{ "id": 4357421, "name": "JUMA MUSSA v. NIKKI PALMER-MUSSA", "name_abbreviation": "Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa", "decision_date": "2012-08-24", "docket_number": "No. 10A12", "first_page": "185", "last_page": "195", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 N.C. 185" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "719 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. App. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4348201 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": -1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/217/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "272 S.E.2d 349", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "301 N.C. 479", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567995 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/301/0479-01" ] }, { "cite": "133 S.E.2d 155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "159" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "260 N.C. 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575284 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/260/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 S.E. 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "203 N.C. 533", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8614976 ], "year": 1932, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/203/0533-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 S.E.2d 457", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 N.C. 721", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562581 ], "year": 1963, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/258/0721-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 S.E.2d 729", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731" }, { "page": "731" }, { "page": "731" }, { "page": "731" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 93", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2510111 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "97" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "97" }, { "page": "97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0093-01" ] }, { "cite": "442 S.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2539559 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "309 S.E.2d 209", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "218" }, { "page": "218-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 N.C. 726", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4764743 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "741" }, { "page": "740-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/309/0726-01" ] }, { "cite": "33 S.E.2d 871", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 12, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "876-77" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "873" }, { "page": "875, 877" }, { "page": "876", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "877" }, { "page": "877" }, { "page": "876" }, { "page": "876-77" }, { "page": "876" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 N.C. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8601928 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1945, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "163-64" }, { "page": "157-58" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "163-64" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/225/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 N.C. 599", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4720010, 4723567, 4719316, 4724474, 4724541 ], "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/313/0599-03", "/nc/313/0599-01", "/nc/313/0599-02", "/nc/313/0599-05", "/nc/313/0599-04" ] }, { "cite": "326 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 8524126 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/73/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "681 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777" }, { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151041 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "564" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "719 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 13, "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193, 195" }, { "page": "341" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "342" }, { "page": "194" }, { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "Bryant, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 N.C. App. 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4348201 ], "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "343" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/217/0339-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 903, "char_count": 26347, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.018258607370055e-07, "percentile": 0.745094598179276 }, "sha256": "f955cf93273b7cef34704ea6e39668a095a62611064cf3a4147bea3dc773d16c", "simhash": "1:9b03e66685b70d5f", "word_count": 4190 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:35:25.873086+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "JUMA MUSSA v. NIKKI PALMER-MUSSA" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Justice.