{ "id": 4359627, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MEGAN SUE OTTO", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Otto", "decision_date": "2012-06-14", "docket_number": "No. 523A11", "first_page": "134", "last_page": "140", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 N.C. 134" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "673 S.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642974 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "769" }, { "page": "766" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/673/0765-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 383", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 682", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "196 N.C. App. 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4165780 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/196/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 N.C. App. 740", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4164237 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" }, { "page": "741" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/195/0740-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 S.E.2d 437", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 N.C. App. 251", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8916310 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/162/0251-01" ] }, { "cite": "112 S. Ct. 134", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "502 U.S. 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6371424, 6369665, 6369475, 6370820, 6368805, 6369834, 6369998, 6368561, 6370643, 6370388, 6369240, 6371641, 6368410, 6369021, 6370175 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/502/0842-14", "/us/502/0842-07", "/us/502/0842-06", "/us/502/0842-13", "/us/502/0842-03", "/us/502/0842-08", "/us/502/0842-09", "/us/502/0842-02", "/us/502/0842-12", "/us/502/0842-11", "/us/502/0842-05", "/us/502/0842-15", "/us/502/0842-01", "/us/502/0842-04", "/us/502/0842-10" ] }, { "cite": "402 S.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537668, 2543786, 2542358, 2539640, 2542331 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0334-04", "/nc/328/0334-02", "/nc/328/0334-01", "/nc/328/0334-03", "/nc/328/0334-05" ] }, { "cite": "397 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "655" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 N.C. App. 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8527353 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/100/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "490 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 605100 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "1585", "parenthetical": "internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/490/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 67", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 437", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549311 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "442", "parenthetical": "quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0437-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150881 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "414" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "21" }, { "page": "1880", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "653" }, { "page": "1396" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "585" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "337 N.C. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2550000 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/337/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 162", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153463 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "167-68", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0162-01" ] }, { "cite": "718 S.E.2d 181", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184-85" }, { "page": "186", "parenthetical": "Ervin, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "184", "parenthetical": "majority" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "658 S.E.2d 643", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640657 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "645", "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's singular, but prolonged, delay in response at a green traffic signal gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/658/0643-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 L. Ed. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's singular, but prolonged, delay in response at a green traffic signal gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "129 S. Ct. 264", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's singular, but prolonged, delay in response at a green traffic signal gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "555 U.S. 914", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's singular, but prolonged, delay in response at a green traffic signal gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 244", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149866 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "248", "parenthetical": "holding that a defendant's singular, but prolonged, delay in response at a green traffic signal gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0244-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 1879", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1890" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "338 U.S. 160", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3943769 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1949, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "1310" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/338/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "462 U.S. 213", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187462 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231", "parenthetical": "quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949)" }, { "page": "2328", "parenthetical": "quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949)" }, { "page": "544", "parenthetical": "quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/462/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 