{ "id": 4154177, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS JOHN STARR", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Starr", "decision_date": "2011-12-09", "docket_number": "No. 64PA11", "first_page": "314", "last_page": "320", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "365 N.C. 314" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "113 S. Ct. 983", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "506 U.S. 1055", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12088546, 12088613, 12088135, 12088199, 12088168, 12088235, 12088651, 12088462, 12088687, 12088369, 12088273, 12088507, 12088413, 12088574, 12088319 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/506/1055-11", "/us/506/1055-13", "/us/506/1055-01", "/us/506/1055-03", "/us/506/1055-02", "/us/506/1055-04", "/us/506/1055-14", "/us/506/1055-09", "/us/506/1055-15", "/us/506/1055-07", "/us/506/1055-05", "/us/506/1055-10", "/us/506/1055-08", "/us/506/1055-12", "/us/506/1055-06" ] }, { "cite": "415 S.E.2d 732", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2498297 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144-45" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 S.E.2d 629", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649-50" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561442 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 123", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" }, { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8568158 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510-11" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "510" }, { "page": "511" }, { "page": "511" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 S. Ct. 2349", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12448324, 12448325, 12448326, 12448327, 12448328, 12448329 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/176/0567-06", "/l-ed-2d/176/0567-07", "/l-ed-2d/176/0567-08", "/l-ed-2d/176/0567-09", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-01", "/l-ed-2d/176/0568-02" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 796", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "807", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 261", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150562 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0261-01" ] }, { "cite": "484 S.E.2d 372", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "375-76" }, { "page": "376", "parenthetical": "quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "376" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "346 N.C. 119", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 139354 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" }, { "page": "124" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/346/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 346 N.C. 119, 124, 484 S.E.2d 372, 375-76 (1997)" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 640", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132055 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "646", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Johnson, 346 N.C. 119, 124, 484 S.E.2d 372, 375-76 (1997)" }, { "page": "646" }, { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0640-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 S.E.2d 652", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656-57" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4689817 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34-35" }, { "page": "34" }, { "page": "33" }, { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 S.E.2d 717", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 N.C. 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566549 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/297/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 789", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1083", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9696835, 9696995, 9696964, 9696934, 9696712, 9696907, 9696799, 9696783, 9696879, 9696818, 9696692, 9696758, 9696855, 9696735 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1083-08", "/us/531/1083-14", "/us/531/1083-13", "/us/531/1083-12", "/us/531/1083-02", "/us/531/1083-11", "/us/531/1083-06", "/us/531/1083-05", "/us/531/1083-10", "/us/531/1083-07", "/us/531/1083-01", "/us/531/1083-04", "/us/531/1083-09", "/us/531/1083-03" ] }, { "cite": "530 S.E.2d 807", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "824" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 684912 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 313", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558792 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "338" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0313-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 S. Ct. 1321", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "520 U.S. 1147", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11675296, 11674881, 11674587, 11675208, 11675112, 11674987, 11674924, 11675149, 11674507, 11675249, 11675063, 11675354, 11674683, 11674780 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/520/1147-13", "/us/520/1147-05", "/us/520/1147-02", "/us/520/1147-11", "/us/520/1147-09", "/us/520/1147-07", "/us/520/1147-06", "/us/520/1147-10", "/us/520/1147-01", "/us/520/1147-12", "/us/520/1147-08", "/us/520/1147-14", "/us/520/1147-03", "/us/520/1147-04" ] }, { "cite": "476 