{ "id": 4327597, "name": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT TIMOTHY WALSTON, SR.", "name_abbreviation": "State v. Walston", "decision_date": "2014-12-19", "docket_number": "No. 392PA13", "first_page": "721", "last_page": "732", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 N.C. 721" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "N.C.", "id": 9292, "name": "Supreme Court of North Carolina" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 5, "name_long": "North Carolina", "name": "N.C." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "747 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2013, "opinion_index": -1 }, { "cite": "522 U.S. 900", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11525121, 11525092, 11524710, 11524582, 11524807, 11525031, 11524847, 11524689, 11524884, 11524761, 11524635, 11524924, 11524734, 11524959 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/522/0900-14", "/us/522/0900-13", "/us/522/0900-04", "/us/522/0900-01", "/us/522/0900-07", "/us/522/0900-12", "/us/522/0900-08", "/us/522/0900-03", "/us/522/0900-09", "/us/522/0900-06", "/us/522/0900-02", "/us/522/0900-10", "/us/522/0900-05", "/us/522/0900-11" ] }, { "cite": "519 U.S. 896", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11652003, 11652037, 11652199, 11651912, 11652155, 11652234, 11652362, 11652271, 11652081, 11651967, 11652123, 11652316, 11651935 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/519/0896-04", "/us/519/0896-05", "/us/519/0896-09", "/us/519/0896-01", "/us/519/0896-08", "/us/519/0896-10", "/us/519/0896-13", "/us/519/0896-11", "/us/519/0896-06", "/us/519/0896-03", "/us/519/0896-07", "/us/519/0896-12", "/us/519/0896-02" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1167", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9787808, 9788992, 9789122, 9788188, 9787934, 9788430, 9788718, 9787538, 9789235, 9788565, 9788053, 9788309, 9788860, 9787676, 9787422 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1167-04", "/us/531/1167-13", "/us/531/1167-14", "/us/531/1167-07", "/us/531/1167-05", "/us/531/1167-09", "/us/531/1167-11", "/us/531/1167-02", "/us/531/1167-15", "/us/531/1167-10", "/us/531/1167-06", "/us/531/1167-08", "/us/531/1167-12", "/us/531/1167-03", "/us/531/1167-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 U.S. 948", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 231682, 233093, 235270, 233531, 235692, 232590, 231374, 230994, 230899, 232630, 234584, 234875, 235740, 233052 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/510/0948-14", "/us/510/0948-04", "/us/510/0948-12", "/us/510/0948-11", "/us/510/0948-13", "/us/510/0948-10", "/us/510/0948-08", "/us/510/0948-09", "/us/510/0948-01", "/us/510/0948-06", "/us/510/0948-07", "/us/510/0948-02", "/us/510/0948-03", "/us/510/0948-05" ] }, { "cite": "531 U.S. 1019", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9679139, 9679395, 9679434, 9679118, 9679470, 9679312, 9679215, 9679186, 9679283, 9679251, 9679351, 9679101, 9679165, 9679069 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/531/1019-04", "/us/531/1019-12", "/us/531/1019-13", "/us/531/1019-03", "/us/531/1019-14", "/us/531/1019-10", "/us/531/1019-07", "/us/531/1019-06", "/us/531/1019-09", "/us/531/1019-08", "/us/531/1019-11", "/us/531/1019-02", "/us/531/1019-05", "/us/531/1019-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 1006", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1330529, 1332356, 1330884, 1335114, 1332012, 1330701, 1332079, 1330544, 1333073, 1334483, 1335603, 1332603, 1332790, 1332535, 1332666, 1335835 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/1006-07", "/us/513/1006-08", "/us/513/1006-05", "/us/513/1006-06", "/us/513/1006-01", "/us/513/1006-15", "/us/513/1006-02", "/us/513/1006-10", "/us/513/1006-11", "/us/513/1006-14", "/us/513/1006-13", "/us/513/1006-16", "/us/513/1006-12", "/us/513/1006-09", "/us/513/1006-03", "/us/513/1006-04" ] }, { "cite": "445 S.E.2d 18", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "22" }, { "page": "22" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2536933 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "565-66" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 L. 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Ct.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "507 U.S. 924", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6320448, 6319744, 6319556, 6317832, 6320936, 6319018, 6318187, 6319180, 6320236, 6320654, 6318735, 6321233, 6318451, 6317622, 6319356 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/507/0924-12", "/us/507/0924-10", "/us/507/0924-09", "/us/507/0924-02", "/us/507/0924-14", "/us/507/0924-06", "/us/507/0924-03", "/us/507/0924-07", "/us/507/0924-11", "/us/507/0924-13", "/us/507/0924-05", "/us/507/0924-15", "/us/507/0924-04", "/us/507/0924-01", "/us/507/0924-08" ] }, { "cite": "417 S.E.2d 765", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "777" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 N.C. 387", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2502221 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/331/0387-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 S.E.2d 786", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 N.C. 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4715685 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31", "parenthetical": "citation and quotation marks omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/315/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 S.E.2d 753", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "760" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "365 N.C. 468", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4153898 ], "year": 2012, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "478" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/365/0468-01" ] }, { "cite": "136 L. Ed. 2d 170", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "117 S. Ct. 241", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "467 S.