\nIn this action plaintiff Juma Mussa seeks to annul his twelve-year marriage to defendant Nikki Palmer-Mussa on grounds that their marriage was bigamous. After conducting a bench trial, the district court made findings of fact, which are uncontested on appeal. Based on these findings, the district court concluded that plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence to support his claim. As a result, the district court dismissed the case. Because the district court\u2019s unchallenged findings of fact support its conclusions of law, we affirm the district court\u2019s order. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Emp\u2019t Sec. Comm\u2019n, 363 N.C. 562, 564, 681 S.E.2d 776, 777 (2009). Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nPlaintiff and defendant were married on 27 November 1997 during a ceremony at the Islamic Center of Raleigh. The ceremony was performed by an imam who was authorized to perform marriages pursuant to both the laws of North Carolina and the tenets of Islam. The couple obtained a marriage license before the ceremony and the imam signed it. Following the ceremony, the couple held themselves out as husband and wife during the next twelve years. Plaintiff listed defendant as his wife on both his health and dental insurance policies. The couple filed joint tax returns, purchased real property together, and had three children who now are fourteen, ten, and eight years old.\nOn 4 December 2008, defendant filed a complaint for divorce from bed and board in the District Court, Wake County. Approximately two months later, on 3 February 2009, plaintiff sought a domestic violence protection order against defendant. The district court issued the protection order on 12 February 2009, finding, among other things, that plaintiff and defendant were married. Two days after requesting the domestic violence protection order, plaintiff filed an answer to defendant\u2019s complaint for divorce from bed and board. In his answer plaintiff asserted several counterclaims in which he requested divorce from bed and board, custody of the couple\u2019s children, child support, and equitable distribution. Both parties admitted in their pleadings that they were married.\nOn 17 February 2009, plaintiff filed motions for a psychological evaluation of defendant, temporary child custody, and possession of the marital residence. In response defendant filed a motion for child custody, child support, postseparation support, alimony, equitable distribution, and attorney\u2019s fees. The trial court conducted a hearing on defendant\u2019s motions on 1 September 2009. On 30 September 2009, the trial court entered an order that, among other things: (1) awarded defendant $212.24 per month in child support and $250.00 per month in postseparation support; and (2) declared plaintiff in arrears as to his support obligations. Notably, the order found that plaintiff and defendant were married on 27 November 1997 and that neither party had challenged the validity of their union at the time of the hearing or the entry of the order.\nApproximately three months later, on 3 December 2009, plaintiff filed this annulment action, alleging that his marriage to defendant was bigamous pursuant to section 51-3 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Plaintiff\u2019s complaint stated that his marriage to defendant was void because defendant had married Khalil Braswell in early 1997 and the alleged union had not been dissolved by divorce, annulment, or death. In an answer filed on 2 February 2010, defendant asserted several affirmative defenses and made two motions to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s case. Defendant\u2019s answer admitted, among other things, that: (1) she and Braswell had participated \u201cin a ceremony\u201d in early 1997; (2) neither she nor Braswell had obtained an annulment or divorce from any jurisdiction; and (3) Braswell was still living when she married plaintiff. Defendant\u2019s answer also stated that, notwithstanding her participation in the ceremony, she and Braswell had not established a legally valid marriage because the ceremony was conducted by a person who \u201cwas not authorized to perform marriage ceremonies.\u201d Additionally, defendant noted that she and Braswell had not obtained a marriage license prior to the ceremony and that there was no other documentation of the event.\nThe district court held a bench trial on plaintiff\u2019s annulment action on 17 March 2010. Plaintiff called six witnesses to testify: defendant, an imam who presented expert testimony regarding Islamic marriage practices, two of defendant\u2019s acquaintances, defendant\u2019s mother, and himself. Defendant and her mother were the only witnesses who attended the ceremony involving defendant and Braswell.\nDefendant testified that in early 1997 she and Braswell participated in a marriage ceremony at the Islamic Center of Raleigh during which they freely and seriously gave their consent to take the other as husband and wife before a friend of Braswell\u2019s named Kareem. Defendant stated that, even though she and Braswell expected to enter into a long-term marriage, they did not obtain a marriage license prior to the ceremony because they only intended to establish a religious union. Defendant testified that following the ceremony she and Braswell attended a wedding reception at a historic home in Raleigh and then honeymooned in West Virginia. Defendant told the district court that she lived with Braswell in Maryland for \u201ca couple of months,\u201d after which the couple separated and defendant moved back to Raleigh. Defendant stated that the- couple never consummated their marriage. Defendant also said that while she had not filed an action for divorce or annulment in North Carolina, Maryland, or any other jurisdiction, she and Braswell had taken steps to divorce in accordance with their religious beliefs.