminate the child\u2019s relationship with the parent, id. \u00a7 48-3-606(9) (2009). The second is referred to as an \u201c[a]gency placement\u201d adoption. Id. \u00a7 48-3-203 (2009). In such an adoption, the \u201cagency may acquire legal and physical custody of a minor for purposes of adoptive placement only by means of a relinquishment pursuant to [N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 48-3-701 to 48-3-707] or by a court order terminating the rights and duties of a parent or guardian of the minor.\u201d Id. \u00a7 48-3-203(a). The agency is then responsible for placing the minor for adoption. See id. \u00a7 48-3-203(b), (d). The third type is the stepparent adoption. Id. \u00a7 48-4-100 (2009). A stepparent is defined as \u201can individual who is the spouse of a parent of a child, but who is not a legal parent of the child.\u201d Id. \u00a7 48-1-101(18) (2009). Generally speaking, when a stepparent adopts the child of his or her spouse, the child must consent if twelve or more years of age, and the child\u2019s parents and any guardian must consent. Id. \u00a7 48-4-102 (2009). Indicating the comprehensive and limiting nature of this statutory procedure, the General Assembly has also explicitly provided for the adoption of adults, id. \u00a7\u00a7 48-5-100 to 48-5-103 (2009), and the readoption by former parents of both adults and minors, id. \u00a7\u00a7 48-6-100 to 48-6-102 (2009). According to plaintiff, the parties here presented a modified direct placement adoption that explicitly omitted the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 48-l-106(c) and 48-3-606(9).\nIn N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-1-106, the General Assembly declared the \u201c[l]egal effect of [a] decree of adoption\u201d in a direct placement adoption. Id. \u00a7 48-1-106 (2009). That statute provides in pertinent part:\n(a) A decree of adoption effects a complete substitution of families for all legal purposes after the entry of the decree.\n(b) A decree of adoption establishes the relationship of parent and child between each petitioner and the individual being adopted. From the date of the signing of the decree, the adoptee is entitled to inherit real and personal property by, through, and from the adoptive parents in accordance with the statutes on intestate succession and has the same legal status, including all legal rights and obligations of any kind whatsoever, as a child born the legitimate child of the adoptive parents.\n(c) A decree of adoption severs the relationship of parent and child between the individual adopted and that individual\u2019s biological or previous adoptive parents. After the entry of a decree of adoption, the former parents are relieved of all legal duties and obligations due from them to the adoptee, except that a former parent\u2019s duty to make past-due payments for child support is not terminated, and the former parents are divested of all rights with respect to the adoptee.\nId. \u00a7 48-l-106(a)-(c). With this statute the legislature provided, inter alia, that -a direct placement adoption decree terminates the adoptee\u2019s relationship with his or her former parent or parents. Id. \u00a7 48-l-106(c).\nThe provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-1-106 establish the relief that may be issued by a court in an adoption proceeding. The legislature instructed that in a direct placement adoption the court may issue only an adoption decree that \u201ceffects a complete substitution of families.\u201d Id. \u00a7 48-l-106(a). The General Assembly directed our courts to enter adoption decrees that \u201cseverQ the [former] relationship of parent and child,\u201d id. \u00a7 48-l-106(c), and \u201cestablish)] the [new] relationship of parent and child,\u201d id. \u00a7 48-l-106(b). Our legislature expressly required the dictates of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-1-106 to be stated in a direct placement adoption decree. Id. \u00a7 48-2-606(a)(6) (2009) (\u201cA decree of adoption must state at least. . . [t]he effect of the decree of adoption as set forth in G.S. 48-1-106 . . . .\u201d (emphasis added)). There is no language in our statutes authorizing the issuance of any other relief. Accordingly, direct placement adoption decrees issued under Chapter 48 must have the effect the General Assembly established in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-1-106.\nFurther, the legislature requires that when consenting to the direct placement adoption of their children, parents acknowledge the effect an adoption decree has on their rights and responsibilities. In N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-606, titled \u201cContent of consent; mandatory provisions,\u201d the legislature provides that a parent\u2019s consent to the adoption of her child\nmust be in writing and state ... [t]hat the individual executing the consent understands that when the adoption is final, all rights and obligations of the adoptee\u2019s former parents or guardian with respect to the adoptee will be extinguished, and every aspect of the legal relationship between the adoptee and the former parent or guardian will be terminated.\nId. \u00a7 48-3-606(9) (emphasis added). Thus, this statute ensures that a parent understands the direct placement adoption will totally sever her relationship with the child being adopted.\nIf \u201c \u2018the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u2019 \u201d In re D.L.H., 364 N.C. 214, 221, 694 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2010) (citation omitted). This is especially true in the context of adoption, which is purely a creation of statute. See Wilson, 232 N.C. at 215, 59 S.E.2d at 839'. With direct placement adoptions, the General Assembly stated in these statutes that an adoption decree must sever the former parent-child relationship. Further, the legislature included no language allowing for the issuance of a decree that does not fulfill this mandate. It did so despite allowing for the alteration of other provisions of Chapter'48. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-3-501 (2009) (\u201cUnless the court orders otherwise, when a parent. . . .\u201d (emphasis added)); id. \u00a7 48-3-502(a) (2009) (\u201cUnless the court orders otherwise, during a proceeding . . . .\u201d (emphasis added)); id. \u00a7 48-4-101(3) (2009) (allowing a court to dispense with several specific statutory requirements \u201c[f]or cause\u201d). Because the General Assembly\u2019s chosen language in these statutes is clear and unambiguous, courts are without power to \u201cliberally construe[],\u201d id. \u00a7 48-l-100(d), that language. Accordingly, a court is without authority to disregard these statutes.\nIn N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-100, titled \u201cJurisdiction,\u201d our General Assembly established prerequisites for our courts to obtain jurisdiction over adoption proceedings. Id. \u00a7 48-2-100 (2009). At the relevant time, that statute stated in pertinent part:\n(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, jurisdiction over adoption proceedings commenced under this Chapter exists if, at the commencement of the proceeding:\n(1) The adoptee has lived in this State for at least the six consecutive, months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or from birth, and the prospective adoptive parent is domiciled in this State; or\n(2) The prospective adoptive parent has lived in or been domiciled in this State for at least the six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition.\nId. \u00a7 48-2-100 (2005). Thus, pursuant to the text of this statute, our courts have subject matter jurisdiction of adoption proceedings \u201ccommenced under\u201d Chapter 48 of our General Statutes.\nTo commence an adoption proceeding under Chapter 48 of our General Statutes, a petitioner must be seeking an adoption available under Chapter 48. See id. \u00a7 48-2-301(a) (2009); Wilson, 232 N.C. at 215, 59 S.E.2d at 839'(\u201cAdoption . . . can be accomplished only in accordance with provisions of statutes enacted by the legislative branch of the State government.\u201d). In defining both \u201c[w]ho may adopt\u201d and \u201c[w]ho may be adopted,\u201d the legislature emphasized that adoptions may occur only as provided in Chapter 48. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-1-103 (2009) (\u201cAny adult may adopt another individual as provided in this Chapter . . . .\u201d (emphasis added)); id. \u00a7 48U-104 (2009) (\u201cAny individual may be adopted as provided in this Chapter.\" (emphasis added)). Further, under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-301, titled \u201cPetition for adoption; who may file,\u201d the legislature provided only that \u201c[a] prospective adoptive parent,\u201d someone who is attempting an adoption \u201cprovided in\u201d Chapter 48, id. \u00a7 48-1-103, may file an adoption petition, id. \u00a7 48-2-301(a).\nPlaintiff was not seeking an adoption available under Chapter 48. In her petition for adoption, plaintiff explained to the adoption court that she sought an adoption decree that would establish the legal relationship of parent and child with the minor child, but not sever that same relationship between defendant and the minor child. As we have established, such relief does not exist under Chapter 48. Id. \u00a7\u00a7 48-1-106, 48-2-606(a)(6), 48-3-606(9). Because plaintiff was seeking relief unavailable under our General Statutes, the adoption proceeding at issue in this case was not \u201ccommenced under\u201d Chapter 48 of our General Statutes. Id. \u00a7 48-2-100 (2005).\nA court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case is invoked by the pleading. In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 346-47, 677 S.E.2d 835, 837 (2009) (\u201c \u2018The purpose ... of the pleadings] is] to give jurisdiction of the subject matter of litigation ....\u2019\u201d (quoting Peoples v. Norwood, 94 N.C. 144, 149, 94 N.C. 167, 172 (1886))). The adoption petition filed in this case explained that plaintiff was seeking relief unknown to our adoption law. As the petition sought relief that does not exist under our statutes, the petition did not invoke the adoption court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction. All actions in the proceeding before the adoption court, including the entry of the decree, were therefore taken without subject matter jurisdiction. See In re T.R.P, 360 N.C. 588, 593, 636 S.E.2d 787, 792 (2006) (determining that a court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a subsequent custody review hearing since the court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction was not invoked at the outset of a juvenile case). Accordingly, the adoption decree at issue in this case is void ab initio. Id. at 590, 636 S.E.2d at 790 (citations omitted).\nPlaintiff contends that the legality of the adoption decree notwithstanding, defendant may no longer contest its validity. In support of this contention, plaintiff cites N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607(a), which states in part that \u201cafter the final order of adoption is entered, no party to an adoption proceeding nor anyone claiming under such a party may question the validity of the adoption because of any defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or otherwise, in the proceeding, but shall be fully bound by the order.\u201d Id. \u00a7 48-2-607(a) (2009). We note that the Court of Appeals rejected this argument in its opinion below, recognizing that this statute does not preclude a challenge to a court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction. Boseman,-N.C. App. at-, 681 S.E.2d at 378 (\u201c[T]he only avenue by which [defendant] can contest the adoption is to show that it was void ab initio, a legal nullity.\u201d). As we have long held, a void judgment has no legal effect; it is a legal nullity that may be challenged at any time. In re T.R.P, 360 N.C. at 590, 636 S.E.2d at 790 (citation omitted); Stroupe v. Stroupe, 301 N.C. 656, 662, 273 S.E.2d 434, 438 (1981); City of Monroe v. Niven, 221 N.C. 362, 365, 20 S.E.2d 311, 313 (1942) (\u201cThe passage of time, however great, does not affect the validity of a judgment; it cannot render a void judgment valid.\u201d (citations and quotation marks omitted)); Casey v. Barker, 219 N.C. 465, 467-68, 14 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1941) (citations omitted); Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 422, 130 S.E. 7, 9 (1925) (citation omitted); Clark v. Carolina Homes, Inc., 189 N.C. 703, 708, 128 S.E. 20, 23-24 (1925) (citations omitted); Carter v. Rountree, 109 N.C. 21, 23, 109 N.C. 29, 32, 13 S.E. 716, 717 (1891).\nMoreover, the General Assembly intended for N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607 to shield from further review only those decrees entered by courts having subject matter jurisdiction. \u201cIt is always presumed that the legislature acted with care and deliberation and with full knowledge of prior and existing law.\u201d State v. Benton, 276 N.C. 641, 658, 174 S.E.2d 793, 804 (1970) (citations omitted). \u201c \u2018A universal principle as old as the law is that the proceedings of a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter are a nullity,\u2019 \u201d In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. at 590, 636 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting Burgess ex rel. Burgess v. Gibbs, 262 N.C. 462, 465, 137 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1964)), and without subject matter jurisdiction, \u201ca court has no power to act,\u201d id. (citing Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1956)). Because we assume the General Assembly enacted N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607 with full knowledge that subject matter jurisdiction \u201ccannot be conferred upon a court by consent, waiver or estoppel,\u201d 360 N.C. at 595, 636 S.E.2d at 793 (citations and quotation marks omitted), the legislature\u2019s words \u201cno party,\u201d \u201cdefect\u201d and \u201cirregularity\u201d indicate that this statute is designed to foreclose challenges other than subject matter jurisdiction. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607(a). The adoption court in this case had no authority to act in a proceeding seeking relief unknown to Chapter 48. See State v. Verrier, 173 N.C. App. 123, 130, 617 S.E.2d 675, 680 (2005) (\u201cIt is outside the realm of this Court\u2019s function as the judiciary to modify statutory law.