{ "id": 4313062, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY E. BOWDEN", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Bowden", "decision_date": "2014-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 514PA08-3", "first_page": "680", "last_page": "692", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 N.C. 680" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "747 S.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "668 S.E.2d 107", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12642152 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109-10", "parenthetical": "\"Bowden II\"" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/668/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 L. Ed. 2d 168", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12703328, 12581249, 12703329, 12703330, 12703331, 12581260, 12703340, 12581262, 12581263, 12581264, 12581265, 12581266, 12703348, 12703349, 12583742, 12703327 ], "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/571/0894-03", "/s-ct/134/0224-04", "/us/571/0894-04", "/us/571/0894-05", "/us/571/0894-06", "/s-ct/134/0226-01", "/us/571/0895-08", "/s-ct/134/0226-03", "/s-ct/134/0226-04", "/s-ct/134/0226-05", "/s-ct/134/0226-06", "/s-ct/134/0226-07", "/us/571/0895-09", "/us/571/0895-10", "/s-ct/134/0394-06", "/us/571/0894-02" ] }, { "cite": "134 S. Ct. 394", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12703331, 12703205, 12703206, 12703274, 12703316, 12703259, 12583737, 12583738, 12583739, 12583740, 12583741, 12583742 ], "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/571/0894-06", "/us/571/0885-04", "/us/571/0885-05", "/us/571/0890-06", "/us/571/0893-07", "/us/571/0889-04", "/s-ct/134/0394-01", "/s-ct/134/0394-02", "/s-ct/134/0394-03", "/s-ct/134/0394-04", "/s-ct/134/0394-05", "/s-ct/134/0394-06" ] }, { "cite": "2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 253", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "749 S.E.2d 847", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "848" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 N.C. 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4322083, 4318084, 4329095, 4325521, 4330291, 4332729, 4334142 ], "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "267" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/367/0267-07", "/nc/367/0267-02", "/nc/367/0267-05", "/nc/367/0267-06", "/nc/367/0267-01", "/nc/367/0267-03", "/nc/367/0267-04" ] }, { "cite": "697 S.E.2d 327", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "327", "parenthetical": "holding that a Bowden-class inmate convicted of first-degree felony murder was not entitled to have her credits applied towards calculating an unconditional release date" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4152855 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320", "parenthetical": "per curiam" }, { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "683 S.E.2d 208", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 N.C. 621", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4151285 ], "year": 2009, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/363/0621-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 N.C. App. 597", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4161318 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "600-01", "parenthetical": "\"Bowden II\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/193/0597-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 L. Ed. 2d 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12459367, 12459368, 12459369, 12459370, 12459371, 12459372, 12459373 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-01", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-02", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-03", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-04", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-05", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-06", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-07" ] }, { "cite": "131 S. Ct. 2150", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "case_ids": [ 12459366, 12459367, 12459368, 12459369, 12459503 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/179/0934-06", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-01", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-02", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-03", "/l-ed-2d/179/0952-02" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 20, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "54" }, { "page": "58" }, { "page": "52-53" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "53" }, { "page": "53" }, { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "55-56" }, { "page": "54-55" }, { "page": "55" }, { "page": "55-56" }, { "page": "54, 56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153103 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "254" }, { "page": "260" }, { "page": "252" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "737 S.E.2d 737", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "737" }, { "page": "737", "parenthetical": "holding that Bowden-class inmates convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree burglary were not entitled to have their credits applied towards calculating an unconditional release date" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 N.C. 471", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4351007 ], "weight": 3, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/366/0471-01" ] }, { "cite": "228 S.E.2d 414", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "424", "parenthetical": "\"Bowden I \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "290 N.C. 702", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8564470 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717", "parenthetical": "\"Bowden I \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/290/0702-01" ] }, { "cite": "428 U.S. 280", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6177464 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/428/0280-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 S.E.2d 617", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "630" }, { "page": "619" }, { "page": "621-22" }, { "page": "621" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "545 U.S. 209", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 8209063 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "221", "parenthetical": "citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at OSO-SOS, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951-52, for the proposition that there is a \"liberty interest in avoiding withdrawal of state-created system of good-time credits\"" }, { "page": "189", "parenthetical": "citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at OSO-SOS, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951-52, for the proposition that there is a \"liberty interest in avoiding withdrawal of state-created system of good-time credits\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/545/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 433", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11595864 ], "weight": 15, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435, 440" }, { "page": "68, 72" }, { "page": "435-36" }, { "page": "68-69", "parenthetical": "footnote call number omitted" }, { "page": "440" }, { "page": "71" }, { "page": "441" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "446-47" }, { "page": "75-76", "parenthetical": "emphasis in original" }, { "page": "450-51" }, { "page": "77-78", "parenthetical": "Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0433-01" ] }, { "cite": "450 U.S. 24", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6181086 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "30-31", "parenthetical": "\"Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it violates the [Ex Post Facto] Clause if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.\"" }, { "page": "24", "parenthetical": "\"Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it violates the [Ex Post Facto] Clause if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/450/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "418 U.S. 539", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6173832 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553-58" }, { "page": "949-52" }, { "page": "556-57" }, { "page": "951", "parenthetical": "internal citation omitted" }, { "page": "951-52" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/418/0539-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 L. Ed. 2d 935", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "case_ids": [ 12459367, 12459368, 12459369, 12459370, 12459371, 12459372, 12459373 ], "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-01", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-02", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-03", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-04", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-05", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-06", "/l-ed-2d/179/0935-07" ] }, { "cite": "698 S.E.2d 49", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" }, { "page": "59", "parenthetical": "Newby, J., concurring in the result" }, { "page": "55", "parenthetical": "majority" }, { "page": "54", "parenthetical": "brackets and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "364 N.C. 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153103 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/nc/364/0249-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1158, "char_count": 32667, "ocr_confidence": 0.753, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14533279739475158 }, "sha256": "fd50715eff906029f886f8e071201fa70c1e1da861352a10d5c4827e1b944bd5", "simhash": "1:9babb43e328d2d58", "word_count": 5183 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:46.212757+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "Justice BEASLEY joins in this dissenting opinion." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY E. BOWDEN" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nIn this case we determine whether the various credits defendant Bobby E. Bowden has accumulated during his incarceration must be applied to reduce his sentence of life imprisonment, thereby entitling him to immediate and unconditional release. Our previous holdings regarding the particular class of inmates that includes defendant mandate the conclusion that defendant remains lawfully incarcerated. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nOn 20 December 1975, defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and one count of armed robbery in Superior Court, Cumberland- County, and was later sentenced to death. On direct appeal in 1976, this Court vacated defendant\u2019s death sentence and remanded the case with directives to impose life sentences for the two counts of first-degree murder, in accord with Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976). State v. Bowden, 290 N.C. 702, 717, 228 S.E.2d 414, 424 (1976) (\u201cBowden I \u201d). Upon remand of this case to the trial court, defendant received two life sentences to run concurrently.