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "666" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 N.C. 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 795906 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/342/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 997", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 1131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "536 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "29", "parenthetical": "approving of jury instructions that followed the pattern instructions \"almost verbatim\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "352 N.C. 227", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 685065 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275", "parenthetical": "approving of jury instructions that followed the pattern instructions \"almost verbatim\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/352/0227-01" ] }, { "cite": "142 L. Ed. 2d 216", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "119 S. Ct. 263", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "525 U.S. 915", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11124480, 11124386, 11124611, 11124518, 11124424, 11124587, 11124376, 11124398, 11124564, 11124503, 11124440, 11124409, 11124540, 11124350 ], "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/525/0915-08", "/us/525/0915-03", "/us/525/0915-14", "/us/525/0915-10", "/us/525/0915-06", "/us/525/0915-13", "/us/525/0915-02", "/us/525/0915-04", "/us/525/0915-12", "/us/525/0915-09", "/us/525/0915-07", "/us/525/0915-05", "/us/525/0915-11", "/us/525/0915-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 S.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 N.C. 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1659874 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "119" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/348/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "447 S.E.2d 409", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 613", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2534887, 2535410, 2535795, 2535349, 2538587 ], "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0613-03", "/nc/336/0613-01", "/nc/336/0613-04", "/nc/336/0613-02", "/nc/336/0613-05" ] }, { "cite": "437 S.E.2d 906", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "909" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "113 N.C. App. 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 8521659 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/113/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "533 S.E.2d 476", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "350 N.C. 105", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 132192, 132017, 132126, 132186, 132030 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/350/0105-04", "/nc/350/0105-05", "/nc/350/0105-02", "/nc/350/0105-01", "/nc/350/0105-03" ] }, { "cite": "506 S.E.2d 738", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743", "parenthetical": "\"[E]vidence of defendant's general psychological make-up is not pertinent to the commission of a sexual assault.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 N.C. App. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C. App.", "case_ids": [ 11198977 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293", "parenthetical": "\"[E]vidence of defendant's general psychological make-up is not pertinent to the commission of a sexual assault.\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc-app/131/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 S.E.2d 710", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2014, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718-19" }, { "page": "718-19" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 S.E.2d 654", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "320 N.C. 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 4726570 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/320/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 S.E.2d 861", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "870", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "330 N.C. 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2508466 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "289-90", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/330/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "422 S.E.2d 692", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "703", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "332 N.C. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2504164 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "507", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/332/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "126 L. Ed. 2d 341", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 S. Ct. 392", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "428 S.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "333 N.C. 350", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2549203 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "384" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/333/0350-01" ] }, { "cite": "148 L. Ed. 2d 498", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "121 S. Ct. 582", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "528 S.