\u201d). Because the adoption court had no authority to act, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607 does not apply to its decree.\nThe argument that the child will lose legal benefits if the adoption is not upheld must also be rejected. The record shows that this new form of judicially-created adoption may have been available only in Durham County and not available in the other counties of North Carolina. If our uniform court system is to be preserved, a new form of adoption cannot be made available in some counties but not all. This Court has the responsibility to ensure that the law is applied uniformly in all our counties. N.C. Const, art. IV. Accordingly, any best interests evaluation is limited to legal benefits that are equally available under the law to all children. See State v. Holden, 64 N.C. 702, 704, 64 N.C. 829, 831 (1870) (\u201cThe intention of the Legislature and the remedy aimed at are manifest, and under such circumstances it is the duty of Judges to give such an interpretation of the law as shall \u2018suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, putting down all subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief . . . and adding force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the act....\u2019\u201d (citation omitted)).\nW\u00e9 recognize that many policy arguments have been made to this Court that the adoption in this case ought to be allowed. However, adoption is a statutory creation. Wilson, 232 N.C. at 215, 59 S.E.2d at 839. Accordingly, those arguments are appropriately addressed to our General Assembly. Until the legislature changes the provisions of Chapter 48, we must recognize the statutory limitations on the adoption decrees that may be entered. Because the adoption decree is void, plaintiff is not legally recognized as the minor child\u2019s parent.\nWe are now left with a custody dispute between a parent and a third party. The Court of Appeals did not pass upon this issue. The trial court, however, concluded that defendant \u201chas acted inconsistent with her paramount parental rights and responsibilities\u201d before determining that the parties \u201care fit and proper persons to have custody\u201d of the minor child \u201cand it is in the best interest of the child for the parties to have joint legal custody of him,\u201d providing an alternative basis for its custody decision. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by concluding that she has acted inconsistently with her constitutionally protected, paramount parental status. As defendant does not challenge the findings on which this decision is based, we review this conclusion de novo, see Adams v. Tessener, 354 N.C. 57, 65, 550 S.E.2d 499, 504 (2001), and determine whether it is supported by \u201cclear and convincing evidence,\u201d id. at 63, 550 S.E.2d at 503 (citation omitted).\nA parent has an \u201cinterest in the companionship, custody, care, and control of [his or her children that] is protected by the United States Constitution.\u201d Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 73, 484 S.E.2d 528, 531 (1997); Petersen v. Rogers, 337 N.C. 397, 400, 445 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1994). So long as a parent has this paramount interest in the custody of his or her children, a custody dispute with a nonparent regarding those children may not be determined by the application of the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard. Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534 (citations omitted).\nA parent loses this paramount interest if he or she is found to be unfit or acts inconsistently \u201cwith his or her constitutionally protected status.\u201d David N. v. Jason N., 359 N.C. 303, 307, 608 S.E.2d 751, 753 (2005). However, there is no bright line beyond which a parent\u2019s conduct meets this standard. See Price, 346 N.C. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534-35. As we explained in Price, conduct rising to the \u201cstatutory level warranting termination of parental rights\u201d is unnecessary. Id. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534. Rather, \u201c[u]nfitness, neglect, and abandonment clearly constitute conduct inconsistent with the protected status parents may enjoy. Other types of conduct. . . can also rise to this level so as to be inconsistent with the protected status of natural parents.\u201d Id. at 79, 484 S.E.2d at 534-35.\nAs the trial court found, this is not a case in which the natural parent is unfit, or has abandoned or neglected the child. The trial court found that defendant is a fit parent with whom the minor child has a \u201cvery loving and respectful relationship.\u201d Accordingly, we must determine whether defendant has engaged in some other conduct inconsistent with her paramount parental status. Though determining whether the trial court erred is a fact-sensitive inquiry, we are guided in our analysis by decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals.\nIn Price v. Howard we observed a custody dispute between a natural mother and a nonparent. The child in that case was born into a family unit consisting of her natural mother and a man who the natural mother said was the child\u2019s father. Id. at 83, 484 S.E.2d at 537 (\u201cKnowing that the child was her natural child, but not plaintiff\u2019s, she represented to the child and to others that plaintiff was the child\u2019s natural father.\u201d). The mother \u201cchose to rear the child in a family unit with plaintiff being the child\u2019s defacto father.\u201d Id.\nAfter illustrating the creation of the family unit in Price, we focused our attention on the mother\u2019s voluntary grant of nonparent custody. Id. We stated:\nThis is an important factor to consider, for, if defendant had represented that plaintiff was the child\u2019s natural father and voluntarily had given him custody of the child for an indefinite period of time with no notice that such relinquishment of custody would be temporary, defendant would have not only created the family unit that plaintiff and the child have established, but also induced them to allow that family unit to flourish in a relationship of love and duty with no expectations that it would be terminated.\nHowever, if defendant and plaintiff agreed that plaintiff would have custody of the child only for a temporary period of time and defendant sought custody at the end of that period, she would still enjoy a constitutionally protected status absent other conduct inconsistent with that status.\nId. (citation omitted). Thus, under Price, when a parent brings a nonparent into the family unit, represents that the nonparent is a parent, and voluntarily gives custody of the child to the nonparent without creating an expectation that the relationship would be terminated, the parent has acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status.\nIn Mason v. Dwinnell, 190 N.C. App. 209, 660 S.E.2d 58 (2008), our Court of Appeals applied our decision in Price to facts quite similar to those in the case sub judice. In Mason the parties \u201cjointly decided to create a family and intentionally took steps to identify [the nonparent] as a parent of the child.