S.E.2d 658", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "669" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 N.C. 542", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 867611 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "563" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/344/0542-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 876", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542, 563, 476 S.E.2d 658, 669 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1147, 117 S. Ct. 1321 (1997), and State v. Corbett, 339 N.C. 313, 338, 451 S.E.2d 252, 265 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 708, "char_count": 13844, "ocr_confidence": 0.757, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.210403175727271e-07, "percentile": 0.5957586716445631 }, "sha256": "0d19b1f4816dce7c39fcc28a295f6e1d08c2bd8e90c8247a8e3cea0342a8264b", "simhash": "1:8f6f952a672f09d6", "word_count": 2301 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:57:15.030367+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS JOHN STARR" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Justice.\nThis case presents the question of whether the trial court exercised its discretion in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1233(a) when it denied the jury\u2019s request to review the trial transcript. For the reasons stated herein, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals finding no error in the trial court\u2019s denial of the jury\u2019s request.\nOn 27 September 2007, members of the Wilmington Fire Department arrived at an apartment complex in response to a 911 call reporting water leaking into one of the units. Concerned that defendant, the upstairs resident, might need medical assistance, four firefighters and a police officer knocked loudly on his door and identified themselves. When there was no response from defendant\u2019s apartment, they forced entry with a Halligan tool. Firefighters Spruill, Lacewell, Chadwick, and Comer, along with the police officer, stood directly in front of defendant\u2019s door during this process. Spruill wedged the Halligan tool between the door and the jamb, while Chadwick hammered the tool with an axe to break the lock. As Chadwick hammered, Spruill, Lacewell, and he heard a \u201cpop\u201d sound. When Spruill pushed the door open, he heard a second \u201cpop\u201d just before entering the apartment. He then saw defendant standing about twelve feet away, pointing a gun at him. Defendant fired at Spruill, who quickly exited and shouted, \u201cHe\u2019s got a gun[!]\u201d Chadwick also saw defendant pointing his gun and ducked out of the doorway just as another \u201cpop\u201d sounded. The police officer entered the apartment with his gun drawn and ordered defendant to drop his weapon. Defendant complied and was promptly arrested.\nDefendant was charged with one count of assaulting a law enforcement officer with a firearm and four counts of assaulting a firefighter with a firearm. Defendant pleaded not guilty and the case proceeded to trial. Corporal Musacchio and three of the four firemen testified. The jury acquitted defendant of the charge of assaulting a law enforcement officer with a firearm, but convicted him of all four counts of assaulting a firefighter with a firearm. The trial court sentenced defendant to two consecutive active terms of nineteen to twenty-three months, suspended for thirty-six months with supervised probation.\nDefendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals on 26 August 2010. Among other things, defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to follow the procedures of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1233 when it denied the jury\u2019s request to review Firefighter Spruill\u2019s testimony. The Court of Appeals stated that a \u201ctrial court properly exercises its discretion in denying the jury\u2019s request to review testimony when the court instructs the jurors to rely on their recollection of the evidence in reaching a verdict.\u201d State v. Starr, _ N.C. App. _, _, 703 S.E.2d 876, 882 (2011) (citing State v. Harden, 344 N.C. 542, 563, 476 S.E.2d 658, 669 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1147, 117 S. Ct. 1321 (1997), and State v. Corbett, 339 N.C. 313, 338, 451 S.E.2d 252, 265 (1994)). The court held that because the trial court instructed the jurors to rely on their recollection of the evidence, the trial court \u201cproperly exercised its discretion in denying the jury\u2019s request to review Firefighter Spruill\u2019s trial testimony.\u201d Id. at _, 703 S.E.2d at 882 (citing State v. Lawrence, 352 N.C. 1, 27, 530 S.E.2d 807, 824 (2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1083, 121 S. Ct. 789 (2001)). On 15 June 2011, we allowed defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review on that issue.\nJury requests for review of evidence during deliberations are governed by section 15A-1233(a), which states:\nIf the jury after retiring for deliberation requests a review of certain testimony or other evidence, the jurors must be conducted to the courtroom. The judge in his discretion, after notice to the prosecutor and defendant, may direct that requested parts of the testimony be read to the jury and may permit the jury to reexamine in open court the requested materials admitted into evidence. In his discretion the judge may also have the jury review other evidence relating to the same factual issue so as not to give undue prominence to the evidence requested.