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 N.C. 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 1155711 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/351/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 S.E.2d 191", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "194", "parenthetical": "ruling that character evidence inadmissible under Rule 404(a)(1) \"focused on factual information about defendant's behavior and appearance rather than pertinent traits of his character\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 170", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54151 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174", "parenthetical": "ruling that character evidence inadmissible under Rule 404(a)(1) \"focused on factual information about defendant's behavior and appearance rather than pertinent traits of his character\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0170-01" ] }, { "cite": "481 S.E.2d 641", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "647", "parenthetical": "citation, emphases, and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "647" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 N.C. 585", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 54138 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "596", "parenthetical": "citation, emphases, and quotation marks omitted" }, { "page": "596" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/345/0585-01" ] }, { "cite": "130 L. Ed. 2d 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "115 S. Ct. 525", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "444 S.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "901" }, { "page": "901", "parenthetical": "requiring that Rule 404(a)(1) be restrictively construed" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 N.C. 321", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2537586 ], "weight": 2, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "360" }, { "page": "360" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/336/0321-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 S.E.2d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(1) (1988)" }, { "page": "752", "parenthetical": "holding that \"the traits of truthfulness and honesty are not 'pertinent' ... to the crime of trafficking in marijuana\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 N.C. 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2486024 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201", "parenthetical": "quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(1) (1988)" }, { "page": "202" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/324/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 L. Ed. 168", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "173-74", "parenthetical": "internal citations and footnotes omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "335 U.S. 469", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6159942 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475-76", "parenthetical": "internal citations and footnotes omitted" }, { "page": "218-19", "parenthetical": "internal citations and footnotes omitted" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/335/0469-01" ] }, { "cite": "2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1048", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "N.C. Sess. Laws", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 S.E.2d 354", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "357" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "357" }, { "page": "358", "parenthetical": "noting that generally the trait of being law-abiding is a relevant character trait" }, { "page": "358" }, { "page": "357" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "321 N.C. 541", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.C.", "case_ids": [ 2568804 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" }, { "page": "547" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "548" }, { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nc/321/0541-01" ] }, { "cite": "747 S.E.2d 720", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.E.2d", "weight": 18, "year": 2013, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "724" }, { "page": "725-26" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "726, 728" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1098, "char_count": 27678, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.6886446490175793e-07, "percentile": 0.6987032834732836 }, "sha256": "56ac058fd66cda383ce71957b0ae98122d6fb3ac4a080e893f9947cd320e3552", "simhash": "1:8777f438070d8cfc", "word_count": 4653 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T22:06:46.212757+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "Justice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case." ], "parties": [ "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT TIMOTHY WALSTON, SR." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "NEWBY, Justice.\nIn this case we consider the admissibility of evidence of a pertinent character trait of a criminal defendant under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1). For character evidence to be admissible at trial under Rule 404(a)(1), an accused must \u201ctailor the evidence to a particular trait that is relevant to an issue in the case.