{ "id": 4316820, "name": "DOUGLAS KIRK LUNSFORD v. THOMAS E. MILLS, JAMES W. CROWDER, III, and SHAWN T. BUCHANAN", "name_abbreviation": "Lunsford v. Mills", "decision_date": "2014-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 385PA13", "first_page": "618", "last_page": "642", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 N.C. 618" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "747 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "526 U.S. 1098", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11178628, 11178790, 11178507, 11178542, 11178897, 11178675, 11178836, 11178709, 11178867, 11178586, 11178751 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/526/1098-04", "/us/526/1098-08", "/us/526/1098-01", "/us/526/1098-02", "/us/526/1098-11", "/us/526/1098-05", "/us/526/1098-09", "/us/526/1098-06", "/us/526/1098-10", "/us/526/1098-03", "/us/526/1098-07" ] }, { "cite": "660 S.E.2d 217", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12640856 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "232", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"[Legislative, history cannot ... be relied upon to force a construction on [a] statute inconsistent with the plain language\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/660/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511527, 1511629, 1511511, 1511639, 1511292 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0675-01", "/nc/356/0675-02", "/nc/356/0675-03", "/nc/356/0675-05", "/nc/356/0675-04" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838", "parenthetical": "citations, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249061 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 34", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795937 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "434 S.E.2d 642", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "rejecting, based on Baxley, the insurer's contention \"that 'damages' does not include costs or interest\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "112 N.C. App. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8519967 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-36", "parenthetical": "rejecting, based on Baxley, the insurer's contention \"that 'damages' does not include costs or interest\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/112/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 S.E.2d 895", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "899" }, { "page": "901" }, { "page": "898", "parenthetical": "emphasis omitted" }, { "page": "901", "parenthetical": "\"Since [the UIM carrier] promised to pay [the insured]'s resulting damages, it must now do so, up to, but not in excess of, its UIM policy limits.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2531661 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "6-7" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/334/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507687 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138-39" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "548 S.E.2d 513", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 659", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135857 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0659-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 L. Ed. 2d 671", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 S. Ct. 1576", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 11633683 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/br/232/1576-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 284", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 290", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571505 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "297", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0290-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 F. Supp. 2d 684", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9186370 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/338/0684-01" ] }, { "cite": "118 S.E.2d 303", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307", "parenthetical": "construing provisions of the FRA in pari materia" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "254 N.C. 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8624259 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53", "parenthetical": "construing provisions of the FRA in pari materia" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/254/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "763" }, { "page": "764" }, { "page": "764", "parenthetical": "rejecting insurer's construction of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) that \"resulted] in the least possible protection for the innocent victim of an underinsured tortfeasor\" and thus \"undermine[d] the intent and purpose of the statute\"" }, { "page": "764" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 221", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2485985 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224-25" }, { "page": "225-26" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0221-01" ] }, { "cite": "1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1550", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "420 S.E.2d 124", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "127" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 184", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2505670 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0184-01" ] }, { "cite": "515 S.E.2d 8", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "10-11", "parenthetical": "first alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 131983 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "first alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 345", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151071 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 N.C. App. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4158899 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25", "parenthetical": "explaining that \"[Legislative, history cannot ... be relied upon to force a construction on [a] statute inconsistent with the plain language\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/190/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "123 S.E.2d 582", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "586", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.C. 155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8571604 ], "year": 1962, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "161", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/256/0155-01" ] }, { "cite": "599 S.E.2d 549", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "\"Exhaustion occurs when the liability carrier has tendered the limits of its policy in a settlement offer or in satisfaction of a judgment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "358 N.C. 691", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2987471 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "698", "parenthetical": "\"Exhaustion occurs when the liability carrier has tendered the limits of its policy in a settlement offer or in satisfaction of a judgment.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/358/0691-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 A.2d 385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "387" }, { "page": "388", "parenthetical": "observing that if the insured is not permitted to recover UIM benefits until exhausting all liability limits of all joint tortfeasors, \"the insured could be required to pursue claims of weak liability against third parties, thereby fostering marginal and costly litigation in our courts\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 Conn. 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Conn.", "case_ids": [ 525780 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "213" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/conn/221/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 F.3d 217", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11866469 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "222", "parenthetical": "\"Placing the article 'the' in front of a word connotes the singularity of the word modified.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/135/0217-01" ] }, { "cite": "446 N.Y.S.2d 77", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 A.D.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "A.D.2d", "case_ids": [ 3260781 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ad2d/84/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 S.E.2d 386", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "388-89", "parenthetical": "\"[C]ourts must give [a clear and unambiguous] statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\"" }, { "parenthetical": "\"triggering provision\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "295 N.C. 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8562180 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "239", "parenthetical": "\"[C]ourts must give [a clear and unambiguous] statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/295/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "675 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150708 ], "year": 2009, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 S.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152382 ], "year": 2010, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 394", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "425 S.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "701", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 258", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2547559 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0258-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 S.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 N.C. 205", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 5307411 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "209" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/326/0205-01" ] }, { "cite": "576 S.E.2d 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511442 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "522", "parenthetical": "observing that the interpretation of \"the language used in [a] policy of insurance\" is \"a question of law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 N.C. 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561396 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354", "parenthetical": "observing that the interpretation of \"the language used in [a] policy of insurance\" is \"a question of law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/276/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 S.E.2d 894", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896", "parenthetical": "\"A question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law for the courts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 N.C. 520", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 571692 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "\"A question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law for the courts.