{ "id": 4351487, "name": "LANVALE PROPERTIES, LLC and CABARRUS COUNTY BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION v. COUNTY OF CABARRUS and CITY OF LOCUST", "name_abbreviation": "Lanvale Properties, LLC v. County of Cabarrus", "decision_date": "2012-08-24", "docket_number": "No. 438PA10", "first_page": "142", "last_page": "184", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 N.C. 142" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "699 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. App. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "633 S.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12636464, 12636463 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/633/0678-02", "/se2d/633/0678-01" ] }, { "cite": "630 S.E.2d 200", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12635851 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "206" }, { "page": "206", "parenthetical": "determining that Durham County could not rely on its general zoning and police powers to impose a mandatory school impact fee on developers and home builders" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/630/0200-01" ] }, { "cite": "639 S.E.2d 421", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637514 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423", "parenthetical": "quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/639/0421-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" }, { "page": "50" }, { "page": "52", "parenthetical": "Mitchell and Webb, JJ., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538018 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "45" }, { "page": "44" }, { "page": "48" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" }, { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305276 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" }, { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 S.E.2d 443", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444, 445", "parenthetical": "stating that \"it is generally held that statutory delegations of power to municipalities should be strictly construed, resolving any ambiguity against the corporation's authority to exercise the power\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 N.C. 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567833 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "552, 554", "parenthetical": "stating that \"it is generally held that statutory delegations of power to municipalities should be strictly construed, resolving any ambiguity against the corporation's authority to exercise the power\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/302/0550-01" ] }, { "cite": "1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 724", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1233", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "70 N.C. 14", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8683798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1874, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "18" }, { "page": "18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/70/0014-01" ] }, { "cite": "4 N.C. (Taylor) 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1817, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1843, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1846, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Wake Forest L. Rev.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "166 S.E.2d 78", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "275 N.C. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8558203 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/275/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11273499 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1886, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191" }, { "page": "191" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/95/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 S.E.2d 579", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "583" }, { "page": "583" }, { "page": "583" }, { "page": "583" }, { "parenthetical": "\"Within these districts a county may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2517410 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "617" }, { "page": "617" }, { "page": "617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010 WL 4366287", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*3", "parenthetical": "order remanding case to Superior Court, Mecklenburg County" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "703 S.E.2d 148", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 442", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 S.E.2d 504", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507-08" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "506" }, { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "noting that Union County had unsuccessfully sought legislative approval of school impact fees in 1998, 2000, and 2005" }, { "page": "508", "parenthetical": "stating that Union County's APFO \"use[d] a VMP and other similar measures[ ] to shift impermissibly a portion of the burden for funding school construction onto developers seeking approval for new developments\"" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "noting that Union County had unsuccessfully sought legislative approval of school impact fees in 1998, 2000, and 2005" }, { "page": "505" }, { "page": "505", "parenthetical": "noting that Union County had unsuccessfully sought legislative approval of school impact fees in 1998, 2000, and 2005" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4173000 ], "weight": 9, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380-81" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "375-76" }, { "page": "378" }, { "page": "381" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "375" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "716 S.E.2d 849", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154104 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 404", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "416" }, { "page": "416", "parenthetical": "holding that the two-month statute of limitations governing municipal ordinances did not bar the plaintiff's cause of action \"because [the ordinance at issue was] a subdivision ordinance rather than a zoning ordinance\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. App. 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4178206 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/206/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 481", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "482" }, { "page": "482" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153582 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E.2d 810", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "278 N.C. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561426 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "691-92" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/278/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "180 S.E. 777", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "weight": 2, "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "783" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606973 ], "year": 1935, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "365" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/208/0354-01" ] }, { "cite": "50 S.E. 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "137 N.C. 579", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8657269 ], "year": 1905, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/137/0579-01" ] }, { "cite": "565 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "17" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511222 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "712 S.E.2d 868", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "871", "parenthetical": "citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cnty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 152", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153654 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156", "parenthetical": "citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cnty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0152-01" ] }, { "cite": "586 S.E.2d 247", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "249" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491872 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "496" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3739419 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196", "parenthetical": "quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 S.E.2d 35", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42-43" }, { "page": "43" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 531", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8572863 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544-45" }, { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0531-01" ] }, { "cite": "2010 WL 3467567", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "page": "*1", "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 42", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 11, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "699 S.E.2d 139", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "206 N.C. App. 761", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" }, { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "665 S.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 457", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4149743 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0457-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 Campbell L. Rev. 239", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Campbell L. Rev.", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 532", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3792160, 3798656, 3794250, 3791503, 3793488, 3786647, 3795032, 3796126 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0532-07", "/nc/360/0532-06", "/nc/360/0532-03", "/nc/360/0532-02", "/nc/360/0532-04", "/nc/360/0532-08", "/nc/360/0532-05", "/nc/360/0532-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 N.C. App. 629", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8301922 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" }, { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/177/0629-01" ] }, { "cite": "1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 609", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 604", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" }, { "page": "613", "parenthetical": "stating that counties enjoy \"considerable latitude\" in exercising their powers, but recognizing that a county's \"zoning authority cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to the express provisions of the zoning enabling authority\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 496", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529794 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "509" }, { "page": "509" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0496-01" ] }, { "cite": "200 S.E.2d 635", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "284 N.C. 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561942 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/284/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "451 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "citing Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 382, 200 S.E.2d 635, 640 (1973)" }, { "page": "289", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 N.C. 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2558127 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419-20", "parenthetical": "citing Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 382, 200 S.E.2d 635, 640 (1973)" }, { "page": "419-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/339/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 S.E.2d 655", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" }, { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "322 N.C. 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2516033 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/322/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878", "parenthetical": "quoting Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, BSA, Inc., 322 N.C. 271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1988)" }, { "page": "878" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132228 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811", "parenthetical": "quoting Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, BSA, Inc., 322 N.C. 271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1988)" }, { "page": "811" }, { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0805-01" ] }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547559 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 232", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508082 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "480 S.E.2d 681", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683", "parenthetical": "quoting Correll v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 53883 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472", "parenthetical": "quoting Correll v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 45", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50", "parenthetical": "quoting River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 109, 388 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1990)" }, { "page": "51", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 37", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538018 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "44", "parenthetical": "quoting River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 109, 388 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1990)" }, { "page": "45" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0037-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 538", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 100", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5305276 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0100-01" ] }, { "cite": "2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 42", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "496 S.E.2d 394", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "347 N.C. 409", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 551395, 551302, 551321, 551388, 551102 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/347/0409-03", "/nc/347/0409-04", "/nc/347/0409-05", "/nc/347/0409-01", "/nc/347/0409-02" ] }, { "cite": "488 S.E.2d 845", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "127 N.C. App. 212", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11793979 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "223" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/127/0212-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 615", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "628" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 708", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 796096 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "729" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0708-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 U.S. 253", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1104910 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260", "parenthetical": "\"[Congress] has preferred to use general language and thereby requires the judiciary to apply this general language to a specific problem. To that end we must resort to whatever aids to interpretation the legislation in its entirety and its history provide.\"" }, { "page": "819", "parenthetical": "\"[Congress] has preferred to use general language and thereby requires the judiciary to apply this general language to a specific problem. To that end we must resort to whatever aids to interpretation the legislation in its entirety and its history provide.