\u201d Id. at 222, 660 S.E.2d at 67. These steps included \u201cusing both parties\u2019 surnames to derive the child\u2019s name, allowing [the nonparent] to participate in the pregnancy and birth, [and] bolding a baptismal ceremony at which [the nonparent] was announced as a parent.\u201d Id. at 222-23, 660 S.E.2d at 67. After the child\u2019s birth, the parties acted as a family unit. Id. at 223, 660 S.E.2d at 67. They shared \u201ccaretaking and financial responsibilities for the child.\u201d Id. As a result of the parties\u2019 creation, the nonparent' \u201cbecame the only other adult whom the child considers a parent.\u201d Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).\nThe parent in that case also relinquished custody of the minor child to the nonparent with no expectation that the nonparent\u2019s relationship with the child would be terminated. Id. The parent \u201cchose to share her decision-making authority with [the nonparent].\u201d Id. The parent also executed a \u201cParenting Agreement\u201d in which she \u201cagreed that [the nonparent] should participate in making \u2018all major decisions regarding their child.\u2019 \u201d Id. In that document the parent also stated that\nshe and [the nonparent] had committed to \u201cjointly parent\u201d the child; that [the parent] would consent to [the nonparent]\u2019s adoption of the child if allowed by North Carolina law; that \u201calthough [the nonparent] is not the biological mother, she is a de facto parent who has and will provide the parties\u2019 child with a stable environment and she has formed a psychological parenting relationship with the parties\u2019 child;\u201d that the child\u2019s relationship with [the nonparent] \u201cshould be protected and promoted to preserve the strong emotional ties that exist between them;\u201d and that the purpose of the document was to make provisions for the continuation of the relationship should [the parties] cease to live together.\n190 N.C. App. at 224, 660 S.E.2d at 67-68. As such, the natural parent created along with the nonparent a family unit in which the two acted as parents, shared decision-making authority with the nonparent, and manifested an intent that the arrangement exist indefinitely.\nThe Court of Appeals recognized that the degree of custody relinquishment in Mason differed from that in Price. Id. at 225, 660 S.E.2d at 68. In Price, though there remained a factual issue regarding whether the relinquishment was intended to be only temporary, the natural parent completely relinquished custody of the child for some period of time. 346 N.C. at 82-83, 484 S.E.2d at 536-37. In Mason, on the other hand, the natural parent did not completely relinquish custody. 190 N.C. App. at 225, 660 S.E.2d at 68. However, the natural parent in Mason did completely relinquish her paramount parental right to make decisions regarding her child by voluntarily \u201csharing decision-making\u201d authority with the nonparent. Id. at 225, 660 S.E.2d at 68-69. After observing this difference in degree, the Court of Appeals explained, and we think rightly so, that the similarity in both cases is that if a parent cedes paramount decision-making authority, then, so long as he or she creates no expectation that the arrangement is for only a temporary period, that parent has acted inconsistently with his or her paramount parental status. See id. at 225-28, 660 S.E.2d at 68-70.\nThe record in the case sub judice indicates that defendant intentionally and voluntarily created a family unit in which plaintiff was intended to act \u2014 and acted \u2014 as a parent. The parties jointly decided to bring a child into their relationship, worked together to conceive a child, chose the child\u2019s first name together, and gave the child a last name that \u201cis a hyphenated name composed of both parties\u2019 last names.\u201d The parties also publicly held themselves out as the child\u2019s parents at a baptismal ceremony and to their respective families. The record also contains ample evidence that defendant allowed plaintiff and the minor child to develop a parental relationship. Defendant even \u201cagrees that [plaintiff] ... is and has been a good parent.\u201d\nMoreover, the record indicates that defendant created no expectation that this family unit was only temporary. Most notably, defendant consented to the proceeding before the adoption court relating to her child. As defendant envisioned, the adoption would have resulted in her child having \u201ctwo legal parents, myself and [plaintiff].\u201d In asking the adoption court to create such a relationship, defendant represented that she and plaintiff \u201chave raised the [minor child] since his birth and have jointly and equally provide[d] said child with care, support and nurturing throughout his life.\u201d Defendant explained to the adoption court that she \u201cintends and desires to co-parent with another adult who has agreed to adopt a child and share parental responsibilities.\u201d Thus, defendant shared parental responsibilities with plaintiff and, when occurring in the family unit defendant created without any expectation of termination, acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status. The record contains clear and convincing evidence in support of that conclusion.\nThe Court of Appeals erred in determining that the adoption decree at issue in this case is valid. We hold that the decree is void ab initio and that plaintiff is not a legally recognized parent of the minor child. However, because defendant has acted inconsistently with her paramount parental status, the trial court did not err by employing the \u201cbest interest of the child\u201d standard to reach its custody decision. Thus, we reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision regarding the validity of the adoption decree and affirm as modified its conclusion leaving undisturbed the trial court\u2019s custody award. We remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for actions not inconsistent with this opinion.\nMODIFIED AND AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.\n. The subsequent amendments to this statute are immaterial to our analysis. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-100 (2009).", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON\ndissenting.\n[A]fter the final order of adoption is entered, no party to an adoption proceeding nor anyone claiming under such a party may question the validity of the adoption because of any defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or otherwise, in the proceeding, but shall be fully bound by the order.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607(a) (2009) (emphasis added).\nBecause Melissa Ann Jarrell is statutorily barred from challenging the adoption decree, I dissent.\nThe legislature identified two narrow situations when challenges are allowed, and neither permits Jarrell\u2019s challenge. Id. First, Jarrell did not appeal within thirty days of the final adoption decree. Id. \u00a7 48-2-607(b) (2009). Second, she failed to move to set aside the decree within six months of a discovery that her consent to the adoption was obtained by fraud or duress. Id. \u00a7 48-2-607(c) (2009). Instead, Jarrell challenged the adoption nearly two years after entry of the final adoption decree. This she cannot do. The plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607(a) bars her claim.