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/349/0520-01" ] }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150896 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 S.E.2d 843", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4313570, 4330635, 4315054, 4314639, 4317682, 4317715, 4330324, 4317143 ], "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/367/0259-05", "/nc/367/0259-08", "/nc/367/0259-06", "/nc/367/0259-03", "/nc/367/0259-07", "/nc/367/0259-02", "/nc/367/0259-04", "/nc/367/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "407 S.E.2d 497", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "503" }, { "page": "498" }, { "page": "503" }, { "page": "502-03" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 N.C. 603", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2555126 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" }, { "page": "605" }, { "page": "613" }, { "page": "612-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/329/0603-01" ] }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491424, 491841, 491598, 491502, 491829, 491835, 491710 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0578-03", "/nc/357/0578-06", "/nc/357/0578-05", "/nc/357/0578-02", "/nc/357/0578-07", "/nc/357/0578-04", "/nc/357/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8956100 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 14, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "393" }, { "page": "393" }, { "page": "393", "parenthetical": "emphasis added" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" }, { "page": "395" }, { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "614 S.E.2d 274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12633106 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "277" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/614/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "117 N.J. 139", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J.", "case_ids": [ 1386104, 1386560, 1386564, 1386295 ], "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nj/117/0139-01", "/nj/117/0139-03", "/nj/117/0139-02", "/nj/117/0139-04" ] }, { "cite": "155 S.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "82", "parenthetical": "\"Laws in effect at the time of issuance of a policy of insurance become a part of the contract. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "270 N.C. 544", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8569521 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "555", "parenthetical": "\"Laws in effect at the time of issuance of a policy of insurance become a part of the contract. . . .\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/270/0544-01" ] }, { "cite": "529 S.E.2d 676", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "683" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685063 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 S.E.2d 597", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "603", "parenthetical": "\"Obviously, the Court will, whenever possible, interpret a statute so as to avoid absurd consequences.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "293 N.C. 431", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8565135 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "440", "parenthetical": "\"Obviously, the Court will, whenever possible, interpret a statute so as to avoid absurd consequences.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/293/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 S.E.2d 98", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104", "parenthetical": "\"We are further guided by rules of construction that statutes in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561318 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "202", "parenthetical": "\"We are further guided by rules of construction that statutes in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "359 N.C. 611", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 3795543 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "614" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/359/0611-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 A.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "557 A.2d 332", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" }, { "page": "334", "parenthetical": "\"We conclude that where the amount paid by the insurors for the multiple tortfeasors equals or exceeds the amount of the UIM coverage, plaintiff has no UIM claim.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "232 N.J. Super. 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 299228 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "398-99" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/232/0393-01" ] }, { "cite": "108 N.M. 807", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1592846 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810-11", "parenthetical": "discussing a UIM statute similar to subsection 20-279.21(b)(4)" }, { "page": "636-37", "parenthetical": "discussing a UIM statute similar to subsection 20-279.21(b)(4)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nm/108/0807-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295", "parenthetical": "\"A construction which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "287 N.C. 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8561054 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "80", "parenthetical": "\"A construction which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/287/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "403 S.E.2d 291", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "observing that, inter alia, \"we are guided by the structure of the statute\" in determining legislative intent (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "294", "parenthetical": "\"An analysis utilizing the plain language of the statute and the canons of construction must be done in a manner which harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the statute.\" (citation omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "328 N.C. 651", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2538925 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "observing that, inter alia, \"we are guided by the structure of the statute\" in determining legislative intent (citations omitted)" }, { "page": "656" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/328/0651-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" }, { "page": "120" }, { "parenthetical": "reducing UIM amounts by amounts received by the plaintiff from a tortfeasor's exhausted policy or policies" }, { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 571", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511376 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "573-74", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0571-01" ] }, { "cite": "577 S.E.2d 627", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "356 N.C. 675", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1511527, 1511629, 1511511, 1511639, 1511292 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/356/0675-01", "/nc/356/0675-02", "/nc/356/0675-03", "/nc/356/0675-05", "/nc/356/0675-04" ] }, { "cite": "566 S.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838", "parenthetical": "noting the statute's goal of putting a policy holder \"in the same position that the policy holder would have been in if the tortfeasor had had liability coverage equal to the amount of the UM/UIM coverage\" (citations and emphasis omitted)" }, { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "152 N.C. App. 137", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 9249061 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "142", "parenthetical": "noting the statute's goal of putting a policy holder \"in the same position that the policy holder would have been in if the tortfeasor had had liability coverage equal to the amount of the UM/UIM coverage\" (citations and emphasis omitted)" }, { "page": "142" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/152/0137-01" ] }, { "cite": "382 S.E.2d 759", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "762" }, { "page": "763", "parenthetical": "observing that \"[(legislative intent can be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the statute but also from the nature and purpose of the act and the consequences which would follow its construction one way or the other\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "325 N.C. 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2492574 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "263" }, { "page": "265" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/325/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 S.E.2d 229", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2507687 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0135-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 761", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1989, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1550", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "captioned \"An Act to Prohibit the Stacking of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "589 S.E.2d 125", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "357 N.C. 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 491424, 491841, 491598, 491502, 491829, 491835, 491710 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/357/0578-03", "/nc/357/0578-06", "/nc/357/0578-05", "/nc/357/0578-02", "/nc/357/0578-07", "/nc/357/0578-04", "/nc/357/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "583 S.E.2d 307", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312" }, { "page": "312" }, { "parenthetical": "\"at its option\"" }, { "page": "308-09" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "312" }, { "parenthetical": "emphasis added" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "159 N.C. App. 365", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8956100 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "373" }, { "page": "373" }, { "page": "367-68" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/159/0365-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 S.E.2d 390", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "394" }, { "page": "394" } ], "opinion_index": 1 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1768, "char_count": 63523, "ocr_confidence": 0.754, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.912228167992022e-07, "percentile": 0.8458902430218904 }, "sha256": "c1f25629732524829399e56d10b7696725789db29cc56d1c138d1396205ab290", "simhash": "1:a92180b6673f087e", "word_count": 10014 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:46.212757+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "DOUGLAS KIRK LUNSFORD v. THOMAS E. MILLS, JAMES W. CROWDER, III, and SHAWN T. BUCHANAN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Justice.