{ "id": 4330591, "name": "IN THE MATTER OF: L.M.T., A.M.T.", "name_abbreviation": "In re L.M.T.", "decision_date": "2013-12-20", "docket_number": "No. 40PA13", "first_page": "165", "last_page": "183", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 N.C. 165" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642304 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "59" }, { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/669/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633155 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 S.E.2d 246", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "252", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he court's decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4679227 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "110", "parenthetical": "\"[T]he court's decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0101-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 455", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151517 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "194 N.C. App. 142", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4163317 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "146" }, { "page": "146" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/194/0142-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 469", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474", "parenthetical": "\"Our holding [ensures that the best interest of the juvenile are of paramount consideration] by minimizing procedural delay that interferes with addressing the needs of the child when that delay is unnecessary \u2022 to protect the rights of parents.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4154260 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "381", "parenthetical": "\"Our holding [ensures that the best interest of the juvenile are of paramount consideration] by minimizing procedural delay that interferes with addressing the needs of the child when that delay is unnecessary \u2022 to protect the rights of parents.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "captioned \"An Act to Amend the Juvenile Code to Expedite Outcomes for Children and Families Involved in Welfare Cases and Appeals and to Limit the Appointment of Guardians ad Litem for Parents in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "581 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 N.C. App. 473", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9188114 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/158/0473-01" ] }, { "cite": "568 S.E.2d 192", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 163", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511544, 1511451, 1511636, 1511574 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0163-01", "/nc/356/0163-02", "/nc/356/0163-03", "/nc/356/0163-04" ] }, { "cite": "559 S.E.2d 233", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "148 N.C. App. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9367005 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "544" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/148/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "530", "parenthetical": "citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C. App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 235, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 192 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 N.C. App. 35", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4179130 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41", "parenthetical": "citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C. App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 235, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 192 (2002)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/207/0035-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3804066 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "738 S.E.2d 359", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2012 WL 6595388", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*2", "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "636 S.E.2d 787", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637106 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/636/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "615 S.E.2d 26", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633239 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "32", "parenthetical": "concluding that the trial court's finding that \"return of the children would be contrary to their best interests,\" coupled with a recitation of \"DSS attempts to assist the mother, were sufficient to support cessation of reunification efforts" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/615/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 489", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633155 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" }, { "page": "494", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "553" }, { "page": "498" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0489-01" ] }, { "cite": "686 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "679 S.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "908-09" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "198 N.C. App. 525", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4168966 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/198/0525-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 S.E.2d 4", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7", "parenthetical": "\"[W]ords of a statute are not to be deemed useless or redundant and amendments are presumed not to be without purpose.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2497813 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "\"[W]ords of a statute are not to be deemed useless or redundant and amendments are presumed not to be without purpose.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "319 S.E.2d 567", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "574" }, { "page": "597" }, { "page": "574" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "311 N.C. 586", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4683884 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/311/0586-01" ] }, { "cite": "360 N.C. 588", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3787934 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/360/0588-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E.2d 899", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "902" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "241 N.C. 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8613077 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518-19" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/241/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "161 S.E. 532", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. 791", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8628160 ], "year": 1931, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "792", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/201/0791-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 230", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8436263 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "concluding that the trial court's finding that \"return of the children would be contrary to their best interests,\" coupled with a recitation of \"DSS attempts to assist the mother, were sufficient to support cessation of reunification efforts" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0230-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 S.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "111", "parenthetical": "determining that the trial court's findings supported its \"conclusion that further reunification efforts were not required\" despite none of the findings using N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l) phraseology" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "208 N.C. App. 160", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4181094 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "164", "parenthetical": "determining that the trial court's findings supported its \"conclusion that further reunification efforts were not required\" despite none of the findings using N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l) phraseology" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/208/0160-01" ] }, { "cite": "2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 539", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3804066 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" }, { "page": "548" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0539-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1358, "char_count": 44847, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.289677309573715e-07, "percentile": 0.9163568995721372 }, "sha256": "672b81e79e32edde2b62b42e0f8bb86a46a70c4076a051321893dee88ea8cb10", "simhash": "1:abed8d0636a6b574", "word_count": 7122 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:46.212757+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "IN THE MATTER OF: L.M.T., A.M.T." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nIn this case we consider the statutory requirement that a trial court make certain findings of fact in matters involving the legal separation of a parent and child. Though a trial court is required to make written findings of fact in a permanency planning order that consider the factors in section 7B-507 of our General Statutes, these findings need not recite the statutory language verbatim. When reviewing the sufficiency of such orders, an appellate court should consider whether the trial court\u2019s findings of fact address the substance of the statutory requirements. Further, even if the permanency planning order is deficient standing alone, the appellate court should review that order in conjunction with the trial court\u2019s termination of parental rights order to determine whether the statutory requirements are met. In some instances, a deficiency in one may be cured by the other. In this case, because both the permanency planning order and the termination of parental rights order comply with the statutory mandate, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nRespondent Mother appealed after the trial court entered two orders that (1) ceased reunification efforts between respondent and her children, L.M.T. and A.M.T., (\u201ccease reunification order\u201d) and (2) terminated respondent\u2019s parental rights (\u201ctermination order\u201d). At the Court of Appeals respondent argued that the trial court\u2019s cease reunification order failed to satisfy section 7B-507, which requires trial courts to \u201cmake[ ] written findings of fact that\u201d further reunification efforts would be \u201cfutile\u201d or \u201cinconsistent with the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l) (2011). The Court of Appeals acknowledged that in the cease reunification order the trial court \u201cmade numerous and detailed findings addressing respondent\u2019s troubled case history.\u201d In re L.M.T.,_N.C. App. _, _ S.E.2d_, No. COA12-743, 2012 WL 6595388, at *2 (Dec. 18, 2012) (unpublished). Moreover, the Court of Appeals found \u201csufficient evidence in the record to support the required findings.\u201d Id. at *3. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals determined that the cease reunification order contained \u201cno finding explicitly linking those facts with any of the factors listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7 7B-507, including the futility of further reunification efforts or that further efforts would be inconsistent with the juveniles\u2019 health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home.\u201d Id. at *2. Based on these perceived deficiencies in the cease reunification order, and without considering the termination of parental rights order, the Court of Appeals reversed both orders and remanded for additional findings. Id. at *3.\nWe allowed discretionary review to consider the requirement that a trial court make certain findings of fact under subsection 7B-507(b) of our Juvenile Code. In re L.M.T., _ N.C. _, 738 S.E.2d 359 (2013). The purpose of the Juvenile Code is, in part, to \u201cprovide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their homes and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents\u201d and to ensure \u201cthat the best interests of the juvenile are of paramount consideration by the court.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-100(4), (5) (2011). The General Assembly further stated that \u201cwhen it is not in the juvenile\u2019s best interest to be returned home, the juvenile will be placed in a safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of time.\u201d Id. \u00a7 7B-100(5). The Juvenile Code strikes a balance between the constitutional rights of a parent and the best interests of a child, id. \u00a7 7B-100(3) (2011) (stating that a purpose of the Juvenile Code is \u201c[t]o provide for services for the protection of juveniles by means that respect both the right to family autonomy and the juveniles\u2019 needs for safety, continuity, and permanence\u201d), and provides a protective framework when a juvenile is \u201calleged to be abused, neglected, or dependent,\u201d id. \u00a7 7B-300 (2011). See In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 553, 614 S.E.2d 489, 498 (2005) (\u201cParents\u2019 fundamental right to control their children at some point gives way to the state\u2019s interest in the welfare of the child. In Subchapter I of our Juvenile Code, the General Assembly has established procedures to safeguard parental rights while simultaneously providing for the removal of children and even the termination of parental rights.\u201d).\nTo advance the Juvenile Code\u2019s dual purpose of protecting parental rights and promoting the best interests of the child, subsection 7B-507(b) requires that trial courts make written findings of fact in orders that place \u201ca juvenile in the custody or placement responsibility of a county department of social services.