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/351/0253-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 S.E.2d 659", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "264 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574883 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "673", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/264/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 S.E.2d 19", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "48", "parenthetical": "Sharp, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566644 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476", "parenthetical": "Sharp, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 S.E.2d 265", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "268", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138302 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "548", "parenthetical": "per curiam" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "5 S.E.2d 542", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "543", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8606201 ], "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "493", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/216/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "517 S.E.2d 874", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "878" }, { "page": "883", "parenthetical": "Frye, J., Mitchell, C.J., & Parker, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "884" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 805", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132228 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "811" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0805-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2600, "char_count": 112300, "ocr_confidence": 0.75, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.183216739733733e-07, "percentile": 0.864661993807361 }, "sha256": "cb3e8ad93129f4b16bb7cbbde20ec8922a7d961970c5baae9ce4e347c51a8e45", "simhash": "1:7235c420066fc7d2", "word_count": 17552 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:35:25.873086+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "LANVALE PROPERTIES, LLC and CABARRUS COUNTY BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION v. COUNTY OF CABARRUS and CITY OF LOCUST" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Justice.\nIn this appeal we consider whether defendant Cabarrus County (\u201cthe County\u201d) had the authority pursuant to its general zoning powers or, in the alternative, a 2004 law enacted by the General Assembly, to adopt an adequate public facilities ordinance (\u201cAPFO\u201d) that effectively conditions approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction to prevent overcrowding in the County\u2019s public schools. Because we hold that the County lacked this authority, we affirm the Court of Appeals.\nI\nConcerned about the effect of explosive population growth on the County\u2019s ability to provide adequate public facilities for its citizens, the Cabarrus County Board of Commissioners (\u201cthe Board\u201d) adopted an initial APFO in January 1998. In that form the APFO, which was enacted as an amendment to the County\u2019s subdivision ordinance, conditioned County approval of new residential developments on the existence of sufficient public facilities to support the developments. In concise language the ordinance stated: \u201cTo ensure public health, safety and welfare the [Cabarrus County] Planning and Zoning Commission shall review each subdivision, multi-family development, and mobile home park to determine if public facilities are adequate to serve that development.\u201d Cabarrus County, N.C., Subdivision Ordinance ch. 4. \u00a7 17 (Jan. 1998). Pursuant to the ordinance, the County\u2019s Planning and Zoning Commission (\u201cthe Commission\u201d) reviewed all proposed residential developments, except those located within the territorial jurisdictions of Concord and Kannapolis, to determine if the new homes would exacerbate overcrowding in the County\u2019s two public schools systems: the Cabarrus County Schools and Kannapolis City Schools.\nThe APFO first was applied when Westbrook Highland Creek, LLC (\u201cWestbrook\u201d) sought preliminary approval from the Commission for a single family development of approximately 800 units located in an unincorporated area of the County. The Commission denied Westbrook\u2019s application based upon insufficient public school capacity. Westbrook appealed to the Board, which ultimately approved the development after Westbrook agreed to place $400,000.00 \u2014 $500.00 per unit \u2014 into an escrow account for the purchase of property for a new high school.\nOver the next five years, the Commission denied preliminary approval applications for a number of proposed developments based upon insufficient public school capacity. However, as with the Westbrook development, the Board ultimately approved these developments on appeal once developers executed consent agreements designed to mitigate the impact of their developments on public school capacity. Developers typically agreed to pay an adequate public facilities fee of $500.00 per residential unit; however, some developers agreed to make an in-kind donation of land for future school sites or construct improvements to existing school facilities.\nFollowing the APFO\u2019s enactment, county staff began monitoring the number of new residential developments being built in Concord and Kannapolis because these municipalities were not cooperating fully with the County in enforcing the APFO. In some instances, these cities voluntarily annexed residential developments, which precluded the County from collecting adequate public facilities fees. Jonathan Marshall, Director of the Commerce Department of Cabarrus County, stated in his affidavit in support of the County\u2019s motion for summary judgment that this practice frustrated the Board because approximately seventy percent of new residential developments in the County were located within municipal jurisdictions.\nIn part to address these frustrations, the Board adopted a resolution on 25 August 2003 expressing its desire that all Cabarrus County municipalities should cooperate with the County in enforcing the APFO. Cabarrus County, N.C., Res. No. 2003-26 (Aug. 25, 2003). The resolution also increased the minimum value of the adequate public facilities fee from $500.00 per residential unit to not less than $1,008.00 per unit. Id. Further, the resolution defined the term \u201cschool adequacy\u201d to mean \u201cestimated enrollment not exceeding 110% of capacity as determined by the Kannapolis and C\u00e1barrus School Systems.\u201d Id.\nOn 30 June 2004, the General Assembly enacted Chapter 39 of the 2004 North Carolina Session Laws (\u201cSession Law 2004-39\u201d or \u201cthe session law\u201d), which authorized the annexation of several properties in Cabarrus County. Section 5 of the session law attempted to clarify the authority of municipalities to enforce the APFO. Act of June 30, 2004, ch. 39, sec. 5, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 42, 47. About a month and a half later, during its 16 August 2004 meeting, the Board adopted a resolution linking the APFO to the session law. See Cabarrus County, N.C., Res. No. 2004-30 (Aug. 16, 2004).\nOver the next few months, the Board made several more revisions to the APFO. On 20 September 2004, the Board adopted a resolution that increased the value of the adequate public facilities fee from not less than $1,008.00 per residential unit to not less than $4,034.00 per single family unit and $1,331.00 per multifamily unit. Cabarrus County, N.C., Res. No. 2004-37 (Sept. 20, 2004). The resolution also indexed the fee to reflect annual changes in the cost of public school construction. Id. During the Board\u2019s discussion concerning the resolution, several Board members stated that developers should be required to pay for the cost of constructing new public schools in the County. The sentiment among most commissioners was \u201cwhoever creates the problems pays the bills.\u201d One commissioner expressed the view that \u201c[t]he people using [subdivision developments] should pay for the school[,] not 93 year-olds. If [developers] are going to build $150-$300 thousand dollar house [sic] they should pay for the schools.\u201d The Board\u2019s vice chair voted against the resolution, citing concerns about \u201cthe legality of the [APFO\u2019s] advancement requirement\u201d and the potential for litigation.\nIn August 2005 the Board began considering the possibility of making further changes to the APFO. Almost two years later, on 20 August 2007, the Board adopted the APFO in its current form. Cabarrus County, N.C., Zoning Ordinance No. 2007-11 (Aug. 20, 2007). Notably, the revised APFO was added as a new chapter to the County\u2019s zoning ordinance. Id. As a result, the revised APFO superseded the version that appeared in the County\u2019s subdivision ordinance. The Board also attempted to tie the new version of the APFO to the session law, stating that \u201cPer Session Law 2004-39, H.B. 224, Cabarrus County may review proposed developments within an incorporated area of the County for compliance with the Level of Service standards for schools.\u201d Cabarrus County, N.C., Zoning Ordinance ch. 15, \u00a7 9(l)(b) (Aug. 20, 2007). Less than a month later, the Board amended its subdivision ordinance by inserting a cross-reference to the newly revised APFO. Cabarrus County, N.C., Subdivision Ordinance No. 2007-12 (Sept. 17, 2007).\nThe current APFO is more sophisticated than the earlier version. Covering over twenty pages, the ordinance goes into great detail about the process for review of the County\u2019s school capacity. The current APFO includes thirty-four definitions, see Zoning Ordinance ch. 15, \u00a7 3, illustrates the ordinance\u2019s Reservation of Capacity Process with a flow chart, id. ch. 15, \u00a7 8, and describes the complex statistical formula used to calculate the estimated enrollment impact of a proposed development, id. ch. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 9-11. In contrast, the prior version occupied only two paragraphs in the County\u2019s subdivision ordinance. See Cabarrus County, N.C., Subdivision Ordinance, ch 4. \u00a7 17 (June 24, 2004).\nNotwithstanding its complexity, the current APFO operates in much the same manner as the prior version; that is, it links residential development approval to the availability of space for students in the County\u2019s public school systems. Pursuant to the ordinance, proposed residential developments, except those located in Concord, Kannapolis, and Locust, are reviewed to determine whether local elementary, middle, and high schools have sufficient student capacity to support the development. Zoning Ordinance ch. 15, \u00a7 7.\nIf there is sufficient unused student capacity to support a proposed development, the Board is required to approve the development without additional APFO conditions. Id. ch. 15, \u00a7 7(1). But if available student capacity is insufficient to support the development, the Board may either deny the developer\u2019s application or approve it subject to several \u201cconditions that reduce or mitigate the impacts of the proposed development.\u201d Id. ch. 15, \u00a7 7(2)-(3). These conditions include: (1) deferring approval of final plats, building permits, or certificates of occupancy for a maximum of five years or until sufficient student capacity becomes available; (2) phasing construction of the development in increments that coincide with available capacity; (3) reducing density or intensity of the development; (4) entering into a consent agreement involving a monetary contribution, the donation of land, or construction of a school; or (5) \u201cany other reasonable conditions to ensure that all [public schools] will be adequate and available.\u201d Id. ch. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 7, 8.\nWhen a developer enters into a consent agreement with the County, the developer receives a Reservation of Capacity Certificate that requires the developer to secure proof of development approval from any other local jurisdiction within one year of issuance. Id. ch. 15 \u00a7\u00a7 6-8. Once the developer submits proof of approval to the Board, the consent agreement is approved, executed, and recorded. Id. ch. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 6(6)(d), 8. At this point the developer may proceed to review of construction drawings, permitting, and ultimately, construction. Id. ch. 15., \u00a7 8.\nThe ordinance\u2019s reference to a monetary contribution continued the practice of developers paying an adequate public facilities fee to secure Board approval of their projects. Pursuant to the current version of the APFO, these fees are dedicated to the construction of public schools in the specific areas that are impacted by particular developments. Eventually, these fees became known as voluntary mitigation payments (\u201cVMPs\u201d). In 2008 the Board increased the VMP from not less than $4,034.00 per single family unit and $1,331.00 per multifamily unit to $8,617.00 per single family unit, $4,571.00 per townhouse, and $4,153.00 per multifamily unit. Between 2003 and 2008, the Board increased the APFO\u2019s fee for single family units by more than 1,600 percent. As a result of these fees, the APFO has provided the County a substantial source of alternative funding for public schools. Since enactment of the APFO, the County has spent or budgeted over $267 million for school construction.\nII\nPlaintiff Lanvale Properties, LLC plans to construct a residential development on fifty-four acres located within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Locust (\u201cLocust\u201d). Most of the site is in Cabarrus County; however, a small portion is in Stanly County. Plaintiff alleges that Cabarrus County has refused to issue a building permit for its development until it complies with the APFO.\nOn 4 April 2008, plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action against Cabarrus County and Locust challenging the validity of the County\u2019s APFO on various statutory and constitutional grounds. The County answered plaintiff\u2019s first amended complaint on 8 June 2008, asserting, inter alia, that: (1) plaintiff\u2019s complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state any claim upon which relief can be granted; and (2) plaintiff\u2019s claims are barred by the two-month statute of limitations set forth in sections 153A-348 and 1-54.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s motions to dismiss on 19 August 2008 and further concluded that the statute of limitations did not bar plaintiff\u2019s claims for relief.\nOn 18 May 2009 and 20 May 2009, plaintiff and the County filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding all claims in the case. After hearing the motions on 1 June 2009, the trial court allowed plaintiff\u2019s summary judgment motion and denied the County\u2019s motion in an order entered on 17 August 2009. In its written order the trial court concluded as a matter of law that: (1) the County did not have inherent authority to enact its APFO pursuant to North Carolina\u2019s general zoning or subdivision statutes; and (2) even if the County had authority to enact the APFO, Session Law 2004-39 did not authorize the County to enforce the APFO within the territorial jurisdictions of Concord, Midland, and Locust. The County appealed.\nThe Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed the trial court\u2019s ruling in an unpublished opinion issued on 7 September 2010. Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 206 N.C. App. 761, 699 S.E.2d 139, 2010 WL 3467567 (2010) (unpublished). We allowed the County\u2019s petition for discretionary review on 15 June 2011.\nIII\nEntry of summary judgment by a trial court is proper when \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2011); see also Blades v. City of Raleigh, 280 N.C. 531, 544-45, 187 S.E.2d 35, 42-43 (1972). Because the parties do not dispute any material facts, \u201c[w]e review [the] trial court\u2019s order for summary judgment de novo to determine . . . whether either party is \u2018entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Robins v. Town of Hillsborough, 361 N.C. 193, 196, 639 S.E.2d 421, 423 (2007) (quoting Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249 (2003)). When applying de novo review, we \u201cconsiderf ] the case anew and may freely substitute\u201d our own ruling for the lower court\u2019s decision. Morris Commc\u2019ns Corp. v. City of Bessemer City Zoning Bd. of Adjust., 365 N.C. 152, 156, 712 S.E.2d 868, 871 (2011) (citing Mann Media, Inc. v. Randolph Cnty. Planning Bd., 356 N.C. 1, 13, 565 S.E.2d 9, 17 (2002)).\nIV\nThe County urges us to reverse the decisions below for three reasons: (1) The County was authorized to adopt the APFO pursuant to its \u201cgeneral zoning power\u201d; (2) Session'Law 2004-39 authorized the County to \u201cadopt and enforce its APFO countywide, including within incorporated areas of the county and without the request or consent of any municipality in the County\u201d; and (3) Plaintiff\u2019s claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. We reject each of these arguments.