{ "id": 4153670, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL KRIS HUNT", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Hunt", "decision_date": "2012-03-09", "docket_number": "No. 195PA11", "first_page": "432", "last_page": "443", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "365 N.C. 432" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "616 S.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633593 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" }, { "page": "581" }, { "page": "581" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/616/0576-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.W.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "277 Wis. 2d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wis. 2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005 WI 1", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "WI", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004 WI App. 213", "category": "reporters:neutral", "reporter": "WI App", "case_ids": [ 9011250 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "\u00b6 21" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "690" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wis-2d/277/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "866 P.2d 40", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "122 Wash. 2d 1026", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "853 P.2d 953", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "956" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 Wash. App. 424", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. App.", "case_ids": [ 1745266 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "428-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-app/70/0424-01" ] }, { "cite": "383 N.W.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10657548 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nw2d/383/0828-01" ] }, { "cite": "86 N.Y.2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.2d", "case_ids": [ 4436067 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "87" }, { "page": "1165-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny-2d/86/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "7 Neb. App. 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb. Ct. App.", "case_ids": [ 267727 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202" }, { "page": "350-51" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb-app/7/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 P. 257", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.", "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "259", "parenthetical": "stating that the jury could determine whether the victim had the mental capacity to consent, without the testimony of expert witnesses, because \"[t]he victim was present in court and testified,\" giving the jury \"the opportunity of seeing her, and . . . judging as to her mentality\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "86 Colo. 406", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Colo.", "case_ids": [ 5324463 ], "year": 1929, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/colo/86/0406-01" ] }, { "cite": "48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. Rptr. 3d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "142 Cal. App. 4th 1426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cal. App. 4th", "case_ids": [ 3499464 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/cal-app-4th/142/1426-01" ] }, { "cite": "890 P.2d 587", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10347574 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/890/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "198 S.E. 619", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "620-21", "parenthetical": "liability for punitive damages in criminal conversation case" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 N.C. 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8629431 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193-94", "parenthetical": "liability for punitive damages in criminal conversation case" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/214/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "62 S.E.2d 50", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "credibility of a witness" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "232 N.C. 727", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614170 ], "year": 1950, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "credibility of a witness" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/232/0727-01" ] }, { "cite": "146 S.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "499-500", "parenthetical": "contracts" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561099 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448-50", "parenthetical": "contracts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 S.E.2d 607", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "execution of a will and codicil" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "267 N.C. 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558306 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "execution of a will and codicil" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/267/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863-64", "parenthetical": "capacity to stand trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 N.C. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2564239 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653-54", "parenthetical": "capacity to stand trial" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/323/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 72", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "74" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. 347", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8610704 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "350" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/203/0347-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 S.E.2d 231", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Will of Brown, 203 N.C. 347, 350, 166 S.E. 72, 74 (1932)" }, { "page": "236", "parenthetical": "insanity defense" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "298 N.C. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424", "parenthetical": "quoting In re Will of Brown, 203 N.C. 347, 350, 166 S.E. 72, 74 (1932)" }, { "page": "424-25" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/298/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1841, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83-85", "parenthetical": "\"[I]f belief of capacity founded on personal observation be evidence, and we think it is, it is admissible whether the opportunity for observation has been frequent or rare.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "172 N.C. App. 772", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8321446 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" }, { "page": "779" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/172/0772-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 U.S. 558", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8898517 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/539/0558-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 S.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "266 N.C. 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8560324 ], "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/266/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 9, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449" }, { "page": "449" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151610 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327-28", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "327-28" }, { "page": "328" }, { "page": "327-28" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 339", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1221, "char_count": 29705, "ocr_confidence": 0.755, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.8631019814676005e-07, "percentile": 0.9001215901004267 }, "sha256": "576ec7a1f7e81298ff09b9f813aaa15590748bc0db1a8d3f0e5500ccee06f788", "simhash": "1:f91470477ba6ef1a", "word_count": 4746 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:57:15.030367+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL KRIS HUNT" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Justice.\nDefendant was convicted of second-degree sexual offense and crime against nature, based upon the victim\u2019s age and inability to consent due to a mental disability. In this appeal we consider whether expert testimony is always necessary to establish whether a victim in such a case had the requisite mental capacity to consent. Because we hold that expert testimony is not required as articulated by the Court of Appeals, and that the State presented sufficient evidence to withstand defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss, we reverse and remand.\nOn 25 May 2008, defendant and his wife hosted a birthday party at a local park for their daughter Madison who was turning sixteen. Approximately thirty people attended the party, including the complaining witness Clara, who was seventeen. Madison and Clara lived on the same street, rode the school bus together, and often visited each other\u2019s homes. After the party, defendant and his wife took Madison, Clara, and Madison\u2019s friend Ashley back to defendant\u2019s house for a sleep over. Defendant and his wife left the house around 9:00 p.m. to patronize several bars in Greensboro. While defendant and his wife were gone, Madison, Clara, Ashley, and defendant\u2019s four other children \u2014 ages four, ten, eleven, and fifteen \u2014 watched a movie and looked at pictures from the party while in the living room.\nDefendant and his wife returned home around 3:00 a.m. on 26 May 2008. Defendant had consumed six beers and eight to ten \u201cJager bombs\u201d at the bars and was admittedly intoxicated. Defendant and his wife went into their bedroom but defendant soon emerged alone, wearing sweatpants but no shirt. Defendant went into the living room, where the children still were watching the movie, and sat down on the couch. Defendant then got up and motioned for Clara to follow him into the kitchen after tapping her on the arm. Clara testified that she followed defendant into the kitchen because she \u201cthought [defendant] was going to show [her] where the cups were\u201d located.\nOnce they were in the kitchen, defendant began touching Clara outside her clothing on her breasts, vagina, and \u201cbutt.\u201d Defendant asked Clara, \u201cDo you like it?\u201d Clara testified that she \u201cwas scared\u201d and \u201cdidn\u2019t know what [defendant] was going to do.\u201d Defendant then pulled his penis out of his sweatpants. Clara was \u201cshocked\u201d and \u201cthought [defendant] was going to do something else\u201d to her. Instead, defendant forced Clara\u2019s head down to his penis and she put her mouth on it. Clara testified that she only put her mouth on defendant\u2019s penis because he \u201cforced [her] head down to it.