\nNotably, defendant is one of a limited group of prisoners, referred to herein as the Bowden-class inmates, who committed offenses between 8 April 1974 and 30 June 1978 and received death sentences that were later reduced to life imprisonment. The version of section 14-2 of the North Carolina General Statutes in effect during that time period stated that \u201c[a] sentence of life imprisonment shall be considered as a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 80 years in the State\u2019s prison.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-2 (Supp. 1974). Defendant has accrued various credits while incarcerated, including good time, gain time, and merit time. For Bowden-class inmates serving a life sentence, the Department of Correction (\u201cDOC\u201d) has applied these credits towards privileges like obtaining a lower custody grade or earlier parole eligibility, but not towards the calculation of an unconditional release date. Lovette v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 366 N.C. 471, 737 S.E.2d 737 (per curiam), cert. denied,_U.S._, 134 S. Ct. 394, 187 L. Ed. 2d 168 (2013); Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, 254, 698 S.E.2d 49, 54 (2010), cert. denied,_U.S._, 131 S. Ct. 2150, 179 L. Ed. 2d 935 (2011). The DOC applied some of defendant\u2019s credits towards earlier parole eligibility. The Parole Commission has periodically reviewed defendant\u2019s parole eligibility according to law since 1987 and denied defendant parole after each review. In December 2005 defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, claiming he was entitled to immediate release from prison because, after applying all his various credits, he had completed his eighty-year life sentence. The trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition by an order dated 25 January 2006.\nDefendant petitioned the Court of Appeals for review. Treating defendant\u2019s petition for writ of certiorari as a motion for appropriate relief, the Court of Appeals vacated the 25 January 2006 order and remanded the matter for an evidentiary hearing under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1420. Following that hearing, the trial court entered an order on 27 August 2007 once again denying defendant\u2019s claim for relief.\nDefendant appealed the denial of his motion for appropriate relief. The Court of Appeals held that N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-2 (1974) regards defendant\u2019s life sentence as an eighty-year sentence \u201cfor all purposes\u201d \u201cwithout any limitation or restriction.\u201d State v. Bowden, 193 N.C. App. 597, 600-01, 668 S.E.2d 107, 109-10 (2008) (\u201cBowden II\u201d), disc. rev. improvidently allowed per curiam, 363 N.C. 621, 683 S.E.2d 208 (2009). The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court\u2019s order and remanded \u201cfor a hearing to determine how many sentence reduction credits defendant is eligible to receive and how those credits are to be applied.\u201d Id. at 601, 668 S.E.2d at 110.\nIn response to this decision, the DOC calculated projected release dates for Bowden and all other affected inmates and informed those inmates accordingly. Nonetheless, in subsequent litigation involving other Bowden-class inmates, the DOC maintained and successfully defended its position that credits had not been and should not be applied towards the unconditional release of Bowden-class inmates. Lovette, 366 N.C. at 472, 737 S.E.2d at 737; Jones, 364 N.C. at 260, 698 S.E.2d at 58; accord Brown v. N.C. Dep\u2019t of Corr., 364 N.C. 319, 320, 697 S.E.2d 327 (2010) (per curiam).\nIn this case, upon remand from the Court of Appeals, the trial court held a hearing and entered an order on 8 May 2012, concluding that defendant had a liberty interest in good time, gain time, and merit time credits that he earned between 1975 and October 2009. The trial court ruled that all of defendant\u2019s credits should be applied to his sentence for all purposes, including calculating an unconditional release date. Further, the trial court concluded that the DOC\u2019s refusal to apply defendant\u2019s credits in this way violated his rights under both the Due Process Clause and the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. Upon applying all of defendant\u2019s credits to his eighty-year life sentence, the trial court determined that defendant had served his entire sentence, that his unconditional release date was 13 October 2009, and that he should have been released on 29 October 2009. The trial court ordered the DOC to release defendant unconditionally by 11 May 2012, but stayed its order the following day pending final appellate review.\nOn appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. State v. Bowden,_N.C. App._,_, 747 S.E.2d 617, 630 (2013). The Court of Appeals noted, inter alia, that the DOC applied credits towards the calculation of defendant\u2019s unconditional release date following its decision in Bowden II in 2008 and this Court\u2019s silence on the merits of that case in 2009. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 619. To support its determination, the Court of Appeals pointed to the presence of the word \u201capplied\u201d in defendant\u2019s computerized credit records and informal internal discussions among DOC employees following Bowden II. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 621-22. The trial court and the Court of Appeals contended this evidence rendered our previous decision in Jones, regarding an otherwise indistinguishable defendant, inapplicable. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 621.\nThe State sought review in this Court via a petition for writ of certiorari, which we allowed to decide whether our decision in Jones controls the outcome of this case. State v. Bowden, 367 N.C. 267, 267, 749 S.E.2d 847, 848 (2013). Defendant argues, as did the defendant in Jones, that when his various credits are applied to his statutorily defined eighty-year life sentence, he is entitled to immediate and unconditional release. See Jones, 364 N.C. at 252, 698 S.E.2d at 52-53. Again like the defendant in Jones, defendant contends the DOC\u2019s refusal to apply his credits in this way infringes on his due process protected liberty interests and subjects him to an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Id. at 256, 698 S.E.2d at 55.\nIn all significant ways, the issues presented by this case are indistinguishable from those resolved by our decision in Jones. In Jones the trial court ruled that Alford Jones, a Bowden-class defendant who was convicted of first-degree murder and whose death sentence was subsequently reduced to life imprisonment, was entitled to receive credits for all purposes and to have those credits applied towards his unconditional release. Id. at 251, 698 S.E.2d at 52. Jones also argued that after Bowden II, the DOC applied his credits in calculating an unconditional release date of which he was informed. This Court rejected that reasoning and concluded that the DOC possessed \u201cstatutorily and constitutionally permissible authority\u201d to apply Jones\u2019s credits \u201cfor limited purposes that did not include calculating an unconditional release date.\u201d Id. at 252, 698 S.E.2d at 53.\nThough we noted that the DOC does not have unfettered discretion, we recognized that the General Assembly has delegated certain authority to the DOC to govern prisoners and administer criminal sentences. Id. at 252-53, 698 S.E.2d at 53; see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 148-11 (1974) (\u201cThe Commissioner [of Correction] shall propose rules and regulations for the government of the State prison system, which shall become effective when approved by the Commission of Correction.\u201d); id. \u00a7 148-11 (2013) (\u201cThe Secretary shall adopt rules for the government of the State prison system.\u201d); see also id. \u00a7 148-4 (1974) (\u201cThe Commissioner of Correction shall have control and custody of all prisoners serving sentence in the State prison system, and such prisoners shall be subject to all the rules and regulations legally adopted for the government thereof.\u201d); id. \u00a7 148-4 (2013) (same with exception of substituting the Secretary of Public Safety for the Commissioner of Correction); id. \u00a7 148-13 (1974) (stating that the Department\u2019s regulations include provisions governing \u201crewards and privileges applicable to the several classifications of prisoners as an inducement to good conduct [and] allowances of time for good behavior.\u201d); id. \u00a7 148-13 (2013) (authorizing the Secretary of Public Safety to \u201cissue regulations regarding . . . the privileges and restrictions applicable to each custody grade\u201d). The application of credits earned during incarceration falls under the \u201cstrictly administrative\u201d discretion allotted to the DOC and remains \u201coutside the purview of the courts.\u201d Jones, 364 N.C. at 255, 698 S.E.2d at 55 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Recognizing this statutory delegation of administrative discretion, this Court in Jones deferred to the DOC\u2019s policies for governing prisoners so long as those policies remained within constitutional bounds. Id. at 256-57, 698 S.E.2d at 55-56. We noted that the DOC had never applied these credits towards the calculation of an unconditional release date for a Bowden-class inmate. Id. at 254-55, 698 S.E.2d at 54-55.\nThe DOC\u2019s exercise of authority in Jones did not exceed constitutional limits despite the defendant\u2019s claims that, inter alia, the DOC\u2019s actions violated his due process rights and subjected him to an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Id. at 256, 698 S.E.2d at 55. This Court concluded that a prisoner\u2019s de minimis liberty interest in having his various credits applied towards his desired purpose of unconditional release must be balanced against the State\u2019s corresponding and compelling interest in public safety. Id. at 256-58, 698 S.E.2d at 55-56. As such, the DOC may apply those credits for limited purposes, such as earlier parole eligibility, but decline to reduce the remaining sentence. Id. at 254-55, 257, 698 S.E.2d at 54, 56. Ultimately, we determined that because he had \u201cno State-created right to have his time credits used to calculate his eligibility for unconditional release [,] Jones\u2019s due process rights ha[d] not been violated.\u201d Id. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56. Likewise, the DOC\u2019s policy to refuse to apply these credits towards calculating an unconditional release date for a Bowden-class inmate serving a life sentence did not constitute an ex post facto violation. Id. at 259, 698 S.E.2d at 57.