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b) (2011). Relevant to the case at hand, that statute mandates:\n[T]he court may direct that reasonable efforts to eliminate the need for placement of the juvenile shall not be required or shall cease if the court makes written findings of fact that:\n(1) Such efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time[.]\nId. Strict adherence to this statute ensures that the trial court fulfills the aspirations of the Juvenile Code by allowing our appellate courts to conduct a thorough review of the order. While trial courts are advised that use of the actual statutory language would be the best practice, the statute does not demand a verbatim recitation of its language as was required by the Court of Appeals in this case. Put differently, the order must make clear that the trial court considered the evidence in light of whether reunification \u201cwould be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.\u201d The trial court\u2019s written findings must address the statute\u2019s concerns, but need not quote its exact language. On the other hand, use of the precise statutory language will not remedy a lack of supporting evidence for the trial court\u2019s order.\nOur review of the cease reunification order in this case \u201cis limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings [of fact] and whether the findings support the conclusions of law.\u201d In re P.O., 207 N.C. App. 35, 41, 698 S.E.2d 525, 530 (2010) (citing In re Eckard, 148 N.C. App. 541, 544, 559 S.E.2d 233, 235, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 163, 568 S.E.2d 192 (2002)). The trial court\u2019s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence. Id. (citing In re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 473, 477, 581 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2003)).\nAt the permanency planning review hearing, the trial court considered extensive evidence from multiple witnesses, including respondent, about respondent\u2019s continued drug abuse, which she admitted occurred in the presence of her children; her lack of employment, attempted suicide, and confessed deception of the court; her involvement in domestic violence with her husband; and other repeated instances of behavior inconsistent with the best interests of the juveniles. That evidence supported the following findings of fact contained in the cease reunification order:\nThe Respondent Mother has now disclosed that she has a substance abuse problem, primarily related to prescription drugs.\n[Respondent Mother\u2019s drug use became] increasingly worse . . . while she was in the process of seeking reunification with the juveniles.\nThere have been instances of domestic violence between the Respondent Mother and her now husband .... At least one of those incidents involved [respondent\u2019s] use of a knife. . . .\nThe environment of the Respondent Mother\u2019s home is not conducive to raising children. In fact, the environment that the Respondent Mother and her husband have created is injurious.\nThat while the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad Litem and everyone else involved was working toward the reunification process, the Respondent Mother was sinking deeper and deeper into an abyss of domestic violence and drug abuse all the while covering it up and refusing to acknowledge the fact of its existence in order that the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad Litem and others surrounding her could assist her and help the juveniles. The deception of the Court during this process is bad enough, but the Respondent Mother has completely let her children down.\nThe Respondent Mother and her husband are facing eviction and have received a notice to vacate their housing ....\n[The juveniles] are in need of permanence and deserve a fresh start.\nThe Court determines that in the best interest of the juveniles, the permanent plan should now be changed to that of placement with other Court approved caretakers with a concurrent plan of adoption.\nReturn of the juveniles to the custody of the Respondents would be contrary to the welfare and best interest of the juveniles.\nWhile these findings of fact do not quote the precise language of subsection 7B-507(b), the order embraces the substance of the statutory provisions requiring findings of fact that further reunification efforts \u201cwould be futile\u201d or \u201cwould be inconsistent with the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l). As an example, the trial court\u2019s finding that \u201cthe environment that the Respondent Mother and her husband have created is injurious\u201d indicates that further reunification efforts would be \u201cinconsistent\u201d with the juveniles\u2019 \u201chealth\u201d and \u201csafety.\u201d Id. Likewise, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact related to respondent\u2019s drug abuse, participation in domestic violence, deception of the court, and repeated failures at creating an acceptable and safe living environment certainly suggest that reunification efforts \u201cwould be futile.\u201d Id. Moreover, these findings clearly support the trial court\u2019s conclusions that \u201c[r]eturn of the juveniles ... is contrary to the welfare and best interest of the juveniles,\u201d \u201c[t]hat in the best interest of the juveniles, legal and physical custody should remain with the Cumberland County Department of Social Services,\u201d and \u201c[t]hat the Cumberland County Department of Social Services should be relieved of reunification and visitation efforts with the Respondents.\u201d\nEven if the cease reunification order standing alone had been insufficient, that would not end the appellate court\u2019s inquiry. Parents may seek appellate review of cease reunification orders only in limited circumstances. In this case, respondent appealed under subsection 7B-1001(a)(5)(a), which provides that\na. The Court of Appeals shall review [an] order [entered under section 7B-507] to cease reunification together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights order if all of the following apply:\n1. A motion or petition to terminate the parent\u2019s rights is heard and granted.\n2. The order terminating parental rights is appealed in a proper and timely manner.\n3. The order to cease reunification is identified as an issue in the record on appeal of the termination of parental rights.\nId. \u00a7 7B-1001(a)(5) (2011). In other words, if a termination of parental rights order is entered, the appeal of the cease reunification order is combined with the appeal of the termination order.\nDespite the General Assembly\u2019s plain language that we are to \u201creview the order to cease reunification together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights order,\u201d id. (emphasis added), respondent urges the Court to consider each order by itself. Had the General Assembly intended to so limit our scope of review, it could have clearly drawn such a distinction. Rather, the legislature unambiguously instructed our appellate courts to review both orders \u201ctogether.