U.S. 690", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11746351 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695", "parenthetical": "quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949))" }, { "page": "1661", "parenthetical": "quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949))" }, { "page": "918", "parenthetical": "quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949))" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "1663" }, { "page": "920-21" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/517/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 119", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9476180 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "123", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)" }, { "page": "675", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)" }, { "page": "576", "parenthetical": "citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0119-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 438", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 412", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150881 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0412-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30" }, { "page": "1884" }, { "page": "911" }, { "page": "22" }, { "page": "1880-81" }, { "page": "907" }, { "page": "22-23" }, { "page": "1880-81" }, { "page": "907", "parenthetical": "concluding that a series of lawful acts, while seemly innocent in isolation, can warrant investigation when taken together" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 816, "char_count": 15361, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.5187320906663194e-07, "percentile": 0.81128513670102 }, "sha256": "86c89df4c6568634e5f33b4ecb7d5f6b24c4261e12326e121e513ac8287b687e", "simhash": "1:28a9d6ca664685e6", "word_count": 2523 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:35:25.873086+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice JACKSON joins in this concurring opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MEGAN SUE OTTO" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "HUDSON, Justice.\nThe State seeks review of a divided Court of Appeals opinion holding that one of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact was not supported by the evidence and reversing the trial court\u2019s denial of her motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of her vehicle. While we agree with the Court of Appeals that one of the trial court\u2019s findings of fact was not supported by the evidence, we hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, because there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop.\nBackground\nOn 29 February 2008, Trooper A.B. Smith was working on preventive patrol near the intersection of NC 43 and NC 264 in Pitt County. Around 11:00 p.m., as the trooper sat on a cross street, he observed a burgundy Ford Explorer drive past him on NC 43 heading south. At that point, he was about a half mile from Rock Springs Equestrian Center (\u201cRock Springs\u201d), and the vehicle was coming from its direction. But, because NC 43 is a busy road into and out of Greenville, Trooper Smith did not know specifically where the vehicle was coming from. He did know that Rock Springs was hosting a Ducks Unlimited Banquet that night, and he had heard from others that Rock Springs sometimes served alcohol.\nTrooper Smith happened to turn onto NC 43 behind the Ford, and he did not notice anything out of the ordinary when he pulled onto the road behind it. But while driving about a hundred feet behind the Ford, he \u201cimmediately started noticing [it] was weaving\u201d within its own lane. The vehicle never left its lane, but was \u201cconstantly weaving from the center line to the fog line.\u201d The Ford appeared to be traveling at the posted speed limit of fifty-five miles per hour. Trooper Smith watched it weave in its own lane for about three-quarters of a mile, and then he activated his lights and stopped defendant, the driver. During the traffic stop, Trooper Smith issued defendant a citation for driving while subject to an impairing substance.\nAfter several proceedings in both the district court and superior courts in Pitt County, on 3 December 2009, defendant filed in Superior Court a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. The matter was heard on 27 September 2010, and an order was entered on 13 January 2011, nunc pro tunc 30 September 2010, denying the motion to suppress. Defendant pleaded guilty to driving while impaired, reserving her right to appeal. She was sentenced to sixty days imprisonment, suspended, with twenty-four months of supervised probation. Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, in a divided opinion, reversed the decision of the trial court. State v. Otto, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, 718 S.E.2d 181 (2011). The State appealed.\nFindings of Fact\nIn its 30 September 2010 order denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress, the trial court made, inter alia, the following finding of fact:\n5. Trooper Smith knew that there was a Ducks Unlimited Banquet being held at the Rock Springs Equestrian Center that evening, which was approximately four-tenths to five-tenths of a mile away from where he initially observed the vehicle, and Trooper Smith knew that Rock Springs Equestrian Center serves alcohol.\n(emphasis added). Defendant argues here, as she did at the Court of Appeals, that the trial court erred in finding that Trooper Smith \u201cknew\u201d that Rock Springs served alcohol. The Court of Appeals majority held that the evidence did not support the finding that the trooper \u201cknew\u201d Rock Springs served alcohol.\n\u201cThe standard of review in evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress is whether competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law.\u201d State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 167-68, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011) (citing State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 140-41, 446 S.E.2d 579, 585 (1994)).