\u201d State v. Squire, 321 N.C. 541, 546, 364 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1988). Defendant\u2019s proffered evidence of being respectful towards children was not sufficiently tailored to the State\u2019s charges of child sexual abuse and was thus inadmissible. Separately, we consider the extent to which, if at all, use of the word \u201cvictim\u201d in a trial court\u2019s jury charge amounts to prejudicial error. Based on long-standing precedent, the trial court\u2019s use of the term \u201cvictim\u201d was not impermissible commentary on a disputed issue of fact. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying defendant\u2019s request to use the words \u201calleged victim\u201d instead of \u201cvictim\u201d in its charge to the jury. Accordingly, on both issues we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.\nThis case arose from incidents that occurred in 1988 and 1989 between defendant and the prosecuting witnesses, E.C. and J.C., sisters who at the time of the incidents were about seven and four years old, respectively. During the relevant period, defendant\u2019s wife operated an at-home day care where she watched E.C., J.C., and their younger brother in addition to her own three children. According to the State\u2019s evidence, on several occasions defendant sexually abused the prosecuting witnesses individually, with each child being unaware that the other had been abused. Apparently, at some point several years later, J.C. and E.C.\u2019s mother became concerned that her daughters had been abused. As a result, in 1994 E.C. and J.C. were interviewed by a social services worker and two sheriff\u2019s deputies. In those interviews both girls denied having been abused. No physical exams were conducted at that time, and the sheriff\u2019s office concluded that nothing in the interviews indicated any type of sexual assault.\nIn 2001, for the first time, E.C. and J.C. confided in each other and their parents that defendant had abused them. Seven years later, J.C. contacted law enforcement to report the incidents; officers subsequently reached E.C., who detailed similar incidents of her own. In January 2009 defendant was indicted on two counts of first-degree sex offense with a child, five counts of first-degree rape of a child, and seven counts of taking indecent liberties with a child. Superseding indictments were filed on 14 November 2011.\nThe State\u2019s evidence at trial relied almost exclusively on the testimony of E.C. and J.C. The State also called witness K.B., who testified under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 404(b) regarding alleged incidents of sexual abuse involving defendant when she was approximately ten and defendant was eighteen. Defendant took the stand in his own defense and also sought to introduce witness testimony regarding his good character. Defense counsel summarized the character witnesses\u2019 proposed testimony in a voir dire proffer, stating that each witness would testify to defendant\u2019s traits of (1) being law-abiding, (2) having good character, and (3) being respectful towards children. The trial court ruled that the testimony regarding defendant\u2019s law-abiding character trait would be admissible, but that testimony about the other two traits was prohibited as a matter of law.\nAt another point in the trial, defendant proffered Dr. Moira Artigues\u2019s voir dire expert testimony on repressed and suggested memories, which the trial court prohibited in all respects. During the jury instruction conference, defendant unsuccessfully sought to have the word \u201cvictim\u201d changed to \u201calleged victim\u201d in the pattern jury instructions used by the trial court. The jury found defendant guilty of one count of first-degree sexual offense, three counts of first-degree rape, and five counts of taking indecent liberties with a minor. Defendant appealed.\nDefendant raised, inter alia, three issues on appeal. Defendant first argued that the trial court erred in prohibiting witness testimony about his character under Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1). State v. Walston,_N.C. App._,_, 747 S.E.2d 720, 724 (2013). The Court of Appeals agreed, concluding that the trait of being respectful towards children was relevant and admissible under the rule. Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 725-26. As to defendant\u2019s second issue on appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that the trial court erred in not substituting \u201calleged victim\u201d for the word \u201cvictim\u201d in the pattern jury instructions. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 726. According to the Court of Appeals, the use of the word \u201cvictim\u201d \u201cintimate [d] the trial court\u2019s belief that E.C. and J.C. were sexually assaulted,\u201d which was \u201ca disputed issue of fact for the jury to resolve.\u201d Id. at _, 747 S.E.2d at 727. Given that the State\u2019s and defendant\u2019s evidence \u201cwere in equipoise,\u201d id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 728, the Court of Appeals ordered a new trial because \u201cthe jury reasonably might have reached a different verdict\u201d had either of the trial court\u2019s errors not occurred, id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 726, 728; see N.C.G.S. \u00a7 15A-1443(a) (2013). Lastly, defendant contended that the trial court erroneously excluded his proposed expert testimony on repressed and suggested memory under North Carolina Rule of Evidence 702. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 728. The Court of Appeals determined that the trial court incorrectly relied on an earlier version of Rule 702 in arriving at its conclusion. Id. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 728. Rule 702 was amended in 2011. See Act of June 17, 2011, ch. 283, sec. 1.3, 2011 N.C. Sess. Laws 1048, 1049. The amended version applies to actions \u201ccommenced on or after\u201d 1 October 2011. Id. at sec. 4.2, at 1051. Concluding that the \u201ctrigger date\u201d for applying the new statute predated 14 November 2011, the date of the superseding indictments, the Court of Appeals instructed the trial court, on retrial, to apply the newly-amended rule. Walston, ._N.C. App. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 728.\nIn response to the Court of Appeals\u2019 holdings regarding the Rule 404(a)(1) character evidence and the use of the word \u201cvictim\u201d in the jury instructions, the State petitioned this Court for discretionary review, which we allowed.\nWe first consider the State\u2019s contention that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that defendant should have been allowed to introduce evidence of his being respectful towards children under Rule 404(a)(1). We agree with the State that such character evidence was not sufficiently tailored to a relevant issue at trial to satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 404(a)(1).\nA jury\u2019s perception of a defendant\u2019s character can have a strong impact on its determination of the defendant\u2019s innocence or guilt. As a result, our legislature has crafted specific rules to control the admission of character evidence at trial. See N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rules 404, 405 (2013). Effective 1 July 1984, Rule 404 governs the content of admissible character evidence and the contexts in which it may be admitted. Rule 404(a) is a general rule of exclusion, stating that \u201c[e]vidence of a person\u2019s character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion.\u201d Id. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a). The rule\u2019s federal counterpart uses substantially the same language. Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1). The rule is of \u201cfundamental importance in American law,\u201d implementing \u201cthe philosophy that a defendant should not be convicted because he is an unsavory person, nor because of past misdeeds, but only because of his guilt of the particular crime charged.\u201d 1 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence \u00a7 4:21 at 677 (4th ed. 2013). As the United States Supreme Court stated in Michelson v. United States:\nCourts that follow the common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to any kind of evidence of a defendant\u2019s evil character to establish a probability of his guilt. Not that the law invests the defendant with a presumption of good character, but it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution\u2019s case-in-chief. The state may not show defendant\u2019s prior trouble with the law, specific criminal acts, or ill name among his neighbors, even though such facts might logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the crime. The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.\n335 U.S. 469, 475-76, 69 S. Ct. 213, 218-19, 93 L. Ed. 168, 173-74 (1948) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).\nDefendants in criminal cases, however, may utilize an exception under Rule 404(a) that \u201cpermits the accused to offer evidence of a \u2018pertinent trait of his character\u2019 as circumstantial proof of-his innocence.\u201d State v. Bogle, 324 N.C. 190, 201, 376 S.E.2d 745, 751 (1989) (quoting N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(1) (1988)). This exception should be \u201crestrictively construed\u201d though because \u201cRule 404(a), as a general rule, excludes character evidence.\u201d State v. Sexton, 336 N.C. 321, 360, 444 S.E.2d 879, 901 (citation and quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1006, 115 S. Ct. 525, 130 L. Ed. 2d 429 (1994). Thus, even though the term \u201cpertinent\u201d is synonymous with the word \u201crelevant,\u201d State v. Squire, 321 N.C. at 547, 364 S.E.2d at 358, for a trait to be pertinent under Rule 404(a)(1), it \u201cmust bear a special relationship to or be involved in the crime charged,\u201d State v. Laws, 345 N.C. 585, 596, 481 S.E.2d 641, 647 (1997) (citation, emphases, and quotation marks omitted). In other words, to have evidence of his good character admitted at trial under Rule 404(a)(1), the accused must \u201ctailor the evidence to a particular trait that is relevant to an issue in the case.\u201d Squire, 321 N.C. at 546, 364 S.E.2d at 357.\nOur past application of Rule 404(a)(1) has not been so narrow as to preclude evidence of a more generalized character trait such as being law-abiding. See id. at 546, 364 S.E.2d at 357. We have, however, consistently required the accused to conform the character evidence to relevant traits, such as honesty for a defendant charged with embezzlement, or peacefulness for a defendant charged with a crime of violence. See, e.g., State v. Collins, 345 N.C. 170, 174, 478 S.E.2d 191, 194 (1996) (ruling that character evidence inadmissible under Rule 404(a)(1) \u201cfocused on factual information about defendant\u2019s behavior and appearance rather than pertinent traits of his character\u201d); Bogle, 324 N.C. at 202, 376 S.E.2d at 752 (holding that \u201cthe traits of truthfulness and honesty are not \u2018pertinent\u2019 ... to the crime of trafficking in marijuana\u201d); Squire, 321 N.C. at 548, 364 S.E.2d at 358 (noting that generally the trait of being law-abiding is a relevant character trait); see also State v. Roseboro, 351 N.C. 536, 553, 528 S.E.2d 1, 12 (noting, in