{ "id": 4347571, "name": "MARGARET DICKSON, ALICIA CHISOLM, ETHEL CLARK, MATTHEW A. McLEAN, MELISSA LEE ROLLIZO, C. DAVID GANTT, VALERIA TRUITT, ALICE GRAHAM UNDERHILL, ARMIN JANCIS, REBECCA JUDGE, ZETTIE WILLIAMS, TRACEY BURNS-VANN, LAWRENCE CAMPBELL, ROBINSON O. EVERETT, JR., LINDA GARROU, HAYES McNEILL, JIM SHAW, SIDNEY E. DUNSTON, ALMA ADAMS, R. STEVE BOWDEN, JASON EDWARD COLEY, KARL BERTRAND FIELDS, PAMLYN STUBBS, DON VAUGHAN, BOB ETHERIDGE, GEORGE GRAHAM, JR., THOMAS M. CHUMLEY, AISHA DEW, GENEAL GREGORY, VILMA LEAKE, RODNEY W. MOORE, BRENDA MARTIN STEVENSON, JANE WHITLEY, I.T. (\"TIM\") VALENTINE, LOIS WATKINS, RICHARD JOYNER, MELVIN C. McLAWHORN, RANDALL S. JONES, BOBBY CHARLES TOWNSEND, ALBERT KIRBY, TERRENCE WILLIAMS, NORMAN C. CAMP, MARY F. POOLE, STEPHEN T. SMITH, PHILIP A. BADDOUR, and DOUGLAS A. WILSON v. ROBERT RUCHO, in his official capacity only as the Chairman of the North Carolina Senate Redistricting Committee; DAVID LEWIS, in his official capacity only as the Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; NELSON DOLLAR, in his official capacity only as the Co-Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; JERRY DOCKHAM, in his official capacity only as the Co-Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity only as the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate; THOM TILLIS, in his official capacity only as the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; and THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES OF THE NAACP, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA, DEMOCRACY NORTH CAROLINA, NORTH CAROLINA A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, REVA McNAIR, MATTHEW DAVIS, TRESSIE STANTON, ANNE WILSON, SHARON HIGHTOWER, KAY BRANDON, GOLDIE WELLS, GRAY NEWMAN, YVONNE STAFFORD, ROBERT DAWKINS, SARA STOHLER, HUGH STOHLER, OCTAVIA RAINEY, CHARLES HODGE, MARSHALL HARDY, MARTHA GARDENHIGHT, BEN TAYLOR, KEITH RIVERS, ROMALLUS O. MURPHY, CARL WHITE, ROSA BRODIE, HERMAN LEWIS, CLARENCE ALBERT, JR., EVESTER BAILEY, ALBERT BROWN, BENJAMIN LANIER, GILBERT VAUGHN, AVIE LESTER, THEODORE MUCHITENI, WILLIAM HOBBS, JIMMIE RAY HAWKINS, HORACE P. BULLOCK, ROBERTA WADDLE, CHRISTINA DAVIS-McCOY, JAMES OLIVER WILLIAMS, MARGARET SPEED, LARRY LAVERNE BROOKS, CAROLYN S. ALLEN, WALTER ROGERS, SR., SHAWN MEACHEM, MARY GREEN BONAPARTE, SAMUEL LOVE, COURTNEY PATTERSON, WILLIE O. SINCLAIR, CARDES HENRY BROWN, JR., and JANE STEPHENS v. THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; THOM TILLIS, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; and PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate", "name_abbreviation": "Dickson v. Rucho", "decision_date": "2013-01-25", "docket_number": "No. 201PA12", "first_page": "332", "last_page": "351", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "366 N.C. 332" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "649 S.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639167 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "368", "parenthetical": "interpreting \"N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-2.5 to mean that any appeal from a three-judge panel dealing with apportionment or redistricting pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-267.1 is direct to\" the Supreme Court of North Carolina" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/649/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "385 S.E.2d 473", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 438", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2491477 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "448-49" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0438-01" ] }, { "cite": "115 S.E. 336", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "339" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "184 N.C. 499", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11271250 ], "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/184/0499-01" ] }, { "cite": "150 L. Ed. 2d 804", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "533 U.S. 975", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9354636, 9354598, 9354711 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/533/0975-02", "/us/533/0975-01", "/us/533/0975-03" ] }, { "cite": "549 S.E.2d 840", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "851" }, { "page": "853", "parenthetical": "alterations in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 696", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135641 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "712" }, { "page": "715" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0696-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150708 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "28 C.F.R. \u00a7 51.27", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "weight": 2, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "listing the \"[r]equired contents\" of a \"submitted change affecting voting\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 S.E.2d 773", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "778", "parenthetical": "relying on the title of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-136 to support the Court's conclusion that the statute addresses a matter of venue" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "318 N.C. 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4736806 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "relying on the title of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-136 to support the Court's conclusion that the statute addresses a matter of venue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/318/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "694 S.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152349 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "904" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155898 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566967 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "783" }, { "page": "782", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "782", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491499 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "329" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 U.S. 399", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11182588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "384", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/524/0399-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 459", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "462" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153413 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "556 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3653583 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/556/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "361 N.C. 491", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3736872 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497", "parenthetical": "interpreting \"N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-2.5 to mean that any appeal from a three-judge panel dealing with apportionment or redistricting pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-267.1 is direct to\" the Supreme Court of North Carolina" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/361/0491-01" ] }, { "cite": "N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 120-133", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "N.C. Gen. Stat.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 65", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 297", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152888 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "302", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0297-01" ] }, { "cite": "527 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "314" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 401", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155640 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411-12" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0401-01" ] }, { "cite": "967 F.2d 980", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10519628 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "984" }, { "page": "984" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/967/0980-01" ] }, { "cite": "229 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 5, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citation, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" }, { "page": "201" }, { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "291 N.C. 19", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8557249 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35", "parenthetical": "citation, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "35" }, { "page": "35" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/291/0019-01" ] }, { "cite": "235 S.E.2d 828", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" }, { "page": "840" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561617 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" }, { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0105-01" ] }, { "cite": "731 S.E.2d 800", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "809-10", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4351487 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 S.