{ "id": 4323332, "name": "IN RE TWIN COUNTY MOTORSPORTS, INC.", "name_abbreviation": "In re Twin County Motorsports, Inc.", "decision_date": "2014-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 552PA13", "first_page": "613", "last_page": "617", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 N.C. 613" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "749 S.E.2d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "661 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640984, 12640985, 12640986 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/661/0238-01", "/se2d/661/0238-02", "/se2d/661/0238-03" ] }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 354", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 12641491, 12641420, 12641421 ], "year": 2008, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/663/0312-01", "/se2d/662/0900-04", "/se2d/662/0901-01" ] }, { "cite": "653 S.E.2d 11", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12639847 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/653/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "379 S.E.2d 30", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" }, { "parenthetical": "brackets in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2483734 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "379" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 S.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320-21" }, { "page": "276" }, { "page": "276" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added by court" }, { "page": "276" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549177 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" }, { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 S.E.2d 517", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "520", "parenthetical": "\"When a corporation's employees perform legal services for the corporation in the course of their employment, their acts have been held to be the acts of the corporation so that in law, the corporation itself is performing the acts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 N.C. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4702150 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289-90", "parenthetical": "\"When a corporation's employees perform legal services for the corporation in the course of their employment, their acts have been held to be the acts of the corporation so that in law, the corporation itself is performing the acts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/316/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 S.E.2d 337", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "257 N.C. 634", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569760 ], "year": 1962, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/257/0634-01" ] }, { "cite": "755 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "187 N.C. App. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8373379 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/187/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 547", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "155 N.C. App. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249637 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/155/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 S.E.2d 474", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "476" }, { "page": "477" }, { "page": "477" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 535, "char_count": 11456, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.3610859966818675e-07, "percentile": 0.7943090504504317 }, "sha256": "0149b4567e9987bfe3c036919bd80b7d005c4343caa7ce4cac33769b94470dd2", "simhash": "1:4a5d9f77356da030", "word_count": 1845 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:46.212757+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "IN RE TWIN COUNTY MOTORSPORTS, INC." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Justice.\nIn this appeal we consider whether a corporation may appear or proceed at hearings before the Division of Motor Vehicles (\u201cDMV\u201d) without being represented by an attorney. Because we have determined that a hearing before an administrative agency is not an \u201caction or proceeding,\u201d we hold that a nonattorney may appear or proceed on behalf of a corporation before an administrative hearing officer without engaging in the unauthorized practice of law under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.\nTwin County Motorsports, Inc. (\u201cTwin County\u201d) is licensed by the DMV to perform vehicle emissions and equipment inspections. On 7 October 2010, the DMV charged Twin County with six violations of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-183.7B(a)(3) for allowing a person not licensed as a safety inspection mechanic to perform safety inspections. Lance Cherry, an officer and shareholder of Twin County, requested a hearing before the DMV. On 19 May 2011, Cherry appeared on behalf of Twin County at the DMV hearing. He informed the hearing officer that he did not wish to have an attorney present. In his testimony, he stated that the allegations levied by the DMV were \u201caccurate,\u201d but that the violations were \u201cunintentional.\u201d The hearing officer concluded that sufficient evidence was presented to sustain that Twin County violated N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-183.7B(a)(3). The hearing officer levied a civil penalty of fifteen hundred dollars and suspended Twin County\u2019s inspection license for 1080 days.