\u201d She said that she was \u201cscared\u201d because she \u201cthought [defendant] was going to hurt [her] more than he did.\u201d Clara tried to raise her head but defendant pushed it back down to his penis, which he forced into her mouth again. At some point during the encounter, defendant told Clara, \u201cDon\u2019t tell nobody. I can get in serious trouble.\u201d Eventually, Clara pulled her head away from defendant\u2019s penis.\nAfter Clara pulled her head away, defendant told her, \u201cGo in the girls\u2019 bedroom and take off your clothes.\u201d Instead, Clara returned to the living room and told Ashley that defendant had asked her to go into the girls\u2019 bedroom and remove her clothes. Ashley told Madison what Clara had told her. Clara also told Madison that defendant had \u201ctouched [her] all over\u201d and \u201cmade [her] suck his penis.\u201d Madison and Ashley took Clara into the bathroom and stayed with her while she washed her hands and brushed her teeth. Clara asked Madison and Ashley to protect her from defendant. The girls went into Madison\u2019s bedroom and talked until they fell asleep at approximately 6:00 a.m. Before they fell asleep, the girls arranged themselves in the bed to protect Clara. Clara was against the wall with Madison lying next to her.\nSometime after the girls fell asleep, defendant came into their bedroom, touched Clara\u2019s feet, and motioned for her to come into the hallway. Clara woke Madison, who was sleeping next to her, and told Madison that defendant wanted her to come into the hallway. Madison told Clara not to go into the hallway, and the girls went back to sleep.\nLater that morning, Madison woke her mother and told her what had occurred between defendant and Clara. Based on this information, defendant\u2019s wife confronted him. Defendant\u2019s wife testified that defendant initially denied the accusations, but eventually admitted that Clara had performed oral sex on him. Defendant\u2019s wife became upset and told defendant to get out of the house.\nAt approximately the same time, Clara decided to walk home and tell her father what defendant had done. Defendant started to follow Clara, but then turned around and returned home after Clara called defendant\u2019s wife. Defendant subsequently decided to turn himself in to the police. Defendant drove to the Asheboro police station and told an officer on duty that he had \u201cmade a mistake\u201d and \u201cmessed up.\u201d Defendant gave police a statement, admitting that he \u201crubbed [Clara] on her chest and she put [his] dick in her mouth for about one minute or so.\u201d Defendant later admitted to a second officer that he had \u201csexual relations\u201d with Clara.\nOn 21 July 2008, defendant was indicted for second-degree sexual offense and crime against nature. On 6 October 2009, defendant was tried in the Superior Court, Randolph County. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, defendant moved to dismiss the charges based upon insufficiency of the evidence. In support of these motions, defendant argued in part that the State had not introduced expert testimony to show that Clara had a mental disability that rendered her substantially incapable of consenting to sexual acts or resisting unwanted sexual advances. The trial court denied all defendant\u2019s motions.\nAfter deliberating for less than one hour, the jury found defendant guilty of second-degree sexual offense and crime against nature. The trial court then denied defendant\u2019s renewed motion to dismiss. The trial court consolidated defendant\u2019s convictions and sentenced him to an active term of seventy-three to ninety-seven months imprisonment.\nDefendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which unanimously reversed and vacated defendant\u2019s convictions, holding \u201cthat in sit\u00faations such as presented by this case, where the victim\u2019s IQ falls within the range considered to be \u2018mental retardation[,]\u2019 but who is highly functional in her daily activities and communication, the State must present expert testimony as to the extent of the victim\u2019s mental disability as defined by N.C.[G.S.] \u00a7 14-27.5.\u201d State v. Hunt, _ N.C. App. _, _, 710 S.E.2d 339, 348 (2011) (alteration in original). We allowed the State\u2019s petition for discretionary review.\nOur standard of review regarding motions to dismiss is well established:\nWhen reviewing a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines whether the State presented substantial evidence in support of each element of the charged offense. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion. In this determination, all evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State receives the benefit of every reasonable inference supported by that evidence. The defendant\u2019s evidence, unless favorable to the State, is not to be taken into consideration, except when it is consistent with the State\u2019s evidence, the defendant\u2019s evidence may be used to explain or clarify that offered by the State. Additionally, a substantial evidence inquiry examines the sufficiency of the evidence presented but not its weight, which is a matter for the jury. Thus, if there is substantial evidence \u2014 whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\nState v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 327-28, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nThe State argues that expert testimony should not be required to establish the extent of a victim\u2019s mental capacity to consent to sexual acts and contends that it presented sufficient evidence to withstand defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss. During defendant\u2019s trial Clara testified for the State, giving the jury the opportunity to observe independently whether or not she was mentally disabled. In addition, the State presented six lay witnesses who testified about Clara\u2019s capabilities.