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "547" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "283 N.C. 589", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8559660 ], "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "602" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/283/0589-01" ] }, { "cite": "394 S.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "446", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "327 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2494227 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/327/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "122 S. Ct. 2332", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "535 U.S. 1114", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 354625, 353731, 354760, 353448, 352172, 354576, 355188, 353749, 351828, 354680, 354745, 352827, 353947, 354297 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/535/1114-11", "/us/535/1114-05", "/us/535/1114-06", "/us/535/1114-02", "/us/535/1114-09", "/us/535/1114-03", "/us/535/1114-10", "/us/535/1114-08", "/us/535/1114-07", "/us/535/1114-13", "/us/535/1114-04", "/us/535/1114-14", "/us/535/1114-12", "/us/535/1114-01" ] }, { "cite": "557 S.E.2d 500", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "354 N.C. 131", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 138455 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "168", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/354/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150708 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 566", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "570" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 688", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566967 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0688-01" ] }, { "cite": "584 S.E.2d 772", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "782", "parenthetical": "stating that \"this protection for confidential communications is one of the oldest and most revered in law\"" }, { "page": "787", "parenthetical": "stating that \"the responsibility of determining whether the attorney-client privilege applies belongs to the trial court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 316", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491499 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "328", "parenthetical": "stating that \"this protection for confidential communications is one of the oldest and most revered in law\"" }, { "page": "336" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0316-01" ] }, { "cite": "524 U.S. 399", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11182588 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[t]he attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications\"" }, { "page": "2084", "parenthetical": "noting that \"[t]he attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/524/0399-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1781, "char_count": 50755, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5330898749405745e-07, "percentile": 0.6714937820699199 }, "sha256": "523e44be932d8aae66f02265ba0b14a329485504e8e79673857ebad40a3dd6ec", "simhash": "1:09a9a07f370915d2", "word_count": 7639 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:35:25.873086+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "MARGARET DICKSON, ALICIA CHISOLM, ETHEL CLARK, MATTHEW A. McLEAN, MELISSA LEE ROLLIZO, C. DAVID GANTT, VALERIA TRUITT, ALICE GRAHAM UNDERHILL, ARMIN JANCIS, REBECCA JUDGE, ZETTIE WILLIAMS, TRACEY BURNS-VANN, LAWRENCE CAMPBELL, ROBINSON O. EVERETT, JR., LINDA GARROU, HAYES McNEILL, JIM SHAW, SIDNEY E. DUNSTON, ALMA ADAMS, R. STEVE BOWDEN, JASON EDWARD COLEY, KARL BERTRAND FIELDS, PAMLYN STUBBS, DON VAUGHAN, BOB ETHERIDGE, GEORGE GRAHAM, JR., THOMAS M. CHUMLEY, AISHA DEW, GENEAL GREGORY, VILMA LEAKE, RODNEY W. MOORE, BRENDA MARTIN STEVENSON, JANE WHITLEY, I.T. (\u201cTIM\u201d) VALENTINE, LOIS WATKINS, RICHARD JOYNER, MELVIN C. McLAWHORN, RANDALL S. JONES, BOBBY CHARLES TOWNSEND, ALBERT KIRBY, TERRENCE WILLIAMS, NORMAN C. CAMP, MARY F. POOLE, STEPHEN T. SMITH, PHILIP A. BADDOUR, and DOUGLAS A. WILSON v. ROBERT RUCHO, in his official capacity only as the Chairman of the North Carolina Senate Redistricting Committee; DAVID LEWIS, in his official capacity only as the Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; NELSON DOLLAR, in his official capacity only as the Co-Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; JERRY DOCKHAM, in his official capacity only as the Co-Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity only as the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate; THOM TILLIS, in his official capacity only as the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; and THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES OF THE NAACP, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA, DEMOCRACY NORTH CAROLINA, NORTH CAROLINA A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, REVA McNAIR, MATTHEW DAVIS, TRESSIE STANTON, ANNE WILSON, SHARON HIGHTOWER, KAY BRANDON, GOLDIE WELLS, GRAY NEWMAN, YVONNE STAFFORD, ROBERT DAWKINS, SARA STOHLER, HUGH STOHLER, OCTAVIA RAINEY, CHARLES HODGE, MARSHALL HARDY, MARTHA GARDENHIGHT, BEN TAYLOR, KEITH RIVERS, ROMALLUS O. MURPHY, CARL WHITE, ROSA BRODIE, HERMAN LEWIS, CLARENCE ALBERT, JR., EVESTER BAILEY, ALBERT BROWN, BENJAMIN LANIER, GILBERT VAUGHN, AVIE LESTER, THEODORE MUCHITENI, WILLIAM HOBBS, JIMMIE RAY HAWKINS, HORACE P. BULLOCK, ROBERTA WADDLE, CHRISTINA DAVIS-McCOY, JAMES OLIVER WILLIAMS, MARGARET SPEED, LARRY LAVERNE BROOKS, CAROLYN S. ALLEN, WALTER ROGERS, SR., SHAWN MEACHEM, MARY GREEN BONAPARTE, SAMUEL LOVE, COURTNEY PATTERSON, WILLIE O. SINCLAIR, CARDES HENRY BROWN, JR., and JANE STEPHENS v. THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; THOM TILLIS, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; and PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Justice.\nIn this appeal we consider whether section 120-133 of the North Carolina General Statutes waives the right of legislators to assert the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine in litigation concerning redistricting. Because any waiver of such well-established legal principles must be clear and unambiguous, we conclude that the statute\u2019s silence on such waivers renders the statute ambiguous as to this issue. After further analysis, we conclude that the General Assembly did not intend to waive either the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine when it enacted section 120-133. While we acknowledge that the General Assembly may choose to waive its legal rights, we are unwilling to infer such a sweeping waiver unless the General Assembly leaves no doubt about its intentions. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part the order of the three-judge panel for the reasons stated below.\nOn 27 and 28 July 2011, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted new redistricting plans for the North Carolina House of Representatives, North Carolina Senate, and United States House of Representatives pursuant to Article II, Sections 3 and 5 of the North Carolina Constitution and Title 2, sections 2a and 2c of the United States Code. During the legislative process leading up to and following enactment, the defendant members of the General Assembly, including Senate President Pro Tempore Philip Berger, House Speaker Thom Tillis, Senate Redistricting Chair Robert Rucho, and House Redistricting Chair David Lewis, received legal advice from lawyers employed by the Attorney General of North Carolina and two private law firms, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. (\u201cOgletree Deakins\u201d) and Jones Day. Like the lawyers who are employed by the Attorney General, the Ogletree Deakins and Jones Day attorneys were paid with State funds.