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1233(a) (2009). This statutory provision is a codification of the common law rule that \u201cthe decision whether to grant or refuse the jury\u2019s request for a restatement of the evidence lies within the discretion of the trial court.\u201d State v. Ford, 297 N.C. 28, 30, 252 S.E.2d 717, 718 (1979) (citations omitted); see also State v. Ashe, 314 N.C. 28, 34-35, 331 S.E.2d 652, 656-57 (1985). Under this rule, the trial court \u201cmust exercise its discretion in determining whether to permit requested evidence to be read to or examined by the jury together with other evidence relating to the same factual issue.\u201d Ashe, 314 N.C. at 34, 331 S.E.2d at 656.\nWhen a trial court violates this statutory mandate by denying the jury\u2019s request to review the transcript \u201c \u2018upon the ground that the trial court has no power to grant the motion in its discretion, the ruling is reviewable,\u2019 \u201d and the alleged error is preserved by law even when the defendant fails to object. State v. Barrow, 350 N.C. 640, 646, 517 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1999) (quoting State v. Johnson, 346 N.C. 119, 124, 484 S.E.2d 372, 375-76 (1997)). \u201c[Tjhere is error when the trial court refuses to exercise its discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question presented.\u201d Id. (quoting Johnson, 346 N.C. at 124, 484 S.E.2d at 376 (quotation marks omitted)).\nHere, after the jury retired to deliberate, the following exchange took place:\nTHE COURT: They\u2019ve got a question. Let the record reflect that they have sent another note saying, \u201cWe are requesting the testimony of Marvin Spruill.\u201d\nOf course, we don\u2019t have that. We don\u2019t have that capability and I thought if it was okay with you, since we\u2019re in the middle of jury selection in this one, that we would open the door without y\u2019all being seen and let [the court reporter] take everything down and me just inform them to rely on their recollections. We don\u2019t have the modem day equipment to provide real-time transcript or something.\n(NO VERBAL RESPONSE.)\n(THE FOLLOWING TOOK PLACE AT THE JURY ROOM DOOR.)\nTHE COURT: Hey, freeze what you\u2019re doing right now. I have received this note, \u201cWe are requesting the testimony of Marvin Spruill.\u201d In North Carolina we don\u2019t have the capability of real-time transcripts so we cannot provide you with that. You are to rely on your recollection of the evidence that you have heard in your deliberations. That\u2019s my instmction to you. Okay. Thank you. [Emphasis added.]\nWhen the trial court gives no reason for a ruling that must be discretionary, we presume on appeal that the court exercised its discretion. Johnson, 346 N.C. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 376. \u201cHowever, where the statements of the trial court show that the trial court did not exercise discretion, as is evident in the present case, the presumption is overcome, and the denial is deemed erroneous.\u201d Id. The trial court\u2019s statement \u201cwe don\u2019t have the capability... so we cannot provide you with that\u201d overcomes the presumption the court exercised its discretion.\nA trial court\u2019s statement that it is unable to provide the transcript to the jury demonstrates the court\u2019s apparent belief that it lacks the discretion to comply with the request. Barrow, 350 N.C. at 646, 517 S.E.2d at 378. Because \u201c[a] court does not exercise its discretion when it believes it has no discretion,\u201d State v. Maness, 363 N.C. 261, 278, 677 S.E.2d 796, 807 (2009) (citations omitted), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 130 S. Ct. 2349 (2010), a response indicating the inability to provide a transcript constitutes erroneous failure to exercise discretion.\nThis Court has examined exchanges nearly identical to the exchange in this case and concluded that the trial court did not properly exercise its discretion in denying the jury\u2019s request to review the transcript. Those cases compel our decision in the present case. For example, the trial court did not exercise discretion when it responded: \u201c[W]hat [the court reporter is] taking down has not yet been transcribed. And the Court doesn\u2019t have the ability to now present to you the transcription of what was said during the course of the trial. . . . It will be your responsibility and obligation to use your independent recollection of what those witnesses testified . . . .\u201d Barrow, 350 N.C. at 647, 517 S.E.2d at 378 (emphasis omitted). Similarly, we held that the trial court did not exercise discretion when it said: \u201cI\u2019ll have to give you this instruction. There is no transcript at this point. You and the other jurors will have to take your recollection of the evidence as you recall it and as you can agree upon that recollection in your deliberations.