\nLisa Cheek was the school social worker for Asheboro High School and had known Clara for almost three and a half years. Cheek testified that certain children with developmental disabilities can be \u201cmainstreamed\u201d into regular classes but those who likely will struggle in the traditional school environment are placed into the occupational course of study. Cheek stated that Clara had been in occupational training classes for as long as Cheek had known her. Cheek said that Clara was \u201cvery up-front about her . . . disabilities.\u201d Cheek also testified that Clara had a mental health counselor at N.C. Mentor, a mental health facility for persons with disabilities. Cheek said that Clara\u2019s N.C. Mentor counselor met with Clara at least once or twice a week. Cheek further testified that Clara received a Social Security disability check. Cheek stated that the Randolph County Department of Social Services (\u201cDSS\u201d) managed Clara\u2019s money because Clara was unable to oversee her own finances.\nHeather Cox was Clara\u2019s special education teacher at Asheboro High School for three years. Cox testified that Clara is intellectually disabled, with an intelligence quotient (\u201cIQ\u201d) of sixty-one. Cox explained that Clara struggled intellectually and that her \u201cprocessing\u201d was slow. Cox further stated that Clara was placed on an individual education plan for students with disabilities. Cox classified Clara\u2019s disability as being in the \u201cmild category\u201d and testified that Clara had been placed into the second of three levels of intellectually disabled students in the special education program. Cox explained that students in the second level have more severe disabilities than those in the first level and are not able to learn the general curriculum, even with modifications. These students do not receive a regular high school diploma, but instead receive a certificate upon completion. They generally find work in the restaurant and hospitality industries as housekeepers, fry cooks, dishwashers, and busboys. They are able to function in society with some assistance. Cox testified that Clara had never taken any classes outside the special education curriculum.\nCheryl Lackey handled adult protective referrals for DSS. Lackey testified that Clara had developmental disabilities and an IQ below 70. Lackey stated that DSS prepared a budget for Clara and gave her money for clothes and medication. Lackey also said that Clara lived with Mary Nunez, the mother of another developmentally disabled child, and DSS paid for Clara\u2019s room and board. Lackey further testified that Nunez helped Clara go to the store, and representatives from N.C. Mentor helped Clara determine what she wanted to do and made sure that she was not neglected or exploited. When asked if Clara could interact with her as an adult, Lackey stated, \u201cYes, I mean, she can talk to me and everything. But like I said before, she has a problem understanding.\u201d\nDetective Deborah McKenzie of the Asheboro Police Department testified that she knew Clara based on the five and a half years that she had served as a school resource officer at South Asheboro Middle School. Detective McKenzie had served in law enforcement for twenty years and specialized in the investigation of sexual assaults of women and children. She described Clara as \u201cvery child-like\u201d and observed that Clara\u2019s \u201cbehavior was more child-like for her age group than the other kids at the school.\u201d Detective McKenzie interviewed Clara at the police station as part of her investigation of defendant\u2019s actions. She testified that \u201c[b]eeause of [Clara\u2019s] mental disability, it was more like interviewing a child than a young adult.\u201d Detective McKenzie explained that Clara had difficulty writing a statement and that Clara agreed to let Detective McKenzie write it for her instead.\nIn addition to these witnesses, Madison testified that her family was aware that Clara had disabilities and had talked about it. Defendant\u2019s wife also testified that after Clara had visited their house and played with their children a few times, she asked Madison if Clara was \u201cslow.\u201d Defendant\u2019s wife had observed that Clara seemed to be more at the intellectual level of her ten-year-old daughter than on Madison\u2019s level. Defendant\u2019s wife also recalled discussing Clara\u2019s apparent mental impairment with defendant. In addition, defendant\u2019s wife stated that Clara\u2019s father had told both defendant and her that Clara was \u201ckind of slow.\u201d\nAfter the State presented its witnesses, defendant testified that he \u201cknew [Clara] was sexually active\u201d and \u201cthought that she was used to sexual transactions.\u201d Defendant admitted that Clara performed oral sex on him, but stated that it was consensual. Defendant denied that Clara\u2019s father or anyone else had told him that Clara was developmentally disabled or. \u201cslow.\u201d Defendant stated that he had never noticed anything unusual about Clara. Defendant testified that he did not learn that Clara had a mental disability until he was interviewed at the police station.