{ "id": 4320509, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERIC STEVEN JONES and JERRY ALVIN WHITE", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Jones", "decision_date": "2014-03-07", "docket_number": "No. 527A12", "first_page": "299", "last_page": "315", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 N.C. 299" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "734 S.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "638 S.E.2d 591", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12637395 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "595", "parenthetical": "holding that an indictment that alleged, inter alia, the defendant had \"attempted to obtain BEER AND CIGARETTES from FOOD LION ... BY MEANS OF USING THE CREDIT CARD AND C[H]ECK CARD\" of a named individual was sufficient" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/638/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633106 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 562", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633180 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 S.E.2d 998", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999" }, { "page": "999-1000" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "145 N.C. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11253560 ], "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/145/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 N.C. 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570300 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 N.C. App. 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8373367 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "holding that an indictment that alleged, inter alia, the defendant had \"attempted to obtain BEER AND CIGARETTES from FOOD LION ... BY MEANS OF USING THE CREDIT CARD AND C[H]ECK CARD\" of a named individual was sufficient" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/181/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 S.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "36" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "219 N.C. 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624269 ], "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/219/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "83 N.C. 637", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11278962 ], "year": 1880, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "640" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/83/0637-01" ] }, { "cite": "85 S.E. 7", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "169 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8658786 ], "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/169/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "169 N.C. 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1915, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "383", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "158 S.E.2d 820", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "822", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 N.C. 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574573 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "730", "parenthetical": "citations and internal quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/272/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566760 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "77 S.E.2d 917", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "919" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 N.C. 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8607564 ], "year": 1953, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/238/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "262 S.E.2d 277", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5) (1978)" }, { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8574230 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "234", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5) (1978)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795543 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 L. Ed. 2d 80", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 U.S. 835", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9489058, 9489509, 9489574, 9489290, 9489387, 9489132, 9489679, 9489168, 9489105, 9489200, 9489334, 9489623, 9489435, 9489244 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/528/0835-01", "/us/528/0835-11", "/us/528/0835-12", "/us/528/0835-07", "/us/528/0835-09", "/us/528/0835-03", "/us/528/0835-14", "/us/528/0835-04", "/us/528/0835-02", "/us/528/0835-05", "/us/528/0835-08", "/us/528/0835-13", "/us/528/0835-10", "/us/528/0835-06" ] }, { "cite": "139 S.E.2d 661", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "665" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 N.C. 353", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569961 ], "year": 1965, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/263/0353-01" ] }, { "cite": "509 S.E.2d 178", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "191", "parenthetical": "first alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571533 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "447", "parenthetical": "first alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 S.E.2d 364", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "240 N.C. 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8596105 ], "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/240/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 S.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "508" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "285 N.C. 746", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569924 ], "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "750" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/285/0746-01" ] }, { "cite": "263 S.E.2d 711", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1974)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 N.C. 445", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8575234 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1974)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/299/0445-01" ] }, { "cite": "677 S.E.2d 444", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "449", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 322", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151610 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "327-28", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0322-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 S.E.2d 484", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "488", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 327-28, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153670 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436", "parenthetical": "quoting State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 327-28, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" }, { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "250 N.C. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624666 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" }, { "page": "517" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/250/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 N.C. App. 314", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8436667 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "317", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/171/0314-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 S.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 39, "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "621" }, { "page": "621" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "621" }, { "page": "621" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "622" }, { "page": "626" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "627" }, { "page": "627", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "628" }, { "page": "628", "parenthetical": "Elmore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "629" }, { "page": "629" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" }, { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "314 N.C. 432", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4693655 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/314/0432-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 882", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "893", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 615", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571622 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "632", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "632" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0615-01" ] }, { "cite": "58 S.E. 998", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.", "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999-1000" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 199", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 1835, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "79 N.C. 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8698360 ], "year": 1878, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/79/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 N.C. 202", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11277399 ], "year": 1874, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "203" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/71/0202-01" ] }, { "cite": "283 S.E.2d 719", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "731", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "304 N.C. 293", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8567490 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/304/0293-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 S.E.2d 294", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "282 N.C. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564162 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "245", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/282/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 S.E.2d 864", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "872" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "312 N.C. 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4750769 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "210" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/312/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 S.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" }, { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "citation and internal quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "73" }, { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "second alteration in original" }, { "page": "74", "parenthetical": "citations and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 268", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2535615 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0268-01" ] }, { "cite": "90 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "243 N.C. 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624072 ], "year": 1955, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/243/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "145 N.C. 422", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 11253560 ], "year": 1907, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/145/0422-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 S.E.2d 147", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "280 N.C. 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8570300 ], "year": 1971, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/280/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "239 S.E.2d 406", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 633", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8566760 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "638" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0633-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 S.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" }, { "page": "861", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "250 N.C. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624666 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1959, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517-18" }, { "page": "517-18" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/250/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 S.E.2d 743", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 2 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1348, "char_count": 41321, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.681724271039326e-07, "percentile": 0.69767156309113 }, "sha256": "48476c153d98eb6aeb5d071e54f488b5fefc537741359c6de2e0fc767576828a", "simhash": "1:db31d4f2a429a05a", "word_count": 6598 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:46.212757+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice NEWBY joins in this opinion.", "Justice BEASLEY joins in this opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERIC STEVEN JONES and JERRY ALVIN WHITE" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JACKSON, Justice.\nIn this appeal we consider whether the trial court properly denied defendant Eric Steven Jones\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft, and whether the trial court properly dismissed indictments charging Jones with obtaining property by false pretenses and defendant Jerry Alvin White with trafficking in stolen identities. We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to support the jury\u2019s determination that Jones possessed the specific intent to commit identity theft. We further conclude that the indictments against Jones and White were insufficient to support the resulting convictions against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and against White for trafficking in stolen identities. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.