\nOn 2 September 2011, the Attorney General filed an action to preclear the redistricting plans in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia pursuant to Section five of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, North Carolina v. Holder, No. 1:11-CV-01592 (D.D.C. Sept. 2, 2011), and simultaneously sought administrative preclearance from the United States Attorney General. The redistricting plans were precleared administratively by the United States Attorney General on 1 November 2011. As a result, the federal district court dismissed as moot the State\u2019s preclearance action on 8 November 2011.\nOn 1 November 2011, the General Assembly also alerted the United States Department of Justice that an error in the computer software program used to draw the redistricting plans had caused certain areas of the state to be omitted from the original plans. The General Assembly passed legislation on 7 November 2011 to cure this technical defect. The United States Attorney General precleared the revised plans on 8 December 2011.\nMeanwhile, plaintiffs, the North Carolina State Conference of Branches of the NAACP, League of Women Voters of North Carolina, Democracy North Carolina, North Carolina A. Philip Randolph Institute, and individual registered voters, filed separate suits on 3 and 4 November 2011, challenging the constitutionality of the redistricting plans and seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent defendants from conducting elections using the redistricting plans. In accordance with section 1-267.1 of the North Carolina General Statutes, the Chief Justice appointed a three-judge panel to hear both actions.\nOn 19 December 2011, the panel consolidated the cases. On the same day defendants filed their answers and moved to dismiss the suit. Thereafter, on 20 January 2012, the panel entered an order denying plaintiffs\u2019 motion for a preliminary injunction. The panel also entered an order on 6 February 2012 allowing in part and denying in part defendants\u2019 motion to dismiss.\nMost relevant to the issues before us, on 8 and 17 November 2011, plaintiffs served requests for production of documents on defendants pursuant to Rule 34 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. These requests sought production of a variety of communications concerning enactment of the redistricting plans. After receiving an extension of time to respond, on 13 January 2012, defendants served written responses to plaintiffs\u2019 discovery requests, in which they objected to the production of certain categories of documents based upon the attorney-client privilege, legislative privilege, or work-product doctrine. On 24 February 2012, defendants amended their objections, providing additional information regarding their privilege claims. Specifically, defendants identified the following communications as privileged:\n1. Emails to and from Tom Farr, Phil Strach, Alec Peters, and Tiare Smiley to or from Bob Rucho, David Lewis, Thom Tillis, Phil Berger or their legislative staff members acting on their behalf or at their direction regarding legal advice on the impact of census data on redistricting plans.\n2. Emails to and from Tom Farr, Phil Strach, Alec Peters, and Hare Smiley to or from Bob Rucho, David Lewis, Thom Hllis, Phil Berger or their legislative staff members acting on their behalf or at their direction regarding legal requirements for a fair process under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.\n3. Emails to and from Tom Farr, Phil Strach, Alec Peters, and Hare Smiley to or from Bob Rucho, David Lewis, Nelson Dollar, Thom Hllis, Phil Berger or their legislative staff members acting on their behalf or at their direction regarding legal advice in preparation for meetings of the House and Senate Redistricting Committees.\n4. Emails to and from Tom Farr, Phil Strach, Michael Carvin, Michael McGinley, Alec Peters, and Hare Smiley to or from Bob Rucho, David Lewis, Nelson Dollar, Thom Hllis, Phil Berger or their legislative staff members acting on their behalf or at their direction regarding legal requirements for legislative and congressional districts.\n5. Emails to and from Tom Farr, Phil Strach, Michael Carvin, Michael McGinley, Alec Peters, and Hare Smiley to or from Bob Rucho, David Lewis, Nelson Dollar, Thom Hllis, Phil Berger or their legislative staff members acting on their behalf or at their direction regarding legal advice regarding any public statements about redistricting or proposed redistricting plans.\n6. Emails to and from Tom Farr, Phil Strach, Michael Carvin, Michael McGinley, Alec Peters, and Hare Smiley to or from Bob Rucho, David Lewis, Thom Hllis, Phil Berger or their legislative staff members acting on their behalf or at their direction regarding legal advice on the preclearance process for redistricting plans.\n7. Emails to and from Tom Farr, Phil Strach, Michael Carvin, Michael McGinley, Alec Peters, and Hare Smiley to or from Bob Rucho, David Lewis, Nelson Dollar, Thom Hllis, Phil Berger or their legislative staff members acting on their behalf or at their direction regarding legal advice for the redistricting session of the General Assembly.\nOn 29 February 2012, plaintiffs filed a motion to compel discovery, seeking production of, among other things, \u201call communications between legislators and core staff and all lawyers or consultants paid with state funds, and unredacted invoices and time sheets.\u201d In support of their motion, plaintiffs cited section 120-133 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which reads:\nNotwithstanding any other provision of law, all drafting and information requests to legislative employees and documents prepared by legislative employees for legislators concerning redistricting the North Carolina General Assembly or the Congressional Districts are no longer confidential and become public records upon the act establishing the relevant district plan becoming law.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133 (2011). Plaintiffs argued that section 120-133 constitutes a \u201cbroad and unambiguous\u201d waiver by the General Assembly of \u201cany privileges\u201d relating to redistricting communications once the relevant act becomes law. Plaintiffs contended that section 120-133 compelled the production of documents prepared by defendants\u2019 counsel, including lawyers from the Attorney General\u2019s Office and private firms.\nOn 11 April 2012, defendants responded to plaintiffs\u2019 motion, denying that section 120-133 waives, or even addresses, the common law attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine or that the statute applies to the Attorney General\u2019s Office. Defendants\u2019 response included an engagement letter executed in 1991 by Daniel T. Blue, Jr., who then was serving as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, and outside counsel James E. Ferguson, II of Ferguson, Stein, Watt, Wallas, Adkins & Gresham, P.A (\u201cFerguson Stein\u201d). In the letter, Ferguson Stein agreed to provide legal advice to the North Carolina House of Representatives concerning redistricting. The letter stated that \u201c[b]ecause communications between the firm and members of the House are privileged attorney-client communications, N.C.G.S. \u00a7[ ] 120-133 shall not apply to communications, including written communications, between any attorneys in the firm and any member of the North Carolina House of Representatives.\u201d\nOn 20 April 2012, the three-judge panel entered a written order allowing plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel. Most significantly, the panel concluded:'\n20. Although certain communications by and between members of the General Assembly and legal counsel pertaining to redistricting plans may have originally been cloaked with privilege, the General Assembly, by enacting N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 120-133, expressly waived any and all such privileges once those redistricting plans were enacted into law.\n21. This waiver is clear and unambiguous; it is applicable \u201cnotwithstanding any other provision of law.\u201d The waiver applies regardless of whether the privilege is claimed under a theory of attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine or legislative privilege.\nAccordingly, the panel stated that \u201c[a]ll drafting and information requests ... to legislative employees\u201d and \u201c[documents . . . prepared by legislative employees\u201d concerning the redistricting plans were \u201c \u2018no longer confidential\u2019 \u201d and became \u201c \u2018public record\u2019 \u201d when, the redistricting plans were enacted, (underlining omitted). The panel concluded that counsel from Ogletree Deakins, Jones Day, and any legislative staff attorneys \u201cwere \u2018legislative employees\u2019 \u201d because they \u201cserved as \u2018consultants and counsel\u2019 \u201d to members of the General Assembly and were paid with State funds. The panel stated that this waiver of confidentiality \u201cd[id] not extend to documents or communications to or from attorneys who were . . . members of the North Carolina Attorney General\u2019s staff because the Attorney General, [as] a member of the Council of State, is not a \u2018legislative employee\u2019 and neither are his staff attorneys.