\nThe primary issue in this appeal is whether an insured may, in a situation in which there is more than one at-fault driver responsible for the accident causing the insured\u2019s injuries, recover under his or her underinsured motorist (UIM) policy before exhausting the liability insurance policies of all the at-fault drivers. We conclude that the insured is only required to exhaust the liability insurance coverage of a single at-fault motorist in order to trigger the insurer\u2019s obligation to provide UIM benefits. Accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision on this issue. Because, however, the trial court\u2019s award of interest and costs against the insurer in this case exceeds the amount the insurer contractually promised to pay under the terms of its policy with the insured, the Court of Appeals erred in upholding that portion of the award. In this respect, we reverse the Court of Appeals.\nFacts\nThe parties to this appeal have stipulated to the material facts, which tend to establish that on 18 September 2009, defendant Thomas E. Mills was operating a tractor-trailer owned by his employer, defendant James W. Crowder, III. Mills was traveling eastbound on Interstate Highway 40 in McDowell County when he lost control while rounding a curve, causing his vehicle to collide with the concrete median barrier and flip. Plaintiff Douglas Kirk Lunsford, a volunteer firefighter, responded first to the scene and found that Mills was injured and that diesel fuel was leaking from the tractor-trailer. Lunsford, who was standing in the highway median, attempted to lift Mills over the concrete divider so that he could carry Mills to safety and assess his injuries. As Lunsford was doing so, defendant Shawn T. Buchanan was driving westbound on Interstate Highway 40. When the vehicle in front of Buchanan slowed down because of the tractor-trailer accident, Buchanan swerved to the left to avoid the vehicle and struck Lunsford. Lunsford was dragged underneath Buchanan\u2019s car and suffered severe injuries, including multiple broken bones, lacerations, and internal injuries.\nAt the time of the accidents, Mills and Crowder were insured through Crowder\u2019s business motor vehicle policy with United States Fire Insurance Company (U.S. Fire), which provided a liability coverage limit of $1 million. The second driver, Buchanan, was insured under a policy written by Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), providing liability coverage of $50,000. Lunsford maintained two policies with unnamed defendant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau): (1) a business policy with UIM coverage of $300,000; and (2) a personal policy with UIM coverage of $100,000.\nLunsford subsequently filed a negligence action against Mills, Crowder, and Buchanan (named defendants), claiming that they were jointly and severally liable for his injuries. All named defendants filed answers, which included crossclaims for indemnification and contribution. Farm Bureau, as an unnamed defendant, also filed an answer in which it claimed that it would be entitled to an offset with respect to Lunsford\u2019s UIM policies for any damages he recovered through the insurance policies held by the named defendants.\nOn 24 May 2011, Allstate tendered to Lunsford the $50,000 liability coverage limit for Buchanan\u2019s policy. Lunsford\u2019s attorney notified Farm Bureau the next day of Allstate\u2019s tender and demanded that Farm Bureau tender payment on Lunsford\u2019s UIM claim. In a letter dated 7 June 2011, Farm Bureau indicated that (1) it would not advance the liability policy limits tendered to Lunsford by Allstate; and (2) it would review its legal options regarding Lunsford\u2019s UIM claim and respond \u201cat a later date.\u201d On 15 November 2011, Lunsford\u2019s attorney informed Farm Bureau that Lunsford had tentatively settled his claims against Mills and Crowder for $850,000, which was to be paid through Crowder\u2019s policy with U.S. Fire. At the time of these settlements, Farm Bureau had not provided UIM coverage to Lunsford.\nOn 12 January 2012, the trial court entered an order approving the settlement agreements. On 19 July 2012, Farm Bureau filed a motion for summary judgment on Lunsford\u2019s UIM claim, arguing that he was not entitled to UIM coverage because the total amount of his settlements with Buchanan, Mills, and Crowder ($50,000 + $850,000 = $900,000) exceeded the aggregate amount of Lunsford\u2019s UIM policies ($300,000 + $100,000 = $400,000). Lunsford also moved for summary judgment, maintaining that his UIM policies stacked and that he was entitled to recover $350,000 from Farm Bureau \u2014 the amount of his aggregated UIM coverage limit ($400,000) minus the $50,000 he recovered through his settlement with Buchanan.\nAfter conducting a hearing on the parties\u2019 motions, the trial court entered an order on 13 November 2012 granting summary judgment in favor of Lunsford. The trial court accordingly ordered Farm Bureau to pay Lunsford $350,000, plus costs and pre- and post-judgment interest \u201cas provided by law.\u201d\nFarm Bureau appealed the trial court\u2019s order to the Court of Appeals, primarily arguing that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Lunsford and ordering Farm Bureau to pay $350,000 in UIM coverage because, under the statute governing UIM coverage, Farm Bureau \u201cwas not required to provide coverage until all applicable policies \u2014 meaning all policies held by all the named Defendants \u2014 had been exhausted.\u201d Lunsford v. Mills,_N.C. App. _, _, 747 S.E.2d 390, 393 (2013). The court disagreed based on its reading of the UIM statute: \u201c \u2018Underinsured motorist coverage is deemed to apply when, by reason of payment of judgment or settlement, all liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for bodily injury caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway vehicle have been exhausted.\u2019 \u201d Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 393 (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added by court)). The court interpreted this language \u201cto mean that UIM coverage is triggered the moment that an insured has recovered under all policies applicable to \u2018a\u2019 \u2014 meaning one \u2014 \u2018underinsured highway vehicle\u2019 involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting in injury to the insured.\u201d Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 393 (emphasis added).\nNoting that the issue of when UIM coverage is triggered in situations involving multiple potential at-fault drivers is one of first impression in North Carolina, the Court of Appeals believed that its interpretation of the UIM statute was consistent with that court\u2019s precedent suggesting that \u201cinsureds should [not] \u2018be kept hanging in limbo as they are forced to sue any and all possible persons ... before they could recover UIM benefits\u2019 just because other potential tortfeasors also happen to be covered under automobile policies.\u201d Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 394 (quoting Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of N.C. v. Blong, 159 N.C. App. 365, 373, 583 S.E.2d 307, 312, disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 578, 589 S.E.2d 125 (2003)). In light of this rationale, the court determined that, in such a situation, UIM carriers are obligated \u201cto first provide coverage, and later seek an offset through reimbursement or exercise of subrogation rights.\u201d Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 394. Consequently, the court determined that upon the exhaustion of \u201call policies applicable to Mr. Buchanan\u2019s vehicle,\u201d Lunsford\u2019s \u201cUIM coverage was triggered,\u201d and \u201cFarm Bureau was not at liberty to withhold coverage until [Lunsford] reached settlement agreements with Mr. Mills and Mr. Crowder.\u201d Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 394.\nFarm Bureau alternatively argued that, even it were required to provide UIM coverage, the trial court nevertheless erred in ordering it to pay pre- and post-judgment interest and costs. In support of this contention, Farm Bureau cited our decision in Sproles v. Greene, 329 N.C. 603, 613, 407 S.E.2d 497, 503 (1991), in which we concluded that North Carolina\u2019s compulsory motor vehicle insurance laws do not impose an obligation on liability insurers to pay interest on a judgment in excess of the insurer\u2019s policy limits, but rather, such an obligation \u201cis governed by the terms of the [insurance] policy.\u201d The Court of Appeals believed that Sproles was distinguishable on the ground that Sproles held that a \u201cUIM carrier is not required to pay pre and post-judgment interest on behalf of the insured where the judgment has been entered against the insured.\u201d Lunsford,_N.C. App. at ._, 747 S.E.2d at 395 (citing Sproles, 329 N.C. at 605, 407 S.E.2d at 498). Here, in contrast, \u201cthe judgment was entered against Farm Bureau itself, not against its insured (Plaintiff).\u201d Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 395. Thus the court concluded that Sproles \u201cha[d] no bearing on the case at hand\u201d and upheld the trial court\u2019s award of interest and costs. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 395 (2013).\nFarm Bureau petitioned this Court for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision regarding both the UIM coverage and the judgment interest issues. We allowed Farm Bureau\u2019s petition with respect to both questions. 367 N.C. 259, 749 S.E.2d 843 (2013).\nStandard of Review\nUnder Rule 56(c) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate when the record establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that any party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. N.C. R. Civ. P. 56(c); e.g., In re Will of Jones, 362 N.C. 569, 573, 669 S.E.2d 572, 576 (2008). Here the parties have stipulated to the material facts, and therefore, the only question for our consideration is whether either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Answering this question primarily involves interpretation of the Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953 (commonly referred to as the \u201cFRA\u201d), N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-279.1 through -279.39 (2013), and examination of the terms of Farm Bureau\u2019s motor vehicle insurance policy, each a question of law. See Brown v. Flowe, 349 N.C. 520, 523, 507 S.E.2d 894, 896 (1998) (\u201cA question of statutory interpretation is ultimately a question of law for the courts.\u201d); Wachovia Bank & Trust v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 276 N.C. 348, 354, 172 S.E.2d 518, 522 (1970) (observing that the interpretation of \u201cthe language used in [a] policy of insurance\u201d is \u201ca question of law\u201d). This Court reviews questions of law de novo, meaning that we consider the matter anew and freely substitute our judgment for the judgment of the lower court. In re Greens of Pine Glen Ltd. P\u2019ship, 356 N.C. 642, 647, 576 S.E.2d 316, 319 (2003) (citation omitted).\nUnderinsured Motorist Coverage\nThe parties\u2019 principal dispute centers on the proper interpretation of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4), the FRA\u2019s provision governing UIM coverage. The primary objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134, 137 (1990). \u201cIf the language of the statute is clear and is not ambiguous, we must conclude that the legislature intended the statute to be implemented according to the plain meaning of its terms.