\nV\nWe first must look to the nature of counties and their role within the structure of State government. This Court clearly has stated that:\nIn the exercise of ordinary governmental functions, [counties] are simply agencies of the State constituted for the convenience of local administration in certain portions of the State\u2019s territory, and in the exercise of such functions they are subject to almost unlimited legislative control except where this power is restricted by constitutional provision.\nJones v. Madison Cnty. Comm\u2019rs, 137 N.C. 579, 596, 50 S.E. 291, 297 (1905). As such, a county\u2019s \u201cpowers . .. both express and implied, are conferred by statutes, enacted from time to time by the General Assembly.\u201d Martin v. Bd. of Comm\u2019rs of Wake Cnty., 208 N.C. 354, 365, 180 S.E. 777, 783 (1935). A county \u201cis not, in a strict legal sense, a municipal corporation, as a city or town. It is rather an instrumentality of the State, by means of which the State performs certain of its governmental functions within its territorial limits.\u201d Id. With these limitations in mind, we begin our analysis of the County\u2019s arguments on appeal.\nWe first consider the County\u2019s argument that its APFO is authorized by sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 of the North Carolina General Statutes. At the outset, we note that county zoning ordinances enjoy a presumption of validity. Orange Cnty. v. Heath, 278 N.C. 688, 691-92, 180 S.E.2d 810, 812 (1971). As a result, the party challenging the validity of a zoning ordinance must rebut this presumption. Id.-, see also Wally v. City of Kannapolis, 365 N.C. 449, 451, 722 S.E.2d 481, 482 (2012). Similar arguments to those raised by the County have been rejected. See Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary, 206 N.C. App. 38, 53, 698 S.E.2d 404, 416 (2010), aff\u2019d per curiam without precedential value by an equally divided court, 365 N.C. 305, 716 S.E.2d 849 (2011); Union Land Owners Ass\u2019n v. Cnty. of Union, 201 N.C. App. 374, 380-81, 689 S.E.2d 504, 507-08 (2009), disc. rev. denied, 364 N.C. 442, 703 S.E.2d 148 (2010); see also FC Summers Walk, LLC v. Town of Davidson, No. 3:09-CV-266-GCM, 2010 WL 4366287, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 2010) (order remanding case to Superior Court, Mecklenburg County) (stating that \u201cNorth Carolina law does appear to be settled\u201d regarding the invalidity of \u201cschool APFOs\u201d). After careful consideration, we conclude that plaintiff has rebutted the APFO\u2019s presumption of validity, see Wally, 365 N.C. at 451, 722 S.E.2d at 482, and that the County lacked statutory authority to enact the ordinance.\nWe look further at several foundational principles defining the structure of our State government. The Constitution of North Carolina vests the State\u2019s legislative power in the General Assembly, N.C. Const. art. II, \u00a7 1, and permits the legislature to delegate some of its \u201cpowers and duties to counties, cities and towns, and other governmental subdivisions as it may deem advisable,\u201d id. art. VII, \u00a7 1 para. 1; see also Chrismon v. Guilford Cnty., 322 N.C. 611, 617, 370 S.E.2d 579, 583 (1988). As we have noted, counties \u201care instrumentalities of the State government . . . subject to its legislative control.\u201d Comm\u2019rs of Dare Cnty. v. Comm\u2019rs of Currituck Cnty., 95 N.C. 189, 191 (1886). As such, \u201c[cjounties have no inherent authority to enact zoning ordinances.\u201d Jackson v. Guilford Cnty. Bd. of Adjust., 275 N.C. 155, 162, 166 S.E.2d 78, 83 (1969).\nIn accordance with this constitutional framework, the General Assembly has given counties the general authority to enact ordinances. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-121(a) (2011) (\u201cA county may by ordinance define, regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions detrimental to the health, safety, or welfare of its citizens and the peace and dignity of the county . . . .\u201d). Counties may, therefore, restrict the use of real property when there is a \u201creasonable basis to believe that [the restrictions] will promote the general welfare by conserving\u201d property values and prompting the \u201cmost appropriate use\u201d of land. Blades, 280 N.C. at 546, 187 S.E.2d at 43. Based on these general principles, the General Assembly has authorized counties to enact zoning ordinances. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(a) (2011). But counties do not possess unlimited zoning authority. As the Court of Appeals has observed, \u201c[T]he General Assembly has enacted the zoning and subdivision regulation statutes for the purposes of delineating the authority of county governments to regulate the development of real estate.\u201d Union Land Owners, 201 N.C. App. at 378, 689 S.E.2d at 506.\nTwo statutes in particular establish the boundaries of county zoning power. Section 153A-340(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes provides that county zoning ordinances may:\nregulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(a). Section 153A-341 describes the \u201cpublic purposes\u201d that zoning regulations may address:\nZoning regulations shall be designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare. To that end, the regulations may address, among other things, the following public purposes: to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and dangers; and to facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. The regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration as to, among other things, the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the county. In addition, the regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration to expansion and development of any cities within the county, so as to provide for their orderly growth and development.\nId. \u00a7 153A-341 (2011). Thus, county zoning ordinances are valid when they conform to the contours of the authority described in these enabling statutes.\nBased on their plain language, sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 do not expressly authorize the County\u2019s APFO. Consequently, the County contends that these statutes convey implied authority for the ordinance. In support of its position, the County urges us to construe these provisions in light of section 153A-4 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which states:\nIt is the policy of the General Assembly that the counties of this State should have adequate authority to exercise the powers, rights, duties, functions, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of local acts shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any powers that are reasonably expedient to the exercise of the power.\nId. \u00a7 153A-4 (2011). The County argues that the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred by failing to apply section 153A-4. We disagree.\nThis Court\u2019s general approach to construing the legislative authority of local governments has evolved over time. Early in our history, we broadly construed the State\u2019s grant of legislative authority to municipalities. See David W. Owens, Local Government Authority to Implement Smart Growth Programs, 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671, 680 n.47, 682 (2000) [hereinafter Owens, Local Gov\u2019t Auth.] (citing Whitfield v. Longest, 28 N.C. (6 Ired.) 268 (1846); Hellen v. Noe, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 493 (1843); Shaw v. Kennedy, 4 N.C. (Taylor) 591 (1817)). However, in the 1870s this Court adopted a more restrictive approach known as \u201cDillon\u2019s Rule.\u201d Smith v. City of Newbern, 70 N.C. 14, 18 (1874); see also David W. Owens, Land Use Law in North Carolina 22-23 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Owens, Land Use Law]. Dillon\u2019s Rule is a rule of statutory construction that is based on the\ngeneral and undisputed proposition of law, that a municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in express words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared objects and purposes of the corporation.\nSmith, 70 N.C. at 18. Nonetheless, this Court\u2019s application of Dillon\u2019s Rule did not always constrain local government authority. See Owens, Local Gov\u2019t Auth., at 680-693 (describing the application of Dillon\u2019s Rule in North Carolina from the mid-1860s to 1971). Still, the rule \u201cwas applied more stringently to interpretation of grants of authority for taxes and fees and local government service provision than to grants of regulatory authority.\u201d Owens, Land Use Law, at 23 n.17 (emphasis added).\nIn 1973 the General Assembly enacted section 153-4 (now codified as section 153A-4) of the North Carolina General Statutes two years after it adopted section 160A-4, a similar provision relating to municipal governments. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 822, sec. 1, 1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 1233, 1234; Act of June 30, 1971, ch. 698, sec. 1, 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws 724, 725. Our initial application of these provisions to zoning cases was inconsistent. In Porsh Builders, Inc. v. City of Winston-Salem, one of our first decisions following enactment of these statutes, we did not apply section 160A-4, but rather used Dillon\u2019s Rule to analyze whether the city was required by statute to accept \u201cthe highest responsible bid\u201d for a parcel of land that it owned. 302 N.C. 550, 552, 554, 276 S.E.2d 443, 444, 445 (1981) (stating that \u201cit is generally held that statutory delegations of power to municipalities should be strictly construed, resolving any ambiguity against the corporation\u2019s authority to exercise the power\u201d). Subsequently, we stated that section 160A-4 established a \u201clegislative mandate that we are to construe in a broad fashion the provisions and grants of P9wer\u201d conferred upon municipalities. River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 109, 388 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1990). Thereafter, in Homebuilders Ass\u2019n of Charlotte, Inc. v. City of Charlotte we applied section 160A-4 to uphold the city\u2019s imposition of user fees in conjunction with the provision of regulatory services and the use of public facilities because the user fees were \u201creasonably necessary or expedient to the execution of the City\u2019s power to regulate the activities for which the services are provided.\u201d 336 N.C. 37, 45, 442 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1994).\nRelying on Homebuilders and River Birch, the County argues that the decisions below conflict with our \u201crepeated pronouncements that [section 153A-4\u2019s broad construction] mandate must always be faithfully applied in interpreting the powers conferred by the Legislature to counties and cities in enacting zoning regulations.\u201d (emphasis added). The principal flaw in the County\u2019s argument is that section 153A-4 is a rule of statutory construction rather than a general directive to give our general zoning statutes the broadest construction possible. As we long have held, \u201c \u2018Statutory interpretation properly begins with an examination of the plain words of the statute.\u2019 \u201d Three Guys Real Estate v. Harnett Cnty., 345 N.C. 468, 472, 480 S.E.2d 681, 683 (1997) (quoting Correll v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 332 N.C. 141, 144, 418 S.E.2d 232, 235 (1992)). \u201c \u2018If the language of the statute is clear and is not ambiguous, we must conclude that the legislature intended the statute to be implemented according to the plain meaning of its terms.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993)). Thus, \u201c \u2018[w]hen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.\u2019 \u201d Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham, 350 N.C. 805, 811, 517 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1999) (quoting Lemons v. Old Hickory Council, BSA, Inc., 322 N.C. 271, 276, 367 S.E.2d 655, 658 (1988)). Therefore, \u201ca statute clear on its face must be enforced as written.\u201d Bowers v. City of High Point, 339 N.C. 413, 419-20, 451 S.E.2d 284, 289 (1994) (citing Peele v. Finch, 284 N.C. 375, 382, 200 S.E.2d 635, 640 (1973)).\nConsequently, section 153A-4 applies only when our zoning statutes are ambiguous, see Smith Chapel, 350 N.C. at 811, 517 S.E.2d at 878 (citing Lemons, 322 N.C. at 276, 367 S.E.2d at 658), or when its application is necessary to give effect to \u201cany powers that are reasonably expedient to [a county\u2019s] exercise of the power,\u201d see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-4. Sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 express in unambiguous language the General Assembly\u2019s intent to delegate general zoning powers to county governments. Thus, section 153A-4 is inapposite in the instant case.\nAccordingly, we must ascertain whether the plain language of our enabling statutes gives the County implied authority to enact its APFO. We hold that it does not. When interpreting a statute we \u201cpresume that the legislature acted with care and deliberation, and, when appropriate,\u201d we consider \u201cthe purpose of the legislation.\u201d Bowers, 339 N.C. at 419-20, 451 S.E.2d at 289 (citations omitted). As we have noted above, the purpose of sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 is to give counties general authority to enact zoning ordinances. Consequently, these provisions articulate basic zoning concepts. In so doing, these statutes impose reasonable constraints on how county governments may exercise their zoning powers. See Union Land Owners, 201 N.C. App. at 378, 689 S.E.2d at 506. Although we acknowledge that counties have \u201cconsiderable latitude\u201d in implementing these powers, we previously have stressed that a county\u2019s \u201czoning authority cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to the express provisions of the zoning enabling authority.\u201d Cnty. of Lancaster, S.C. v. Mecklenburg Cnty., N.C., 334 N.C. 496, 509, 434 S.E.2d 604, 613 (1993).\nThe dissent also posits that the \u201cstatutory language [in sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341] does not plainly define the limits of the powers delegated, and must be read in light of the General Assembly\u2019s intent for the entire Chapter as conveyed in sections 153A-4 and section 153-124.\u201d As a result, the dissent concludes that the plain language of sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 is ambiguous. This is a curious conclusion. The dissent\u2019s position appears to be premised upon an apparent lack of specificity in the statutory language. In the absence of this more precise language \u2014 it is unclear from the dissent\u2019s opinion how much more specific the language must be \u2014 the dissent argues for the broadest construction of county power possible, relying upon sections 153A-4 and 153A-124. But this argument overlooks the fact that the plain language of sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 provides clear guidance to counties regarding the extent of their zoning powers. Accordingly, sections 153A-4 and 153A-124 simply cannot be employed to give authority to county ordinances that do not fit within the parameters set forth in the enabling statutes. See Cnty. of Lancaster, S.C., 334 N.C. at 509, 434 S.E.2d at 613 (stating that counties enjoy \u201cconsiderable latitude\u201d in exercising their powers, but recognizing that a county\u2019s \u201czoning authority cannot be exercised in a manner contrary to the express provisions of the zoning enabling authority\u201d). Moreover, the dissent\u2019s argument, if adopted, would fundamentally alter the relationships between counties, which are creations of the General Assembly, and the General Assembly itself, whose power emanates directly from Article II of the North Carolina Constitution.\nNotwithstanding the dissent\u2019s assertion, the General Assembly, in the past, has enacted session laws authorizing Chatham and Orange Counties to enact impact fee ordinances, which we discuss in more detail below. Act of 23 June 1987, ch. 460, secs. 4-12, 17-18.1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 609, 611-13, 616-622. As a result, we conclude that the County\u2019s enactment of its APFO in this case was not within the purview of sections 153A-4 and 153A-124, but rather must be the subject of specific enabling legislation. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that Union County (which had enacted an APFO that is almost identical to the APFO at issue here) sought \u2014 and was denied \u2014 such authority from the General Assembly on three occasions. See Union Land Owners, 201 N.C. App. at 375-76, 689 S.E.2d at 505 (noting that Union County had unsuccessfully sought legislative approval of school impact fees in 1998, 2000, and 2005).