\u201d\nThe panel also concluded that any documents prepared \u201csolely in connection with the redistricting litigation\u201d remain confidential pursuant to the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine; however, the panel did not identify the specific documents to which the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine would apply. Instead, it invited the parties to negotiate \u201ca reasonable means of identifying categories of documents that ought to remain confidential.\u201d\nDefendants appealed to this Court as of right pursuant to section 120-2.5 of the North Carolina General Statutes. See Pender Cnty. v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 497, 649 S.E.2d 364, 368 (2007) (interpreting \u201cN.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-2.5 to mean that any appeal from a three-judge panel dealing with apportionment or redistricting pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-267.1 is direct to\u201d the Supreme Court of North Carolina), aff\u2019d sub. nom. Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 173 L. Ed. 2d 173 (2009). Defendants also asked the three-judge panel to stay its discovery order during the pendency of this appeal. The panel issued a temporary stay, but set an expiration date of 11 May 2012. Consequently, defendants filed a motion for temporary stay and petition for writ of supersedeas with this Court on 4 May 2012. On 11 May 2012, we allowed defendants\u2019 motion for temporary stay and petition for writ of supersedeas and expedited the hearing of this appeal.\nBefore this Court plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to all preenactment communications and documents relating to redistricting pursuant to section 120-133 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Plaintiffs contend that section 120-133 is unambiguous and by its plain language waives the right of legislators to assert the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine for communications and documents made during redistricting. In contrast, defendants argue that, strictly construed, section 120-133 only operates as a narrow waiver of legislative confidentiality that is codified in Article 17, Chapter 120 of the North Carolina General Statutes. Defendants therefore contend that section 120-133 does not waive their right to invoke the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine for communications and documents made before enactment of the redistricting plans. The parties agree that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply to relevant post-enactment communications and documents.\nThis matter presents a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. In re Vogler Realty, Inc., 365 N.C. 389, 392, 722 S.E.2d 459, 462 (2012). \u201cThe primary rule of construction of a statute is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and to carry out such intention to the fullest extent.\u201d Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990). When there is no reference whatsoever to the attorney-client privilege in the statute, a clear and unambiguous waiver is absent, meaning the common law right to assert the privilege prevails. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 4-1 (2011) (\u201cAll such parts of the common law as were heretofore in force and use within this State . . . and which has not been otherwise provided for in whole or in part, not abrogated, repealed or become obsolete, are hereby declared to be in full force within this State.\u201d). After carefully reviewing the parties\u2019 arguments, we conclude that section 120-133 cannot reasonably be construed to waive these common law doctrines because the section in no way mentions, let alone explicitly waives, the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine.\n\u201cThe attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications. The privilege is intended to encourage full and frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the administration, of justice.\u201d Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 141 L. Ed. 2d 379, 384 (1998) (citations and quotation marks omitted). As such, \u201c[t]he public\u2019s interest in protecting the attorney-client privilege is no trivial consideration .... The privilege has its foundation in the common law and can be traced back to the sixteenth century.\u201d In re Miller, 357 N.C. 316, 328, 584 S.E.2d 772, 782 (2003) (citations omitted). Although the privilege \u201cis well-grounded in the jurisprudence of this State,\u201d id.-, see also N.C.G.S. \u00a7 4-1, we emphasize that the privilege \u201chas not been statutorily codified,\u201d in re Miller, 357 N.C. at 329, 584 S.E.2d at 783.\n\u201c[W]hen the relationship of attorney and client exists, all confidential communications made by the client to his attorney on the faith of such relationship are privileged and may not be disclosed.\u201d Id. at 328, 584 S.E.2d at 782 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Given that the privilege advances complete and frank communications, it \u201cencourag[es] clients to make the fullest disclosure to their attorneys [and] enables the latter to act more effectively, justly and expeditiously.\u201d Id. at 329, 584 S.E.2d at 782 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nWe are unaware of \u2014 and neither plaintiffs nor defendants have identified \u2014 any decisions by this Court fully abrogating the attorney-client privilege in any context as plaintiffs advocate here; however, the General Assembly itself has abrogated the attorney-client privilege on three occasions. In each instance the waiver has been clear and unambiguous. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1415(e) (2011) (stating that a criminal defendant who alleges ineffective assistance of prior counsel \u201cshall be deemed to waive the attorney-client privilege\u201d to the extent that prior counsel \u201creasonably believes\u201d revealing these privileged communications is \u201cnecessary to defend against the allegations\u201d); id. \u00a7 78C-97(c) (2011) (stating that a student-athlete who enters into a representation agreement with an agent \u201cwill be deemed to waive the attorney-client privilege\u201d regarding certain records retained by the agent); id. \u00a7 127A-62(h)(3) (2011) (stating that a defendant who alleges ineffective assistance of prior counsel in court-martial proceedings \u201cshall be deemed to waive the attorney-client privilege\u201d to the extent that prior counsel reasonably believes revealing these privileged communications is \u201cnecessary to defend against the allegations\u201d).\nThe text of section 120-133 includes no such clear and unambiguous waiver of the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. Instead, section 120-133 states only:\nNotwithstanding any other provision of law, all drafting and information requests to legislative employees and documents prepared by legislative employees for legislators concerning redistricting the North Carolina General Assembly or the Congressional Districts are no longer confidential and become public records upon the act establishing the relevant district plan becoming law.\nId. \u00a7 120-133. There is no reference in this section to either the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. \u201c[I]t is always presumed that the Legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law.\u201d Ridge Cmty. Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1977). Necessarily, this presumption must include the common law. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 4-1. In contrast, the General Assembly has set a clear limitation on the attorney-client privilege in the Public Records Act. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 132-1.1(a) (2011). There the legislature placed a three-year restriction on the length of time that a confidential communication between an attorney and a public client \u2014 such as \u201cany public board, council, commission or other governmental body of the State or of any county, municipality or other political subdivision or unit of government\" \u2014 may remain unavailable for public inspection. Id.\nPlaintiffs argue that the phrase \u201c[notwithstanding any other provision of law\u201d in section 120-133 waives \u201cany privileges\u201d regarding redistricting legislation. Nonetheless, we begin by observing that the statute does not define the term \u201cprovision\u201d in Article 17. \u201cIn the absence of a contextual definition, courts may look to dictionaries to determine the ordinary meaning of words within a statute. \u201d Perkins v. Ark. Trucking Servs., Inc., 351 N.C. 634, 638, 528 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2000). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cprovision\u201d as \u201c[a] clause in a statute, contract, or other legal instrument.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1345 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). This definition suggests that the General Assembly\u2019s use of the word \u201cprovision\u201d was meant to refer only to other statutory clauses and not to common law doctrines such as the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. Plaintiffs\u2019 counsel conceded as much during oral argument. This interpretation is bolstered by the fact that the General Assembly repeatedly has demonstrated that it knows how to be explicit when it intends to repeal or amend the common law. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. \u00a7 48A-1 (2011) (\u201cThe common-law definition of minor insofar as it pertains to the age of the minor is hereby repealed and abrogated.\u201d); id. \u00a7 50-6 (2011) (\u201cNotwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 50-11, or of the common law, a divorce under this section shall not affect the rights of a dependent spouse with respect to alimony which have been asserted in the action or any other pending action.\u201d); id \u00a7 160A-626(b) (2011) (\u201cThe Authority may contract with any railroad to allocate financial responsibility for passenger rail services claims, . . . notwithstanding any other statutory, common law, public policy, or other prohibition against same . . . .\u201d); see also id. \u00a7 36C-8-816.1(g) (2011) (recognizing that the phrase \u201cprovision of law\u201d does not refer to the common law by stating: \u201cNothing in this section shall be construed to abridge the right of any trustee who has a power to appoint property in further trust that arises under the terms of the original trust or under any other section of this Chapter or under another provision of lawor under common law.\u201d).\nWe read section 120-133 in the context of the entire article in which it appears. See In re D.S., 364 N.C. 184, 187, 694 S.E.2d 758, 760 (2010). Doing so militates against the conclusion that the General Assembly intended to waive its attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. As we have noted in other cases, the title of an act may be an indication of legislative intent. See, e.g., State v. Flowers, 318 N.C. 208, 215, 347 S.E.2d 773, 778 (1986) (relying on the title of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-136 to support the Court\u2019s conclusion that the statute addresses a matter of venue). Section 120-133 appears in Chapter 120, Article 17 of the General Statutes and is entitled \u201cConfidentiality of Legislative Communication\u2019s.\u201d In light of this title, we may reasonably infer that Article 17 was intended to govern a specific class of communications. Indeed, a North Carolina House of Representatives Resolution introduced in 1983, shortly before Article 17 was enacted, requested a Legislative Research Commission study pertaining to confidentiality of \u201clegislative communications.\u201d See H.R. Res. 1461, 1983 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1983). As such, Article 17 governs an important aspect of the General Assembly\u2019s internal operations. In contrast to the Public Records Act, which was designed to disclose documentary material of State government agencies or subdivisions to facilitate public inspection and examination, Article 17 was enacted to protect legislative communications from disclosure so as to preserve the integrity of the legislative process. Compare N.C.G.S. \u00a7 132-l(b) (2011) (stating that \u201cpublic records and public information... are the property of the people\u201d and \u201cit is the policy of this State that the people may obtain copies of their public records and public information\u201d) with id. \u00a7\u00a7 120-131, -131.1 (2011) (emphasizing that specified legislative communications \u201care confidential\u201d or \u201cshall be kept confidential\u201d). In fact, according to a 1984 Legislative Research Commission report, Article 17 was created to address concerns that the General Assembly\u2019s common law legislative privilege could be eroded by an expansive reading of the Public Records Act. See N.C. Legislative Research Comm\u2019n, Confidentiality of Legislative Communications, 1983 Gen. Assemb. (1984 Reg. Sess.) 2 (June 7, 1984) (\u201c[S]ince its enactment in 1935, the public records law had been read much more broadly than originally intended.\u201d). We also note that the General Assembly\u2019s specific use of the term \u201cconfidential\u201d thirteen times throughout Article 17, see, e.g., N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-130(a), -131(a), -131.1(a), (al) (2011) (stating, for example, \u201cis confidential,\u201d \u201care confidential,\u201d and \u201cshall be kept confidential\u201d), demonstrates that Article 17 was enacted to shield legislative communications from disclosure.\nOperationally, Article 17 places a veil of confidentiality over several specific legislative communications: (1) drafting and information requests made to legislative employees by legislators, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-130 (2011); (2) documents produced by legislative employees upon the request of legislators, id. \u00a7 120-131 (2011); and (3) requests from legislative employees to employees in other State agencies for assistance in the preparation of fiscal notes and evaluation reports, id,. \u00a7 120-131.1 (2011). Article 17 also prohibits legislative employees from disclosing confidential information obtained in the legislative context. Id. \u00a7 120-132 (2011). Moreover, Article 17 expressly states that these legislative communications are not public records pursuant to the Public Records Act. See id. \u00a7\u00a7 120-130(d), -131(b), -131.1(al).\nSection 120-133 provides a narrow exception to the protections generally established in Article 17 to help ensure the State\u2019s compliance with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. See 42 U.S.C. \u00a7 1973c (2012) (outlining the preclearance procedure); 28 C.F.R. \u00a7 51.27 (2012) (listing the \u201c[r]equired contents\u201d of a \u201csubmitted change affecting voting\u201d); id. \u00a7 51.28 (2012) (listing supplemental contents for submissions). In effect, section 120-133 permits \u201call drafting and information requests to legislative employees and documents prepared by legislative employees for legislators concerning redistricting\u201d to become \u201cpublic records\u201d for this limited purpose. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133. We observe that, in contrast to the other sections of Article 17, section 120-133 makes no reference to the Public Records Act. We presume that the General Assembly \u201ccarefully chose each word used\u201d in drafting the legislation. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009). The General Assembly could have referenced the Public Records Act in section 120-133, but chose not to do so. This omission demonstrates that the General Assembly intended for its redistricting communications to be made public in accordance with the narrow scope of section 120-133, rather than the broad scope of the Public Records Act. Given the limited purpose of section 120-133 as read within the full context of Article 17, we can discern no clear legislative intent by the General Assembly to waive the common law attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine.\nAs a part of our analysis of section 120-133, we must also emphasize that this Court operates within a \u201ctripartite system of government.\u201d Bacon v. Lee, 353 N.C. 696, 712, 549 S.E.2d 840, 851, cert. denied, 533 U.S. 975, 150 L. Ed. 2d 804 (2001). \u201cThe legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of the State government shall be forever separate and distinct from each other.\u201d N.C. Const. art. I, \u00a7 6. \u201c[T]he principal function of the separation of powers[ ] ... is to maintain the tripartite structure of the ... Government \u2014 and thereby protect individual liberty \u2014 by providing a safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.\u201d Bacon, 353 N.C. at 715, 549 S.E.2d at 853 (alterations in original) (quotation marks omitted). As such, \u201cthe fundamental law guarantees to the Legislature the inherent right to discharge its functions and to regulate its internal concerns in accordance with law without interference by any other department of the government.