\nAfter carefully reviewing the testimony at trial, we conclude that the trial corut properly denied defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the second-degree sexual offense charge. The crime of second-degree sexual offense is set forth in section 14-27.5(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes: \u201cA person is guilty of a sexual offense in the second degree if the person engages in a sexual act with another person . . . [w]ho is mentally disabled . . . and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know that the other person is mentally disabled . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.5(a)(2) (2011). The term \u201cmentally disabled\u201d is defined in section 14-27.1(1) of the North Carolina General Statutes as:\n(i) a victim who suffers from mental retardation, or (ii) a victim who suffers from a mental disorder, either of which temporarily or permanently renders the victim substantially incapable of appraising the nature of his or her conduct, or of resisting the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act, or of communicating unwillingness to submit to the act of vaginal intercourse or a sexual act.\nId. \u00a7 14-27.1(1) (2011). Here, the record contains sufficient evidence that: (1) Clara is mentally disabled; (2) her condition rendered her substantially incapable of resisting defendant\u2019s sexual advances; and (3) defendant knew or reasonably should have known of Clara\u2019s mental disability.\nFirst, the State presented evidence that Clara is mentally disabled. See id. \u00a7\u00a7 14-27.1(1), -27.5(a)(2). Clara has an IQ of sixty-one. At the time of the incident, Clara was enrolled in special education classes that had a vocational, rather than an academic, focus. According to the testimony of one of her teachers, Clara was placed in the middle level of intellectually disabled students in the special education curriculum. Although Clara earned good grades for her intelligence level, her academic accomplishments were measured differently from those of students who were placed in the regular curriculum.\nIn addition, the State presented evidence that Clara requires assistance to function in society. Clara receives much of this assistance from DSS. Although Clara lives with Nunez, DSS pays for her room and board. DSS also provides Clara with assistance in setting a budget and gives her money to purchase clothes and medication. To ensure that Clara is not taken advantage of when she interacts with others, Clara receives help from both Nunez and representatives from N.C. Mentor. As Lackey testified, Clara \u201ccan talk to me and everything\u201d but she \u201chas a problem understanding.\u201d\nSecond, the State demonstrated that Clara\u2019s condition rendered her substantially incapable of resisting defendant\u2019s advances. See id. \u00a7 14-27.1(1). When defendant asked Clara to follow him into the kitchen, she thought he was going to show her where the cups were located. Clara testified that defendant\u2019s act of \u201crubbing\u201d her breasts, vagina, and butt \u201cscared\u201d her because she \u201cdidn\u2019t know what [defendant] was going to do.\u201d Clara said that she was \u201cshocked\u201d when defendant pulled his penis out of his sweatpants. After defendant forced Clara to put his penis into her mouth, Clara again said that she was scared because she \u201cthought [defendant] was going to hurt [her] more than he did.\u201d In addition, when Clara tried to raise her head, defendant pushed it back down to his penis.\nFinally, the record contains evidence that defendant knew or reasonably should have known about Clara\u2019s mental disability. Defendant\u2019s wife testified that previously defendant and she had discussed Clara\u2019s condition. Defendant\u2019s wife further stated that on one occasion defendant, Clara\u2019s father, and she discussed Clara\u2019s mental disability.\nConsidered in the light most favorable to the State, see Abshire, 363 N.C. at 328, 677 S.E.2d at 449, a reasonable juror could have inferred from this evidence that: (1) Clara was mentally disabled; (2) her condition rendered her substantially incapable of resisting defendant\u2019s sexual advances; and (3) defendant knew or should reasonably have known of Clara\u2019s mental disability, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 14-27.1(1), -27.5(a)(2). Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the second-degree sexual offense charge. See Abshire, 363 N.C. at 327-28, 677 S.E.2d at 449.\nIn addition, the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the crime against nature charge. See id. Section 14-177 of the North Carolina General Statutes states: \u201cIf any person shall commit the crime against nature, with mankind or beast, he shall be punished as a Class I felon.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-177 (2011). \u201c[T]he legislative intent and purpose of [N.C.JG.S. [\u00a7] 14-177 ... is to punish persons who undertake by unnatural and indecent methods to gratify a perverted and depraved sexual instinct which is an offense against public decency and morality.\u201d State v. Stubbs, 266 N.C. 295, 298, 145 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1966). In response to the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003), the scope of section 14-177 has been narrowed. State v. Whiteley, 172 N.C. App. 772, 777, 616 S.E.2d 576, 580 (2005). Nonetheless, the statute \u201cmay properly be used to prosecute conduct in which a minor is involved, conduct involving non-consensual or coercive sexual acts, conduct occurring in a public place, or conduct involving prostitution or solicitation.\u201d Id. at 779, 616 S.E.2d at 581.