\nThis Court must respect the statutory limitations imposed by the legislature and should not reach substantive issues not before it. The legislature determined it to be'in the best interest of minors that adoptions be final, see id. \u00a7\u00a7 48-l-100(b)(l) (2009), 48-2-607(a), and allowed challenges in narrow circumstances, none of which are satisfied in this case. The wisdom of these restrictions to adoption challenges is an issue for the legislature to decide, not this Court. And if the members of our General Assembly wish to modify these restrictions, it is their prerogative and role to do so.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON" }, { "text": "Justice HUDSON\ndissenting.\nToday a majority of this Court acts contrary to explicit statutory language and legislative intent in order to achieve this outcome. Because I am not willing to read into statutes language that simply is not there, I dissent.\nBy its unambiguous language, the General Assembly has emphasized the overriding legislative goals of promoting the finality of adoptions and making primary the best interests of the child when construing Chapter 48. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-1-100 (2009). To that end, a final adoption decree that was not appealed may be set aside at a date as late as the one here only if the natural parent shows by clear and convincing evidence within six months of the reasonable date of discovery that his or her consent was obtained by fraud or duress. Id. \u00a7 48-2-607(c) (2009). Defendant Melissa Ann Jarrell has made no such allegations, and indeed, the record plainly shows her active, informed, and voluntary consent to plaintiff Julia Boseman\u2019s adoption of .the minor child. As such, defendant can present no serious argument that any provision in Chapter 48 would authorize a court to set aside the adoption after the passage of so much time.\nInstead, defendant contends that the adoption is void ab initio, despite conceding that the jurisdictional requirements set forth in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-100 were fully satisfied here. According to defendant, in reasoning largely adopted by the majority opinion, the trial court stripped itself of subject matter jurisdiction by exceeding its statutory authority under Chapter 48 when it allowed defendant to waive the provisions in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-l-106(c) (stating that a legal effect of an adoption decree is to sever the relationship between the adoptee and his natural parents) and \u00a7 48-3-606(9) (requiring the natural parent\u2019s consent to include a recognition that the adoption decree will terminate all parental rights with respect to the minor child). Defendant offers no authority for this approach to subject matter jurisdiction, and I have found none. Instead, the majority opinion today creates an entirely new formulation of the law of subject matter jurisdiction.\nThe underlying premise of the majority\u2019s holding, that the trial court was not authorized under Chapter 48 to waive the provisions of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-l-106(c) and \u00a7 48-3-606(9) concerning termination of defendant\u2019s parental rights, at most could amount to an error of law. Our case law makes clear that any such error would neither divest the trial court of, nor even implicate, its subject matter jurisdiction or authority to grant the relief sought by the parties, namely, plaintiff\u2019s adoption of the minor child. As such, I conclude that the adoption decree was not void, but merely voidable and subject to the statutory time limits for appeal. Because this challenge is time-barred, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.\nWhen outlining the general adoption procedure in Chapter 48, the General Assembly specifically included a section titled \u201cJurisdiction,\u201d which states in pertinent part:\n(b) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, jurisdiction over adoption proceedings commenced under this Chapter exists if, at the commencement of the proceeding:\n(1) The adoptee has lived in this State for at least the six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition or from birth, and the prospective adoptive parent is domiciled in this State; or\n(2) The prospective adoptive parent has lived in or been domiciled in this State for at least the six consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition.\nId. \u00a7 48-2-100 (2005) (emphasis added). These are the only statutory requirements before a North Carolina court may exercise jurisdiction over adoption proceedings. Here the trial court found as fact, properly affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that plaintiff, defendant, and the minor child all fulfilled the North Carolina residency requirements necessary to establish the trial court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction over the adoption under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-100. No party disputes that these statutory requirements were met, or challenges the trial court\u2019s personal jurisdiction over the parties.\nThe majority acknowledges that the General Assembly specifically enacted a section in Chapter 48 entitled \u201cJurisdiction\u201d and that those requirements were fully met here. The majority then reads into that section an additional requirement that does not actually appear in Chapter 48, to wit: that the trial court may not enter an order waiving certain statutory provisions. Based upon this new requirement, the majority then determines that the district court divested itself of jurisdiction by entering such an order, even though the statutory requirements for jurisdiction were satisfied. As such, reasons the majority, this adoption decree is void ah initio rather than potentially voidable for error. This new approach to subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 to ignore the statutory requisites and instead create our own \u2014 runs counter to the language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-100, and decades of jurisprudence on subject matter jurisdiction. Indeed, had the General Assembly intended such a requirement, the \u201cJurisdiction\u201d section makes obvious that legislators are more than capable of drafting it.\nThe Court\u2019s holding today implies that a court may be stripped of \u2022 subject matter jurisdiction by its own action, a conclusion inconsistent with long-standing case law:\nOnce the jurisdiction of a court . . . attaches, the general rule is that it will not be ousted by subsequent events. . . . Jurisdiction is not a light bulb which can be turned off or on during the course of the trial. Once a court acquires jurisdiction over an action it retains jurisdiction over that action throughout the proceeding. ... If the converse of this were true, it would be within the power of the defendant to preserve or destroy jurisdiction of the court at his own whim.