\nTwin County retained legal counsel and sought review of the hearing officer\u2019s decision by the Commissioner of the DMV. The Commissioner upheld the hearing officer\u2019s order on 5 August 2011. Twin County appealed the Commissioner\u2019s decision to the Superior Court of Nash County. In its appeal to the trial court, Twin County asserted that Twin County, as a corporation, should not have been represented by Cherry, a nonattorney, at the DMV hearing. The trial court agreed, concluded that Cherry\u2019s pro se representation of Twin County as an agent of Twin County constituted the unauthorized practice of law in violation of N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 84-4 and 84-5, and remanded the matter to the DMV hearing officer for a new hearing. The State appealed to the Court of Appeals.\nThe Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. In re Twin Cnty. Motorsports, Inc., _N.C. App. _, 749 S.E.2d 474 (2013). The court reasoned that its earlier holding in Lexis-Nexis, Division of Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Travishan Corp. that \u201c \u2018a corporation must be represented by a duly admitted and licensed attorney-at-law and cannot proceed pro se\u2019 \u201d controlled here. Id. at_, 749 S.E.2d at 476 (quoting Lexis-Nexis, 155 N.C. App. 205, 209, 573 S.E.2d 547, 549 (2002)). The Court of Appeals explained that even though it had determined that a corporation may represent itself pro se in \u201ccontested case\u201d proceedings under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-23 before the Office of Administrative Hearings (\u201cOAH\u201d), Allied Envtl. Servs., PLLC v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Envtl. & Natural Res., 187 N.C. App. 227, 653 S.E.2d 11 (2007), disc. rev. denied, 362 N.C. 354, 661 S.E.2d 238 (2008), this exception to Lexis-Nexis\u2019s general prohibition against pro se representation by corporations did not apply here because DMV proceedings are exempt from the \u201ccontested case\u201d provisions of N.C.G.S. Chapter 150B and are thus not governed by section 150B-23. Twin Cnty. Motorsports,_N.C. App. at_, 749 S.E.2d at 477. Because the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals in announcing the Allied \u201cexception\u201d did not apply to administrative appeals not governed by N.C.G.S. \u00a7 150B-23, the court held that \u201cin hearings before the DMV, corporations must be represented by legal counsel.\u201d Id. at _, 749 S.E.2d at 477.\nThe State sought our discretionary review of the court\u2019s decision, which we allowed on 6 March 2014. _N.C. _, 755 S.E.2d 627 (2014). In its appeal to this Court, the State asks that we conclude that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4, governing the unauthorized practice of law, does not prohibit an owner of a business licensed by the DMV from appearing on behalf of his entity at a license hearing. The State asserts that \u201cadministrative license hearings before [the] DMV are not by law an \u2018action or proceeding\u2019 \u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 and that, under State v. Pledger, 257 N.C. 634, 127 S.E.2d 337 (1962), a nonlawyer agent is allowed to perform a legal act on behalf of a corporation without violating section 84-4 if the act is in \u201cthe primary interest of the corporation.\u201d See Gardner v. N.C. State Bar, 316 N.C. 285, 289-90, 341 S.E.2d 517, 520 (1986) (\u201cWhen a corporation\u2019s employees perform legal services for the corporation in the course of their employment, their acts have been held to be the acts of the corporation so that in law, the corporation itself is performing the acts.\u201d).\nIn pertinent part, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 provides that\nit shall be unlawful for any person or association of persons, except active members of the Bar of the State of North Carolina admitted and licensed to practice as attorneys-at-law, to appear as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding before any judicial body, including the North Carolina Industrial Commission, or the Utilities Commission ....\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 (2013). A prerequisite for the unauthorized practice of law under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4, therefore, is indeed an appearance in an \u201caction or proceeding\u201d before a judicial body.\nIn Ocean Hill Joint Venture v. North Carolina Department of Environment, Health & Natural Resources, 333 N.C. 318, 426 S.E.2d 274 (1993), this Court addressed the definition of \u201caction or proceeding.\u201d We addressed whether a one-year statute of limitations, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54(2), applied to an administrative agency\u2019s assessment of a civil penalty. Id. at 320-21, 426 S.E.2d at 276. The provision-in question prescribed a one-year statute of limitations of one year for \u201can action or proceeding . . . [u]pon a statute . . . where the action is given to the State alone.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54, -54(2) (1983). We determined that \u201caprerequisite for application of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54 is that there must be an \u2018action or proceeding.\u2019 \u201d Ocean Hill, 333 N.C. at 321, 426 S.E.2d at 276. We turned to the question of what, then, constitutes an \u201caction or proceeding\u201d:\nAn \u201caction\u201d as defined in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-2 \u201cis an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice . . . .\u201d Although \u201cproceeding\u201d itself is not defined in Chapter 1, the terms \u201cordinary proceeding\u201d and \u201cspecial proceeding\u201d are both used. The definition of \u201caction\u201d encompasses \u201cordinary\u201d proceedings while a \u201cspecial proceeding\u201d includes every other remedy in a court of justice. From these definitions we conclude that, as the term is used in Chapter 1 of the General Statutes, a \u201cproceeding,\u201d like an \u201caction,\u201d must take place in a court of justice.