\nAt the suppression hearing, Trooper Smith testified that he had never personally been inside Rock Springs, nor had he ever witnessed anyone drinking alcohol there; however, he did state that he had \u201cheard that they do serve alcohol.\u201d He further testified on cross-examination that he did not know what Rock Springs was like on the inside, but added that he would not classify the facility as creating the same atmosphere as the downtown area of Greenville where multiple bars are located.\nWe hold that this evidence does not support the trial court\u2019s finding that Trooper Smith \u201cknew\u201d that alcohol was served at Rock Springs. Accordingly, this finding of fact is not binding on this Court. However, we note that reliable information received or obtained by a law enforcement officer indicating that a facility serves alcohol may provide a basis for an officer\u2019s reasonable suspicion that a motorist has consumed alcohol. The better practice, which also facilitates appellate review, is for the trial court to set out the nature and extent of an officer\u2019s knowledge or belief when making findings of fact.\nMotion to Suppress\nBoth the United States and North Carolina Constitutions protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const, amend. IV; N.C. Const, art. I, \u00a7 20. Although potentially brief and limited in scope, a traffic stop is considered a \u201cseizure\u201d within the meaning of these provisions. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979). \u201cTraffic stops have \u2018been historically reviewed under the investigatory detention framework first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968).\u2019 \u201d State v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (citation omitted). Therefore, \u201creasonable suspicion is the necessary standard for traffic stops.\u201d Id. at 415, 665 S.E.2d at 440 (citations omitted). As articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terry, the stop must be based on \u201cspecific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted). \u201cThe only requirement is a minimal level of objective justification, something more than an \u2018unparticularized suspicion or hunch.\u2019 \u201d State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 442, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 1585 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).\nHere the Court of Appeals majority determined that the traffic stop of defendant was unreasonable because it was supported solely by defendant\u2019s weaving within her own lane. Otto, \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, 718 S.E.2d at 184-85. The dissenting judge would have held the stop was reasonable. Id. at \u2014, 718 S.E.2d at 186 (Ervin, J., dissenting). Looking to its own prior precedent, the Court of Appeals determined that in each case in which weaving in one\u2019s own lane was a basis for the traffic stop, reasonable suspicion was found only if the weaving was accompanied by some other factor. For example, in State v. Aubin, the Court of Appeals found that there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop when a driver was weaving within his own lane and traveling below the speed limit. 100 N.C. App. 628, 632, 397 S.E.2d 653, 655 (1990), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 328 N.C. 334, 402 S.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 502 U.S. 842, 112 S. Ct. 134 (1991). In State v. Jacobs, the Court of Appeals found reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop when the driver was weaving within his own lane and driving at 1:43 a.m. in the vicinity of several bars. 162 N.C. App. 251, 255, 590 S.E.2d 437, 440 (2004). On the other hand, in State v. Fields, the Court of Appeals determined that there was not reasonable suspicion when the driver was weaving within his own lane at 4:00 p.m. 195 N.C. App. 740, 746, 673 S.E.2d 765, 769, disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C. 376, 679 S.E.2d 390 (2009). Given this precedent, the majority here concluded that \u201c[w]ithout any additional circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, stopping a vehicle for weaving is unreasonable.\u201d Otto, \u2014 N.C. App. at \u2014, 718 S.E.2d at 184 (majority).\nA court \u201c \u2018must consider \u201cthe totality of the circumstances \u2014 -the whole picture\u201d in determining whether .a reasonable suspicion\u2019 exists.\u201d Styles, 362 N.C. at 414, 665 S.E.2d at 440 (citations omitted). The totality of the circumstances here leads us to conclude that there was reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop. Unlike the Court of Appeals cases in which weaving within a lane was found to be insufficient to support reasonable suspicion, the weaving here was constant and continual. In Fields the defendant weaved only three times over the course of a mile and a half. 195 N.C. App. at 741, 673 S.E.2d at 766. Similarly, in State v. Peele, there was only one instance of weaving. 196 N.C. App. 668, 671, 675 S.E.2d 682, 685, disc. rev. denied, 363 N.C. 587, 683 S.E.2d 383 (2009). In contrast, defendant here was weaving \u201cconstantly and continuously\u201d over the course of three-quarters of a mile. In addition, defendant was stopped around 11:00 p.m. on a Friday night. These factors are sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.\nAccordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals holding that there was no reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, and we hold that the trial court correctly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress.\nREVERSED.", "type": "majority", "author": "HUDSON, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice NEWBY\nconcurring.\nI agree with the majority that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle. In my view, however, defendant\u2019s constant and continuous weaving standing alone is sufficient to support such a conclusion.\nA law enforcement officer may conduct an investigatory stop when there is \u201ca reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.