\u201d The word \u201ctogether\u201d is defined to include \u201cat one time,\u201d \u201cwith each other,\u201d and \u201cconsidered as a whole.\u201d Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 2404 (1967). Accordingly, we read this statute to mean that we are to look to both orders \u201cwith each other,\u201d id., to determine whether the trial court has made sufficient findings of fact. Because we consider both orders \u201ctogether,\u201d incomplete findings of fact in the cease reunification order may be cured by findings of fact in the termination order. This application of the statute is consistent with the \u201cparamount\u201d aim of the Juvenile Code to provide for \u201cthe best interests of the juvenile\u201d within a \u201creasonable amount of time.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-100(5); see also Act of Aug. 23, 2005, ch. 398, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455 (captioned \u201cAn Act to Amend the Juvenile Code to Expedite Outcomes for Children and Families Involved in Welfare Cases and Appeals and to Limit the Appointment of Guardians ad Litem for Parents in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings.\u201d); cf. In re M.I.W., 365 N.C. 374, 381, 722 S.E.2d 469, 474 (2012) (\u201cOur holding [ensures that the best interest of the juvenile are of paramount consideration] by minimizing procedural delay that interferes with addressing the needs of the child when that delay is unnecessary \u2022 to protect the rights of parents.\u201d).\nThough the issue was not addressed by the Court of Appeals, to provide finality in this case we now shift our attention to the sufficiency of the termination of parental rights order. In regards to this order, at the Court of Appeals respondent challenged only the trial court\u2019s conclusion of law that terminating her parental rights would be in the best interests of her children.\n\u201cOnce the trial court has found a ground for termination, the court then considers the best interests of the child in making its decision on whether to terminate parental rights.\u201d In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. 142, 146, 669 S.E.2d 55, 59 (2008), aff\u2019d per curiam, 363 N.C. 368, 677 S.E.2d 455 (2009). When making a decision on a child\u2019s best interests, section 7B-1110 requires the trial court to consider:\n(1) The age of the juvenile.\n(2) The likelihood of adoption of the juvenile.\n(3) Whether the termination of parental rights will aid in the accomplishment of the permanent plan for the juvenile.\n(4) The bond between the juvenile and the parent.\n(5) The quality of the relationship between the juvenile and the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.\n(6) Any relevant consideration.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1110 (2011). \u201cWe review this decision on an abuse of discretion standard, and will reverse a court\u2019s decision only where it is \u2018manifestly unsupported by reason.\u2019 \u201d In re S.N., 194 N.C. App. at 146, 669 S.E.2d at 59 (citation omitted); see also In re Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984) (\u201c[T]he court\u2019s decision to terminate parental rights is discretionary.\u201d).\nAt the termination of parental rights hearing, the trial court again took extensive evidence regarding domestic violence, lack of necessary medical care for the juveniles,' respondent\u2019s admitted drug abuse and related criminal activity, her neglect of the juveniles while they were visiting her, specifically that they were not \u201cfed\u201d or \u201cbathed,\u201d her failure to obtain a job and pay child support, and her struggles with mental illness. The court heard further testimony that respondent had made little progress toward changing the circumstances that initially led to the removal of her children and that another family was interested in permanently adopting them. The trial court made the following findings of fact:\nThat the Respondent Mother and [her husband] have demonstrated a pattern of failing to provide appropriate care for the juveniles and the Court finds that it is probable that this neglect would be repeated if custody of the juveniles was returned to the Respondent Mother.\nThat the Respondent Mother\u2019s situation has not improved, and based on the evidence presented on this date, the juveniles would be subjected to irreparable harm if the juveniles were returned to the home of the Respondents.\nSince [the Department of Social Services was relieved of reunification and visitation efforts], the Respondent Mother has not made efforts to communicate with the juveniles by sending any cards, gifts, or letters to the juveniles.\nThe Respondent Mother has willfully failed to pay any amount towards the costs of care for the juveniles. The Respondent Mother is physically and financially able to do so.\nThe Respondents have demonstrated a pattern of failing to provide appropriate care for the juveniles. It is highly probable that neglect would be repeated if custody of the juveniles was returned to either of the Respondents. The Respondents have neglected the welfare of the juveniles for several years. This behavior is likely to continue into the foreseeable future.\nAdditionally, the court concluded that \u201cbased on the tender age of the juveniles, the likelihood of adoption for each of the juveniles is great,\u201d that there is a \u201cminimal bond\u201d between respondent and her children, and that the juveniles \u201chave begun to adjust\u201d to their \u201cpotential adoptive home.\u201d Given the totality of the evidence and the trial court\u2019s extensive order, the court clearly considered the factors in section 7B-1110. Viewing the trial court\u2019s decision through the lens of the abuse of discretion standard, we cannot say that its determination was manifestly unsupported by reason, and we must thus defer to the trial court\u2019s judgment \u201cthat it is in the best interest of these juveniles for the purpose of obtaining safety, permanence, and stability that the parental rights of the Respondents ... be terminated.\u201d\nAccordingly, we conclude that the trial court\u2019s orders ceasing reunification and terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights were each sufficient standing alone and should have been affirmed. The Court of Appeals erred both in its analysis of the cease reunification order and in its determination that the cease reunification order was deficient without considering that order in light of the findings of fact in the termination order. Ending a parent-child relationship is a decision the court must weigh carefully, mindful of constitutional protections and statutory safeguards. Those safeguards, however, are to be applied practically so that the best interests of the child \u2014 the polar star in controversies over child neglect and custody \u2014 are the paramount concern. The decision of the Court of Appeals is therefore reversed thereby reinstating the trial court\u2019s orders.\nREVERSED.", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice BEASLEY\nconcurring.