\u201d Person v. Bd. of State Tax Comm\u2019rs, 184 N.C. 499, 503, 115 S.E. 336, 339 (1922). \u201cAll power which is not expressly limited by the people in our State Constitution remains with the people, and an act of the people through their representatives in the legislature is valid unless prohibited by that Constitution.\u201d State ex rel. Martin v. Preston, 325 N.C. 438, 448-49, 385 S.E.2d 473, 478 (1989). The General Assembly can waive its common law rights in addition to its statutory rights, and whether it chooses to do so is not within the purview of this Court. Nevertheless, we will not lightly assume such a waiver by a coordinate branch of government. Therefore, without a clear and unambiguous statement by the General Assembly that it intends to waive its attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine, we are compelled to exercise judicial restraint and defer to the General Assembly\u2019s judgment regarding the scope of its legislative confidentiality. Such a clear and unambiguous statement is notably absent from section 120-133. Accordingly, we must conclude that the General Assembly did not intend to waive the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine with respect to redistricting litigation when it enacted section 120-133.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the three-judge panel\u2019s conclusion of law that the General Assembly waived the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine for pre-enactment communications and documents through section 120-133; however, we affirm the panel\u2019s conclusion that the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine apply to relevant post-enactment communications and documents. This case is remanded to the three-judge panel for additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; and REMANDED.\nJustice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. Defendants also stated that the term \u201clegislative staff members\u201d was limited to: (1) Jason Kay, General Counsel for Representative Tillis; (2) Tracy Kimbrell, General Counsel for Senator Berger; (3) Jim Blaine, Chief of Staff for Senator Berger; and (4) Brent Woodcox, redistricting counsel for Senators Berger and Rucho.\n. The term \u201clegislative employee\u201d is defined to include \u201cconsultants and counsel to members and committees of either house of the General Assembly or of legislative commissions who are paid by State funds.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-129(2) (2011). However, the term \u201clegislative employee\u201d excludes \u201cmembers of the Council of State.\u201d Id. In addition, the term \u201cdocuments]\u201d is defined to include \u201call records, papers, letters, maps ... or other documentary material regardless of physical form or characteristics.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-129(1) (2011).\n. In two additional instances the General Assembly has addressed the waiver of the attorney-client privilege more obliquely but nevertheless without ambiguity. In section 7A-450(d) the privilege is waived for indigent persons to the extent that if the \u201cperson .. . becomes financially able to secure legal representation and provide other necessary expenses of representation, he must inform the counsel appointed by the court to represent him of that fact.... and counsel must promptly inform the court of that information.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-450(d) (2011). Such information is specifically excluded by the statute from the protection of the privilege. Id. In addition, section 44-50.1(a) mandates that \u201c[if] the person distributing settlement or judgment proceeds [from a personal injury action] is an attorney, the accounting [of disbursements] required by . . . section [44-50.1] is not a breach of the attorney-client privilege.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 44-50.1(a) (2011).", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice HUDSON\ndissenting.\nBecause I am concerned that in its opinion the majority has abandoned the principle that confidentiality is the basis for attorney-client privilege, I respectfully dissent. While the majority\u2019s extensive analysis of the history and purpose of the attorney-client privilege and Article 17 is interesting, it fails to address the fundamental premise that the attorney-client privilege applies only to confidential communications. In N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133, the General Assembly has explicitly stripped confidentiality from redistricting communications upon enactment of the redistricting law. For many years, our law has established that without confidentiality, no attorney-client privilege can apply.\nIt is well established that the attorney-client privilege \u201cprotects confidential communications made by a client to his attorney.\u201d State v. Fair, 354 N.C. 131, 168, 557 S.E.2d 500, 525 (2001) (emphasis added) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1114, 122 S. Ct. 2332 (2002). Importantly, \u201cthe attorney-client privilege covers only confidential communications.\u201d State v. Brown, 327 N.C. 1, 20, 394 S.E.2d 434, 446 (1990) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Even communications between attorney and client made in public or in front of others can lose their confidential nature and thus the protection of the privilege. See State v. Van Landingham, 283 N.C. 589, 602, 197 S.E.2d 539, 547 (1973). Confidentiality is aprerequisite to application of the attorney-client privilege \u2014 information that is not confidential simply is not subject to the privilege.\nDefendants seek to protect much of their legislative redistricting work from public scrutiny under the cloak of attorney-client privilege; however, the relevant statutory language could not be clearer in indicating that the privilege is inapplicable here, making waiver irrelevant. The pertinent language of the statute reads: \u201cNotwithstanding any other provision of law, all drafting and information requests to legislative employees and documents prepared by legislative employees for legislators concerning redistricting . . . are no longer confidential and become public records upon the act establishing the relevant district plan becoming law.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133 (2011) (emphasis added).\nThere is nothing unclear or ambiguous about the statutory phrase \u201care no longer confidential.\u201d This Court has long held that \u201cwhen the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction, and the courts must give it its plain and definite meaning.\u201d Lanvale Props., LLC v. Cnty. of Cabarrus, 366 N.C. 142, 731 S.E.2d 800, 809-10 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The unequivocal statutory language here can be summed up quite simply: as of 7 November 2011, the dates that this redistricting plan finally became law, all prior \u201cdrafting and information requests\u201d and \u201cdocuments\u201d concerning redistricting ceased to be confidential. Therefore, these requests and documents cannot be covered by the attorney-client privilege, which applies only to confidential communications. This case does not concern a broad waiver of various privileges \u2014 the nonconfidential communications in question are simply beyond the protection of the attorney-client privilege, even if they once were protected.\nThe majority spends its entire opinion in a confusing and unnecessary attempt to prove a negative \u2014 that the phrase \u201cattorney-client privilege\u201d does not appear in the text of the statute and therefore, the privilege cannot be considered waived or abrogated thereby. Meanwhile, the majority never addresses, let alone explains, how communications that are \u201cno longer confidential\u201d (a phrase that actually is in the statutory text) can be covered by a common law privilege that has never applied to nonconfidential communications. The only way to reach this conclusion is by suggesting that the word \u201cconfidential\u201d in the statute means something other than \u201cconfidential.\u201d And as the majority points out, we presume that the legislature \u201ccarefully chose each word used,\u201d N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009), and \u201cthat the Legislature acted with full knowledge of prior and existing law,\u201d Ridge Cmty. Investors, Inc. v. Berry, 293 N.C. 688, 695, 239 S.E.2d 566, 570 (1977). Therefore, we must presume that the General Assembly deliberately used the words \u201care no longer confidential\u201d with full knowledge that a requisite element of the common law attorney-client privilege is that the communications are, and remain, confidential.