\u201d Ashe, 314 N.C. at 33, 331 S.E.2d at 656; see also State v. Lang, 301 N.C. 508, 510-11, 272 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1980); Ford, 297 N.C. at 30, 252 S.E.2d at 718. These cases demonstrate the well-settled rule that a trial court does not exercise its discretion when, as evidenced by its response, it believes it cannot comply with the jury\u2019s transcript request. In cases such as these, in which the trial court\u2019s statement indicates its belief that it does not have discretion to grant the jury\u2019s request to review evidence, the court\u2019s additional instruction that the jurors rely on their memory will not render the response discretionary. Therefore, the trial court in the instant case violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1233(a) by failing to exercise its discretion, and thus the error is preserved by operation of law for appellate review. See Ashe, 314 N.C. at 40, 331 S.E.2d at 659.\nWe pause to provide guidance to trial court judges to ensure compliance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1233(a). The trial court must exercise its discretion to determine whether, \u201cunder the facts of th[e] case,\u201d the transcript should be made available to the jury. Lang, 301 N.C. at 511, 272 S.E.2d at 125. But the trial court is not required to state a reason for denying access to the transcript. The trial judge may simply say, \u201cIn the exercise of my discretion, I deny the request,\u201d and instruct the jury to rely on its recollection of the trial testimony. See 1 Super. Court Subcomm., Bench Book Comm. & N.C. Conf. of Super. Court Judges, North Carolina Trial Judges\u2019 Bench Book \u00a7 III, ch. 38, at 2 (Inst. of Gov\u2019t, Chapel Hill, N.C., 3d ed. 1999).\nHaving determined that there was error and that defendant\u2019s failure to object at trial did not bar appellate review, we now consider whether the trial court\u2019s failure to exercise its discretion was prejudicial. See Lang, 301 N.C. at 510, 272 S.E.2d at 125. Defendant bears the burden of showing that he has been prejudiced by the trial court\u2019s error in not exercising discretion in accordance with N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1233(a). He must show \u201ca reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a).\nDefendant argues that \u201c[t]he jury\u2019s review of Fireman Spruill\u2019s testimony could have reasonably resulted in not guilty verdicts for Mr. Starr on one or more of the guilty verdicts of the four firemen.\u201d Defendant has not carried his burden of proving that the error was prejudicial. He does not explain how the review of Spruill\u2019s testimony would have created a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at his trial. The jury had the opportunity to see and hear Spruill\u2019s testimony at trial, see State v. Covington, 290 N.C. 313, 344, 226 S.E.2d 629, 649-50 (1976), and the testimony was not confusing or contradicted, see Johnson, 346 N.C. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 377. Further, Spruill\u2019s testimony was not \u201c \u2018material to the determination of defendant\u2019s guilt or innocence.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Lang, 301 N.C. at 511, 272 S.E.2d at 125). Specifically, the requested testimony was incriminating to defendant and came from a witness for the prosecution, unlike alibi testimony or other testimony that would tend to benefit a defendant. See State v. Hudson, 331 N.C. 122, 144-45, 415 S.E.2d 732, 744 (1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1055, 113 S. Ct. 983 (1993); Lang, 301 N.C. at 511, 272 S.E.2d at 125. In addition, Spruill\u2019s testimony was not \u201cthe only evidence directly linking defendant to the alleged crimes.\u201d Johnson, 346 N.C. at 126, 484 S.E.2d at 377. Rather, three other witnesses gave testimony that corroborated Spruill\u2019s testimony. Defendant thus has not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that a different res\u00falt would have been reached at his trial had the error not been committed. Accordingly, we modify and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nMODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Karen A. Blum, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.", "Thomas Reston Wilson for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. THOMAS JOHN STARR\nNo. 64PA11\n(Filed 9 December 2011)\nJury\u2014 request to review testimony denied \u2014 trial court\u2019s failure to exercise discretion \u2014 inability to provide transcript\nAlthough the trial court violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1233(a) by failing to exercise its discretion in a multiple assaulting a firefighter with a firearm case by denying the jury\u2019s request to review a firefighter\u2019s testimony based on the inability to provide a transcript, defendant failed to show a reasonable possibility that a different result would have been reached at trial absent this error.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,-N.C. App.-, 703 S.E.2d 876 (2011), finding no error in judgments entered on 12 November 2008 by Judge W. Allen Cobb, Jr. in Superior Court, New Hanover County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 14 November 2011.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Karen A. Blum, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.\nThomas Reston Wilson for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0314-01", "first_page_order": 352, "last_page_order": 358 }