\u201d Hyler v. GTE Prods. Co., 333 N.C. 258, 262, 425 S.E.2d 698, 701 (1993) (citations omitted), superseded in part by statute, Workers\u2019 Compensation Reform Act of 1994, ch. 679, sec. 2.5, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 394, 399-400, as recognized in N.C. Ins. Guar. Ass\u2019n v. Bd. of Trs., 364 N.C. 102, 691 S.E.2d 694 (2010). Thus, in effectuating legislative intent, it is our duty to give effect to the words actually used in a statute and not to delete words used or to insert words not used. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr. v. N.C. Med. Bd., 363 N.C. 189, 201, 675 S.E.2d 641, 649 (2009); accord In re Banks, 295 N.C. 236, 239, 244 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1978) (\u201c[C]ourts must give [a clear and unambiguous] statute its plain and definite meaning, and are without power to interpolate, or superimpose, provisions and limitations not contained therein.\u201d).\nThe first paragraph of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) defines the term \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d as\na highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of underinsured motorist coverage for the vehicle involved in the accident and insured under the owner\u2019s policy.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). The statute further sets out when UIM coverage is triggered:\nUnderinsured motorist coverage is deemed to apply when, by reason of payment of judgment or settlement, all liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for bodily injury caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway vehicle have been exhausted.\nId. (\u201ctriggering provision\u201d).\nFarm Bureau reads the reference to \u201call bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident\u201d in the definition of an underinsured highway vehicle to mean that, in determining whether UIM coverage is triggered, the insured\u2019s UIM coverage limit must be compared to the sum of all of the liability limits of all the at-fault motorists. Thus, according to Farm Bureau, as a prerequisite to receiving UIM benefits, Lunsford was required to exhaust not only Buchanan\u2019s liability limits, but also the policy limits of Mills and Crowder to the extent that they are liable as joint tortfeasors. We read subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) differently.\nAs an initial matter, the reference to \u201call bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident\u201d is found in the UIM statute\u2019s definition of an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle,\u201d not in the triggering provision. The location of the clause in a separate and distinct provision of the UIM statute indicates that the clause relates solely to an underinsured highway vehicle and not, as Farm Bureau suggests, to all the vehicles involved in an accident. See Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Salti, 84 A.D.2d 350, 352, 446 N.Y.S.2d 77, 79 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (\u201c[T]he [UIM] endorsement affords coverage for bodily injury arising out of the use of an underinsured highway vehicle and the clause \u2018the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds or insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident\u2019. . . should be read to relate ... to [the underinsured] vehicle only, and not, as [the insurer] contends, to the total number of vehicles involved in the accident.\u201d (emphasis added)).\nAn examination of the actual language of the triggering provision further undermines Farm Bureau\u2019s reading of the statute to provide that UIM coverage is not triggered until \u201call liability limits applicable \u2018at the time of the accident\u2019 \u201d are exhausted. The plain language of the triggering provision identifies the liability bonds and insurance policies relevant to determining whether UIM coverage is triggered as those bonds and policies relating to \u201cthe ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway vehicle.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added). A statute\u2019s use of the definite article \u2014 \u201cthe\u201d\u2014indicates that the legislature intended the term modified to have a singular referent. See Renz v. Grey Adver., Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1997) (\u201cPlacing the article \u2018the\u2019 in front of a word connotes the singularity of the word modified.\u201d); see also Gen. Accident Ins. Co. v. Wheeler, 221 Conn. 206, 211, 603 A.2d 385, 387 (1992) (concluding, under an insurance regulation providing that \u201cthe \u2018insurer shall undertake to pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall be legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured [or underinsured] motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured caused by an accident involving the uninsured [or underinsured] motor vehicle,\u2019 \u201d that an insured is required to exhaust \u201cthe insurance coverage of only one tortfeasor\u201d in order to recover UIM benefits (brackets in original)).\nFarm Bureau\u2019s interpretation effectively rewrites the triggering provision to provide that UIM coverage applies only once all liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for any party potentially liable for the insured\u2019s bodily injuries have been exhausted. But that is not what the statute says. The plain language of the triggering provision establishes that when an insured suffers bodily injury caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of an underinsured highway vehicle, and when the liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for that vehicle have been exhausted, UIM coverage is triggered. Accordingly, a UIM carrier\u2019s statutory obligation to provide UIM benefits is triggered when the insurer of a single vehicle meeting the definition of an underinsured highway vehicle tenders its liability limits to the UIM claimant through an offer of settlement or in satisfaction of a judgment. See Register v. White, 358 N.C. 691, 698, 599 S.E.2d 549, 555 (2004) (\u201cExhaustion occurs when the liability carrier has tendered the limits of its policy in a settlement offer or in satisfaction of a judgment.\u201d).\nFarm Bureau contends, however, that this interpretation of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) has been \u201cexpressly rejected by the legislature.\u201d In support of this argument, Farm Bureau points to the General Assembly\u2019s consideration and ultimate rejection of a bill proposed in the 1983 legislative session that was designed \u201cto clarify the law concerning UIM coverage.\u201d The proposed bill would have completely repealed subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4), the FRA\u2019s provision governing UIM coverage, and amended subdivision 20-279.21(b)(3), the provision governing uninsured motorist coverage, so that an underinsured motor vehicle would have constituted an \u201cuninsured motor vehicle\u201d to the extent of \u201cthe difference between the limits of the bodily injury liability insurance and property damage liability insurance coverages on such motor vehicle and the limits of the uninsured motorist coverage provided under the insured\u2019s motor vehicle liability insurance policy.\u201d H. 60, 135th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 1983) (emphasis added).\nThe fact that this proposed bill was not enacted is unavailing. When, as here, \u201cthe language of a statute expresses the legislative intent in clear and unambiguous terms, the words employed must be taken as the final expression of the meaning intended unaffected by its legislative history.\u201d Piedmont Canteen Serv., Inc. v. Johnson, 256 N.C. 155, 161, 123 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1962) (citations omitted); accord Wake Cares, Inc. v. Wake Cnty Bd. of Educ., 190 N.C. App. 1, 25, 660 S.E.2d 217, 232 (2008) (explaining that \u201c[Legislative, history cannot ... be relied upon to force a construction on [a] statute inconsistent with the plain language\u201d), aff\u2019d, 363 N.C. 165, 675 S.E.2d 345 (2009).\nFarm Bureau\u2019s construction of the UIM statute also undermines the statute\u2019s purpose. Section 20-279.21 \u201cwas passed to address circumstances where \u2018 \u201cthe tortfeasor has insurance, but his [or her] coverage is in an amount insufficient to compensate the injured party for his [or her] full damages.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Vasquez, 350 N.C. 386, 390, 515 S.E.2d 8, 10-11 (1999) (first alteration in original) (quoting Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 184, 189, 420 S.E.2d 124, 127 (1992), superseded by statute, Act of July 12, 1991, ch. 646, secs. 1, 2, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1550, 1559). We have recognized the remedial nature of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) and explained that the statute should be \u201cliberally construed\u201d in order to accomplish its purpose of \u201cprotecting] ... innocent victims who may be injured by financially irresponsible motorists.\u201d Proctor v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 221, 224-25, 376 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1989). To that end, subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) \u2014 as well as the FRA as a whole \u2014 should be \u201cinterpreted to provide the innocent victim with the fullest possible protection.\u201d Id. at 225, 376 S.E.2d at 764.\nIf Farm Bureau\u2019s interpretation were adopted, insureds would be required to pursue all claims, including weak, tenuous ones, against all potentially liable parties, no matter how impractical, before being eligible to collect their contracted-for UIM benefits. Placing this burden on insureds \u2014 who, like Lunsford, commonly suffer serious injuries and need prompt payment of benefits to pay medical expenses and other costs \u2014 -would substantially delay the recovery of UIM benefits and promote litigation expenses that reduc\u00e9 insureds\u2019 overall recovery. See Wheeler, 221 Conn, at 213, 603 A.2d at 388 (observing that if the insured is not permitted to recover UIM benefits until exhausting all liability limits of all joint tortfeasors, \u201cthe insured could be required to pursue claims of weak liability against third parties, thereby fostering marginal and costly litigation in our courts\u201d). Because Farm Bureau\u2019s interpretation of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) would fail to provide innocent victims \u201cthe fullest possible protection,\u201d we reject Farm Bureau\u2019s proposed construction. See Proctor, 324 N.C. at 225-26, 376 S.E.2d at 764 (rejecting insurer\u2019s construction of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) that \u201cresulted] in the least possible protection for the innocent victim of an underinsured tortfeasor\u201d and thus \u201cundermine[d] the intent and purpose of the statute\u201d).