\nIn Jones we thoroughly reviewed and rejected the same arguments advanced by defendant here \u2014 that a Bowden-class inmate serving a life sentence is entitled to have his credits applied for all purposes, including immediate and unconditional release. We have since extended our holding in Jones to other Bowden-class defendants to deny them the application of credits towards an unconditional release date. Lovette, 366 N.C. at 472, 737 S.E.2d at 737 (holding that Bowden-class inmates convicted of second-degree murder and second-degree burglary were not entitled to have their credits applied towards calculating an unconditional release date); Brown, 364 N.C. at 320, 697 S.E.2d at 327 (holding that a Bowden-class inmate convicted of first-degree felony murder was not entitled to have her credits applied towards calculating an unconditional release date). In erroneously distinguishing Jones from the case at hand, the trial court and the Court of Appeals placed great emphasis on the DOC\u2019s attempt to interpret and implement the Court of Appeals\u2019 ruling in Bowden II by calculating a proposed release date. But defendant has no State-created right to his unconditional release based on an agency\u2019s good faith interpretation of, and actions taken to comply with, a ruling that is later found to be contrary to law. The DOC is charged with ensuring public safety and facilitating the orderly release and supervision of criminal defendants, some of whom have been convicted of the most heinous crimes. We must not force the DOC to reverse its longstanding policies in response to lower court directives that prove inconsistent with those ultimately determined by this Court. To decide otherwise would undermine the State\u2019s ability to react to court decisions while still seeking further judicial review.\nDefendant here, like Jones, is a member of the Bowden class of inmates who are all serving life sentences. The nature and severity of the offenses warranting a life sentence remains the same, and the DOC retains the same implicit discretion in governing these inmates. Moreover, the DOC bears the same significant responsibility to ensure the release and subsequent supervision of only those prisoners who are prepared to return safely to society. Because defendant\u2019s status is indistinguishable from that of the defendant in Jones, he must be treated equally under the law. The DOC has never applied these credits towards the calculation of an unconditional release date for a Bowden-class inmate. Therefore, we hold that defendant, like Jones, remains lawfully incarcerated and is not entitled to release. The decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court\u2019s order to the contrary is reversed.\nREVERSED.\nJustice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\n. Effective January 2012, the DOC was renamed the Department of Public Safety. Act of June 4, 2011, ch. 145, sec. 19.1.(a), 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 253, 535 (\u201cCurrent Operations and Capital Improvements Appropriations Act of 2011\u201d).", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." }, { "text": "Justice HUDSON\ndissenting.\nThe majority holds that Bobby Bowden must remain incarcerated, despite the unchallenged fact that he has accumulated good time, gain time, and merit time credits which, if applied, would have entitled him to release in October 2009. Here I conclude that, unlike in Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, 698 S.E.2d49 (2010), cert. denied,_ U.S. _, 179 L. Ed. 2d 935 (2011), the North Carolina Department of Correction (\u201cDOC\u201d) actually applied the prison credits to defendant Bowden\u2019s record, and it may not now take those credits away without violating his constitutional rights. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.\nThe majority bases its decision primarily on this Court\u2019s opinion in Jones v. Keller, 364 N.C. 249, 698 S.E.2d 49. However, in my view, Jones does not control the outcome of this case. Central to the outcome in Jones was the trial court\u2019s factual finding, based on competent evidence, that the DOC had not actually applied credits to the defendant\u2019s account for purposes of calculating his unconditional release date. If it had done so, clear and binding precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States would have required his release on the date as calculated there. Here, however, the trial court found as fact that credits had been applied for this purpose \u2014 a factual finding of paramount importance which the majority has largely ignored. Because we are bound on appeal by that finding, just as we are bound by the Supreme Court\u2019s interpretations of federal constitutional law, I conclude that defendant Bowden was entitled to release in October 2009 and that his continued detention violates the United States Constitution.\nTo begin with, the majority opinion conflicts with binding precedent from the Supreme Court of the United States. As it did in Jones, the majority characterizes the liberty interest at stake here as \u201cde minimis.\u201d State v. Bowden _ N.C. _, _, _ S.E.2d __, _(2014) (\u201cThis Court concluded that a prisoner\u2019s de minimis liberty interest in having his various credits applied towards his desired purpose of unconditional release must be balanced against the State\u2019s corresponding and compelling interest in public safety.\u201d); Jones, 364 N.C. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56 (\u201cThus, [the defendant\u2019s] liberty interest, if any, in having these credits used for the purpose of calculating his date of unconditional release is de minimis, particularly when contrasted with the State\u2019s compelling interest in keeping inmates incarcerated until they can be released with safety to themselves and to the public.