\nEven the authorities cited by the majority repeatedly and explicitly refer to confidentiality as the basis for this privilege. See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403, 118 S. Ct. 2081, 2084 (1998) (noting that \u201c[t]he attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized privileges for confidential communications\u201d); In re Miller, 357 N.C. 316, 328, 584 S.E.2d 772, 782 (2003) (stating that \u201cthis protection for confidential communications is one of the oldest and most revered in law\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 120-129 to -139 (2011) (titled \u201cConfidentiality of Legislative Communications\u201d); N.C.G.S. \u00a7 132-1.1(a) (2011) (exempting certain \u201cConfidential Communications\u201d from the definition of \u201cpublic records\u201d for three years).\nIn this opinion the majority has either repudiated the longstanding rule that only confidential communications are entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, which is inconsistent with all prior authority; or, it has rewritten N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133 to say, instead of \u201care no longer confidential,\u201d that redistricting communications \u201ccontinue to be confidential,\u201d which is inconsistent with our role as a reviewing court rather than a legislative body. As a result, the majority has unnecessarily muddled the law in this area to reach its result, and made any future cases in this area of law unpredictable.\nBecause I conclude that the attorney-client privilege does not apply here, I find it necessary to briefly analyze what the statute renders nonconfidential \u2014 \u201cdrafting and information requests\u201d and \u201cdocuments\u201d \u201cconcerning redistricting.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133. While the statute does not define \u201cdrafting and information requests,\u201d it does provide a very specific and quite broad definition of \u201cdocuments.\u201d For the purposes of this statute, \u201cdocument\u201d means \u201call records, papers, letters, maps, books, photographs, films, sound recordings, magnetic or other tapes, electronic data-processing records, artifacts, or other documentary material regardless of physical form or characteristics.\u201d Id,.' \u00a7 120-129(1) (2011). While the statute does not explicitly use the term \u201ce-mail,\u201d I conclude that this statutory definition that includes \u201cletters . . . regardless of physical form or characteristics\u201d necessarily includes electronic mail, which is what plaintiffs seek to discover here. Moreover, the statute expressly applies to outside counsel for members of the General Assembly. The definition of \u201c[legislative employee\u201d expressly includes \u201ccounsel to members and committees of either house of the General Assembly . . . who are paid by State funds.\u201d Id. \u00a7 120-129(2) (2011).\nIn sum, the plain and unambiguous terms of the statute provide that all documents (including e-mails) concerning redistricting, even those between legislators and outside counsel, ceased to be confidential upon final enactment of the law on 7 November 2011. Because N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133 renders these communications \u201cno longer confidential\u201d upon enactment of the districts (and because this litigation commenced after enactment of the law), the attorney-client privilege cannot apply.\nWhile the majority offers no analysis of the work-product doctrine, I see no reason to believe that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133 has any effect on the application of that doctrine here because work-product doctrine is not premised upon the confidentiality of communications. Work-product doctrine is \u201cdesigned to protect the mental processes of the attorney,\u201d specifically his \u201cimpressions, opinions, and conclusions or his legal theories and strategies.\u201d State v. Hardy, 293 N.C. 105, 126, 235 S.E.2d 828, 841 (1977). This Court has stated that work-product doctrine is \u201cnot a privilege,\u201d but rather a \u201cqualified immunity\u201d that \u201cextends to all materials prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.\u201d Willis v. Duke Power Co., 291 N.C. 19, 35, 229 S.E.2d 191, 201 (1976) (citation, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted). It is important not to overstate this protection, however, as the phrase \u201cprepared in anticipation of litigation\u201d does not mean \u201cprepared while anticipating litigation.\u201d The fact that redistricting litigation is virtually inevitable every ten years does not cloak every redistricting document with work-product protection. While work-product protection is broad for those materials prepared for litigation, it does not extend to any and all materials prepared in a situation in which litigation is likely. As the Fourth Circuit has stated, only those materials prepared specifically \u201cbecause of' litigation are protected, not those that are created \u201cwith the general possibility of litigation in mind.\u201d Nat\u2019l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Murray Sheet Metal Co., 967 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1992).\nIn addition, \u201c[m] ater\u00edais prepared in the ordinary course of business are not protected.\u201d Willis, 291 N.C. at 35, 229 S.E.2d at 201 (citation omitted); See Nat\u2019l Union Fire Ins., 967 F.2d at 984. Maps, tables, plans, and other materials and discussions related to the actual writing of the redistricting legislation are obviously prepared in the ordinary course of business of the legislature. Even an analysis of the constitutional framework for redistricting would seem to me to be within the ordinary course of a legislature\u2019s fulfilling its constitutional responsibility to rewrite the districting legislation. Thus, any documents that relate to the substance of the redistricting legislation (decisions on where to draw district lines, analysis of census data, etc.) should not be covered by work-product protection. Communications regarding strategic preparation for preclearance litigation, for example, might well be covered, and the trial court can address such matters as document production moves forward.\nFinally, the work-product doctrine gives only a \u201cqualified immunity,\u201d not an absolute shield. Willis, 291 N.C. at 35, 229 S.E.2d at 201. \u201cUpon a showing of \u2018substantial need\u2019 and \u2018undue hardship\u2019 involved in obtaining the substantial equivalent otherwise, plaintiff may be allowed discovery.\u201d Id. at 36, 229 S.E.2d at 201. Because the materials necessary to show whether the legislature violated the basic rules of redistricting as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court may well lie among those documents now claimed as privileged, plaintiffs may have a reasonable claim to an exception to work-product protection. This determination should be left to the trial court. Here, as in Willis, \u201ca large portion of the materials in defendant\u2019s . . . files may be subject to the trial preparation immunity. The record is insufficient for us to determine the extent to which this may be the case.\u201d Id.\nIn its order here, the trial court ruled that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133 requires defendants to produce certain material pertaining to the redistricting process without regard to attorney-client privilege, legislative privilege, or work-product doctrine. The order states that \u201cbecause the record before the Court at this time does not permit the Court to rule with any specificity which documents might be excluded from the scope of \u00a7 120-133 . . . the Court can only suggest that the parties consider and agree among themselves a reasonable means of identifying categories of documents that ought to remain confidential.\u201d In my opinion, the trial court erred in leaving responsibility for these determinations entirely in the hands of the parties; the trial court should conduct an in camera review and resolve any issues on which the parties cannot agree. See In re Miller, 357 N.C. at 336, 584 S.E.2d at 787 (stating that \u201cthe responsibility of determining whether the attorney-client privilege applies belongs to the trial court\u201d). To the extent there is any argument about whether a particular communication meets the statutory definition of \u201cdocument\u201d or whether it is \u201cconcerning redistricting,\u201d the only appropriate remedy consistent with the rules of Civil Procedure and prior case law is an in camera review by the trial court. \u201cIf . . . there is disagreement about whether the order covers certain questionable documents or communications, the superior court must conduct an in camera review to determine the extent of the order as to those documents or communications.