\nI concur in the majority\u2019s holding that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact are sufficient under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l) to support its conclusion that reunification efforts should cease in respondent\u2019s case. I disagree, however, with the majority\u2019s further statement that any hypothetical deficiencies in the permanency planning order\u2019s findings could be \u201ccured\u201d by examining that order in conjunction with the order terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights. Accordingly, I write separately to express my concerns.\nThe majority correctly observes that this case asks us to \u201cconsider the statutory requirement that a trial court make certain findings of fact in matters involving the legal separation of a parent and child.\u201d This inquiry is controlled by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b), which specifies that orders relieving county departments of social services of further reunification efforts must include findings of fact addressing, among other considerations, whether \u201c[s]uch efforts clearly would be futile or would be inconsistent with the juvenile\u2019s health, safety, and need for a safe, permanent home within a reasonable period of time.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l) (2013). The majority concludes \u2014 and I agree \u2014 that the trial court\u2019s findings in this case, while not couched in the \u201cprecise language\u201d of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l), are sufficient to \u201cembrace the substance of the statute.\u201d\nIn its order, the trial court found as fact:\n3. The Court readopts the findings from the previous orders entered in this matter, and the Court further finds that those were the findings that existed at the time that those particular orders were entered.\n4. The juveniles were adjudicated dependent on January 5, 2010. They have remained in the continual care of the Cumberland County Department of Social Services since on or about August 31, 2009, as a result of a Non Secure Custody Order filed subsequent to the filing of the Petition. The Petition was filed on July 29, 2009.\n5. It is not possible for the juveniles to return to the custody of the Respondents in as much as the conditions which led to the removal of the juveniles from the home as well as the accruing conditions have not been alleviated.\n6. Since the previous hearing, it has been determined that the Respondent Mother has been very much less than candid with the Court, the Cumberland County Department of Social Services as well as all others involved in this case.\n7. The Respondent Mother has now disclosed that she has a substance abuse problem, primarily related to prescription drugs. Her testimony today indicates that she began abusing the drugs in November, 2009. The abuse has become increasingly worse. The Court notes that this occurred while she was in the process of seeking reunification with the juveniles. She failed to disclose this to the Court or the Cumberland County Department of Social Services. In fact, at a previous hearing where the Cumberland County Department of Social Services had significant concerns about missing prescription medication, the Respondent Mother came into court and, in fact, lied under oath. She attributed the missing medication into [sic] a mix-up at the pharmacy. She indicated that the pills were not actually missing but that she had taken the pills back to the pharmacy and there was some problem with the pharmacy records. She admitted today that that statement was not true and that she and a friend had abused the prescription drugs. In fact, she did this while the juveniles were within her care.\n9. There have been incidents of domestic violence between the Respondent Mother and her now husband Mr. Dickerson. At least one of those incidents involved the use of a knife by the Respondent Mother directed toward her husband. Additionally, the Respondent Mother\u2019s husband has a problem with illegal drugs and prescription drugs. Each of them are facing serious felony charges. The Respondent Mother is currently facing charges of Felony Trafficking Opium or Heroin and Felony Obtaining a Controlled Substance by Fraud or Forgery. This incident surrounds allegations of forgery of a prescription. They could both face a significant period of incarceration. Additionally, the Respondent Mother is facing charges of Driving While Impaired. The offense date for that is August 20, 2010. She took a significant number of Zanex, and her testimony today is that she has little or no recollection after taking the pills.\n10. The Respondent Mother\u2019s husband\u2019s chain of command has had significant difficulties with the substance abuse and domestic violence between the Respondent Mother and the Respondent Mother\u2019s husband. They have had to respond to several different incidents. Witnesses present in court today have responded to several of the domestic violence incidents as well as other incidents involving illegal drugs and controlled substances. The Respondent Mother\u2019s husband has been placed on buddy-watch on at least four (4) different occasions within the past couple of months. Buddy-watch is placed in effect when an individual has suicidal or homicidal ideations. Both the Respondent Mother and her husband have had suicidal attempts. Mr. Dickerson has been taken to the 6th floor at Womack Army Hospital which is the unit that deals with behavioral and emotional and mental health issues as well as substance abuse issues. He has gone there on at least one (1) occasion within the past sixty (60) days. The environment of the Respondent Mother\u2019s home is not conducive to raising children. In fact, the environment that the Respondent Mother and her husband have created is injurious.\n11. Of significant concern to this Court is the fact that these juveniles were formerly placed with relatives and had to be removed following significant incidents and a toxic relationship between the Respondent Mother and her relatives. The Court has previously ruled out relative involvement as a result of that and has closed that chapter in these juveniles\u2019 lives while we made a sincere and significant effort to reunify the Respondent Mother with her children. That while the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad Litem and everyone else involved was working toward the reunification process, the Respondent Mother was sinking deeper and deeper into an abyss of domestic violence and drug abuse all the while covering it up and refusing to acknowledge the fact of its existence in order that the Court, the Department, the Guardian ad Litem and others surrounding her could assist her and help the juveniles. The deception of the Court during this process is bad enough, but the Respondent Mother has completely let her children down.\n12. The Respondent Mother and her husband are facing eviction and have received a notice to vacate their housing by October 11, 2010. Mr. Dickerson has obtained a new residence at 709 Wellons Avenue in Spring Lake, North Carolina. The Respondent Mother is not listed as a tenant on the lease, and their relationship at this time is unclear. Mr. Dickerson is in the process of being chaptered out of the military. That is likely to occur within a very short period of time. The Respondent Mother is unemployed.