defendant\u2019s trial for first-degree murder, that testimony about the defendant\u2019s reputation for \u201cnonviolence or peacefulness\u201d was admitted as \u201ca pertinent trait of his character\u201d), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1019, 121 S. Ct. 582, 148 L. Ed. 2d 498 (2000); State v. Syriani, 333 N.C. 350, 384, 428 S.E.2d 118, 136 (same), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 948, 114 S. Ct. 392, 126 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1993); State v. Cummings, 332 N.C. 487, 507, 422 S.E.2d 692, 703 (1992) (same); State v. Garner, 330 N.C. 273, 289-90, 410 S.E.2d 861, 870 (1991) (same); State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 70, 357 S.E.2d 654, 658 (1987) (same); State v. Clapp,_N.C. App._,_,761 S.E.2d 710, 718-19 (2014) (concluding, in defendant\u2019s trial for sexual offenses against a 13, 14, or 15 year old child, that evidence defendant worked well with children and did not have an unnatural lust to have sexual relations with children was not pertinent and was \u201cnothing more than an attestation to Defendant\u2019s normalcy\u201d); State v. Wagoner, 131 N.C. App. 285, 293, 506 S.E.2d 738, 743 (1998) (\u201c[E]vidence of defendant\u2019s general psychological make-up is not pertinent to the commission of a sexual assault.\u201d) (internal quotation marks omitted), disc. rev. denied, 350 N.C. 105, 533 S.E.2d 476 (1999); State v. Mustafa, 113 N.C. App. 240, 246, 437 S.E.2d 906, 909 (determining that evidence of the defendant\u2019s good military record was not pertinent to a charge of rape), cert, denied, 336 N.C. 613, 447 S.E.2d 409 (1994). Applying the aforementioned principles, we now determine if defendant\u2019s evidence in the present case satisfied the requirements of Rule 404(a)(1).\nIn his proffer of character witness testimony to the court, defendant\u2019s counsel asserted three potentially pertinent traits to which the witnesses would attest: (1) defendant\u2019s good character; (2) defendant\u2019s law-abiding nature; and (3) defendant\u2019s respect towards children. We conclude, and defendant does not dispute, that the trial court correctly prohibited testimony of defendant\u2019s general character under Rule 404(a). We also conclude that testimony about defendant\u2019s law-abiding character trait was properly allowed under Rule 404(a)(1). See Squire, 321 N.C. at 548, 364 S.E.2d at 358. As to the last trait, we hold that the trial court did not err in prohibiting evidence of defendant\u2019s respectful attitude towards children. Being respectful towards children does not bear a special relationship to the charges of child sexual abuse, Laws, 345 N.C. at 596, 481 S.E.2d at 647, nor is the proposed trait sufficiently tailored to those charges, Squire, 321 N.C. at 546, 364 S.E.2d at 357. Having a respectful or thoughtful attitude towards children does not preclude a defendant from sexually abusing them. Sexton, 336 N.C. at 360, 444 S.E.2d at 901 (requiring that Rule 404(a)(1) be restrictively construed). Such evidence would only be relevant if defendant were accused in some way of being disrespectful towards children or if defendant had demonstrated further in his proffer that a person who is respectful is less likely to be a sexual predator. Defendant provided no evidence that there was a correlation between the two or that the trait of respectfulness has any bearing on a person\u2019s tendency to sexually abuse children. As detailed above, our case law has repeatedly held that peacefulness is a pertinent trait with regards to alleged acts of violence (under which defendant\u2019s charges would fall) and that truthfulness is admissible as a pertinent trait when defendant is charged with crimes involving dishonesty. Defendant cites no case law from our appellate courts in which we found traits similar to respectfulness towards children to be pertinent. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals recently determined in State v. Clapp that the defendant\u2019s trait of \u201cworking well with children\u201d was not pertinent under Rule 404(a)(1) when the defendant was charged with child sexual offenses._N.C. App. at _, 761 S.E.2d at 718-19. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in the present case in overturning the trial court\u2019s ruling on this issue.\nThe State also contends that there was no error in the trial court\u2019s use of the pattern jury instructions that include the term \u201cvictim.\u201d At trial, counsel for defendant objected to the trial court\u2019s use of the pattern jury instructions and requested that the court substitute the phrase \u201calleged victim\u201d for \u201cvictim\u201d when giving the jury charge. The trial court did not modify the pattern instructions and instructed the jury, in relevant part, as follows, in accordance with North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, 207.15.1 and 207.45.1:\nFirst degree sexual offense. The defendant has been charged with two counts, two charges of first degree sexual offense. For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense, the State must prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFirst, that the defendant engaged in a sexual act with the victim. A sexual act means fellatio, which is any touching by the lips or tongue of one person and the male sex organ of another, or any penetration, however slight, by an object into the genital opening of a person\u2019s body.\nSecond, that at the time of the acts alleged the victim was a child under the age of 13.