\nIn the early morning hours of 2 June 2010, Officer Steven Maloney of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department initiated a traffic stop of a silver Hyundai Accent that was a suspect vehicle in a financial transaction card theft case. Jones, the driver, was unable to produce a driver\u2019s license or vehicle registration card. During a consensual search of the vehicle, Officer Maloney found a Maaco work order listing James Coleman as the customer and two bags of marijuana. Officer Maloney placed Jones under arrest and conducted a search incident to the arrest. In Jones\u2019s wallet, Officer Maloney found, inter alia, pieces of paper with the names, addresses, and credit card information of John Rini, James Payton, Sean Daly, and Charles Batchelor.\nSubsequent police investigation revealed that each of these individuals had stayed at The Blake Hotel in Charlotte in May 2010. Each man had been checked into the hotel by White and had provided a credit card to him for payment. White confessed that he had written down the names, addresses, and credit card numbers of Payton, Daly, and Batchelor, and had provided this information to another individual; however, White denied recording Rini\u2019s information. On various dates in May 2010, unauthorized charges were made on Rini\u2019s, Payton\u2019s, and Batchelor\u2019s credit cards.\nFurther investigation revealed that on 18 May 2010, an unauthorized purchase was made with Melanie Wright\u2019s credit card for the installation of four new tires and rims, an alignment, wiper blades, and brake services for a Hyundai Accent with the same vehicle identification number as the car Jones was driving when arrested. The work order was made under the name \u201cPayton James\u201d or \u201cJames Payton,\u201d and the credit card receipt was signed with the name \u201cJames Payton.\u201d On 28 May 2010, Jones paid for paint materials and service, body supplies and labor, and \u201csublet/towing\u201d of the Hyundai Accent by Maaco with Mary Berry\u2019s credit card. This work order was made under the name \u201cJames Coleman\u201d and Jones signed the credit card receipt as \u201cColeman J.\u201d\nOn 7 September 2010, the grand jury returned true bills of indictment charging Jones with four counts of trafficking in stolen identities, two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses, and one count of identity theft. The grand jury indicted White for four counts of trafficking in stolen identities. Jones and White were tried jointly during the 29 August 2011 criminal session of Superior Court in Mecklenburg County. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, defendants moved to dismiss all charges on two grounds: (1) that the indictments were fatally flawed; and (2) that the State\u2019s evidence was insufficient. The trial court denied defendants\u2019 motions as to insufficiency of the evidence, but deferred ruling on the motions based upon the indictments. Defendants did not present any evidence, and both renewed their motions to dismiss at the close of the evidence.\nThe jury found Jones not guilty of trafficking in stolen identities but guilty of two counts of obtaining property by false pretenses and one count of identity theft.' The jury found White guilty of all four counts of trafficking in stolen identities. The trial court denied Jones\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft. The trial court then dismissed the charges against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and all charges against White for trafficking in stolen identities on the basis that the indictments were \u201cinsufficient as a matter of law.\u201d\nJones appealed his conviction for identity theft to the Court of Appeals, arguing, inter alia, that the State failed to prove that he possessed the specific intent necessary to be convicted of identity theft. State v. Jones,_.N.C. App._,_, 734 S.E.2d 617, 621 (2012). The State appealed the dismissals of the charges against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and against White for trafficking in stolen identities. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 621.\nThe Court of Appeals found no error in the trial court\u2019s denial of Jones\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 622. The court noted that identity theft occurs when a person \u201c \u2018knowingly obtains, possesses, or uses identifying information of another person, living or dead, with the intent to fraudulently represent that the person is the other person for the purposes of making financial or credit transactions in the other person\u2019s name.\u2019 \u201d Id. at _, 734 S.E.2d at 621 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-113.20(a) (2011) (emphasis added)). The court further observed that fraudulent intent may be established \u201cbased upon a defendant\u2019s conduct or actions.\u201d Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 621. The court determined that evidence that Jones used the credit card numbers to make purchases and payments on his own behalf when he was not the cardholder or an authorized user was sufficient to raise a reasonable inference of misrepresentation. Id. at _, 734 S.E.2d at 622. The court stated, \u201c[W]hen one presents a credit card or credit card number as payment, he is representing himself to be the cardholder or an authorized user thereof. . . . No verbal statement of one\u2019s identity is required, nor can the mere stating of a name different from that of the cardholder negate the inference of misrepresentation.\u201d Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 622. Therefore, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence of Jones\u2019s intent to commit identity theft and that the trial court properly denied Jones\u2019s motion to dismiss the identity theft charge. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 622.\nThe Court of Appeals also found no error in the trial court\u2019s dismissal of the charges against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 626. The court stated that in charging the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses, \u201c \u2018it is the general rule that the thing obtained . . . must be described with reasonable certainty, and by the name or term usually employed to describe it.\u2019 \u201d Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 627 (quoting State v. Ledwell, 171 N.C. App. 314, 317, 614 S.E.2d 562, 565 (2005) (alteration in original)). Citing examples of insufficient descriptions, the court concluded that alleging that Jones obtained \u201cservices\u201d from Tire Kingdom and Maaco, \u201cwithout even the most general description of the services or their monetary value,\u201d was \u201cplainly insufficient\u201d to sustain the charges. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 627.\nThe Court of Appeals was divided on the dismissal of the charges against White for trafficking in stolen identities. Relying upon a long line of cases involving illegal trafficking in various substances, the majority below stated that \u201c \u2018it is necessary ... to allege in the bill of indictment the name of the person to whom the [transfer] was made or that his name is unknown, unless some statute eliminates that requirement.