\nSee In re Peoples, 296 N.C. 109, 146, 250 S.E.2d 890, 911 (1978) (third alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929, 61 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1979). Moreover, if the trial court lacked jurisdiction ab initio, then the order defendant now uses to challenge the validity of the adoption must itself be void and of no effect. As such, that order could not serve as the basis for successfully challenging the jurisdiction of the court. In holding that the order does so serve, the majority adopts circular reasoning and has allowed this defendant to \u201cdestroy jurisdiction of the court at [her] own whim,\u201d by asking the district court to enter the order she now claims deprived it of jurisdiction. Id.\nIn my view, defendant\u2019s arguments that the adoption is void ab initio, making it \u201ca nullity [which] may' be attacked either directly or collaterally,\u201d State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230, 235, 345 S.E.2d 179, 182 (1986) (citations omitted), must necessarily fail in light of the long-established rule that \u201c[a]n order is void ab initio only when it is issued by a court that does not have jurisdiction,\u201d id.-, see also Travis v. Johnston, 244 N.C. 713, 719-20, 95 S.E.2d 94, 99 (1956) (\u201cTo have validity a judgment must be rendered by a court which has authority to hear and determine the questions in dispute and control over the parties to the controversy or their interest in the property which is the subject matter of the controversy. When these tests are met, the judgment rendered by the court is not void.\u201d (citations omitted)).\nA judgment is not rendered void ab initio, nor is a trial court divested of subject matter jurisdiction or authority to enter a judgment, because of a failure to follow proper procedure or even because of an error of law. See Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 422, 130 S.E. 7, 9 (1925) (noting \u201cthe established principle that where the court has jurisdiction of both the subject-matter and the parties and acts within its power, the binding force and effect of a judgment is not impaired because the same has been erroneously allowed, though the error may be undoubted and apparent on the face of the record\u201d (citations omitted)); Peoples v. Norwood, 94 N.C. 162, 166, 94 N.C. 167, 172 (1886) (\u201c[W]hen the parties are voluntarily before the [c]ourt, and ... a judgment is entered in favor of one party and against another, such judgment is valid, although not granted according to the orderly course of procedure.\u201d (citations omitted)).\nWhile a void judgment \u201cis in legal effect no judgment,\u201d as \u201c[i]t neither binds nor bars any one, and all proceedings founded upon it are worthless,\u201d Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 90, 92 S.E.2d 673, 678 (1956) (citation and quotation marks omitted), \u201c[a]n erroneous judgment should be corrected by appeal or certiorari,\u201d Ellis, 190 N.C. at 422, 130 S.E. at 9; see also Daniels v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co., 320 N.C. 669, 676, 360 S.E.2d 772, 777 (1987) (\u201c \u2018An irregular order, one issued contrary to the method of practice and procedure established by law, is voidable.\u2019 . . . An erroneous order may be remedied by appeal; it may not be attacked collaterally.\u201d (citations omitted)); Worthington v. Wooten, 242 N.C. 88, 92, 86 S.E.2d 767, 770 (1955) (stating that a judgment, \u201ceven if irregular or even erroneous was binding on the parties, unless set aside or reversed on appeal. . . provided the court had jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter.\u201d (citations omitted)); see also Sawyer v. Slack, 196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929) (holding that, partly because of the strong public policy in favor of marriage and maintaining familial relationships and rights, the marriage of an underage female without the parental consent required by statute was not void but voidable).\nThe time limits for appeal or challenge to this adoption must be read in accordance with the General Assembly\u2019s forceful statement of legislative intent in the opening section of Chapter 48, notably not mentioned in the majority opinion:\nLegislative findings and intent; construction of Chapter\n(a) The General Assembly finds that it is in the public interest to establish a clear judicial process for adoptions, to promote the integrity and, finality of adoptions, to encourage prompt, conclusive disposition of adoption proceedings, and to structure services to adopted children, biological parents, and adoptive parents that will provide for the needs and protect the interests of all parties to an adoption, particularly adopted minors.\n(b) With special regard for the adoption of minors, the General Assembly declares as a matter of legislative policy that:\n(1) The primary purpose of this Chapter is to advance the welfare of minors by (i) protecting minors from unnecessary separation from their original parents, (ii) facilitating the adoption of minors in need of adoptive placement by persons who can give them love, care, security, and support, (iii) protecting minors from placement with adoptive parents unfit to have responsibility for their care and rearing, and (iv) assuring the finality of the adoption; and\n(2) Secondary purposes of this Chapter are (i) to protect biological parents from ill-advised decisions to relinquish a child or consent to the child\u2019s adoption, (ii) to protect adoptive parents from assuming responsibility for a child about whose heredity or mental or physical condition they know nothing, (iii) to protect the privacy of the parties to the adoption, and (iv) to discourage unlawful trafficking in minors and other unlawful placement activities.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-1-100 (emphases added); see also In re Adoption of Anderson, 360 N.C. 271, 275-76, 624 S.E.2d 626, 628 (2006) (noting that \u201cthe General Assembly recognized the public interest in establishing a clear judicial process for adoptions\u201d and \u201cpromoting the integrity and finality of adoptions\u201d (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).\nConsistent with its legislative intent \u201cto establish a clear judicial process for adoptions,\u201d including the \u201cprompt, conclusive disposition of adoption proceedings,\u201d id. \u00a7 48-l-100(a), and its primary purpose of \u201cassuring the finality of\u2019 adoptions, id. \u00a7 48-l-100(b)(l), the General Assembly mandated carefully delineated time limits and circumstances for appeals or challenges to a final adoption. Direct appeal of an adoption decree entered by a district court judge is allowed if filed within thirty days after the adoption becomes final, id. \u00a7 48-2-607(b) (2009), or within six months of the time a natural parent\u2019s consent or relinquishment \u201cwas obtained\u201d or \u201cought reasonably to have been discovered\u201d to have been obtained \u201cby fraud or duress,\u201d id. \u00a7 48-2-607(c). A natural parent may also revoke his or her consent within seven days of a consent to adoption, id. \u00a7 48-3-608(a) (2009), or within five days after receipt of a preplacement assessment in a direct placement adoption, id. \u00a7 48-3-608(b) (2009). A consent is void if clear and convincing evidence establishes that it was obtained by fraud or duress, or if the parties mutually agree to set it aside, if the petition to adopt is voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, or.if the court dismisses the petition to adopt and either no appeal is taken or the dismissal is affirmed on appeal and all appeals have been exhausted. Id. \u00a7 48-3-609(a) (2009).