\u201d). From this premise, it would seem naturally to follow that such credits are entitled to little, if any, constitutional protection.\nBut this is not what the Supreme Court of the United States has said. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974), the Court addressed whether good time credits authorized by state statute were protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 553-58, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 949-52. The Court opined:\nWe also reject the assertion of the State that whatever may be true of the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment] in general or of other rights protected by that Clause against state infringement, the interest of prisoners in disciplinary procedures is not included in that \u201cliberty\u201d protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is true that the Constitution itself does not guarantee good-time credit for satisfactory behavior while in prison----But the State having created the right to good time and itself recognizing that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner\u2019s interest has real substance and is sufficiently embraced within Fourteenth Amendment \u201cliberty\u201d to entitle him to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the state-created right is not arbitrarily abrogated.\nId. at 556-57, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951 (internal citation omitted); see also Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30-31, 67 L. Ed. 2d 17, 24 (1981) (\u201cThus, even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it violates the [Ex Post Facto] Clause if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense.\u201d). So despite the determination of the Supreme Court of the United States that the liberty interest in prison credits \u201chas real substance\u201d protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority here holds that this interest is \u201cde minimis.\u201d Failing even to mention Wolff, the majority concludes that the State can continue to imprison Bobby Bowden, regardless of the number of credits he has earned to reduce his sentence, without violating the constitutional promise of due process.\nThe majority here can only justify characterizing defendant Bowden\u2019s liberty interest in prison credits as de minimis \u2014 despite the Supreme Court\u2019s explicit holding to the contrary \u2014 by inaccurately characterizing the facts found by the trial court regarding what is at' stake. As noted, the majority in Jones described the defendant\u2019s liberty interest as his interest \u201cin having these credits used for the purpose of calculating his date of unconditional release.\u201d 364 N.C. at 257, 698 S.E.2d at 56. Today\u2019s majority writes similarly. Here, however, the trial court found that the credits had already been applied to defendant Bowden\u2019s account \u2014 and the difference between applying the earned credits, and not applying them, is the difference between freedom and incarceration. Certainly to defendant and others behind bars, this interest is anything but \u201cde minimis.\u201d\nBut my disagreement does not end with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Today\u2019s majority also ignores the opini\u00f3n of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 137 L. Ed. 2d 63 (1997). There, the Court addressed the strikingly comparable question of whether the State of Florida violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution when it awarded early release credits to state inmates, then took those credits away. See id. at 435, 440, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 68, 72. The Court summarized the relevant facts as follows:\nIn 1986 petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of attempted murder and received a sentence of 22 years (8,030 days) in prison. In 1992 the Florida Department of Corrections released him from prison based on its determination that he had accumulated five different types of early release credits totaling 5,668 days. Of that total, 1,860 days were \u201cprovisional credits\u201d awarded as a result of prison overcrowding. Shortly after petitioner\u2019s release, the state attorney general issued an opinion interpreting a 1992 statute as having retroactively canceled all provisional credits awarded to inmates convicted of murder or attempted murder. Petitioner was therefore rearrested and returned to custody. His new release date was set for May 19, 1998.\nId. at 435-36, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 68-69 (footnote call number omitted). Presented with these facts, the Court concluded unanimously that awarding such credits, and then revoking them, cannot comport with the constitutional protection against ex post facto punishment. In an opinion written by Justice Stevens, and joined in full by six other justices, the Court opined that the guarantee against increasing punishment after the fact \u201cis only one aspect of the broader constitutional protection against arbitrary changes in the law.\u201d Id. at 440, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 71. The Court noted further that this protection also \u201cplaces limits on the sovereign\u2019s ability to use its lawmaking power to modify bargains it has made with its subjects.\u201d Id.