{ "id": 4313028, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONDELL LUVELL SANDERS", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Sanders", "decision_date": "2014-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 60A14", "first_page": "716", "last_page": "721", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 N.C. 716" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "753 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "623 S.E.2d 600", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "case_ids": [ 12634713 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" }, { "page": "606", "parenthetical": "determining that the New York offense of second-degree assault is not substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of assault inflicting serious injury because, unlike the North Carolina offense, the New York offense does not require that the defendant cause \"serious\" physical injury" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/se2d/623/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "758 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "762 S.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2014, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "758 S.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "474" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "175 N.C. App. 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8351769 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" }, { "page": "258-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/175/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "687 S.E.2d 518", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hanton, 175 N.C. App. 250, 255, 623 S.E.2d 600, 604 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 N.C. App. 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 4173844 ], "year": 2010, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "671", "parenthetical": "citing State v. Hanton, 175 N.C. App. 250, 255, 623 S.E.2d 600, 604 (2006)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/201/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "595 S.E.2d 804", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "164 N.C. App. 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8896980 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/164/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "710 S.E.2d 9", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 200", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "year": 2011, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "708 S.E.2d 112", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125-26" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "210 N.C. App. 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 3822110 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70-72" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/210/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "715 S.E.2d 867", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2011, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 N.C. App. 54", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. 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App.", "case_ids": [ 11465606 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/130/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "736 S.E.2d 238", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "753 S.E.2d 713", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "717" }, { "page": "716" }, { "page": "717" }, { "page": "719-20", "parenthetical": "Bryant, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-101", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Tenn. Code Ann.", "weight": 8, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 523, "char_count": 13442, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0133349086504843e-07, "percentile": 0.5427503688438978 }, "sha256": "56933142f3d3e5a5e4130458ee2cb1c8dd926e6f9fe0d37573f9871f391046c2", "simhash": "1:e3bd56ba362aaf54", "word_count": 2162 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:46.212757+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONDELL LUVELL SANDERS" ], "opinions": [ { "text": "BEASLEY, Justice. \u2022\nOn 19 November 2009, a jury found Rondell Luvell Sanders (\u201cdefendant\u201d) guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. At sentencing, the trial court awarded sentencing points for defendant\u2019s two prior Tennessee misdemeanor convictions, finding the Tennessee offenses of \u201ctheft of property\u201d and \u201cdomestic assault\u201d to be substantially similar to North Carolina offenses. On appeal, the Court of Appeals remanded the case and instructed the trial court to consider the elements of the offenses, rather than their punishments, when determining substantial similarity. State v. Sanders, _N.C. App. _, 736 S.E.2d 238 (2013). On remand, the trial court considered the elements and determined the Tennessee offenses to be substantially similar to the North Carolina offenses of \u201clarceny\u201d and \u201cassault on a female.\u201d It is from the trial court\u2019s order on remand that defendant presently appeals.\nIn its opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and remanded in part the trial court\u2019s judgment. State v. Sanders,_ N.C. App. _, _, 753 S.E.2d 713, 717 (2014). The court unanimously affirmed the trial court\u2019s determination that the Tennessee offense of \u201ctheft of property\u201d is substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of \u201clarceny.\u201d Id. at_, 753 S.E.2d at 716. The Court of Appeals majority held that the trial court erred in finding the Tennessee offense of \u201cdomestic assault\u201d to be substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of \u201cassault on a female.\u201d Id. at_, 753 S.E.2d at 717. The majority concluded that the elements of the Tennessee offense differed from the North Carolina offense to such an extent that the two offenses were not substantially similar. Id. at _, 743 S.E.2d at 717. The dissent disagreed, and would have held that, because the purposes of the two states\u2019 offenses are similar and because additional evidence in the record would demonstrate that defendant\u2019s conduct would satisfy the elements of the North Carolina offense, the State met its burden of establishing the two offenses\u2019 substantial similarity by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at_, 753 S.E.2d at 719-20 (Bryant, J., dissenting). The State appeals the holding of the Court of Appeals on the basis of the dissent pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2).