\nOutside these specific situations, however, the General Assembly explicitly prohibits any challenge after a final order of adoption is entered. Through the unequivocal language of the section of Chapter 48 titled \u201cAppeals,\u201d the legislature has established its preference for the finality of adoptions over correcting procedural irregularities:\n(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) of this section, after the final order of adoption is entered, no party to an adoption proceeding nor anyone claiming under such a party may question the validity of the adoption because of any defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or otherwise, in the proceeding, but shall be fully bound by the order. No adoption may be .attacked either directly or collaterally because of any procedural or other defect by anyone who was not a party to the adoption. The failure on the part of the court or an agency to perform duties or acts within the time required by the provisions of this Chapter shall not affect the validity of any adoption proceeding.\nId. \u00a7 48-2-607(a) (2009) (emphasis added). This strong preference is further evidenced in provisions that sanction final adoption decrees despite omissions of required information and vesting courts with a certain degree of leeway to determine compliance with statutory requirements. See, e.g., id. \u00a7 48-2-306(b) (2009) (\u201cAfter entry of a decree of adoption, omission of any information required [to be in the adoption petition, including consent and/or relinquishments] by G.S. 48-2-304 and G.S. 48-2-305 does not invalidate the decree.\u201d (emphasis added)); id. \u00a7 48-2-603(a)(4) (2009) (providing that, at the hearing on or \u201c[e]ach necessary consent, relinquishment, waiver, or judicial order terminating parental rights, has been obtained and filed . .. and the time for revocation has expired\u201d).\nHere, despite the passage of so much time, defendant would have us invalidate the adoption decree, even though she expressly consented to any irregularity, and even though taking such action is contrary to statutory language prioritizing finality over strict procedural compliance. Defendant first sought to challenge plaintiffs adoption of the minor child in a custody proceeding in May 2007, nearly two years after the final adoption decree was entered in August 2005, and well after expiration of the time limits for an appeal specified in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607. The waivers she now disclaims should fall squarely within the General Assembly\u2019s prohibition against untimely appeals claiming \u201cany defect or irregularity, jurisdictional or otherwise.\u201d Id. \u00a7 48-2-607(a). Nothing in the statutory language itself supports defendant\u2019s position, or the majority\u2019s endorsement of it. Rather, such a holding is contrary'to the unequivocally stated primary legislative goal of assuring the finality of adoptions.\nThe holding here likewise runs afoul of the General Assembly\u2019s categorical directive that Chapter 48 be construed in a manner to ensure that \u201cthe needs, interests, and rights of minor adoptees are primary.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-7-100(c) (emphasis added). Moreover, the legislature has instructed that \u201c[a]ny conflict between the interests of a minor adoptee and those of an adult shall be resolved in favor of the minor,\u201d id. (emphasis added), and Chapter 48 should be \u201cliberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies,\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-l-100(d), such as \u201cthe integrity and finality of adoptions\u201d and the \u201cprompt, conclusive disposition of adoption proceedings,\u201d id. \u00a7 48-l-100(a).\nThese provisions are plain and unambiguous, and appear in statutory text. By contrast, there is neither an explicit prohibition against, nor an explicit authorization of, the waivers at issue here. In the absence of any statutory language indicating legislative intent regarding these waivers, we must be guided by the legislative priorities we do know and thus act to safeguard the best interests of this child by barring this late challenge and promoting the finality of this adoption. Reading into Chapter 48 a jurisdictional requirement that is not there, the majority overlooks the interests of this child and promotes defendant\u2019s rights over those of the child, in direct contravention of the law as written.\nCONCLUSION\nThe majority decision here is at odds with the timetables and express intent of Chapter 48, as well as prior case law on the finality of adoptions. I would hold that at all pertinent times the trial court had jurisdiction, that this appeal is time-barred, and that the adoption decree must stand. Accordingly, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.\n. This statutory language was in effect when the petition for adoption was filed in this case, and subsequent amendments to remove barriers to adoption of North Carolina children by residents of other states, see Act. of Oct. 1, 2007, ch. 151, sec. 2, 2007 N.C. Sess. Laws 255, 255-56; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-100 (2009), do not affect my analysis here.\n. Although not argued here, this Court in an unrelated case has applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel to bind a party to a settlement he acknowledged (unsworn) in open court and later refused to perform. Powell v. City of Newton, \u2014 N.C. \u2014, S.E.2d \u2014 (2010) (No. 482A09). The Court of Appeals and ultimately this Court applied the doctrine even though it was not argued in the trial court or the Court of Appeals. Here, Jarrell sought, in a verified pleading, the order she now repudiates, arguably an even clearer scenario in which to apply estoppel.\n. Citing to, but not quoting, this statute, the majority maintains that \u201cthe legislature\u2019s words \u2018no party,\u2019 \u2018defect\u2019 and \u2018irregularity\u2019 indicate that this statute is designed to foreclose \u2018waivable\u2019 challenges in a court with subject matter jurisdiction.\u201d I reiterate that statement here, while including the actual statutory language, to highlight that the majority must necessarily read words (at least the word \u201cwaivable\u201d) into N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48-2-607, while ignoring the words \u201cany\u201d and \u201cfully bound,\u201d as well as the lack of a qualifier for \u201cjurisdictional,\u201d in order to reach its interpretation of this purported legislative intent.\nThis approach is at odds with the majority\u2019s reliance on In re D.L.H., which states the maxim that when a statute is clear and unambiguous, \u201cthere is no room for judicial construction and the courts must give the statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u201d 364 N.C. 214, 221, 694 S.E.2d 753, 757 (2010) (citation omitted).