\nTurning to the specific issue at hand, the Court went on to hold that these dual protections against arbitrariness and compact-breaking apply to sentence reduction credits created and awarded by the State. It noted that \u201cthe operation of the 1992 statute to effect the cancellation of overcrowding credits . . . was clearly retrospective\u201d and reasoned that this retroactivity narrowed the relevant question to \u201cwhether those consequences disadvantaged petitioner by increasing his punishment.\u201d Id. at 441, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 72. The Court then concluded that the petitioner was disadvantaged, and central to this conclusion was the fact that the credits had already been awarded:\nThe 1992 statute has unquestionably disadvantaged petitioner because it resulted in his rearrest and prolonged his imprisonment. Unlike [actions taken in a previous case], the 1992 Florida statute did more than simply remove a mechanism that created an opportunity for early release for a class of prisoners whose release was unlikely; rather, it made ineligible for early release a class of prisoners who were previously eligible \u2014 including some, like petitioner, who had actually been released.\nId. at 446-47, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 75-76 (emphasis in original). Importantly, it is undisputed that here, like the defendant in Lynce, the application of the credits Bobby Bowden has already earned would provide him with no mere \u201copportunity,\u201d but would entitle him to immediate release.\nAs noted, this majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court was fully endorsed by seven justices. Justice Thomas also wrote a brief opinion, joined by Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Critically, that opinion also confirms the central relevance of the fact that the sentence reduction credits had already been awarded:\nUnlike in [a previous case], the increase in petitioner\u2019s punishment here was neither \u201cspeculative\u201d nor \u201cattenuated.\u201d Petitioner pleaded nolo contendere to a charge of attempted murder and was duly sentenced. During the period of his confinement, petitioner accumulated release credits under a state statute adopted in response to prison overcrowding. Those credits enabled petitioner to be freed from prison before his sentence (as originally imposed) had run. . . .\nUnder these narrow circumstances, I agree with the Court that the State\u2019s retroactive nullification of petitioner\u2019s previously accrued, and then used, release credits violates the Constitution\u2019s ban on ex post facto lawmaking.... The present case involves not merely an effect on the availability o\u00ed future release credits, but the retroactive elimination of credits already earned and used. Accordingly, I concur in part and concur in the judgment.\nId. at 450-51, 137 L. Ed. 2d at 77-78 (Thomas & Scalia, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (emphasis in original). In light of this concurring opinion, it is clear that the Court was unanimous on this point. Today\u2019s majority thus ignores a recent legal holding that commanded nine votes at the Supreme Court of the United States.\nThe import of these cases, then, is also clear: The State is under no obligation to create or to award credits that reduce a prisoner\u2019s sentence for a crime for which he was lawfully convicted. But once it does so, it cannot then arbitrarily and with no process take those credits back. I would hold that if the State does so, it violates both the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution. These principles continue to bind this Court and we are not free to disregard them.\nIn my view, these cases compel this conclusion so clearly that a different outcome would be possible only if the relevant facts were different. In Jones, the facts were different. That case, like this one, involved a defendant who was a member of what has been called the Bowden-class of inmates. See, e.g., Jones, 364 N.C. at 262, 698 S.E.2d at 59 (Newby, J., concurring in the result). And as here, the defendant argued that the State\u2019s failure to apply the credits he had earned to calculate his unconditional release date was unconstitutional and violated both his right to due process and his right to be free from ex post facto punishment. See id. at 256, 698 S.E.2d at 55 (majority). In Jones, the majority rejected both arguments, based in large part on the trial court\u2019s finding of fact that \u201cthe Department of Correction has never used good time, gain time, or merit time credits in the calculation of unconditional release dates for inmates who received sentences of life imprisonment.\u201d Id. at 254, 698 S.E.2d at 54 (brackets and quotation marks omitted). With that finding, the defendant in Jones missed landing squarely within the holdings of the Supreme Court in Wolff and Lynce. He was held not to be entitled to release.\nHere, the findings of fact are different: Judge Weeks found as fact what Judge Rand did not. For example, Judge Weeks\u2019 order granting defendant\u2019s Motion for Appropriate Relief included a heading titled \u201cThe Department of Correction\u2019s historic application of Mr. Bowden\u2019s sentence reduction credits shows: (1) Mr. Bowden received enough credits to unconditionally discharge his sentence on October 13, 2009; and (2) those credits were applied to reduce his unconditional release date.