{ "id": 4323544, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONDELL SUPREME CHILDRESS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Childress", "decision_date": "2014-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 527PA13", "first_page": "693", "last_page": "696", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 N.C. 693" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "753 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "669 S.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "362 N.C. 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4150820 ], "year": 2008, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "531" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/362/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "539 S.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 N.C. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 135796 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/353/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "411 S.E.2d 592", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 557", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2512329 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0557-01" ] }, { "cite": "279 S.E.2d 788", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "802", "parenthetical": "\"Premeditation and deliberation axe seldom susceptible of direct proof, but they may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "303 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 8573792 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "344", "parenthetical": "\"Premeditation and deliberation axe seldom susceptible of direct proof, but they may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.\" (citations omitted)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/303/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 S.E.2d 791", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "794", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 N.C. 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2529092 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758", "parenthetical": "citation omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/335/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "560 S.E.2d 776", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "781", "parenthetical": "alteration in original" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 N.C. 294", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 220055 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301", "parenthetical": "citations omitted" }, { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/355/0294-01" ] }, { "cite": "2013 WL 5947787", "category": "reporters:specialty_west", "reporter": "WL", "weight": 2, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "*5", "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "753 S.E.2d 399", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "unpublished" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 519, "char_count": 8327, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.759608021241926e-08, "percentile": 0.49512693597194274 }, "sha256": "42ba457d3c3bc1f1e76687f9f6b54b817dde83d1919a8fd151124ef6b070e207", "simhash": "1:476ff400540f8c72", "word_count": 1348 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:46.212757+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONDELL SUPREME CHILDRESS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "MARTIN, Chief Justice.\nFrom the safety of a car, defendant drove by Patrice Harney\u2019s home, shouted a phrase used by gang members, and then returned to shoot at her and repeatedly fire bullets into her home when she retreated from his attack. We hold defendant\u2019s actions provided sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to survive a motion to dismiss an attempted murder charge.\nAround two in the morning on 12 August 2010, Patrice Harney was sitting on her front porch talking with her cousin and brother while her three children slept inside. While Patrice and her companions were on the porch, a silver car and a green car drove by. The road was no more than sixty feet from the house in a well-lit area, and Patrice recognized defendant as the driver of the silver car. Someone in the silver car yelled out, \u201c[W]hat\u2019s popping.\u201d Patrice testified the phrase was used by gang members, but she \u201cdidn\u2019t take offense to it\u201d because she was not part of a gang. The cars did not stop at this point. A few minutes later, the silver car returned and came to \u201ca dead stop\u201d in front of Patrice\u2019s house, and defendant rolled down his window and \u201cjust started shooting.\u201d\nAfter Patrice and her cousin saw the gun pointed in their direction, they ran inside the house. Patrice sprinted to her children\u2019s room to pull them onto the floor and shield them from the bullets that were then coming through the walls of the house. Once the shooting stopped, Patrice ran to the front of her home, where police had already arrived. Bullets had pierced the window in front of which Patrice had been sitting and the exterior of the residence. Bullet holes were also found in the children\u2019s room. Between six and twelve shots were fired overall. Before the shooting, Patrice did not have any problem with defendant, and later said she was surprised at what he had done.\nDefendant was apprehended several weeks later. He was subsequently indicted for one count of attempted murder and six counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property. At the close of the State\u2019s evidence, the trial court dismissed one count of discharging a firearm into occupied property. At the close of all evidence, after not having put on any evidence in his defense, defendant moved to dismiss all charges. Specifically, defendant claimed that the State had failed to produce evidence of intent for the attempted murder charge. The trial court denied his motion. The jury found defendant guilty of the remaining five counts of discharging a firearm into occupied property and of attempted first-degree murder. The trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 36 to 53 months for each of the five firearms convictions followed by 185 to 231 months of imprisonment for the attempted murder conviction.