\u2019 \u201d Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 627 (second alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bissette, 250 N.C. 514, 517, 108 S.E.2d 858, 861 (1959)). Finding no language in either section 14-113.20 or section 14-113.20A of the North Carolina General Statutes eliminating the common law requirement, the majority concluded that the trial court properly dismissed the indictments for failure to name the recipient of the identifying information or to state that the recipient\u2019s name was unknown. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 628. The majority stated that naming the recipient was \u201cparticularly crucial to avoid the risk of double jeopardy\u201d in cases involving trafficking in stolen identities because identifying information theoretically \u201ccan be trafficked an infinite number of times to an infinite number of recipients.\u201d Id. at _, 734 S.E.2d at 628. Therefore, in order to give a defendant sufficient notice of the incidence of trafficking for which he must present a defense, the majority held that an indictment for trafficking in stolen identities \u201cmust specify the identity of the recipient.\u201d Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 628.\nThe dissent below agreed with the majority that the common law requires naming the recipient or stating that the recipient is unknown in an indictment for trafficking in illicit substances. Id. at__, 734 S.E.2d at 628 (Elmore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Nonetheless, the dissenting judge would have held that the common law rule is inapplicable to the distinct crime of trafficking in stolen identities. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 629. The dissenting judge noted that, unlike illicit substances, the items listed as \u201cidentifying information\u201d in section 14-113.20(b) have \u201cindependent identifying characteristics which can be specifically described in an indictment so as to put the accused on notice regarding the identifying information he allegedly sold or transferred.\u201d Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 629. The dissenting judge further noted that identifying information often is stored on-line and can be easily accessed without authorization and transferred to another in an \u201canonymous vacuum,\u201d which would result in most indictments stating that the transferee\u2019s identity is \u201cunknown.\u201d Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 629. Given the \u201cunique nature\u201d of trafficking in stolen identities, the dissenting judge reasoned that imposing the common law rule is short-sighted and unnecessary. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 629. Turning to the instant case, the dissenting judge would have held that the indictment sufficiently apprised White of the conduct that was the subject of the accusation, and therefore, was not fatally defective. Id. at_, 734 S.E.2d at 629.\nThe State filed its appeal of right based upon the dissenting opinion. We allowed the State\u2019s petition for discretionary review on the issue of the indictments against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses and Jones\u2019s petition for discretionary review on the issue of his motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft.\nJones argues that the State failed to prove that he possessed the specific intent necessary to be convicted of identity theft, and therefore, the trial court should have granted his motion to dismiss. We disagree. The standard of review regarding motions to dismiss is well settled:\n\u201cWhen reviewing a defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss a charge on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines whether the State presented substantial evidence in support of each element of the charged offense. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion. In this determination, all evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the State, and the State receives the benefit of every reasonable inference supported by that evidence.... [I]f there is substantial evidence \u2014 whether direct, circumstantial, or both \u2014 -to support a finding that the offense charged has been committed and that the defendant committed it, the case is for the jury and the motion to dismiss should be denied.\u201d\nState v. Hunt, 365 N.C. 432, 436, 722 S.E.2d 484, 488 (2012) (quoting State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 327-28, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted)). Here the indictment charged that Jones \u201cdid knowingly obtain or possess the identifying information pertaining to three or more separate persons with [fraudulent intent] ... , to wit: [Jones] possessed the credit card number[s] of. . . Rini, . . . Batchelor, . . . Payton, . . . and . . . Daly.\u201d It is undisputed that Jones possessed Rini\u2019s, Batchelor\u2019s, Payton\u2019s, and Daly\u2019s credit card numbers. At issue is whether the evidence was sufficient to support an inference that he did so with the intent to \u201cfraudulently represent that [he] [wa]s [Rini, Batchelor, Payton, or Daly] for the purposes of making financial or credit transactions in [those individuals\u2019] name[s].\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-113.20(a) (2013).\n\u201c[I]ntent is seldom provable by direct evidence and ordinarily must be proved by circumstances from which it may be inferred.\u201d State v. Hardy, 299 N.C. 445, 449, 263 S.E.2d 711, 714 (1980) (citing State v. Bell, 285 N.C. 746, 750, 208 S.E.2d 506, 508 (1974)). Moreover, when \u201ca specific mental intent or state is an essential element of the crime charged, evidence may be offered of such acts or declarations of the accused as tend to establish the requisite mental intent or state, even though the evidence discloses the commission of another offense by the accused.\u201d State v. McClain, 240 N.C. 171, 175, 81 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1954) (citations omitted). Here the evidence showed that using the name James Coleman, Jones used Mary Berry\u2019s credit card number to obtain various services at Maaco. Additionally, the evidence tended to show that Jones, using the name James Payton, used Melanie Wright\u2019s credit card number to obtain various items and services at Tire Kingdom. Although these actions are not the basis of the identity theft charge, this evidence tends to establish Jones\u2019s mental intent in possessing Rini\u2019s, Payton\u2019s, Daly\u2019s, and Batchelor\u2019s credit card numbers. Based upon the evidence that Jones had fraudulently used other individuals\u2019 credit card numbers, a reasonable juror could infer that Jones possessed Rini\u2019s, Payton\u2019s, Daly\u2019s, and Batchelor\u2019s credit card numbers with the intent to fraudulently represent that he was those individuals for the purpose of making financial transactions in their names. It was then \u201c \u2018for the [jurors] to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in combination, satisfied] them beyond a reasonable doubt that . . . defendant [wa]s actually guilty [of identity theft].\u2019 \u201d State v. Trull, 349 N.C. 428, 447, 509 S.E.2d 178, 191 (1998) (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Rowland, 263 N.C. 353, 358, 139 S.E.2d 661, 665 (1965)), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 835, 145 L. Ed. 2d 80 (1999).