\nHere the record contains sufficient evidence that defendant engaged in nonconsensual or coercive sexual acts with a minor. As defendant concededly knew, Clara was seventeen at the time of her encounter with him. Defendant also admitted that Clara performed oral sex on him. As we concluded above, the State introduced sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Clara\u2019s condition rendered her substantially incapable of resisting defendant\u2019s advances. This evidence indicates that the sexual acts were not consensual. In addition, the record suggests that the sexual acts were coercive. Clara testified that defendant \u201cforced\u201d her head down to his penis and \u201cpushed [her] head back down\u201d when she tried to raise it. Clara stated that she only put her mouth on defendant\u2019s penis because he \u201cforced [her] head down to it.\u201d Clara said that she was \u201cscared\u201d because she \u201cthought [defendant] was going to hurt [her].\u201d Clara also testified that defendant told her twice not to tell anybody because he could get in \u201cserious trouble.\u201d Considered in the light most favorable to the State, see Abshire, 363 N.C. at 328, 677 S.E.2d at 449, a reasonable juror could infer from these facts that defendant engaged in nonconsensual or coercive sexual acts with a minor, see Whiteley, 172 N.C. App. at 779, 616 S.E.2d at 581. Therefore, the State presented sufficient evidence to overcome defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the crime against nature charge. See Abshire, 363 N.C. at 327-28, 677 S.E.2d at 449.\nAccordingly, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred by overruling the trial court. In so holding, we emphasize that expert testimony is not necessarily required to establish the extent of a victim\u2019s mental capacity to consent to sexual acts when a defendant is charged with second-degree sexual offense pursuant to section 14-27.5 or crime against nature pursuant to section 14-177 of the North Carolina General Statutes.\nRule 702(a) of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence provides that: \u201cIf scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 702(a) (2011) (emphasis added). Thus, Rule 702(a) recognizes the permissive, rather than mandatory, nature of expert testimony. See 2 Kenneth S. Broun, Brandis and Broun on North Carolina Evidence \u00a7 184, at 700 (7th ed. 2011) (\u201cThe Rule should not be interpreted to require such a witness.\u201d). Additionally, it has been well settled in this state that lay witness testimony may be received regarding the mental condition of an individual whose capacity is at issue. See Clary\u2019s Adm\u2019rs v. Clary, 24 N.C. (2 Ired.) 78, 83-85 (1841) (\u201c[I]f belief of capacity founded on personal observation be evidence, and we think it is, it is admissible whether the opportunity for observation has been frequent or rare.\u201d). Particularly, \u201c \u2018[a]nyone who has observed another, or conversed with him, or had dealings with him, and a reasonable opportunity, based thereon, of forming an opinion, satisfactory to himself, as to the mental condition of such person, is pemiitted to give his opinion in evidence upon the issue of mental capacity, although the witness be not a psychiatrist or expert in mental disorders.\u2019 \u201d State v. Mayhand, 298 N.C. 418, 424, 259 S.E.2d 231, 236 (1979) (quoting In re Will of Brown, 203 N.C. 347, 350, 166 S.E. 72, 74 (1932)). We previously have applied these principles to authorize lay witness opinions or observations about mental capacity in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., State v. Silvers, 323 N.C. 646, 653-54, 374 S.E.2d 858, 863-64 (1989) (capacity to stand trial); Mayhand, 298 N.C. at 424-25, 259 S.E.2d at 236 (insanity defense); In re Will of Jones, 267 N.C. 48, 51, 147 S.E.2d 607, 609 (1966) (execution of a will and codicil); Moore v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 266 N.C. 440, 448-50, 146 S.E.2d 492, 499-500 (1966) (contracts); State v. Armstrong, 232 N.C. 727 passim, 62 S.E.2d 50 passim (1950) (credibility of a witness); Bryant v. Carrier, 214 N.C. 191, 193-94, 198 S.E. 619, 620-21 (1938) (liability for punitive damages in criminal conversation case). Moreover, courts in a number of other jurisdictions explicitly have rejected the notion that expert testimony is required to establish that a victim lacks the mental capacity to consent to sexual acts. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 890 P.2d 587, 592 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (stating that expert testimony is not required to establish that a victim is \u201cincapable of understanding the consequences of sexual intercourse\u201d because \u201c[a] person\u2019s capacity to understand something ... is a factual issue for the jury . . . [that] may properly be established by circumstantial evidence\u201d); People v. Thompson, 142 Cal. App. 4th 1426, 1437, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 803, 810 (\u201cThere is a nationwide consensus that expert testimony on th[e] issue [of a victim\u2019s mental capacity to consent] is not required.