\n15. The juveniles have been in care since August 31, 2009. They are in need of permanence and deserve a fresh start. The juveniles are doing well in the current foster care placements. There are no suitable relatives, based on the information that has previously been provided to the Court, and relative placement is not appropriate for these juveniles.\n17. The previous permanent plan was reunification with the Respondent Mother. The Court previously approved of this plan and finds that the Cumberland County Department of Social Services has been making reasonable efforts, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-507 and 7B-907, to implement that permanent plan of care. Those efforts include, but are not limited to, conducting Child and Family Team Meetings, developing an appropriate Out-of-Home Family Services Case Plan, making necessary referrals, coordinating with the Respondent Mother to complete the psychological evaluation and parenting assessment, and ensuring that the needs of the juveniles were being met. The Court determines that in the best interest of the juveniles, the permanent plan should now be changed to that of placement with other Court approved caretakers with a concurrent plan of adoption. The Court further determines that the Cumberland County Department of Social Services should be relieved of reunification and visitation efforts with the Respondents.\n18. Return of the juveniles to the custody of the Respondents would be contrary to the welfare and best interest of the juveniles.\nBased on these findings, the trial court concluded:\n2. Return of the juveniles to the Respondents is contrary to the welfare and best interest of the juveniles.\n3. That the Cumberland County Department of Social Services should be relieved of reunification and visitation efforts with the Respondents.\n5. That in the best interest of the juveniles, legal and physical custody should remain with the Cumberland County Department of Social Services for placement in foster care, with suitable relatives or with other Court approved caretakers, pending further orders of the Court.\nThe trial court\u2019s adoption of the findings contained in its previous orders is critical, I believe, because it shows that the trial court was aware of the developments in this case, from the events leading to the juveniles entering Cumberland County DSS custody in August 2009 to the events precipitating the court\u2019s decision to cease reunification efforts in October 2010. The court\u2019s finding that the conditions which led to the juveniles\u2019 removal from respondent\u2019s custody had not been alleviated and, in fact, had worsened implicitly recognizes that continuing reunification efforts would be futile. Such a conclusion is further supported by the trial court\u2019s findings regarding respondent\u2019s increasing abuse of prescription drugs, her \u201csinking\u201d into an \u201cabyss of domestic violence,\u201d her consistent deception of the trial court, and her inability to obtain and maintain a safe home for the juveniles. The court\u2019s findings further recognize that it would be inconsistent with the juveniles\u2019 health and safety to work toward reunifying respondent with the juveniles \u2014 indeed, the court found that the living environment created by respondent is \u201cinjurious\u201d and \u201cnot conducive to raising children.\u201d Moreover, in the trial court\u2019s finding of fact 17, the court reviews its \u201cprevious permanent plan,\u201d recites the \u201creasonable efforts\u201d made by the Cumberland County Department of Social Services, and determines that the Department \u201cshould be relieved of reunification . . . efforts with the Respondents,\u201d indicating that the trial court properly considered the relevant factors set out in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l).\nAccordingly, I agree with the majority that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact in its permanency planning order \u201caddress the substance of the statutory requirements\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l). See In re T.R.M., 208 N.C. App. 160, 164, 702 S.E.2d 108, 111 (2010) (determining that the trial court\u2019s findings supported its \u201cconclusion that further reunification efforts were not required\u201d despite none of the findings using N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(b)(l) phraseology); In re D.J.D., 171 N.C. App. 230, 238, 615 S.E.2d 26, 32 (2005) (concluding that the trial court\u2019s finding that \u201creturn of the children would be contrary to their best interests,\u201d coupled with a recitation of \u201cDSS attempts to assist the mother, were sufficient to support cessation of reunification efforts).\nNonetheless, despite having concluded that the trial court\u2019s permanency planning order is sufficient \u201cstanding alone,\u201d the majority then discusses whether the order also might have been sufficient if read together with the trial court\u2019s termination order. This discussion is both unnecessary and inappropriate. It is unnecessary because we have already held that the trial court\u2019s \u201cwritten findings of fact in [its] permanency planning order [establish] that [it] considered] the factors in section 7B-507 of our General Statutes.\u201d We have thus answered the question before us; we should not engage in any further analysis that is not necessary to dispose of this case.\nThe majority\u2019s discussion is, moreover, inappropriate in light of the well-established principle that \u201c[i]t is no part of the function of the courts, in the exercise of the judicial power vested in them by the Constitution, to give advisory opinions, or to answer moot questions, or to maintain a legal bureau for those who may chance to be interested, for the time being, in the pursuit of some academic matter.\u201d Poore v. Poore, 201 N.C. 791, 792, 161 S.E. 532, 533 (1931) (citations omitted). Critically, we have held that the permanency planning order in this case adequately stands on its own under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 7B-507 and 7B-907. Thus any further discussion of whether a hypothetically deficient order could be salvaged by looking at a subsequent termination order is purely advisory in nature. Because the facts of this case do not compel this Court to answer this question, we should refrain from doing so. See Boswell v. Boswell, 241 N.C. 515, 518-19, 85 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1955) (\u201cThis Court declares the law as it relates to the facts of the particular case under consideration. A decision may be considered authority only within the framework of such facts. Dissimilarity as to a material fact may call for application of a different principle of law. Hence, the Court will not give advisory opinions or decide abstract questions.\u201d (citations omitted)).