{
  "id": 4346347,
  "name": "MARQUES COLE JONES v. NIAH DRAKE WHIMPER",
  "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. Whimper",
  "decision_date": "2013-01-25",
  "docket_number": "No. 89A12",
  "first_page": "367",
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    "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:35:25.873086+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [
      "Justice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "MARQUES COLE JONES v. NIAH DRAKE WHIMPER"
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PER CURIAM.\nThe holding of the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals is affirmed; however, to the extent that the majority opinion has construed the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (\u201cPKPA\u201d) and the Uniform Child-Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (\u201cUCC-JEA\u201d) as enacted in this state as requiring a threshold of \u201csubstantial compliance\u201d with these statutes, the majority opinion is vacated. Instead, \u201csubstantial compliance\u201d as set forth in our General Statutes requires our courts to determine whether the foreign state has substantially the same type of jurisdiction that we have. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-206(b) (2011). As the Court of Appeals properly noted, but misapprehended, \u201c[i]f the court of the state having jurisdiction substantially in accordance with [the UCCJEA] does not determine that the court of this State is a more appropriate forum, the court of this State shall dismiss the proceeding.\u201d Id. Therefore, the subsection 50A-206(b) determination is limited to whether the court of the state having jurisdiction has the same type of jurisdiction that North Carolina has, not whether \u201cthe statutory prerequisites for determining child custody jurisdiction were substantially complied with in\u201d a given case. Jones v. Whimper, \u2014 N.C. App. \u2014, \u2014, 727 S.E.2d 700, 704 (2012).\nIn addition, that portion of the Court of Appeals\u2019 opinion that holds that section 50A-110 of the General Statutes only applies to discretionary communications is vacated. We hold that section 50A-110 applies to all communications between courts attempting to determine jurisdiction in these circumstances. We find support in the official commentary to the section, which states that \u201c[t]his section emphasizes the role of judicial communications. It authorizes a court to communicate concerning any proceeding arising under this Act.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-110 official cmt. (2011) (emphasis added); see Parsons v. Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 333 N.C. 420, 425, 426 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1993) (noting that \u201cthe commentary to a statutory provision can be helpful in some cases in discerning legislative intent\u201d and that while not binding \u201ccould be given substantial weight in our efforts to discern legislative intent\u201d). The commentary goes on to mention section 206 specifically, stating that \u201c[c]ommunications between courts is required under Sections 204, 206, and 306, and is strongly suggested in applying Section 207.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-110 official cmt.\nUltimately, North Carolina does not have jurisdiction here. As the New Jersey court declined to cede jurisdiction to North Carolina, the case remained in New Jersey. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals\u2019 affirmation of the trial court\u2019s order declining to exercise jurisdiction. As such, remand would serve no purpose.\nMODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.\nJustice BEASLEY did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PER CURIAM."
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Bishop & Smith, PLLG, by Keith A. Bishop, for plaintiff-appellant.",
      "W. Gregory Duke for defendant-appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "MARQUES COLE JONES v. NIAH DRAKE WHIMPER\nNo. 89A12\n(Filed 25 January 2013)\n1. Child Custody and Support\u2014 jurisdiction \u2014 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act \u2014 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act\n\u201c [Substantial compliance\u201d with the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act as enacted in this state requires our courts to determine whether the foreign state has substantially the same type of jurisdiction th\u00e1t we have.\n2. Child Custody and Support\u2014 communications between courts \u2014 Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act \u2014 Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 50A-110 applies to all communications between courts attempting to determine jurisdiction in custody cases involving the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, - N.C. App. \u2014, 727 S.E.2d 700 (2012), affirming an order declining jurisdiction entered on 21 February 2011 by Judge P. Gwynett Hilbum in District Court, Pitt County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 5 September 2012.\nBishop & Smith, PLLG, by Keith A. Bishop, for plaintiff-appellant.\nW. Gregory Duke for defendant-appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0367-01",
  "first_page_order": 399,
  "last_page_order": 400
}