\u201d), rev. denied, 2006 Cal. LEXIS 15393 (2006); Wilkinson v. People, 86 Colo. 406, 412, 282 P. 257, 259 (1929) (stating that the jury could determine whether the victim had the mental capacity to consent, without the testimony of expert witnesses, because \u201c[t]he victim was present in court and testified,\u201d giving the jury \u201cthe opportunity of seeing her, and . . . judging as to her mentality\u201d); State v. Collins, 7 Neb. App. 187, 202, 583 N.W.2d 341, 350-51 (1998) (concluding that expert testimony is not always required but when expert testimony is not presented, \u201ca court must examine the evidence and determine whether the nonexpert testimony is of sufficient probative value to justify a rational finding that the victim was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the [defendant\u2019s] conduct\u201d); People v. Cratsley, 86 N.Y.2d 81, 87, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1165-66 (1995) (stating that \u201cdetermination of capacity is a judicial, not a medical, function\u201d that \u201cis best based on evidence concerning the victim\u2019s ability to function in society\u201d as presented by \u201c[p]eople who observe the [victim] daily\u201d and that this \u201cassessment [is] within the ken of the average juror\u201d); State v. Kingsley, 383 N.W.2d 828, 830 (N.D. 1986) (concluding that \u201cexpert medical testimony was not required to establish\u201d a prima facie case that the victims were \u201cincapable of understanding the nature of the conduct involved,\u201d but such testimony \u201cwould have established a stronger case for the prosecution and provided additional helpful information for the juries\u201d); State v. Summers, 70 Wash. App. 424, 428-29, 853 P.2d 953, 956 (stating that expert testimony is not \u201cindispensable\u201d to prove a victim\u2019s mental incapacity; rather, \u201c[t]he issue is best approached on a case by case basis, by examining whether the non-expert testimony justifies a rational finding that the victim lacked the capacity to consent\u201d), rev. denied, 122 Wash. 2d 1026, 866 P.2d 40 (1993); State v. Perkins, 2004 WI App. 213, \u00b6 21, 277 Wis. 2d 243, 257, 689 N.W.2d 684, 690 (\u201c[W]e cannot conclude that expert testimony should be required in every case to establish the existence of a mental illness or deficiency rendering the victim unable to appraise his or her conduct....\u201d), rev. denied, 2005 WI 1, 277 Wis. 2d 153, 691 N.W.2d 354 (2004). Although not binding on this Court, the principles articulated in these cases are well-reasoned and support our conclusion in the case at bar.\nWe recognize that there may be cases involving a person\u2019s mental capacity that will necessitate expert testimony; however in light of Clara\u2019s own testimony and the significant amount of lay witness testimony regarding Clara\u2019s condition, this is not such a case. Consequently, the State was not required to use expert testimony pursuant to Rule 702 to establish the extent of Clara\u2019s mental capacity to consent to sexual acts. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this case to that court for consideration of defendant\u2019s remaining issues.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\n. We adopt the pseudonyms used in the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion. In addition, we refer to Madison\u2019s other friend who attended the sleep over by the pseudonym \u201cAshley.\u201d\n. According to the American Psychiatric Association, an individual with an IQ between fifty to fifty-five and approximately seventy falls within the \u201cMild Mental Retardation\u201d category. Am. Psychiatric Ass\u2019n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 42 (4th ed. 2000).", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "M. Alexander Chams for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. SAMUEL KRIS HUNT\nNo. 195PA11\n(Filed 9 March 2012)\n1. Sexual Offenses\u2014 second-degree sexual offense \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence \u2014 mentally disabled victim\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the charge of second-degree sexual offense. The record contained sufficient evidence that the victim was mentally disabled, her condition rendered her substantially incapable of resisting defendant\u2019s sexual advances, and defendant knew or reasonably should have known of the victim\u2019s mental disability.\n2. Sexual Offenses\u2014 crimes against nature \u2014 motion to dismiss\u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss the charge of crimes against nature. The record contained sufficient evidence that defendant engaged in nonconsensual or coercive sexual acts with a minor.\n3. Sexual Offenses\u2014 expert testimony \u2014 not necessarily required to establish mental capacity of victim to consent to sexual acts\nThe Court of Appeals erred by concluding that expert testimony was required to establish the extent of a victim\u2019s mental capacity to consent to sexual acts including second-degree sexual offense under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-27.5 or crimes against nature under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-177. There may be cases involving a person\u2019s mental capacity that will necessitate expert testimony, but it was not necessary in this case in light of the victim\u2019s own testimony and the significant amount of lay witness testimony regarding the victim\u2019s condition.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A '31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014\u2022, 710 S.E.2d 339 (2011), reversing a judgment entered on 8 October 2009 by Judge Edwin G. Wilson, Jr. in Superior Court, Randolph County, and vacating defendant\u2019s convictions. Heard in the Supreme Court on 10 January 2012.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Anne M. Middleton, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nM. Alexander Chams for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0432-01", "first_page_order": 470, "last_page_order": 481 }