\nOur conclusion that an insured may recover UIM benefits upon exhausting the liability limits of a single at-fault motorist is further buttressed by examining the subrogation provision of section 20-279.21. See Faizan v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 254 N.C. 47, 53, 118 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1961) (construing provisions of the FRA in pari materia). The third paragraph of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4) states in pertinent part:\nAn underinsured motorist insurer may at its option, upon a claim pursuant to underinsured motorist coverage, pay moneys without there having first been an exhaustion of the liability insurance policy covering the ownership, use, and maintenance of the underinsured highway vehicle. In the event of payment, the underinsured motorist insurer shall be either: (a) entitled to receive by assignment from the claimant any right or (b) subrogated to the claimant\u2019s right regarding any claim the claimant has or had against the owner, operator, or maintainer of the underinsured highway vehicle, provided that the amount of the insurer\u2019s right by subrogation or assignment shall not exceed payments made to the claimant by the insurer.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4); see also id. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) (providing an insurer a right to reimbursement from settlement proceeds, to the extent the insurer has made a \u201cpayment to any person under the coverage required by this section and subject to the terms and conditions of coverage\u201d).\nIf, as Farm Bureau argues, insureds were required to exhaust the liability policies of all at-fault motorists as a prerequisite to recovering UIM coverage, there would be no need to provide UIM carriers subrogation or reimbursement rights, and consequently, these provisions would be rendered meaningless. See Leslie v. W.H. Transp. Co., 338 F. Supp. 2d 684, 689 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (\u201cThe reservation of a subrogation right indicates that [the insurer] foresees situations in which an insured receives UIM benefits and [the insurer] then pursues a claim against a tortfeasor who is legally liable for the damages suffered by the insured. If the insured were required to exhaust every tortfeasor\u2019s policy limit before receiving UIM benefits, it is hard to imagine a UIM scenario in which subrogation rights would arise.\u201d). Yet it is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that courts should \u201cevaluate [a] statute as a whole and ... not construe an individual section in a manner that renders another provision of the same statute meaningless.\u201d Polaroid Corp. v. Offerman, 349 N.C. 290, 297, 507 S.E.2d 284, 290 (1998) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1098, 119 S. Ct. 1576, 143 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by Lenox, Inc. v. Tolson, 353 N.C. 659, 548 S.E.2d 513 (2001).\nMoreover, given the General Assembly\u2019s provision of subrogation and reimbursement rights for the financial protection of insurers, we cannot agree with Farm Bureau\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s order resulted in a \u201cwindfall\u201d for Lunsford. Farm Bureau could have preserved its subrogation rights by advancing its UIM policy limits. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Blackwelder, 332 N.C. 135, 138-39, 418 S.E.2d 229, 231 (1992) (concluding that the insurer of the injured party\u2019s vehicle had \u201cpreserved its subrogation rights\u201d against the estate of the deceased tortfeasor by advancing the deceased tortfeasor\u2019s liability limits to its insured and by advancing an additional amount to settle its insured\u2019s UIM claim). Had Farm Bureau elected to do so, it would have been entitled to recoup the advanced funds from the proceeds of the settlements with Mills and Crowder. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3). But by not advancing its policy limits, Farm Bureau waived its subrogation rights. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (prohibiting insurers from exercising any right of subrogation when \u201cthe insurer fails to advance a payment to the insured in an amount equal to the tentative settlement within 30 days\u201d of receiving written notice of the proposed settlement).\nIn sum, we believe that the structure and plain language of subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4), the purpose behind the UIM statute, and the legislature\u2019s inclusion of subrogation rights for insurers, compel the conclusion that UIM coverage is triggered upon the exhaustion of the policy limits of a single at-fault motorist. Accordingly, upon Allstate\u2019s tender of its policy limit of $50,000 on behalf of Buchanan, UIM coverage was triggered under subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4), and Lunsford was entitled to recover UIM benefits according to the terms of his policy with Farm Bureau. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision on this issue.\nJudgment Interest and Costs\nFarm Bureau also challenges the Court of Appeals\u2019 determination that Lunsford is entitled to pre- and post-judgment interest and costs. Farm Bureau contends that the award of these damages, taxed in excess of Lunsford\u2019s UIM coverage limits, conflicts with our decision in Baxley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 334 N.C. 1, 430 S.E.2d 895 (1993). We agree.\nWe have established that \u201cwhen a statute is applicable to the terms of a policy of insurance, the provisions of that statute become terms of the policy to the same extent as if they were written in it, and if the terms of the policy conflict with the statute, the provisions of the statute prevail.\u201d Id. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 898 (citing Sutton v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 325 N.C. 259, 263, 382 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1989)). Section 20-279.21 is silent with respect to pre- and post-judgment interest, and thus subsection 24-5(b), the statute governing judgment interest, \u201cis not a part of the Financial Responsibility Act so as to be written into every liability policy.\u201d Id. (citing Sproles, 329 N.C. at 613, 407 S.E.2d at 503). When, as here, no statutory provision dictates a liability insurer\u2019s obligation to pay interest in excess of its policy limits, such an obligation \u201cis governed by the language of the policy.\u201d Id. (citing Sproles, 329 N.C. at 612-13, 407 S.E.2d at 502-03) (emphasis omitted).\nThe pertinent language in Lunsford\u2019s business and personal policies states that Farm Bureau promises to pay, up to its UIM policy limit,\nall sums the \u201cinsured\u201d is legally entitled to recover as compensatory damages from the owner or driver of:\na. An \u201cuninsured motor vehicle\u201d because of \u201cbodily injury\u201d sustained by the \u201cinsured\u201d and caused by an \u201caccident\u201d; and\nb. An \u201cuninsured motor vehicle\u201d as defined in Paragraphs a. and c. of the definition of \u201cuninsured motor vehicle\u201d, because of \u201cproperty damage\u201d caused by an \u201caccident\u201d.\nThe owner\u2019s or driver\u2019s liability for these damages must result from the ownership, maintenance or use of the \u201cuninsured motor vehicle\u201d.\n(Emphasis added.) The policies\u2019 definition of an \u201cuninsured motor vehicle\u201d includes an \u201cunderinsured motor vehicle.\u201d\nIn Baxley, 334 N.C. at 6-7, 430 S.E.2d at 899, we examined substantially similar policy language:\nThe contractual language [at issue] is [the UIM carrier\u2019s promise to pay, up to its UIM policy limit,\ndamages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of:\n1. Bodily injury sustained by a covered person and caused by an accident; and\n2. Property damage caused by an accident.\nHolding that interest is an element of \u201cdamages,\u201d id. at 11, 430 S.E.2d at 901, we held that, based on the pertinent policy language, the UIM carrier in Baxley was \u201cobligated to pay pre-judgment interest up to its policy limits.\u201d Id. at 6, 430 S.E.2d at 898 (emphasis omitted). Our reasoning in Baxley regarding judgment interest has similarly been applied to costs. See Wiggins v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 112 N.C. App. 26, 35-36, 434 S.E.2d 642, 648 (1993) (rejecting, based on Baxley, the insurer\u2019s contention \u201cthat \u2018damages\u2019 does not include costs or interest\u201d).\nThe relevant language in Farm Bureau\u2019s policy is, we believe, materially indistinguishable from the policy language at issue in Baxley. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Farm Bureau was required to pay pre- and post-judgment interest and costs in excess of its remaining UIM policy limit of $350,000. Because Farm Bureau contractually capped its obligation to pay \u201ccompensatory damages\u201d at its UIM coverage limit, Farm Bureau is not required to pay interest and costs over and above the $350,000 coverage amount. See Baxley, 334 N.C. at 11, 430 S.E.2d at 901 (\u201cSince [the UIM carrier] promised to pay [the insured]\u2019s resulting damages, it must now do so, up to, but not in excess of, its UIM policy limits.\u201d).\nLunsford nonetheless claims that Farm Bureau should be required to pay pre- and post-judgment interest because the judgment \u201cwas entered directly against Farm Bureau\u201d due to Farm Bureau\u2019s \u201cbreach of its obligations under its insurance contract.\u201d This argument is misplaced. There is no underlying breach of contract claim against Farm Bureau in this case, and thus, such a claim could not have been the basis for the trial court\u2019s award of interest and costs. Rather, the basis for the award is Farm Bureau\u2019s promise to pay, up to its UIM coverage limit, the \u201ccompensatory damages\u201d resulting from the named defendants\u2019 negligence. In such circumstances, our precedent \u201cclearly establishes]\u201d that the extent to which a UIM carrier is required to pay judgment interest is controlled by \u201cthe specific terms of [the] policy.\u201d Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mabe, 342 N.C. 482, 491, 467 S.E.2d 34, 40 (1996). Farm Bureau was permitted to, and did in fact, cap its liability for damages, including interest, at the amount of its UIM coverage limit. We accordingly reverse the Court of Appeals\u2019 decision with respect to interest and costs.\nConclusion\nWe affirm that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals holding than an insured is only required to exhaust the liability insurance coverage of a single at-fault motorist in order to trigger the insurer\u2019s obligation to provide UIM benefits. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals awarding interest and costs against the insurer in an amount that exceeds the amount the insurer contractually promised to pay under the terms of its policy with the insured. This case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Superior Court, McDowell County, for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nAFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.