\u201d State v. Buckner, 351 N.C. 401, 411-12, 527 S.E.2d 307, 314 (2000). Here, it is the trial court\u2019s responsibility to determine whether disputed materials are \u201cdocuments\u201d within the meaning of the statute, whether they are \u201cconcerning redistricting,\u201d and whether work-product doctrine protects such documents (or portions thereof) nonetheless. I would so hold and remand for the trial court to proceed accordingly.\nIn conclusion, the majority has analyzed at length an issue that is not really presented here while failing to address the substantial issues presented on appeal. I would hold that documents listed in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-133 are not subject to attorney-client privilege because, following enactment of the redistricting legislation on 7 November 2011, those documents are not confidential. I would reverse the trial court\u2019s order insofar as it found a broad waiver of privilege and remand for in camera review of any and all disputed documents. Those that relate to the legislative process of redistricting and were confidential before enactment should be open to discovery. Should defendants assert work-product protection of any material, any such claims should also be subject to in camera review and a ruling by the trial court.\nFor the reasons stated here, I respectfully dissent.\n. If, as the majority suggests, section 120-133 was written as a \u201cnarrow exception\u201d solely intended to \u201censure compliance with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act,\u201d surely the General Assembly could and would have said so. Courts \u201care without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained [in the statute].\u201d State v. Davis, 364 N.C. 297, 302, 698 S.E.2d 65, 68 (2010) (citations omitted).\n. Other cases have referred to the doctrine as a \u201cqualified privilege\u201d while retaining the parameters of the protection described in Willis. E.g. Hardy, 293 N.C. at 126, 235 S.E.2d at 840.\n. Obviously, any materials that are not \u201cdocuments\u201d or are not \u201cconcerning redistricting\u201d would still be eligible for attorney-client privilege if they meet the common law requirements of that privilege.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Poyner Spruill LLP, by Edwin M. Speas, Jr., for Dickson plaintiff-appellees; and Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Southern Coalition for Social Justice by Anita S. Earls, and Ferguson Stein Chambers Gresham & Sumter, PA. by Adam Stein, for NC NAACP plaintiff-appellees.", "Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., by Thomas A. Farr and Phillip J. Strach, for legislative defendant-appellants; and Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Alexander McC. Peters and Susan K. Nichols, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for all defendant-appellants.", "Bussian Law Firm, PLLC, by John A. Bussian, for North Carolina Press Association, Inc.; and .Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Mark J. Prak, for North Carolina Association of Broadcasters, Inc., amici curiae.", "Stevens Martin Vaughn & Tadych, PLLC, by Hugh Stevens, for The North Carolina Open Government Coalition, Inc., amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARGARET DICKSON, ALICIA CHISOLM, ETHEL CLARK, MATTHEW A. McLEAN, MELISSA LEE ROLLIZO, C. DAVID GANTT, VALERIA TRUITT, ALICE GRAHAM UNDERHILL, ARMIN JANCIS, REBECCA JUDGE, ZETTIE WILLIAMS, TRACEY BURNS-VANN, LAWRENCE CAMPBELL, ROBINSON O. EVERETT, JR., LINDA GARROU, HAYES McNEILL, JIM SHAW, SIDNEY E. DUNSTON, ALMA ADAMS, R. STEVE BOWDEN, JASON EDWARD COLEY, KARL BERTRAND FIELDS, PAMLYN STUBBS, DON VAUGHAN, BOB ETHERIDGE, GEORGE GRAHAM, JR., THOMAS M. CHUMLEY, AISHA DEW, GENEAL GREGORY, VILMA LEAKE, RODNEY W. MOORE, BRENDA MARTIN STEVENSON, JANE WHITLEY, I.T. (\u201cTIM\u201d) VALENTINE, LOIS WATKINS, RICHARD JOYNER, MELVIN C. McLAWHORN, RANDALL S. JONES, BOBBY CHARLES TOWNSEND, ALBERT KIRBY, TERRENCE WILLIAMS, NORMAN C. CAMP, MARY F. POOLE, STEPHEN T. SMITH, PHILIP A. BADDOUR, and DOUGLAS A. WILSON v. ROBERT RUCHO, in his official capacity only as the Chairman of the North Carolina Senate Redistricting Committee; DAVID LEWIS, in his official capacity only as the Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; NELSON DOLLAR, in his official capacity only as the Co-Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; JERRY DOCKHAM, in his official capacity only as the Co-Chairman of the North Carolina House of Representatives Redistricting Committee; PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity only as the President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate; THOM TILLIS, in his official capacity only as the Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; THE STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; and THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA NORTH CAROLINA STATE CONFERENCE OF BRANCHES OF THE NAACP, LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF NORTH CAROLINA, DEMOCRACY NORTH CAROLINA, NORTH CAROLINA A. PHILIP RANDOLPH INSTITUTE, REVA McNAIR, MATTHEW DAVIS, TRESSIE STANTON, ANNE WILSON, SHARON HIGHTOWER, KAY BRANDON, GOLDIE WELLS, GRAY NEWMAN, YVONNE STAFFORD, ROBERT DAWKINS, SARA STOHLER, HUGH STOHLER, OCTAVIA RAINEY, CHARLES HODGE, MARSHALL HARDY, MARTHA GARDENHIGHT, BEN TAYLOR, KEITH RIVERS, ROMALLUS O. MURPHY, CARL WHITE, ROSA BRODIE, HERMAN LEWIS, CLARENCE ALBERT, JR., EVESTER BAILEY, ALBERT BROWN, BENJAMIN LANIER, GILBERT VAUGHN, AVIE LESTER, THEODORE MUCHITENI, WILLIAM HOBBS, JIMMIE RAY HAWKINS, HORACE P. BULLOCK, ROBERTA WADDLE, CHRISTINA DAVIS-McCOY, JAMES OLIVER WILLIAMS, MARGARET SPEED, LARRY LAVERNE BROOKS, CAROLYN S. ALLEN, WALTER ROGERS, SR., SHAWN MEACHEM, MARY GREEN BONAPARTE, SAMUEL LOVE, COURTNEY PATTERSON, WILLIE O. SINCLAIR, CARDES HENRY BROWN, JR., and JANE STEPHENS v. THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA; THE NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS; THOM TILLIS, in his official capacity as Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives; and PHILIP E. BERGER, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the North Carolina Senate\nNo. 201PA12\n(Filed 25 January 2013)\nEvidence\u2014 attorney-client privilege \u2014 redistricting\u2014no waiver by statute\nSection 120-133 of the North Carolina General Statutes does not waive the right of legislators to assert the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine in litigation concerning redistricting where the statute is silent on the issue. Any waiver of such well-established legal principles must be clear and unambiguous and this statute in no way mentions, let alone explicitly waives, the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine. The phrase \u201cnotwithstanding any other provision of law\u201d in the statute lacks a contextual definition; the ordinary meaning of \u201cprovision,\u201d determined by reference to a Black's Law Dictionary, refers to a statue.\nJustice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nJustice HUDSON dissenting.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 120-2.5 from an order entered on 20 April 2012 by a three-judge panel of the Superior Court, Wake County appointed by the Chief Justice pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-267.1, allowing plaintiffs\u2019 motion to compel production of certain documents. On 11 May 2012, the Supreme Court of North Carolina issued an order expediting hearing of the appeal. Heard in the Supreme Court on 10 July 2012.\nPoyner Spruill LLP, by Edwin M. Speas, Jr., for Dickson plaintiff-appellees; and Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Southern Coalition for Social Justice by Anita S. Earls, and Ferguson Stein Chambers Gresham & Sumter, PA. by Adam Stein, for NC NAACP plaintiff-appellees.\nOgletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., by Thomas A. Farr and Phillip J. Strach, for legislative defendant-appellants; and Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Alexander McC. Peters and Susan K. Nichols, Special Deputy Attorneys General, for all defendant-appellants.\nBussian Law Firm, PLLC, by John A. Bussian, for North Carolina Press Association, Inc.; and .Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Mark J. Prak, for North Carolina Association of Broadcasters, Inc., amici curiae.\nStevens Martin Vaughn & Tadych, PLLC, by Hugh Stevens, for The North Carolina Open Government Coalition, Inc., amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0332-01", "first_page_order": 364, "last_page_order": 383 }