\nSubsection 15A-1340.14(e) governs the assignment of sentencing points for prior convictions in other jurisdictions and states, in pertinent part, that\n[i]f the State proves by the preponderance of the evidence that an offense classified as a misdemeanor in the other jurisdiction is substantially similar to an offense classified as a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor in North Carolina, the conviction is treated as a Class A1 or Class 1 misdemeanor for assigning prior record level points.\nN.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(e) (2013). This Court has not addressed the comparison of out-of-state offenses with North Carolina offenses for purposes of determining substantial similarity under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(e).\nFirst, the State argues that the trial court did not err in determining the Tennessee offense of \u201cdomestic assault\u201d and the North Carolina offense of \u201cassault on a female\u201d to be substantially similar without reviewing the Tennessee statute defining the offense of \u201cassault.\u201d\nThe Court of Appeals has held that, for purposes of determining \u201csubstantial similarity\u201d under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1340.14(e), a party may establish the elements of an out-of-state offense by providing \u201cevidence of the statute law of such state.\u201d State v. Rich, 130 N.C. App. 113, 117, 502 S.E.2d 49, 52 (citing N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8-3), disc. rev. denied, 349 N.C. 237, 516 S.E.2d 605 (1998). Further, the Court of Appeals has consistently held that when evidence of the applicable law is not presented to the trial court, the party seeking a determination of substantial similarity has failed to meet its burden of establishing substantial similarity by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Burgess, 216 N.C. App. 54, 57-58, 715 S.E.2d 867, 870 (2011) (holding that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of out-of-state convictions\u2019 similarity to North Carolina offenses when, inter alia, the State provided copies of the 2008 version of the applicable out-of-state statutes, but did not present evidence that the statutes were unchanged from the 1993 and 1994 versions under which the defendant had been convicted); State v. Wright, 210 N.C. App. 52, 70-72, 708 S.E.2d 112, 125-26 (holding that when the State did not provide evidence of the New York and Connecticut statutes under which the defendant had been convicted, did not submit copies of the applicable out-of-state statutes, and did not furnish a comparison of the statutes\u2019 provisions with the laws of North Carolina, the State failed to demonstrate the substantial similarity of the out-of-state convictions to North Carolina crimes), disc. rev. denied, 365 N.C. 200, 710 S.E.2d 9 (2011); State v. Morgan, 164 N.C. App. 298, 309, 595 S.E.2d 804, 812 (2004) (holding that the State failed to meet its burden of showing that the defendant\u2019s prior conviction was substantially similar to a North Carolina offense when it offered the 2002 version of the applicable New Jersey statute governing the defendant\u2019s 1987 New Jersey conviction, but failed to present any evidence that the statute was unchanged from 1987 to 2002).\nSection 39-13-111 of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that \u201c[a] person commits domestic assault who commits an assault as defined in \u00a7 39-13-101 against a domestic abuse victim.\u201d Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111(b) (2009). Section 39-13-101 of the Tennessee Code Annotated, in turn, establishes that someone commits an \u201cassault\u201d when he or she: \u201c(1) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes bodily injury to another; (2) Intentionally or knowingly causes another to reasonably fear imminent bodily injury; or (3) Intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another and a reasonable person would regard the contact as extremely offensive or provocative.\u201d Id. \u00a7 39-13-101(a)(l)-(3) (2009). Here the State provided the trial court with a photocopy of the 2009 version of Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111, but did not give the trial court a photocopy of Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-101.\nWe agree with the Court of Appeals that for a party to meet its burden of establishing substantial similarity of an out-of-state offense to a North Carolina offense by the preponderance of the evidence, the party seeking the determination of substantial similarity must provide evidence of the applicable law. We therefore hold that it was error for the trial court to determine that Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111 was substantially similar to a North Carolina offense without reviewing Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-101, which is explicitly referenced by Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111 and defines Tennessee\u2019s statutory elements of assault.\nSecond, the State argues the trial court did not err in its determination that the Tennessee offense of \u201cdomestic assault\u201d and the North Carolina offense of \u201cassault on a female\u201d were substantially similar. The State urges this Court to look beyond the elements of the offenses and consider (1) the underlying facts of defendant\u2019s out-of-state conviction, and (2) whether, considering the legislative purpose of the respective statutes defining the offenses, the North Carolina offense is \u201csuitably equivalent\u201d to the out-of-state offense.\nIn North Carolina, \u201cany person who commits [an] assault\u201d is guilty of a class A1 misdemeanor \u201cif, in the course of the assault, ... he or she . . . [a]ssaults a female, he being a male person at least 18 years of age.