\nThe dissent contends that we \u201cminimize the unqualified and expansive powers that the General Assembly has given counties to oversee and control development and school construction.\u201d Nothing could be farther from the truth because the legislative powers of county governments in these areas are not as broad as the dissent characterizes them. As we noted above, counties \u201care instrumentalities of the State government . . . subject to its legislative control,\u201d see Comm\u2019rs of Dare Cnty., 95 N.C. at 191, a proposition the dissent endorses in its opening line. As a result, counties must exercise their legislative powers within the confines of the enabling statutes enacted by the General Assembly. We recognize that counties enjoy flexibility in enacting ordinances, but the dissent\u2019s interpretation of sections 153A-4 and 153A-124 \u2014 carried to its logical conclusion\u2014 would give counties virtual carte blanche to enact an unlimited range of ordinances affecting the use of real property no matter how tenuous the connection between the ordinance and our zoning statutes. We are not persuaded that the General Assembly intended to give counties such expansive legislative power.\nThe dissent further asserts that the \u201cparticular instructions\u201d contained in section 153A-4 \u201care mandatory.\u201d In support of its view, the dissent cites Homebuilders, which states that section 160A-4 (relating to the extent of municipal authority) constitutes a \u201clegislative mandate that we are to construe in a broad fashion the provisions and grants of power contained in section 160A.\u201d 336 N.C. at 44, 442 S.E.2d at 50 (quoting River Birch, 326 N.C. at 109, 388 S.E.2d at 543). But in Smith Chapel we did not apply section 160A-4 because the statute at issue there was \u201cclear and unambiguous.\u201d 350 N.C. at 811, 517 S.E.2d at 878. In a footnote, the dissent attempts to brush aside our decision in Smith Chapel by referring to the dissenting opinion in that case. Interestingly enough, Homebuilders also featured a dissenting opinion. See 336 N.C. at 48, 442 S.E.2d at 52 (Mitchell and Webb, JJ., dissenting). But the existence of a dissenting opinion in our decisions does not undermine the decision\u2019s status as binding precedent. The statutes at issue here \u2014 section 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 \u2014 are clear and unambiguous articulations of county zoning powers. As a result, Smith Chapel governs this case no matter how much the dissent wishes otherwise.\nIn reality, this case is more straightforward than the dissent\u2019s sweeping interpretation would lead the casual reader to believe. The starting point of our analysis is to establish the distinction between zoning ordinances and subdivision ordinances. \u201cZoning, as a definitional matter, is the regulation by a local governmental entity of the use of land within a given community, and of the buildings and structures which may be located thereon, in accordance with a general plan.\u201d Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 617, 370 S.E.2d at 583; accord 1 Arden H. Rathkopf & Daren A. Rathkopf, Rathkopf\u2019s The Law of Zoning and Planning \u00a7 1:3, at 1-15 (Edward H. Ziegler, Jr. ed. 2011). According to one commentator, \u201c[t]he principal characteristic of a zoning ordinance is division of the city or county\u2019s land area into districts with a separate set of development regulations for each zone, or district.\u201d Owens, Land Use Law, at 40. Although specific regulations may vary by district, the essential difference between zoning districts \u201cis the range of land uses permitted to be located in that district.\u201d Id. Fundamentally, the primary purpose of county zoning ordinances is to specify the types of land use activities that are permitted, and prohibited, within particular zoning districts. See Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 617, 370 S.E.2d at 583. Thus, county zoning ordinances typically divide the land within a county\u2019s territorial jurisdiction into broad use categories, including, for example, agricultural, commercial, office-institutional, and residential. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-342(a) (2011) (\u201cA county may divide its territorial jurisdiction into districts of any number, shape, and area that it may consider best suited to carry out the purposes of this Part. Within these districts a county may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land.\u201d (emphasis added)).\nAs a result, general zoning ordinances are distinct from subdivision ordinances. Pursuant to section 153A-330 of the North Carolina General Statutes, a county may enact ordinances to \u201cregulate the subdivision of land within its territorial jurisdiction.\u201d Id. \u00a7 153A-330 (2011). Section 153A-335 of the North Carolina General Statutes defines the term \u201csubdivision\u201d in part to \u201cmean[ ] all divisions of a tract or parcel of land into two or more lots, building sites, or other divisions when any one or more of those divisions are created for the purpose of sale or building development (whether immediate or future).\u201d Id. \u00a7 153-335(a) (2011) (emphases added). Thus, as a general matter, subdivision ordinances are designed to \u201cregulate the creation of new lots or separate parcels of land.\u201d Owens, Land Use Law, at 49. \u201cUnlike zoning, which controls the use of land and remains important before, during and after development, subdivision regulation generally refers to controls implemented during the development process.\u201d Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer & Daren E. Roberts, Land Use Planning and Development Regulation Law \u00a7 7:2, at 395 (2d ed. 2007). To this end, subdivision ordinances have several purposes, including, among other things, \u201cfacilitat[ing] record keeping regarding land ownership\u201d; establishing \u201cstandards on the size and shape of new lots and the layout of public facilities (such as street location, intersection design, and the like)\u201d; and \u201crequir[ing] the provision of essential infrastructure (such as roads, utilities, recreational lands, and open space) and the details of how [that infrastructure] is to be laid out and constructed.\u201d Id. at 49-50 (footnote omitted). Therefore, county subdivision ordinances control the development of specific parcels of land while general zoning ordinances regulate land use activities over multiple properties located within a distinct area of the county\u2019s territorial jurisdiction. See Union Land Owners, 201 N.C. App. at 378, 689 S.E.2d at 507 (citing David W. Owens, Introduction to Zoning 3, 129 (3d ed. 2007)).\nSurprisingly, the dissent argues that \u201cwe do not need to label this ordinance as either a zoning or subdivision ordinance.\u201d The dissent\u2019s contention that the APFO\u2019s non-VMP provisions are \u201cunremarkable\u201d exercises of the County\u2019s zoning power also relies upon this flawed reasoning. Additionally, the dissent overstates the purposes of unified development ordinances (\u201cUDOs\u201d), which counties are authorized to enact pursuant to section 153A-322(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes. As a result, the dissent states that \u201c[t]he question on the merits is not whether the APFO is a zoning ordinance or a subdivision ordinance, but whether any of the powers delegated by the General Assembly to counties in Chapter 153A would support the voluntary mitigation payments provision.\u201d\nThe dissent\u2019s contentions, however, are at odds with the County\u2019s primary argument that its APFO is authorized by its general zoning power. They also reflect a lack of understanding about the purpose of unified development ordinances. As Professor David W. Owens notes, \u201cSubdivision ordinances are most commonly adopted as separate ordinances, but they are occasionally combined with zoning and other development regulations into a single ordinance regulating multiple aspects of land development (often termed a \u2018unified development ordinance\u2019).\u201d Owens, Land Use Law, at 49. However, the functional distinctions between zoning ordinances and subdivision ordinances remain intact even when they are adopted as part of a UDO. In enacting section 153A-322(d), the General Assembly did not give counties the authority to eliminate the differentiation between zoning and subdivision ordinances. Rather, the General Assembly was providing counties with a means of compiling certain ordinances together to ensure the uniform use of \u201cdefinitions and procedures.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-322(d).\nAn understanding of the distinctions between zoning ordinances and subdivision ordinances is critical because, while both types of ordinances regulate the use of real property, they do so in very different ways. The dissent\u2019s severance argument can survive only by confusing this long-standing distinction. Severance is not an appropriate remedy because the entire APFO simply does not fall within the ambit of zoning; that is, it has little or nothing to do with the County\u2019s ability to divide its land into districts \u2014 or zones \u2014 based on specific land uses, see Chrismon, 322 N.C. at 617, 370 S.E.2d at 583; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-342(a) (2011), which are applicable \u201cbefore, during and after development,\u201d Juergensmeyer, Land Use Planning, at 395.\nHere the purpose and effect of the County\u2019s APFO do not fall within the purview of the County\u2019s general zoning authority. In contrast to the basic zoning concepts articulated in the plain language of sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341, the APFO does not define the specific land uses that are permitted, or prohibited, within a particular zoning district. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(a). Instead, the APFO links County approval of residential developments to the availability of space for students in the County\u2019s public schools. If the local public schools have insufficient capacity to serve the development, developers, more often than not, are required to pay a substantial sum to the County to secure project approval. Even though the ordinance allows developers to secure development approval by other means, such as waiting up to five years until the public school overcapacity issue is resolved, making significant changes to development plans, or donating land to the county\u2019s school systems, see Zoning Ordinance ch. 15, \u00a7\u00a7 7, 8, the record indicates that only a few developments have been approved upon complying with these alternative conditions. In our view, the County\u2019s APFO cannot be classified as a zoning ordinance because, as plaintiff correctly observes, \u201cthe APFO simply does not \u2018zone.\u2019 \u201d As a result, the County cannot rely upon its general zoning authority to enact its APFO.\nThe dissent argues that section 153A-342 is inconsistent with \u201cthe majority\u2019s narrow interpretation of zoning.\u201d Once again, the dissent\u2019s criticism is based on a misunderstanding of basic land use law. The first sentence of section 153A-342(a) addresses the power of counties with respect to their geography by authorizing the division of each county\u2019s \u201cterritorial jurisdiction into districts of any number, shape, and area that [the county] may consider best suited to carry out the purposes of this Part. \u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-342(a) (emphasis added). In the second sentence, the General Assembly provided counties with the power to determine the overarching land use activities that are permitted or prohibited within each district. Id. (\u201cWithin these districts a county may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land.\u201d). As previously noted, these activities govern general land uses such as agricultural, commercial, office-institutional, and residential. The dissent, however, reads the second sentence in isolation from the context of the first sentence. In essence, the dissent concludes that because the APFO is tied to the approval of residential developments it is a zoning ordinance. But this argument fails to account for the very specific purpose of our zoning statues. The APFO does nothing to organize the County\u2019s territorial jurisdiction into districts or zones and it does not govern specific categories of land use activities. Therefore, it cannot be classified a zoning ordinance.\nIn operation the APFO is a very effective means of generating revenue, as the Board\u2019s public actions demonstrate. Between 1998 and mid-August 2003, developers seeking approval of their residential developments paid the County an adequate public facilities fee of $500.00 per residential unit. On 25 August 2003, the Board increased that amount to not less than $1,008.00 per residential unit. Res. No. 2003-26. Slightly over a year later, the Board raised the APFO fee to not less than $4,034.00 per single family unit and $1,331.00 per multifamily unit. Cabarrus County, N.C., Res. No. 2004-37 (Sept. 20, 2004). In 2008 the Board increased the minimum VMP to $8,617.00 per single family unit, $4,571.00 for townhouses, and $4,153.00 per multifamily unit. Looking at just the five year period between 2003 and 2008, the Board increased the APFO\u2019s fee for single family units by more than 1,600 percent. According to the county manager\u2019s 2008 annual budget statement, the Board\u2019s decision to increase the VMP to $8,617.00 per single family unit \u201cwill produce millions more in revenue over time and help defray the amount of debt required for school construction.\u201d As noted above, the County has spent or budgeted over $267 million for school construction since the first APFO was enacted in 1998. Therefore, we must conclude that the APFO is a carefully crafted revenue generation mechanism that effectively establishes a \u201cpay-to-build\u201d system for developers.\nMoreover, we cannot accept the County\u2019s argument that the APFO\u2019s VMP is \u201cvoluntary.\u201d Several statements made by county commissioners and staff illustrate this point. At the Board\u2019s 20 September 2004 meeting, one commissioner acknowledged making a statement at a previous meeting that the APFO was designed to ensure that \u201cwhoever creates the problems pays the bills.\u201d During the same meeting, the Board\u2019s vice chair stated that the APFO\u2019s consent agreements \u201care forced,\u201d meaning, as he expressed it, that the agreements \u201cmay be consensual in the legal forms, but in reality [they are] not.\u201d Further, at the Board\u2019s 10 July 2006 meeting, a commissioner and the county attorney had an exchange in which the county attorney explained that, although the Board could approve without conditions a development that would result in school overcrowding, construction on the project could not begin until school capacity became adequate:\n\u201cCommissioner: If that is the case we will not get the fee.\u201d\n\u201cAttorney: They will not be building either.\u201d\nIn light of these statements, it is clear that the VMP operates much like the mandatory school impact fee that the Court of Appeals invalidated in Durham Land Owners Ass\u2019n v. County of Durham, 177 N.C. App. 629, 638, 630 S.E.2d 200, 206 (determining that Durham County could not rely on its general zoning and police powers to impose a mandatory school impact fee on developers and home builders) disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 532, 633 S.E.2d 678 (2006). See also Michael F. Roessler, Public Education, Local Authority, and Democracy: The Implied Power of North Carolina Counties to Impose School Impact Fees, 33 Campbell L. Rev. 239, 242 n.9 (2011) (noting the differences between Durham County\u2019s school impact fee and Union County\u2019s APFO but stating that the \u201cessence of both ordinances . . . was the same: the imposition of a per-housing-unit fee on new residential development designed to generate funds to build and renovate schools\u201d). Recognizing that the County\u2019s APFO could generate significant amounts of revenue from a possibly unpopular group \u2014 residential developers \u2014 the Board substantially increased its adequate public facilities fee over a five year period. These increases illustrate the precise harm that may occur when APFOs are adopted absent specific enabling legislation.