\nDefendant testified that she had met Kareem before the ceremony, but had not known him long. She could not remember Kareem\u2019s last name. Defendant stated that Kareem was a Maryland resident whose primary occupation was nonresidential construction. She testified that Kareem was not employed by the Islamic Center of Raleigh and he had not led any of the prayers that she had attended at the center. Defendant also testified that to her knowledge Kareem was not an imam.\nAfter plaintiff rested his case, defendant renewed her motions to dismiss. The district court then rendered an oral order involuntarily dismissing plaintiff\u2019s annulment action for insufficiency of the evidence. On 27 July 2010, the district court entered a written order detailing its ruling. The district court noted that the case was governed by the version of section 51-1 of the North Carolina General Statutes that was in effect in 1997. The statute provided:\nThe consent of a male and female person who may lawfully marry, presently to take each other as husband and wife, freely, seriously and plainly expressed by each in the presence of the other, and in the presence of an ordained minister of any religious denomination, minister authorized by his church, or of a magistrate, and the consequent declaration by such minister or officer that such persons are husband and wife, shall be a valid and sufficient marriage ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 51-1 (Cum. Supp. 1977). The order also listed several relevant findings of fact that were based on the testimony presented at trial:\n14. The Defendant and Mr. Braswell made preparations over a period of weeks for a \u201cmarriage\u201d ceremony. Defendant and Mr. Braswell took part in a ceremony with the intent to become husband and wife in early 1997. Defendant and Mr. Braswell took a honeymoon trip to West Virginia after the ceremony and reception. The \u201cmarriage\u201d was not consummated either during that trip or subsequent time together in Maryland.\n15. Neither Defendant nor Mr. Braswell obtained a marriage license prior to the ceremony.\n16. The \u201cmarriage\u201d ceremony was conducted by a friend of Mr. Braswell named Kareem who came with Mr. Braswell from Maryland. The Court did not receive evidence of the last name of Kareem and he was not present during the trial. There was insufficient evidence presented for the Court to find that Kareem had the status of either \u201can ordained minister\u201d or a \u201cminister authorized by his church\u201d as those terms would apply to the Sunni Islamic faith. There was no evidence presented that Kareem was a magistrate.\n21. With the exception of the Defendant, no one present during the ceremony was in court to testify about the ceremony. There was no evidence presented about Kareem\u2019s authorization or qualification to perform the ceremony.\nBased on these findings, the district court made several relevant conclusions of law:\n5. Because no marriage license was obtained by or issued to Defendant and Khalil Braswell, and there is insufficient evidence that the marriage ceremony met the requirements for a valid marriage, the Court cannot find that Defendant married Mr. Braswell as contemplated by the statute. The purported marriage between Defendant and Mr. Braswell did not require an annulment or divorce or death of either party for termination.\n6. Even in a light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the Court cannot find based on the evidence presented that the Defendant married Mr. Braswell, and therefore, the marriage between the parties is not bigamous and an annulment is not warranted as a matter of law. Defendant\u2019s Motions to Dismiss Plaintiff\u2019s claim for Annulment, made at the close of Plaintiff\u2019s evidence, should be granted. The Plaintiff has failed to meet his burden in establishing that his marriage was bigamous. Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Defendant was previously legally married.\n7. Plaintiff\u2019s Complaint for an Annulment must be denied.\nPlaintiff appealed the district court\u2019s order to the Court of Appeals, which reversed and remanded in a divided opinion. Mussa v. Palmer-Mussa, 217 N.C. App. 339, 343, 719 S.E.2d 192, 193, 195 (2011). The Court of Appeals majority concluded that the \u201cdispositive issue\u201d on appeal was \u201cwhether the defendant\u2019s first marriage was void ab initio or merely voidable because of the status of the person who performed the ceremony.\u201d Id. at 341, 719 S.E.2d at 193. Although the majority acknowledged that \u201cthe evidence presented at trial supported the trial court\u2019s finding that Kareem was not authorized to conduct the marriage,\u201d the majority determined that \u201cthe court\u2019s finding does not support its\u2019 [sic] conclusion of law that defendant and Mr. Braswell were not married.\u201d Id. at 342, 719 S.E.2d at 194. Relying on \u201c[t]he well-established law in North Carolina. . . that only bigamous marriages are void and all other marriages are voidable,\u201d id. at 342, 719 S.E.2d at 194 (citing Fulton v. Vickery, 73 N.C. App. 382, 387, 326 S.E.2d 354, 358, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 599, 332 S.E.2d 178 (1985)), the majority concluded that \u201ceven though defendant and Mr. Braswell did not have a marriage license and the ceremony failed to meet statutory requirements, the marriage is merely voidable.