\nJones argues that the Maaco and Tire Kingdom purchases actually negate an intent to commit identity theft because he used names that were different from the names of the credit card owners. Specifically, Jones contends that the words \u201cwith the intent to fraudulently represent that the person is the other person\u201d require the State to prove that he intended to represent that he was Rini, Payton, Daly, and Batchelor, and not some other individual or an authorized user. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-113.20(a).\n\u201cWe generally construe criminal statutes against the State. However, this does not require that words be given their narrowest or most strained possible meaning. A criminal statute is still construed utilizing \u2018common sense\u2019 and legislative intent.\u201d State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 277 (2005) (citations omitted). \u201c[W]here a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature,... the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded.\u201d Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). We cannot conclude that the Legislature intended for individuals to escape criminal liability simply by stating or signing a name that differs from the cardholder\u2019s name. Such a result would be absurd and contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature to criminalize fraudulent use of identifying information. Because the State\u2019s evidence was sufficient to raise an inference of Jones\u2019s fraudulent intent in possessing Rini\u2019s, Payton\u2019s, Daly\u2019s, and Batchelor\u2019s credit card numbers, the trial court did not err by denying Jones\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft.\nIn its appeal the State first argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictments against Jones for obtaining property by false pretenses. An indictment must contain\n\u201c[a] plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.\u201d\nState v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 234, 262 S.E.2d 277, 281 (1980) (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5) (1978)). The purpose of this requirement is:\n\u201c(1) [to provide] such certainty in the statement of the accusation as will identify the offense with which the accused is sought to be charged; (2) to protect the accused from being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense; (3) to enable the accused to prepare for trial, and (4) to enable the court, on conviction or plea of nolo contendere or guilty to pronounce sentence according to the rights of the case.\u201d\nId. at 235, 262 S.E.2d at 281 (quoting State v. Greer, 238 N.C. 325, 327, 77 S.E.2d 917, 919 (1953)). \u201c[A]n indictment couched in the language of the statute is generally sufficient to charge the statutory offense.\u201d State v. Palmer, 293 N.C. 633, 638, 239 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1977). But\n\u201c[i]f the statutory words fail to [charge the essential elements of the offense in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner,] they must be supplemented by other allegations which so plainly, intelligibly and explicitly set forth every essential element of the offense as to leave no doubt in the mind of the accused and the court as to the offense intended to be charged.\u201d\nState v. Cook, 272 N.C. 728, 730, 158 S.E.2d 820, 822 (1968) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).\nSection 14-100(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes defines the elements of obtaining property by false pretenses as (1) \u201cknowingly and designedly by means of any kind of false pretense\u201d; (2) \u201cobtainfing] or attempting] to obtain from any person ... any money, goods, property, services, chose in action, or other thing of value\u201d; (3) \u201cwith intent to cheat or defraud any person of such money, goods, property, services, chose in action or other thing of value.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-100(a) (2013). Additionally, \u201c[i]t is the general rule that the thing obtained by the false pretense ... must be described with reasonable certainty, and by the name or term usually employed to describe it.\u201d State v. Gibson, 169 N.C. 380, 383, 169 N.C. 318, 320, 85 S.E. 7, 8 (1915) (citations omitted). This Court has not had occasion to address this issue recently, but consistently has held that simply describing the property obtained as \u201cmoney,\u201d State v. Reese, 83 N.C. 637, 640 (1880), or \u201cgoods and things of value,\u201d State v. Smith, 219 N.C. 400, 401, 14 S.E.2d 36, 36 (1941), is insufficient to allege the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses.\nHere the indictments alleged that Jones obtained \u201cservices\u201d from Tire Kingdom and Maaco. Like the terms \u201cmoney\u201d or \u201cgoods and things of value,\u201d the term \u201cservices\u201d does not describe with reasonable certainty the property obtained by false pretenses. Moreover, \u201cservices\u201d is not the name or term usually employed to adequately describe the tires, rims, wiper blades, tire and rim installation, wheel alignment, and brake services Jones allegedly obtained from Tire Kingdom, or the paint materials and service, body supplies and labor, and \u201csublet/towing\u201d services Jones obtained from Maaco. Cf. State v. Perkins, 181 N.C. App. 209, 215, 638 S.E.2d 591, 595 (2007) (holding that an indictment that alleged, inter alia, the defendant had \u201cattempted to obtain BEER AND CIGARETTES from FOOD LION ... BY MEANS OF USING THE CREDIT CARD AND C[H]ECK CARD\u201d of a named individual was sufficient). Accordingly, we hold that the indictments were insufficient to allege the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses and that the trial court property dismissed those charges.\nThe State also argues that the trial court erred by dismissing the indictments against White for trafficking in stolen identities. In Bissette, we stated that \u201c[w]here a sale is prohibited, it is necessary, for a conviction, to allege in the bill of indictment the name of the person to whom the sale was made or that his name is unknown, unless some statute eliminates that requirement.\u201d 250 N.C. at 517, 108 S.E.2d at 861. We have extended the Bissette rule to apply to a statute prohibiting the possession or sale of narcotics. State v. Bennett, 280 N.C. 167, 169, 185 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1971). Therefore, it is a logical extension to also apply the Bissette rule to the crime of trafficking in stolen identities. Section 14-113.20A(a) of the North Carolina General Statutes states that \u201c[i]t is unlawful for a person to sell, transfer, or purchase the' identifying information of another person with the intent to commit identity theft, or to assist another person in committing identity theft, as set forth in [N.C.]G.S. 14-113.20.