\nWe also observe that the APFO\u2019s revenue generation characteristics conflict with our State\u2019s current approach to funding public education. The General Assembly has authorized counties to obtain revenue for public schools and other services from various sources, including property taxes, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-149(b)(7) (2011); special assessments against property, see id. \u00a7 153A-185 (2011); and local government sales and use taxes, see id. \u00a7\u00a7 105-495, -502 (2011). With respect to each of these sources of revenue, the burden of funding public schools is spread among a large number of individuals, including county residents and those traveling through or doing business in that county. Conversely, the APFO concentrates the majority of the financial burden for school construction on residential developers. See Union Land Owners, 201 N.C. App. at 381, 689 S.E.2d at 508 (stating that Union County\u2019s APFO \u201cuse[d] a VMP and other similar measures[ ] to shift impermissibly a portion of the burden for funding school construction onto developers seeking approval for new developments\u201d).\nWe recognize the difficulty that county governments currently face as they try to meet their statutory obligation to provide adequate public school facilities, see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-408(b) (2011), and we applaud the County\u2019s commitment to securing additional funds for school construction. But we believe the General Assembly is best suited to address the complex issues involving population growth and its impact on public education throughout the State. We note that the General Assembly has not addressed this precise issue to date. See Union Land Owners, 201 N.C. App. at 375, 689 S.E.2d at 505. Without expressing an opinion on the policy merits of APFOs, we stress that absent specific authority from the General Assembly, APFOs that effectively require developers to pay an adequate public facilities fee to obtain development approval are invalid as a matter of law. Accordingly, we conclude that the County\u2019s first argument lacks merit.\nVI\nWe now turn to the County\u2019s argument that its APFO was authorized by Session Law 2004-39, which states:\nNotwithstanding the provisions of Article 19 of Chapter 160A of the General Statutes, the County of Cabarrus or any municipality therein may enforce, within its jurisdiction, any provision of the school adequacy review performed under the Cabarrus County Subdivision Regulations, including approval of a method to address any inadequacy that may be identified as part of that review.\nCh. 39, sec. 5, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws at 47. The County argues that Session Law 2004-39 provides \u201cspecial authorization to \u2018adopt\u2019 and \u2018enforce\u2019 its APFO as an exception to the general zoning and subdivision-regulation statutes.\u201d The County asserts that its power to \u201cenforce\u201d the APFO \u201cnecessarily and logically includes\u201d the authority to adopt the APFO. We are not persuaded.\n\u201cWhen interpreting a statute, we ascertain the intent of the legislature, first by applying the statute\u2019s language and, if necessary, considering its legislative history and the circumstances of its enactment.\u201d Shaw v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 362 N.C. 457, 460, 665 S.E.2d 449, 451 (2008). Applying these rules of statutory construction to Session Law 2004-39, we identify several flaws in the County\u2019s arguments.\nFirst, our review of the session law\u2019s plain language belies the County\u2019s \u201cadopt and enforce\u201d argument. Most notably, the word \u201cadopt\u201d does not appear anywhere in the text of the session law. If the legislature had intended to authorize the County to adopt an APFO such as the one at issue, it could have done so expressly. In 1987 the General Assembly expressly authorized Chatham and Orange Counties to impose impact fees on residential developers to support the provision of public facilities, including schools. Act of June 23, 1987, ch. 460, secs. 4-12.1, 17-18.1, 1987 N.C. Sess. Laws 609, 611-13, 616-622. For example, with respect to Chatham County, the General Assembly stated:\nThe Board of Commissioners of a county may provide by ordinance for a system of impact fees to be paid by developers to help defray the costs to the county of constructing certain capital improvements, the need for which is created in substantial part by the new development that takes place within the county.\nId., sec. 4(a). This language conclusively demonstrates that the General Assembly knows how to convey upon counties specific authority to adopt ordinances similar to the one before us. With respect to APFOs in general, our research discloses no instance in which the General Assembly has acted upon the requests of county governments for legislation authorizing them to adopt these ordinances. See Union Land Owners, 201 N.C. App. at 375, 689 S.E.2d at 505 (noting that Union County had unsuccessfully sought legislative approval of school impact fees in 1998, 2000, and 2005). As we previously observed, Union County\u2019s APFO was almost identical to the one we consider and reject today. Id. at 375-76, 689 S.E.2d at 505. Therefore, in the absence of express language authorizing the adoption of the APFO, we cannot accept the County\u2019s strained interpretation of Session Law 2004-39.\nEven assuming that the session law\u2019s language is ambiguous enough to allow us to entertain the County\u2019s position, the circumstances surrounding enactment of Session Law 2004-39 indicate that the General Assembly did not intend for the session law to authorize the County to adopt its APFO. Rather, the record shows that the session law was an effort to address the confusion between the County and several municipalities regarding enforcement of the APFO. The record contains ample evidence that Concord and Kannapolis chose not to enforce the ordinance within their municipal jurisdictions because of the fees themselves and concerns about whether the County had authority to collect the fees within their jurisdictional boundaries. On 12 August 2004, the county manager sent letters to the city managers of Concord and Kannapolis informing them that pursuant to the new session law, the APFO now applied to all municipalities in the County. The next day \u2014 13 August 2004 \u2014 Concord\u2019s city manager sent a memorandum to Concord\u2019s mayor, members of the city council, and the city attorney expressing doubt that Session Law 2004-39 clarified \u201cthe municipalities\u2019 ability to collect [the APFO] fee,\u201d but stating that the city staff \u201cthought there was a way it could be done.\u201d The city manager also wrote that he had explained to the county manager during a telephone call that attempts by the County to revise the APFO without consulting Concord \u201cwould not be received well.\u201d According to the memorandum, the county manager understood these concerns, but felt that the County \u201cneeded to go ahead [with the revisions] so [it] c[ould] position [itself] to try to get the [APFO] fees from the developers.\u201d\nOn 16 August 2004, slightly over a month after Session Law 2004-39 was enacted, the county manager told the Board during its monthly meeting that the session law \u201cauthorized Cabarrus County to enforce its school adequacy requirements countywide, including within the corporate limits of the municipalities.\u201d Following the county manager\u2019s statement and a presentation by a member of the County\u2019s planning department staff regarding school construction capital costs, the Board engaged in a discussion about its adequate public facilities policy. Several issues were raised, including \u201cenforcement [of the APFO] within municipalities.\u201d During this exchange the Board\u2019s vice chair expressed \u201cconcerns about the legality of the [APFO\u2019s] advancement requirement and stated [that] a higher fee would have a negative impact on the building industry and the economy of Cabarrus County.\u201d Notwithstanding this statement, the commission voted four to one, with the vice chair in dissent, to approve a resolution that, among other things, stated:\nNew development within the corporate limits of any of the cities and towns located in Cabarrus County shall also be subject to the adequacy review through the Cabarrus Countv Subdivision Regulations Chapter 4, Section 17 \u201cAdequate Public Facilities Standards,\u201d as provided for by Session Law 2004-39, House Bill 224, which became effective June 30, 2004.\nRes. No. 2004-30. According to the meeting minutes and the text of this resolution, the Board and county staff believed Session Law 2004-39 was intended to address APFO enforcement concerns involving the municipalities located within Cabarrus County, not to give the County authority to enact the APFO.\nThis point is corroborated by correspondence between county and municipal staff following the Board\u2019s 16 August 2004 meeting. On 20 August 2004, the interim city manager for Kannapolis responded to the county manager\u2019s 12 August 2004 letter by saying that he was \u201cnot convinced that\u201d Session Law 2004-39 \u201cauthorize[d] the County to collect [APFO] fees within our City limits in the manner in which you have described to me.\u201d On 26 October 2004, the County\u2019s planning and zoning manager sent a letter to the Kannapolis planning director stating in part: \u201cIn [Session Law 2004-39], authority was granted to the County to enforce Adequate Public Facility standards through all areas within the County including those areas within municipal boundaries.\u201d Additionally, the planning and. zoning manager wrote that the Board\u2019s 16 August 2004 resolution expressed \u201cthe County\u2019s intent to enforce Adequate Public Facility standards within the municipalities.\u201d None of this correspondence shows that Session Law 2004-39 was intended to give the County authority to adopt its APFO.\nApparently anticipating the weakness of its argument, the County contends in its brief that \u201cit would have made no sense for the [General Assembly] to use the word \u2018adopt\u2019 when the APFO had already been in existence for a number of years.\u201d Ironically, the existence of the County\u2019s APFO before enactment of Session Law 2004-39 further undermines the County\u2019s \u201cadopt and enforce\u201d theory. The record demonstrates that county officials believed (mistakenly) that the County already had statutory authority to enact the APFO. The County\u2019s commerce director admitted in his 24 April 2009 deposition that the County did not rely upon Session Law 2004-39 as authority for the APFO stating, \u201cWe had an APFO prior to that.\u201d Notably, the commerce director\u2019s deposition was taken several months before the Court of Appeals invalidated Union County\u2019s APFO in Union Land Owners. Thus, it appears that the County\u2019s \u201cadopt and enforce\u201d argument is a relatively recent development.\nAs a final note, even if we assume arguendo that Session Law 2004-39 authorized the County to adopt its APFO, we do not believe that the legislature intended to give the County unfettered authority to enact this revenue-driven ordinance. Our conclusion is derived from the substantial differences between the APFO\u2019s initial version and its current iteration, the General Assembly\u2019s reluctance to authorize the imposition of school impact fees, and the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision in Durham Land Owners.\nThe current APFO effectively requires developers to pay a substantial adequate public facilities fee to receive development approval. In practice, the Board has leveraged this dynamic to generate substantial revenues for the County, which once again, demonstrates the precise harm that APFOs may inflict on unpopular groups. Such government action should not be permitted without specific enabling legislation enacted by the General Assembly.\nMoreover, as noted above, when the session law was enacted, the General Assembly already had rejected requests by another county to authorize the imposition of school impact fees. See Union Land Owners, 201 N.C. App. at 375, 689 S.E.2d at 505 (noting that Union County had unsuccessfully sought legislative approval of school impact fees in 1998, 2000, and 2005). In addition, in 2006 the Court of Appeals invalidated Durham County\u2019s mandatory school impact fee. Durham Land Owners, 177 N.C. App. at 638, 630 S.E.2d at 206 (determining that Durham County could not rely on its general zoning and police powers to impose a mandatory school impact fee on developers and home builders).\nOne of the implied premises of the County\u2019s \u201cadopt and enforce\u201d argument is that by enacting Session Law 2004-39, the General Assembly intended to grant the County unconditional authority to expand substantially the scope of its APFO, from a simple adequacy review process into a complex revenue generating system. We reject this proposition. Again, assuming arguendo that Session Law 2004-39 authorized adoption of the APFO, we simply do not believe that the General Assembly intended for the session law to give the County the power to adopt an APFO with the broad scope that we consider and reject today.\nIn sum, we hold that Session Law 2004-39 did not authorize the County to enact its APFO. As a result, we do not address the parties\u2019 arguments regarding whether the session law actually authorized the County to enforce the APFO within the corporate boundaries of the County\u2019s municipalities.\nVII\nFinally, we consider the County\u2019s argument that plaintiff\u2019s action was barred by the statutes of limitations that were in effect when plaintiff filed its initial complaint on 4 April 2008. Specifically, the County contends it was entitled to summary judgment pursuant to sections 153A-348 (2009) and 1-54.1 (2009) of the North Carolina General Statutes. We disagree.\nPursuant to section 153A-348: \u201cA cause of action as to the validity of any zoning ordinance, or amendment thereto, adopted under this Part or other applicable law shall accrue upon adoption of the ordinance, or amendment thereto, and shall be brought within two months as provided in G.S. 1-54.1.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-348 (2009). Section 1-54.1 requires a party to file:\nWithin two months an action contesting the validity of any zoning ordinance or amendment thereto adopted by a county under Part 3 of Article 18 of Chapter 153A of the General Statutes or other applicable law or adopted by a city under Chapter 160A of the General Statutes or other applicable law.\nId. \u00a7 1-54.1 (2009).\nThe County argues that plaintiff filed its complaint well over two months after the County revised the APFO on 20 August 2007. In addition, the County asserts that the Court of Appeals erred by relying on its decision in Amward Homes, Inc. v. Town of Cary to reject the County\u2019s statute of limitations argument. See Amward Homes, 206 N.C. App. at 53-54, 698 S.E.2d at 416 (holding that the two-month statute of limitations governing municipal ordinances did not bar the plaintiff\u2019s cause of action \u201cbecause [the ordinance at issue was] a subdivision ordinance rather than a zoning ordinance\u201d). In support of its position, the County urges us to consider \u201cthe substance of the [APFO] to determine whether it regulates those matters set out in the zoning enabling statute ... , or those matters set out in the subdivision-regulation statutes.\u201d\nAs discussed above, after reviewing the substance of the APFO, we conclude that it is not a zoning ordinance. Rather, the APFO impermissibly places the burden of funding public school construction on developers by using a revenue generating mechanism that is disguised as a zoning ordinance. Because the APFO is not a zoning ordinance, plaintiffs action is not time barred by sections 153A-348 and 1-54.1.\nVIII\nIn conclusion, we hold that (1) the County did not have statutory authority to adopt its APFO; (2) Session Law 2004-39 did not authorize enactment of the APFO; and (3) plaintiffs cause of action is not time barred. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nAFFIRMED.\n. The Cabarrus County towns of Harrisburg, Midland, and Mt. Pleasant have authorized the County to enforce its zoning and subdivision ordinances within their territorial jurisdictions pursuant to section 160A-360(d) of the North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-360(d) (2011). The County, which furnishes planning services to these three municipalities, enforced its APFO in those towns at their request. The record indicates that to date, the cities of Concord, Kannapolis, and Locust have not granted this authority to the County.\n. All residential developments, including single family units, townhouses, multifamily units (e.g., apartments), and mobile home parks, that impact public school capacity are subject to the APFO. Zoning Ordinance ch. 15, \u00a7 4(1). However, residential developments which are unlikely to impact public school enrollment, such as retirement homes and subdivisions of five lots or less, do not fall within its jurisdiction. Id.