\nJustice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. Farm Bureau further contends that Lunsford\u2019s recovery of an amount greater than his contracted-for UIM coverage limit is inconsistent with the purpose of the UIM statute, as articulated by the Court of Appeals in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Haight, 152 N.C. App. 137, 566 S.E.2d 835 (2002), disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 675, 577 S.E.2d 627 (2003), in which the court stated: \u201cUIM coverage is intended to place a policy holder in the same position that the policy holder would have been in if the tortfeasor had had liability coverage equal to the amount of the . . . UIM coverage.\u201d Id. at 142, 566 S.E.2d at 838 (citations, emphasis, and quotation marks omitted). We perceive no inherent conflict between Haight\u2019s articulation of the intended purpose of the UIM statute and the principle we reaffirmed in Proctor that subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4), as a remedial statute, must be \u201cinterpreted to provide the innocent victim with the fullest possible protection.\" Proctor, 324 N.C. at 225, 376 S.E.2d at 764. Even if, as we have held, a UIM carrier is required to provide UIM coverage upon exhaustion of the liability liinits of a single tortfeasor, the carrier may still seek recovery of any overpayment through the exercise of its rights to subrogation or reimbursement. Through these mechanisms, insurers are able to recoup any overpayment and insureds are divested of any so-called \u201cwindfall.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice NEWBY\ndissenting in part and concurring in part.\nThe purpose of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in our state is to serve as a safeguard when tortfeasors\u2019 liability policies do not provide sufficient recovery \u2014 that is, when the tortfeasors are \u201cunder insured.\u201d This is simply not the case here. Plaintiff incurred damages amounting to $900,000. He brought suit jointly and severally against responsible tortfeasors whose total liability limits were $1,050,000. Those combined liability limits were more than sufficient to satisfy plaintiff\u2019s damages and were more than twice as high as plaintiff\u2019s $400,000 UIM limits. Not only does the majority incorrectly hold that UIM coverage was necessary in this instance, but the majority\u2019s outcome also leaves plaintiff with $350,000 in excess of his agreed-to damages. By contrast, I would hold that UIM coverage was not activated in this case. Rather, under the UIM statute, coverage only applies when the policyholder\u2019s UIM limits are more than the combined limits of the insurance coverage of all jointly and severally liable tortfeasors against whom the plaintiff files suit. Consequently, I respectfully dissent.\nAt the time of the accident, the jointly and severally liable tortfeasors, Mills, his employer Crowder, and Buchanan, carried liability policies totaling $1,050,000 while plaintiff was covered by two UIM policies with North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company (Farm Bureau) with combined limits of $400,000. After plaintiff filed suit against Mills, Crowder, and Buchanan, Buchanan\u2019s provider, Allstate, tendered to plaintiff the $50,000 limits of Buchanan\u2019s policy. Six months later, plaintiff settled his claim with defendants Mills\u2019 and Crowder\u2019s coverage provider for $850,000. After the trial court approved plaintiff\u2019s settlement with the named defendants, Farm Bureau, as an unnamed defendant, moved for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff was not entitled to UIM coverage because the combined policy limits of the defendants exceeded plaintiff\u2019s UIM limits. Plaintiff also moved for summary judgment, insisting that Buchanan was an underinsured driver and that plaintiff was thus entitled to Farm Bureau\u2019s UIM policy limits of $400,000 less an offset of $50,000 for Buchanan\u2019s Allstate insurance payment. The trial court entered judgment in plaintiff\u2019s favor for $350,000, plus costs and pre- and post-judgment interest. As a result, plaintiff received $50,000 from Buchanan\u2019s insurer, $850,000 from the settlement with Mills and Crowder, and $350,000 from his own UIM policy with Farm Bureau for a total of $1,250,000 while settling his damages claims with the actual tortfeasors for only $900,000, which left untapped $150,000 of tortfeasor insurance.\nThe majority\u2019s holding is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of UIM coverage and the implementing statute, as well as a misunderstanding of Farm Bureau\u2019s argument. UIM insurance in North Carolina developed out of uninsured motorist (UM) insurance. James E. Snyder, Jr., North Carolina Automobile Insurance Law \u00a7 30-1 (3d ed. 1999). UM insurance provides recovery for a policyholder injured in an auto accident by the motor vehicle of a tortfeasor who has no liability insurance. Id. By comparison, UIM coverage provides a secondary source of recovery for an insured when the tortfeasor has insurance, but the tortfeasor\u2019s liability limits are insufficient to compensate the injured party. Sutton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259, 263, 382 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1989), superseded on other grounds by statute, Act of July 12, 1991, ch. 646, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1550 (captioned \u201cAn Act to Prohibit the Stacking of Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Coverage\u201d). The UM and UIM statute is part of North Carolina\u2019s Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act of 1953 (Act). N.C.G.S. \u00a7\u00a7 20-279.1 to 279.39 (2013). The Act\u2019s purpose is\nto compensate the innocent victims of financially irresponsible motorists. The Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed so that the beneficial purpose intended by its enactment may be accomplished. The purpose of the Act, we have said, is best served when [every provision of the Act] is interpreted to provide the innocent victim with the fullest possible protection.\nLiberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 573-74, 573 S.E.2d 118, 120 (2002) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Even though the Act is intended to provide \u201cthe fullest possible protection,\u201d id. at 574, 573 S.E.2d at 120, it is only activated when a plaintiff is \u201cunder insured.\u201d A plaintiff cannot, under the statute, obtain UIM proceeds if the tortfeasors\u2019 insurance is greater than the UIM coverage or is sufficient to compensate his damages. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). The recovery provided by UIM coverage is only meant to augment inadequate recoveries obtained from underinsured tortfeasors. Id. (reducing UIM amounts by amounts received by the plaintiff from a tortfeasor\u2019s exhausted policy or policies). In other words, UIM coverage puts the insured claimant back in the position he would have occupied had the tortfeasor been insured at limits equal to the claimant\u2019s UIM limits. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haight, 152 N.C. App. 137, 142, 566 S.E.2d 835, 838 (2002) (noting the statute\u2019s goal of putting a policy holder \u201cin the same position that the policy holder would have been in if the tortfeasor had had liability coverage equal to the amount of the UM/UIM coverage\u201d (citations and emphasis omitted)), disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 675, 577 S.E.2d 627 (2003).\nTwo provisions in the UIM statute in particular demonstrate this intent by the legislature to make UIM coverage a source of compensation secondary to 'tortfeasors\u2019 liability policies. Elec. Supply Co. of Durham v. Swain Elec. Co., 328 N.C. 651, 656, 403 S.E.2d 291, 294 (1991) (observing that, inter alia, \u201cwe are guided by the structure of the statute\u201d in determining legislative intent (citations omitted)). The first is the reduction provision, which states:\nIn any event, the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to any claim is determined to be the difference between the amount paid to the claimant under the exhausted liability policy or policies and the limit of underinsured motorist coverage applicable to the motor vehicle involved in the accident.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (\u201creduction provision\u201d). Under the reduction provision, a UIM carrier reduces its applicable policy limits by amounts paid to the claimant from tortfeasors\u2019 exhausted policies.\nThe second supporting provision is the offset or recovery provision found in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3), which is incorporated by reference into subdivision 20-279.21(b)(4): Id. at \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3). This provision entitles a UIM carrier to use a claimant\u2019s judgment proceeds to recoup the UIM carrier\u2019s payments to the claimant. The presence of the reduction and offset provisions in the statute evinces a legislative intent for UIM coverage to be applicable only to the extent that other sources of recovery fail to compensate for the injury up to the UIM limits. Nice. Supply Co., 328 N.C. at 656, 403 S.E.2d at 294 (\u201cAn analysis utilizing the plain language of the statute and the canons of construction must be done in a manner which harmonizes with the underlying reason and purpose of the statute.\u201d (citation omitted)); State v. Hart, 287 N.C. 76, 80, 213 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1975) (\u201cA construction which operates to defeat or impair the object of the statute must be avoided if that can reasonably be done without violence to the legislative language.\u201d (citation omitted)). The insured\u2019s UIM limits, not the insured\u2019s total damages, provide the ceiling for recovery. See Fasulo v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 108 N.M. 807, 810-11, 780 P.2d 633, 636-37 (1989) (discussing a UIM statute similar to subsection 20-279.21(b)(4)). Thus, an insured plaintiff\u2019s UIM recovery \u201cis controlled contractually by the amount of the UIM policy limits purchased and available to her, not fortuitously by the number of tortfeasors involved in the accident.\u201d Nikiper v. Motor Club of Am. Cos., 232 N.J. Super. 393, 398-99, 557 A.2d 332, 335, certification denied, 117 N.J. 139, 564 A.2d 863 (1989). The majority\u2019s holding runs contrary to the nature and purpose of UIM coverage.\nIn the event of payment to any person under the coverage required by this section and subject to the terms and conditions of coverage, the insurer making payment shall, to the extent thereof, be entitled to the proceeds of any settlement for judgment resulting from the exercise of any limits of recovery of that person against any person or organization legally responsible for the bodily injury for which the payment is made, including the proceeds recoverable from the assets of the insolvent insurer.