\u201d Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 S. Ct. 673, 675, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 576 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 911 (1968)). As this Court has explained:\nReasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence. The standard is satisfied by some minimal level of objective justification. This Court requires that [t]he stop ... be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by his experience and training.\nState v. Styles, 362 N.C. 412, 414, 665 S.E.2d 438, 439 (2008) (alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).\nA criminal act need not occur before an officer may initiate a stop. In Terry v. Ohio, the law enforcement officer observed lawful conduct, \u201ca series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent in itself, but which taken together warranted further investigation.\u201d Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880-81, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 907. Furthermore, the reasonable suspicion standard is a \u201ccommonsense, nontechnical conception[ ] that deal[s] with \u2018 \u201cthe factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians act.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 918 (1996) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527, 544 (1983) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1890 (1949))).\nIn this case, Trooper Smith followed behind defendant \u201cfor approximately three-quarters of a mile, during which time Trooper Smith observed the vehicle weaving constantly and continuously within the width of the travel lane.\u201d That alone provides the minimal level of objective justification required for reasonable suspicion. The specific and articulable fact that defendant weaved \u201cconstantly and continuously\u201d for three-quarters of a mile is sufficient to cause a reasonable and prudent officer to infer that defendant may be driving while impaired. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 22-23, 88 S. Ct. at 1880-81, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 907 (concluding that a series of lawful acts, while seemly innocent in isolation, can warrant investigation when taken together); see also, e.g., State v. Barnard, 362 N.C. 244, 248, 658 S.E.2d 643, 645, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 914, 129 S. Ct. 264, 172 L. Ed. 2d 198 (2008) (holding that a defendant\u2019s singular, but prolonged, delay in response at a green traffic signal gave rise to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). While constant and continuous weaving within defendant\u2019s own lane could be innocent, lawful conduct, it also gives rise to reasonable suspicion that defendant is driving while impaired. Thus, there was reasonable, articulable suspicion for Trooper Smith to stop defendant\u2019s vehicle.\nAlthough unnecessary to resolve this case, I believe the trial court had sufficient evidence to find that Trooper Smith \u201cknew\u201d when he stopped defendant\u2019s vehicle that Rock Springs Equestrian Center served alcohol. Under common-usage definitions of the word \u201cknow,\u201d actual certainty or first-hand knowledge is not required. See Random House Webster\u2019s College Dictionary 750 (1991) (defining \u201cto know\u201d as \u201cto be cognizant or aware of\u2019 or \u201cto be acquainted or familiar with (a thing, place, person, etc.)\u201d). Further, this is a matter on which our Court should defer to the trial court. See, e.g., Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 116 S. Ct. at 1663, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920-21 (pointing out that a reviewing court should give due weight to inferences drawn from facts by resident judges and local law enforcement officers since a trial judge views the facts \u201cin light of the distinctive features and events of the community\u201d and a law enforcement officer views the facts \u201cthrough the lens of his police experience and expertise\u201d).\nIn any event, defendant\u2019s constant and continuous weaving standing alone is sufficient to support reasonable suspicion.\nJustice JACKSON joins in this concurring opinion.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Justice NEWBY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by WilliamP. Hart, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and William P. Hart, Sr., Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Robinson Law Firm, P.A., by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendantappellee.", "Isaac T. Avery, III for North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys; Tiffanie W. Sneed for North Carolina Association of Police Attorneys; and Edmond W. Caldwell, Jr. for North Carolina Sheriffs\u2019 Association, amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MEGAN SUE OTTO\nNo. 523A11\n(Filed 14 June 2012)\nSearch and Seizure\u2014 vehicular stop \u2014 reasonable suspicion\u2014 motion to suppress properly denied\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the stop of her vehicle in a driving while impaired case. While there was insufficient evidence to support the finding of fact that the officer \u201cknew that Rock Springs Equestrian Center serves alcohol[,]\u201d the fact that defendant was weaving \u201cconstantly and continuously\u201d over the course of three-quarters of a mile and was stopped around 11:00 p.m. on a Friday night was sufficient to create reasonable suspicion.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, \u2014\u2014 N.C. App.-, 718 S.E.2d 181 (2011), reversing a judgment entered on 30 September 2010 by Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr. in Superior Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 16 April 2012.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by WilliamP. Hart, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, and William P. Hart, Sr., Senior Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nRobinson Law Firm, P.A., by Leslie S. Robinson, for defendantappellee.\nIsaac T. Avery, III for North Carolina Conference of District Attorneys; Tiffanie W. Sneed for North Carolina Association of Police Attorneys; and Edmond W. Caldwell, Jr. for North Carolina Sheriffs\u2019 Association, amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0134-01", "first_page_order": 166, "last_page_order": 172 }