\n. In accordance with Rule 40 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court of Appeals consolidated plaintiff\u2019s declaratory judgment action with two similar actions filed against Cabarrus County. See Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 206 N.C. App. 761, 699 S.E.2d 139, 2010 WL 3467567, at *1 (2010) (unpublished) (consolidating with Craft Dev., LLC. v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, No. COA09-1610 (N.C. Ct. App.) and Mardan IV v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, No. COA09-1611 (N.C. Ct. App.)). Craft Development, LLC plans to develop a 15.56 acre tract of land located in Midland into a multifamily project. Mardan IV intends to develop a 168 unit apartment complex on an 11.23 acre parcel of land located within the corporate boundaries of Concord. Id. at *2.\n. Locust\u2019s territorial jurisdiction overlaps the border between Cabarrus and Stanly Counties. On 20 September 2004, the Stanly County Board of Commissioners adopted an APFO that is similar to the Cabarrus County APFO. Notably, Stanly County\u2019s minimum VMP is $1,500.00 per residential unit.\n. Plaintiff subsequently amended its complaint on 23 April 2008 and 29 August 2008. In addition, on 19 August 2008, the trial court allowed the Cabarrus County Building Industry Coalition to intervene in this matter as a party plaintiff pursuant to Rule 24 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Because Lanvale is the only plaintiff participating in this appeal, we will refer to plaintiff in the singular throughout this opinion.\n. Locust filed its answers on 27 June 2008 and 26 September 2008.\n. Although plaintiff named Locust as a defendant, Locust did not join in the County\u2019s appeal. Instead, Locust filed a brief persuasively arguing that the County lacks authority to enact its APFO.\n. The dissent argues that we should apply section 153A-4 because the APFO is a \u201creasonably expedient\u201d means of providing funds for public school construction. We disagree. Without belaboring the point, after thoroughly reviewing the record, we observe that the Board\u2019s actions between 2003 and 2008 to increase the VMP for single family units by 1,600 percent (from $500.00 per unit in 2003 to $8,617.00 per unit in 2008) were anything but reasonable.\n. As an illustration, in early April 2008, county staff determined that local schools were insufficient to support the Mardan IV development, see n.5, which comprised 168 apartment units. On 21 April 2008, the Board approved a Reservation of Capacity Certificate for the project on the condition that the Mardan IV developers pay the $4,153.00 per unit VMP. As a result, the Mardan IV developers would have been required to make a payment of $697,704.00 to secure development approval. The Mardan IV developer\u2019s Reservation of Capacity Certificate expired on 22 April 2009 because the developer failed to submit to the County the requisite development approval from Concord.\n. As further evidence of the distinction between zoning and subdivision ordinances, we observe that the statutes conveying zoning and subdivision powers on counties are treated separately in the General Statutes. The subdivision statutes appear in Part Two of Article 18. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-330 to -336. Meanwhile, the zoning statutes are contained in Part Three of the same article. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-340 to -349.\n. The General Assembly substantially revised sections 153A-348 and 1-54.1 in 2011. See Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 384, secs. 2, 3, 2011 5 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 465, 465-66 (LexisNexis). These revisions do not apply to this case. See id., sec. 7 at 467 (\u201cThis act becomes effective July 1, 2011, but the provisions of Sections 1 through 4 of this act, to the extent they effect a change in existing law, shall not apply to litigation pending on that date.\u201d). We therefore analyze the County\u2019s statute of limitations argument using the versions of these statutes that were in effect when plaintiff filed its initial complaint.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice HUDSON\ndissenting.\nI agree with the majority that counties are instrumentalities of the State, with powers granted by the General Assembly. \u201cBut it is also true that a municipal corporation may exercise all the powers within the fair intent and purpose of its creation which are reasonably necessary to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and in doing this it may exercise discretion as to the means to the end.\u201d Riddle v. Ledbetter, 216 N.C. 491, 493, 5 S.E.2d 542, 543 (1939) (citations omitted). I respectfully dissent because (1) the majority opinion is overly broad, striking down the entire APFO and effectively foreclosing all future APFO-like efforts when it only needed to sever the voluntary mitigation payment provision, and (2) the majority\u2019s decision conflicts with the plain language of N.C.G.S. Chapter 153A, as well as its intent.\nI. Severance\nThe majority here strikes down the entire APFO based primarily on its determination that the voluntary mitigation payments provision of the APFO exceeds the county\u2019s authority under the General Statutes. In doing so, the majority passes over, with minimal explanation, the obvious remedy required when only one provision of an ordinance is statutorily unauthorized: severance of the offending provision.\nThe majority opinion analyzes only one provision of the entire twenty page APFO: the voluntary mitigation payment provision, to which it refers as a \u201ccarefully crafted revenue generation mechanism\u201d \u201cdisguised as a zoning ordinance.\u201d Underlying the analysis in the majority opinion is its characterization of the VMP as a mandatory fee. As will be discussed below, the VMP is not mandatory; it is one of five options in the APFO from which a developer may choose if current school capacity is determined to be inadequate for the proposed development. If the VMP is truly the only problematic provision, then the majority could easily reach the same result by severing that provision, without undermining the county\u2019s authority to provide for orderly growth and development.\n\u201cThe test for severability is whether the remaining portion of the legislation can stand on its own and whether the [legislative body] would have enacted the remainder absent the offending portion.\u201d Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 548, 556 S.E.2d 265, 268 (2001) (per curiam) (citation omitted). As described in Section III.A below, the APFO without the voluntary mitigation payment provision can \u201cstand on its own,\u201d id., as it is an unremarkable exercise of the powers granted to counties under Chapter 153A of the North Carolina General Statutes. As to whether the legislative body \u201cwould have enacted the remainder absent the offending portion,\u201d \u201cthe inclusion of a severability clause within legislation will be interpreted as a clear statement of legislative intent to strike an unconstitutional provision and to allow the balance to be enforced independently.\u201d Id. (citation omitted). Here section 15-21 of the APFO explicitly states that \u201c[i]f any portion, clause or sentence of this ordinance shall be determined to be invalid or unconstitutional, such declaration of invalidity shall not affect the remaining portions of this ordinance.\u201d Because the remainder of the APFO here is sound, the voluntary mitigation payment provisions are severable, and the majority\u2019s sweeping rejection of the entire APFO is unnecessary as well as contrary to the enabling statutes at issue.\nThe majority states that \u201c[severance is not an appropriate remedy because the entire APFO simply does not fall within the ambit of zoning.\u201d The entire APFO, with or without the VMP provision, contains extensive provisions detailing methods of calculating school impact and various mitigation measures developers could take to address inadequate school capacity. These provisions and others appear to me to be within the scope of regulating and restricting the use of land and buildings for residence and other purposes, as intended by the General Assembly. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(a) (2011). At no point does the majority explain how denying a development application in light of inadequate school capacity, delaying development until school capacity is adequate, or requiring the developer to modify the development application to address inadequate school capacity are not authorized by statute.\nBy failing to sever the VMP provision, the majority appears to have created a situation in which the county is powerless to delay or deny development applications in light of inadequate school capacity, and now has few choices beyond raising property taxes on existing residents to pay for schools that will serve the new residents who move into the new development.\n\u201cThe history of the Supreme Court of North Carolina has been one of judicial restraint. . ..\u201d State v. Waddell, 282 N.C. 431, 476, 194 S.E.2d 19, 48 (1973) (Sharp, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In my view, this Court could and should exercise such restraint and uphold the remaining inoffensive, uncontroversial, and statutorily authorized provisions of the APFO. Severing the voluntary mitigation payment provisions while upholding the remainder of the APFO is the most the Court should have done here in light of the plain language of N.C.G.S. Chapter 153A. But in light of other provisions of the statute and the special legislation affecting Cabarrus County (\u201cSession Law 2004-39\u201d), I further conclude that the Court should uphold the entire APFO as written.\nII. Matters Preliminary to the Merits\nA. The Interpretive Framework\nTo explain why the entire APFO should be upheld, I begin with a discussion of the provisions in Chapter 153A in which the General Assembly specifically and clearly articulated the intent behind these statutory delegations of authority. By ignoring these provisions, the majority misreads the individual provisions of the statute at issue here. Legislative intent \u201cis the guiding star in the interpretation of statutes.\u201d Moore v. Adams Elec. Co., 264 N.C. 667, 673, 142 S.E.2d 659, 665 (1965) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The legislature\u2019s intent in delegating certain powers to counties is clearly indicated in two important provisions of Chapter 153A, one of which the majority regards as \u201cinapposite\u201d (section 153A-4), and the other of which the majority ignores entirely (section 153A-124). Section 153A-4 reads:\nIt is the policy of the General Assembly that the counties of this State should have adequate authority to exercise the powers, rights, duties, functions, privileges, and immunities conferred upon them by law. To this end, the provisions of this Chapter and of local acts shall be broadly construed and grants of power shall be construed to include any powers that are reasonably expedient to the exercise of the power.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-4 (emphases added) (2011). Section 153A-124 drives home the same point:\nThe enumeration in this Article or other portions of this Chapter of specific powers to define, regulate, prohibit, or abate acts, omissions, or conditions is not exclusive, nor is it a limit on the general authority to adopt ordinances conferred on counties by G.S. 153A-121. \u2022\nId. \u00a7 153A-124 (emphasis added) (2011). The plain language of these two sections indicates a specific legislative will that all provisions of Chapter 153A be read broadly to effectuate the goals of the General Assembly in granting numerous powers to local governments.\nThe sections of the statute at issue here read in pertinent part:\nA zoning ordinance may regulate and restrict the height, number of stories and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lots that may be occupied, the size of yards, courts and other open spaces, the density of population, and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(a).\nZoning regulations shall be designed to promote the public health, safety, and general welfare. To that end, the regulations may address, among other things, the following public purposes: to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid undue concentration of population; to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic, and dangers; and to facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. The regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration as to, among other things, the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the county. In addition, the regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration to expansion and development of any cities within the county, so as to provide for their orderly growth and development.\nId. \u00a7 153A-341 (2011).\nThe majority circumvents section 153A-4 by claiming that the statutory language in these zoning enabling statutes, N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-340, et seq., is plain, and therefore, no construction is necessary and section 153A-4 does not apply. This interpretive evasion is untenable for two reasons: first, because section 153A-4 is not an optional provision, and second, because the language in the zoning statutes is not plain.\nFirst, section 153A-4 is not an optional provision of the statute. While interpretive instructions in statutes are not generally binding upon this Court, we have previously ruled \u2014 -twice\u2014that these particular instructions are mandatory: \u201cWe treat this language as a \u2018legislative mandate that we are to construe in a broad fashion the provisions and grants of power contained\u2019 \u201d in the statute. Homebuilders Ass\u2019n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 336 N.C. 37, 44, 442 S.E.2d 45, 50 (1994) (quoting River Birch Assocs. v. City of Raleigh, 326 N.C. 100, 109, 388 S.E.2d 538, 543 (1990)) (discussing an identical provision in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-4,-which relates to city powers). The language of section 153A-4 is abundantly clear in mandating that we read all other sections of Chapter 153A broadly, not just when we decide they are ambiguous, but all the time. The majority states, without citing authority, that this provision is not a \u201cgeneral directive\u201d but instead is a \u201crule of statutory interpretation\u201d that only applies if another section is ambiguous. This view is contrary to the rulings of this Court cited above and imposes limitations the General Assembly did not enact. Moreover, the majority acknowledges that section 153A-4 applies \u201cwhen its application is necessary to give effect to any powers that are reasonably expedient to [a county\u2019s] exercise of the power.\u201d Here the APFO exercises powers \u2014 delaying development and collecting payments in exchange for expedited development rights \u2014 reasonably expedient to the exercise of the express power to regulate and restrict land use for the purpose of providing adequate public schools. The application of section 153A-4 is necessary to \u201cgive effect\u201d to these reasonably expedient measures. As such, even within the majority\u2019s own narrow view of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-4, that section applies here.\nThe majority completely omits any discussion of section 153A-124, which states that the enumerated list of powers is not exclusive. The majority\u2019s interpretation \u2014 that the lack of an explicit provision enabling voluntary mitigation payments means that such payments are not authorized \u2014 is frankly inexplicable in light of this provision. Section 153A-124 expressly states that the enumeration of powers in the statutes that compose Chapter 153A \u201cis not exclusive, nor is it a limit on the general authority to adopt ordinances.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-124. This language can only mean that the General Assembly did not intend to limit county powers to those it specifically named in each statute at the time of its passage, but rather anticipated giving local governing bodies significant discretion in how to exercise their \u201cgeneral authority to adopt ordinances.\u201d Id. As with section 153A-4, nothing in section 153A-124 suggests it should be applied only when the statutory language at issue is ambiguous; it is rather a general guideline that the provisions of the Chapter should always be read broadly to meet the purposes expressed by the General Assembly. Sections 153A-4 and 153A-124 are not optional provisions, and the majority ignores the express will of the General Assembly by failing to apply those provisions in this case.