\u201d Id. at 342, 719 S.E.2d at 194. Noting defendant\u2019s admissions that she had not secured a divorce or annulment from Braswell in North Carolina or any other jurisdiction and that Braswell was still alive when she married plaintiff, the majority concluded that \u201cat the time of defendant\u2019s marriage to plaintiff, she was still married to Mr. Braswell and thus any marriage between plaintiff and defendant was bigamous, and consequently void.\u201d Id. at 342, 719 S.E.2d at 194.\nThe dissenting judge agreed with the majority that plaintiff had failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant and Braswell had participated in a valid marriage ceremony pursuant to section 51-1. Id. at 344, 719 S.E.2d at 195 (Bryant, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, the dissenting judge stated that \u201cthe dispositive issue is not whether defendant\u2019s first marriage was void ab initio or merely voidable but, rather, whether plaintiff met his burden of proof establishing that defendant\u2019s first marital union was valid and remained in existence at the time defendant married plaintiff.\u201d Id. at 344, 719 S.E.2d at 195. Citing the presumption favoring the validity of second marriages, the dissenting judge would have affirmed the district court because \u201c [p]laintiff s direct evidence failed to establish the'existence of a valid prior marriage as a result of the early 1997 ceremony.\u201d Id. at 344, 719 S.E.2d at 195-96 (citing Kearney v. Thomas, 225 N.C. 156, 163-64, 33 S.E.2d 871, 876-77 (1945)). Defendant appeals on the basis of the dissenting opinion.\nAs explained above, after hearing plaintiffs evidence, the trial court allowed defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss plaintiff\u2019s annulment action for insufficient evidence. Although the district court\u2019s order did not reference the applicable procedural rule, Rule 41(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions that \u201cchallenge [ ] the sufficiency of plaintiff\u2019s evidence to establish plaintiff\u2019s right to relief.\u201d Lumbee River Elec. Membership Corp. v. City of Fayetteville, 309 N.C. 726, 741, 309 S.E.2d 209, 218 (1983). Pursuant to Rule 41(b), the trial court, \u201cas trier of the facts,\u201d \u201crendered] judgment on the merits against the plaintiff\u2019 and made \u201cfindings [of fact] as provided in Rule 52(a)\u201d of the Rules of Civil Procedure. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (2011). The district court also made conclusions of law, in accordance with Rules 41(b) and 52(a)(2). See id.; N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(2) (2011) (\u201cFindings of fact and conclusions of law are necessary on decisions of any motion ... as provided by Rule 41(b).\u201d).\nWhen reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling to dismiss involuntarily an action on the merits pursuant to Rule 41(b), our appellate courts must determine whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those findings support the court\u2019s conclusions of law. See, e.g., Lumbee River, 309 N.C. at 740-42, 309 S.E.2d at 218-19. \u201cThe well-established rule is that findings of fact by the trial court supported by competent evidence are binding on the appellate courts even if the evidence would support a contrary finding. Conclusions of law are, however, entirely reviewable on appeal.\u201d Scott v. Scott, 336 N.C. 284, 291, 442 S.E.2d 493, 497 (1994) (citation omitted). A trial court\u2019s unchallenged findings of fact are \u201cpresumed to be supported by competent evidence and [are] binding on appeal.\u201d Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991). If the trial court\u2019s uncontested findings of fact support its conclusions of law, we must affirm the trial court\u2019s order. See Carolina Power & Light, 363 N.C. at 564, 681 S.E.2d at 777.\nAs a starting point, we observe that plaintiff generally does not contest the district court\u2019s findings of fact; therefore, we are bound by them. See Koufman, 330 N.C. at 97, 408 S.E.2d at 731. At most, plaintiff raises the issue \u201c[w]hether the trial court erred by concluding that the failure of Defendant and Mr. Braswell to obtain a marriage license was proof of the invalidity of their marriage.\u201d In his brief to the Court of Appeals, plaintiff\u2019s argument regarding this issue consisted of the bare statement that \u201c[b]ecause a marriage performed without a license is valid, the lack of a license authorizing [Kareem] to perform the wedding ceremony between Mr. Braswell and Ms. Palmer should not have been a factor in the trial court\u2019s conclusion that their marriage was invalid.\u201d Standing alone, this statement was insufficient to challenge the trial court\u2019s findings of fact. Consequently, the only issue before us is whether the district court\u2019s findings support its conclusions of law. See Carolina Power & Light, 363 N.C. at 564, 681 S.E.2d at 777.\nThis Court set forth the appropriate analytical framework for reviewing the instant case almost seventy years ago in Kearney v. Thomas, which involved a dispute between Alexander Kearney\u2019s second wife and the children of his first wife over two parcels of land that Kearney owned when he died intestate in 1943. 