\nBeyond issues of judicial restraint and abstract questions, I further disagree with the majority\u2019s merging of permanency planning and termination orders for purposes of appellate review. Underlying my disagreement is the fact that permanency planning hearings are fundamentally different in nature than proceedings to terminate parental rights. We have recognized that\n[t]he permanency planning process in Article 9 [of Chapter 7B] is meant to bring about a definitive placement plan for the abused, neglected, or dependent child. Within twelve months of its initial custody order removing a child from his parent, the court must conduct a permanency planning hearing to \u201cdevelop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time.\u201d [N.C.G.S.] \u00a7 7B-907(a). The permanent plan may include, inter alia, returning the child to his parent, legal guardianship, or adoption. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-907. The court enters a written order memorializing the permanent plan and continuing or modifying custodial arrangements accordingly. Id. \u00a7 7B-907(c). Even the \u201cpermanent plan\u201d is not immutable, however. Follow-up hearings every six months enable the court to review progress and, if necessary, formulate a new permanent plan. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-907(a).\nIn re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 546, 614 S.E.2d 489, 494 (2005), superseded by statute on other grounds, Act of Aug. 23, 2005, ch. 398, sec. 12, N.C. Sess. Laws 1455, 1460-61, as recognized in In re T.R.P., 360 N.C. 588, 592, 636 S.E.2d 787, 791 (2006).\n\u201cThe essential requirement ] at. . . the review hearing[ ] is that sufficient evidence be presented to the trial court so that it can determine what is in the best interest of the child.\u201d In re Shue, 311 N.C. 586, 597, 319 S.E.2d 567, 574 (1984). In light of this objective, neither the parent nor the county department of social services bears the burden of proof in permanency planning hearings, and the trial court\u2019s findings of fact need only be supported by sufficient competent evidence. Id. at 597, 319 S.E.2d at 574.\nIn contrast to the fluidity and reviewability built into Article 9 decisions, \u201cthe dissolution of parental rights under Article 11 is decisive. Termination orders \u2018completely and permanently terminate [ ] all rights and obligations of the parent to the juvenile and the juvenile to the parent arising from the parental relationship.\u2019 \u201d In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. at 548, 614 S.E.2d at 494 (alteration in original) (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1112). The petitioner bears the burden of proving that grounds for termination exist and, given the gravity of such decisions, the trial court\u2019s findings of fact must be \u201cbased on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1109(f) (2013). Given these important differences in the purposes of and procedures involved in the two types of proceedings, I do not believe that a trial court\u2019s findings in a termination order may substitute for or supplement the factual determinations necessary to support a decision to cease reunification efforts.\nThe majority concludes that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1001(a)(5) authorizes our appellate courts to consider both orders \u201ctogether\u201d so that any \u201cincomplete findings of fact in the cease reunification order may be cured by findings of fact in the termination order.\u201d In support of this conclusion, the majority cites the General Assembly\u2019s 2005 amendments to the Juvenile Code\u2019s framework for appealing juvenile cases, entitled \u201cAn Act to Amend the Juvenile Code to Expedite Outcomes for Children and Families Involved in Welfare Cases and Appeals and to Limit the Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem for Parents in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings.\u201d See Ch. 398, 2005 N.C. Sess. Laws 1455. The majority, however, ignores the fact that the 2005 amendments were enacted by the legislature to supersede our decision in In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 614 S.E.2d 489, in which we held that the entry of an order terminating parental rights during the pendency of an appeal from a permanency planning order renders the pending appeal moot. Id. at 553, 614 S.E.2d at 498. The majority\u2019s holding that a permanency planning order containing insufficient findings may be \u201ccured\u201d by substituting the findings from a subsequent termination order is simply a retooling of the holding in R.T.W., one that was rejected by our General Assembly.\nSubsection 7B-1001(a) enumerates the \u201cjuvenile matters [that] may be appealed,\u201d providing in pertinent part:\nThe Court of Appeals shall review the order to cease reunification together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights order if all of the following apply:\n1. A motion or petition to terminate the parent\u2019s rights is heard and granted.\n2. The order terminating parental rights is appealed in a proper and timely manner.\n3. The order to cease reunification is identified as an issue in the record on appeal of the termination of parental rights.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1001(a)(5)(a) (2013). The majority reads this provision as establishing that \u201cthe legislature unambiguously instructed our appellate courts to review both orders \u201c \u2018togetherf.]\u2019 \u201d But this is not what the statute says. Rather, the statute authorizes our appellate courts to \u201creview the order to cease reunification together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights order.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). Contrary to the majority\u2019s interpretation, the statute merely dictates the timing of when an underlying permanency planning order may be reviewed, which is \u201cwith an appeal of the termination of parental rights order.\u201d\nHad the legislature intended to authorize the rehabilitation of a defective permanency planning order by borrowing from a subsequent termination order, it \u201cclearly\u201d would have done so. Rather than saying that an order ceasing reunification efforts may be \u201creviewed]... together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights order,\u201d id. (emphasis added), the General Assembly would have said that such an order may be \u201creviewed]... together with the order terminating parental rights.\u201d\nReflecting on the practical results of the majority\u2019s holding further suggests that the majority has misconstrued the statute. Under the majority\u2019s rationale, despite the legislature\u2019s mandate that we \u201creview the order to cease reunification together with an appeal of the termination of parental rights order,\u201d id., we need not actually conduct a review of such an order because even the most deficient or defective order ceasing reunification efforts can be ignored so long as we conclude that the termination order contains findings that, when considered post hoc, justify the cessation of reunification efforts. But this outcome is effectively what we held in R.T.W. and what the General Assembly overrode in enacting the 2005 amendments to the Juvenile Code. The majority simply reads out of the statute the deliberately imposed requirement that orders ceasing reunification efforts \u201cshall\u201d be subject to review and reinstates the holding from R.T.W. But see Town of Pine Knoll Shores v. Evans, 331 N.C. 361, 366, 416 S.E.2d 4, 7 (1992) (\u201c[W]ords of a statute are not to be deemed useless or redundant and amendments are presumed not to be without purpose.