\nAnd third, that at the time of the alleged offense the defendant was at least 12 years old and was at least four years older than the victim. Now if you find, from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant engaged in a sexual act with the victim, \u00c9.C., in the living room area of the defendant\u2019s house by inserting his finger into her vagina and that at that time the victim was a child under the age of 13 years, and that the defendant was at least 12 years old, and was at least four years older than the victim, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\nAlso, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant engaged in a sexual act with the victim, J.C., in the defendant\u2019s bedroom by having the victim place his penis in her mouth, and that at the time the victim was a child under the age of 13 years, and that the defendant was at least 12 years old and was at least four years older than the victim, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty.\nIf you do not so find or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\nFirst degree rape. The defendant has been charged with three counts of first degree rape. For you to find the defendant guilty of this offense the State must prove three things beyond a reasonable doubt.\nFirst, that the defendant engaged in vaginal intercourse with the victim. Vaginal intercourse is penetration, however slight, of the female sex organ by the male sex organ. The actual emission of semen is not necessary. It is not necessary that the vagina be entered or that the hymen be ruptured. The entering of the labia is sufficient to establish this element.\nSecond, at the time of the acts alleged the victim was a child under the age of 13 years.\nAnd third, that at the time of the acts alleged the defendant was at least 12 years old and was at least four years older than the victim.\nSo if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant engaged in vaginal intercourse with the victim, J.C., in the defendant\u2019s car and that at the time the victim was a child under the age of 13 years, and that the defendant was at least 12 years old and was at least four years older than the victim, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find or have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it would be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\nIf you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant engaged in vaginal intercourse with the victim, J.C., in the bathroom of the defendant\u2019s home and that at that time the victim was a child under the age of 13 years and that the defendant was at least 12 years old and was at least four years older than the victim, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find or if you have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\nNow if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about the alleged date the defendant engaged in vaginal intercourse with the victim, J.C., in the second bedroom of the defendant\u2019s home and that at that time the victim was a child under the age of 13 years, and that the defendant was at least 12 years old, and was at least four years older than the victim, it would be your duty to return a verdict of guilty. If you do not so find or have a reasonable doubt as to one or more of these things, it will be your duty to return a verdict of not guilty.\nSee 1 N.C.P.L-Crim. 207.15.1, 207.45.1 (Jan. 2002) (emphases added).\nThe Court of Appeals determined that the trial court erred in using the word \u201cvictim\u201d instead of \u201calleged victim\u201d in the jury instructions because whether the prosecuting witnesses were victimized \u201cwas a disputed issue of fact for the jury to resolve,\u201d given the lack of physical evidence. Walston,_N.C. App. at_, 747 S.E.2d at 727. The State insists that the Court of Appeals\u2019 conclusion is contrary to our long-standing precedent. We agree.\nThe jury charge is one of the most critical parts of a criminal trial. \u201cPattern\u201d jury instructions have existed for years, compiled as trial court judges individually developed effective, appeals-tested instructions and informally shared them with each other. 1 N.C.P.L-Crim. Intro. 3-4 (2014). That process was formalized in North Carolina in the 1960s when the North Carolina Conference of Superior Court Judges appointed a committee of trial court judges to systematically draft pattern jury instructions to be used across the state. Id. at 4. The first edition of the North Carolina Pattern Jury Instructions was published for public use in 1973. Id. at 5. Since then, subsequent committees have continued the meticulous work of refining and revising the pattern instructions to reflect changes in both the general statutes and case law. Id.\nThough the pattern instructions have \u201cneither the force nor the effect of law,\u201d State v. Warren, 348 N.C. 80, 119, 499 S.E.2d 431, 453, cert. denied, 525 U.S. 915, 119 S. Ct. 263, 142 L. Ed. 2d 216 (1998), we have often approved of jury instructions that are consistent with the pattern instructions, see, e.g., State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 275, 536 S.E.2d 1, 29 (2000) (approving of jury instructions that followed the pattern instructions \u201calmost verbatim\u201d), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1167, 121 S. Ct. 1131, 148 L. Ed. 2d 997 (2001); State v. DeCastro, 342 N.C. 667, 693, 467 S.E.2d 653, 666 (holding that instructions \u201cvirtually identical\u201d to the pattern jury instructions were a correct statement of the law), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 896, 117 S. Ct. 241, 136 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1996). Those holdings reflect the continual efforts of the pattern jury instructions committees to draft instructions consistent with \u201cthe long-standing, published understanding\u201d of our case law and statutes. Stark v. Ford Motor Co., 365 N.C. 468, 478, 723 S.E.2d 753, 760 (2012). That being said, in giving jury instructions, \u201cthe court is not required to follow any particular form,\u201d as long as the instruction adequately explains \u201ceach essential element of the offense.