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-113.20A(a) (2013). Nothing in section 14-113.20A eliminates the common law requirement that the indictment state either the name of the recipient or that the recipient\u2019s name is unknown. Accordingly, the State was required to allege in the indictments the name of the recipient of the identifying information or that the recipient\u2019s name was unknown.\nIn addition, we note that \u201c[t]he reason for setting forth the name of the [recipient] is because each sale [or transfer] constitutes a distinct offense for which the offender may be punished.\u201d State v. Tisdale, 145 N.C. 305, 307, 145 N.C. 422, 425, 58 S.E.2d 998, 999 (1907). Naming the recipient notifies the accused of \u201cthe particular transaction on which the indictment is founded\u201d and gives the accused \u201cthe benefit of the first acquittal or conviction if accused a second time of the same offense.\u201d Id. at 425, 58 S.E.2d at 999-1000. This reasoning is even more persuasive in the context of trafficking in stolen identities because a single item of identifying information can be transferred to countless recipients. The- State argues that the independent identifying characteristics of identifying information are sufficient to put a defendant on notice of the particular transaction on which the indictment is founded. However even if a defendant is put on notice of the particular identifying information he is alleged to have transferred, he will not know the particular transaction with which he is being charged. We hold that the State must allege the name of the recipient or that the recipient\u2019s name is unknown in charging the crime of trafficking in stolen identities. Because the State failed to do so here, the indictments were insufficient to support White\u2019s convictions for trafficking in stolen identities and the trial court properly dismissed those charges.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nAFFIRMED.\n. The language of the statute has remained unchanged as of the date of this opinion.\n. Although social security numbers and digital signatures may contain \u201cunique identifiers,\u201d State v. Jones, _N.C. _, _, _S.E.2d_, _(2014) (527A12) (Martin, J., dissenting in part), section 14-113.20(b) lists other examples of \u201cidentifying information\u201d that do not share the same type of independent identifying characteristics, such as passwords and \u201c[a]ny other numbers or information that can be used to access a person\u2019s financial resources.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-113.20(b)(10), (13).", "type": "majority", "author": "JACKSON, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice MARTIN\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nA jury found defendant Jerry White guilty of four counts of trafficking in stolen identities. The majority today affirms the dismissal of all four charges by extending a common law rule that has never before been applied to this statutory offense. This extension of the common law rule runs counter to our long-standing requirements for indictments and furthers neither the interests of defendants nor the administration of justice. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent to that portion of the majority\u2019s opinion.\nThe majority\u2019s decision fails to properly consider the standards for legally sufficient indictments. Indictments must contain \u201c[a] plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the defendant... of the conduct which is the subject of the accusation.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5)(2013). The statutory requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5) fulfill a longstanding dual purpose: \u201cto give the defendant notice of the charge against him to the end that he may prepare his defense and to be in a position to plead [double jeopardy] in the event he is again brought to trial for the same offense . . . [and] to enable the court to know what judgment to pronounce in case of conviction.\u201d State v. Burton, 243 N.C. 277, 278, 90 S.E.2d 390, 391 (1955).\nIn State v. Worsley, 336 N.C. 268, 443 S.E.2d 68 (1994), this Court considered an issue nearly identical to the one now before us, involving an indictment for burglary. While the common law had required burglary indictments to specify which felony the defendant intended to commit, we held, \u201cSuch cases were decided prior to the enactment of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5) . . . and are no longer controlling on this issue.\u201d Id. at 279, 443 S.E.2d at 73. The former rule was \u201cdrawn from the ancient strict pleading requirements of the common law while the pleading requirements of the Criminal Procedure Act are more liberal.\u201d Id. at 280, 443 S.E.2d at 74 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The indictment statute, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924, therefore \u201csupplanted prior [common] law.\u201d Id. at 279, 443 S.E.2d at 73. The new statutory paradigm \u2014 the same that is in place today \u2014 requires indictments to \u201c \u2018charge [ ] the offense ... in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner and contain [ ] sufficient allegations to enable the trial court to proceed to judgment and to bar a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.\u2019 \u201d Id. at 281, 443 S.E.2d at 74 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted). The Court accordingly held that \u201c[t]he indictment for first-degree burglary in the present case therefore satisfied] the requirements of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5), notwithstanding the fact that it [did] not\u201d comply with the prior common law requirement of specifying the felony the defendant intended to commit. Id. The same reasoning applies to the case before us.\n\u201c[A]n indictment couched in the language of the statute is generally sufficient to charge the statutory offense.\u201d State v. Palmer, 293 N.C. 633, 638, 239 S.E.2d 406, 410 (1977). As long as the indictment \u201cexpress [es] the charge against the defendant in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner . . . [it] shall not be quashed.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15-153 (2013). Pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-925, when a defendant believes he needs more information to mount his preferred defense, he \u201cmay request a bill of particulars to obtain information to supplement the facts contained in the indictment.\u201d State v. Randolph, 312 N.C. 198, 210, 321 S.E.2d 864, 872 (1984). \u201cIf any or all of the items of information requested are necessary to enable the defendant adequately to prepare or conduct his defense, the court must order the State to file and serve a bill of particulars.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-925(c) (2013). Indictments receive a liberal construction and quashing indictments is not favored. State v. Russell, 282 N.C. 240, 245, 192 S.E.2d 294, 297 (1972) (citations omitted). Moreover, \u201cit is not the function of an indictment to bind the hands of the State with technical rules of pleading; rather, its purposes are to identify clearly the crime being charged, thereby putting the accused on reasonable notice to defend against it and prepare for trial, and to protect the accused from being jeopardized by the State more than once for the same crime.