\nAs such, when I turn to the particular zoning (and subdivision) provisions at issue here, I read them in the context of these expressions of intent by the General Assembly. But even if these sections only apply to ambiguous statutory language, they must still be applied here because the language in sections 153A-340 and 153A-341 is ambiguous. The majority concludes that \u201c[s]ections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 express in unambiguous language the General Assembly\u2019s intent to delegate general zoning powers to county governments,\u201d and thus declares section 153A-4 \u201cinapposite.\u201d While I agree that these provisions \u201cexpress in unambiguous language\u201d an \u201cintent to delegate general zoning powers,\u201d that is not the appropriate question here. The appropriate question is whether the language describing the general zoning powers to be delegated is plain. It is the content and extent of the delegation that must be plainly expressed if we are to avoid any statutory construction. In these sections, the General Assembly authorizes counties to adopt ordinances which \u201cregulate and restrict the . . . use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(a). Moreover, counties \u201cmay address, among other things ... the efficient and adequate provision of schools . . . .\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-341.\nI conclude that this statutory language does not plainly define the limits of the powers delegated and must be read in light of the General Assembly\u2019s intent for the entire Chapter as conveyed in sections 153A-4 and 153A-124. The plain language of sections 153A-340(a) and 153A-341 does no more than simply and broadly authorize, among other things, the regulation and restriction of the use of land for residence purposes and gives examples of the types of public purposes counties may address. The question before us, therefore, is whether this general language authorizes the particular regulation and restriction of the use of land created in the ordinance at issue. See Offutt Hous. Co. v. Cnty. of Sarpy, 351 U.S. 253, 260, 76 S. Ct. 814, 819 (1956) (\u201c[Congress] has preferred to use general language and thereby requires the judiciary to apply this general language to a specific problem. To that end we must resort to whatever aids to interpretation the legislation in its entirety and its history provide.\u201d). The statute here is conspicuously silent on the reach of the general power to \u201cregulate and restrict\u201d land use under section 153A-340(a), leaving significant discretion in the hands of the counties. Therefore, the specific limit of that general grant of power in this context is unmistakably a question of statutory construction. Sections 153A-4 and 153A-124 must be applied and all provisions must be construed broadly.\nThese mandates from the General Assembly to read Chapter 153A broadly have real significance. Most statutes do not contain such interpretive guidance. \u201cThese provisions evince an evident legislative purpose to give local governments considerable flexibility and discretion . . . .\u201d Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 729, 467 S.E.2d 615, 628 (1996). The General Assembly intentionally gave counties very broad powers to operate in those areas assigned to them, one of which is the provision of capital facilities for schools. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 115C-408 (2011). Whether we agree with the policy advanced or not, we should be very cautious in second-guessing, and even negating, the General Assembly\u2019s decisions on this legislative matter.\nB. General Discussion of Zoning\nRegarding another general matter, I am troubled by the majority\u2019s broad discussion of the definitions of zoning and subdivision ordinances. As an initial point, given the statutory framework, we do not need to label this ordinance as either a zoning or subdivision ordinance. Clearly, zoning and subdivision powers are distinct, but the General Statutes also authorize unified development ordinances that include powers found throughout Chapter 153A:\nA county may elect to combine any of the ordinances authorized by this Article into a unified ordinance. Unless expressly provided otherwise, a county may apply any of the definitions and procedures authorized by law to any or all aspects of the unified ordinance and may employ any organizational structure, board, commission, or staffing arrangement authorized by law to any or all aspects of the ordinance.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-322(d) (2011) (emphasis added). See also N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-330 (2011), -340(a). Because counties are specifically authorized to select and combine powers from throughout Chapter 153A in a unified development ordinance, the question on the merits is not whether the APFO is a zoning ordinance or a subdivision ordinance, but whether any of the powers delegated by the General Assembly to counties in Chapter 153A would support the voluntary mitigation payments provision.\nNevertheless, to the extent the majority determines that the APFO is clearly not a zoning ordinance, I disagree: it certainly contains some elements of a zoning ordinance. The majority claims that \u201cthe County\u2019s APFO cannot be classified as a zoning ordinance because . . . \u2018the APFO simply does not \u2018zone.\u2019 \u201d This conclusion seems to arise from the majority\u2019s determination that the \u201cprincipal characteristic\u201d or \u201cprimary purpose\u201d of zoning is the division of land into zones for various uses. In its discussion the majority appears to hold, or at least to strongly suggest, that zoning is limited to that regulation which relates to the creation of districts for land use.\nWhile zoning may be theoretically about creating land use districts, in reality zoning is whatever the General Assembly has said it is. And the General Assembly has granted to counties zoning power much broader and more nuanced than just what is needed to create general zoning districts. In subsection 153A-340(a), quoted in part above, the General Assembly defines the zoning power as including the power to \u201cregulate and restrict\u201d many things, including \u201cthe location and use of buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.\u201d In section 153A-341, also quoted in part above, the General Assembly adds that \u201cregulations may address\u201d a host of \u201cpublic purposes\u201d including \u201cto facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of. . . schools.\u201d Most inconsistent with the majority\u2019s narrow interpretation of zoning is section 153A-342:\nA county may divide its territorial jurisdiction into districts of any number, shape, and area that it may consider best suited to carry out the purposes of this Part. Within these districts a county may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings, structures, or land.\nId. \u00a7 153A-342(a) (2011) (emphasis added). The majority quotes but does not recognize the significance of the emphasized portion. The APFO clearly \u201cregulate[s] and restrict[s]\u201d the \u201cerection\u201d and \u201cuse of buildings\u201d and \u201cland\u201d within residential zoning districts. Section 153A-342(a) illustrates the process the County followed here: first, it created zoning districts wherein residential development may occur; second, it applied the APFO, which \u201cregulate [s] and restrict[s] the ... use of . . . land\u201d specifically \u201cwithin these [residential] districts.\u201d Id. The majority\u2019s excessively narrow definition of zoning \u2014 that \u201cthe ambit of zoning\u201d is limited to \u201cthe County\u2019s ability to divide its land into districts \u2014 or zones \u2014 based on specific land uses\u201d \u2014 recognizes only the first sentence of section 153A-342(a).\nAll these provisions fall under what the General Assembly labeled as the \u201cZoning\u201d part of Article 18 of Chapter 153A. Whether or not scholars and theorists define zoning narrowly, our legislature has defined it broadly. What Cabarrus County has created is an ordinance that unmistakably exercises zoning powers as defined and delegated by the General Statutes.\nMoreover, even applying the majority\u2019s definition of zoning as \u201cregulatfing] land use activities over multiple properties,\u201d this APFO does just that. In particular, I find curious the following statement in the majority opinion: \u201c[T]he APFO does not define the specific land uses that are permitted, or prohibited, within a particular zoning district. See N.C.G.S \u00a7 153A-340(a). Instead, the APFO links County approval of residential developments to the availability of space for students in the County\u2019s public schools.\u201d The problem with this approach is that the language of section 153A-340(a) does not specifically limit zoning ordinances to those which \u201cdefine the specific land uses that are permitted, or prohibited, within a particular zoning district.\u201d Rather, the statute authorizes counties to \u201cregulate and restrict the ... use of... land for... residence ... purposes.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(a). It seems clear to me that conditioning approval of residential development on the existence of adequate public school capacity is the very definition of a regulation (\u201c[t]he act or process of controlling by rule or restriction,\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1311 (8th ed. 2004)) or restriction of the use of land. Thus, the APFO does \u201cregulate and restrict\u201d the use of land within land use districts that allow residential development. Linking approval of residential development to school adequacy is a textbook example of an exercise of the zoning power granted in Article 18 of Chapter 153A, and the distinction the majority attempts to draw is simply illusory. Consistent with sections 153A-340(a) and -341, the alternative mitigation options in the ordinance reflect the county\u2019s \u201cconsideration of expansion and development...\u201d so as \u201cto address the . . . adequate provision of. . . schools.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-340(a), -341.\nThe majority seems to conclude that Cabarrus County\u2019s APFO is a subdivision ordinance. Applying the same logic the majority uses-\u2014 that the APFO cannot be called a zoning ordinance because it \u201csimply does not zone\u201d \u2014 one would conclude that the County\u2019s APFO cannot be classified as a subdivision ordinance because it \u201csimply does not\u201d subdivide. As the majority notes, subdivision is defined as \u201call divisions of a tract or parcel of land into two or more lots.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-335 (2011) (emphasis added). The APFO here does not regulate divisions of a tract or parcel of land. Rather, it regulates the use of the lots, specifically the number of housing units planned by the developer. The APFO is concerned with the number of housing units (a zoning issue), not the number of subdivided lots (a subdivision issue).\nThe majority states that \u201ccounty subdivision ordinances control the development of specific parcels of land while general zoning ordinances regulate land use activities over multiple properties located with a distinct area of the county\u2019s territorial jurisdiction.\u201d Even this attempt to draw a clear distinction between subdivision and zoning regulations fails to explain how this APFO is not a zoning regulation. The APFO clearly \u201cregulate [s] land use activities\u201d \u2014 by controlling the approval process for large residential construction and development projects. It acts \u201cover multiple properties\u201d- \u2014 all properties in any residential district in the county that are going to be developed into more than five housing units. The properties regulated are \u201clocated within a distinct area of the county\u2019s territorial jurisdiction\u201d \u2014 the area served by a particular public school within that residential district. Thus, even under the majority\u2019s new and limited definition of zoning, the APFO still zones.\nIn sum, the majority\u2019s efforts to distinguish subdivision and zoning are unnecessary in light of N.C.G.S. 153A-322(d), and the majority fails to explain how this APFO does not directly implicate the statutorily granted power to \u201cregulate and restrict the . . . use of ... land for . . . residence . . . purposes,\u201d a power expressly found in the zoning enabling statute. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(a).\nIII. Authority for the APFO\nA. General Authority for the APFO without VMPs\nAs noted in Section I regarding severance, the majority does not at any point substantively address the nearly twenty pages of Cabarrus County\u2019s APFO that do not involve VMPs. It appears to me that the APFO provisions other than the VMP provision are well within the authority granted by the General Assembly to counties in Chapter 153A. Minus the VMPs, Cabarrus County\u2019s APFO simply allows the county to review large residential development proposals for their impact on the public school system and, when a significant negative impact is found, allows the county to temporarily delay some or all of the development to help mitigate that negative impact.\nIn my view, the power to temporarily delay development in light of inadequate public school capacity falls squarely within the statutory powers delegated to counties by the General Assembly. Counties are expressly granted the authority to \u201cregulate and restrict. . . the location and use o/buildings, structures, and land for trade, industry, residence, or other purposes.\u201d Id. \u00a7 153A-340(a) (emphases added). The General Assembly also specifically names some of the purposes for which the powers granted in section 153A-340 may legitimately be used, one of which is \u201cto facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of . . . schools.\u201d Id. \u00a7 153A-341. Notably, the General Assembly does not define the exact types of regulations and restrictions that can be imposed on the use of land for residential purposes, nor does it specify how a county might create zoning regulations to facilitate the adequate provision of schools. The General Assembly has left the creation of these regulations to the sound discretion of local governments, while requiring that they be made with\nreasonable consideration as to, among other things, the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the county. In addition, the regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration to expansion and development of any cities within the county, so as to provide for their orderly growth and development.\nId. I have seen no analysis, and the majority provides none, that would place the basic power to delay or withhold development approval to mitigate impact on overcrowded public schools outside of the express statutory authority to regulate or restrict land use so as to provide for counties\u2019 orderly growth and development and \u201cto facilitate the efficient and adequate provision of. . . schools.\u201d Id.\nIn addition, the General Assembly has expressly given counties the power to temporarily halt all development in a county. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-340(h) (2011) (stating that \u201ccounties may adopt temporary moratoria on any county development approval required by law\u201d). Certainly, if the County can temporarily halt all development to address a given concern, it can temporarily delay specific development that particularly affects that concern. Our Court of Appeals has previously upheld a county\u2019s denial of a development application because of school capacity concerns. Tate Terrace Realty Investors, Inc. v. Currituck County, 127 N.C. App. 212, 223, 488 S.E.2d 845, 851 (upholding the Board of Commissioners\u2019 decision to deny development permit for 601-lot subdivision when, inter alia, \u201csubstantial competent evidence in the record supported the Board's . . . conclusion that petitioner\u2019s proposed development \u2018fail[ed] to meet the provision of Section 1402(2)(e) of the [County\u2019s Unified Development Ordinance] because it exceeds the county\u2019s ability to provide adequate public school facilities\u2019 \u201d (first set of brackets in original)), disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 409, 496 S.E.2d 394 (1997). If a county may deny development applications outright based on school capacity concerns, surely it can insist on reasonable delays of development to allow for new school construction as well. The APFO without the voluntary mitigation payment provision does exactly that, which is well within the statutory grant of power found in Chapter 153A.