225 N.C. 156, 157-58, 33 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1945). At trial, the children asserted that Kearney\u2019s second wife did not have a legal interest in the properties because her marriage to Kearney was bigamous. Id. at 158, 33 S.E.2d at 873. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court\u2019s judgment following the jury\u2019s verdict that Kearney\u2019s second wife had a legal interest in the properties, notwithstanding the fact that Kearney was still married to his first wife at the time of his second marriage. Id. at 161, 165, 33 S.E.2d at 875, 877. In the process we recognized two principles of law that control here.\nFirst, we stated that when the existence of a second marriage is established before the finder of fact, the second marriage is presumed valid until the \u201cattacking party\u201d demonstrates that the second marriage is invalid. Id. at 163, 33 S.E.2d at 876 (emphasis added). Second, we noted that the attacking party cannot rely on the presumption favoring the continuation of a prior marriage to satisfy its burden because \u201c[t]he laws of evidence do not recognize a presumption on a presumption.\u201d Id. Moreover, we observed that the presumption favoring the continuation of the prior marriage, if applicable, must yield to the presumption favoring the second marriage. Id. at 164, 33 S.E.2d at 877. As we explained: \u201c \u2018A second or subsequent marriage is presumed legal until the contrary be proved, and he who asserts its illegality must prove it. In such case[s] the presumptionfs] of innocence and morality prevail over the presumption of the continuance of the first or former marriage.\u2019 \u201d Id. (quoting Leslie J. Tompkins, Trial Evidence: The Chamberlayne Handbook \u00a7 416, at 376 (2d ed. 1936)).\nPlaintiff argues that, although Kareem was not authorized to perform marriage ceremonies, defendant\u2019s marriage to Braswell was valid because it was voidable at the option of defendant or Braswell. Thus, plaintiff argues that his marriage to defendant is bigamous and void because, as defendant admitted at trial, she had not dissolved her marriage to Braswell and Braswell was alive when she married plaintiff. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 51-3 (2011). We disagree. Relying upon our long line of cases discussing the distinction between void and voidable marriages, see, e.g., Ivery v. Ivery, 258 N.C. 721, 726-30, 129 S.E.2d 457, 460-63 (1963); Pridgen v. Pridgen, 203 N.C. 533, 536-37, 166 S.E. 591, 593 (1932), plaintiff essentially asks us to presume the continuation of defendant\u2019s alleged marriage to Braswell as a means of invalidating his marriage to defendant notwithstanding Kearney\u2019s express rejection of this argument. 225 N.C. at 164, 33 S.E.2d at 877.\nAs Kearney instructs, our analysis must begin by analyzing plaintiff\u2019s marriage to defendant, not defendant\u2019s alleged marriage to Braswell. If sufficient evidence is presented to establish plaintiff\u2019s marriage to defendant, that marriage is presumed valid. Id. at 163, 33 S.E.2d at 876. The burden then shifts to plaintiff to overcome this presumption. Plaintiff must attack the validity of his marriage, showing that (1) defendant and Braswell were married lawfully, and (2) this union had not been dissolved at the time when plaintiff and defendant were wed. See id.) N.C.G.S. \u00a7 51-3. Therefore, pursuant to the Kearney framework, ascertaining whether defendant\u2019s purported marriage to Braswell is void or voidable is irrelevant to determining whether plaintiff has met his burden of proof.\nWe now review the district court\u2019s order by applying Kearney. As noted previously, the district court found that in prior proceedings it had concluded that plaintiff and defendant were married on 27 November 1997. Plaintiff does not challenge this finding; therefore, it is binding on appeal. See Koufman, 330 N.C. at 97, 408 S.E.2d at 731. Even if plaintiff had contested the finding, the record contains ample evidence showing that plaintiff and defendant were married. Defendant stated that she and plaintiff participated in a marriage ceremony officiated by an imam who was authorized to perform marriages pursuant to section 51-1. Both plaintiff and defendant testified that they had obtained a marriage license prior to their wedding. Indeed, \u201c[t]here can be no question about the performance of a second marriage ceremony in the instant case.\u201d Stewart v. Rogers, 260 N.C. 475, 481, 133 S.E.2d 155, 159 (1963). Further, over a twelve-year period, the couple filed joint tax returns, purchased real property together, and had three children. Plaintiff listed defendant as his wife on his health and dental insurance policies. Consequently, plaintiff\u2019s marriage to defendant meets the test of presumptive validity set forth in Kearney. See 225 N.C. at 163-64, 33 S.E.2d at 876-77.\nAs the attacking party, plaintiff then had the burden to demonstrate that his marriage to defendant was bigamous. See id. at 163, 33 S.E.2d at 876. But based upon the evidence presented at trial, the district court concluded that defendant and Braswell never were married because Kareem was not authorized to perform marriage ceremonies pursuant to the version of section 51-1 that was in effect in 1997. As we have stated previously, the prior version of section 51-1 required parties participating in a marriage ceremony to \u201cexpress their solemn intent to marry in the presence of (1) \u2018an ordained minister of any religious denomination,\u2019 or (2) a \u2018minister authorized by his church\u2019 or (3) a \u2018magistrate.