\u201d State v. Sturdivant, 304 N.C. 293, 311, 283 S.E.2d 719, 731 (1981) (citation omitted).\nIn this case, White\u2019s indictment for trafficking in stolen identities mirrored the language of the controlling statute. The indictment not only alleged the precise statutory language but also included the names of White\u2019s victims, the dates of the sales, the county in which the sales occurred, and the type of identifying information being trafficked. Yet the majority has seen fit to void that indictment based on a common law rule that has never been \u2014 and should not be\u2014 extended to trafficking in stolen identities.\nThe rule applied by the majority because of its \u201clogical extension\u201d to this case was formally announced in State v. Bissette, 250 N.C. 514, 108 S.E.2d 858 (1959), but it originated much earlier. The Court\u2019s earliest application of the rule requiring the State to allege the name of the recipient of an illicit sale was in the unlawful sale of alcohol, and its purpose was \u201cto identify the particular fact or transaction on which the indictment is founded.\u201d State v. Stamey, 71 N.C. 202, 203 (1874); see also State v. Pickens, 79 N.C. 652 (1878); State v. Blythe, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 199 (1835). Bissette extended that rule to the unlawful sale of agricultural seeds. 250 N.C. at 517-18, 108 S.E.2d at 861. Later, the Court again extended the rule to the unlawful sale of narcotics. State v. Bennett, 280 N.C. 167, 169, 185 S.E.2d 147, 149 (1971).\nThe commonality among all these cases is the inherent fungibility of the substances being unlawfully sold. Differentiating between two jugs of malt liquor, two sacks of tobacco seed, or two baggies of cocaine is nearly impossible. It was this lack of differentiation that raised the concern of multiple prosecutions for the same transaction. Because the goods themselves could not be used to specify which unlawful transaction was the basis for prosecution, this Court substituted a different identifying element, concluding, \u201cWhen the name of the vendee of the liquor is given, the particular transaction on which the indictment is founded is identified.\u201d State v. Tisdale, 145 N.C. 422, 425, 58 S.E. 998, 999-1000 (1907).\nStolen identities, however, are not fungible goods. The inherent nature of the information regulated by N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 14-113.20 and 14-113.20A \u2014 -social security numbers, drivers license numbers, bank account numbers, debit and credit card numbers, digital signatures, biometric data, etc. \u2014 is that they are unique identifiers. The uniqueness and non-fungibility of these data are what make them valuable. When the State alleges trafficking in stolen identities, it must allege specific information sufficient to put defendant on notice when it \u201casserts facts supporting every element of [the] criminal offense and the defendant\u2019s commission thereof.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924(a)(5). Alleging the specific credit card or passport number that has been sold necessarily limits the possible transactions for prosecution. Therefore, logic does not require the extension of the Bissette rule to the offense of trafficking in stolen identities.\nWhile the majority uses the potential for repetitious and anonymous sales as a reason to enforce the extra-statutory Bissette rule, in reality it shows the harmful consequences of extending the rule. As noted by the majority, stolen identifying information can be sold many times over to anonymous purchasers, creating a situation (not at issue here) in which a defendant has sold someone else\u2019s identifying information so many times that he does not know to which sale the indictment is referring. While alleging the recipient may provide additional notice to the defendant, compliance with the Bissette rule may be accomplished either by alleging \u201cthe name of the person to whom the sale was made\u201d or that \u201cthe purchaser was in fact unknown.\u201d Bissette, 250 N.C. at 517-18, 108 S.E.2d at 861 (citations omitted). The State can thus comply with this extra-statutory common law rule without providing any useful information to the defendant. Yet under the majority\u2019s rule, failure to include this statement is grounds for quashing the indictment and finding a jurisdictional defect. This result furthers neither defendant\u2019s desire for notice of his alleged crimes nor the State\u2019s interest in pursuing violations of our criminal code. The Bissette rule simply is poorly tailored to this uniquely twenty-first century criminal offense.\nAs in Worsley, the passage of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924 supplanted the prior common law requirement. The indictment here charged the offense \u201cin a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner\u201d that \u201cinformed] the defendant of the charge against him with sufficient certainty to enable him to prepare his defense.\u201d Worsley, 336 N.C. at 281, 443 S.E.2d at 74 (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nThe decision to extend or limit common law rules is rooted in the courts\u2019 duty \u201cto reflect the spirit of their times and discard legal rules when they serve to impede society rather than to advance it.\u201d Nelson v. Freeland, 349 N.C. 615, 632, 507 S.E.2d 882, 893 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The State suffers a harsh penalty for flawed indictments \u2014 complete dismissal of its case. The Criminal Procedure Act was \u201cdesigned to remove from our law unnecessary technicalities which tend to obstruct justice.\u201d State v. Freeman, 314 N.C. 432, 436, 333 S.E.2d 743, 746 (1985). Accordingly, when determining whether indictments are fatally flawed, we apply N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-924 and decline to \u201cengraft additional unnecessary burdens upon the due administration of justice.\u201d Id. The common law \u201cis not inflexible, and therefore we will not hesitate to abandon a rule which has resulted in injustices, whether it be criminal or civil.\u201d Nelson, 349 N.C. at 632, 507 S.E.2d at 893 (citation omitted). The indictment in this case reasonably put White on notice of the transactions for which he was being prosecuted. It contained \u201cplain and concise factual statements] supporting every element of [the] criminal offense[s] with sufficient precision to clearly apprise the defendant of the conduct which [was] the subject of the accusation.\u201d Freeman, 314 N.C. at 436, 333 S.E.2d at 746. I would not quash this indictment based on a technical pleading requirement that this Court now imposes for the first time. Accordingly, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.\nJustice NEWBY joins in this opinion.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Justice MARTIN" }, { "text": "Justice HUDSON\nconcurring in part and dissenting in part.