\nB. General Authority for Voluntary Mitigation Payments\nWith the interpretive framework described in Section II.A in mind, it is an easy step from the general and uncontroversial authority to review school adequacy and delay development to the more specific and controversial authority to offer builders the choice either to delay development or to engage in voluntary mitigation measures, one of which is the payment of fees. The voluntary mitigation measures prescribed by the ordinance, which include phasing or modifying the development plans, as well as the possibility of paying for schools, are \u201creasonably expedient\u201d measures in the exercise of the power to regulate or restrict the use of land for residences with the purpose of providing adequate schools. Thus, applying section 153A-4, we should construe the voluntary mitigation measures to be included with the express textual grants of power.\nOur decision in Homebuilders Ass\u2019n of Charlotte is closely analogous to the reasoning here. There, a homebuilders association challenged the city\u2019s imposition of user fees for certain regulatory services and access to public facilities on grounds that no statute expressly authorized those specific fees. The plaintiff bolstered its argument by pointing to the express inclusion of certain fees for sewer usage as evidence that other user fees were not authorized. The Court in Homebuilders Ass\u2019n rejected that analysis:\n[ T]he Court of Appeals noted that the General Assembly has expressly authorized county water and sewer districts to charge user fees for furnished services while it has remained silent on the authority to impose user fees for other services. Here again, the General Assembly did not specify that sewer services were the only services for which user fees could be charged and we find no basis for such a strained reading of this statute.\n336 N.C. at 45, 442 S.E.2d at 51 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). That final statement applies equally well to this case: nowhere in Chapter 153A does the General Assembly forbid counties from accepting voluntary contributions or fees-in-lieu from developers in exchange for expedited development rights, much less from delaying or phasing development to achieve a legitimate policy goal. Rather, the General Assembly expressly and broadly authorizes counties to regulate and restrict development for the purpose of ensuring adequate schools, which is exactly what this APFO does.\nIt should be noted at this point that, despite the majority\u2019s juxtaposition of the two (\u201c[I]t is clear that the VMP operates much like the mandatory school impact fee that the Court of Appeals invalidated in Durham Land Owners Ass\u2019n v. County of Durham.\u201d), Cabarrus County\u2019s APFO is significantly different from the school impact fee ordinance struck down by the Court of Appeals in Durham Land Owners. Under the Durham ordinance builders had to pay a mandatory fee for every dwelling unit built. The fee was required irrespective of existing school capacity, location of the development, or the county\u2019s future school construction plans. There was no requirement that the fees be spent to build a school in the area of the development, so future residents of the development might not even see the benefit of the fees paid by the developer. By contrast, Cabarrus County\u2019s APFO is carefully crafted and narrowly tailored, and payment can be avoided. Cabarrus County engages in an individualized school adequacy review for each proposed development based on the specific high school feeder area in which the development would be built. The review is based on hard data and mathematical formulae that show the expected impact of the development, to the precision of fractions of a pupil, as well as the p\u00e9r-pupil cost of new capital facilities. Only if the capacity of the specific high school feeder area is inadequate for the development is any action taken at all. And even then, the developer has choices: delay development, phase development, modify the development plan, or make a mitigation payment to offset school impact. All the mitigation measures in the ordinance are geared toward providing school facilities that will accommodate the specific demand generated by the proposed development, not school needs countywide. The two cases are quite different, and our views of the mandatory Durham school impact fees should not influence our analysis of Cabarrus County\u2019s finely tuned, research-based regulatory scheme.\nIV. Session Law 2004-39\nEven if the Court is unconvinced that the broad construction provisions of sections 153A-4 and 153A-124 apply and lead us to uphold the voluntary mitigation measures, the Court should still approve the entire APFO based on the additional grant of power contained in Session Law 2004-39. While it is arguable whether the session law provides authority to adopt the APFO, it undoubtedly authorizes the enforcement of the APFO: \u201c[T]he county of Cabarrus . . . may enforce . . . any provision of the school adequacy review performed under the Cabarrus County Subdivision Regulations, including approval of a method to address any inadequacy that may be identified as part of that review.\u201d Act of June 30, 2004, Ch. 39, Sec. 5, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 42, 47 (emphases added). The key language in the bill is the phrase \u201cincluding approval of a method to address any inadequacy.\u201d This is another broad grant of power by the General Assembly. If Cabarrus County has authority to engage in the APFO\u2019s school adequacy review without VMPs \u2014 and as described in Section III.A it clearly does- \u2014 then Session Law 2004-39 becomes the special legislation needed to support the VMP provision. Voluntary mitigation payments, as well as the other optional mitigation measures, are, without doubt, \u201cmethodfs] to address any inadequacy\u201d revealed by the school adequacy review.\nThe majority suggests that the session law did not authorize the adoption of an APFO. This conclusion ignores the fact that Cabarrus County had already adopted an APFO \u2014 without the VMP provision\u2014 pursuant to the statutory authority described in detail above. Only the VMP provision added after the session law raises any questions about statutory authority, as the APFO in effect at the time of the session law did not have such a provision. The session law clearly authorizes enforcement of the school adequacy review described in the preexisting, statutorily authorized APFO. But more importantly, the session law authorizes \u201capproval of a method to address any inadequacy that may be identified as part of that review.\u201d Id. This clause, in the context of enforcing an APFO, indicates the legislature\u2019s awareness that future action might need to be taken; I see no functional distinction between \u201capproval\u201d and adopting, by a vote to approve, a method to address school inadequacy. Whatever the label, the session law specifically authorized Cabarrus County to create a method of addressing any inadequacy in school capacity it found during review. The VMP provision is exactly that: a method to address inadequacies identified in the school adequacy review. The General Assembly unequivocally authorized Cabarrus County to approve such a method through Session Law 2004-39.\nThus, even absent general statutory authority for the voluntary mitigation measures, Cabarrus County had authority under Session Law 2004-39 to modify its existing APFO by approving a method\u2014 voluntary mitigation payments \u2014 to address inadequacies revealed by school reviews.\nV. Conclusion\nThe majority\u2019s opinion minimizes the expansive powers that the General Assembly has given counties to oversee and control development and school construction. The opinion overlooks the clear language of the General Statutes in Chapter 153A, and misreads the broad enabling language of Session Law 2004-39. Finally, the majority opinion ignores the increasingly desperate situation of many county governments in North Carolina, which are faced with rising populations, diminishing state funding for schools, and already burdensome property taxes. These county governments will be, by the majority\u2019s opinion, deprived of an innovative but statutorily authorized tool to help meet their constitutional obligations regarding education. In my view, a carefully crafted ordinance like this one before us is exactly the kind of creative regulation of growth to keep pace with school capacity that the General Assembly intended. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.\nJustice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this dissenting opinion.\n. The County specifically requested severance as an alternative outcome at the Court of Appeals and before this Court.\n. The majority states its holding as follows: \u201c[AJbsent specific authority from the General Assembly, APFO\u2019s that effectively require developers to pay an adequate public facilities fee to obtain development approval are invalid as a matter of law.\u201d\n. Admittedly, this is not the first time this Court has ignored its precedent in Homebuilders Ass\u2019n and avoided applying the General Assembly\u2019s interpretive mandate. In Smith Chapel Baptist Church v. City of Durham this Court declared the language of a city authority statute plain without any mention of section 160A-4 (the provision in the municipal powers statute identical to section 153A-4). 350 N.C. 805, 811, 517 S.E.2d 874, 878 (1999). In Smith Chapel, the majority\u2019s avoidance of the interpretive mandate drew a sharp rebuke from three dissenting justices. See id. at 819, 517 S.E.2d at 883 (Frye, J., Mitchell, C.J., & Parker, J., dissenting) (\u201c[T]he majority takes an unduly narrow view of the City\u2019s authority.\u201d); id. at 821, 517 S.E.2d at 884 (\u201cN.C.G.S. \u00a7 160A-4 and Homebuilders Ass\u2019n of Charlotte require us to interpret the applicable public enterprise statutes broadly . . . .\u201d).\n. The majority dismisses this argument, noting that the County repeatedly raised the VMP amounts, which it claims are not \u201creasonable.\u201d The statutory text clearly uses the phrase \u201cpowers that are reasonably expedient,\u201d with the word \u201cexpedient\u201d modifying \u201cpowers\u201d and the word \u201creasonably\u201d (not \u201creasonable\u201d) modifying \u201cexpedient.\u201d The reasonableness of the VMP amounts has no bearing on whether the measure is \u201creasonably expedient to the exercise of\u2019 the expressly granted powers. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 153A-4.\n. The majority addresses the statute of limitations issue by holding that the APFO is not a zoning ordinance and thus the challenge is not time-barred. But even calling the APFO a zoning ordinance does not create an issue with the statute of limitations. Three days before plaintiff filed the complaint, the Cabarrus County Board of Commissioners amended the Cabarrus County Zoning Ordinance by deleting the existing APFO and adding a substantially revised APFO. In my view, this action reset the two-month statute of limitations.\n. Even the majority\u2019s specific response to the severance discussion in this dissent provides no detailed analysis of any non-VMP provision of the APFO. The majority simply asserts that \u201cthe entire APFO simply does not fall within the ambit of zoning.\u201d The majority provides no reasoning, statutory authority, or case citations for the idea that a county may not deny development applications, delay development, or require developers to modify non-conforming development applications, in light of inadequate school capacity.\n. This APFO is not a temporary moratorium because it is narrowly conditioned on specific inquiries into school adequacy in the particular area proposed for development, and because it involves discretion rather than a blanket ban. However, the APFO conforms in broad terms to the requirements described in section 153A-340(h) for valid temporary moratoria.\n. The majority states that \u201cwe cannot accept the County\u2019s argument that the APFO\u2019s VMP is \u2018voluntary.\u2019 \u201d This conclusion is not supported by the record. The majority acknowledges that the county ordinance provides alternative conditions on development should a developer refuse to pay the VMP. Though the majority casts these situations as rare \u2014 \u201cthe record indicates that only a few developments have been approved upon complying with these alternative conditions\u201d \u2014 the fact that any developments at all have been approved without VMPs shows that the VMPs are, in fact, voluntary. The majority\u2019s determination that the fee is not voluntary is not supported by the language of the ordinance, nor is it supported by the record.\n. Though the majority does not reach the issue, I would agree with the plaintiffs that the session law does not give the County authority to act within municipalities without their permission.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Ferguson, Scarbrough, Hayes, Hawkins & DeMay, P.A., by James R. DeMay and James E. Scarbrough, for plaintiffappellee Lanvale Properties, LLC.", "Brough Law Firm, by G. Nicholas Herman and Richard M. Koch, for defendant-appellant County of Cabarrus.", "Hartsell & Williams, P.A., by Christy E. Wilhelm and Fletcher L. Hartsell, Jr., for defendant-appellee City of Locust.", "J. Michael Carpenter, General Counsel, and Bums, Day & Presnell, P.A., by Daniel C. Higgins and James J. Mills, for North Carolina Home Builders Association, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LANVALE PROPERTIES, LLC and CABARRUS COUNTY BUILDING INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION v. COUNTY OF CABARRUS and CITY OF LOCUST\nNo. 438PA10\n(Filed 24 August 2012)\n1. Counties\u2014 enactment of ordinance \u2014 new residential construction \u2014 school construction fee \u2014 presumption of validity rebutted \u2014 no statutory authority\nThe trial court did not err in an action concerning defendant county\u2019s authority to enact an ordinance that conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff developer. Plaintiff rebutted the ordinance\u2019s presumption of validity and the plain language of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-340(a) and -341 did not give the county authority to enact the ordinance.\n2. Counties\u2014 enactment of ordinance \u2014 new residential construction \u2014 school construction fee \u2014 no authority pursuant to session law \u2014 issue of enforcement not reached\nThe trial court did not err in an action concerning defendant county\u2019s authority to enact an ordinance that .conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff developer. Session Law 2004-39 did not authorize the county to enact its ordinance. The issue of whether the session law authorized the county to enforce the ordinance was not reached.\n3. Counties\u2014 enactment of ordinance \u2014 new residential construction \u2014 school construction fee \u2014 not zoning ordinance \u2014not barred by statute of limitations\nThe trial court did not err in an action concerning defendant county\u2019s authority to enact an ordinance that conditioned approval of new residential construction projects on developers paying a fee to subsidize new school construction by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff developer. Because the ordinance at issue was not a zoning ordinance, plaintiff\u2019s claims were not barred by the two-month statute of limitations provided in N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 153A-348 and 1-54.1.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals, 206 N.C. App. 761, 699 S.E.2d 139 (2010), affirming orders entered on 19 August 2008 by Judge Mark E. Klass and on 17 August 2009 by Judge W. David Lee, both in Superior Court, Cabarrus County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 October 2011.\nFerguson, Scarbrough, Hayes, Hawkins & DeMay, P.A., by James R. DeMay and James E. Scarbrough, for plaintiffappellee Lanvale Properties, LLC.\nBrough Law Firm, by G. Nicholas Herman and Richard M. Koch, for defendant-appellant County of Cabarrus.\nHartsell & Williams, P.A., by Christy E. Wilhelm and Fletcher L. Hartsell, Jr., for defendant-appellee City of Locust.\nJ. Michael Carpenter, General Counsel, and Bums, Day & Presnell, P.A., by Daniel C. Higgins and James J. Mills, for North Carolina Home Builders Association, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0142-01", "first_page_order": 174, "last_page_order": 216 }