\nWith this understanding of the UIM statute\u2019s purpose in mind, it is necessary to consider closely the statute\u2019s controlling provision in this case \u2014 the activation provision. As an initial matter, the majority misreads Farm Bureau\u2019s argument. Farm Bureau is not insisting that the statute requires plaintiff \u201cto exhaust not only Buchanan\u2019s liability limits, but also the policy limits of Mills and Crowder to the extent that they are liable as joint tortfeasors\u201d in order for plaintiff to receive UIM benefits. Rather, Farm Bureau is asserting that UIM coverage is not applicable at all because plaintiff implicated $1,050,000 in liability coverage when he sued the three tortfeasors. As a result of this mischaracterization, the majority errs in its approach to the statute by focusing on the UIM\u2019s triggering (exhaustion) provision without first fully considering subdivision (b)(4)\u2019s activation provision. The distinction between the activation and triggering provisions is critical because if no vehicle meets the definition of an under-insured vehicle under the activation provision, then consideration of the subsequent triggering provision is unnecessary.\nThe activation provision is found in subdivision (b)(4), which is the portion of the statute governing UIM coverage. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). A UIM carrier pays on its policy to an injured claimant when (1) the auto accident involves a tortfeasor who meets the statute\u2019s definition of an underinsured highway vehicle (the activation provision); and (2) the underinsured highway vehicle\u2019s liability coverage has been exhausted (triggering provision). Id. The UIM statute\u2019s activation provision defines an underinsured highway vehicle as:\n[A] highway vehicle with respect to the ownership, maintenance, or use of which, the sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of underinsured motorist coverage for the vehicle involved in the accident and insured under the owner\u2019s policy.\nId. The activation provision applies a comparison of limits approach \u2014 UIM coverage is activated when the insured\u2019s UIM policy limits 'are greater than the liability limits of policies connected with the tortfeasor\u2019s ownership, maintenance, or use of a highway vehicle. 3 Irvin E. Schermer & William J. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance \u00a7 38:7 (4th ed. Dec. 2004) [hereinafter Automobile Liability Insurance\\. In a scenario involving a single insured claimant and a single tortfeasor, application of the statute\u2019s activation provision is straightforward. If the insured\u2019s UIM limits are greater than the tortfeasor\u2019s liability limits, the insured\u2019s UIM coverage is activated. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). Only then does subdivision (b)(4)\u2019s triggering provision become relevant.\nUnder the triggering provision, once the tortfeasor\u2019s liability limits have been paid out to the insured, if the injuries have not been adequately compensated, the insured can collect from the UIM carrier up to the maximum amount of the UIM coverage limits minus the amount paid to the claimant under the tortfeasor\u2019s exhausted policy. Id. The net effect is that UIM coverage puts the insured claimant back in the position he would have occupied had the tortfeasor been insured at limits equal to the claimant\u2019s UIM limits. See Haight, 152 N.C. App. at 142, 566 S.E.2d at 838.\nThough the activation provision\u2019s application is clear when only one tortfeasor is involved, we have not previously addressed whether, in a multiple tortfeasor scenario, the insured\u2019s UIM policy limits should be compared individually to each tortfeasor\u2019s liability limits or compared to the sum of the liability limits of all tortfeasors. When read in the broader context of the statute, the UIM\u2019s activation provision instructs comparing the insured\u2019s policy limits to the sum of the liability of all jointly and severally liable tortfeasors. More specifically, a vehicle is underinsured when \u201cthe sum of the limits of liability under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident\u201d with respect to the use of the vehicle is less than an insured\u2019s UIM limits. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4).\nThis interpretation of the activation provision is in consonance with the surrounding provisions of the statute and in keeping with the overall legislative intent of requiring UIM coverage to provide a limited source of compensation when a claimant is injured by tortfeasors who are collectively underinsured. Automobile Liability Insurance \u00a7 41.3 at 41-42 (noting that under \u201ccomparison of limits\u201d statutes like North Carolina\u2019s, \u201can underinsured motorist carrier may defeat underinsured motorist coverage by pointing to other liability coverages available to the tortfeasor which, when aggregated, produce a totality of limits in excess of the underinsured motorist insured\u2019s limits, or by aggregating the liability coverages of joint tortfeasors.\u201d (emphasis added) (footnote call number omitted)); see Nikiper, 232 N.J. Super, at 397, 557 A.2d at 334 (\u201cWe conclude that where the amount paid by the insurors for the multiple tortfeasors equals or exceeds the amount of the UIM coverage, plaintiff has no UIM claim.\u201d); see also Sutton, 325 N.C. at 265, 382 S.E.2d at 763 (observing that \u201c[(legislative intent can be ascertained not only from the phraseology of the statute but also from the nature and purpose of the act and the consequences which would follow its construction one way or the other\u201d). In the case at hand it is contrary to the purpose of the statute to conclude that Buchanan\u2019s vehicle alone activates UIM coverage when the combined liability limits of the jointly and severally liable tortfeasors is $1,050,000 and plaintiff\u2019s UIM coverage is $400,000. Likewise, it is nonsensical to say a party is \u201cunderinsured\u201d when the injured party settles with the tortfeasors for $150,000 less than their policies\u2019 coverage. State v. Beck, 359 N.C. 611, 614, 614 S.E.2d 274, 277 (2005) (\u201c[Wjhere a literal interpretation of the language of a statute will lead to absurd results, or contravene the manifest purpose of the Legislature, as otherwise expressed, the reason and purpose of the law shall control and the strict letter thereof shall be disregarded.\u201d (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).\nInterpreting the first portion of the activation provision to require comparing UIM limits to the combined limits of jointly and severally liable tortfeasors is in harmony with the immediately succeeding portion of the activation provision, which addresses UIM coverage in the context of multiple victims. State ex rel. Comm\u2019r of Ins. v. N. C. Auto. Rate Admin. Office, 287 N.C. 192, 202, 214 S.E.2d 98, 104 (1975) (\u201cWe are further guided by rules of construction that statutes in pari materia, and all parts thereof, should be construed together and compared with each other.\u201d (citation omitted)). The succeeding portion of the provision states:\nFor purposes of an underinsured motorist claim asserted by a person injured in an accident where more than one person is injured, a highway vehicle will also be an \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d if the total amount actually paid to that person under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time of the accident is less than the applicable limits of underinsured motorist coverage for the vehicle involved in the accident and insured under the owner\u2019s policy.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (emphasis added). This provision unambiguously contemplates comparing an insured plaintiff\u2019s UIM limits broadly to payments the plaintiff has received under all liability policies applicable at the time of the accident. It does not restrict the comparison of limits test to a single tortfeasor. Because this second portion of the activation provision requires aggregation of liability limits for the purposes of comparison in a multiple victim scenario, under the first portion of the activation provision, in a multiple tortfeasor scenario, the same aggregation of liability limits must apply. Otherwise, in a multiple victim, multiple tortfeasor scenario, the activation provision would produce conflicting determinations as to the existence of an underinsured highway vehicle, with the first portion requiring a one-to-one comparison and the second portion requiring a one-to-all comparison. An interpretation of the activation provision that limits policy comparisons to a single tortfeasor violates a basic rule of statutory interpretation by creating this conflict. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431, 440, 238 S.E.2d 597, 603 (1977) (\u201cObviously, the Court will, whenever possible, interpret a statute so as to avoid absurd consequences.\u201d (citations omitted)).\nThe majority contends that under Farm Bureau\u2019s approach, \u201cinsureds would be required to pursue all claims, including weak, tenuous ones, against all potentially liable parties, no matter how impractical, before being eligible to collect their contracted-for UIM benefits.\u201d As noted above, this conclusion arises from mischaracterizing Farm Bureau\u2019s argument as stating that UIM benefits should only be paid after plaintiff exhausts all applicable policies. The majority\u2019s policy concern disappears, however, when Farm Bureau\u2019s position is correctly understood to be that UIM coverage is not activated when the sum of the jointly and severally liable tortfeasors\u2019 policy limits is higher than plaintiff\u2019s UIM limits. In the instant case plaintiff chose to bring suit against the three defendants jointly and severally; no one was being \u201cforced to sue any and all possible persons,\u201d Lunsford v. Mills, _N.C. App. _, _, 747 S.E.2d 390, 394 (2013), or \u201crequired to pursue all claims,\u201d as the majority insists. An attempt by a UIM carrier to demand that plaintiff pursue the other tortfeasors before being eligible for UIM benefits \u201cwould be in the realm of bad faith.\u201d Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of N. C. v. Blong, 159 N.C. App. 365, 373, 583 S.E.2d 307, 312, disc. rev. denied, 357 N.C. 578, 589 S.E.2d 125 (2003). Our General Statutes already prohibit such actions. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-63-15(ll)(f) (2013) (\u201cUnfair Claim Settlement Practices\u201d); see also Gray v. N.C. Ins. Underwriting Ass\u2019n, 352 N.C. 61, 71, 529 S.E.2d 676, 683 (2000) (concluding that \u201cthe act or practice of \u2018[n]ot attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in which liability has become reasonably clear,\u2019 also engages in conduct that embodies the broader standards of N.C.G.S. \u00a7 75-1.1\u201d (alteration in original) (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 58-63-15(ll)(f))). The decision whether to pursue further litigation is within the control of the plaintiff unless he subrogates his claims to the insurer; a UIM carrier \u201ccannot require an insured to pursue [other alleged tortfeasors] before exhaustion can occur.\u201d Blong, 159 N.C. App. at 373, 583 S.E.2d at 312. If plaintiff in this case had preferred to sue Buchanan alone and collect on his $50,000 policy limits, plaintiffs UIM coverage would have been activated and triggered. Having chosen, however, to pursue simultaneously claims against multiple tortfeasors whose combined liability limits far exceeded plaintiffs own UIM coverage, plaintiff was no longer able to access his UIM policy limits.