\u201d N.C.G.S. \u00a7 14-33(c), (c)(2) (2013). The offense \u201cassault on a female\u201d thus requires that (1) the assailant be male, (2) the assailant be at least eighteen years old, and (3) the victim of the assault be female. Id., \u00a7 14-33(c)(2). The offense does not require that any type of relationship exist between the assailant and the victim.\nIn comparison, a person in Tennessee is guilty of the offense of domestic assault if that person \u201ccommits an assault as defined in \u00a7 39-13-101 against a domestic abuse victim.\u201d Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-lll(b) (2009). Subsection 39-13-lll(a) of the Tennessee statutes specifically defines a \u201cdomestic abuse victim\u201d as \u201cany person who falls within the following categories:\u201d\n(1) Adults or minors who are current or former spouses;\n(2) Adults or minors who live together or who have lived together;\n(3) Adults or minors who are dating or who have dated or who have or had a sexual relationship, but does not include fraternization between two (2) individuals in a business or social context;\n(4) Adults or minors related by blood or adoption;\n(5) Adults or minors who are related or were formerly related by marriage; or\n(6) Adult or minor children of a person in a relationship that is described in subdivisions (a)(l)-(5).\nTenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-lll(a) (2009). The offense thus requires that the person being assaulted fall within at least one of these six enumerated categories of domestic relationships. The offense does not require the victim to be female or the assailant to be male and of a certain age.\nThe Court of Appeals has stated, and we agree, that \u201c[d]etermination of whether the out-of-state conviction is substantially similar to a North Carolina offense is a question of law involving comparison of the elements of the out-of-state offense to those of the North Carolina offense.\u201d State v. Fortney, 201 N.C. App. 662, 671, 687 S.E.2d 518, 525 (2010) (citing State v. Hanton, 175 N.C. App. 250, 255, 623 S.E.2d 600, 604 (2006)). The Court of Appeals has appropriately determined certain offenses to be insufficiently similar by comparing the elements of out-of-state and North Carolina offenses. See, e.g., State v. Hogan,_N.C. App._,_, 758 S.E.2d 465, 474 (concluding that the New Jersey offense of third-degree theft is not substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of misdemeanor larceny \u201c[g]iven the disparity in elements\u201d between the definitions of the two offenses), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, _N.C. _, 762 S.E.2d 465 (2014); Hanton, 175 N.C. App. at 258-59, 623 S.E.2d at 606 (determining that the New York offense of second-degree assault is not substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of assault inflicting serious injury because, unlike the North Carolina offense, the New York offense does not require that the defendant cause \u201cserious\u201d physical injury). After comparing the elements of the Tennessee offense of \u201cdomestic assault\u201d and the North Carolina offense of \u201cassault on a female,\u201d we must conclude that the offenses are not substantially similar. Indeed, a woman assaulting her child or her husband could be convicted of \u201cdomestic assault\u201d in Tennessee, but could not be convicted of \u201cassault on a female\u201d in North Carolina. A male stranger who assaults a woman on the street could be convicted of \u201cassault on a female\u201d in North Carolina, but could not be convicted of \u201cdomestic assault\u201d in Tennessee.\nWe therefore hold that the trial court erred in determining the two offenses to be substantially similar. Accordingly, we affirm the holding of the Court of Appeals on this issue and remand this case to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion.\nAFFIRMED AND REMANDED.\n. This Court denied defendant\u2019s petition for discretionary review of this unanimous holding on 11 June 2014._N.C._, 758 S.E.2d 861 (2014).\n. We note that the 2009 version was not, in fact, the version of the statute actually in force at the time of defendant\u2019s Tennessee conviction. After defendant was convicted on 6 January 2009, the statute was amended to add subsection (c)(3). Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111 (2009) (showing the effective date of the 2009 amendment to Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111 as 1 July 2009).", "type": "majority", "author": "BEASLEY, Justice. \u2022" } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Laura E. Parker, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "W. Michael Spivey for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. RONDELL LUVELL SANDERS\nNo. 60A14\n(Filed 19 December 2014)\n1. Sentencing \u2014 parallel offense in another state \u2014 burden of proof \u2014 producing statutes\nIt was error for the trial court to determine that the Tennessee offense of domestic assault was substantially similar to the North Carolina offense of assault on a female without fully examining the Tennessee statutes. Section 39-13-111 of the Tennessee Code Annotated provides that a person commits domestic assault who commits an assault as defined in \u00a7 39-13-101 against a domestic abuse victim. The State provided the trial court with a photocopy of the 2009 version of Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-111 but not Tenn. Code Ann. \u00a7 39-13-101. The party seeking the determination of substantial similarity must provide evidence of the applicable law.\n2. Sentencing \u2014 prior Tennessee offense \u2014 domestic assault\u2014 no substantial similarity to N.C. assault on a female\nThe offenses of domestic assault in Tennessee and assault on a female in North Carolina were not substantially similar for sentencing purposes.\nAppeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals,_N.C. App._, 753 S.E.2d 713 (2014), affirming in part and remanding for resentencing in part a judgment entered on 15 February 2013 by Judge Wayland J. Sermons, Jr. in Superior Court, Beaufort County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 18 November 2014.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Laura E. Parker, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nW. Michael Spivey for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0716-01", "first_page_order": 756, "last_page_order": 761 }