\nDefendant appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a unanimous, unpublished opinion, the court concluded that the State had failed to produce sufficient evidence of defendant\u2019s premeditation and deliberation. State v. Childress, _N.C. App. _, 753 S.E.2d 399, 2013 WL 5947787, at *5 (2013) (unpublished). Accordingly, the court held that the trial court\u2019s denial of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss was error and reversed the attempted murder conviction. Id. We allowed the State\u2019s petition for discretionary review of that issue and now reverse.\nWhen considering a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, in the light most favorable to the State and with all reasonable inferences drawn in the State\u2019s favor, there is enough evidence of each essential element of the crime charged to persuade a rational juror that the defendant was the perpetrator. State v. Mann, 355 N.C. 294, 301, 560 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2002) (citations omitted). In this case we consider only whether there was sufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support defendant\u2019s conviction for attempted murder.\n\u201cWe have recognized that it is difficult to prove premeditation and deliberation and that these factors are usually proven by circumstantial evidence because they are mental processes that are not readily susceptible to proof by direct evidence.\u201d State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 758, 440 S.E.2d 791, 794 (1994) (citation omitted); see also State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 344, 279 S.E.2d 788, 802 (1981) (\u201cPremeditation and deliberation axe seldom susceptible of direct proof, but they may be inferred from circumstantial evidence.\u201d (citations omitted)). In the context of a first-degree murder charge, this Court has identified several examples of circumstantial evidence, any one of which may support a finding of the existence of these elusive qualities:\n(1) absence of provocation on the part of the deceased, (2) the statements and conduct of the defendant before and after the killing, (3) threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence giving rise to the death of the deceased, (4) ill will or previous difficulties between the parties, (5) the dealing of lethal blows after the deceased has been felled and rendered helpless, (6) evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner, and (7) the nature and number of the victim\u2019s wounds.\nState v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 565, 411 S.E.2d 592, 596 (1992) (citation omitted); see also State v. Leazer, 353 N.C. 234, 238, 539 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2000) (same). When evaluating the presence of premeditation and deliberation, this Court has additionally considered whether a defendant arrived at the scene of the crime with a weapon and whether a defendant fired multiple shots. State v. Taylor, 362 N.C. 514, 531, 669 S.E.2d 239, 256 (2008). These examples are merely illustrative and are not to be treated as an exhaustive list of factors a jury may use to infer premeditation and deliberation.\nAt least five of the above circumstances are implicated in this case. Considered in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence presented at trial showed that: (1) Patrice did not provoke defendant in any way and was unarmed; (2) defendant drove by Patrice\u2019s home before returning and shooting at her; (3) during this initial drive-by, defendant or a companion in his car yelled out \u201c[W]hat\u2019s popping,\u201d a phrase associated with gang activity that a jury may interpret as a threat; (4) defendant had a firearm with him; and (5) defendant fired multiple shots toward Patrice and her home. A reasonable juror could easily infer from this evidence that defendant drove by Patrice\u2019s home, threatened her, and returned shortly to carry out that threat without any intervening provocation by Patrice. Based on defendant\u2019s actions, a reasonable juror could conclude that defendant shot repeatedly at Patrice and that those shots tracked her movement through her home and into her children\u2019s bedroom. While alternative theories may be possible, \u201c[circumstantial evidence may withstand a motion to dismiss and support a conviction even when the evidence does not rule out every hypothesis of innocence.\u201d Mann, 355 N.C. at 301, 560 S.E.2d at 781 (alteration in original) (citations and quotation marks omitted).\nThe evidence presented supported an inference that defendant deliberately and with premeditation set out to kill Patrice by shooting her on her front porch. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.\nREVERSED.", "type": "majority", "author": "MARTIN, Chief Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Mary Carla Babb, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Staples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Charlesena Elliott Walker and Constance E. Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONDELL SUPREME CHILDRESS\nNo. 527PA13\n(Filed 19 December 2014)\nHomicide \u2014 attempted murder \u2014 motion to dismiss \u2014 sufficiency of evidence\nThe trial court did not err by denying defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss the charge of attempted murder. The evidence supported an inference that defendant deliberately and with premeditation set out to kill the victim by shooting her on her front porch.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous, unpublished decision of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App. _, 753 S.E.2d 399 (2013), finding no error in part and reversing in part judgments entered on 17 July 2012 by Judge Jerry R. Tillett in Superior Court, Pasquotank County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 10 September 2014.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Mary Carla Babb, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nStaples S. Hughes, Appellate Defender, by Charlesena Elliott Walker and Constance E. Widenhouse, Assistant Appellate Defenders, for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0693-01", "first_page_order": 733, "last_page_order": 736 }