\nWhile I agree with the majority that the trial court properly dismissed the obtaining property by false pretenses charges against defendant Jones and the trafficking in stolen identities charges against defendant White, I believe the trial court erred in denying Jones\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion.\nThe crime of identity theft requires that a defendant \u201cknowingly obtain] ], possess[ ], or use[ ] identifying information of another person, living or dead, with the intent to fraudulently represent that the person is the other person for the purposes of making financial or credit transactions in the other person\u2019s name, to obtain anything of value, benefit, or advantage, or for the purpose of avoiding legal consequences.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-113.20(a) (2013) (emphasis added). Here defendant Jones argued that the State had not presented any evidence that he had acted with the intent of representing that he was the person named on the credit cards; in fact, as noted by the majority, defendant Jones pointed out that he specifically did not sign the transactions at either Maaco or Tire Kingdom with the names on the credit cards. In rebutting this argument, the majority states that it \u201ccannot conclude that the Legislature intended for individuals to escape criminal liability simply by stating or signing a name that differs from the cardholder\u2019s name. Such a result would be absurd and contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature to criminalize fraudulent use of identifying information.\u201d\nThe majority here seems to overlook the other statutes besides the identity theft statute that \u201ccriminalize fraudulent use of identifying information\u201d; an offender could be charged with one of these, which would easily avoid the result the majority fears. Most relevant here, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-113.13 provides in part:\n(a) A person is guilty of financial transaction card fraud when, with intent to defraud the issuer, a person or organization providing money, goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person, he\n(2) Obtains money, goods, services, or anything else of value by:\na. Representing without the consent of the cardholder that he is the holder of a specified card; or\nb. Presenting the financial transaction card without the authorization or permission of the cardholder ....\nId. \u00a7 14-113.13 (2013). Unlike the crime of identity theft addressed in section 14-113.20, financial transaction card fraud does not require that the defendant represent that he is the other person, it is instead enough that he represents that he is an authorized user of the card. Id. \u00a7 14-113.13(a)(2)(b). If we read out of the identity theft statute the requirement that the defendant act \u201cwith the intent to fraudulently represent that the person is the other person,\u201d there is little to no difference between identity theft and financial transaction card fraud. Because I do not see our task as rewriting this statute, and because our doing so cannot be what the legislature intended, I respectfully dissent.\nGiven the above, I would hold that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that defendant committed identity theft and that the trial court erred in denying defendant Jones\u2019s motion to dismiss. Therefore, I concur in part and dissent in part.\nJustice BEASLEY joins in this opinion.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Justice HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan and Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State-appellant/appellee.", "Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Andrew DeSimone, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee/appellant Eric Steven Jones.", "C. Scott Holmes for defendant-appellee Jerry Alvin White." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ERIC STEVEN JONES and JERRY ALVIN WHITE\nNo. 527A12\n(Filed 7 March 2014)\n1. Identity Theft \u2014 sufficient evidence of intent\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant Jones\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of identity theft where Jones argued that the State failed to prove that he possessed the specific intent necessary for identity theft. Based upon evidence that Jones had fraudulently used other individuals\u2019 credit card numbers, a reasonable juror could have inferred that Jones possessed Rini\u2019s, Payton\u2019s, Daly\u2019s, and Batchelor\u2019s credit card numbers with the intent to fraudulently represent that he was those individuals for the purpose of making financial transactions in their names. Although Jones contended that the State was required to prove that he intended to represent that he was Rini, Payton, Daly, and Batchelor and not some other individual or an authorized user, it cannot be concluded that the Legislature intended for individuals to escape criminal liability simply by stating or signing a name that differs from the cardholder\u2019s name.\n2. False Pretenses \u2014 indictments\u2014not sufficiently specific\u2014 property obtained \u2014 \u201cservices\u201d\nIndictments were insufficient to allege the crime of obtaining property by false pretenses and the trial court property dismissed those charges where the indictments alleged that defendant Jones obtained \u201cservices\u201d from lire Kingdom and Maaco. Like the terms \u201cmoney\u201d or \u201cgoods and things of value,\u201d the term \u201cservices\u201d does not describe with reasonable certainty the property obtained by false pretenses.\n3. Identity Theft \u2014 indictments\u2014insufficient\u2014name of recipient\nThe State must allege the name of the recipient or that the recipient\u2019s name is unknown in charging the crime of trafficking in stolen identities. Because the State failed to do so here, the indictments were insufficient to support defendant White\u2019s convictions for trafficking in stolen identities and the trial court properly dismissed those charges.\nJustice MARTIN concurring part and dissenting in part.\nJustice HUDSON concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 734 S.E.2d 617 (2012), finding no error in a judgment and orders entered on 7 September 2011 by Judge Robert C. Ervin in Superior Court, Mecklenburg County. On 24 January 2013, the Supreme Court allowed petitions by the State and defendant Jones for discretionary review of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme Court on 8 May 2013 by special session in the Old Chowan County Courthouse (1767) in the Town of Edenton pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-10(a).\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Kimberly N. Callahan and Joseph L. Hyde, Assistant Attorneys General, for the State-appellant/appellee.\nStaples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Andrew DeSimone, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee/appellant Eric Steven Jones.\nC. Scott Holmes for defendant-appellee Jerry Alvin White." }, "file_name": "0299-01", "first_page_order": 339, "last_page_order": 355 }