\u201d (citations omitted)). This decision is for the General Assembly to make, not this Court.\nSimply put, I believe that the General Assembly intended our appellate courts to review permanency planning orders separately and independently from termination orders. I find nothing in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1001(a)(5) suggesting that a termination order may effectively render a flawed permanency planning order moot. Indeed, there is no point to explicitly providing parents with a right to review decisions to cease reunification efforts only to have that review obviated by allowing courts to leapfrog the permanency planning order and review the termination order in its place.\nThis conclusion is further supported by examining the provisions in the Juvenile Code detailing the process required to \u201cpreserve\u201d such decisions for review. Subsection 7B-507(c) provides, in pertinent part, that \u201c[a]t any hearing at which the court orders that reunification efforts shall cease, the affected parent, guardian, or custodian may give notice to preserve the right to appeal that order in accordance with G.S. 7B-1001.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(c) (2013). This notice of preservation is required to be \u201cgiven in writing by a proper party as defined in G.S. 7B-1002 and shall be made within 30 days after entry and service of the order in accordance with G.S. 1A-1, Rule 58.\u201d Id. \u00a7 7B-1001(b) (2013). Section 7B-1001(a)(5) further provides that review is proper only if the parents\u2019 \u201crights to appeal [were] properly preserved\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507(c). Id. \u00a7 7B-1001(a)(5).\nThe majority\u2019s holding frustrates parents\u2019 efforts to preserve their challenges to decisions ceasing reunification efforts. If parents fail to comply with any step of the preservation process, they have waived appellate review. See In re S.C.R., 198 N.C. App. 525, 531, 679 S.E.2d 905, 908-09 (concluding that a father waived appellate review of an order ceasing reunification efforts by failing to give notice within statutory time frame), appeal dismissed, 363 N.C. 654, 686 S.E.2d 676 (2009). Even if parents do preserve their right to appeal, under the majority\u2019s reasoning, a reviewing court is nonetheless not required to address any deficiencies in the permanency planning order\u2019s findings of fact and conclusions of law so long as the ultimate order terminating the parents\u2019 rights can be read as justifying the trial court\u2019s earlier decision. The General Assembly, I believe, did not set out a specific process for preserving the right to challenge decisions ceasing reunification efforts, only to have that right frustrated by a mode of review that does not require independent scrutiny of that very order.\nThe majority concludes that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact support its conclusion of law that reunification efforts should cease in this case. This holding is all that is necessary to dispose of this case.\n. The majority refers to the trial court\u2019s 19 October 2010 order as a \u201ccease reunification order.\u201d Because reunification efforts are only one aspect of the review that district courts undertake in conducting permanency planning hearings, I refer to the order as a \u201cpermanency planning order.\u201d\n. The General Assembly has recently merged the provisions regarding custody review hearings, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-906, and permanency planning hearings, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-907, into one provision: N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-906.1 (2013). See Act of June 13, 2013, ch. 129, secs. 25, 26, 2013 Sess. Laws_,_(effective October 1, 2013). As the proceedings in this matter occurred before the amendment\u2019s 1 October 2013 effective date, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-906.1 does not apply.\n. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1001 also permits a parent \u201cto appeal the order [ceasing reunification efforts] if no termination of parental rights petition or motion is filed within 180 days of the order.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-1001(a)(5)(b) (2013).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "Justice BEASLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Christopher L. Carr and Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee for Cumberland County Department of Social Services, and Beth A. Hall, Attorney Advocate for the Guardian ad Litem, petitioner-appellants.", "J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellee-mother.", "Annick Lenoir-Peek, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Office of Parent Representation, amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN THE MATTER OF: L.M.T., A.M.T.\nNo. 40PA13\n(Filed 20 December 2013)\nTermination of Parental Rights \u2014 findings\u2014permanency planning order \u2014 termination order \u2014 reviewed together\nA trial court must make written findings in a permanency planning order that consider the factors of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7B-507, but need not recite the statutory language verbatim. Even if the permanency planning order is deficient, the appellate court should review the order in conjunction with the trial court\u2019s termination of parental rights order to determine whether statutory requirements have been met. A deficiency in one may be cured by the other. In this case, the trial court\u2019s orders ceasing reunification efforts and terminating respondent\u2019s parental rights were each sufficient standing alone and should have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals.\nJustice BEASLEY concurring.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App. _,_S.E.2d_(2012), reversing orders entered on 19 October 2010 and 5 March 2012, both by Judge Edward A. Pone in District Court, Cumberland County, and remanding for additional findings of fact. Heard in the Supreme Court on 4 September 2013.\nChristopher L. Carr and Elizabeth Kennedy-Gurnee for Cumberland County Department of Social Services, and Beth A. Hall, Attorney Advocate for the Guardian ad Litem, petitioner-appellants.\nJ. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellee-mother.\nAnnick Lenoir-Peek, Assistant Appellate Defender, for Office of Parent Representation, amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "0165-01", "first_page_order": 205, "last_page_order": 223 }