\n. I note as well that this Court has previously considered, and rejected, untimely challenges to final adoption decrees that assert the decree is void for lack of jurisdiction. See Hicks v. Russell, 256 N.C. 34, 40-41, 123 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1961); see also Fakhoury v. Fakhoury, 171 N.C. App. 104, 613 S.E.2d 729 (rejecting as irrelevant due to the untimeliness of the appeal the argument that \u201cpublic policy opposes a stepparent adoption when the stepparent, at the time of filing the petition for adoption, does not intend to stay in the marriage with the legal parent\u201d), disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 62, 621 S.E.2d 622 (2005).", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lea, Rhine & Rosbrugh, PLLC, by James W. Lea, III, Lori W. Rosbrugh, and Holli B. Newsome, for plaintiff/third-party defendant-appellee.", "Ward and Smith, P.A., by John M. Martin and Leslie G. Fritscher, for defendant/third-party plaintiff-appellant.", "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Mabel Y. Bullock, Special Deputy Attorney General, for North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, third-party defendant-appellee.", "Tami L. Fitzgerald, Lloyd T. Kelso, Julee T. Flood, and Deborah J. Dewart, for American College of Pediatricians, Christian Action League of North Carolina, North Carolina Family Policy Council, NC4Marriage, and Christian Family Law Association, amici curiae.", "Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Jill Schnabel Jackson, for American Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers, and North Carolina Chapter, National Association of Social Workers, amici curiae.", "Gailor Wallis & Hunt PLLC, by Cathy C. Hunt, for Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, National Center for Adoption Law and Policy, Barton Child Law & Policy Center, Center for Adoption Policy, and Katharine T. Bartlett, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Maxine Eichner, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, and Barbara Woodhouse, amici curiae.", "Kenneth S. Broun, UNC School of Law, for Law Professors; and Ellen W. Gerber for North Carolina Association of Women Attorneys, amici curiae.", "McGuire Woods LLP, by Bradley R. Kutrow and Monica E. Webb; and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, by Carmine D. Boccuzzi, pro hac vice, for North Carolina Chapter of American Academy of Pediatrics, amicus curiae.", "Ellis & Winters, LLP, by Jonathan D. Sasser, for American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Equality North Carolina Foun dation, and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., amici curiae.", "Alliance Defense Fund, by Austin R. Nimocks, pro hac vice; and Law Offices of Keith A. Williams PA, by Keith A. Williams, for Family Research Council, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JULIA CATHERINE BOSEMAN, Plaintiff v. MELISSA ANN JARRELL, Defendant and MELISSA ANN JARRELL, Third-Party Plaintiff v. JULIA CATHERINE BOSEMAN and NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Third-Party Plaintiff\nNo. 416PA08-2\n(Filed 20 December 2010)\n1. Adoption\u2014 subject matter jurisdiction \u2014 unmarried couple \u2014 artificial insemination \u2014 prior parental rights not terminated\nAn adoption decree was void ab initio where the petition sought relief that does not exist under the North Carolina statutes. Plaintiff became an adoptive parent without the termination of defendant\u2019s relationship with the child after the unmarried couple planned and conceived their son through an anonymous sperm donor.\n2. Child Support, Custody, and Visitation \u2014 custody\u2014artificial insemination \u2014 voluntarily creating new family unit \u2014 best interests of child test\nThe trial court did not err by applying the best interests of the child standard in a custody decision where defendant and plaintiff were not married but decided to bring a child into their relationship through an anonymous sperm donor and acted together as parents to the child. Defendant intentionally and voluntarily created a family unit in which plaintiff acted as a parent, with no indication that defendant intended the family unit to be temporary.\nJustice TIMMONS-GOODSON dissenting.\nJustice HUDSON dissenting.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,-N.C. App. \u2022 \u2014 , 681 S.E.2d 374 (2009), affirming in part, vacating in part, and remanding in part judgments and orders entered on 14 January 2008, 6 February 2008, 14 February 2008, 20 March 2008, and 16 April 2008, all by Judge Lillian B. Jordan in District Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Supreme Court 8 September 2010.\nLea, Rhine & Rosbrugh, PLLC, by James W. Lea, III, Lori W. Rosbrugh, and Holli B. Newsome, for plaintiff/third-party defendant-appellee.\nWard and Smith, P.A., by John M. Martin and Leslie G. Fritscher, for defendant/third-party plaintiff-appellant.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Mabel Y. Bullock, Special Deputy Attorney General, for North Carolina Department of Health and Human Services, third-party defendant-appellee.\nTami L. Fitzgerald, Lloyd T. Kelso, Julee T. Flood, and Deborah J. Dewart, for American College of Pediatricians, Christian Action League of North Carolina, North Carolina Family Policy Council, NC4Marriage, and Christian Family Law Association, amici curiae.\nTharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Jill Schnabel Jackson, for American Psychological Association, National Association of Social Workers, and North Carolina Chapter, National Association of Social Workers, amici curiae.\nGailor Wallis & Hunt PLLC, by Cathy C. Hunt, for Evan B. Donaldson Adoption Institute, National Center for Adoption Law and Policy, Barton Child Law & Policy Center, Center for Adoption Policy, and Katharine T. Bartlett, Naomi Cahn, June Carbone, Maxine Eichner, Joan Heifetz Hollinger, and Barbara Woodhouse, amici curiae.\nKenneth S. Broun, UNC School of Law, for Law Professors; and Ellen W. Gerber for North Carolina Association of Women Attorneys, amici curiae.\nMcGuire Woods LLP, by Bradley R. Kutrow and Monica E. Webb; and Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, by Carmine D. Boccuzzi, pro hac vice, for North Carolina Chapter of American Academy of Pediatrics, amicus curiae.\nEllis & Winters, LLP, by Jonathan D. Sasser, for American Civil Liberties Union, American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina Legal Foundation, Equality North Carolina Foun dation, and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., amici curiae.\nAlliance Defense Fund, by Austin R. Nimocks, pro hac vice; and Law Offices of Keith A. Williams PA, by Keith A. Williams, for Family Research Council, amicus curiae.\n. These professors are Jennifer Collins, Michael Kent Curtis, Shannon Gilreath, and Suzanne Reynolds, Wake Forest University School of Law; John Martin Conley, Maxine Eichner, Holning Lau, Gene R. Nichol, and Phillip A. Pucillo, University of North Carolina School of Law; Adrienne M. Fox, Susan E. Hauser, Lydia E. Lavelle, and Kia H. Vernon, North Carolina Central University School of Law; and Sonya Garza, Elon University School of Law." }, "file_name": "0537-01", "first_page_order": 631, "last_page_order": 655 }