\nId. (emphasis added by court) (citations omitted). We then contemplated whether an agency, when empowered by the General Assembly with judicial authority, may constitute such a \u201ccourt of justice\u201d:\nWe have recognized that \u201c[a]rticle IV, section 3 of the Constitution contemplates that discretionary judicial authority' may be granted to an agency when reasonably necessary to accomplish the agency\u2019s purposes.\u201d In the Matter of Appeal from the Civil Penalty Assessed for Violations of the SPCA, 324 N.C. 373, 379, 379 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1989). However, an agency so empowered is not a part of the \u201cgeneral court of justice.\u201d N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 2. In fact, \u201c[a]ppeals from administrative agencies shall be to the general court of justice.\u201d N.C. Const, art. IV, \u00a7 3 (emphasis added). Thus, the grant of limited judicial authority to an administrative agency does not transform the agency into a court for purposes of the statute of limitations.\nId. (brackets in original). We concluded that the agency\u2019s \u201cissuance ... of a notice of civil penalty\u201d was \u201cnot the institution of an action or proceeding in a court [of justice]\u201d and therefore, was not \u201cwithin the meaning of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 1-54.\u201d Id.\nOur holding in Ocean Hill governs the question before us today. As in Ocean Hill, a prerequisite for the statute at issue is that there be an \u201caction or proceeding.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4. We have determined that an \u201caction or proceeding\u201d requires a \u201ccourt of justice,\u201d and that an administrative agency, though empowered with limited judicial authority, is not a \u201ccourt of justice.\u201d Ocean Hill, 333 N.C. at 321, 426 S.E.2d at 276. We must therefore conclude that a nonattomey\u2019s appearance on behalf of a corporate entity before an administrative hearing officer does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 because the appearance is not an \u201cappear[ance] as attorney or counselor at law in any action or proceeding before any judicial body.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 (emphasis added). Because an appearance by a nonattomey before an administrative hearing officer does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4, we need not address the State\u2019s arguments concerning Pledger.\nWe further note that our conclusion that a nonattorney may appear before an administrative hearing officer without violating N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4 is in line with recent legislative action. The North Carolina General Assembly has recently provided that, in contested cases before the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) and in appeals to the Property Tax Commission, \u201c[a] business entity may represent itself using a nonattorney representative.\u201d Act of Aug. 15, 2014, ch. 120, secs. 7(a), 7(b), 2014 5 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 26, 31-32 (LexisNexis) (amending N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 150B-23(a) and 105-290). While not directly governing the matter sub judice because the legislation applies to contested cases before the OAH and appeals to the Property Tax Commission commencing on or after 18 September 2014, the passage of this legislation is consistent with our conclusion that a nonattomey\u2019s appearance before an administrative hearing officer does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4.\nThe trial court erred in reversing the DMV\u2019s final agency decision in this case. For the reasons stated above, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court\u2019s order and remanding this matter for a new hearing before the DMV.\nREVERSED.", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Christopher W. Brooks, Assistant Attorney General, for respondant-appellant Michael D. Robertson, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles.", "Jessica C. Williams, PLLC, by Ralph E. Stevenson, III, for petitioner-appellee Twin County Motorsports, Inc." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "IN RE TWIN COUNTY MOTORSPORTS, INC.\nNo. 552PA13\n(Filed 19 December 2014)\nAdministrative Law \u2014 administrative agency hearing \u2014 pro se representation of corporation by nonattorney \u2014 not unauthorized practice of law\nThe Court of Appeals erred by holding that a nonattorney had engaged in unauthorized practice of law under N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 84-4 and 84-5 when he represented a corporation in a Department of Motor Vehicles hearing. An administrative hearing does not constitute an \u201caction or proceeding\u201d before a judicial body under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 84-4. The corporation was not entitled to a new hearing.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, _ N.C. App. _, 749 S.E.2d 474 (2013), affirming an order entered on 17 October 2012 by Judge Frank Brown in Superior Court, Nash County, and remanding the matter for a new hearing. Heard in the Supreme Court on 7 October 2014.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Christopher W. Brooks, Assistant Attorney General, for respondant-appellant Michael D. Robertson, Commissioner, North Carolina Division of Motor Vehicles.\nJessica C. Williams, PLLC, by Ralph E. Stevenson, III, for petitioner-appellee Twin County Motorsports, Inc." }, "file_name": "0613-01", "first_page_order": 653, "last_page_order": 657 }