\u201d A finding within that subsection of the order states:\nUpon learning that Mr. Bowden was serving a term of years sentence, the Department of Correction applied and awarded all good, gain, and merit time sentence reduction credits previously earned by Mr. Bowden to reduce Mr. Bowden\u2019s unconditional release date, resulting in a determination that Mr. Bowden\u2019s sentence would expire on October 13, 2009.\nA later portion of the order addresses the subsequent retraction of those awarded and applied credits. A heading in the order is explicitly titled \u201cThe Department of Correction revoked Mr. Bowden\u2019s sentence reduction credits.\u201d A finding of fact within that section then provides:\nThis Court finds that pursuant to [a memorandum issued by the Secretary of Correction], the Department of Correction revoked Mr. Bowden\u2019s sentence reduction credits [including good, gain, and merit time credits], which had previously been awarded to him and applied to reduce his unconditional release date, and recalculated his unconditional release date such that it was reduced only by jail credits. As of the date of the entry of this Order, Mr. Bowden\u2019s unconditional release date as posted on the \u201cOffender Public Information\u201d portion of the North Carolina Department of Correction website is July 23, 2055.\n(Footnote call number omitted.) These findings are fully supported by competent evidence in the record, as detailed in the trial court\u2019s order and noted by the Court of Appeals. In essence, the State argues that defendant Bowden\u2019s credits should not be treated as \u201capplied\u201d because credits accumulated by other inmates were not treated as \u201capplied.\u201d In my view, there is no plausible claim of ambiguity regarding what Judge Weeks determined based on the evidence presented in this case. The facts as found by the trial court are straightforward, and those quoted are joined by many others in the trial court\u2019s forty-six page order.\nHaving carefully reviewed the trial court\u2019s findings, I cannot avoid the conclusion that these binding facts distinguish this case from Jones and place it squarely within the purviews of Wolff and Lynce. The majority\u2019s assertion that \u201c[t]he DOC has never applied these credits toward the calculation of the unconditional release date of a Bowden-class inmate\u201d is simply inconsistent with the record here. Bowden, _N.C. at _, _ S.E.2d at _. Instead of recognizing the long-standing principle that we are bound on appeal by a trial court\u2019s findings of fact when those findings are either unchallenged or supported by competent evidence, the majority has in essence grounded its discussion in facts that it wishes the trial court had found, but did not. The majority has, at a minimum, departed significantly from our well-established approach to review of a trial court\u2019s factual findings.\nBecause the binding findings here establish that sentence reduction credits were actually applied to calculate an unconditional release date for defendant, and when that finding was absent in Jones, our opinion in Jones does not compel the outcome here. And because I conclude that controlling Supreme Court precedents, applied to those findings of fact, require the release of Bobby Bowden, I would affirm the Court of Appeals and the trial court. I respectfully dissent.\nJustice BEASLEY joins in this dissenting opinion.\n. Wolff may have been abrogated in some respects, but not on this point. In fact, the Supreme Court has recently cited Wolff for just this proposition. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 162 L. Ed. 2d 174, 189 (2005) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at OSO-SOS, 41 L. Ed. 2d at 951-52, for the proposition that there is a \u201cliberty interest in avoiding withdrawal of state-created system of good-time credits\u201d)). Accordingly, there is no credible argument that the passage of time, or other doctrinal developments, have lessened our obligation to comply with Wolff.", "type": "dissent", "author": "Justice HUDSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Katherine Jane Allen, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. BOBBY E. BOWDEN\nNo. 514PA08-3\n(Filed 19 December 2014)\nSentencing \u2014 life imprisonment \u2014 credits\u2014never applied for calculation of unconditional release date\nThe trial court erred by concluding that the various credits defendant had accumulated during his incarceration must be applied to reduce his sentence of life imprisonment, thereby entitling him to immediate and unconditional release. Although the Department of Corrections (DOC) has applied these credits towards privileges like obtaining a lower custody grade or earlier parole eligibility, DOC has never applied these credits towards the calculation of an unconditional release date for a Bowdenclass inmate.\nJustice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nJustice HUDSON dissenting.\nJustice BEASLEY joins in the dissenting opinion.\nOn writ of certiorari pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-32(b) of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals,__ N.C. App._, 747 S.E.2d 617 (2013), affirming an order entered on 8 May 2012 by Judge Gregory A. Weeks in Superior Court, Cumberland County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 15 April 2014.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Joseph Finarelli, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nStaples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Katherine Jane Allen, Assistant Appellate Defender, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0680-01", "first_page_order": 720, "last_page_order": 732 }