\u201d State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 31, 337 S.E.2d 786, 803 (1985) (citation and quotation marks omitted).\nThe term \u201cvictim\u201d appears frequently in our state\u2019s pattern jury instructions. Unsurprisingly, this is not the first time we have addressed whether use of the term in jury instructions is error. In State v. Hill, we concluded that use of the term \u201cvictim\u201d was not improper and was not \u201cintimating that the defendant committed the crime.\u201d 331 N.C. 387, 411, 417 S.E.2d 765, 777 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924, 113 S. Ct. 1293, 122 L. Ed. 2d 684 (1993). We made the same observation in State v. Gaines. 345 N.C. 647, 675, 483 S.E.2d 396, 413, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 900, 118 S. Ct. 248, 139 L. Ed. 2d 177 (1997). In State v. McCarroll, in which a defendant was charged with several child sexual abuse counts, we considered the defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s use of the term \u201cvictim\u201d in the jury charge was prejudicial when referring to the thirteen-year-old prosecuting witness. 336 N.C. 559, 565-66, 445 S.E.2d 18, 22 (1994). Observing that \u201c[t]he judge properly placed the burden of proof on the State\u201d in his instructions, we determined the trial court did not commit plain error in its use of the word \u201cvictim\u201d in that case. Id. at 566, 445 S.E.2d at 22.\nAccordingly, we hold in this case that the trial court did not err in using the word \u201cvictim\u201d in the pattern jury instructions to describe the complaining witnesses. We stress, however, when the State offers no physical evidence of injury to the complaining witnesses and no corroborating eyewitness testimony, the best practice would be for the trial court to modify the pattern jury instructions at defendant\u2019s request to use the phrase \u201calleged victim\u201d or \u201cprosecuting witness\u201d instead of \u201cvictim.\u201d As the pattern jury instructions themselves note, \u201call pattern instructions should be carefully read and adaptations made, if necessary, before anv instruction is given to the iurv.\u201d 1 N.C.P.I.-Crim. at xix (\u201c.Guide to the Use of this Book\u201d) (2014).\nThe trial court was correct in concluding that defendant\u2019s character evidence of his respectful attitude towards children was inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1). Such testimony was not tailored to a pertinent trait of defendant\u2019s character. So too, the trial court\u2019s use of the word \u201cvictim\u201d in the jury instructions was not error. It was improper for the Court of Appeals to order a new trial based on these two issues. On remand the Court of Appeals should address fully whether the trial court\u2019s application of the former expert witness standard was prejudicial error. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.\nREVERSED AND REMANDED.\nJustice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "NEWBY, Justice." } ], "attorneys": [ "Roy Cooper, Attorney General, by Sherri Homer Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.", "Mark Montgomery for defendant-appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. ROBERT TIMOTHY WALSTON, SR.\nNo. 392PA13\n(Filed 19 December 2014)\n1. Evidence \u2014 good character \u2014 respectful towards children\u2014 not sufficiently tailored to charges \u2014 child sexual abuse\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree sexual offense, multiple first-degree rape, and multiple taking indecent liberties with a minor case by denying defendant\u2019s request to introduce evidence of his being respectful towards children under N.C.G.S. \u00a7 8C-1, Rule 404(a)(1). Defendant\u2019s proffered evidence was not sufficiently tailored to the State\u2019s charges of child sexual abuse.\n2. Jury \u2014 jury charge \u2014 use of word \u201cvictim\u201d \u2014 not impermissible commentary\nThe trial court did not err in a first-degree sexual offense, multiple first-degree rape, and multiple taking indecent liberties with a minor case by denying defendant\u2019s request to use the words \u201calleged victim\u201d instead of \u201cvictim\u201d in its charge to the jury to describe the complaining witnesses. The trial court\u2019s use of the term \u201cvictim\u201d was not impermissible commentary on a disputed issue of fact.\nJustice HUNTER did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.\nOn discretionary review pursuant to N.C.G.S. \u00a7 7A-31 of a unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals, _ N.C. App. _,, 747 S.E.2d 720 (2013), finding prejudicial error in defendant\u2019s trial resulting in judgments entered on 17 February 2012 by Judge Cy A. Grant in Superior Court, Dare County, and ordering that defendant receive a new trial. Heard in the Supreme Court on 9 September 2014.\nRoy Cooper, Attorney General, by Sherri Homer Lawrence, Assistant Attorney General, for the State-appellant.\nMark Montgomery for defendant-appellee." }, "file_name": "0721-01", "first_page_order": 761, "last_page_order": 772 }