\nThe majority further asserts, again under a misunderstanding of Farm Bureau\u2019s position, that requiring exhaustion before the receipt of UIM benefits would render \u201cmeaningless\u201d the provisions granting UIM carriers subrogation and reimbursement rights. Under a proper consideration of Farm Bureau\u2019s position and based on a proper reading of the activation provision, the provisions in question would not be surplusage. The subrogation provision noted by the majority is applicable when (a) underinsured motorist coverage is activated, and (b) a UIM carrier voluntarily pays out to the insured before the triggering provision has been satisfied. N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4). This subrogation right is a necessary assurance to a UIM carrier who voluntarily, id. (\u201cat its option\u201d), chooses to pay its insured before exhaustion of a tortfeasor\u2019s policy limits. Granted, this scenario is not likely to occur. George L. Simpson, III, North Carolina Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance \u00a7 4:2, at 351 (2013-2014 ed.) (noting that these occasions are likely to be few). Nevertheless, this does not make the provision superfluous.\nLastly, the majority misapprehends subdivision (b)(4)\u2019s thirty-day advancement-of-payment provision. The majority is incorrect in concluding that Farm Bureau has forfeited its rights to recovery from the proceeds of the Mills and Crowder settlement, N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) (incorporated into subdivision (b)(4) and entitling the UIM carrier to \u201cthe proceeds of any settlement for judgment\u201d related to the plaintiff\u2019s injuries), because it failed to \u201cpreserve its subrogation rights\u201d by not advancing its policy limits to plaintiff in a timely manner. When a UIM carrier fails to advance payment within thirty days of notice of a settlement with an underinsured motorist, it only forfeits its subrogation rights as to the underinsured motorist under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) (\u201cNo insurer shall exercise any right of subrogation or any right to approve settlement with the original owner, operator, or maintainer of the underinsured highway vehicle under a policy providing coverage against an underinsured motorist where the insurer has been provided with written notice before a settlement between its insured and the underinsured motorist and the insurer fails to advance a payment to the insured in an amount equal to the tentative settlement within 30 days following receipt of that notice.\u201d (emphasis added)). That thirty-day deadline does not affect the UIM carrier\u2019s recovery rights against remaining tortfeasors. Furthermore, the offset provision in N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(3) contains no requirement that a UIM carrier first pay out its limits before being entitled to a recovery against the proceeds paid by tortfeasors. Nothing in the statute dictates that a UIM carrier forfeits its rights to offset against judgment recoveries from other parties by not paying out benefits in a timely manner.\nThe case relied on by the majority in support of its forfeiture conclusion, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Blackwelder, determined that the insurer preserved subrogation rights against the underinsured tortfeasor; it does not address a UIM carrier\u2019s right to recover proceeds paid by other tortfeasors. 332 N.C. 135, 418 S.E.2d 229 (1992). In Blong, upon which the Court of Appeals relied in arriving at a conclusion similar to that of the majority, a UIM carrier paid out its policy limits to an insured and then argued it was entitled to an offset against any amounts received by the insured in subsequent actions against additional parties. 159 N.C. App. at 367-68, 583 S.E.2d at 308-09. Noting the UM/UIM statute\u2019s remedial nature, Blong nonetheless concluded that \u201cthe Act appears to allow for the type of subrogation that plaintiff claims.\u201d Id. at 373, 583 S.E.2d at 312. Blong answered the question whether the UIM carrier was entitled to an offset after having already paid out its UIM limits and gave a sequence of \u201chow the procedure may play out.\u201d Id. (emphasis added). The holding in Blong does not \u201cclearly obligate] ] the UIM carrier to first provide coverage, and later seek [recovery]\u201d. Lunsford, _N.C. App. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 394. Neither the UIM statute nor case law provides the necessary support for the majority\u2019s timing and forfeiture determination regarding Farm Bureau\u2019s entitlement to recovery. Furthermore, reading the UIM statute as requiring Farm Bureau to pay out its UIM limits promptly in order to protect the UIM policyholder is unnecessary; a UIM claimant is already protected by the Unfair Claim Settlement Practices statute from delayed payment, as noted above. Regardless whether UIM coverage was activated in this case, Farm Bureau should nevertheless be entitled to recovery.\nThe majority\u2019s insistence on reading the activation provision as limited only to a comparison of the UIM policy limits and an individual tortfeasor\u2019s policy limits in this case allows plaintiff to collect from his $400,000 UIM policy even though he has already settled damr ages claims for $900,000 with the tortfeasors, which is $150,000 less than the maximum primary insurance coverage available. The legislature never intended for UIM coverage to serve this role, providing plaintiff an excess recovery of $350,000. Rather the legislature intended for plaintiffs UIM policy to serve as a safeguard to protect plaintiff in the event the tortfeasors\u2019 liability policies failed to compensate plaintiff for injuries up to $400,000. This legislative intent is best carried out by first comparing plaintiff\u2019s UIM limits to the combined limits of all the auto policies implicated in the lawsuit. Even though the majority\u2019s holding provides \u201cthe fullest possible protection,\u201d Pennington, 356 N.C. at 574, 573 S.E.2d at 120, it contravenes the activation provision\u2019s requirements and the legislature\u2019s intent to reduce UIM payouts by amounts recovered from all liable parties. Accordingly, the trial court erred in requiring Farm Bureau to make the $350,000 payment. Nevertheless, were UIM coverage properly implicated, I agree with the majority that the awarding of costs and interests against the insurer is limited contractually by the terms of the insured\u2019s policy. Thus, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.\n. By contrast, some states apply an \u201cexcess coverage\u201d approach whereby UIM coverage is activated when a tortfeasor\u2019s liability limits are exceeded by the insured\u2019s damages. 3 Irvin E. Schermer & William J. Schermer, Automobile Liability Insurance \u00a7 38:9, at 38-31 (4th ed. Dec. 2004).\n. The majority\u2019s analysis and interpretation of the activation provision is relegated to one paragraph with a citation to a case from New York interpreting, against the insurer, a provision in a claimant\u2019s insurance policy. That case did not interpret a statute and offers no support for an interpretation of North Carolina\u2019s statute.\n. The relevant portions of the current version of this statute are identical to the 2009 version of the statute, which is the version applicable to this case. White v. Mote, 270 N.C. 544, 555, 155 S.E.2d 75, 82 (1967) (\u201cLaws in effect at the time of issuance of a policy of insurance become a part of the contract. . . .\u201d).\n. The legislative history of the statute asserted by Farm Bureau and addressed by the majority provides additional support for this interpretation. Because the activation provision is susceptible to multiple interpretations, the majority\u2019s dismissive \u201cplain meaning\u201d response to Farm Bureau\u2019s argument is unavailing.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "Justice NEWBY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Abrams & Abrams, P.A., by Noah B. Abrams, Douglas B. Abrams, Margaret S. Abrams, and Melissa N. Abrams, for plaintiff-appellee.", "Nelson Levine de Luca & Hamilton, by David L. Brown, Brady A. Yntema, and David G. Harris, II, for unnamed defendant-appellant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.", "White & Stradley, PLLC, by J. David Stradley; and Whitley Law Firm, by Ann C. Ochsner, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.", "Sparkman Larcade, PLLC, by George L. Simpson, IV, for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, amici curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "DOUGLAS KIRK LUNSFORD v. THOMAS E. MILLS, JAMES W. CROWDER, III, and SHAWN T. BUCHANAN\nNo. 385PA13\n(Filed 19 December 2014)\n1. Motor vehicles \u2014 insurance\u2014underinsured motorist coverage \u2014 multiple tortfeasors \u2014 coverage triggered by exhaustion of single at-fault motorist\u2019s liability coverage\nIn a negligence action for an automobile accident involving multiple tortfeasors, the trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff and ordering his insurer to provide his underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits after one of the tortfeasors had tendered the limit of his liability coverage. When a single \u201cunderinsured highway vehicle\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 20-279.21(b)(4) has tendered the liability limit of its insurance, a UIM insurer\u2019s obligation to provide UIM benefits is triggered\n2. Motor vehicles \u2014 insurance\u2014underinsured motorist coverage \u2014 pre- and post-judgment interest and costs\u2014 determined by contract\nIn a negligence action for an automobile accident, the trial court erred by ordering plaintiff\u2019s underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier to pay pre- and post-judgment interest and costs. Because the UIM statute does not speak to the issue of pre- and post-judgment interest and costs, the issue was governed by the terms of the insurance policy. The policy here capped the UIM carrier\u2019s liability at the UIM coverage limit.\nJustice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nJustice NEWBY dissenting in part and concurring in part.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 747 S.E.2d 390 (2013), affirming an order of summary judgment entered on 13 November 2012 by Judge James U. Downs in Superior Court, McDowell County Heard in the Supreme Court on 15 April 2014.\nAbrams & Abrams, P.A., by Noah B. Abrams, Douglas B. Abrams, Margaret S. Abrams, and Melissa N. Abrams, for plaintiff-appellee.\nNelson Levine de Luca & Hamilton, by David L. Brown, Brady A. Yntema, and David G. Harris, II, for unnamed defendant-appellant North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company.\nWhite & Stradley, PLLC, by J. David Stradley; and Whitley Law Firm, by Ann C. Ochsner, for North Carolina Advocates for Justice, amicus curiae.\nSparkman Larcade, PLLC, by George L. Simpson, IV, for North Carolina Association of Defense Attorneys and Property Casualty Insurers Association of America, amici curiae." }, "file_name": "0618-01", "first_page_order": 658, "last_page_order": 682 }