\u2019 \u201d State v. Lynch, 301 N.C. 479, 487, 272 S.E.2d 349, 354 (1980).\nThe district court made several uncontested findings of fact regarding Kareem\u2019s qualifications to conduct marriages. Most notably, the court found that \u201c[t]here was insufficient evidence presented for [it] to find that Kareem had the status of either \u2018an ordained minister\u2019 or a \u2018minister authorized by his church\u2019.... There was no evidence presented that Kareem was a magistrate.\u201d The court also found that \u201c[t]here was no evidence presented about Kareem\u2019s authorization or qualification to perform the ceremony.\u201d These uncontested findings are binding, see Koufman, 330 N.C. at 97, 408 S.E.2d at 731, but we also observe that according to defendant\u2019s testimony, Kareem was an out-of-state friend of Braswell\u2019s whose primary occupation was construction \u2014 he was not an imam. Additionally, in finding of fact fifteen, the court noted that defendant and Braswell did not \u201cobtainf ] a marriage license prior to the ceremony.\u201d Based upon these findings, the court concluded that: \u201cBecause no marriage license was obtained by or issued to Defendant and Khalil Braswell, and there is insufficient evidence that the marriage ceremony met the requirements for a valid marriage, the Court cannot find that Defendant married Mr. Braswell as contemplated by the statute.\u201d The district court also concluded that plaintiff \u201cfailed to meet his burden in establishing that his marriage was bigamous\u201d because he had not shown that defendant \u201cwas previously legally married.\u201d\nIn sum, we are bound by the district court\u2019s uncontested finding that Kareem was not authorized to perform marriage ceremonies in North Carolina. From this finding it follows that plaintiff failed to show that his marriage to defendant was bigamous because he could not demonstrate that defendant married Braswell during a marriage ceremony that met the requirements of section 51-1. As a result, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs annulment action. We conclude that the district court\u2019s uncontested findings of fact support its conclusions of law; therefore, we are compelled to affirm the district court\u2019s order. See Carolina Power & Light, 363 N.C. at 564, 681 S.E.2d at 777. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nREVERSED.\n. The remaining witnesses testified about other matters relating to the case, none of which are relevant to this appeal.\n. The man\u2019s name is spelled \u201cKerim\u201d throughout the narrative of the trial proceedings that appears in the record. However, the district court and Court of Appeals both spelled the man\u2019s name \u201cKareem.\u201d To maintain consistency, we adopt the spelling used by the courts below.\n. In addition to the requirements quoted above, the current version of section 51-1 recognizes marriages that are performed \u201c[i]n accordance with any mode of solemnization recognized by any religious denomination, or federally or State recognized Indian Nation or Tribe.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 51-1(2) (2011). In addition to analyzing this case pursuant to the prior version of section 51-1, the district court considered whether the alleged marriage between defendant and Braswell was valid pursuant to the current statute and determined that it was not. This additional analysis is unnecessary to resolve this case; therefore, our review is limited to the district court\u2019s application of section 51-1 as it read in 1997.\n. In its third conclusion of law the district court expressed its \u201cconcern! ] about the unfairness of the Plaintiff\u2019s inconsistent positions in the earlier proceedings\u201d as to the validity of his marriage to defendant. Although this conclusion is not relevant to our analysis below, we share the district court\u2019s view especially in light of record evidence that suggests plaintiff may have been aware of defendant\u2019s relationship with Braswell before plaintiff married defendant.", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Steven K. Griffith for plaintiff-appellee.", "Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Matthew Nis Leerberg and Elizabeth Brooks Scherer, for defendant-appellant." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JUMA MUSSA v. NIKKI PALMER-MUSSA\nNo. 10A12\n(Filed 24 August 2012)\nAnnulment\u2014 not a bigamous marriage \u2014 person not authorized to perform marriage ceremonies in North Carolina\n. Plaintiff could not annul his twelve-year marriage to defendant on grounds that their marriage was bigamous when the uncontested finding was that defendant\u2019s alleged first marriage was not done by a person authorized to perform marriage ceremonies in North Carolina. The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff husband\u2019s annulment action.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 217 N.C. App. 339, 719 S.E.2d 192 (2011), reversing and remanding an order dismissing plaintiff\u2019s complaint entered on 27 July 2010 by Judge Christine Walczyk in District Court, Wake County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 April 2012.\nSteven K. Griffith for plaintiff-appellee.\nSmith Moore Leatherwood LLP, by Matthew Nis Leerberg and Elizabeth Brooks Scherer, for defendant-appellant." }, "file_name": "0185-01", "first_page_order": 217, "last_page_order": 227 }